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PREFACE

In making this volume of ' ' Selected Cases on the Law of Bail-

ments and Carriers," the guiding principle has been to secure

the clearest and fullest statement and application of every lead-

ing principle of the subject within the range of a moderate

sized book.

The important cases, especially on the law of Carriers, are so

many as to make it impossible to include all the leading cases.

Moreover, the law of Carriers is such a very modern thing as

to make it desirable to include many cases too recent to be

considered leading cases. Accordingly, an effort has been made

to include all the greatest cases, even those of considerable

length, and such others as, because of their broad scope, recent

date or clear statements of principles, seem to fully cover the

subjects of this branch of the law. The Selected Cases are in-

tended to be complete enough to fit the book for use by those

who prefer the "case-method" of study exclusively.

A considerable portion of the cases are chosen from those re-

ported in the American Decisions, American Reports or Ameri-

can State Reports, both because these cases are in general well
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suited to the purpose, and because this plan brings to the atten-

tion of the student the exhaustive notes of the editors of those

series of cases. To these are added leading Federal and English

cases, as well as some others that seem especially desirable.

In general the opinions are presented in full. In some in-

stances, however, portions are omitted, because they have no

bearing in bailment law, or contain references to cases printed

elsewhere in the volume. Such omissions are always indicated.

The cases are not edited, and but few cross-references are made.

'-iG-^^oSS

iv PREFACE.

Those who wish to find all the material on a given topic can do

so by use of the index and of the companion volume, "Outlines

of the Law of Bailments and Carriers," which corresponds chap-

ter for chapter to this volume, and contains citations to all the

Selected Cases. In this volume no other indication of the sub-

ject of any case is given than the general chapter heading. The

student will best acquire the power of analysis, and ability to

see and grasp the \4tal points of a case by cultivating inde-

pendence of extraneous aids. By such a mastery of the cases

may be acquired mental power, and that ability to apply abstract

principles to concrete cases which is so necessary a part of the

equipment of a real lawyer.

Edwin C. Goddard.
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Ann Arbor, July 1, 1904.
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SELECT CASES

TO ILLUSTRATE THE LAW OP

BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS

PART I

OF BAILMENTS IN GENERAL

CHAPTER I.

OF THE DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF BMI.MENTS.

^1. COGGS V. BERNARD,

2 Ld. Raymond 909; 1 Stn. Lead. Cas. 199. 1703.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Holt, C. J. The case is shortly this. This defendant under-

takes to remove goods from one cellar to another, and there lay

them down safely ; and he managed them so negligently, that for

want of care in him some of the goods were spoiled. Upon not

guilty pleaded, there has been a verdict for the plaintiff, and

that upon full evidence, the cause being tried before me at Guild-

hall. There has been a motion in arrest of judgment, that the

declaration is insufficient because the defendant is neither laid

to be a common porter, nor that he is to have any reward for

his labor, so that the defendant is not chargeable by his trade,
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and a private person cannot be charged in an action without a

reward.

I have had a great consideration of this ease; and because

some of the books make the action lie upon the reward, and

some upon the promise, at first I made a groat question whether

this declaration was good. But upon consideration, as this dec-

laration is, I think the action will well lie. In order to show the

11

§ 1 DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION.

grounds upon which a man shall be charged with goods put

into his custody, I must show the several sorts of bailments.

And there are six sorts of bailments. The first sort of baibuent

is, a bare naked bailment of goods, delivered by one man to an-

other to keep for the use of the bailor; and this I call a depos-

itum, and it is that sort of bailment which is mentioned in

Southcote's case. The second sort is, when goods or chattels that

are useful are lent a friend gratis, to be used by him; and this is

called commodatum, because the thing is to be restored in specie.

The third sort is, when goods are left with the bailee to be used

by him for hire; this is called locatio et conductio, and the

lender is called locator, and the borrower conductor. The fourth

sort is, when goods or chattels are delivered to another as a

pawn, to be a security to him for money borrowed of him by

the bailor; and this is called in Latin, vadium, and in English,

a pawn or a pledge. The fifth sort is, when goods or chattels are

delivered to be carried, or something is to be done about them

for a reward to be paid by the person who delivers them to the

bailee, wiio is to do the thing about them. The sixth sort is,
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when there is a delivery of goods or chattels to somebody who is

to carry them, or do something about them gratis, without any

reward for such his work or carriage, which is this present case.

I mention these things, not so much that they are all of them

so necessary in order to maintain the proposition which is to be

proved, as to clear the reason of the obligation which is upon

persons in cases of trust.

As to the first sort, where a man takes goods in his custody

to keep for the use of the bailor, I shall consider for what things

such a bailee is answerable. He is not answerahle if they are

stole without any fault in him, neither ivill a common neglect

make him chargeable, but he must he guilty of some gross neg-

lect. There is, I confess, a great authority against me; where

it is held that a general delivery will charge the bailee to an-

swer for the goods if they are stolen, unless the goods are spe-

cially accepted to keep them only as you will keep your own.

But my Lord Coke has improved the case in his report of it;

for he will have it, that there is no difference between a special

acceptance to keep safely, and an acceptance generally to keep.

But there is no reason or justice, in such a case of a general

bailment, and where the bailee is not to have any reward, but

keeps the goods merely for the use of the bailor, to charge him

2

COGGS V. BEENAED. § 1

without some default in him. For if he keeps the goods in such

a case with an ordinary care, he has performed the trust reposed

in him. But according to this doctrine the bailee must answer

for the wrongs of other people, which he is not, nor cannot be

sufficiently armed against. If the law be so, there must be some

just and honest reason for it, or else some universal settled rule

of law upon wliich it is grounded ; and therefore it is incumbent

upon them that advance this doctrine to show an undisturbed

rule and practice of the law according to this position. But to

show that the tenor of the law was always otherwise, I shall

give a history of the authorities in the books in this matter ; and

by them show, that there never was any such resolution given

before Southcote's case. The 29 Ass. 28 is the first case in the

books upon that learning; and there the opinion is, that the

bailee is not chargeable, if the goods are stole. As for 8 Edw. 2,

Fitzh. Detinue 59, where goods are locked in a chest, and left

with the bailee, and the oAvner took away the key, and the goods

were stolen, it was held that the bailee should not answer for

the goods; that case they say differs, because the bailor did not
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trust the bailee with them. But I cannot see the reason of that

difference, nor why the bailee should not be charged with goods in

a chest, as well as with goods out of a chest; for the bailee has

as little power over them when they are out of a chest, as to any

benefit he might have by them, as when they are in a chest ; and

he has as great power to defend them in one case as in the other.

The case of 9 Edw. 4. 40. b. was but a debate at bar; for Danby

was but a counsel then; though he had been chief justice in the

beginning of Edw. 4, yet he was removed, and restored again

upon the restitution of Hen. 6, as appears by Dugdale 's Chronica

Series. So that what he said cannot be taken to be any authority,

for he spoke only for his client ; and Genney, for his client, said

the contrary. The case in 3 Hen. 7. 4. is but a sudden opinion;

and that but by half the court ; and yet, that is the only ground

for this opinion of my Lord Coke which besides he has improved.

But the practice has been always at Guildhall, to disallow that

to be a sufficient evidence to charge the bailee. And it was prac-

tised so before my time, all Chief Justice Pemberton's time, and

ever since, against the opinion of that case. When I read

Southcote's case heretofore, I was not so discerning as my

brother Powys tells us he was, to disallow that case at first ; and

came not to be of this opinion till I had well considered and

3
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digested that matter. Though, I must confess, reason is strong

against the case, to charge a man for doing such a friendly act*

for his friend ; but so far is the law from being so unreasonable,

that such a bailee is the least chargeable for neglect of any. For

if he keeps the goods bailed to him but as he keeps his own,

though he keeps his own. but negligently, yet he is not chargeable

for them; for the keeping them as he keeps his own is an argu-

ment of his honesty. A fortiori, he shall not be charged where

they are stolen without any neglect in him. Agreeable to this

is Bracton, lib. 3, c. 2, 99, b. 'J. S. apud queni res dcponitur, re

ohligatur, et de ea re, quam accepit, rcstituenda tenetur, et etiam

ad id, si quid in re deposita dole commiserit; cidpae autem no-

mine non tenetur, scilicet desidiae vel negligentiae, quia qui

negligenti arnica rem custodiendani tradit, sihi ipsi et propriae fa-

tuitati hoc deiet imputare.' As suppose the bailee is an idle,

careless, drunken fellow, and comes home drunk, and leaves

all his doors open, and by reason thereof the goods happen to

be stolen with his own. ; yet he shall not be charged, because it is

the bailor's own folly to trust such an idle fellow. So that this
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sort of bailee is the least responsible for neglects, and under

the least obligation of any one, being bound to no other care

of the bailed goods than he takes of his own. This Bracton I

have cited is, I confess, an old author; but in this his doctrine

is agreeable to reason, and to what the law is in other countries.

The civil law is so, as you have it in Justinian's Inst. lib. 3,

tit. 15. There the law goes further; for there it is said: 'Ex

eo solo tenetur, si quid dolo commiserit : culpae autem nomine,

id est, desidiae ac negligentiae, non tenetur. Itaque securus est

qui parum diligenter custoditam rem furto amiserit quia qui

negligenti amico rem custodiendam tradit, non ei, sed suae facil-

itati, id imputare debet.' So that a bailee is not chargeable

without an apparent gross neglect. And if there is such a gross

neglect, it is looked upon as an evidence of fraud. Nay, sup-

pose the bailee undertakes safely and securely to keep the goods,

in express words; yet even that won't charge him with all

sorts of neglects; for if such a promise were put into writing,

it would not charge so far, even then. Hob. 34, a covenant, that

the covenantee shall have, occupy, and enjoy certain lands, does

not bind against the acts of wrongdoers. 3 Cro. 214, ace, 2 Cro.

425, ace, upon a promise for quiet enjoyment. And if a prom-

ise will not charge a man against wrongdoers, when put in writ-
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ing, it is hard it should do it more so when spoken. Doct. and

Stud. 130 is in point, that though a bailee do promise to re-

deliver goods safely, yet if he have nothing for the keeping

of them, he will not be answerable for the acts of a wrongdoer.

So that there is neither sufficient reason nor authority to support

the opinion in Southeote's ease. If the bailee be guilty of gross

negligence, he will be chargeable, but not for any ordinary neg-

lect, -^^ c^^ ji '' -' -■' "

■*'' As to the second sort of baibnent, viz. commodatum, or lending

gratis, the borrower is bound to the strictest care and diligence

to keep the goods, so as to restore them back again to the lender ;

because the bailee has a benefit by the use of them, so as if the

bailee be guilty of the least neglect he will be answerable : as, if

a man should lend another a horse to go westward, or for a

month; if the bailee go northward, or keep the horse above a

month, if any accident happen to the horse in the northern jour-

ney, or after the expiration of the month, the bailee will be

chargeable; because he has made use of the horse contrary to

the trust he was lent to him under ; and it may be, if the horse
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had been used no otherwise than he was lent, that accident

would not have befallen him. This is mentioned in Bracton uhi

supra: his words are: 'Is autem ciii res aliqua utenda datur, re

oUigatur, quae commodata est, sed magna differentia est inter

mutimm et commodatum; quia is qui rem mutuam accepit, ad

ipsam restituendam tenetur, vel ejus pretium, si forte incendio,

ruina, naufragio, aid latronum vel hostium incursu, consumpta

fuerit, vel deperdita, suhtracta vel ahlata. Et qui rem utendam

accepit, non sufficit ad rei custodiam, quod talem diligentiam

adhiheat, qualem suis rehus propriis adhihere solet, si alius earn

diligentius potuit custodire; ad vim autem majorem, vel casus

fortuitos non tenetur quis, nisi culpa sua intervenerit. Tit si rem

sihi commodatum domi, secum detulerit cum peregre profectus

fuerit, et Ulam incursu hostium vel praedonum, vel naufragio,

amiserit, non est duhium quin ad rei restitutionem teneatur.'

I cite this author, though I confess he is an old one, because his

opinion is reasonable, and very much to my present purpose,

and there is no authority in the law to the contrary. But if the

bailee put this horse in his stable, and h*' were stolen from

thence, the bailee shall not be answerable for him. But if he or

his servant leave the house or stable doors open, and the thieves

take the opportunity of that and steal the horse, he will be

5

§ 1 DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION.

chargeable; because the neglect gave the thieves the occasion to

steal the horse. Bracton says, the bailee must use the utmost

care: but yet he shall not be chargeable, where there is such a

force as he cannot resist.

As to the third sort of bailment, scilicet locatio, or lending for

hire, in this case the bailee is also bound to take the utmost care,

and to return the goods when the time of the hiring is expired.

And here again I must recur to my old author, f ol. 62, b. : ' Qui

pro usu vestimentorum auri vel argenti, vel alterius ornamenti,

vel jumenti, merccdem dederit vel promiserit, talis ah eo deside-

ratur custodia, qualem diligentissimus paterfamilias suis rebus

adhibet, quam si praestiterit et rem aliquo casu amiserit, ad rem

restituendam non tenehitur. Nee sufficit aliquem talem diligen-

tiam adhihere, qualem suis rebus propriis adhiberit, nisi talem

adhibuerit, de qua superius dictum est.' From whence it ap-

pears, that if goods are let out for a reward, the hirer is bound

to the utmost diligence, such as the most diligent father of a

family uses; and if he uses that, he shall be discharged. But

every man, how diligent soever he be, being liable to the acci-
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dent of robbers, though a diligent man is not so liable as a

careless man, the bailee shall not be answerable in this case, if

the goods are stolen.

As to the fourth sort of bailment, viz. vadium, or a pawn, in

this I shall consider two things ; first, what property the pawnee

has in the pawn or pledge; and secondly, for what neglects he

shall make satisfaction. As to the first, he has a special prop-

erty, for the pawn is a securing to the pawnee, that he shall be

repaid his debt, and to compel the pawnor to pay him. But if

the pawn be such as it will be the worse for using, the pawnee

cannot use it, as clothes, &c. ; but if it be such as will be never

the worse, as if jewels for the purpose were pawned to a lady,

she might use them: but then she must do it at her peril, for

whereas, if she keeps them locked up in her cabinet, if her cabinet

should be broke open, and the jewels taken from thence, she

would be excused ; if she wears them abroad, and is there robbed

of them, she will be answerable. And the reason is, because

the pawn is in the nature of a deposit, and, as such, is not

liable to be used. And to this efi'ect is Ow. 123. But if the

pawn be of such a nature, as the pawnee is at any charge about

the thing pawned, to maintain it, as a horse, cow, &c., then the

pawnee may use the horse in a reasonable manner, or milk the
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cow, &c., in recompense for the meat. As to the second point,

Bracton, 99. b. gives you the answer: — 'Creditor, qui pignus ac-

cepit, re ohligatur, et ad illam restituendam tenetur; et cum hu-

jusmodi res in pignus data sit utriusque gratia, scilicet dehitoris,

quo magis ei pecunia crederetur, et creditoris quo magis [ei]

in tuto sit creditum, swfficit ad ejus rei custodiam diligentiam

exactam adhihere, quam si praestiterit et rem casu amiserit, se-

curus esse possit, nee impedietur creditum peter e.' In effect,

if a creditor takes a pawn, he is bound to restore it upon the

payment of the debt; but yet it is sufficient, if the pawmee use

true diligence, and he will be indemnified in so doing, and not-

withstanding the loss, yet he shall resort to the pawnor for his

debt. Agreeable to this is 29 Ass. 28, and Southcote's case.

But, indeed, the reason given in Southcote's case, is, because the

pawnee has a special property in the pawn. But that is not the

reason of the case; and there is another reason given for it in

the book of Assize, which is indeed the true reason of all these

cases, that the law requires nothing extraordinary of the pawnee,

but only that he shall use an ordinary care for restoring the
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goods. But, indeed, if the money for which the goods were

pawned be tendered to the pawnee before they are lost, then

the pawnee shall be answerable for them: because the pawnee,

by detaining them after the tender of the money, is a wrong-

doer, and it is a wrongful detainer of the goods, and the special

property of the pawnee is determined. And a man that keeps

goods by wrong must be answerable for them at all events ; for

the detaining of them by him is the reason of the loss. Upon the

same difference as the law is in relation to pawns, it will be

found to stand in relation to goods foundi

As to the fifth sort of bailment, viz. a delivery to carry or

otherwise manage, for a reward to be paid to the bailee, those

cases are of two sorts; either a delivery to one that exercises a

public employment, or a delivery to a private person. First, if it

be to a person of the first sort, and he is to have a reward, he is

hound to answer for the goods at all events. And this is the case

of the common carrier, common hoyman, master of a ship, &c. :

which case of a master of a ship was first adjudged, 26 Car. 2, in

the case of Mors v. Slue, Eaym. 220, 1 Vent. 190, 238. The law

charges this person thus entrusted to carry goods, against all

events, but acts of God, and of the enemies of the king. For

though the force be never so great, as if an irresistible multi-
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tude of people should rob him, Djevertheless he is chargeable.

And this is a politic establishment, contrived by the policy of

the law for the safety of all persons, the necessity of whose

affairs oblige theni to trust these sorts of persons, that they may

be safe in their ways of dealing; for else these carriers might

have an opportunity of undoing all persons that had any deal-

ings with them, by combining with thieves, &c., and yet doing it

in such a clandestine manner as would not be possible to be dis-

covered. And this is the reason the law is founded upon in

that point. The second sort are bailies, factors, and such like.

And though a bailie is to have a reward for his management,

yet he is only to do the best he can; and if he be robbed. &c.,

it is a good account. And the reason of his being a servant, is

not the thing; for he is at a distance from his master, and acts

at discretion, receiving rents and selling corn, &c. And yet if

he receives his master's money, and keeps it locked up with a

reasonable care, he shall not be answerable for it, though it be

stolen. But yet this servant is not a domestic servant, nor under

his master's immediate care. But the true reason of the case is,
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it would be unreasonable to charge him with a trust; farther

than the nature of the thing puts it in his power to perform it.

But it is allowed in the other cases, by reason of the necessity of

the thing. The same law of a factor.

As to the sixth sort of bailment, it is to be taken, that the

bailee is to have no reward for his pains, but yet that by his

ill management the goods are spoiled. Secondly, it is to be

understood, that there was a neglect in the management. But

thirdly, if it had appeared that the mischief happened by any

person that met the cart in the way, the bailee had not been

chargeable. As if a drunken man had come by in the streets,

and had pierced the cask of brandy; in this case the defendant

had not been answerable for it, because he was to have noth-

ing for his pains. Then the bailee having undertaken to man-

age the goods, and having managed them ill, and so by his neg-

lect a damage has happened to the bailor, which is the case in

question, what will you call this? In Bracton, lib. 3. 100, it is

called mandatum. It is an obligation which arises ex mandato.

It is what we call in English an acting by commission. And if

a man acts by commission for another gratis, and in the execut-

ing his commission behaves himself negligently, he is answerable.

Vinnius, in his commentaries upon Justinian, lib. 3. tit. 27, 684,

COGGS V. BEENAED. § 1

defines mandatum to be contractus quo aliquid gratuito geren-

dum committitur et accipitur. This undertaking obliges the

undertaker to a diligent management. Bracton, tchi supra, says,

'Contrahitur etiam ohligatio non solum scripto et verMs,

sed et consensu, sicut in contractihus honae fidei; ut in

emptionihus, venditionibus, locationibus, conductionihus, societa-

tihus et mandatis.' I don't find this word in any other author

of our law, besides in this place in Bracton, which is a full au-

thority, if it be not thought too old. But it is supported by good

reason and authority.

The reasons are, first, because, in such a case, a neglect is a

deceit to the bailor. For, when he entrusts the bailee upon his

undertaking to be careful, he has put a fraud upon the plain-

tiff by being negligent, his pretense of care being the persuasion

that induced the plaintiff to trust him. And a breach of a

trust undertaken voluntarily will be a good ground for an action.

1 Roll. Abr. 10. 2 Hen. 7. 11. a strong case to this matter.

There the case was an action against a man who had undertaken

to keep an hundred sheep, for letting them be drowned by his

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:37 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

default. And there the reason of the judgment is given, because

when the party has taken upon him to keep the sheep, and after

suffers them to perish in his default ; inasmuch as he has taken

and executed his bargain, and has them in his custody, if, after,

he does not look to them, an action lies. For here is his own act,

viz., his agreement and promise, and that after broke of his side,

that shall give a sufficient cause of action.

But, secondly, it is objected, that there is no consideration to

ground this promise upon, and therefore the undertaking is but

nudum pactum. But to this I answer, that the owner's trust-

ing Mm with the goods is a sufjficient consideration to oUige him

to a careful management. Indeed if the agreement had been

executory, to carry these brandies from the one place to the

other such a day, the defendant had not been bound to carry

them. But this is a different case, for assumpsit does not only

signify a future agreement, but in such a case as this it signifies

an actual entry upon the thing, and taking the trust upon him-

self. And if a man will do that, and miscarries in the perform-

ance of his trust, an action will lie against him for that, though

nobody could have compelled him to do the thing. The 19 Hen.

6. 49. and the other cases cited by my brothers, show that this

is the difference. But in the 11 Hen. 4. 33. this difference is

9
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clearly put, and that is the only ease concerning this matter

which has not been cited by my brothers. There the action was

brought against a carpenter, for that he had undertaken to build

the plaintiff a house within such a time, and had not done it,

and it was adjudged the action would not lie. But there the

question was put to the court — what if he had built the house

unskilfully ? — and it is agreed in that case an action would have

lain. There has been a question made. If I deliver goods to A.,

and in consideration thereof he promise to re-deliver them, if

an action will lie for not re-delivering them; and in Yelv. 4,

judgment was given that the action would lie. But that judg-

ment was afterwards reversed; and, according to that

reversal, there was judgment afterwards entered for the defend-

ant in the like case, Yelv. 128. But those cases were grmnbled

at; and the reversal of that judgment in Yelv. 4, was said by

the judges to be a bad resolution ; and the contrary to that re-

versal was afterwards most solemnly adjudged in 2 Cro. 667.

Tr. 21 Jac. 1. in the King's Bench, and that judgment affirmed

upon a writ of error. And yet there is no benefit to the defend-
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ant, nor no consideration in that case, but the having the money

in his possession, and being trusted with it, and yet that was

held to be a good consideration. And so a bare being trusted

with another man's goods must be taken to be a sufficient con-

sideration, if the bailee once enter upon the trust, and take the

goods into his possession. The declaration in the case of Mors

V. Slue, was drawn by the greatest drawer in England in that

time ; and in that declaration, as it was always in all such cases,

it was thought most prudent to put in, that a reward was to be

paid for the carriage. And so it has been usual to put it in the

writ, where the suit is by original. I have said thus much in

this case, because it is of great consequence that the law should

be settled in this point; but I don't know whether I may have

settled it, or may not rather have unsettled it. But however

that happen, I have stirred these points, which wiser heads in

time may settle. And judgment was given for the plaintiff.

JO

KRAUSE V. COMMONWEALTH. §2

2. KRAUSE V. COIMMONWEALTH,

93 Pa. St. 418; 39 Am. R. 762. 1880.

Conviction of larceny. The indictment contained two counts :

1. Larceny ; 2. Larceny by bailee. Upon a plea of former acquit-

tal on the first count there was trial and conviction on the second.

It appeared that defendant agreed to purchase of one Deemer

two horses for $150, to be paid on delivery. They were deliv-

ered, but as defendant had only $25 they were not paid for, and

it was agreed that the defendant should pay the $25, keep the

horses, and have until the following Tuesday to pay the balance

or return the horses, the title meantime to remain in Deemer.

Krause did not pay on Tuesday. On the following Thursday

the horses disappeared, having been sold, or converted by Krause

to his own use. Deemer offered to return the $25 and demanded

his horses, but Krause refused to deliver them back.

Trunkey, J. (After stating the facts) : Ha^ving acquitted the

defendant of larceny of the horses, the Commonwealth put him

to another trial and convicted him of larceny, in stealing the same

horses, under section 108 of the Crimes Act of 1860. Villainous as
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his conduct was, this conviction ought not to stand, unless he was

a bailee within the intendment of the act. The word "bailee" is

a legal term, to be understood in its generally accepted sense

among jurists, and if it be doubtful whether a case be included

it shall be excluded, in the constriiction of a criminal statute.

Blackstone defines bailment as "a delivery of goods in trust

upon a contract, express or implied, that the trust shall be faith-

fully executed on the part of the bailee;" Story, "a delivery of

a thing in trust for some special object or purpose, and upon a

contract, express or implied, to conform to the object or purpose

of the trust;" Jones, "a delivery of goods in trust on a con-

tract, express or implied, that the trust shall be duly executed,

and the goods re-delivered as soon as the time or use for which

they were bailed shall have elapsed or be performed;" and Kent,

"a delivery of goods in trust upon a contract, expressed or im-

plied, that the trust shall be duly executed, and the goods re-

stored to the bailee, as soon as the purpose of the bailment shall

be answered." Mr. Edwards, in his work on Bailment, § 2, re-

marks: These definitions agree in nearly all essential particu-

lars, and disagree in two or three respects. Jones and Kent

11
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assume the property is to be returned, wliile Blackstone and

Story include contracts under wliicli no such return is contem-

plated. Story intends to include among contracts of bailment

a delivery of goods for sale ; and Kent intentionally limits his

definition so as to exclude that species of contract. "In general

terms it may be said that the delivery of goods or any other

species of personal estate for use, keeping, or on some other

trust, where the general property does not pass, creates a bail-

ment. A delivery of chattels upon a sale made on condition

that the title shall pass on the payment of the purchase-money

at a future day, is something more than a bailment; it gives

the buyer a conditional title. If the contract give the buyer a

definite credit or a reasonable time within which to pay, it gives

him a transferable interest in the chattels until the credit ex-

pires, and the property in them as soon as he pays the price."

Authors of received authority generally specify five sorts of

bailment, namely, deposit um, mandatum, commodatuni, pledge

and hiring ; and as severally defined, in each the entire property

of the thing bailed remains in the bailor, the possession only is
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given to the bailee, who is to return or deliver the thing itself as

soon as the purpose of the bailment shall be answered. In this

State it is settled that the bailee of goods, who uses and enjoys

them as if his own, cannot divest the title of the bailor by a sale

to an innocent person ; nor can a creditor of the bailee seize them

in executiop of his debt. When delivered under a contract of

bailment, the owner will be entitled to them against everybody.

But a delivery on a conditional sale, the property to remain in

the vendor until the goods are paid for, with right to reclaim

them, is void as respects the vendee's creditors, or an innocent

purchaser from him. The delivery being on the foot of a pur-

chase, the vendor's right, as against the vendee's creditors, is re-

garded as a lien for the purchase-money. Chamberlain v. Smith,

44 Penn. St. 431; Haak v. Linderman, 64 Penn. St. 499; 3

"Am. Rep. 612. By the terms of the contract the seller may re-

tain the right of property in the goods till paid for, as against

the purchaser, and in default of payment, he may reclaim them,

or use civil remedies for recovery of possession; but the con-

tract does not make him a bailor, as respects other persons, nor

the purchaser a bailee in the sense of the word as used in the

statute.

Our statute, as shown by Eead, J., in Commonwealth v.
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Chathams, 50 Penn. St. 181, is taken from the English statute ;

and in that case the interpretation of the words "bailee" and

"baibnent," as fixed by the English decisions, was adopted,

which decisions were cited, showing that the words must be in-

terpreted according to their ordinary legal acceptation, that "bail-

ment relates to something in the hands of the bailee, which is to

be returned in specie, and does not apply to the case of money

in the .hands of a party who is not under any obligation to re-

turn it in precisely the identical coins which he originally re-

ceived;" that "to bring a case within this clause, in addition

to the fraudulent disposal of the property, it must be proved:

First: That there was such a delivery of the property as to

divest the owner of the possession, and vest it in the prisoner

for some time; Secondly. That at the expiration or determina-

tion of that time the same identical property was to be restored

to the owner."

The term "bailee" is one to be used, not in its large but in its

limited sense, as including simply those bailees who are author-

ized to keep, to transfer, or to deliver, and who receive the goods
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hona fide, and then fraudulently convert. Where it does not ap-

pear that a fiduciary duty is imposed on the defendant to return

the specific goods of which the alleged bailment is composed, a

bailment under the statutes is not constituted. Whart. Crim. Law,

§ 1855 (8th ed).

The bargain was struck for a sale of the horses for $150, pay-

able on delivery. At the time stipulated Deemer delivered the

horses, Krause paid $25, they agreed that the property should

continue in Deemer, and on the next Tuesday Krause would pay

the balance or return the horses. He refused to do either. The

original contract was not changed — time was extended to Krause

to enable him to pay the money. If there was a deliveiy at all,

it was on the footing of the sale. There wa? no agreement to

sell at a future time— a mere contract that the buyer would pay

the balance of the price or return the property, in the mean-

time the title to be in the seller. Payment would have been a

complete performance. Krause was not bound to return the

identical property. He had a transferable interest until the

credit expired, and he or his transferee would have had clear

title the instant of payment. This was something more than a

bailment, and Krause was not a bailee in the statutory sense.

In favor of the liberty of the citizen, the court may, and in a

13
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proper case should, declare the evidence insufficient to convict.

Pauli V. Commonwealth, 89 Penn. St. 432. We are of opinion

that the defendant's first point should have been affirmed.

Judgment reversed, and the record, with this opinion setting

forth the causes of reversal, is remanded to the Court of Quarter

Sessions of Lehigh county for further proceeding.

Judgment accordingly.

3. PULLIAM V. BURLINGAME,

81 Mo. Ill; 51 Am. R. 229. 1883.

Martin, C. The plaintiff brought an action of replevin in

the Circuit Court for the recovery of two mules, alleging that he

was "the owner of, and entitled to the immediate possession of"

the same. The defendant in answer made a general denial of

the facts alleged in the petition. The case was tried by the

court, a jury being waived by the parties.

Plaintiff offered testimony tending to prove that he was the

owner and in possession of the mules in controversy ; that about

the month of February, 1880, defendant borrowed said mules

from plaintiff, but said nothing then about his wife's interest
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in or claim to same. That defendant held said mules, until

they were taken out of his possession under the writ in this

cause.

The defendant then offered, and the court heard testimony

tending to show that Martha E. Burlingame was the sister of

plaintiff, and wife of defendant; that she owned jointly with

plaintiff an undivided half interest in said mules at the time

they were borrowed by her husband, and also at the time they

were taken from defendant under the writ aforesaid. De-

fendant also introduced evidence showing that he was in pos-

session of said mules at the time they were replevied in this

cause, as the agent of his wife ; that he was simply holding the

same with and for his wife, by reason of her half interest afore-

said. This was all the testimony offered.

The court, at the instance of plaintiff, declared the law as

follows :

"If the court, sitting as a jury, believe from the evidence that

the defendant borrowed the mules from the plaintiff and refused

to return them to him when so requested, the court will find the

right of possession in the plaintiff. ' '
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The defendant requested the court, which the latter refused

to do, to declare the law as follows :

"If the court, sitting as a jury, believe from the evidence

that at the time of the service of the writ herein, said defendant

was the husband of one Martha E. Burlingame ; that said Martha

E. Burlingame was, at said date, the joint o^^^aer^ with plaintiff,

of the mules in controversy, and that said defendant was in pos-

session of, and holding the same with and for his wife, then the

court should find the issue for defendant. ' '

The court found the issues for the plaintiff, and rendered its

judgment in due form accordingly.

[Omitting minor point.]

The next inquiry is, whether the defendant could make this

defense of paramount title in his wife, in face of the contract of

bailment by which he acquired possession of the mules.

The admitted evidence in the case is, that he borrowed them

from the plaintiff*, and that at the time he so borrowed and re-

ceived them, he made no mention of any claim in favor of him-

self or his wife. I have examined this question with a scrutiny
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which has not been confined to the briefs of counsel, and I am

unable to reach any other conclusion than that the defendant

is estopped from making the defense by reason of the contract

under which he acquired possession of the property in dispute

from the plaintiff. In borrowing the mules he became a bailee

of them like any other borrower. There being no time fixed

for a termination of the bailment, that time could be indicated

at any moment by the bailor. It was determinable at his option,

and when so terminated, it was the duty of the bailee to return

the property bailed to the bailor. The contract of bailment

necessarily admits the right of property in the bailor, and the

obligation to return it to him at the termination of the term of

bailment. In other words, a bailee, when he receives the prop-

erty by virtue of the bailment, legally admits the right of the

bailor to make the contract of bailment. After this subservient

relation of the defendant to the plaintiff in respect to the prop-

erty was established, the law forbids him to dispute the title

of plaintiff. The relation is analogous to that which exists be-

tween landlord and tenant, a relation which prevents the tenant

from setting up against his landlord, either an outstanding or

self -acquired adverse title ; and from attorning to a stranger with-

out the consent of his landlord, or in pursuance of a judgment
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or sale under execution or deed of trust, or forfeiture under

mortgage. Stagg v. Eureka Tanning, etc., Co., 56 Mo. 317; R.

S. 1879, § 3080 ; McCartney v. Auer, 50 Mo. 395. This rule does

not prevent the tenant from showing that the landlord has

parted with his title, for such fact would npt be inconsistent

with the title admitted by the demise. Higgins v. Turner, 61

Mo. 249.

In pursuing the analogy of these principles in the law of real

estate, Mr, Edwards, in his work on Bailment, says: "The law

always aids the true owner to recover his property; and it is a

general rule that the bailee cannot dispute the title of his bailor,

"When therefore the bailee is applied to for the property by a

third party claiming title, his prudent course is, to leave the

claimant to his action, and at once notify his bailor of the suit;

he is not obliged to bear the burden of a litigation; and it is

not safe for him to surrender the property on demand. For

nothing will excuse a bailee from the duty to restore the prop-

erty to his bailor, except he show that it was taken from him

by due process of law, or by a person having the paramount title,
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or that the title of his bailor has terminated." Edwards Bail-

ments (2d Ed.), § 73; Welles v, Thornton, 45 Barb, 390; Bates

V. Stanton, 1 Duer 79 ; Blivin v. R. Co., 36 N. Y, 403 ; Burton v.

Wilkinson, 18 Vt, 186; 46 Am. Dec. 145; Aubery v. Fiske, 36

N. Y, 47 ; McKay v. Draper, 27 N. Y. 256 ; Sinclair v. Murphy,

14 Mich. 392; Osgood v. Nichols, 5 Gray, 420; The Idaho, 93

U. S. 575.

Mr. Bigelow, in his work on Estoppel, says : ' ' The relation be-

tween bailor and bailee is analogous to that of landlord and ten-

ant. Until something equivalent to title paramount has been

asserted against a bailee, he will be estopped to deny the title

of his bailor to the goods intrusted to him." Bigelow Estoppel

(3d ed.), 430. The principle upon which he can relieve himself

from the obligation to return the goods is ably discussed by

Justice Strong in the "Idaho" case, 93 U. S. 575, wherein he

announces the doctrine, that an actual delivery of the goods by

the bailee to the true owner, upon his demand for them, will

constitute a valid defense against the claim of the bailor. The

same principle was applied by this court in the case of Matheny

V. Mason, 73 Mo, 677; 39 Am. Rep. 541, which was a suit

between vendor and vendee for the consideration money of

the goods sold. The subject was ably and elaborately consid-
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ered by Judge Ray, who rendered the opinion of the court. The

vendor was suing for the price of corn sold, with implied war-

ranty of title, and the vendee, in his answer, after admitting the

sale and consideration price, pleaded that at the time of the

sale he supposed the vendor was the owner of the corn; that

after the sale and delivery, he learned that it belonged to a

third party, named in the plea ; that said third party demanded

of him payment for the same, and threatened suit if he refused ;

that thereupon he paid the full value thereof to said claimant,

who was the true owner. It was also added, that the vendor

was insolvent. This plea was held sufficient to rebut and over-

throw the estoppel imposed on a vendee from denying the title

of his vendor when called upon for the purchase-money. In

the opinion significamce was given to the facts, that the para-

mount title came first to the knowledge of the vendee after the

sale ; that said title was asserted by threats of suit ; and that the

money was actually paid over to the claimant before suit by the

vendor. Now, if it requires such a defense to relieve the estop-

pel imposed upon a vendee, a fortiori the same, or an equivalent,
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will be necessary in the case of a bailee. It has long been set-

tled in this State that the relation of a vendor and vendee, as

to real estate, is antagonistic, and that the vendee is not estopped

from setting up an outstanding or after-acquired title. Wil-

coxon V. Osborn, 77 Mo. 621. The estoppel between them is

recognized only in respect to the purchase-money. In a suit for

it, the vendee is estopped from pleading want of title in the

vendor, as long as he retains possession of the land. Mitchell

V. McMullen, 59 Mo. 252 ; Harvey v. Morris, 63 Mo. 475 ; Wheeler

V. Standley, 50 Mo. 509.

The relation of bailor and bailee is not antagonistic in any

respect, or at any time. By accepting the property he not only

admits the bailor's title, but he assumes, with respect to the

thing bailed, a position of trust and confidence, which continues

till it is returned or lawfully accounted for. Measured by these

principles, the defendant's evidence must fail to excuse him

from the obligation to return the borrowed property found in

his possession at the time of the replevin. It does not appear

that his wife, as paramount claimant, ever asserted any title

to this property. Consequently his plea that he holds it as

agent for his wife, implies that this is his voluntary act, and

was not forced upon him by the assertion in any form of her
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pretended title. It will not do for a bailee to hunt up a para-

mount claimant, and then when called upon by the bailor for

the property, answer that he is now the voluntary bailee of such

claimant. It must be apparent that this would enable him to

enjoy the property by pretending to hold it for another. Jus-

tice Strong in the ''Idaho" case remarks, "a bailee cannot

avail himself of the title of a third person (though the person

be the true owner) for the purpose of keeping the property for

himself, not in any case where he has not yielded to the para-

mount title." 93 U. S. 575.

The evidence in this case shows that the defendant, at the

time of the replevin, was in actual possession of the mules which

he borrowed, and that his plea of being the agent or bailee

of a paramount owner rests upon his voluntary act alone, with-

out suit, threat or demand of such owner or claimant.

Although the cases in which the doctrine of jus tertii is de-

fined and enforced are somewhat conflicting, I am not aware

of any well-considered expression which goes to the length of

justifying the defense, as it appears in the evidence and instruc-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:37 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

tions of this case.

Accordingly I am of the opinion that the court did not err

in refusing it, or in giving the one asked by plaintiff. The

judgment should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.

Judgment affirmed.

All concur.

4. BRETZ V. DIEHL,

117 Pa. St. 589; 2 Am. St. R. 706. 1888.

Feigned issue under sheriff's interpleader act to determine

ownership of flour and bran. The opinion states the facts.

By Court, Clark, J. The defendants in this case are judg-

ment creditors of "William D. Newman, a miller, oper-

ating a steam flouring mill in the town of Bedford. Having

issued executions, they levied on some eighty or ninety barrels

of flour, and some bran found on the floor of Newman's mill.

The plaintiffs claimed the property levied upon, alleging that

it was the product of grain by them delivered to and held by

Newman as their bailee. This is a feigned issue, framed under

the sheriff's interpleader act, to determine the dispute.

The plaintiffs, who are farmers residing in the vicinity of Bed-

18

BRETZ V. DIEHL. § 4

ford, brought their grain to this mill; no special contract or ar-

rangement was made with the miller by any of the plaintiffs

when they delivered their wheat, but, in accordance with the

practice of the mill in all cases, except when wheat was at once

paid for, a receipt or memorandum was given in the following

form : —

Crystal. Mills, Bedford, Pa., Sept. 12, 1884.

Received from D. W. Lee : —

Amount.

Four hundred and fifty-five 14-60 b. wheat $455.14

" rye,

" corn,

Two hundred and fifty-five 12-32 " oats 255.12

" buckwheat.

For use of self. W. D. Newman.

The mill was not arranged to keep the several lots of grain

in separate parcels. It was so constructed that all the grain

delivered into it was hoisted to the second floor, emptied into a

sink on the first floor, and from thence carried by elevators into
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a bin on the third floor, where, at times, there was a large accu-

mulated mass of wheat. Newman also purchased wheat in con-

siderable quantities from time to time, which was delivered into

the mill, and disposed of as the other wheat. This promiscuous

commingling of the grain into a common mass was in accord-

ance with the known usage of the mill, which was supplied for

grinding from the mass of the wheat, without any discrimina-

tion as to the several lots or parcels in which it was received.

The miller, was, of course, under no obligation to restore to

the plaintiffs the specific or identical wheat which he received,

nor the product of it in flour ; indeed, this, owing to the manner

in which the business was conducted, was practically impossible.

The fundamental distinction between a bailment and a sale is,

that in the former the subject of the contract, although in an

altered form, is to be restored to the owner ; whilst in the latter

there is no obligation to return the specific article; the party

receiving it is at liberty to return some other thing of equal

value in place of it. In the one case the title is not changed, in

the other it is, the parties standing in the relation of debtor and

creditor. Thus in Norton v. Woodruff, 2 N. Y. 153, a miller

agreed to take certain wheat, and to give one barrel of superfine

flour for every 4 36-60 bushels thereof, the flour to be delivered
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at a fixed time, or as much sooner as he could make it. As the

miller's contract was satisfied by a delivery of flour from any

wheat, the transaction was held to be a sale. But in Mallroy v.

Willis, 4 Id. 76, wheat was delivered under a contract "to be

manufactured into flour," and one barrel of the flour was to be

delivered for every 4 15-60 bushels of wheat; this transaction

was by the same court held to be a bailment.

If a party having charge of the property of others so con-

founds it with his own that the line of distinction cannot be

traced, all the inconvenience of the confusion is thrown upon

the party who produces it; where, however, the owners consent

to have their wheat mixed in a common mass, each remains the

owner of his share in the common stock. If the wheat is de-

livered in pursuance of a contract for bailment, the mere fact

that it is mixed with a mass of like quality, with the knowledge

of the depositor or bailor, does not convert that intcf a sale

which was originally a bailment, and the bailee of the whole can,

of course, have no greater control of the mass than if the share

of each were kept separate. If the commingled mass has been
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delivered on simple storage, each is entitled on demand to re-

ceive his share; if for conversion into flour, to his proper pro-

portion of the product: Chase v. Washburn, 1 Ohio St, 244;

59 Am. Dec. 623 ; Hutchison v. Commonwealth, 82 Pa. St. 472.

It makes no difl'erence that the bailee had, in like manner, con-

tributed to the mass of his own wheat; for although the abso-

lute owner of his own share, he still stands as a bailee to the

others, and he cannot abstract more than that share from the

common stock without a breach of the bailment, which will sub-

ject him not only to a civil suit, but also to a criminal prosecu-

tion : Hutchison v. Commonwealth, supra.

But where, as in Chase v. Washburn, supra, the understand-

ing of the parties was that the person recei\ang the grain might

take from it or from the flour at his pleasure, and appropriate

the same to his own use, on the condition of his procuring other

wheat to supply its place, the dominion over the property passes

to the depositary, and the transaction is a sale, and not a bail-

ment. To the same efi'ect are Schindler v, Westover, 99 Ind.

395; Richardson v. Olmstead, 74 111. 213; Bailey v. Bensley,

87 Id. 556 ; and Johnston v. Browne, 37 Iowa, 200. In Lyon v.

Lenon, 106 Ind. 567, the distinction is thus stated: "If the

dealer has the right, at his pleasure, either to ship and sell the
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same on his own account, and pay the market price on demand,

or retain and redeliver the wheat, or other wheat in the place

of it, the transaction is a sale. It is only when the bailor re^

tains the right from the beginning to elect whether he will de-

mand the redelivery of his property, or other of like quality

and grade, that the contract will be considered one of bailment.

If he surrender to the other the right of election, it will be con-

sidered a sale, with an option on the part of the purchaser to pay

either in money or property, as stipulated. The distinction is:

Can the depositor, by his contract, compel a delivery of wheat,

whether the dealer is willing or not? If he can, the transac-

tion is a bailment. If the dealer has the option to pay for it in

money or other wheat, it is a sale." This distinction is drawn,

of course, with reference to cases where grain is deposited in a

mass, as in grain elevators, etc.

There are cases in which the doctrine of bailment has been

carried much beyond the rule recognized in the cases we have

cited : See Sexton v. Graham, 53 Iowa, 181 ; 4 N. W. R. 1090,

and Nelson v. Brown, 53 Id. 555, 5 N. W. R. 719. We think,
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however, the rule recognized in Chase v. Washburn, supra, and

Lyon V. Lenon, supra, is a safe one, and is more in accord ■c'/ith

the well-settled principles of the law relating to bailment. .

But in the case at bar, we are not called upon to say what

would be the effect upon the transaction if Newman had au-

thority, in the regular course of dealing, to ship or sell the

wheat of his customers on his own account. Undoubtedly he

had a right to sell of the grain or flour to the extent of his own

share; that is to say, what he contributed to the common stock

and the tolls to which he was entitled. But the jury has found

that he had no authority whatever to sell or to abstract from

the common stock beyond the amount to which he was himself

entitled. In the general charge, and also in the answers to the

points submitted, the learned court instructed the jurors in the

clearest manner that if they should find from the evidence that

Newman, by the nature of his dealings with the several plain-

tiffs, had acquired such dominion over their wheat as authorized

him, at his pleasure, not only to grind it into flour, but also to

sell the same for his own use, the transaction must necessarily

be treated as a sale, and that, in that event, the plaintiffs could

not recover. This instruction was repeated with marked em-

phasis several times during the progress of the charge, and it
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seems quite impossible that the jury could have labored under

any misapprehension as to the nature of the inquiry they were

to make. The verdict of the jury was for the plaintiffs ; and we

must assume the facts which it is plain the jury, in arriving

at such a verdict, must have found, viz., that Newman had no

authority to sell the grain delivered into his mill under the ar-

rangement with the plaintiffs, — that is to say, their share of

the common stock, nor the flour which was the product thereof.

It was the plain duty of Newman, however, to see to it that at

all times the mill contained wheat or flour sufficient in amount

to answer all demands under the bailment; failing in this, he

was derelict in duty, and liable, under the law, for the appro-

priation and conversion unto his own use of property which

did not belong to him.

Nor do we see that the court committed any error in the

answers to the plaintiffs' points. These points, according to

the general practice, were based upon an assumption of facts,

the truth or falsity of which was for the jury, and the law was

stated as upon a finding of these facts by the jury. They were
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relevant to the issue ; they disclosed clearly the specific facts

assumed, which were fairly and reasonably consistent with the

plaintiffs' theory of the case upon the evidence, and the opin-

ion of the court thereon could not have had any weight with

the jurors in their deliberations, unless the facts assumed were,

in their judgment, established by the proofs. The points cer-

tainly were not such as could be disregarded by the court, and

we cannot see how the answers thereto could be supposed to

have misled the jury.

The learned court defined a bailment and a sale, marking

the distinguishing features of each, and as the nature of the

transaction depended not wholly upon the written receipt, but

in part on verbal evidence as to the method of conducting the

business, the question was undoubtedly one proper to be sub-

mitted to the jury. The court instructed the jury that if cer-

tain facts existed, the transaction was a sale; otherwise it was

but a bailment; and the question was proper for the jury

whether or not, under the instruction of the court, according

to the facts as the jury might find them, the transaction was a

bailment or a sale.

On a careful review of the whole case, we find no error, and

the judgment is affirmed.
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CHAPTER U.

OP THE LEGAL RESULTS OF THE RELATION IN GENERAL.

5. DOORMAN V. JENKINS,

2 Ad. & Ellis 256; 29 E. C. L. 80. 1834.

Assumpsit. On the trial before Denman, C. J., at the London

sittings in December, 1833, the plaintiff. proved the delivery of

the money to the defendant for the purpose of the bill being taken

up as alleged in the declaration. The defendant was the proprie-

tor of a coffee-house, and the account which he was proved to have

given of the loss was as follows :— That he unfortunately placed

the money in his cash-box, which was kept in the tap-room;

that the tap-room had a bar in it ; that it was open on a Sunday,

but that the other parts of the premises, which were inhabited

by the defendant and his family, were not open on Sunday ; and

that the cash-box, with the plaintiff's money in it, and also a

much larger sum belonging to the defendant, was stolen from

the tap-room on a Sunday. The defendant did not pay the bill

when presented. The defendant's counsel contended that there

was no case to go to the jury, inasmuch as the defendant, be-

ing a gratuitous bailee, was liable only for gross negligence;
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and the loss of his own money, at the same time as the plain-

tiff's, shewed that the loss had not happened for want of such

care as he would take of his own property. The Lord Chief

Justice refused to nonsuit the plaintiff', but took a note of the

objection. The defendant called no witnesses. His Lordship

told the jury that it did not follow from the defendant's hav-

ing lost his own money at the same time as the plaintiff's, that

he had taken such care of the plaintiff's money as a reason-

able man would ordinarily take of his own ; and he added, that

the fact relied upon was no answer to the action, if they believed

that the loss occurred from gross negligence: but his Lord-

ship then said that the evidence of gross negligence was not, in

his opinion, satisfactory. Verdict for the plaintiff. In Hilary

term last, Sir James Scarlett obtained a rule to shew cause
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why the verdict should not be set aside, and a nonsuit be entered,

or a new trial be had.

Taunton J. I have felt some doubt in this case; but, after

the best consideration I can give it, I think the rule ought not

to be made absolute. The counsel for the plaintiff properly

admitted that, as this bailment was for the benefit of the bailor,

and no remuneration was given to the bailee, the action would

not be maintainable, except in the case of gross negligence.

The sole question, therefore, is, whether there was any proof of

such negligence. If there was, the application for a nonsuit,

at any rate, cannot be granted; and it is almost (though not

quite) equally clear that the defendant must be bound by the

decision to which the jury has come. A great deal has been

said on the point, whether the existence of gross negligence is a

question of law or fact. It is not necessary to enter into that

as an abstract question. Such a question will always depend

upon circumstances. There may be cases where the question

of gross negligence is matter of law more than of fact, and

others where it is matter of fact more than of law. An action
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brought against an attorney for negligence turns upon matter

of law rather than fact. It charges the attorney with having

undertaken to perform the business properly, and alleges that,

from his failure so to do, such and such injuries resulted to the

plaintiff. Now, in nineteen cases out of twenty, unless the

Court told the jury that the injurious results did, in point of

law, follow from the misconduct of the defendant, they would

be utterly unable to form a judgment on the matter. Yet, even

there, the jury have to determine whether, in point of fact, the

defendant has been guilty of that particular misconduct. On

the other hand, take the case of an action against a surgeon,

for negligence in the treatment of his patient. What law can

there possibly be in the question, whether such and such con-

duct amounts to negligence ? That must be determined entirely

by the jury. Without, therefore, laying down any abstract

rule, we may, I think, with perfect safety say that, in the pres-

ent case, the question was entirely for the jury. It is fact, not

law. The circumstances are extremely simple. The defeiMant

receives money to be kept for the plaintiff. What care does he

exercise? He puts it, together with money of his own (which

I think perfectly immaterial), into the till of a public-house.
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We might certainly have had more explicit evidence as to the

exact state of the box; in what place it was; and what class

of strangers frequented the room. If there was no negligence,

if the box was locked up and put in a safe place, and proper

care taken of it, these were circumstances which the defendant

had the best means of knowing, and, knowing them, he might

have exonerated himself. . In the absence, therefore, of evi-

dence to that effect, I think that there was a prima facie case

of gross negligence, which required an answer on the defendant 's

part. The phrase "gross negligence" means nothing more than

a great and aggravated degree of negligence, as distinguished

from negligence of a lower degree. The case of Shiells v. Black-

burne, 1 H. Bl. 158, created at first some degree of doubt in our

minds. It was said that the Court, in that case, treated the mat-

ter as a question of law, and set aside the verdict, because the

thing charged, the false description of the leather in the entry,

did not amount to gross negligence ; and therefore the jury had

mistaken the law. I do not view the case in that light. The jury

there found, that in fact the defendant had been guilty of negli-
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gence; but the Court thought that they had drawn a wrong

conclusion as to that fact. The case, therefore, does not stand

against the conclusion to which I have come. It does not ap-

pear certainly from the report, how the case was treated at

the trial, nor what the Judge said in summing up. But I do

not find it laid down, as a rule, that in every case the question

of negligence is to be matter of law. The ordinary practice is,

to leave it to the jury, whether such negligence has been proved

as the plaintiff has charged in his declaration. If the negligence

so charged be insufficient to give a right of action, the defend-

ant may move in arrest of judgment.

Patteson J. It is agreed on all hands that the defendant is

not liable, unless he has been guilty of gross negligence. The

difficulty lies in determining what is gross negligence, and

whether that is to be decided by the jury or the Court. If the

Court is to decide it, and no evidence has been given that satis-

fies the Court, there ought to have been a nonsuit. If the jury

was to decide, I cannot feel a doubt that there was some evidence

for them. I agree that the onus prohandi was on the plaintiff.

It appeared, by the evidence of what the defendant has said,

that the money committed to his charge was laid in a box in
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the tap room, which room was open on a Sunday, though the

rest of the premises were not. Under these circumstances, there

can be no nonsuit; for there was a sufficient case to go to the

jury. Whether, in the abstract, the question of negligence be

for the jury or the Court, I think it unnecessary, as my brother

Taunton says, to determine. The present, at all events, was

a question of fact, and therefore for the jury. The general

question I approach with much diffidence. I do not know any

thing more difficult, than to say, in mixed questions of law and

fact, what is for the Court, and what for the jury. In the

present case, the principal doubt in my mind arose from the

case of Shiells v. Blackburne, 1 H. Bl. 158. The facts in that

case were not disputed. It appeared that the defendant, being

employed (without reward) to send out some dressed leather,

entered it at the Custom House, together with some dressed

leather of his own, as wrought leather, in consequence of which

the whole was seized. Whether that amounted to gross negli-

gence, must have been a question for the jury. The report does

not say how they were directed, nor whether the Judge told them
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that, in his opinion, it was gross negligence. At first, I con-

ceived that nothing appeared from the report, except that the

Court thought it was a case of gross negligence. But, on looking

into the case, I find the Court thought that the jury had found

the fact erroneously, and sent the issue to another jury. So that,

in the present case, the only remaining question is, whether the

Judge left the question properly. At first, I understood that the

question left had been, whether the defendant had used ordinary

and reasonal)le care, which, although it may be a useful criterion

in determining the question whether there has been gross negli-

gence, is certainly not the same question. But it seems that

his lordship left it to them to say, whether there had been gross

negligence ; and that what he said respecting ordinary care,

was merely by way of illustration. We cannot, therefore, dis-

turb the verdict. Whether I should have found the same ver-

dict, is quite immaterial.

Lord Denman C, J. It appeared to me that some degree of

negligence was clearly proved in the first instance. I thought,

and I still think, it impossible for a judge to take upon himself

to say whether negligence is gross or not. I agree to all the

legal doctrine in Shiells v. Blackburne, 1 H. Bl. 158, which is,
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merely, that a bailee without reward is not liable to an action

without proof of gross negligence. I do not find a word there to

the effect that the judge is to say whether, in fact, negligence is

gross or not. I certainly did not take the view which the jury

did of this case, and I pressed, as strongly as possible, my opin-

ion upon them. Whether, if I had heard all they said to each

other, and had possessed all their experience, I should have

changed my opinion, I cannot say; but certainly the question

was for them. Williams, J. also rendered a concurring opinion.

Rule discharged.

6. GRAY V. MERRIAM.

148 III. 179; 35 N. E. R. 810; 39 Am. St. R. 172. 1893,

Action by I\Ierriam for the value of fifteen bonds left with

defendant bankers for safe keeping. The facts are stated in the

opinion.

Magruder, J. The main error assigned is the giving of the

first instruction .given by the trial court for the plaintiff. It

is claimed by plaintiff in error that the defendant bankers were

gratuitous bailees, holding the bonds in controversy as a special
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deposit for safekeeping without reward. The general rule is,

that a gratuitous bailee is liable only for gross negligence : Story

on Bailments, 9th ed., sees. 62, 79; Schouler on Bailments and

Carriers, 2d ed., sec. 35 ; Skelley v. Kahn, 17 111. 170. The in-

structions for both plaintiff and defendants require the jury to

find that the defendants were guilty of gross negligence in the

keeping of the bonds as a condition to the right of recovery.

But the objection made to plaintiff' 's instruction is the definition

which it gives of gross negligence in the use of the following

clause: "The want of ordinary and reasonable care is in law

termed gross negligence." Gross neligence has been defined to

be the absence or want of slight care or diligence: Story on

Bailments, sees. 62, 64; Schouler on Bailments and Carriers,

sees. 15, 35; Michigan Cent. R. R. Co. v. Carrow, 73 111. 348;

24 Am. Rep. 248; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 103 111.

512. But the portions of the instruction which precede and

follow said clause are in harmony with much of the language

used in the text-books and decisions. Schouler, in his recent
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work on Bailments and Carriers, section 35, after announcing

that the gratuitous bailee is liable only for slight care and dili-

gence, according to the circumstances, and cannot be held for

loss or injury, unless grossly negligent, says: "This statement

of the rule, though strongly buttressed upon authority, fails

at this day of universal approval in our jurisprudence. . . .

'Slight,' 'ordinary,' and 'great' are terms they (some courts)

wish to see discarded, and they prefer judging of each case by

its own complexion." The same author states that in the main

gross negligence is a question of fact upon all the evidence for

the jury, and that what constitutes slight diligence or gross

negligence will depend in each case upon a variety of circum-

stances, such as the occupation, habits, skill, and general char-

acter of the bailee, and local custom and business usage : Schouler

on Bailments and Carriers, sees. 49, 50. Story, after stating

the rule that when the bailment is for the sole benefit of the

bailor, the law requires only slight diligence on the part of the

bailee, subsequently adds that, in every case, good faith requires

a bailee, without reward, to take reasonable care of the deposit ;
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"and what is reasonable care must materially depend upon the

nature, value, and quality of the thing, the circumstances under

which it is deposited, and sometimes upon the character and

confidence and particular dealings of the parties ' ' : Story on

Bailments, sees. 23, 62.

In Smith v. First Nat. Bank, 99 Mass. 605, 97 Am. Dee. 59,

which was an action against a bank for the conversion or loss,

by gross negligence, of valuable articles deposited with it as

a bailee without hire, the court said: "This was a gratuitous

bailment. The defendants are liable only for want of ordi-

nary care."

A deposit is a naked bailment of goods to be kept for the

bailor without recompense, and to be returned when the bailor

shall require it, while a mandate is a bailment of goods without

reward, to be carried from place to place, or to have some act

performed about them: Story on Bailments, sees. 4, 5. But a

mandatary, like a depositary, is said to be bound only to slight

diligence, and responsible only for gross neglect: Story on

Bailments, sec. 174. In Skelley v. Kahn, 17 III. 170, we held that

"a mandatary or bailee who undertakes, without reward, to take

care of the pledge, or perform any duty or labor, is required

to use in its performance such care as men of common sense
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and common prudence, however inattentive, ordinarily take of

their own affairs, and they mil be liable only for bad faith, or

gross negligence, which is an omission of that degree of care."

The liability of banks, acting as bailees, without reward, in

the care of special deposits, has been recently considered in the

case of Preston v. Prather, 137 U. S. 604; 11 Sup. Ct. R. 162;

and it was there held that such bailees are bound to exercise such

reasonable care as men of common prudence usually bestow for

the protection of their own property of a similar character ; that

the exercise of reasonable care is in all such cases the dictate of

good faith; and that the care usually and generally deemed

necessary in the community for the security of similar property,

under like conditions, would be required of the bailee in such

cases, but nothing more. Gross negligence, as applied to grat-

uitous bailees, is defined in that case to be "nothing more than

a failure to bestow the care which the property in its situa-

tion demands"; and the court further says: "The omission of

the reasonable care required is the negligence which creates the

liability, and whether this existed is a question of fact for the
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jury to determine."

In the light of these more liberal views as to the liabilities

of bailees without reward, we think that the clause in question,

when considered in connection with the rest of the instruction,

could only have been understood by the jury as referring to

the want of such ordinary and reasonable care as was designated

in the previous part of the instruction, that is to say, the care

usually and generally deemed necessary in the community for

the security of similar property under like circumstances. The

rule, that a gratuitous bailee is responsible only for the want of

care which is taken by the most inattentive, cannot be applied

to all cases of bailment without reward. When securities are

deposited with banks accustomed to receive such deposits, they

are liable for any loss thereof occurring through the want of

that degree of care which good business men should exercise

in keeping property of such value: Bank v. Zent, 39 Ohio St.

105 ; 16 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 160, 206.

But if it be conceded that the definition of gross negligence

in the clause above quoted, even when considered in connec-

tion with the balance of the instruction, is technically inaccu-

rate, it does not follow that plaintiff in error is entitled to a re-

versal of the judgment in this case. A judgment will not be
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reversed for error in an instruction when it appears affirm-

atively that the defeated party was not injured by the error.

The absence of such injury is clearly manifest when the undis-

puted evidence establishes the correctness of the verdict, so that,

either with or without the erroneous instruction, the verdict

could not have been otherwise than it was, and, had it been

otherwise, would have been set aside by the court: Hall v.

Sroufe, 52 111. 421 ; Burling v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 85 111.

18 ; Hubner v. Feige, 90 111. 208 ; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. War-

ner, 108 111. 538 ; United States Rolling Stock Co. v. Wilder, 116

111. 100; 5 N. E. R. 92; Town of Wheaton v. Hadley, 131 111.

640, 23 N. E. R. 422.

The defendants in this case did a regular banking business.

The plaintiff kept a deposit and check account Avith them. He

borrowed money from them from time to time, and authorized

them to hold the bonds in question as collaterals to secure the

notes given for such loans. While the bonds were thus held as

collaterals, the character of the bailment was changed from a

bailment for the exclusive benefit of the bailor to one for the
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mutual benefit of the bailor and bailee : Preston v. Prather, 137

U. S. 604, 11 Sup. Ct. R. 162. In ordinary cases of special de-

posits without reward the banker has no right to handle or

examine the property except so far as its safety may require.

But here the bankers had access to the package containing the

bonds, and detached the interest coupons when they fell due,

and collected the interest, and deposited it to the credit of the

plaintiff, to be checked out by him in the regular course of busi-

ness: National Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S. 699; Whitney v.

First Nat. Bank, 55 Vt. 154 ; 45 Am. Rep. 598.

Ker, the assistant cashier of the bank, stole the bonds in the

summer of 1882. He had access to these bonds and to the other

special deposits kept by the bank in its vault. About a year

before he absconded, Kean, the chief officer of the bank, had his

attention called to the fact that Ker was speculating upon the

board of trade in Chicago, and had a conversation upon the

subject with him. Ker was not known to have any other prop-

erty than his salary of eighteen hundred dollars. He was, how-

ever, allowed to retain his position in the bank, and no effort

was made to verify the truth of the statements made as to his

speculations, and no examination was made to ascertain whether

he was using moneys which did not belong to him. About two
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months before he absconded, the subject of his speculations was

again called to the attention of the chief officers of the bank

through an anonymous communication, and Kean had a second

interview with him in relation to his conduct in this regard. ' ' The

defendants then entered upon an examination of their books

and securities, but made no effort to ascertain whether the spe-

cial deposits had been disturbed": Preston v. Prather, 137 U. S.

604, 11 Sup. Ct. R. 162. The facts thus detailed are undisputed,

and are established by the evidence of the defendants themselves.

In Preston v. Prather, 137 U. S. 604, 11 Sup. Ct. 162, an action

was brought in the circuit court of the United States by parties

in Missouri, doing business under the firm name of the Nodaway

Valley Bank of Maryville, against the same bankers who are de-

fendants in the present suit, to recover the value of United States

bonds held as a special deposit, and stolen by the said Ker about

the same time when he appropriated the bonds in controversy

here. The Prather case was tried by agreement before the fed-

eral circuit judge without a jury, resulting in judgment for

the plaintiffs, and was taken afterwards to the supreme court
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of the United States, where the judgment rendered by the cir-

cuit judge was affirmed. The evidence in that case estab-

lished substantially the same facts as are herein set forth. Those

facts, which are here undisputed and supported by the testi-

mony of the defendants, were there held by the federal supreme

court to constitute such gross negligence as to make the defend-

ants liable for the loss of the bonds. ( Omitting a quotation from

the opinion of the court in the Prather case).

Inasmuch as the undisputed facts presented to the jury for

their consideration on the trial below have been determined by

the supreme court of the United States to amount to such gross

negligence as will fasten liability upon a gratuitous bailee, we

are disposed to hold that the verdict of the jury was right, in-

dependently of the error in the instruction, and that it ought

not to be disturbed : Scott v. National Bank, 72 Pa. St. 471 ;

13 Am. Rep. 711.

It is said that the trial court erred in admitting testimony

showing that the bonds had been pledged as collateral security

for loans made by the bank to the plaintiff at various times

before they were stolen, and that the evidence should have been

confined to the character of the bailment at the time of the

loss in the summer or fall of 1882, as at the latter date all prev-
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ious loans, for the security of which the bonds had been pledged,

had been paid up, and they were then held merely as a special

deposit. We think that this testimony, as well as that showing

that Ker had access to the bonds for the purpose of cutting the

quarterly coupons therefrom, as late as October, 1882, after some

of them had been abstracted, was competent to show the rela-

tion of the parties to each other and to the property. As the

reasonable care which the defendants were required to take

of the bonds depended upon the situation and the bearing of

surrounding circumstances, and the nature of the custody which

they were allowed to exercise over the bonds, the extent to which

they were permitted to have access to the bonds, under instruc-

tions by correspondence from the plaintiff, who lived iri Iowa,

either for the purpose of holding them as collaterals to notes,

or for the purpose of detaching the coupons, had a direct bear-

ing upon the question of their obligation to make examination

when advised of the speculations of their assistant cashier.

The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
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-V 7. PRESTON V. PRATHER,

137 U. S. 601; 11 S. Ct. K. 162. 1890.

Action for the value of certain U. S. bonds of about $12,000

face value, purchased for plaintiff by defendants and kept as a

special deposit under a special agreement. The bonds were

stolen by defendants' assistant cashier. Judgment for plain-

tiffs.

]VIr. Justice Field, after stating the case, delivered the opinion

of the court.

By the defendants it was contended below in substance, and

the contention is renewed here, that the bonds being placed with

them on special deposit for safe-keeping, without any reward,

promised or implied, they were gratuitous bailees, and were

not chargeable for the loss of the bonds, unless the same resulted

from their gross negligence, and they deny that any such negli-

gence is imputable to them.

On the other hand, the plaintiffs contended below, and re-

peat their contention here, that, assuming that the defendants

were in fact simply gratuitous bailees when the bonds were
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deposited with them, they still neglected to keep them with

the care which such bailees are bound to give for Mie protec-

tion of property placed in their custody; and further, that

subsequently the character of the bailment was changed to

one for the mutual benefit of the parties.

Much of the argument of counsel before the court, and in

the briefs filed before them, was unnecessary — indeed, was not

open to consideration — from the fact that the case was heard,

upon stipulation of parties, by the court without the interven-

tion of a jury, and its special findings cover all the disputed

questions of fact. There is in the record no bill of exceptions

taken to ruling in the progress of the trial, and the correct-

ness of the findings upon the evidence is not open to our con-

sideration. Rev. Stat. § 700. The question whether the facts

found are sufficient to support the judgment is the only one

of inquiry here.

Undoubtedly, if the bonds were received by the defendants

for safe-keeping, without compensation to them in any form,

but exclusively for the benefit of the plaintiffs, the only obli-
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gation resting upon them was to exercise over the bonds such

reasonable care as men of common prudence would usually

bestow for the protection of their own property of a similar

character. No one taking upon himself a duty for another

without consideration is bound, either in law or morals, to do

more than a man of that character would do generally for

himself under like conditions. The exercise of reasonable care

is in all such cases the dictate of good faith. An utter dis-

regard of the property of the bailor would be an act of bad

faith to him. But what will constitute such reasonable care

will vary with the nature, value and situation of the property,

the general protection afforded by the police of the community

against violence and crime, and the bearing of surrounding

circumstances upon its security. The care usually and generally

deemed necessary in the community for the security of similar

property, under like conditions, would be required of the bailee

in such cases, but nothing more. The general doctrine, as stated

by text writers and in judicial decisions, is that gratuitous

bailees of another's property are not responsible for its loss

unless guilty of gross negligence in its keeping. But gross neg-

ligence in such cases is nothing more than a failure to bestow

the care which the property in its situation demands ; the omis-
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sion of the reasonable care required is the negligence which

creates the liability; and whether this existed is a question of

fact for the jury to determine, or by the court where a jury

is waived. See Steamboat New "World v. King, 16 How. 469,

474, 475; Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 383; Mil-

waukee & St. Paul Railway v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489, 494. The

doctrine of exemption from liability in such cases was at one

time carried so far as to shield the bailees from the fraudulent

acts of their own employees and officers, though their employ-

ment embraced a supervision of the property, such acts not be-

ing deemed within the scope of their employment.

Thus, in Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479, 9 Am. D. 168,

the bank was, in such a case, exonerated from liability for the

property entrusted to it, which had been fraudulently appro-

priated by its cashier, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-

setts holding that he had acted without the scope of his author-

ity, and, therefore, the bank was not liable for his acts any more

than it would have been for the acts of a mere stranger. In that

case a chest containing a quantity of gold coin, which was speci-
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fied in an accompanying memorandum, was deposited in the

bank for safe-keeping, and the gold was fraudulently taken out

by the cashier of the bank and used. It was held, upon the doc-

trine stated, that the bank was not liable to the depositor for

the value of the gold taken.

In the subsequent case of Smith v. First National Bank in

Westfield, 99 Mass. 605, 611, 97 Am. D. 59, the same court held

that the gross carelessness which would charge a gratuitous

bailee for the loss of property must be such as would affect its

safe-keeping, or tend to its loss, implying that liability would

attach to the bailee in such cases, and to that extent qualifying

the previous decision.

In Scott V. National Bank of Chester Valley, 72 Penn. St.

471, 480, 13 Am. R. 711, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

asserted the same doctrine as that in the Massachusetts case,

holding that a bank, as a mere depositary, without special con-

tract or reward, was not liable for the loss of a government bond

deposited with it for safe-keeping, and afterwards stolen by one

of its clerks or tellers. In that case it was stated that the teller

was suffered to remain in the employment of the bank after it

was known that he had dealt once or twice in stocks, but this fact

was not allowed to control the decision, on the ground that it
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was unknowii to the officers of the bank that the teller gambled

in stocks until after he had absconded, but at the same time ob-

serving that:

"No officer in a bank, engaged in stock gambling, can be

safely trusted, and the evidence of this is found in the numer-

ous defaulters, whose peculations have been discovered to be

directly traceable to this species of gambling. A cashier, treas.

urer, or other officer having the custody of funds, thinks he sees

a desirable speculation, and takes the funds of his institution,

hoping to return them instantly, but he fails in his venture, or

success tempts him on ; and he ventures again to retrieve his loss,

or increase his gain, and again and again he ventures. Thus

the first step, often taken without a criminal intent, is the fatal

step, w^hich ends in ruin to himself and to those whose confi-

dence he has betrayed."

As stated above, the reasonable care which persons should

take of property entrusted to them for safe-keeping without

reward will necessarily vary with its nature, value and situa-

tion, and the bearing of surrounding circumstances upon its
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security. The business of the bailee will necessarily have some

effect upon the nature of the care required of him, as, for ex-

ample, in the case of bankers and banking institutions, having

special arrangements, by vaults and other guards, to protect

property in their custody. Persons therefore depositing val-

uable articles with them, expect that such measures will be

taken as will ordinarily secure the property from burglars out-

side and from thieves within, and that whenever ground for

suspicion arises an examination will be made by them to see

that it has not been abstracted or tampered with; and also

that they will employ fit men, both in ability and integrity,

for the discharge of their duties, and remove those employed

whenever found wanting in either of these particulars. An

omission of such measures would in most cases be deemed cul-

pable negligence, so gross as to amount to a breach of good

faith, and constitute a fraud upon the depositor.

It was this view of the duty of the defendants in this case,

who were engaged in business as bankers, and the evidence of

their neglect, upon being notified of the speculations in stock

of their assistant cashier who stole the bonds, to make the

necessary examination respecting the securities deposited with

them, or to remove the speculating cashier, which led the court
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to its conclusion that they were guilty of gross negligence. It

was shown that about a year before the assistant cashier ab-

sconded the defendant Kean, who was the chief officer of the

banking institution, was informed that there was some one in

the bank speculating on the Board of Trade at Chicago. There-

upon Kean made a quiet investigation, and the facts discovered

by him pointed to Ker, whom he accused of speculating. Ker re-

plied that he had made a few transactions, but was doing nothing

then and did not propose to do anything more, and that he was

then about a thousand dollars ahead, all told. It was not known

that Ker had any other property besides his salary. His posi-

tion as assistant cashier gave him access to the funds as well as

the securities of the bank, and he was afterwards kept in his

position without any effort being made on the part of the de-

fendants to verify the truth of his statement, or whether he had

attempted to appropriate to his own use the property of others.

Again, about two months before Ker absconded, one of the

defendants, residing at Detroit, received an anonymous com-

munication, stating that some one connected with the bank in
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Chicago was speculating on the Board of Trade. He there-

upon wrote to the bank, calling attention to the reported specu-

lation of some of its employees, and suggesting inquiry and a

careful examination of its securities of all kinds. On receipt of

this communication Kean told Ker what he had heard, and

asked if he had again been speculating on the Board of Trade.

Ker replied that he had made some deals for friends in Canada,

but the transactions were ended. The defendants then entered

upon an examination of their books and securities, but made no

effort to ascertain whether the special deposits had been dis-

turbed. Upon this subject the court below, in giving its de-

cision, Prather v. Kean, 29 Fed. Rep. 498, after observing that

the defendants knew that Ker had been engaged in business

which was hazardous and that his means were scant, and after

commenting upon the demoralizing effect of speculating in

stocks and grain, as seen in the numerous peculations, embez-

zlements, forgeries and thefts plainly traceable to that cause,

and the free access by Ker to valuable securities, which were

transferable by delivery, easily abstracted and converted, and

yet his being allowed to retain his position without any effort

to see that he had not converted to his own use the property of

others, or that his statements were correct, held that it was
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gross negligence in the defendants not to discharge him or place

him in some position of less responsibility. In this conclusion

we fully concur.

The second position of the plaintiffs is also well taken, that,

assuming the defendants were gratuitous bailees at the time

the bonds were placed with them, the character of the bail-

ment was subsequently changed to one for the mutual benefit

of the parties. It appears from the findings that the plaintiffs,

subsequent to their deposit, had repeatedly asked for a dis-

count of their notes by the defendants, offering the latter the

bonds deposited with them as collateral, and that such discounts

were made. Wlien the notes thus secured were paid, and the

defendants called upon the plaintiffs to know what they should

do with the bonds, they were informed that they were to hold

them for the plaintiffs' use as previously. The plaintiffs had

already written to the defendants that they desired to keep the

bonds for an emergency, and also that they wished at times to

overdraw their account, and that they would consider the bonds

as securities for such overdrafts. From these facts the court was
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of opinion that the bonds were held by the defendants as collat-

eral to meet any sums which the plaintiffs might overdraw;

and the accounts show that they did subsequently overdraw in

numerous instances.

The deposit, by its change from a gratuitous bailment to a

security for loans, became a bailment for the mutual benefit

of both parties, that is to say, both were interested in the trans-

actions. For the bailor it obtained the loans, and to that extent

was to his advantage ; and to the bailee it secured the payment

of the loans, and that was to his advantage also. The bailee

was therefore required, for the protection of the bonds, to give

such care as a prudent owner would extend to his own property

of a similar kind, being in that respect under an obligation of a

more stringent character than that of a gratuitous bailee, but

differing from him in that he thereby became liable for the loss

of the property if caused by his neglect, though not amounting

to gross negligence.

Two cases cited by counsel, one from the Court of Appeals

of Maryland and the other from the Court of Appeals of New

York, declare and illustrate the relation of parties under con-

ditions similar to those of the parties before us.
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(Omitting a discussion of Third National Bank v. Boyd, 44

Maryland, 47, and of Cutting v. Marlor, 78 N. Y. 454.)

It follows, therefore, that whether we regard the defendants

as gratuitous bailees in the first instance, or as afterwards be-

coming bailees for the mutual benefit of both parties, they were

liable for the loss of the bonds deposited with them. And the

measure of the recovery was the value of the bonds at the time

they were stolen.

Judgment affirmed.

8. WILSON V. BRETT,

11 Mees. and Welshy 113. 1843.

Case. — Plea, not guilty.

At the trial before Rolfe, B., at the London Sittings in this

term, it appeared that the plaintiff had intrusted the horse in

question to the defendant, requesting him to ride it to Peckham,

for the purpose of showing it for sale to a Mr. Margetson. The

defendant accordingly rode the horse to Peckham, and for the

purpose of showing it, took it into the East Surrey Race Ground,

where Mr. Margetson was engaged with others in playing the
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game of cricket: and there, in consequence of the slippery

nature of the ground, the horse slipped and fell several times,

and in falling broke one of his knees. It was proved that the

defendant was a person conversant with and skilled in horses.

The learned Judge, in summing up, left it to the jury to say

whether the nature of the ground was such as to render it a

matter of culpable negligence in the defendant to ride the horse

there ; and told them, that under the circumstances, the defend-

ant, being shown to be a person skilled in the management of

horses, was bound to take as much care of the horse as if he had

borrowed it; and that, if they thought the defendant had been

negligent in going upon the ground where the injury was done,

or had ridden the horse carelessly there, they ought to find for

the plaintiff. The jury found for the plaintiff, damages, 5£.

10s.

Byles, Serjt., now moved for a new trial, on the ground of

misdirection. — There was no evidence here that the horse was

ridden in an unreasonable or improper manner, except as to

the place where he was ridden. The defendant was admitted
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to be a mere gratuitous bailee : and there being no evidence of

gross or culpable negligence, the learned Judge misdirected

the jury, in stating to them that there was no difference be-

tween his responsibility and that of a borrower. There are

three classes of bailments; the first, where the bailment is alto-

gether for the benefit of the bailor, as where goods are deliv-

ered for deposit or carriage ; the second, where it is altogether

for the benefit of the bailee, as in the case of a borrower; and

the third, where it is partly for the benefit of each, as in the

case of a hiring or pledging. This defendant was not within the

rule of law applicable to the second of these classes. The law

presumes that a person who hires or borrows a chattel is pos-

sessed of competent skill in the management of it, and holds

him liable accordingly. The learned Judge should therefore

have explained to the jury, that that which would amount to

proof of negligence in a borrower, would not be sufficient to

charge the defendant, and that he could be liable only for gross

and culpable negligence.

Parke, B. — I think the case was left quite correctly to the jury.
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The defendant was s1io^\ti to be a person conversant with horses,

and was therefore bound to use such care and skill as a person

conversant with horses might reasonably be expected to use:

if he did not, he was guilty of negligence. The whole effect of

what was said by the learned Judge as to the distinction between

this case and that of a borrower, was this; that this particu-

lar defendant, being in fact a person of competent skill, was

in effect in the same situation as that of a borrower, who in

point of law represents to the lender that he is a person of com-

petent skill. In the case of gratuitous bailee, where his pro-

fession or situation is such as to imply the possession of com-

petent skill, he is equally liable for the neglect to use it.

EOLFE, B. — The distinction I intended to make was, that a

gratuitous bailee is only bound to exercise such skill as he pos-

sesses, whereas a hirer or borrower may reasonably be taken to

represent to the party who lets, or from whom he borrows, that

he is a person of competent skill. If a person more skilled

knows that to be dangerous which another not so skilled as he

does not, surely that makes a difference in the liability. I said

I could see no difference between negligence and gross negli-

gence — that it was the same thing, with the addition of a vitu-

39

§§ 8, 9 LEGAL EESULTS OF BAILMENT EELATION.

perative epithet; and I intended to leave it to the jury to say

whether the defendant, being, as appeared by the evidence, a

person accustomed to the management of horses, was guilty of

culpable negligence.

Lord Abinger, C. B., and Alderson, B., concurred.

Rule refused.

9. CLAFLIN V. MEYER,

75 N. Y. 260; 31 Am. R. 467. 1878.

Action against warehouseman for failure to deliver goods.

Judgment for plaintiff.

Hand, J. The counsel for the respondents is correct in his

position that the question of burden of proof is the material

one upon this appeal. For the evidence is such that if it were

incumbent upon the defendant to prove himself free from all

negligence causing or attending upon the burglary, and not

merely to leave the case as consistent with due care as with

the want of it, it is clear that the judgment, so far as it adjudges

his liability for the goods, must be affirmed, as we cannot say

that such proof of a conclusive character was given. But the
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law as to the burden of proof is pretty well settled to the con-

trary. Upon its appearing that the goods were lost by a bur-

glary committed upon the defendant's warehouse, it was for

the plaintiffs to establish affirmatively that such burglary was

occasioned or was not prevented by reason of some negligence

or omission of due care on the part of the warehouseman.

The cases agree that where a bailee of goods, although liable

to their owner for their loss only in case of negligence, fails,

nevertheless, upon their being demanded, to deliver them or

account for such non-delivery, or, to use the language of

Sutherland, J., in Schmidt v. Blood, where "there is a total

default in delivering or accounting for the goods," 9 Wend.

268, 24 Am. D. 143, this is to be treated as prima facie evidence

of negligence. Fairfax v. N. Y. C. and H. R. R. R. Co., 67 N.

Y. 11, 29 Am. R. 119 ; Steers v. Liverpool Steamship Co., 57 id.

1 ; 15 Am. Rep. 453 ; Burnell v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 184,

6 Am. Rep. 61. This rule proceeds either from the assumed

necessity of the case, it being presumed that the bailee has ex-

clusive knowledge of the facts and that he is able to give the
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reason for his non-delivery, if any exist, other than his own act

or fault, or from a presumption that he actually retains the

goods and by his refusal converts them.

But where the refusal to deliver is explained by the fact ap-

pearing that the goods have been lost, either destroyed by fire

or stolen by thieves, and the bailee is therefore unable to de-

liver them, there is no prima facie evidence of his want of care,

and the court will not assume in the absence of proof on the

point that such fire or theft was the cause of his negligence. Lamb

V. Camden and Amboy E. R. Co., 46 N. Y. 271, 7 Am. R. 327,

and cases there cited ; Schmidt v. Blood, 9 Wend. 268, 24 Am. D.

143 ; Piatt v. Hibbard, 7 Cow. 500, note. Grover, J., in 46 N. Y.,

supra, says, in delivering the opinion of the court, the question

is ''whether the defendant was bound to go further {i. e., than

showing the loss by fire) and show that it and its employees

were free from negligence in the origin and progress of the

fire, or whether it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to main-

tain the action to prove that the fire causing the loss resulted

from such negligence." And he proceeds to show that the
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charge of the judge who tried the cause gave to the jury the

former instruction, and that this was contraiy to the law and

erroneous. So Sutherland, J., in 9. Wend, supra, in the case

of a warehouseman, says: the onus of showing the negligence

''seems to be upon the plaintiff unless there is a total default

in delivery' or accounting for the goods. ' ' And he cites a note

of Judge CowEN to his report of Piatt v. Hibbard, 7 Cow. 500,

in which that very learned author says, criticising and ques-

tioning a charge of the circuit judge, "the distinction would

seem to be that when there is a total default to deliver the

goods bailed on demand, the onus of accounting for the default

lies with the bailee; otherwise he shall be deemed to have con-

verted the goods to his own use and trover will lie (Anonymous,

2 Salk. 655), but when he has shown a loss or where the goods

are injured, the law will not intend negligence. The onus is

then shifted upon the plaintiff. ' '

It will be seen, as the result of these authorities, that the

burden is ordinarily upon the plaintiff alleging negligence to

prove it against a warehouseman who accounts for his failure

to deliver by showing a destruction or loss from fire or theft.

It is not of course intended to hold that a warehouseman, refus-

ing to deliver goods, can impose any necessity of proof upon
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the owuer by merely alleging as an excuse that they have been

stolen or burned. These facts must appear or be proved with

reasonable certainty. Nor do we concur in the view that there

is in these cases any real "shifting" of the burden of proof.

The warehouseman in the absence of bad faith is only liable

for negligence. The plaintiff must in all cases, suing him for

the loss of goods, allege negligence and prove negligence. This

burden is never shifted from him. If he proves the demand

upon the warehouseman and his refusal to deliver, these facts

unexplained are treated by the courts as prima facie evidence

of negligence ; but if, either in the course of his proof or that of

the defendant, it appears that the goods have been lost by theft,

the evidence must show that the loss arose from the negligence

of the warehouseman.

Applying these principles to the present case, we must hold

that when it appeared, as it did, that the goods were taken from

the defendant's warehouse by a burglarious entry thereof, the

plaintiffs should have shown that some negligence or want of

care, such as a prudent man would take under similar circum-
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stances of his own property, caused or permitted or contributed

to cause or permit that burglary.

[Omitting questions of fact.]

The judgment must be reversed and new trial ordered, with

costs to abide the event.

All concur, except Miller and Earl, JJ., absent at argument.

Judgment reversed.

10. THORNE V. DEAS,

4 Johns. (N. Y.) 84. 1809.

This was an action on the case, for a nonfeasance, in not

causing insurance to be made on a certain vessel, called the Sea

Nymph, on a voyage from New- York to Camden, in North-Caro-

lina. The vessel was lost at sea.

Kent, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court. The chief

objection raised to the right of recovery in this case, is the

want of a consideration for the promise. The offer, on the part

of the defendant, to cause insurance to be effected, Avas perfectly

voluntary. Will, then, an action lie, when one party intrusts
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the performance of a business to another, who undertakes to

do it gratuitously, and %A^holly omits to do it ? If the party who

makee this engagement, enters upon the execution of the busi-

ness, and does it amiss, through the want of due care, by which

damage ensues to the other party, an action will lie for this

Luisfeasance. But the defendant never entered upon the execu-

tion of his undertaking, and the action is brought for the non-

feasance. Sir William Jones, in his "Essay on the Law of

Bailments," considers this species of undertaking to be as ex-

tensively binding in the English law, as the contract of man-

datum, in the Roman law ; and that an action will lie for damage

occasioned by the non-performance of a promise to become a

mandatary, though the promise be purely gratuitous. This treat-

ise stands high with the profession, as a learned and classical

performance, and I regret, that, on this point, I find so much

reason to question its accuracy. I have carefully examined all

the authorities to which he refers. He has not produced a sin-

gle adjudged case; but only some dicta (and those equivocal)

from the Year Books, in support of his opinion ; and was it not
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for the weight which the authority of so respectable a name

imposes, I should have supposed the question too well settled

to admit of an argument.

A short review of the leading cases will show, that, by the

common law, a mandatary, or one who undertakes to do an act

for another, without reward, is not answerable for omitting to

do the act, and is only responsible when he attempts to do it,

and does it amiss. In other words, he is responsible for a mis-

feasance, but not for a nonfeasance, even though special dam-

ages are averred. Those who are conversant with the doctrine

of mandatum in the civil law, and have perceived the equity

which supports it, and the good faith which it enforces, may,

perhaps, feel a portion of regret, that Sir William Jones was

not successful in his attempt to ingraft this doctrine, in all its

extent, into the English law. I have no doubt of the perfect

justice of the Roman rule, on the ground, that good faith ought

to be observed, because the emploj^er, placing reliance upon that

good faith in the mandatary, was thereby prevented from doing

the act himself, or employing another to do it. This is the

reason which is given in the Institutes for the rule : Mandatum

non suscipere cuilihet liherum est; susceptum autem consum-

mandum est, aut quam primum renunciandum, ut per semetip-
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sum aut per alium, eandem rem mandator exequatur. (Inst. lib.

3. 27. 11.) But there are many rights of moral obligation which

civil laws do not enforce, and are, therefore, left to the con-

science of the individual, as rights of imperfect obligation ; and

the promise before us seems to have been so left by the common

law, which we cannot alter, and which we are bound to pro-

nounce.

The earliest case on this subject, is that of Watson v. Brinth

(Year Book 2 Hen. IV. 3 &.), in which it appears that the de-

fendant promised to repair certain houses of the plaintiff, and

had neglected to do it, to his damage. The plaintiff was non-

suited, because he had shown no covenant ; and Brincheley said,

that if the plaintiff had counted that the thing had 1)6671 com-

menced, and aftertvards, hy negligence, nothing done, it had

been otherwise. Here the court, at once, took the distinction

between nonfeasance and misfeasance. No consideration was

stated, and the court required a covenant to bind the party.

In the next case (11 Hen. IV, 33 a.) an action was brought

against a carpenter, stating that he had undertaken to build a
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house for the plaintiff, within a certain time, and had not done

it. The plaintiff was also nonsuited, because the undertaking

was not binding without a specialty; but, says the case, if he

had undertaken to huild the house, and had done it illy or neg-

ligently, an action would have lain, without deed. Brooke

(Action sur le Case, pi. 40.) in citing the above case, says, that

"it seems to be good law to this day; wherefore the action

upon the case which shall be brought upon the assumption,

must state that for such a sum of money to him paid, &c., and

that in the above case, it is assumed, that there was no sum

of money, therefore it was a nudum pactum."

The case of 3 Hen. VI. 36 b. is one referred to, in the Essay

on Bailments, as containing the opinion of some of the judges,

that such an action as the present could be maintained. It

was an action against Watkins, a mill-wright, for not building

a mill according to promise. There was no decision upon the

question, and in the long conversation between the counsel and

the court, there was some difference of opinion on the point.

The counsel for the defendant contended, that a consideration

ought to have been stated ; and of the three judges who expressed

any opinion, one concurred with the counsel for the defendant,

and another (Babington, Ch. J.) was in favor of the action, but
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he said nothing expressly about the point of consideration,

and the third (Cokain, J.) said, it appeared to him that the

plaintiff had so declared, for it shall not be intended that the

defendant would build the mill for nothing. So far is this

case from giving countenance to the present action, that Brooke

(Action sur le Case, pi. 7. and Contract, pi. 6) considered it

as containing the opinion of the court, that the plaintiffs ought

to have set forth what the miller was to have for his labor,

for otherwise, it was a nude pact; and in Coggs v. Bernard,

Mr. Justice Gould gave the same exposition of the case.

The general question whether assumpsit would lie for a non-

feasance, agitated the courts in a variety of cases, afterwards,

down to the time of Hen. VII. (14 Hen. VI. 18 b. pi. 58. 19

Hen. VI. 49 a. pi. 5. 20 Hen. VI. 34 a. pi. 4. 2 Hen. VII. 11.

pi. 9. 21 Hen. VII. 41 a. pi. 66). There was no dispute or doubt,

but that an action upon the case lay for a misfeasance in the

breach of a trust undertaken voluntarily. The point in contro-

versy was, whether an action upon the case lay for a nonfeas-

ance, or non-performance of an agreement, and whether there
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was any remedy where the party had not secured himself by a

covenant or specialty. But none of these cases, nor, as far as I

can discover, do any of the dicta of the judges in them, go so

far as to say, that an assumpsit would lie for the non-perform-

ance of a promise, without stating a consideration for the prom-

ise. And when, at last, an action upon the case for the non-per-

formance of an undertaking came to be established, the necessity

of showing a consideration was explicitly avowed.

Sir William Jones says, that "a case in Brooke, made com-

plete from the Year Book to which he refers, seems directly

in point." The case referred to is 21 Hen. VII. 41. and it is

given as a loose 7iote of the reporter. The chief justice is there

made to say, that if one agree with me to build a house by such

a day, and he does not built it, I have an action on the case for

this no7ifeasance, equally as if he had done it amiss. Nothing

is here said about a consideration; but in the next instance

which the judge gives of a nonfeasance for which an action

on the case lies, he states a consideration paid. This case, how-

ever is better reported in Keilway, 78. pi. 5., and this last report

must have been overlooked by the author of the "Essay."

Frowicke, Ch. J., there says, "that if I covenant with a car-

penter to build a house, and pay him 201. to build the house
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by a certain day, and he does not do it, I have a good action

upon the case, hy reason of the payment of my money; and

without payment of the money in this case, no remedy. And

yet, if he make the house in a bad manner, an action upon the

case lies; and so for the nonfeasance, if the money he paid,

action upon the case lies. ' '

There is, then, no just reason to infer, from the ancient

authorities, that such a promise as the one before us is good,

without showing a consideration. The whole current of the de-

cisions runs the other way, and, from the time of Henry VII.

to this time, the same law has been uniformly maintained.

The doctrine on this subject, in the Essay on Baibnents, is

true, in reference to the civil law, but is totally unfounded in

reference to the English law; and to those who have atten-

tively examined the head of Mandates, in that Essay, I hazard

nothing in asserting, that that part of the treatise appears to be

hastily and loosely written. It does not discriminate well be-

tween the cases; it is not very profound in research, and is

destitute of true legal precision.
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But the counsel for the plaintiffs contended, that if the gen-

eral rule of the common law was against the action, this was a

commercial question, arising on a subject of insurance, as to

which, a different rule had been adopted. The case of Wilkin-

son V. Coverdale (1 Esp. Rep. 75.), was upon a promise to cause

a house to be insured, and Lord Kenyon held, that the defendant

was answerable only upon the ground that he had proceeded to

execute the trust, and had done it negligently. The distinction,

therefore, if any exists, must be confined to cases of marine in-

surance. In Smith v. Lascelles (2 Term Rep. 188.), Mr. Justice

Buller said it was settled law, that there were three cases in

which a merchant, in England, was bound to insure for his

correspondent abroad.

1. Where the merchant abroad has effects in the hands of

his correspondent in England, and he orders him to insure.

2. Where he has no effects, but, from the course of dealing

between them, the one has been used to send orders for insur-

ance, and the other to obey them.

3. Where the merchant abroad sends bills of lading to his

correspondent in England, and engrafts on them an order to

insure, as the implied condition of acceptance, and the other

accepts.
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The case itself, which gave rise to these observations, and

the two cases referred to in the note to the report, were all

instances of misfeasance, in proceeding to execute the trust,

and in not executing it well. But I shall not question the appli-

cation of this rule, as stated by Buller, to cases of nonfeasance,

for so it seems to have been applied in Webster v. De Tastet.

(7 Term Rep. 157.) They have, however, no application to the

present case. The defendant here was not a factor or agent

to the plaintiffs, within the purview of the law-merchant. There

is no color for such a suggestion. A factor, or commercial

agent, is employed by merchants to transact business abroad, and

for which he is entitled to a commission or allowance. (Malyne,

81. Beawes, 44.) In every instance given, of the responsibility

of an agent for not insuring, the agent answered to the defini-

tion given of a factor, who transacted business for his prin-

cipal, who was absent, or resided abroad; and there were spe-

cial circumstances m each of these cases, from which the agent

was to be charged ; but none of those circumstances exist in this

case. If the defendant had been a broker, whose business it was
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to procure insurance for others, upon a regular commission, the

case might, possibly, have been different. I mean not to say,

that a factor or commercial agent cannot exist, if he and his

principal reside together at the same time, in the same place;

but there is nothing here from which to infer that the defend-

ant was a factor, unless it be the business he assumed to per-

form, viz. to procure the insurance of a vessel and that fact alone

will not make him a factor. Every person who undertakes

to do any specific act, relating to any subject of a commercial

nature, would equally become, quoad hoc, a factor ; a proposition

too extravagant to be maintained. It is very clear, from this

case, that the defendant undertook to have the insurance ef-

fected, as a voluntary and gratuitous act, without the least idea

of entitling himself to a commission for doing it. He had an

equal interest in the vessel with the plaintiffs, and what he un-

dertook to do was as much for his own benefit as theirs. It

might as well be said, that whenever one partner promises his

copartner to do any particular act for the common benefit, he

becomes, in that instance, a factor to his copartner, and entitled

to a commission. The plaintiffs have, then, failed in their at-

tempt to bring this case within the range of the decisions, or

within any principle which gives an action against a commercial
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agent, who neglects to insure for his correspondent. Upon the

whole view of the case, therefore, we are of opinion, that the

defendant is entitled to judgment.

Judgment for the defendant.

*^^ 11. LEACH V. FRENCH,

69 Me. 389; 31 Am. R. 296. 1879.

Assumpsit for board, keeping and burial of a horse.

Barrows, J. The case, as stated in the report, is that the

defendant owned the horse, for the board and keeping of which

while sick, and the expense of its removal when dead, plaintiff

brings this action, under the following circumstances:

Defendant let the horse to one Devereux. The horse became

diseased and sick while thus let, and Devereux left him with the

plaintiff for care and cure. "While plaintiff was keeping the

horse defendant wrote him informing him that he (defendant)

owned the horse and inquiring about its condition, and saying

that an uncle of Devereux would pay the bill. After the horse

died plaintiff's attorney wrote defendant demanding payment

of the bill. Defendant answered, ' ' Please not make any costs on
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it (the bill) as I will call and settle the same soon." Plaintiff's

attorney thereupon wrote defendant saying he would wait. After

waiting awhile, in pursuance of this arrangement, payment not

being made, this suit was brought. Defendant denies his lia-

bility to pay for the expenses of his horse thus incurred, and

contends that there was no valid consideration for his express

promise to do it. Unless there was an original liability on his

part by reason of the circumstances and acts of the parties

while the plaintiff was furnishing the care and board of the

horse, it may well be doubted whether a valid consideration is

shown for the promise in defendant's letter to the attorney.

We do not find it necessary to decide that question, for as the

case is stated, we think, upon natural and legal presumptions,

it is made to appear that the plaintiff might well charge the

keeping of the horse to its owner, and that the defendant would

be liable for the bill without any express promise.

The first inquiry is, what were the respective rights and
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duties of the defendant and Devereux under the circumstances

disclosed ?

"If a man hires a horse," remarks Lumpkin, J., in Mayor of

Columbus V. Howard, 6 Ga. 213, "he is bound to ride it moder-

ately and to treat it as carefully as any man of common dis-

cretion would his own, and to supply it with suitable food."

Thus doing, if the animal falls sick or lame, without any want

of ordinary care on the part of the hirer, he is not responsible

to the owner for the consequences. The owner of the animal

must bear them.

But if the horse falls sick or becomes exhausted the hirer is

bound not to use it. And if he does pursue his journey and use

it when reasonable care and attention would forbid, he would

make himself responsible to the owner for that act. Bray v.

Mayne, Gow. 1 (5 E. C. L. 437).

On the other hand, one who lets a horse impliedly undertakes

that the animal shall be capable of performing the journey for

which he is let, and if without the fault of the hirer he becomes

disabled by lameness or sickness, so that the hirer is compelled
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to incur expense to procure other means of returning, such ex-

pense may be recouped against the demand of the bailor for

the services. Harrington v. Snyder, 3 Barb. 380.

Upon whom, then, as between Devereux and the defendant,

should the expense of keeping and caring for the defendant's

horse, which "became diseased and sick while in Devereux 's

hands," fall? Up to the time when he fell sick it was Dever-

eux 's business to furnish him at his own proper expense with

' ' meat for his work. ' ' But how was it when he could no longer

lawfully use him under his contract ? Unless the horse was dis-

abled through some fault or neglect of Devereux, the owner

is the one who bears the burdens occasioned by his failure to

perform the work for which he was hired, and among them

would be the expense of the care and cure of the animal —

an expense which enures directly to his benefit. There

would be good reason for holding that in such case the hirer is,

ex necessitate, the agent of the owner to procure such reason-

able and necessary sustenance and farrier's attendance as might

be required until the animal could be got home; for while the

hirer is not responsible for any mistakes which a regular far-

rier whom he calls in may make in the treatment of the animal,

still, if instead of applying to a farrier, he undertakes to pre-
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scribe for the beast himself, and by his uuskilliulness does it

a mischief, he assumes a new degree of responsibility, and be-

comes liable to the owner for the result of any want of such

care as a man of ordinary prudence would take of his own

horse. Deane v. Keate, 3 Camp. 4.

But it is unnecessary in this case to determine the extent of

the hirer's authority as agent for the owner, for the report shows

that while plaintiff was keeping the horse defendant wrote to

him mentioning his ownership and inquiring as to the condi-

tion of the animal. Since he thus knowingly availed himself of

the plaintiff's services and outlay in the premises, the law

will imply a promise on his part to do what was right and pay

the plaintiff for them. Nor could the fact that he gave the plain-

tiff an assurance that Devereux's uncle, who was certainly under

no legal obligation so to do, would pay the bill, make any dif-

ference with regard to plaintiff's right to charge the keeping of

the horse to its owner who knew he was keeping it. ' ' The horse

became diseased and sick while in Devereux's hands." There is

nothing here to show that it was by the fault of Devereux. The
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language used rather indicates the contrary, and the legal pre-

sumption is against it. Negligence and misdoing are not to be

presumed, but there must be some positive evidence of them.

Cooper V. Barton, 3 Camp. 5 ; Tobin v. Murison, 9 Jur. 907.

It is not enough to show that the horse became disabled, but

he must show that he became so by the fault of the hirer. Har-

rington V. Snyder, uti supra.

It is not the case of property, while in the possession of a

bailee for hire, receiving an injury, which could not ordinarily

occur without negligence on the part of the custodian, when it

would be for him to show that the injury was not caused by his

negligence. Collins v. Bennett, 46 N. Y. 490.

"We think the case as stated shows a good consideration

for an implied promise on the part of defendant to reimburse

the plaintiff for his outlay in defendant's behalf. Hence, per-

haps, defendant's readiness to promise payment if he could have

a little delay.

Defendant defaulted.
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12. WENTWORTH Y. McDUFFIE.

48 N. H. 402. 1869.

Trover for a horse. The jury found that plaintiff hired a

horse and buggy to defendant to drive from Rochester to Dover.

Defendant drove the mare to Hoit's, two miles away from the

journey agreed upon, and drove her immoderately on a very

hot day, so that when she returned to plaintiff's stable she was

exhausted and sick, and in about half an hour died. Verdict for

plaintiff.

Smith, J. (Omitting a question of evidence.) Taking into

account the nature of the evidence on which the plaintiff relied,

the gist of the instructions excepted to would seem to be con-

tained in the last clause, and we are not inclined to think that

the jury were misled by the remarks which preceded that clause.

The jury were instructed that "if the defendant willfully and

intentionally drove the mare at such an immoderate and vio-

lent rate of speed as seriously to endanger her life, and he was

at the same time aware of the danger, and her death was caused

thereby, it would be such a tortious act as would amount to a
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conversion, and trover might be maintained; though it would

be otherwise if the fast driving was the result of mere negli-

gence and want of discretion, he not being aware that it en-

dangered the safety or life of the mare."

Two established principles of the law of trover tend to sup-

port this instruction. The first is the settled rule in this State,

that if the owner of a horse let him to be driven to one place,

and the hirer voluntarily drives him beyond that place to

another, this is a conversion of the horse, for which the owner

may maintain trover against the hirer. Woodman v. Hubbard,

25 N. H. 67, 57 Am. D. 310. This doctrine does not seem to

proceed upon the idea that the driving the horse beyond the

place named in the contract is conclusive evidence of the bailee's

intention to convert the animal to his own use, but rather upon

the ground that such use of the property is so substantial an

invasion of the owner's rights, and so inconsistent with the idea

of an existing bailment, that the bailee cannot reasonably object

to the bailor's treating the bailment as terminated thereby or to

his proceeding against the bailee for a conversion. "A con-

version consists in an illegal control of the thing converted, in-
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consistent with the plaintiff's right of property;" Perley, J.,

25 N. H. p. 71. It has been said that, "if the thing be put to a

different use from that for which it was bailed, ' ' the bailor may

maintain trespass or trover, but that "any misuser or abuse of

the thing bailed, in the particular use for which the bailment

was made, will not enable the general owner to maintain tres-

pass or trover against the bailee"; Redfield, J., in Swift v.

Mosely, 10 Vermont 208, p. 210, 33 Am. D. 197. But we are

unable to perceive any just ground for the distinction as stated

in these broad terms. If a horse is hired upon the usual implied

contract that he is to be driven at a safe rate of speed, the act

of the bailee in willfully and intentionally driving the horse at

such an immoderate rate of speed as he knew would seriously

endanger the life of the horse is at least as marked an assump-

tion of o\^Tiership and as substantial an invasion of the bailor's

right of property as the act of driving the horse at a moderate

speed one mile beyond the place named in the contract of hiring.

The probability of injury to the horse is much greater in the

former case, and the cruel treatment of the horse is certainly
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as inconsistent with the continued existence of the contract of

bailment as the use of the horse for a different journey.

The other established principle which tends to support this

instruction is the doctrine that the willful destruction by the

bailee of the thing bailed is a conversion ; see Morse v. Crawford,

17 Vermont 499, 44 Am. D. 349. If the death of the mare was

caused by an act willfully and intentionally done by the bailee

with knowledge on liis part that the life of the mare was thereby

seriously endangered, we think that, so far as the civil remedy is

concerned, the bailee may be regarded as having willfully de-

stroyed the mare. If the property is destroyed by the bailee's

willful act the bailor's right to maintain trover cannot depend

upon the time when the destruction is consummated. "It can

make no difference whether the destruction takes place imme-

diately on the commission of the act, or is the necessary result of

it." If the bailor had seen that his mare was about to be de-

stroyed by the bailee's willful act he would have been entitled to

terminate the bailment, and retake his property if he could do it

without force. When the bailor learns that an act has already

been done which will result in the death of the mare, can he not

elect to consider the bailment as having been rescinded by the

act at the moment of its commission?
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It may be urged that the principles referred to as sustaining

the instructions are themselves arbitrary exceptions engrafted

on the law of trover, and that they therefore do not furnish a

foundation upon which to reason from analogy. If we are to

look merely to the form of the declaration, very few of the

actions of trover now brought would be sustained. The legal

fictions which prevail in reference to trover are based upon au-

thority; and however arbitrary the established principles may

be, we know of no other test by which to decide any question

pertaining to the form of action which has not already been

conclusively settled by authority.

The right of a bailor to maintain trespass or trover against a

bailee in a case like that supposed in the instructions is a ques-

tion not conclusively settled by authorities directly in point.

Rotch V. Hawes, 12 Pick. 136, 22 Am. D. 414, seems favorable

to the defendant. McNeill v. Brooks, 1 Yerger 73, is cited on

the same side, but an examination of the opinion shows that the

court did not have in mind such a willful and intentional misuse

as that described in the instructions given in the present case.
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Swift V. Moseley, 10 Vermont 208, 33 Am. D. 197, contains a

dictum favorable to the defendant, but the case itself is. not in

point ; see also Harris, J., in Parker v. Thompson, 5 Sneed 349,

p. 352. On the other hand Maguyer v. Hawthorn, 2 Harrington

71, tends to sustain the plaintiff; as do also Campbell v. Stakes,

2 Wend. 137, 19 Am. D. 561 ; and Nelson v. Bondurant, 26 Ala.

341, reaffirmed in Hall v. Goodson, 32 Ala. 277 ; see also James

V. Carper, 4 Sneed 397.

We think the instructions were correct.

Judgment on the verdict.

13. ARMORY V. DELAMIRIE,

1 Strange 505. 1721.

In Middlesex, coram Pratt, C. J.

The plaintiff being a chimney sweeper's boy found a jewel

and carried it to the defendant's shop (who was a goldsmith)

to know what it was, and delivered it into the hands of the

apprentice, who under pretence of weighing it, took out the

stones, and calling to the master to let him know it came to
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three halfpence, the master offered the boy the money, who

refused to take it, and insisted to have the thing again: where-

upon the apprentice delivered him back the socket without the

stones. And now in trover against the master these points

were ruled:

1. That the finder of a jewel, though he does not by such

finding acquire an absolute property or ownership, yet he has

such a property as will enable him to keep it against all but

the rightful owner, and consequently may maintain trover.

2. That the action well lay against the master, who gives a

credit to his apprentice, and is answerable for his neglect.

3. As to the value of the jewel several of the trade were

examined to prove what a jewel of the finest water that would

fit the socket would be worth : and the Chief Justice directed

the jury, that unless the defendant did produce the jewel, and

shew it not to be of the finest water, they should presume the

strongest against him, and make the value of the best jewels

the measure of tbeir damages ; which they accordingly did.

>.14. LITTLE V FOSSETT,
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34 Me. 545; 56 Am. D. 671. 1852.

Trespass for damages to a hired wagon and harness, injured

by negligence of defendant in driving against the wagon on the

highway. The court below refused an instruction that one hav-

ing a mere temporary possession could not sue for a permanent

injury. Exceptions to such refusal. Verdict for plaintiff.

By CouET, Appletox. J. The law seems to be well settled that

the bailee of personal property may recover compensation for

any conversion of or any injury to the article bailed while in his

possession. The longer or shorter period of such bailment, the

greater or lesser amount of compensation — and whether

such amount is a matter of special contract or is a

legal implication from the beneficial enjoyment of the loan does

not seem to affect the question. "The borrower has no special

property in the thing loaned, though his possession is sufficient

for him to protect it by an action of trespass against a wrong-

doer:" 2 Kent's Com. 574. By the common law, in virtue of

the bailment, the hirer acquires a special property in the thing
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during the continuance of the contract and for the purposes

expressed or implied by it. Hence he may maintain an action

for any tortious dispossession of it or any injury to it during

the existence of his right : Story on Bail., sec. 394. In Croft v.

Alison, 4 Barn. & Aid. 590, the court held that the plaintiffs,

who had hired the chariot injured, for the day, and had ap-

pointed the coachman and furnished the horses, might be

deemed the owners and proprietors of the chariot, and as such

might recover of the defendant for the injury it had sustained

from his negligent driving. In Nicolls v. Bastard, 2 Cromp. M.

& R. 659, it was decided that, in case of a simple bailment of a

chattel without reward, its value might be recovered in trover

either by the bailor or bailee, if taken out of the bailee's pos-

session.

The bailee is entitled to damages commensurate with the value

of the property taken or the injury it may have sustained, ex-

cept in a suit against the general owner, in which case his dam-

ages are limited to his special interest, "If," say the court,

in White v. Webb, 15 Conn. 302, "the suit is brought by a bailee
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or special propertjTnan against the general owner, then the

plaintiff can recover the value of his special property ; but if the

writ is against a stranger, then he recovers the value of the

property and interest according to the general rule, and holds

the balance beyond his own interest, in trust for the general

owner." This view of the law seems fully confirmed by the

uniform current of authority : Lyle v. Barker, 5 Binn. 457 ;

Ingersoll v. Van Bokkelin, 7 Cow. 670; Chesley v. St. Clair, 1

N. H. 189; 2 Kent's Com. 585.

The instructions given were correct. The exceptions are over-

ruled, and judgment is to be rendered on the verdict.

ivl5. GREEN V. HOLLINGSWORTH,

5 Dana (Ey.) 173; 30 Am. D. 680. 1837.

Detinue for the wrongful detention of a watch. Judgment

for defendant, and plaintiff excepts.

By Court, Robertson, C. J. Hollingsworth ha%dng obtained

a verdict and judgment against Green, in an action of detinue,

for a gold watch, several errors are assigned by Green, as arising
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from instructions and refusals to instruct the jury on the trial.

It appears from the bill of exceptions, that the parties being

intimate acquaintances and cordial friends, and both being in

a jocund mood on a public occasion, while Hollingsworth was

a candidate for the legislature, Green said to him, in the hear-

ing and presence of several persons, "Give me your watch and

I will vote for you, and do all I can to assist you in your elec-

tion"; whereupon Hollingsworth handed the watch to him,

without the chain, and Green having fastened a twine string

and a key to it, put it in his pocket, and they shortly afterwards

separated, Green still retaining the watch ; about three weeks af-

ter which, Green, being on a hunting excursion, with the watch

in his pocket, said, on his return home, that he had lost it in

the woods; and having afterwards engaged others to assist in

searching for it, and not finding it, he offered a reward of

ten dollars for its discovery and restoration ; but the witnesses

never heard that it had ever been seen since; that some time

after the alleged loss of it, Hollingsworth requested Green to

return it, which he, of course, failing to do, this suit was brought
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for a wrongful detention of it. The jury had to decide whether

the foregoing facts conduced most strongly to establish a gift,

a loan, a deposit, or a sale on an illegal consideration; and if

there was no sale nor gift, it was the province of the jury to de-

cide whether the bailment was a loan or a mere deposit, and

whether the watch had, as alleged, been lost; but it was the

province of the court to decide respecting the degree of care re-

quired by law, according to the facts.

Hollingsworth could not recover, unless the jury had con-

cluded that the watch had been bailed to Green; for it is evi-

dent that if it was sold upon an illegal consideration, although

the contract was void, the law would not help either party,

standing, as they would, in equal fault. It is to just such a case

that the maxim in pari delicto potior conditio defendentis, is con-

clusively applicable. And whether, upon the hypothesis that

there was a bailment, there should have been a recovery, de-

pends on the following considerations ;

1. If the bailment was a simple deposit, with implied leave

to carry the watch in the pocket, and if it was lost by the

bailee, he is not liable unless he was guilty of gross negligence,

or unless, prior to the loss, he had violated his implied obliga-

tion to return it in a reasonable time, and thereby rendered
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himself responsible for all consequences; and whether, without

demand, it was his duty to have returned it within three weeks

after the date of the deposit, was a question of law for the

court, and not the jury, to decide. But the evidence will hardly

allow the deduction that there was a mere deposit; and if it

would, it would perhaps also show that it was a deposit at the

instance of Green, rather than of Hollingsworth, and therefore

required the observance of ordinary care, at least.

2. If there was a simple loan, more than ordinary care was

required by law. And if the watch was in fact lost, as alleged,

it was the province of the court to decide as to what was gross,

ordinary, and slight neglect, and that of the jury to determine

whether the facts established the one, or the other, or any de-

gree of negligence. If the watch was loaned to Green, when

it was to be returned was a fact to be ascertained by the jury

from the circumstances proved; and if those circumstances

conduced to establish no special time, and, from the nature of

the transaction as proved, the jury could have inferred that

the parties actually intended a beneficial loan, the law made it
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the duty of Green to return the watch in a reasonable time. But,

in such a state of ease, of indefinite loan for use, a court could

not decide that Green was guilty of a breach of his implied

obligation, in not returning the watch within three weeks, or

the time that elapsed before the alleged loss of it. Nor could

it be decided, as a matter of law, upon the facts proved, that

there was gross or even slight neglect in carrying the watch

in his pocket when he was hunting. The use of it may have been,

and probably was, especially important on such an occasion;

and therefore, if there was culpable negligence in thus using

it, the consequence might be that he could not have used it at

all, without being responsible for an accidental loss of it in

consequence of using it. But there may, prima facie, have been

at least slight neglect in losing the watch out of his pocket.

If the watch was loaned without any express agreement, and

if Green failed, upon a demand of restitution, to return it,

while he had it, or converted it, in judgment of law, by seri-

ously claiming it as his own, he would be liable for it, whatever

may have happened to it, without the agency or assent of Hol-

lingsworth. But there is no proof of any such demand or con-

version prior to the loss of the watch. And if the parties did

not intend a bailment, there was no ground for serious contro-
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versy. There is scarcely a pretext for presuming a sale — it is

much more probable that there was a gift.

As the instructions given by the circuit judge were, in some

respects, essentially variant from the foregoing principles, and

may have been, to some extent, prejudicial to the plaintiff in

error, the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded

for a new trial, without any intimation as to whether the ver-

dict could have been sustained had there been no error in the

instructions.

16. ALLEN V. DELANO,

55 Me, 113; 92 Am. Z). 573, 1867.

Replevin for a colt. The plaintiff sold the defendant a mare,

taking his note therefor, with a written agreement added that

said mare should continue the property of the vendor till paid

for. The mare was with foal at the date of the writing, and

that offspring was the colt replevied. The note was unpaid at

the commencement of the suit. The plaintiff was nonsuited, and

alleged exceptions.

By Court, Appleton, C. J. The nonsuit must be set aside,
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and the case stand for trial.

The plaintiff' 's title to the mare is not questioned. By the

terms of the contract, no title vested in the conditional vendee.

The plaintiff, owning the mare, owned likewise the colt. ' ' Of

all tame and domestic animals, the brood belongs to the owner

of the dam or mother; the English law agreeing with the civil

that partus sequitur ventrem in the brute creation, though for

the most part in the human species it disallows that maxim":

2 Bl. Com. 390. And so are all the authorities. Putting a

mare to pasture in consideration of her services does not entitle

the bailee to her increase: Allen v. Allen, 2 Penr. & W. 166.

In case of a pledge, not only the thing pledged passes, but also,

as accessory, its natural increase, as, for instance, the young of

a flock of sheep : Story on Bailments, sec. 292. Where live stock

is mortgaged, its natural increase and produce becomes subject

to the mortgage: Forman v. Proctor, 9 B. Mon. 124. The in-

crease of domestic animals gratuitously loaned belongs to the

lender: Orser v. Storms, 9 Cow. 687 [18 Am. Dec. 543]. Where

a mare was sold on condition, the vendor continued to be the
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owner of her colts until performance of the condition: Buck-

master V. Smith, 22 Vt. 203. The defendant, having no title to

the mare, can have none to her increase.

Exceptions sustained.

^17. ESI^IAY V. FANNING,

9 Barb, (N. Y.) 176. 1850.

Trover for a carriage. The cause was referred to a referee,

who reported that he foiuid as facts that about the 1st of June,

1846, the plaintiff loaned to the defendant the carriage in ques-

tion, to be safely kept by the defendant for the plaintiff, and to

be re-delivered to the plaintiff on request; that the defendant

had been requested to redeliver the same to the plaintiff; that

the defendant and plaintiff might each use the carriage and the

defendant's horses when he chose; that the carriage was ob-

tained by the defendant from the livery stable of George L.

Crocker, then of Albany city, and that he kept it safely till about

the 1st November, 1846, during which time it was used oc-

casionally by both parties, plaintiff and defendant. That about

the first of November, 1846, it was returned by the defendant to
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the stable of said Crocker; which return of the carriage to the

stable of Crocker, the referee decided was not a re-delivery of

the carriage to the plaintiff or his agent. He, therefore, reported

in favor of the plaintiff' for the value of the carriage at that

time, on which judgment was thereupon given, as for a con-

version of the carriage.

The defendant appealed from the decision of the referee.

By the Court, Willard, J. The gist of this action is the

conversion and deprivation of the plaintiff's property, and not

the acquisition of property by the defendant. (3 Barn. & Aid.

685.) The general requisites to maintain the action are, prop-

erty in the plaintiff ; actual possession or a right to the immedi-

ate possession thereof; and a wrongful conversion by the de-

fendant. (4 Barb. 56.) The plaintiff's title was not dis-

puted in this case. The issue is on the conversion; or, in

other words, it is whether the defendant re-delivered the car-

riage to the plaintiff or his agent, before the commencement of

this suit. The plaintiff alleges a refusal to re-deliver it, and

the defendant avers that he did re-deliver it. The referee found
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the fact that the defendant did not re-deliver the carriage to the

plaintiff or his agent; and the proof is that Crocker, to whom

the defendant did deliver the carriage, in November, 1846, was

not, at that time, the agent of the plaintiff, or authorized to

receive it. And there is no evidence that the plaintiff ever

assented to that delivery. The question, therefore, becomes nar-

rowed dowTi to this : whether a bailee of a chattel is answerable

in trover, on showing a delivery to a person not authorized to

receive it. In Devereux v. Barclay (2 Barn. & Aid. 702), it

was held that trover will lie for the mis-delivery of goods by

a warehouseman, although such mis-delivery was occasioned by

mistake only — and this court, in Packard v. Getman (4 Wend.

613, 21 Am. D. 166), held that the same action would lie against

a common carrier, who had delivered the goods, by mistake, to

the wrong person. The same point was ruled by Lord Kenyon

in Youl V. Ilarbottle (Peake's N. P. Cases, 49), and by the

English Common Pleas in Stephenson v. Hart (4 Bing. 476).

If trover will lie against a common carrier or a warehouseman

for a mis-delivery, it can, under the like circumstances, be sus-
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tained against a bailee for hire, or a gratuitous bailee. It results

from the very obligation of his contract, that if he fails to restore

the article to the rightful owner, but delivers it to another per-

son, not entitled to receive it, he is guilty of a conversion. (Story

on Bail. § 414.)

The referee found as a fact that the carriage was not re-deliv-

ered to the plaintiff, but was delivered to another person having

no right to receive it. The evidence detailed in the case war-

ranted that finding, and it can not be disturbed by this court.

We think the referee drew the right conclusion from that fact,

and justly held the defendant liable for the value of the car-

riage.

As the parties all lived in the same city, the carriage should

have been returned to the plaintiff, unless there was some agree-

ment to the contrary. The fact that the carriage was stored

by the plaintiff in Crocker's stable, at the time the defendant

first received it, did not authorize him, under a contract to

return it to the plaintiff, to deliver it to Crocker, who had ceased

to be the plaintiff's agent. The place of delivery of the car-

riage was the plaintiff's residence. (Barns v. Graham, 4 Cow-

en, 452, 15 Am. D. 394. Story on Bail. §§ 257, 261, 265.) A

delivery elsewhere, without authority, was a conversion. We
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have not adopted the civil law, which allowed the bailee, in case

no place was agreed on, to restore the property to the place from

which he took it, (Story on Bail. § 117.)

It was not necessary in this case to prove a demand and re-

fusal. Had the carriage remained in the defendant's posses-

sion, no action could have been maintained by the plaintiff

against the defendant, until it had been demanded, and the

defendant had neglected or refused to return it. A demand and

refusal are not a conversion, but evidence from which it can be

inferred. A demand is necessary whenever the goods have come

lawfully into the defendant's possession; unless the plaintiff

can prove some wrongful act of the defendant in respect of the

goods which amounts to an actual conversion. (2 Leigh's N. P.

1483. Bates v. Conklin, 10 Wend. 389. Tompkins v. Haile, 3 Id.

406.) As the delivery of the carriage by the defendant to

Crocker instead of the plaintiff amounted to a conversion, proof

of a demand and refusal was unnecessary. The testimony of

Nichols, therefore, to prove a demand was immaterial, and the

decision of the referee, refusing to permit the defendant to prove
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what he said at the time the demand was made, could have no

influence on the result of the cause. Had a demand been ne-

cessary, tlie declaration of the defendant in answer to the de-

mand would have been admissible, as well on the part of the

defendant as of the j)laintiff. The decision of the referee that

a demand and refusal were admitted by the pleadings, whether

right or wrong, worked no injury to the defendant.

A wide range was taken on the argument, on the implied

obligations resulting from the various kinds of bailments, and

particularly with reference to the restoring the thing bailed to

the bailor. But it seems unnecessary to discuss this subject, in

this case, because here there was an express agreement to return

the property to the plaintiff, on request.

The judgment must be affirmed.
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OF ORDINARY BAILMENTS.

i. OF GRATUITOUS BAILMENTS.

CHAPTER III.

A. OF GRATUITOUS SERVICES.

18. NEWHALL V. PAIGE,

10 Gray (Mass.) 366. 1858.

Action of contract, with a count in tort, to recover the

value of merchandise sent from Portland, Maine, by steamboat

to Boston, marked "H. B. Newhall, Saugus, care R. M. Morse,

South Market St., Boston," and lost under the following cir-

cumstances: "Upon its arrival in Boston it was delivered to

the teamster of the steamboat company, who took it to the de-

fendant's store, where was the order box of an expressman who

ran an express to Saugus. As this expressman did not run to

that part of Saugus where the plaintiff lived, he told another

expressman, George Tow^ne, who kept a box in another part of

the city, and went by the plaintiff's house, to call and take

the merchandise. Towue called, paid the freight bill, and the

defendants could not then find the merchandise. The only
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compensation received by the defendants for receiving and stor-

ing merchandise left for expressmen, and for allowing express-

men to have boxes in their store, was the advantage in bringing

them business. The defendants kept a liquor store."

Plaintiff asked a ruling that this advantage was a compensa-

tion sufficient to make defendants bailees for hire, and excepted

to the instruction given to the jury on this point. Verdict for

defendants.

BiGELOW, J. The only error in this case was in the instruc-

tions given to the jury, and consisted in telling them that the
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defendant could not be considered a bailee for hire unless his

compensation was for some certain benefit to himself, and that

a mere • contingent, uncertain and indirect benefit would not

constitute such a consideration as was necessary to establish a

contract of bailment for hire or reward. This was stating the

proposition more broadly than the rules of law will warrant.

A person becomes a bailee for hire when he takes property into

his care and custody for a compensation. The nature and

amount of the compensation are immaterial. The law will not

inquire into its sufficiency or the certainty of its being realized

by the bailee. The real question is, Was the contract made for

a consideration? If so, then it was a locatum and not a de-

positum, and the defendants were liable for a want of ordinary

care. The general rule as to the consideration of a contract is

well understood, and is the same in case of bailments as in all

other contracts. The law does not undertake to determine the

adequacy of a consideration. That is left to the parties, who

are the sole judges of the benefits or advantages to be derived

from their contracts. It is sufficient if the consideration be of
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some value, though slight, or of a nature which may enure to

the benefit of the party making the promise. Haigh v. Brooks,

10 Ad. & El. 320, and 2 P. & Dav. 484. Lawrence v. McCal-

mont, 2 How. 452. Hubbard v. Coolidge, 1 Met. 92. Where

such a consideration exists, a contract cannot be said to be a

nudum pactum, nor a bailment a gratuitous undertaking.

Exceptions sustained. Pr

19. FOSTER V. ESSEX BANK,

17 Mass. 479; 9 Am. D. 168. 1821.

Assumpsit by executors of Israel Foster to recover $50,000

deposited by Foster with the bank for safe keeping, and stolen

by their cashier and chief clerk. The cask containing the gold

was weighed in the presence of the president and cashier, but

the directors had no knowledge of this deposit, though it had

been the custom of the bank to receive special deposits. No

special account was kept by the bank of such deposits. With

this gold was stolen most of the capital of the bank, and it ap-

peared the books had been falsified for more than two years, dur-

ing which they had not been regularly posted.

63

§ 19 OF GEATUITOUS SERVICES.

By Court, Parker, C. J. This is assumpsit to recover of the

defendants the value of certain gold deposited by the plaintiffs'

testator in the bank, of which the defendants are the proprie-

tors; and the facts upon which the action is founded, are es-

tablished by a special verdict found by the jury who tried the

issue. Those facts are multifarious, and present several very

important questions of law, which have been investigated by

the counsel with all the research and ability which novelty, in

their application to a subject of so general concern as banks

seemed to demand. No case has, however, been produced on

either side so apposite as to relieve the court from an inquiry

into the general principles on which the action is founded; and

after all the pains which other public engagements have allowed

us to bestow on this particular case, no authorities have been

discovered, having an essential bearing upon it, which had es-

caped the diligence of the counsel employed in the argument.

The public importance of the questions has induced us to

delay forming a conclusive opinion, while there was any room

to suppose we might be mistaken; and doubts, which have until
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a late period prevailed with one or other of us, owing to a

want of time for examination, rather than to any intrinsic diffi-

culty in the case, have occasioned repeated revisions of the

arguments of counsel, and frequent recurrence to the authorities

cited. Our minds are now definitely settled; and we hope to

be able to show that the result we have come to is supported by

the best-approved principles of the common law, and conform-

able to decisions, ancient and modern, in analogous cases. In

attempting to do this, we shall consider: 1. Wliether the bank

made any contract with the plaintiffs' testator; 2. What is the

nature of that contract ; 3. Whether it has been violated.

1. On the first point we have had little difficulty; for, not-

withstanding the act of incorporation gives no particular au-

thority or power to receive special deposits, and although the

verdict finds that there was no regulation or by-law relative to

such deposits, or any account of them required to be kept and

\aid before the directors or the company, or any practice of ex-

amining them ; yet as it is found that the bank, from the time of

its incorporation, has received money and other valuable things

in this way, and as the practice was known to the directors, and,

we think, must be presumed to have been known to the com-

pany, as far as a corporation can be affected with knowledge;
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and as the building and vaults of the company were allowed to

be used for this purpose, and their officers employed in receiv-

ing into custody the things deposited, the corporation must be

considered the depositary, and not the cashier or other officer

through whose particular agency commodities may have been

received into the bank.

No authorities are necessary to support this position. It rests

upon common and familiar principles. The master and owner

of a house or warehouse, allowing his servants or clerks to re-

ceive for custody the goods of another, and especially if the

practice be general and unlimited, as is the case with banks in

relation to special deposits, will be considered the bailee of the

goods so received, and will incur the duties and liabilities be-

longing to that relation. Not so if the servant, secretly and

without the knowledge, express or implied, of the master, he

not having authorized or submitted to the practice, receives the

goods for such purpose, for no man can be made the bailee of

another's property without his consent; and there must be a

contract, express or implied, to induce a liability. The knowl-
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edge and permission, expressly feund or legally to be presumed

in this case, establishes a contract between the parties. And

this brings us to the consideration of the second point, viz. :

2. The nature and legal qualities of this contract. It will not

be disputed that if it amounts only to a naked bailment, without

reward and without any special undertaking, which in the civil

and common law is called depositum, the bailee will be answer-

able only for gross negligence, which is considered equivalent

to a breach of faith, as every one who receives the goods of

another in deposit, impliedly stipulates that he will take siome

degree of care of it. The degree of care which is necessary to

avoid the imputation of bad faith is measured by the carefulness

which the depositary uses towards his own property of a similar

kind. For, although that may be so slight as to amount even

to carelessness in another, yet the depositor has no reason to

expect a change of character in favor of his particular interest;

and it is his own folly to trust one who is not able or willing to

superintend with diligence his own concerns.

This principle, although denied by Lord Coke, as in 1 Inst.

89, b, has been received as the law regulating gratuitous bail-

ments, as it is sometimes called, or mere deposit, where there is

no advantage but to the depositor, from the luminous opinion
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of Lord Holt in tlie celebrated case of Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld.

Raym. 909, down to the profound and brilliant treatise of Sir

William Jones, in which, with a wonderful mixture of learned

research and classical illustration, he has analyzed the compli-

cated contract of bailment, and applied the principles of moral

philosophy, the doctrines of the civil law, and the usages of all

nations, ancient and modern, to the different branches of this

diversified subject, so as to leave little room for speculation, ex-

cept as to the application of his rules to particular cases as

they arise.

The dictum of Lord Coke that the bare acceptance of goods

to keep implies a promise to keep them safely, so that the de-

positary will be liable for loss by stealth or accident, is entirely

exploded; and Sir W. Jones insists that such a harsh principle

cannot be inferred from Southcote's case, 4 Co. 83, on which

Lord Coke relied; the judgment in that case, as the modern

civilian thinks, being founded upon the particular state of the

pleadings, from which it might be inferred either that there was

a special contract to keep safely, or gross negligence in the
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depositary. But as the judges Gawdy and Clench, who alone

decided that cause, said that the plaintiff ought to recover, be-

cause it was not a special bailment, by which the defendant

accepted to keep them as his own proper goods, and not other-

wise : S. C, Cro. Eliz. 815 ; the inference which Lord Coke drew

from the decision, that a promise to keep implied a promise to

keep safely, even at the peril of thieves, was by no means un-

warranted. But the decision, as well as the dictum of Lord

Coke in his Commentary, were fully and explicitly overruled by

all the judges in the case of Coggs v. Bernard, and upon the

most sound principles. It is so considered in Hargrave and

Butler's note to Co. Lit. n. 78, and all the cases since have

adopted the principle, that a mere depositary, without any

special undertaking and without reward, is answerable for the

loss of the goods only in case of gross negligence; which, as is

everywhere observed, bears so near a resemblance to fraud as to

be equivalent to it in its effect upon contracts.

Indeed, the oJd doctrine, as stated in Southcote's ease, and by

Lord Coke, has been so entirely reversed by the more modern

decisions that instead of a presumption arising from a mere

bailment that the party undertook to keep safely, and was there-

fore chargeable unless he proved a special agreement to keep
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only as he would liis own, the bailor, if he would recover, must

in addition to the mere bailment alleged and proved, prove a

special undertaking to keep the goods safely ; and even then, ac-

cording to Sir William Jones, the depositary is liable only in

case of ordinary neglect, which is such as would not be suffered

by men of common prudence and discretion; so that if goods

deposited with one who engaged to keep them safely were

stolen, without the fault of the bailee, he having taken all rea-

sonable precautions to render them safe, the loss would fall

upon the owner, and not the bailee.

And Sir William Blackstone, in his commentary, recognizes

the same principle; for he says, "If a friend delivers anything

to his friend to be kept for him, the receiver is bound to restore

it on demand; and it was formerly held that in the meantime

he was answerable for any damage or loss it might sustain,

whether by accident or otherwise, unless he expressly under-

took to keep them only with the same care as his own goods ; and

then he should not be answerable for theft or other accidents.

But now the law seems to be settled that such a general bail-
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ment will not charge the bailee with any loss, unless it happen

by gross neglect, which is construed to be an evidence of fraud.

But if he undertake specially to keep the goods safely and

securely, he is bound to answer all perils and damages that

may befall them for want of the same care with which a prudent

man would keep his own " : 2 Bl. Com. 453. And this certainly

is the more reasonable doctrine; for the common understanding

of a promise to keep safely would be, that the party would use

due diligence and care to prevent loss or accident; and there is

no breach of faith or trust if, notwithstanding such care, the

goods should be spoiled or purloined. Anything more than this

would amount to an insurance of the goods, which cannot be

presumed to be intended, unless there be an express agreement,

and an adequate consideration therefor.

The doctrine, as thus settled by reason and authority, is ap-

plicable to the case of a simple deposit, in which there is an

accommodation to the bailor, and the advantage is to him alone.

He shall be the loser, unless the person in whom he confided

has shown bad faith in exposing the goods to hazards to which

he would not expose his own. This would be crassa negligentia,

and for this alone is such a depositary liable. If we proceed

one step further in the gradation of liabilities, we shall discover
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every legal principle which can by possibility affect this cause,

considered as founded on a contract of bailment. It was urged

by the plaintiff's counsel that this is not a naked bailment, but

is accompanied with an advantage from the use of the property,

or the credit derived from the custody of it; and that this

ought to be viewed in the light of a reward, so that the case

will be brought within the principle of bailment for hire or re-

ward. If it be so, the principle applicable to this species of

bailment goes no further than to make the bailee liable in

case of ordinary neglect; so that if he shows that he used due

care, and nevertheless the goods were stolen, he would be ex-

cused. This is the doctrine of Sir "William Jones, and was the

opinion of Lord Kenyon in the case of Finnucane v. Small, 1

Esp. 315, cited in the argument, which, though a nisi prius

decision, is satisfactory evidence of the law, as two very eminent

sergeants acquiesced in his opinion. And this is also reason-

able, for one who takes goods into his warehouse to keep for a

stipulated price, does not intend to insure them against fire and

thieves. His compensation is only in the nature of rent; or if
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anything beyond that, only for the vigilance of a man of com-

mon prudence. If he locks and fastens the warehouse as other

prudent people do, and thieves break through and steal, he

ought not to be accountable; if he leave the door or windows

open, he ought to be. The common sense of mankind must

acquiesce in these reasonable provisions of the law; and with-

out doubt the common dealings of men are governed by them as

principles of natural justice, without a knowledge of the positive

law.

Having thus settled, satisfactorily to ourselves, the principles

by which our judgment in this action is to be guided, we pro-

ceed to a consideration of the facts, in order to ascertain under

what species of bailment the plaintiffs' property was committed

to the keeping of the defendants. It has been before observed

that as it was received into their building and placed in their

vaults by their servants, according to a practice allowed of by

them, they must be responsible in some degree, and are bound

to restore it, or the value, unless it has been lost by some

accident for which they are not liable by the nature of their

contract. We think there is no doubt that on such a deposit

an action of trover would lie against the corporation, if they

should refuse to deliver the property on demand, and assumpsit
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might also be maintained, it being settled by the later author-

ities that either action may be maintained against an incor-

porated company, as well as against a natural person, although

the doings on which the action is founded are not verified by

the seal of the corporation. Vide the opinion of Mr. Justice

Story in the case of The Bank of Columbia v. Patterson, 7

Cranch, 299, in which all the learning upon the subject of cor-

porate liabilities is exhausted.

Looking into the special verdict, we find the money of the

plaintiffs' testator contained in a chest which was locked, and

the key kept by his agent, was received into the bank by W. S.

Gray, the cashier, in the presence of W. Orne, who was presi-

dent of the bank at the time. The money, being gold, was

weighed in the presence of the president and cashier, and a

memorandum of the different pieces in separate bags taken by

the cashier and given to Mr. Bond, the testator's agent, with

the writing signed by Mr. Gray as cashier, viz., "Left at Essex

Bank for safe-keeping." The verdict finds that the chest con-

taining the gold was left at the bank as a special deposit ; that
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the bank was not authorized to use the money, or treat it other-

wise than as a special deposit; that it was kept in the vault of

the bank until it was removed to Haverhill for better security

in time of war, with the consent and at the expense of the

owner ; that after the danger was over it was brought back and

replaced in the vaults of the bank, with the specie belonging to

the bank, and there remained until it was pilfered as afterwards

stated in the verdict. Mr. Bond, the agent of the o^vner, was

in the practice of coming to the bank to look into the vault to

see that the money was safe, but it did not appear that he

opened the cask or counted the money. Some of the doubloons

were delivered to the agent, on the order of the testator, hy the

cashier in August, 1817; and at other times other doubloons

were delivered in the same manner on similar orders. At each

of these times the cask was opened by the cashier or chief clerk

to deliver the doubloons pursuant to orders. This was done

without the knowledge of any of the directors. They knew

nothing of the delivery of the doubloons, nor was any account

taken of them in the books of the, bank. It is found that no

return or statement of special deposits was ever made to the

directors by the cashier; and that such deposits are made and

taken away without the particular knowledge of tha directorSj
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although they know it is the practice so to receive and take

them. The directors knew nothing of the nature or amount of

this or any other special deposit, unless such knowledge may be

presumed from the agency of the president and cashier in re-

ceiving this deposit, or of the cashier when he delivered the

doubloons pursuant to orders. And it is found not to be the

practice of this or any other bank, for the directors to inspect

or examine special deposits, and it is considered improper for

any officer to do so without the consent of the depositor.

Upon this state of facts, we think it must be manifest that, as

far as the bank was concerned, this was a mere naked bailment

for the accommodation of the depositor, and without any ad-

vantage to the bank, which can tend to increase its liability be-

yond the effect of such a contract. No control whatever of the

chest, or of the gold contained in it was left with the bank or

its officers. It would have been a breach of trust to have opened

the chest or to inspect its contents. The owner could at any

time have withdrawn it, there being no lien for any price of its

custody, and it was not thought that the bank had authority to
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remove it to a place of greater safety without the orders of the

owner. If it be possible to constitute a gratuitous bailment, or

a simple deposit, this was one, unless the memorandum given

by the cashier altered its character, or unless the nature of such

a deposit is such as to have given the bank a right to derive

profit from it; both of which points have been contended for

by the counsel for the plaintiffs.

As to the first of these points supposing the bank to be

answerable for any special undertaking of the cashier, we per-

ceive no evidence of such an undertaking in this case. The

writing signed by the cashier is merely a memorandum, signify-

ing that the chest and its contents were left in the bank for

safe-keeping. It contains no promise, and assumes no risk other

than would be derived from the mere delivery without any

writing. Nor does it receive any additional force from the

presence of Mr. Orne, and his certificate of the gold having been

weighed in his presence. For in this he did not act or sign

officially; and if he had assumed to do so, it not being within

the scope of his authority, as president, to charge the bank with

any special liability, his act could not have bound the corpora-

tion, who, according to the practice as found by the jury, take

no notice of special deposits. And the same may be said of the
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memorandum signed by the cashier. For if he had undertaken

to make the bank specially answerable for a deposit, contrary to

its usage, and to the nature of the contract implied by accepting

such a deposit, such an undertaking, without previous authority

or subsequent assent, would have failed to implicate the bank.

We think, also, that there is nothing in the nature of such a

deposit, or in the usages of banks or in the act incorporating

the bank, from which any qualities can be attached to this bail-

ment, which do not belong to that class of contracts generally,

where the advantage is wholly on the side of the depositor. It

was contended that the bank might discount on this property.

But if the true nature of a special deposit is understood by us,

and we think its character is properly described in the special

verdict, we are of opinion this could not be done. For although

the bank, by implication, are allowed in the act of incorporation

to have credit upon the simple amount of all the moneys de-

posited for safe-keeping, we are satisfied that the legislature

had reference to general deposits only in this provision. It

does not appear that this or any other bank ever issued notes
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upon the credit of special deposits; indeed they could not, as

the amount of such deposits, or the value of them, is generally

wholly unknown to the directors and the company. The eighth

section of the incorporating act, we think, clearly shows that

the deposits referred to in the third section are general deposits.

For in the eighth section an annual account of the moneys de-

posited is required to be made to the governor and council, in

order that it may be ascertained whether there has been an

excessive issue of notes. Now, of special deposits, no such ac-

count can be rendered, because none is kept ; and we have never

heard that any bank has been complained of, as violating its

charter, for not rendering an account of such deposits.

We see, then, no profit to the bank arising from special de-

posits unless it be, as was suggested, that they acquire an in-

creased credit with the community on their account. But any

credit founded upon such deposits would be fallacious, since

they cannot be meddled with by any officer of the bank, although

authorized by a vote of the corporation, without a breach of

trust, which would subject them to an action. As to the idea

suggested, that the business of the bank may be facilitated and

increased by the accommodation given to special depositors,

the advantage, if any, is too minute and remote to effect their
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liability. Such deposits are, indeed, simply gratuitous on the

part of the bank, and the practice of receiving them must have

originated in a willingness to accommodate members of the cor-

poration with a place for their treasures, more secure from

fire and thieves than their dwelling-houses or stores; and this

is rendered more probable from the well-known fact, that not

only money or bullion, but documents, obligations, certificates

of public stocks, wills and other valuable papers, are frequently,

and in some banks as frequently as money, deposited for safe

keeping. This is wholly dilTerent from the deposits contem-

plated in the act on which notes may be issued, for they enter

into the capital stock, become the property of ^he bank, as much

as their other moneys, and the bank become debtors to the de-

positors for the amount.

3. The contract in the present case being then only a general

bailment, the third question to be discussed is, whether the con-

tract has been executed by the bank. I use the word bank for

the corporation, consisting of the president, directors and com-

pany, for the sake of brevity. ,
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The rule to be applied to this species of bailment is, as has

been stated, that the depositary is answerable in case of loss

for gross negligence only, or fraud, which will make a bailie of

any character answerable. Gross negligence certainly cannot

be inferred from anything found by the verdict; for the same

care was taken of this as of other deposits, and of the property

belonging to the bank itself. The want of books, showing the

number and amount of deposits is not a culpable negligence;

for the acceptance of the deposit being voluntary, the bank was

not obliged to incur any labor or expense in this respect; and,

besides, the agent of the depositor required nothing but a

memorandum from the cashier; and this was more than he

could have insisted on as a right. As to the supposed neglect

and carelessness of the directors, in not inspecting the cashier's

accounts more strictly, so as to have detected his fraudulent

management of the books to cover his peculation ; this concerned

the property of the company, not that of special depositors;

and the reputation of the cashier, and general confidence in

him, found by the verdict, is a sufficient answer to any charge

of negligence in his original appointment or continuance in

office.

We have thus prepared the way for the discussion of the
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great question in the case, and we believe, the only one on

which doubts could be entertained. The loss was occasioned

by the fraud or felony of two officers of the bank, the cashier

and chief clerk. We shall not consider whether the act of tak-

ing the money was felonious or only fraudulent, as the distinc-

tion is not important in this case, the question being whether

there was gross negligence ; and that fact may appear by suffer-

ing goods to be stolen, as well as if they were taken away by

fraud. Fraud on property deposited, committed by the depos-

itary, or his servants acting under his authority, express or

implied, relative to the subject-matter of the fraud, is equivalent

to gross negligence, and renders the depositary liable. No fraud

is directly imputed to the bank, it being found that the direct-

ors who represent the company were wholly ignorant of the

transactions of the cashier and chief clerk in this respect.

The point, then, is narrowed to this consideration, whether

the corporation, as bailee, is answerable in law for the depreda-

tions committed on the testator's property by two of its officers;

and here it being thought there was some discrepancy in the
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authorities, we have felt ourselves obliged to examine minutely

all which have been cited, and all others having a bearing on

the question.

It was contended, by one of the counsel for the plaintiffs,

as a proposition universally true, that the principal is civilly

answerable for all frauds done by his agents; and he is sup-

ported in the use of this language by a doctrine of Lord Ken-

yon, in the case of Doe v. Martin, and also by Lord Ellen-

borough, in 1 Campb. 127. And yet, it must strike the mind of

every man of sense, that this universal proposition will admit

of, and indeed, upon principles of common justice, actually

requires, considerable qualifications. No one will suppose, if

my servant commits a fraud relative to a subject that does not

concern his duty toward me, that I shall be civilly answerable

for such fraud. If I send him to market, and he steps into a

shop and steals, or, upon false pretenses, cheats the shopkeeper

of his goods, I think all mankind would agree that I am not

answerable for the goods he may thus unlawfully acquire ; and

yet the proposition, as stated, will embrace a case of this kind.

The proposition can be true only when the agent or servant is,

while committing the fraud, acting in the business of his prin-

cipal or master; and this was the state of things in ^oth the
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cases which are cited to support the proposition, and they go

upon the principle of an implied authority to do the act.

The rule of law is correctly laid down by Sir William Black-

stone, 1 Bl. Com. 429, viz., "that the master is answerable for

the act of his servant, if done by his command, either expressly

given or implied." And in another place, "If a servant by his

negligence does any damage to a stranger, the master shall an-

swer for his neglect, but the damage must be done while he is

actually employed in his master's service, otherwise the servant

shall answer for his own misbehavior:" Id. 431. The same rule

will apply more strongly to frauds practiced by the servant.

Christian, in a note to this passage, approves this doctrine, and

illustrates it with some observations of his own.

The supreme court of the United States recognize the same

doctrine in the case of The Mechanics' Bank v. The Bank of

Columbia, 5 Wheat. 326, in which it is said that the liability of

the principal depends upon the facts: 1. That the act was

done in the exercise; and 2. Within the limits of the powers

delegated. Any act, they say, within the scope of the power or

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:37 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

confidence reposed in the agent, such as money credited in the

books of the teller of a bank, or proved to have been deposited

with him, although he omits to credit it. And in the case of El-

lis V. Turner, 8 T. R. 533, Lord Kenyon says : ' ' The defendants

are responsible for the acts of their servant in those things that

respect his duty under them, though they are not answerable for

his misconduct in those things that do not respect his duty to

them, as if he, being master of the defendants' vessel, were to

commit an assault upon a third person in the course of his

voyage." And upon the same principle it has been holden that

if a servant willfully drive his master's carriage against the car-

riage of another, the master is not liable for the damages: 1

East, 106. And the reason is the same; for in such case there

is no authority from the master, express or implied; the serv-

ant in that act not being in the employment of his master. In

the case here referred to, the master was not in the carriage at

the time; the law would have been the same if he had been

present, and had endeavored to prevent the act; the presence

of the master being only presumptive evidence of authority.

I think it may be inferred from all this, as a general rule,

that to make the master liable for any act of fraud or negligence

done by his servant, the act must be done in the course of his

74

POSTER V. ESSEX BANK. § 19

employment ; and that if he steps out of it to do a wrong either

fraudulently or feloniously towards another, the master is no

more answerable than any stranger. The cases of innholders,

common carriers, and perhaps ship masters or seamen, when

goods are embezzled, are exceptions to the general rule founded

on public policy.

We are then to inquire whether, in this case, when the gold

was taken from the cask by the cashier and clerk, they were in

the course of their official employment. Their master, the

bank, had no right to meddle with the cask, or open it, and so

could not lawfully communicate any authority; and that they

did not, in fact, give any, is found by the verdict. Nor did

they in any manner assent to, or have any knowledge of it.

There are no circumstances, then, from which such authority

can be implied. The chest or cask when once placed in the

vault was to remain there until taken away by the owner, or

ordered away by the bank; either party having a right to dis-

continue the bailment. It was never opened but by order

of the owner until it was opened by the officers for a fraudulent
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or felonious purpose. It was no more within the duty of the

cashier than of any other officer or person to know the contents,

or to take any account of them. If the cashier had any official

duty to perform relating to the subject, it was merely to close

the doors of the vault when banking hours were over, that this,

together with other property there, should be secure from theft.

He cannot, therefore, be considered, in any view, as acting

within the scope of his employment when he committed the vil

lainy, and the bank is no more answerable for this act of his

than they would be if he had stolen the pocket-book of any per-

son who might have laid it upon the desk while he was trans

acting some business at the bank.

If it be asked for what acts then of a cashier or clerk the bank

would be answerable, I should answer, for any which pertain to

their official duty, for correct entries in their books, and for a

proper account of general deposits, so that, if by any mistake or

by fraud in these particulars any person be injured, he would

have a remedy. If they should rob the vaults of the property

of the bank, the company would necessarily lose; and if the

bank have become debtors to those who have deposited other-

wise than specially, their debts will not be diminished by the

fraud; so that in this form they are answerable to depositors,
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and for the correct conduct of all their servants, in their proper

sphere of duty, they are answerable. They may also be answer-

able for notices to indorsers upon bills and notes left with them

for collection, if there should be a failure by neglect of any of

their servants, because they have undertaken to give the proper

notices. But even in that ease it may admit of a question

whether they would be liable any further than attorneys who

undertake the collection of debts, would be. But they are not

answerable for special deposits stolen by one of their officers

any more than if stolen by a stranger, or any more than the

owner of a warehouse would be who permitted his friend to

deposit a bale of goods there for safe-keeping, and the goods

should be stolen by one of his clerks or servants.

The undertaking of banking corporations, with respect to

their officers, is that they shall be skillful and faithful in their

employments; they do not warrant their general honesty and

uprightness. And it is the same with individuals. If a friend

commit to my care valuable property to keep for him, and it

be stolen by ray servants, I shall not be answerable for the loss,
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as was stated by Lord Kenyon in the case of Finnucane v. Small.

This case, before referred to for another purpose, deserves

special notice upon this point; for if it be law, it goes the

whole length of the case before us, and even beyond it; for the

bailee there received a reward for his custody of the goods

which were stolen. The plaintiff was an officer in the army,

and being about to leave London, sent his trunk to the defend-

ant's house for safe custody, and was to pay one shilling a week

for house-room. When he returned he received the trunk, but

the contents had been stolen. Lord Kenyon held the defend-

ant not liable, it appearing that he had taken as much care of

the trunk as he had of his own goods; and that if the goods

were stolen by the defendant's servants, as was stated to have

been the fact by the plaintiff's counsel, it would make no differ-

ence. His lordship no doubt considered the hire agreed to be

paid as mere compensation for house-room, not as a reward for

diligence and care, and therefore did not require of the defend-

ant more care than he used about his own goods, considering it

as a simple deposit only. Whether he wa^ right or not in this,

there is no doubt of the correctness of his opinion with respect

to the agency of the servants in the theft ; for they were not in

the course of their duty when pilfering the trunk of its contents.
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Garrow and Shepherd, eminent sergeants, and since judges,

acquiesced in the opinion.

The case is in all respects like the one before us, except that

the goods were to be kept for hire; and the difference is alto-

gether in favor of the defendants in the present case. In an-

swer to this, it was observed by the counsel for the plaintiffs

that the cashier of the bank was trusted, and therefore, the

doctrine of Lord Kenyon did not apply. But if we are right in

the principles before stated, he was not trusted in this business ;

neither he nor his principal, the bank, having anything to do

with the chest or cask but to give it a place in the vault, and to

lock it up when the hours of business were over; and so the

cashier must be considered like the servant in the case cited.

Some stress was laid in the argument upon the security taken

by the bank of the cashier for the faithful discharge of his duty.

But we think it obvious that nothing was contemplated in the

security but the official neglect of the cashier. The act of in-

corporation authorizes the bank to require bonds, in a sum not

less than ten thousand dollars; and a bond was taken for that
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sum only. Now, considering this as one of the oldest banking

companies in one of the most wealthy towns in the common-

wealth, without doubt special deposits of a vast amount were

from time to time received into the bank for safe-keeping, and

a bond for ten thousand dollars could never have been taken to

indemnify against a possible loss of these.

Upon a view, therefore, of all the points in the case, and

after a careful attention to the arguments and authorities, we

are satisfied that upon the special verdict, judgment must be

entered for the defendants.

Costs for the defendants.

20. KNOWLES V. ATLANTIC AND ST. LAWRENCE

RAILROAD CO.,

38 Me. 55; 61 Am. D. 234. 1854.

Action to recover for the loss of sixteen tons of hay.

By Court, Rice, J. The evidence in the case shows that the

original contract of the defendants, as common carriers, was

fully executed to the satisfaction of the plaintiff. Howe, the
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forwarding agent of the railroad company, in his deposition

states that ' ' I told ]\Ir. Knowles that the hay was now delivered

in good order ; that that was an end of our contract, and that it

must now be at his risk against any damage. He replied that

he acknowledged he received it in good order." The defendants,

therefore, clearly are not liable as common carriers. The case

provides that if, in the opinion of the court, the plaintiff is en-

titled to recover in any form of declaring, the defendants are to

be defaulted. It is contended that they are liable as bailees or

depositaries. The hay was permitted to remain upon the de-

fendant 's cars for the accommodation of the plaintiff, and at his

special request. For this the defendant received no additional

compensation nor consideration. At most, therefore, they were

naked bailees or gratuitous depositaries.

The defendants contend that there was no responsibility upon

them; that the whole risk of loss or damage to the hay was

assumed by the plaintiff. Mr. Hamlin, who acted as agent for

the plaintiff, t(^stified that "Mr. Howe consented that the hay

might remain on the cars (until it could be shipped), with the
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understanding that the whole risk should be on Mr. Knowles.

Mr. Knowles asked at the time, 'Is there any risk?' or something

like that. I told Mr. Knowles, Howe being present at the time,

that there was a risk; that there was a risk in all cases. He

asked, 'What risk?' I told him there was the risk of fire and

water or rain ; and there were other risks which could not then

be thought of — there were a thousand risks. After a little more

conversation it finally ended in Mr. Knowles assuming the whole

risk; * * * that it should remain on the cars, and at his

risk, until it was shipped."

This witness further testified that the cars on which the hay

then was were on the principal track, from which they must be

removed to make room for other trains. The track down on

the wharf, and the one where the cars then stood, were the only

tracks from which freight could be shipped.

This was on the sixteenth of July, 1851. On the eighteenth

of the same July, the cars on which the plaintiff's hay was

transported, having been removed, but under whose direction

does not appear, to the defendants' wharf, were precipitated into

the dock by the breaking dow^n of the wharf, in consequence of

its being overloaded with railroad iron. This risk, the plaintiff

affirms, was not contemplated by the parties, nor assumed by

him, but was the consequence of the gross negligence of the

defendants, and therefore they should sustain the loss. Being

a bailee without reward, the defendants are bound to slight dili-

gence only, and are not therefore answerable except for gross
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neglect : Story on Bailments, sec. 62 ; Foster v. Essex Bank, 17

Mass. 500 [9 Am. Dec. 168] . The authorities do not concur in a

uniform standard by which to determine what constitutes gross

negligence in a gratuitous bailee or depositary. Such a bailee,

who receives goods to keep gj'atis, is under the least responsi-

bility of any species of trustee. If he keeps the goods as he

keeps his own, though he keeps his own negligently, he is not

answerable for them. He is only answerable for fraud, or that

gross neglect which is evidence of fraud: Just. Inst., lib. 3, tit.

15, sec. 3; Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 914; Foster v.

Essex Bank, supra; 2 Kent's Com. 561, 562.

Judge Story, in his work on bailments, section 64. says : ' ' The

depositary is bound to slight diligence only; and the measure

of that diligence is that degree of diligence which persons of less

than common prudence, or indeed of any prudence at all, take

of their own concerns. The measure, abstractly considered,

has no reference to the particular character of an individual;

but it looks to the general conduct and character of a whole

class of persons; and so Sir William Jones has intimated on
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some occasions. ' ' He cites Jones on Bailments, 82, 83 ; Tompkins

V. Saltmarsh, 14 Serg. & R. 275; Doorman v. Jenkins, 2 Ad. &

El. 256.

Both of the above rules, which on a strict analysis will not be

found in any essential point dissimilar, are subject, under some

circumstances, to modification. Thus when the bailor or de-

positor not only knows the general character and habits of the

bailee or depositary, but the place where and the manner in

which the goods deposited are to be kept by him, he must be

presumed to assent, in advance, that his goods shall be thus

treated; and if under such circumstances they are damaged or

lost, it is by reason of his own fault or folly. He should not

have entrusted them with such a depositary, to be kept in such

a manner and place. Applying these principles to the case

under consideration, and whatever view we may take of the

extent of the plaintiff's liability by reason of his special con-

tract, the result can not be doubtful. That it was the expecta-

tion of both parties that the hay was to be shipped from the

defendants' wharf is very apparent. That wharf was open to

the inspection of the world. The plaintiff had the same oppor-

tunity to observe its condition as the defendants. The iron by

which it was ultimately carried down had been deposited upon

it months before. No additional incumbrance appears to have

been placed upon the wharf by the defendants after the arrival

of the hay before it finally broke down.
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In view of all the facts in the ease, and independent of the

special contract testified to by Mr. Hamlin, we are of opinion

that the defendants are not liable. Therefore, according to

agreement, a nonsuit must be entered.

CHAPTEE IV.

B. OF GRATUITOUS LOANS.

See the cases in §§ 1, 3, 8, 14, 15.

11. OF MUTUAXi BENEFIT BAILMENTS.

CHAPTER V.

CLASSIFICATION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

See the cases in § § 18, 33.
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CHAPTER VI.

A. PIGNUS, OR PLEDGE.

X 21. STEARNS V. IMARSH,

4 Denio (N. Y.) 227; 47 Am. D. 248. 1847.

Assumpsit on a note, secured by ten cases of boots deposited

with plaintiff. Verdict, under instructions from the court, for

the balance due on the note.

By Court, Jewett, J. The contract between these parties was

strictly a pledge of the boots and shoes. At common law, a

pledge is defined to be a bailment of personal property, as a se-

curity for some debt or engagement: 2 Kent's Com. 577, 5th

ed. ; Story on Bail., sec. 286. The plaintiff's debt, thus se-

cured, became payable on the eighth day of November, 1837.

On the fifteenth of that month, the plaintiffs caused the pledge

to be sold at a public sale by an auctioneer in Boston, pursuant

to a public notice published in certain newspapers in that city

from the second to the fifteenth of November inclusive; but no

notice of sale, or to redeem, was at any time given to the de-

fendants. The net proceeds of the sale was one hundred and

sixty-six dollars and ninety-seven cents, which the plaintiff's ap-
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plied on their debt without the assent of the defendants.

The first question made on the argument is, whether the sale

thus made was authorized and bound the defendants. On the

part of the plaintiffs it was insisted, that the pledge having been

made as a security for their debt, which was payable at a future

day, the plaintiff's had a right, after a default in payment, to sell

the pledge, fairly in the usual course of business, without call-

ing on the defendants to redeem, or giving them notice of the

intended sale : and that such sale concluded the defendants. It

is said that the law makes a distinction between the case of a

pledge for a debt payable immediately, and one where the debt

does not become payable until a future day; and that in the

latter case the creditor is not bound to call for a redemption or

to give notice of sale, though in the former it is conceded that

there must be such demand and that notice must be given.

Non-payment of the debt at the stipulated time did not work a

forfeiture of the pledge, either by the civil or at the common

law. It simply clothed the pledgee with authority to sell the
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pledge and reimburse himself for his debt, interest, and ex-

penses ; and the residue of the proceeds of the sale then belonged

to the pledgor. The old rule, existing in the time of Glanville,

required a judicial sentence to warrant a sale, unless there was

a special agreement to the contrary. But as the law now is, the

pledgee may file a bill in chancery for a foreclosure and proceed

to a judicial sale ; or he may sell without judicial process, upon

giving reasonable notice to the pledgor to redeem, and of the

intended sale.

I find no authority countenancing the distinction contended

for; but on the contrary, I understand the doctrine to be well

settled, that whether the debt be due presently or upon time, the

rights of the parties to the pledge are such as have been stated :

Cortelyou v. Lansing, 2 Cai. Cas. 204; 2 Kent's Com., 5th ed.,

581, 582 ; 4 Id. 138, 139 ; Tucker v. Wilson, 1 P. Wms. 261 ; Lock-

wood V. Ewer, 2 Atk. 303 ; Johnson v. Vernon, 1 Bail. 527 ; Perry

V. Craig, 3 Mo. 516 ; Parker v. Brancker, 22 Pick. 40 ; De Lisle v.

Priestman, 1 Browne (Pa.), 176; Story's Com. on Eq., sec. 1008;

Story on Bailm., sec. 309, 310, 346 ; Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns.
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Ch. 100; Patchin v. Pierce, 12 Wend. 61; Garlick v.

James, 12 Johns. 146 [7 Am. Dec. 294] . Nor do I see any reason

for such a distinction. In either case the right to redeem equally

exists until a sale : the pledgor is equally interested, to see to it

that the pledge is sold for a fair price. The time when the sale

may take place is as uncertain in the one case as in the other;

both depend upon the will of the pledgee, after the lapse of the

term of credit in the one case, and after a reasonable time in the

other; unless indeed the pledgor resorts to a court of equity to

quicken a sale. Personal notice to the pledgor to redeem, and of

the intended sale, must be given as well in the one case as in the

other, in order to authorize a sale by the act of the party. And

if the pledgor can not be found and notice can not be given to

him, judicial proceedings to authorize a sale must be resorted to :

2 Story's Com. on Eq., sec. 1008. Before giving such notice, the

pledgee has no right to sell the pledge; and if he do, the

pledgor may recover the value of it from him, without tendering

the debt ; because by the wrongful sale the pledgee has incapaci-

tated himself to perform his part of the contract, that is to re-

turn the pledge, and it would therefore be nugatory to make the

tender: Cortelyou v. Lansing, supra; Story on Bail. (2d ed.)

349 ; McLean v. Walker, 10 Johns. 472.

The evidence in this case shows that the plaintiffs, in Novem-

ber, 1837, long prior to the commencement of this suit, tor-

tiously sold the pledge, and thereby put it entirely beyond their

power to return it, upon payment of the debt. Where a pledge
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is made by a debtor to his creditor to secure his debt, for a cer-

tain term, the law requires that the latter shall safely keep it

■^thout using it, so as to cause any detriment thereto; and if

any detriment happens to it within the term appointed, it may

be set off against the debt, according to the damage sustained.

And if the pledge is made without mention of any particular

term, the creditor may demand his debt at any time. When the

debt is paid, the creditor is bound to restore the pledge in the

condition he received it, or make satisfaction for any injury

that it has received; for it is a rule, that a creditor is to re-

store the pledge or make satisfaction for it ; if not, he is to lose

his debt: 1 Reeve's Hist. Eng. L. 161, 162. If the pledgor, in

consequence of any default of the pledgee, or of his conversion

of the pledge, has by any action recovered the value of the

pledge, the debt in that case remains, and is recoverable, unless

in such prior action it has been deducted. By the common law

the pledgee, in such an action brought for the tort, has a right to

have the amount of his debt recouped in the damages : Bac. Abr.,

Bailment, B; Jarvis v. Rogers, 15 Mass. 389; Story on Bail.
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(2d ed.) sees. 315, 349.

The plaintiffs were wrong-doers in selling the pledge at the

time they did, without notice to redeem or of the sale being

given to the defendants; and it is shown that the value of the

pledge at the time equaled, if it did not exceed, the debt which

it was made to secure. The counsel for the defendants, in effect,

offered to recoup their damages arising from the plaintiffs'

breach of the contract of pledge, but was not permitted to do so.

It is urged by the plaintiffs' counsel, that the defense was not ad-

missible under the pleadings; but I am satisfied that it was

unnecessary to plead specially, or to give notice of the matters

relied on. The evidence establishes that the plaintiffs had no

cause of action, and the defense is fairly covered by the plea of

non assumpsit : Batterman v. Pierce, 3 Hill, 171 ; Barber v.

Rose, 5 Id. 76 ; Ives v. Van Epps, 22 Wend. 155. The defend-

ants clearly had an election of remedies against the plaintiffs

for the conversion of the pledge. They could maintain trover or

assumpsit, and in the latter action could recover the value under

the common counts: Hill v. Perrott, 3 Taunt. 274; Butts v.

Collins, 13 Wend. 139-154. If assumpsit was maintainable by

them, they may, in an action by the plaintiffs, set off the value

of the boots an(i shoes as for such property sold. There is no

valid objection on the ground that the damages are unliquidated

or imcertain. The case of Butts v. Collins is decisive on that

point. There must be a new trial.

New trial granted.
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22. HALL V. PAGE,

4 Ga. 428; 48 Am. D. 235. 1848.

Trover by Page for note given in payment for certain buggies,

harness and carpets sold by Hall, in part as agent for Page and

in part for himself. He took in payment the note in question

upon six months' time.

By Court, Nesbit, J. (Omitting other points.) 5. On the day

that the goods were deliverd to the defendant, the plaintiff

received from him two notes, as collateral security, for the

payment of the price of them. One of these notes, one hun-

dred and thirty-five dollars in amount, was paid to him. The

payment was after this suit was commenced, and subse-

quent to the service of a process of garnishment upon the

plaintiff, sued out at the instance of other creditors of the

defendant. Upon the motion for a new trial, it was claimed

that the verdict was erroneous, in this; that this sum of one

hundred and thirty-five dollars was not allowed as a credit

to the defendant. The court, upon this point, ruled; "that by

the evidence this sum was held subject to summons of gar-
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nishment at the instance of Hall's (the defendant's) creditors.

It is very certain that either Hall or his creditors have a right

to that money. Both can not have it, and Page (the plaintiff)

can not be delayed in his suit until the controversy between Hall

and his creditors shall be ended. The jury, therefore, properly

refused to abate Page's damages for that sum." The opinion

of the court thus expressed, is excepted to. We can not assent

to the doctrine that collateral securities, pledged hona fide for

the payment of a debt without any trust reserved, belong to the

pledgor or his creditors. That is to say, that they belong to him

or them, in any sense, which will defeat the pledgee's right to

them, or which is the same thing, to money raised on them as

security for his debt. That right is paramount to the rights of

other creditors, and is good against the pledgor himself, until

the debt is paid. The pendency of a garnishment makes no dif-

ference. The pendency of this suit assumes that the debt is due.

If this action can be sustained — if that assumption be true —

upon the trial, it was competent for the court to appropriate

the money received on the collaterals, to the plaintiff, and of

course to credit the defendant. It ought to have been so ap-

propriated. There was no necessity to await an issue on the

garnishment. The court, on the trial of this suit, had jurisdic-

tion of the matter. It did, in fact, exercise that jurisdiction by

determining that this money belonged to the defendant or his
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creditors. If it belonged to the defendant, it was pledged to pay

this very debt. The creditors of the defendant had no rights

in it, until the pledgee is paid. There could, therefore, be no

controversy about it, between the defendant and the creditors,

until the debt of the plaintiff is paid. But the debt, by the

record, is not paid. The very question is, shall it be now paid,

to the extent of the money in hand ? The plaintiff is not delayed

at all. He is expedited; for a judgment that this money be al-

lowed as a credit to the defendant, is an instantaneous payment

to him. An appropriation in this way to the plaintiff would

protect him on the trial of the garnishment. Whether appro-

priated or not, his rights in this money are paramount to those

of the garnishing creditors. There is nothing in this record, it

may be proper to remark, which impeaches the fairness of this

pledge. It is not obnoxious to the act of 1818, or any other

law of the state. Upon the traverse of the plaintiff' 's answer to

the garnishment (he answering truly, as this record discloses

the facts), I apprehend that the garnishing creditors could not

get a judgment against the plaintiff, until they had first proven
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that this debt was paid. In that event, it is true, these collaterals

and this money would belong to the defendant or his creditors.

But only in that event.

We examine this doctrine a little. We say that the deposit

of these notes in the hands of the plaintiff, as collateral secur-

ity for this debt, is a pawn or pledge. A pledge is a bailment

of personal property as security for some debt or engagement :

Story on Bail., sec. 286. Ordinarily, goods and chattels are the

subject of pledges; but money, debts, negotiable instruments,

choses in action, etc., may by the common law be delivered in

pledge: Kemp v. Westbrook, 1 Ves. sen. 278; Lockwood v.

Ewer, 9 Mod. 278 ; Seamer v. Bingham, 3 Atk. 56 ; McLean v.

Walker, 10 Johns. 471, 475; Roberts v. Wyatt, 2 Taunt. 268;

Jarvis v. Rogers, 13 Mass. 105 ; 15 Id. 389 ; Garlick v. James,

12 Johns. 146 [7 Am. Dec. 274] ; Story on Bail., sec. 290.

What are the rights of the pledgee in the thing pledged gen-

erally? In virtue of the pawn, he acquires a special property

in the thing, and is entitled to the exclusive possession of it,

during the time, and for the objects for which it is pledged:

Story on Bail., sec. 303; Jones on Bail., sec. 80; Cortelyou v.

Lansing, 2 Cai. Gas. 202; Garlick v. James, 12 Johns. 146 [7

Am. Dec. 294] ; Ratcliff v. Davis, 1 Bulst. 29; Cro. Jac. 244;

Coggs V. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 916; 2 Kent's Com.

578, 585, 4th ed.; 1 Bell's Com. 200, 4th ed. ; Whitaker v. Sum-

ner, 20 Pick. 399, 405 ; Jones v. Baldwin, 12 Id. 316. The right

of possession is exclusive — that is, it is good against all the world,
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for the purpose for which it is pledged — in this ease, that pur-

pose is the payment of a debt. For that purpose, the right to

the thing is perfect. It yields to no other right which did not

attach upon it, in the shape of a lien, prior pledge, or some claim

existing prior to the pledge, and good in law. It is perfect

against the pledgor. For if he wrongfully get possession, a suit

in favor of the pawnee wiU lie against him for the thing, or for

damages. He can bring an action for it, also against a stranger,

or an action against the stranger for damages: Wilbraham v.

Snow, 2 Saund. 47, note; Woodruff v. Halsey, 8 Pick. 333 [19

Am. Dec. 329]; 2 Kent's Com. 585, 4th ed. ; Story on Bail.,

sec. 303 ; Lyle v. Barker, 5 Binn. 457.

He has also a right to sell the pledge where there has been a de-

fault in the pledgor ; if there is no stipulated time when the debt

shall be paid, the pawnee may sell upon demand and notice:

Story on Bail., sec. 308; 2 Kent's Com. 581, 582, 4th ed. ; 2

Story's Eq. Jur., sees. 1031-1033; Holt's N. P. 385. He may

file a bill in equity for foreclosure and sale, or upon demand

and notice proceed to sell, ex mero motii, at his election; Kemp
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V. Westbrook, 1 Ves. sen. 278; Garlick v. James, 12 Johns.

146 [7 Am. Dec. 249]; 2 Story's Eq. Jur., sees. 1031-1033;

Patchin v. Pierce, 12 Wend. 61; Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns.

Ch. 62 ; Story on Bail., sec. 310. These are the principal rights

of the pawnee. What, specially, are the rights of the pawnee of

negotiable securities? He may recover and receive the money

due thereon ; he may bring suit upon them in his own name :

Id. 321; Bowman v. Wood, 15 Mass. 534; Garlick v. James, 12

Johns. 146 [7 Am. Dec. 294]. He may sell them, and if he sells

to a bona fide purchaser, the latter acquires an absolute prop-

erty, if he buys without notice : Story on Bail., sec. 322 ; 1

Story's Eq. Jur., sees. 434, 435; Story on Ag., sec. 126-130;

Jarvis v. Rogers, 13 Mass. 105; 15 Id. 389; Bowman v. Wood,

Id. 534; Garlick v. James, 12 Johns. 146 [7 Am. Dec. 294] ;

Collins V. Martin, 1 Bos. & Pul. 648 ; Peacock v. Rhodes,

Doug. 633; Seamer v. Bingham, 3 Atk. 56; Miller v. Race, 1

Burr. 452; 1 Bell's Com., sec. 412, 4th ed. ; Matthews v. Poy-

thress, 4 Ga. 287.

It is not necessary to pursue this subject in detail. The

pawnee is entitled to receive the money due on his collateral

securities, and to hold it against his pawner and all the world,

until he is paid. When a pledge is made for the benefit of the

pledgee and a third person, who is also a creditor, and the fund

raised is insufiicient to pay both, the pledgee, being a creditor

in possession, is entitled to preference. According to the idea
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of the Roman law, "/m pari causa possessor potior haheri debet:"

Marshall v. Byrant, 12 Mass. 321 ; Story on Bail., sec. 313. If

this is true as to other creditors, when there is a stipulation in

their behalf, a fortiori, it is true as to creditors generally, as to

whom there is no stipulation. The rights of the holder of nego-

tiable instruments as collateral securities, in them, were con-

sidered by this court in the case of Bond v. The Central Bank,

2 Ga. 106, and in Gibson v, Conner, 3 Id. 52, 53. In the latter

case we say: "The transferror parts with, and the transferee

acquires, the legal title to the negotiable paper thus transferred

— the latter may sue on it in his own name, and although the

original debt is not extinguished, the creditor has the right to

apply the proceeds of the securities, when realized, to its ex-

tinction — nay, he is boiuid to do it, and whatever he does realize

on them is a payment pro tanto." If it be the right of the

pledgee to apply money collected on the securities, it is the right

of the pledgor to consider money thus in hand as a payment.

If such is the law of the case, he (the defendant) is entitled,

the case being made, to have it so declared, and to have a credit
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on the original debt. This the court ought to do, if for no

other reason than to avoid litigation. As before stated, the

court had jurisdiction, in this case, of this subject-matter, and

we think it erred in not ruling that this money was by law to

be appropriated to the plaintiff's debt, and as a consequence,

that the defendant was entitled to a credit for the amount of it.

Upon these grounds we remand the case.

23, AMERICAN PIG IRON STORAGE WARRANT CO, V.

GERMAN,

126 Ala. 194; 28 So. B. 603; 85 Am. St. B. 21. 1899.

Sharp, J. . . . The litigation originated under circumstances

substantially as follows : The Alabama Iron and Steel Company,

a domestic corporation, was for several years engaged in the

manufacture and sale of charcoal pig iron. The appellant, the

American Pig Iron Storage Warrant Company, a corporation

having its principal office in New York city, did a warehouse

business which consisted mainly in the storage of pig iron.

Its yard. No. 38, was located near the furnace of the Alabama

Iron and Steel Company (which we will refer to hereafter as

the furnace company), near Briarfield, Alabama, and was di-

vided into three sections, designated, respectively, as "A," "B,"
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and "C." Under its regulations iron, when stored in it, was

placed in separate piles, each containing one hundred tons, and

marked with letters to identify its location, and with figures to

designate its grade. For each of these hundred ton lots the

local yardmaster gave to the depositor his certificate, and upon

that certificate, when forwarded to the New York office, the

storage company issued to whom the furnace company might

direct its several warrants for each of such lots, which warrants

described the iron covered by it, and stipulated that "this com-

pany has received into its storage yard, located as above, and

entered in its storage-books in New York in the name and subject

to the order of (name of holder) one hundred tons of 2,240

pounds each of pig iron of the brand, grade and weight repre-

sented by this warrant, which will be delivered free on board

cars in the yard above named, only on surrender of this warrant

at the New York office, properly endorsed and witnessed, with

payment of charges as noted below." The storage yard system

was availed of by the furnace company for the purpose of bor-

rowing money on the security of its unmarketed iron, the war-
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rants for which could be conveniently used as evidence of a

pledge of iron to secure its notes. In some instances of borrow-

ing the storage company and its yard were not resorted to, and

the iron was delivered elsewhere in pledge to the lender inde-

pendently of the storage company. Besides other investors who

from time to time made loans to the furnace company upon the

security of storage warrants was the storage company itself. In

this way it became the pledgee of its own warrants, representing

about two thousand one hundred tons of iron in its yard 38. . . .

Joseph Verchot brought this suit, and thereafter, he having

died, it was revived in the name of his executrix. It seeks to

enforce a pledge of seven hundred tons of iron alleged to have

been made to him by the furnace company as security for money

loaned on its seven notes each reciting a pledge of one hundred

tons of designated iron, and further reciting that "any excess

in the value of said collaterals or surplus from the sale thereof

beyond the amount due hereon shall be applicable upon any

other note or claim held by the holder hereof against us now due,

or to become due, or that may hereafter be contracted." It

is alleged in substance that after the iron was so delivered in

pledge it was, under the direction of the furnace company's

president, wrongfully removed into the storage warrant yard,

where interests in it were claimed by other parties defendant.

The demurrer to the bill was properly overruled. Verchot,

not having possession of the iron, could not pursue the ordinary

AMEEICAN PIG IRON, ETC. CO. v. GERMAN. § 23

way of enforcing his security by a sale of the iron, and his sale,

if it could be made, would be embarrassed by the conflicting

claims upon it. In such case equity has jurisdiction to deter-

mine the rights of rival claimants and to enforce the pledge

by judicial sale: 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 1231;

18 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 674; Sharp v. National Bank,

87 Ala. 644, 7 South. 106; Freeman v. Freeman, 17 N. J.

Eq. 44.

There was nothing in the pendency of other creditors' bills

to preclude him from proceeding by original bill instead of

by intervention under those bills : Alabama Iron etc. Co. v. Mc-

Keever, 112 Ala. 134, 20 South. 84.

The statutes requiring chattel mortgages to be in writing and

authorizing their registration have no application to a pledge.

A pledge differs from a mortgage in that the pledgee must have

possession and the pledgor the legal title of the property, while

a mortgage passes the title to the mortgagee and may allow

possession to remain in the mortgagor: Jones on Pledges, sees.

4, 7; Geilfuss v. Corrigan, 95 Wis. 651, 60 Am. St. Rep. 143,
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70 N. W. 306. Notice to the public of the pledgee's interest

in the property is sufficiently given by the possession, which

must reside in the pledgee. Such possession, however, to be

effective either for notice or to give validity at law to the

pledge, must be complete, unequivocal, and exclusive of the

pledgor's possession in his own right: Jones on Pledges, sec.

40; Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U. S. 467; First Nat. Bank v. Caper-

ton, 74 Miss. 857, 60 Am. St. Rep. 540, 22 South. 60. As

bearing on the question what constitutes such possession, the

reported cases are numerous; but those which can be relied on

as express authority are few, since each case is determined upon

its peculiar facts.

In this case it is clearly proven that under the agreement of

pledge between the furnace company, acting by its president

and Verchot, a particular spot of ground belonging to that com-

pany and located apart from its own iron yards was tendered

by the president and accepted by Verchot for his use, and that

a quantity of iron was placed thereon, piled in one hundred ton

lots and marked with paint with Verchot 's initials. There is

nothing to show that any power was reserved or allowed to the

furnace company or its officers or employees either to repledge,

sell, use, or have charge of the iron after it was so placed.

It was not essential for the delivery to be made at the time

of the contract, and the pledge took effect upon subsequent de-

livery made in performance of the contract: Nobles v. Chris-
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tian-Craft Grocery Co., 113 Ala. 220, 20 South. 961; Denis on

Contracts of Pledge, sec. 136. Considering the character of

the property involved, its delivery must be taken as vesting

complete possession in Verchot, thereby validating the pledge.

The cases of Allen v. Smith, 10 Mass. 308, and Sumner v. Ham-

let, 12 Pick. 76, may be referred to as analogous in principle.

it is proven that T. J. Peter, president of the furnace com-

pany, had active charge of its affairs, and that by his direction

iron was taken from the Verchot yard and placed in the storage

company's yard, and there is nothing to show that Verchot

ever authorized or ratified such removal excepting a statement

attributed to T. J. Peter, which is hearsay and for that reason

incompetent as evidence. There is, however, evidence tending

to show that, contrary to the storage company's printed rules,

its yardmaster had, in some instances, given certificates upon

which warrants were issued to, and pledged by, the furnace com-

pany representing deposits of iron in the storage yard before

they were actually made. The necessity for supplying the

shortage thus created, for which E. T. Peter, the yardmaster,
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might have been held responsible to the storage company, fur-

nishes a probable motive for so using the iron in controversy.

It may be that Peter expected that Verchot would ratify such

removal upon restitution made to him from iron to be manu-

factured, but there is no proof of such ratification. On the

contrary, there is evidence tending to show that on being in-

formed of the removal he objected and held to his original con-

tract.

As to the quantity of iron delivered to Verchot on the yard

assigned to him, and likewise as to the quantity thence removed

into the storage company's yard, the evidence is not clear.

Those matters being referred to the register, he ascertained that

the entire seven hundred tons were so delivered and removed.

The testimony is not in accord as to the quantity removed,

neither does it accord as to the time of removal, and the weigh-

ing-books in evidence are not shown to have been accurately

kept. The testimony can be best harmonized upon the supposi-

tion that removals in different quantities occurred at different

dates, and that all of such acts of removal were not known to

each witness. So viewed the evidence supports the register's

findings.

The demurrers to the intervening petitions show no tenable

grounds. Such petitions are not required to conform to all

the technical rules applicable to pleading as between the prin-

cipal parties. When filed by leave of court other parties in
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interest are entitled to notice and an opportunity to defend,

but the petition need not name tliem as defendants, and it needs

no formal prayer for process.

Pfafif's petition presents a case for the most part similar to

that of Verchot. He claims as the holder of notes containing

agreements for pledges of iron as collateral security transferred

to him by C. S. Plumb, who is alleged to have made loans thereon

to the furnace company, aggregating five thousand dollars.

There is evidence amply supporting the petition and showing

that, pursuant to the contracts, iron was set apart to Mrs. Plumb

by being placed upon a spot of ground leased to her by the

furnace company for that purpose, and was there marked with

initial of her name. There is no evidence of any right reserved

or allowed to the furnace company, or anyone cannected with

it, to thereafter use or exercise any control over the iron. This

delivery vested Mrs. Plumb with possession, and in that respect

fully executed the pledge contract.

It was ascertained by the register upon a reference that three

hundred tons of iron were by direction of the furnace company 's
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president removed from the Plumb yard into the storage com-

pany's yard and that two hundred tons of same remained on

that yard, the warrants describing same being held by the stor-

age company, and that a warrant describing the other one hun-

dred tons had been issued to an innocent holder for value, and

that this last-mentioned one hundred tons had been removed

from the state, but that there had been another one hundred

tons substituted and held in lieu of it in the storage yard.

Though a pledgee does not acquire the legal title to the

pledged property, and though relinquishment of his possession

will ordinarily defeat the pledge, yet the pledgor cannot accom-

plish such defeat by wrongfully retaking possession: Way v.

Davidson, 12 Gray, 465, 74 Am. Dec. 604; Palmtag v. Dou-

trick, 59 Cal. 154, 43 Am. Rep. 245. Verchot and Mrs. Plumb,

in whose place Pfaff now stands, being without fault, might have

recovered possession from the furnace company when the iron

was taken by it or its representatives from their respective yards ;

and the same right of action lay against the storage company

after it was held in its yard. Neither the storage company nor

its warrant holders, either with or without notice of the pledge,

could acquire any greater interest than their transferrer, the

furnace company, had, which was only to have the property after

satisfaction of the debts it was pledged to secure: Burton v.

Curyea, 40 111. 320, 89 Am. Dec. 350; Solomon v. Bushnell,

11 Or. 277, 50 Am. Rep. 475, 3 Pac. 677. The statute (Code,
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see. 4222) regulating the issuance of warehouse receipts was

not intended to confer rights upon their hokiers prejudicial to

one whose property is stored Avithoiit authority: Commercial

Bank v. Hurt, 99 Ala. 130, 42 Am. St. Rep. 38, 12 South. 568.

(Omitting other matters.) Judgment affirmed at cost of ap-

pellant storage company.

< 24. GEILFUSS V. CORRIGAN,

95 Wis. 651; 70 N. W. B. 306; 60 Am. St. R. 143. 1897.

Action to recover $178,908.00 for pig iron taken under a judg-

ment in favor of the receiver of Corrigan, Ives & Co., who had

furnished the furnace company the iron ore from which the pig

iron was made. Plaintiff was assignee of the Commercial Bank

of Milwaukee, which had advanced the furnace company large

sums on the security of "storage warrants." Judgment for

plaintiff.

WiNSLOW, J. The so-called storage warrants were not ware-

house receipts, either under the laws of Pennsylvania or of Wis-

consin. In order to be such, they must be issued by a warehouse-

man or one openly engaged in the business of storing property for

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:37 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

others for a compensation: 1 Brightly 's Purdon's Digest, 12th

ed., p. 165, sec. 1; Bucher v. Commonwealth, 103 Pa. St. 528;

Shepardson v. Cary, 29 Wis. 34. And the fact that the receipt

was executed by a warehouseman must affirmatively appear

in the evidence: Shepardson v. Cary, 29 Wis. 34. Not only

was there no proof in this case that the furnace company was

in the warehousing or storage business, but, on the contrary,

the proof was conclusive that it was not in such business, and

never had been. The fact that it surreptitiously issued the

false receipts in question did not constitute it a warehousing

corporation. As well might it be argued that the issuance of

counterfeit bank bills constitutes the counterfeiter a bank. It

seems that, had the certificates been negotiable warehouse re-

ceipts, the bank would have acquired a valid lien upon the iron

they represented by the transfer and indorsement of the receipts

to it by the Buffalo Mining Company: Price v. Wisconsin etc.

Ins. Co., 43 Wis. 267; 1 Brightly 's Purdon's Digest, 12th ed.,

p. 165. sec. 1. But we may dismiss this question, because they

were not such certificates, and the plaintiff obtains no advan-

tage from the fact that they were in the usual form thereof.

Nor were the certificates valid as chattel mortgages upon the
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iron named in tLem, not only because they are not chattel mort-

gages in legal effect, but also because by the law of Pennsyl-

vania, as well as by the law of Wisconsin, a chattel mortgage

is only valid as to third persons when filed in the proper office,

and there is no claim of any filing here: 1 Brightly 's Purdon's

Digest, 12th ed., p. 665, sees. 200-214.

Thus, at the outset of the case, it appears that the plaintiff

had no interest in or lien upon the iron in question, as indorsee

of a warehouse receipt nor as a chattel mortgagee. Nor can

it be claimed that the plaintiff actually bought or obtained legal

title to the iron. These possible claims being thus eliminated,

we know of no other claim which the plaintiff' can make, unless

it be a claim as pledgee of the iron as collateral to the debts of

the Buffalo Mining Company and of Schlesinger; and this, in

fact, is the claim made in the complaint, and the only claim

which the evidence tends to justify. It becomes necessary,

then, to consider the question whether the evidence shows a

valid pledge. The principles of law governing a pledge of per-

sonal property are simple and familiar. To constitute a valid
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pledge there must be transfer of possession to the pledgee, act-

ual or constructive : Seymour v. Colburn, 43 Wis. 67. A pledge

dift'ers from a mortgage in this important respect, namely, that

the legal title to the property pledged remains in the pledgor,

subject to the pledgee's lien for his debt, while a mortgage,

passes the legal title to the mortgagee. In the case of a pledge,

a lien is created, to the existence of which possession is absolute-

ly necessary; in the case of a mortgage, title passes, subject to

be revested by performance of a condition subsequent: Jones

on Pledges, sees. 4, 7; Thompson v. Dolliver, 132 Mass. 103.

Therefore, if the bank had any interest in the iron at the time

of its seizure, it was that of a lien thereon, by way of a pledge.

In considering the question of whether it had such a lien

which was valid as against the creditors of the furnace company,

a brief recapitulation of the essential facts will be useful.

Ferdinand Schlesinger o^\Tied two corporations, one, a mining

corporation, engaged in mining ore in Michigan; the other, a

furnace company, engaged in smelting ore in Pennsylvania.

These corporations were nominally furnished with full comple-

ments of officers, but in fact the business of each was directed

and controlled by Schlesinger as though it were his own. The

furnace company had a large stock of pig iron constantly on

hand in its yards in Pennsylvania, and was largely indebted to

Corrigan, Ives & Co., of whom it purchased its iron. It refused

to gi\e Corrigan, Ives & Co. security on the iron, on the ground
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that such a course would injure its credit. In order to raise

money for the furnace company, Schlesinger caused the furnace

company to issue apparent storage receipts to the mining com-

pany, without consideration, and without agreement to purchase,

and without selection or delivery of the property, either actual

or constructive, unless the handing over of the receipts be

delivery, and with the agreement' that the receipts should

be returned whenever the furnace company needed them on

account of sale of the iron. On receiving the receipts, he bor-

rowed money of the plaintiff bank upon the notes of the mining

company, secured by assignment of the receipts as collateral.

What was done with all the money so borrowed does not ap-

pear. The original purpose seems to have been, as said in re-

spondent's brief, to raise money for the furnace company, and

the evidence shows the fact that the mining company was almost

daily remitting money in large amounts to the furnace company,

as well as the fact that the furnace company was frequently re-

mitting to the mining company. None of the remittances were

made in payment of the iron certificates, nor were they ever
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intended to be applied thereon. The fact seems to be that each

enterprise was bolstering up the other as occasion required, or,

rather, that Mr. Schlesinger was using the property and credit

of his apparently separate concerns indiscriminately, to obtain

money as it was needed. It seems probable that much of the

money borrowed on the notes of the mining company secured

by the receipts in question was forwarded to the furnace com-

pany.

The court found that the bank took the certificates innocently,

without knowledge of any defect. We cannot probably dis-

turb this finding, because it is based on the affirmative evidence

of the cashier who made the loans; but, in view of the facts

proven on cross-examination of the cashier himself, this finding

seems to be a considerable tax on the credulity. The facts are,

in brief, that the cashier was well acquainted with Mr. Schles-

inger, so much so that in 1892 Schlesinger put in his hands

one share of stock in the Buffalo Mining Company, in order

that he might become a director of the company, and he was

thereupon made a director and secretary of the company, and

remained such until April, 1893, when he resigned, and re-

turned his share of stock. This was after the loans on the

credit of the receipts had begun to be made. Notwithstand-

ing his high official position in the mining company, he testifies

that he ''knew nothing of its business," except that it was en-

gaged in mining. We think he could hardly have failed to dis-
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eover the manner in which J\Ir. Schlesinger conducted the busi-

ness of his nominal corporations. However this may be, he

knew, as he testifies, that the mining company was engaged in

mining ore, and not in buying or selling pig iron. He knew

"something" about the furnace company; knew where it was

doing business; knew Mr. Hirschfeld, the nominal president;

discounted some of the furnace company's paper; obtained gen-

eral information about it by inquiries through commercial agen-

cies at the time of the pledging of the receipts. In view of all these

facts which were within his knowledge, and the facts which

he might have ascertained without difficulty by very little in-

quiry, it seems almost an impeachment of his intelligence to

say that he received the receipts in ignorance of any defect or

infirmity in them ; but we suppose we are bound by the finding,

and we shall proceed on that basis.

It is very apparent that, had the certificates remained in the

hands of the mining company, they would have constituted no

obstacle to creditors of the furnace company in the collection

of their debts. They were subject to nearly, if not quite, all
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the objections which render transfers void as to creditors. They

were absolutely false in fact. There was no change of posses-

sion of the iron ; no payment nor agreement to pay for it ; no in-

tention to pass title. They were the merest shams. There

was, in effect, an agreement that the furnace company should

remain the apparent owner, with the right to sell and receive

and dispose of the proceeds of sales, and that it should have

the right to call back certificates whenever it needed them for

this purpose; and it was further expected that, when the need

for borrowing money was over, the certificates should all be

returned. The scheme was certainly a brilliant one. If suc-

cessful, it created a shifting title or interest, which readjusted

itself from day to day as the stock changed, automatically at-

taching to each new pig of iron as it emerged glowing from the

furnace, and with equal facility detaching itself from each pig

that was sold as it was loaded on the car for transportation to

the vendee. Certainly, if such a scheme could be successful,

the inventor should take high rank among a certain class of

financiers; and the laws which have been supposed to prevent

secret transfers and conveyances in fraud of creditors must be

at once revised, or they will pass into the dim limbo of unexe-

cuted and worn-out legislation.

It is seriously and ably argued that the scheme has been suc-

cessful; that the original transaction has been purged of all ob-

jections by the intervention of the innocent third person, in the
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.shape of the plaintiff bank; and thus that the shifting and self-

adjusting, but void, title of the mining company has been turnel

into an equally shifting and delusive, but good, lien for the bene-

fit of the bank— a lien which is secret and invisible to creditors,

but entirely visible and very real to the plaintiff. As before

said in this opinion, the only interest which the plaintiff claims

or can claim in the iron in question is that of a lien thereon as

pledgee ; and, in order to make a valid pledge, there must have

been either actual or constructive delivery of the property

pledged. Bona fides does not avail the pledgee in the absence of

delivery and possession, either actual or constructive. There was

confessedly no actual delivery here, and the only thing that can

be claimed to be a symbolical or constructive delivery is the in-

dorsement and delivery of the false receipts. Hence, the ques-

tion becomes whether the delivery of the receipts under the

circumstances is a constructive delivery of so much iron. Had

they been in fact warehouse receipts, the transfer and indorse-

ment thereof by way of pledge would have operated as a suffi-

cient constructive delivery of the property, both by the common
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law and by the statute: Rev. Stats., sec. 4194; Shepardson v.

Gary, 29 Wis. 34 ; Price v. Wisconsin etc. Ins. Co., 43 Wis. 267.

Bills of lading and railroad receipts are placed by the statutes

of both states on the same footing : See statutes of Pennsylvania

before cited in this opinion. The reasons for this rule are very

apparent. In such cases, the property itself is in the hands of

a third person or corporation, instead of in the possession of the

vendor or pledgor. Consequently, it does not furnish any false

basis of credit, nor is any creditor deceived, because it is well

understood that ^ods in the hands of warehousemen ijr

carriers are or may be the property of others, and, by the long

usage of trade, subject to just this mode of _transfer. No such

considerations, however, apply in the case of goods in the posses-

sion of the vendor or pledgor, or of some third person who is not

a warehouseman or wharfinger, and we know of no rule which

makes the mere delivery of a receipt a constructive delivery of

the property in pledge in such a case. In Shepardson v. Cary,

29 Wis. 34 (which was an action in equity to enforce a pledge

of personal property as collateral, alleged to have been made by

means of the transfer of a warehouse receipt), Dixon, C. J., says :

"To uphold the receipt as a proper warehouse document trans-

ferring the title to the property, and operating as a good con-

structive delivery of it to the vendee, it must in all cases dis-

tinctly appear that it was executed by a warehouseman, one

openly engaged in that business, and in the usual course of
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trade." There are numerous examples of constructive delivery

in the books, but none, we think, which holds that the facts

here constitute such delivery. Constructive or symbolical deliv-

ery is permitted because of the difficulty or impossibility, in some

cases, of actual delivery. Thus, where the goods are very bulky,

as logs in a boom, delivery may be made by pointing them

out to the pledgee; or, where they are goods in a warehouse,

by a delivery of the keys; or, where a savings bank deposit

is to be pledged, it may be done by delivery of the pass-book;

Jewett V. Warren, 12 J\lass. 300; 7 Am. Dec. 74; Jones on

Pledges, sees. 36, 37 ; Boynton v. Payrow, 67 Me. 587. So, also,

where goods are in possession of a third person, and the pledgor

gives an order on the custodian to hold the goods for the pledgee,

which is brought to the knowledge of the custodian, it seems that

this would be a sufficient delivery and change of possession :

"Whitaker v. Sumner, 20 Pick. 399 ; Tuxworth v. Moore, 9 Pick.

347; 20 Am. Dec. 479. In all these cases it will be readily seen

that the property is placed bej'ond the control of the pledgor,

and is not being used to maintain an appearance of wealth by
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either the pledgor or others with the consent of the pledgee.

In the present case there is no such element. The pledgee

never saw or attempted to see the iron described in the certifi-

cates, and made no inquiries concerning it. It never notified

the furnace company that it held any certificates in pledge, or

claimed any interest in any iron in its possession. It tacitly

allowed the furnace company to go on in its business for months,

selling out the very iron nominally covered by the certificates,

and replacing it with other iron, and collecting and using the

proceeds of its sales. There can be no constructive or symbolical

delivery and continuance of possession logically claimed where

such a state of facts appears. Conceding that the title to the

iron was in the mining company, the furnace company was the

custodian, and the custodian received no notice of pledge, made

no agreement to hold for the benefit of the pledgee, but went

on in business, selling the property, and substituting other prop-

erty in its place, with no one to hinder or make it afraid. Ap-

parently the owner of more than twenty thousand tons of iron,

it was (if plaintiff's theory is correct) really not the owner of

it in case a creditor appeared with an execution. It was held

in Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U. S. 467, that where property alleged

to have been pledged has at all times been in the actual possession

of the pledgor, with authority to dispose of it and substitute

another article of equal value in its place, there exists no pledge

as against third persons. No reason is perceived why this is not
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wholesome doctrine, nor why it does not apply with equal force

to possession by a third person, with power of sale and substi-

tution, as in the present case. Our conclusion is, that as against

third persons, the bank never perfected its pledge by obtaining

possession, either actual or constructive, of the iron named in

the certificates, and hence that it cannot maintain this action.

. . . By the Court. Judgment reversed, and action re-

manded with directions to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint.

y^25. WILSON V: LITTLE,

2 N. Y. (2 Comstock) 443; 51 Am. D. 307. 1849.

Trover for the conversion of railroad stock. Judgment for

plaintiff.

By Court, Ruggles, J. This was an action for wrongfully

selling fifty shares of Erie railroad stock, which the defendants,

Little & Co, had received in security for a loan of two thousand

dollars made by them to Wilson, through the agency of R. L.

Cutting, a broker. The contract in writing was in these words:

"$2,000. New York, Dec. 20, 1845.

' ' I promise to pay Jacob Little or order two thousand dollars,
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for value received, with interest at the rate of seven per cent.

p(;r annum, having deposited with tliem as collateral security,

with authority to sell the same at the broker's board, or at pub-

lic auction, or at private sale, at option, on the non-per-

formance of this promise, without notice on fifty Erie.

"R. L. Cutting.''

The stock in fact belonged to the plaintiff Wilson, but stood

in Cutting's name on the books of the New York & Erie Rail-

road Company. It was of that kind known as consolidated

capital stock. Cutting negotiated the loan as the plaintiff's

broker. On the same day Cutting made a transfer of the

stock on the books of the company in the words following:

"N. Y. & Erie Co.

"For value received, I hereby transfer unto Jacob Little &

Co. all my right, title, and interest in fifty shares of the consol-

idated capital stock of the New York & Erie Railroad Company.

"New York, Dec. 20, 1845. R. L. Cutting.''
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It is contended, on the part of the defendants, that the trans-

action was a mortgage, and not a pledge; that the money was

payable immediately, and the stock became absolutely the prop-

erty of the appellants, and was only redeemable in equity. If

this be true, the supreme court and the court for the correction

of errors must have rendered their judgments in the case of Al-

len V. Dykers, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 593, and Dykers v. Allen, 7 Id.

498 [42 Am. Dec. 87], upon a mistaken view of the law. In that

case, as in the present, there was a loan of money, a promissory

note for the payment of the amount, in which it was stated that

the borrower had deposited with the lenders, as collateral se-

curity, with authority to sell the same on the non-performance

of the promise, two hundred and fifty shares of the stock therein

mentioned. The money in that case was payable in sixty days

— the sale was to be made at the board of brokers, and notice

waived if not paid at maturity. The stock was assigned to the

lenders of the money, and the transfer entered on the books of

the company, on the day the note was given. With respect to the

ques^tion whether the stock was mortgaged or pledged, I can per-
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cei^'o no difference between that case and the present. The ques-

tion does not appear, by the report of that case, to have been

raised. It would have been a decisive point, for if it had been

a mortgage and not a pledge, the plaintiff must have failed.

The sale of the stock in that case, by the lender, before the ma-

turity of the note, did not make it the less decisive : See Brown

V. Bement, 8 Johns. 98. If there had been good ground for say-

ing, in Allen v. Dykers, that the stock was mortgaged and not

pledged, it is not to be believed that it would have escaped the

attention of the eminent counsel who argued the cause, and of

both the courts; and on examining the question, I am satisfied

that if the point had been taken it would have been overruled.

The argument of the defendant in this case is founded on the

assumption that when personal things are pledged for the pay-

ment of a debt, the general property and the legal title always

remain in the pledgor; and that in all cases where the legal

title is transferred to the creditor, the transaction is a mortgage

and not a pledge. This, however, is not invariably true. But

it is true that possession must uniformly accompany a pledge.

The right of the pledgee can not otherwise be consummated.

And on this ground it has been doubted whether incorporeal

things like debts, money in stocks, etc., which can not be manu-

ally delivered, were the proper subjects of a pledge. It is now

held that they are so ; and there seems to be no reason why any

legal or equitable interest whatever in personal property may
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not be pledged ; provided the interest can be put, by actual de-

livery or by written transfer, into the hands or within the power

of the pledgee, so as to be made available to him for the satis-

faction of the debt. Goods at sea may be passed in pledge by a

transfer of the muniments of title, as by a written assignment

of the bill of lading. This is equivalent to actual possession,

because it is a delivery of the means of obtaining possession.

And debts and choses in action are capable, by means of a writ-

ten assignment, of being conveyed in pledge: Story on Bail.,

sees. 290, 297. The capital stock of a corporate company is not

capable of manual delivery. The scrip of certificate may be

delivered, but that of itself does not carry with it the stockhold-

er's interest in the corporate funds. Nor does it necessarily

put that interest under the control of the pledgee. The mode

in which the capital stock of a corporation is transferred usu-

ally depends on its by-laws : 1 R. S. 600, sec. 1. It is so in the

case of the New York & Erie Railroad Company: Laws of 1832,

c. 224, sec. 18. The case does not show what the by-laws of that

corporation were. It may be that nothing short of the trans-
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fer of the title on the books of the company would have been

sufficient to give the defendants the absolute possession of the

stock, and to secure them against a transfer to some other per-

son. In such case the transfer of the legal title being necessary

to the change of possession, is entirely consistent with the pledge

of the goods. Indeed, it is in no case inconsistent with it, if

it appears by the terms of the contract that the debtor has a legal

right to the restoration of the pledge on payment of the debt

at any time, although after it falls due, and before the creditor

has exercised the power of sale. Reeves v. Capper, 5 Bing.

N. C. 136, was a case in which the debtor ''made over" to the

creditor "as his property" a chronometer, until a debt of fifty

pounds should be repaid. It was held to be a valid pledge.

In the present case the note for the repayment of the loan

and the transfer of the stock were parts of the same transac-

tion, and are to be construed together. The transfer, if re-

garded by itself, is absolute, but its object and character is

qualified and explained by the contemporaneous paper which de-

clares it to be a deposit of the stock as collateral security for the

payment of two thousand dollars, and there is nothing in the

instrument to work a forfeiture of the right to redeem or other-

wise to defeat it, except by a lawful sale under the power ex-

pressed in the paper.

The general property which the pledgor is said usually to re-

tain, is nothing more than a legal right to the restoration of the
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tiling pledged on payment of the debt. Upon a fair construc-

tion of the note and the transfer taken together, this right was

in the plaintiff, unless it was defeated by the sale which the de-

fendant made of the stock.

In every contract of pledge there is a right of redemption on

the part of the debtor. But in this case that right was illusory

and of no value, if the creditor could instantly, without de-

mand of payment and without notice, sell the thing pledged.

We are not required to give the transaction so unreasonable a

construction. The borrower agreed that the lender might sell

without notice, but not that he might sell without demand of

payment, which is a different thing. The lender might have

brought his action immediately, for the bringing an action is

one way of demanding payment; but selling without notice is

not a demand of payment, and it is well settled that whsre^o

jtime is expressly fixed by contract between the parties for the

payment of a debt secured by a pledge, the pawnee can not sell

the pledge without a previous demand of payment, although the

debt is technically due, immediately: Story on Bail., see. 308;

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:37 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

Stearns v. Marsh, 4 Denio, 227 [47 Am. Dec. 248].

Payment of the note in this case was not demanded until the

third of January, 1846. Previous to that time, and about the

twenty-fourth of December, 1845, the defendants had sold the

whole or the greater part of the fifty shares of consolidated

stock pledged to them by the plaintiff, and were therefore not

in condition to fulfill the contract on their part by restoring the

pledge. Nor were they able nor did they otter to restore the

same kind of stock, or stock of the same value as that which

had been pledged in behalf of the plaintiff. On the third of

January, when the defendants offered to deliver the converted

stock, which was of a different kind and value, the plaintiff's

broker was willing to receive any stock of the same description

as that which had been pledged ; but no stock of that kind was

offered by the defendants. There was at that time a material

difference in the market price between the consolidated and the

converted stock of the company, the former selling at eighty-five

dollars, and the latter at fifty-five dollars, per share. The pledge

of the fifty shares of consolidated stock, therefore, could not be

restored or made good to the plaintiff by assigning to him the

same number of shares of converted stock. The defendants

were bound to restore the identical stock pledged. The sale of

it by the defendants before payment demanded was therefore

wrongful, and the evidence sustains the third count in the

plaintiff's declaration. The defendants having voluntarily put
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it out of their power to restore the pledge, a tender of the

money borrowed would have been fruitless, and was therefore

unnecessary: Allen v. Dykers, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 596; Dykers v.

Allen, 7 Id. 498 [42 Am. Dec. 87] .

The remaining question is as to the rule of damages. The

stock was disposed of by the defendants as early as the twenty-

fourth of December, when its market price was about sixty-

eight dollars the share. The defendant did not, however, dis-

tinctly inform the plaintiff then or afterwards that he had

sold it, although he said he "had not got it," and gave that

as a reason why he did not then transfer it, promising at the

same time, that he would make the transfer as soon as the stock

came in. The plaintiff, to accommodate the defendant, agreed

to wait until the following day, when the transfer was not made,

the defendant again promising to make it shortly. The plaint-

iff's broker reminded the defendant of the stock frequently, and

on the thirtieth of December, formally notified him that he

wanted to pay the loan and get back the stock, insisting that

there should be no more delay, and that if it was not returned,
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he was directed by the party for whom he was acting to buy

fifty shares at the board and charge it to the defendants. The

defendant then said the stock should be returned the next day,

but failed to return it ; and it was not until the second of Janu-

ary that the defendant ceased to hold out the expectation of

restoring the stock, or stock of the same kind and of equivalent

value. On that day and on the third of January, the con-

solidated stock sold at eighty-five dollars the share.

The defendants insist that they are chargeable only with the

value of the pledge at the time it was wrongfully converted by

them to their own use on or before the twenty-fourth of Decem-

ber, and not with its increased value at any subsequent period.

The court below, in making up the verdict, estimated the stock

at eighty-four dollars the share. In actions for the wrongful

conversion of personal property, it has in some cases been held

that the value of the property is to be estimated according to

its price at the time of the conversion, and in others that the

plaintiff is entitled to damages according to its value at any

time between the time of the conversion and the day of the trial :

Bank of Buffalo v. Kortright, 22 Wend. 348, 366. It is un-

necessary in this case to settle the general rule. The ground

on which the defendants insist that the damages nuist be esti-

mated according to the price of the stock on the twenty-fourth

of December, is that the plaintiff, on learning that the defend-

ants had sold it, might then have gone into the market and pur-
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chased it at the current price on that day. But it is evident that

he was prevented from doing so by the repeated promises of the

defendants to restore the stock. Although the plaintiff was

strictly entitled to a retransfer of the same shares that were

pledged, it appears that his broker was willing to receive other

stock of the same description and value, which the defendant

promised from day to day to give, the plaintiff being all the

time ready to pay the money borrowed. Time having thus been

given to the defendants at their request for the fulfillment of

their obligation, and the plaintiff having waited for the deliv-

ery of the stock for the accommodation of the defendants, and

having relied on the expectation thus held out, and lost the

opportunity of purchasing at a reduced price, it is manifestly

just that the plaintiff should recover according to the value of

the thing pledged when the defendant finally failed in his prom-

ises to restore it.

Judgment affirmed. .

26. MASONIC SAVINGS BANK V. BANGS 'S ADMINIS-

TRATOR,
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84 Ky. 135; 4 Am. St. R. 197. 1886.

Petition by administrator of estate of intestate, who died in-

solvent.

Pryor, J. John B. Bangs, in the month of June, 1884, bor-

rowed of the Masonic Savings Bank the sum of ten thousand

dollars, for which he executed his note payable in six months,

with interest from date, and to secure its payment he pledged

as collateral security three hundred shares of the stock of the

New Gait House Company. The nature of the pledge was

indorsed on the back of the note, and is as follows: ''As se-

curity for the payment of the within note, I have deposited

with the Masonic Savings Bank three hundred shares of the

capital stock of the New Gait House Company, and authorize

the said bank to sell the above-described collaterals, and pass

a good title thereto to the purchaser, if the within note is not

paid at maturity, reserving the right to be notified in writing

twenty days previous to the date and place of the contemplated

sale."

Bangs, the obligor in the note, died intestate in August,

1884, and the appellee, W. C. Kendrick, administered on his
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estate, and in order to a settlement with creditors, filed a peti-

tion in the Louisville chancery court, to which the appellant

(Masonic Savings Bank) was made a defendant. The estate

of Bangs was not only involved, but utterly insolvent.

The Masonic Savings Bank, being a large creditor of the es-

tate, filed an answer and counterclaim, setting forth its vari-

ous demands, and among them the note for ten thousand dollars.

A judgment was asked by the bank for the sale of the stock

pledged to secure the payment of that note. The administrator

and the bank consented by an agreed order that the bank should

sell the stock, subject to the rights of the parties in interest.

The stock was sold by the bank, and realized, after the pay-

ment of all costs, the sum of $13,495.10. This sum satisfied the

note, and left a surplus of $3,536.45, and the manner in which

this surplus is to be distributed is the question presented on the

appeal.

The bank, holding many other large claims against the es-

tate, asserts its right to apply this surplus to their payment,

insisting that by the law merchant it has a lien over other
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creditors, and if not, having possession of the fund, its right to

a set-off against the claim of the administrator can not be de-

nied.

We find no decision by this court determining the question

involved; but the right of a bank to a general lien on the

money and funds of the depositor in its vaults for the pay-

ment of the balance of the general account of the depositor is

recognized by all the elementary books on the subject of banks

and banking, and sustained by an unbroken line of American

decisions. So M'hen the depositor is indebted to the bank, his

funds in the bank may be applied to the payment of the debt

at its maturity, and a failure of the bank to make such an appli-

cation has been held to discharge the indorser or sureties.

The right to a set-off would also exist against the adminis-

trator or representative of the depositor attempting to recover

the deposit after his death: Morse on Banking, 34-36.

This doctrine as to the general lien of a bank, or its right

to a set-off, does not control the question involved in this case.

It is equally as well settled that when the deposit is made

for a special purpose, with the knowledge and undertaking of

the bank, that purpose must be carried out ; or when the pledge

is specific to secure a particular debt, the lien only applies

to the debt intended to be secured by it. "A security given for

a contemporaneous advance of one thousand pounds by the

banker was held not te be applicable against an indebtedness
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of five hundred pounds afterwards arising on the ordinary run-

ning account": Morse on Banking, 36.

In this case the intestate deposited with the bank three

hundred shares of the New Gait House stock to secure the

payment of the note for ten thousand dollars. The title to the

stock was in the intestate, subject to this pledge, and the bank

had no right to sell more of the stock than would satisfy the

debt it was given to secure. If two hundred shares had satisfied

the debt, the intestate, if living, could have maintained an ac-

tion against the bank for the remaining one hundred shares.

The debt having been paid, the pledgor or owner would have

been entitled to the immediate possession of the stock remaining

unsold.

The administrator of Bangs consented that the whole of this

stock might be sold by the bank, and when sold, the special

pledge having been satisfied, the surplus fund arising from the

sale passed to the administrator. It was the property of the

estate, and its conversion into money did not alter the rights of

the parties. If the appellee, as the administrator, had paid off
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the ten-thousand dollar note, the whole of the stock would have

belonged to the estate, and no lien could have been asserted

against the administrator so as to have prevented a distribution

among the general creditors.

The special agreement with reference to the particular debt

repels the inference that it was pledged for any and all debts

that might thereafter be owing the bank by the intestate. In

3 Parsons on Contracts, 264, 265, the lien of the banker is thus

stated: "When a negotiable note is indorsed to a banker by

the payee as collateral security for one only of several demands

for which he is liable, the banker has no lien on such note as

security on any other demand against the indorser."

Kent in his Commentaries states the rule: "The pawnee

will not be allowed to retain the pledge for any other debt than

that for which it was made, even though the holder be a banker ' ' :

2 Kent's Com. 775.

In Duncan v. Brennan, 83 N. Y. 487, it was held that per-

sonal property pledged for a particular loan, can not, in the

absence of a special agreement, be held by the pledgee for any

other advance; and in that case it was also said that "the

general lien which bankers have upon bills, notes, and other

securities deposited with them for a balance due on general

account, can not exist where the pledge of property is for a

specific sum, and not a general pledge."

In the ease of Neponset Bank v. Leland, 5 Met. 259, it was
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adjudged that "where a negotiable note is indorsed to a bank

by the payee as collateral security for only one of several de-

mands on which he is liable, the bank has no lien on such note

as security for any other demand against the indorser."

In the case of Wyckoff v. Anthony, 90 N. Y. 442, the bonds

in controversy were pledged by the plaintiff as collateral security

for a note of eight thousand dollars. The plaintiff tendered

the firm the amount of the debt and interest, and demanded the

securities. The defendants refused to deliver them unless the

plaintiff would pay another claim of the defendants against the

plaintiff, for which the bonds had not been specifically pledged.

The plaintiff then brought his action for the value of the

bonds, alleging their conversion by the defendants. It was held

that "where securities are pledged to a banker or broker for

the payment of a particular loan or debt, he has no lien on the

securities for a general balance, or for the payment of other

claims," and a recovery was permitted.

We have found no case decided by the courts of this country

sustaining the position assumed by counsel for the appellant,
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and the English cases relied on, particularly the case of Davis

V. Bowsher, 5 Term Rep. 488, decided by Lord Kenyon, states

the rule to be, that by the general law of the land a banker

has a general lien upon all the securities in his hands belong-

ing to any particular person for" his general balance, unless

there be evidence to show that he received any particular se-

curity under special circumstances, which would take it out of

the common rule.

This general lien arises from the usage of trade; and the

fact that the parties have made the pledge for the particular

debt must be held to exclude the intention of creating or re-

lying on a lien that would otherwise exist upon the general

deposit account. It is a special deposit or pledge for a special

purpose, and when that purpose is accomplished, the lien ceases

to exist. A general lien in such a case would be inconsistent

with the special undertaking: Grant on Banking, 168.

Counsel on each side in this case have bestowed much labor

in presenting and reviewing the authorities on this question,

and w^hile some of the English cases would tend to sustain the

claim of lien, the whole current of American authority is

against such a doctrine.

Nor is the appellant entitled to a set-off, either at law or

equity, against this claim of the administrator. Mutual debts

existing between the intestate and the bank might be set off

by the bank, either at law or equity; but in this case, there
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was no debt due the intestate. The latter was liable to the

bank for a large sum of money, and had pledged his stock in

a corporation to pay a part of the debt only. The stock was

not converted by the bank into money during the life of the

intestate, and no lien, legal or equitable, existed on the

part of the bank outside of the pledge. The stock was the prop-

erty of the intestate in the possession of the bank, and at his

death the title vested in his personal representative. If Bangs

had mortgaged his personal property to secure this debt, a

satisfaction of the mortgage debt by a sale of a part of the per-

sonalty would have left the intestate entitled to the remainder

free of any encumbrance by reason of the mortgage, and the

pledge by a delivery of the possession of the stock to the bank

only invested it with an equity to the extent of the pledge made.

Equitable rights might have arisen as between the intestate,

if living, and the bank, entitling the latter to some of the pro-

visional remedies authorized by the code; but here the personal

assets, after satisfying the lien, vested in the administrator, and

the specific lien having been removed, the surplus is for dis-
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tribution between creditors, as provided in sections 33 and 34

of article 2, chapter 39, General Statutes.

When the personal estate is covered by liens giving a creditor

priority, the residue, after satisfying the lien, must be paid to

other creditors until they have received a sum equal, pro rata,

with the lien creditor. This statutory provision applies to all

liens created on the personal estate, whether by operation of

law or by express contract between the parties: Spratt v. First

National Bank of Richmond, 84 Ky. 85.

The estate being insolvent in any event, the bank must stand

back until the other creditors are made equal to the lien as-

serted and allowed it by reason of the pledge.

The judgment below, conforming to these views, must be

affirmed.

27. HOUTON V. HOLLIDAY,

2 Murphy (N. C.) Ill; 5 Am. D. 522, 1812.

Quantum meruit for money had and received. Henry Taylor

borrowed of Holliday $200.00 and pledged as security his negro

slave, whose services were worth $60.00 a year. Taylor died,

leaving the slave to his daughter Lucy, who a year later married

Houton. The latter paid the loan, received back the slave and
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demanded of Holliday pay for the services of the slave from

Taylor's death until payment of the loan. Verdict for plaintiff

for excess of the services over interest on the loan.

By Court, Taylor, C. J. It has been the uniform practice of

the courts of equity of this state, to make a mortgagee in pos-

session to account for the rents and profits upon a bill filed for

redemption. This is a necessary consequence of the principles

which prevail in those courts relative to a mortgage, which is

considered only as a security for money lent, and the mortgagee

a trustee for the mortgagor. To sanction an opposite doctrine,

even in the case of pledges where the profits exceed the interest

of the money lent, would be to furnish facilities for the evasion

of the statute against usviry, almost amounting to a repeal of

that salutary law. Nothing can come more completely within

the legal notion of a pledge, than the slave held by Holliday in

the present case, for by the very terms of the contract, it was

so to continue until the money should be paid; no legal prop-

erty vesting in Holliday, who had only a lien upon it to secure

his debt. All the profits, therefore, exceeding the interest of
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his debt, he received to the plaintiff's use, and cannot con-

scientiously withhold. Wherever a man receives money be-

longing to another, without any valuable consideration given,

the law implies that the person receiving, promised to account

for it to the true owner; and the breach of such implied under-

taking is to be compensated for in the present form of action,

which is according to Mr. Justice Blackstone, "a very exten-

sive and beneficial remedy, applicable to almost every case

where a person has received money, which ex aequo et hono, he

ought to refund." Nor is its application to cases like the pres-

ent, without authority from direct adjudication; the case of

Astley V. Reynolds, Strange, 915, furnishes an instance of a man

being allowed to receive the surplus which he had paid beyond

legal interest, in order to get possession of goods which he had

pledged. In principle, the cases are the same; the only thing

in which they differ is, that in the case before us, the money

was received by the defendant from the labor of the pledge; in

the other, it was paid by the sheriff.

Let judgment be entered for the plaintiff.
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A 28. GEMMELL V. DAVIS,

75 Md. 546; 23 Atl. R. 1032; 32 Am. St. B. 412. 1892.

Appeal from an auditor's order for distribution of dividends

of stock in a corporation.

McSherry, J. (After deciding that a corporation has no lien

on the^stock of a^ stockholder to satisfy a debt due the company

from him.) There was some additional evidence taken relative

to the ownership of Bry don's stock. It appears from this evi-

dence that Brydon's stock was first pledged by him to Henry

G. Davis and Company on August 27, 1874. No assignment was

then indorsed on the certificates, but the certificates were placed

by Brydon in an envelope, and were delivered to one of the

members of the firm of Henry G. Davis and Company, and

upon or accompanying the envelope was this memorandum,

viz.: "August 27, 1874. Five hundred and three shares stock

of the North Branch Company William A. Brydon placed in

the hands of W. R. Davis as collateral for certain advances

by H. G. Davis & Co. Received August 27, 1874, four hundred

dollars. W. A. Brydon." Subsequently the assignment of No-
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vember 13, 1888, was written on the certificates, which, since

their delivery on August 27, 1874, have been continuously in the

possession of Henry G. Davis and Company. Brydon testified

that the assignment was made for the purpose of pledging the

stock as collateral security for the payment of the Gouverneur

lien, and for a loan of four hundred dollars; though Henry G.

Davis and Company claim that the pledge was intended to

secure numerous other items of indebtedness on the part of

Brydon to them. It further appears that on the twenty-eighth

day of October, 1876, Brydon executed the following transfer

of the same stock to his wife, viz.: "For value received, I

hereby assign and transfer to Susan V. Brydon four hundred

and ninety-two shares of the capital stock of the North Branch

Company, being certificates No said stock being

now held by H. G. Davis & Co. as collateral security for the pay-

ment of the Gouverneur decree, viz., $5,932.92 for which they

hold my note dated June 11, 1875. Witness my hand and seal

this twenty-eighth day of October, 1876." This, he testified,

was intended as a collateral security for his indebtedness to her.

The Gouverneur lien has been paid off and discharged. It was

allowed as a valid claim against the North Branch Company on

the former appeal in this case; and tfiie four hundred dollars
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according to Bry don's testimony, have likewise been settled.

That Brydon was justly indebted to his wife when he executed

this transfer to her does not admit of a doubt. That he was also

indebted to Henry G. Davis and Company for large advances

made by them to him is equally certain.

As the case now stands, there are three claimants to the fund

constituting the dividend on the Brydon stock, namely, the

North Branch Company, represented by its minority stock-

holders: Henry 6. Davis and Company, and Mrs. Susan V.

Brydon, though there is no contest between the latter two; for,

Avhilst they both claim the fund, they do not claim it as against

each other, but as against the North Branch Company. If

Davis and Company are entitled to the dividend, or if Mrs.

Brydon is entitled to it, the claim of the North Branch Com-

l)any must fall. If they be not entitled to it, the North Branch

Company will be, provided Brydon is actually indebted to it as

alleged.

So far as the appellants are concerned, it makes no difference

whether the dividend on the Brydon stock rightfully belongs
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to Davis and Company or to Mrs. Brydon. Unless the North

Branch Company — the body corporate, not Gemmell and Sin-

clair, as individual stockholders — has a lien on the dividend,

which lien is prior in its equities to the claims of Davis and

Company and Mrs. Brydon, the contention of the appellants

cannot be sustained. Naturally, therefore, the first question

which presents itself is, assuming that Brydon is indebted to

the North Branch Company in an amount twice as large as

the dividend, what claim or lien has the company on that divi-

dend? There is no lien reserved in the charter of this com-

pany (Act, 1867, c. 309), or even in its by-laws, in favor of

the corporation upon the stock of any shareholder to satisfy

or secure a debt due by him to the company. No such lien

exists at common law : Angell and Ames on Corporations, sees.

355, 569 ; Cook on Stocks and Stockholders, sec. 521 ; Massachu-

setts Iron Co. V. Hooper, 7 Cush. 183 ; and unless created by

statute, or by the charter, or, perhaps, in some instances, by a

usage brought to the knowledge of, and acted on by both parties,

it does not exist at all : Morse on Banks and Banking, 505. As

the company had, and could have had by implication or by opera-

tion of law, no lien on Brydon 's stock to secure the debt due

by him to it, it was in no position to resist or prevent a transfer

of that stock to some one else ; but the right of a corporation to

withhold a dividend from a stockholder who is indebted to it,

rests upon an entirely different principle. It is the right of set-
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off; for the dividend is a simple debt owing from the corpora-

tion to the shareholder. As in every other case to which this

doctrine of set-off is applicable, the debt, that is, the dividend

due by the corporation, must be payable by it to the person from

whom the obligfation to the corporation is demandable. If the

stock has passed into the hands of a third party before the divi-

dend has been declared, the right of set-off is gone; because a

dividend declared after a transfer of stock has been made be-

longs to the assignee, and not to the assignor. Had the stock

in question been assigned on the company's books, and had new

certificates been issued in the name of Davis and Company, or

Mrs. Brydon before this dividend was declared, the right of

set-off would have been incontestably extinguished. Has it,

under the circumstances of this case, been preserved?

As between vendor and vendee, or pledgor and pledgee, of

stock; a transfer on the books of the company is not essential

to perfect an equitable title in the vendee or pledgee : Noble v.

Turner, 69 Md. 519, 16 Atl. R. 124; Baltimore etc. Brick Co. v.
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Mali, 65 Ud. 96, 3 Atl. R. 285, 57 Am. Rep. 304; Cecil Nat.

Bank v. Watsonto^\Ti Bank, 105 U. S. 217; Johnston v. Laflin,

103 U. S. 800. This principle is fully recognized by the act of

1886, chapter 287, embodied in section 277, article 23 of the

code. By the assignment and delivery of certificates the title

passed to the pledgee. As between vendor and vendee of shares

of stock it is the settled rule that the vendee is entitled to all the

dividends on the stock which are declared after the sale of the

stock. In other words, dijMeiids belong to the person entitled to

the stock when the dividends are declared. Abercrombie v. Rid-

dle, 3 Md. Ch. 320. Evm though the transfer has not been

recorded, the transferee has a right to the dividends, as against

the transferrer: Cook on Stocks and Stockholders, sec. 541. A

pledgee is protected in the same way as a purchaser of stock:

Cook on Stocks and Stockholders, sec. 432; and consequently

dividends declared during the continuance of the pledge belong

to_hira, though he is not registered as owner on the corporate

books : Cook on Stocks and Stockholders, sec. 468 ; Hill v. Newi-

chawanick Co., 8 Hun, 459, affirmed in 71 N. Y. 593, If not so

registered, and the corporation pays the dividend in good faith

and without notice of the transfer to the nominal owner, the

payment would be undoubtedly a good one; but a pledgee who

neglects to notify the corporation that he holds the stock in

pledge, or to take the proper steps to secure title to the stock in

his own name, will not be protected against the lien of the cor-

poration upon the stock to secure the payment of an indebted-
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ness contracted to the company by the pledgor in the meantime,

and subsequently to the pledge of the shares: Cook on Stocks

and Stockholders, sec. 525.

Order affirmed with costs.

29. WRIGHT V. BANK OF METROPOLIS,

110 N. Y. 237; 18 N. E. B. 79; 6 Am. St. B. 356. 1888.

Damages for the conversion of stock owned by "Wright, and

loaned by him to one Elliott to be used as security for a note

due the bank, but not to be sold for six months, January 23,

1878, Elliott informed the bank that ]\Ir. Wright consented to a

sale of the stock. January 29, 1878, the stock was sold. It was

the owner's son who gave the assent, and when plaintiff learned

of the sale. May 9, he demanded the stock, tendering the amount

for which it had been pledged, October 7, 1879, he began suit.

February 14, 1881, it had reached the highest price, $18,003.

Verdict for plaintiff for $3,391.25. There was no evidence to

show that the stock was ever worth just that amount. Both

parties were dissatisfied with the amount and appealed,
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Peckham, J. This case comes before us in a somewhat pecu-

liar condition. As both parties appeal from the same judgment,

which is for a sum of money only, it would seem as if there

ought not to be much difficulty in obtaining its reversal. It

is obvious, however, that a mere reversal would do neither party

any good, as the case would then go down for a new trial, leav-

ing the important legal question in the case not passed upon

by this court. This, we think, would be an injustice to both

sides. The case is here, and the main question is in regard to

the rule of damages, and we think it ought to be decided. By

this charge, the case was left to the jury to give the highest

price the stock could have been sold for intermediate its con-

version and the day of trial, provided the jury thought, under

all the circumstances, that the action had been commenced within

a reasonable time after the conversion, and had been prosecuted

with reasonable diligence since. Authority for this rule is

claimed under Romaine v. Van Allen, 26 N. Y. 309, and sev-

eral other cases of a somewhat similar nature referred to therein,

Markham v. Jaudon, 41 Id. 235, followed the rule laid down in

Romaine v. Van Allen, supra. In these cases, a recovery was

permitted which gave the plaintiff the highest price of the stock

between the conversion and the trial. In the Markham case,
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the plaintiff had not paid for the stocks, but was having them

carried for him by his broker (the defendant) on a margin.

Yet this fact was not regarded as making any difference in the

rule of damages, and the ease was thought to be controlled by

that of Romaine.

In this state of the rule the case of Matthews v. Coe, 49 N.

Y. 57-62, came before the court. The precise question was not

therein involved, but the court (per Church, C. J.) took occa-

sion to intimate that it was not entirely satisfied with the cor-

rectness of the rule in any case not special and exceptional in

its circumstances, and the learned judge added that they did

not regard the rule as so firmly settled by authority as to be

beyond the reach of review whenever an occasion should render

it necessary. One phase of the question again came before this

court, and in proper form, in Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211, 13

Am. Rep. 507, where plaintiff had paid but a small percentage

on the value of the stock, and his broker, the defendant, was

carrying the same on a margin, and the plaintiff had recovered
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in the court below, as damages for the unauthorized sale of the

stock, the highest price between the time of conversion and the

time of trial. The rule was applied to substantially the same

facts as in Markham v. Jaudon, supra, and that case was cited

as authority for the decision of the court below. This court,

however, reversed the judgment, and disapproved the rule of

damages which had been applied. The opinion was written

by that very able and learned judge, Rapallo, and all the cases

pertaining to the subject were reviewed by him, and in such a

masterly manner as to leave nothing further for us to do in

that direction. We think the reasoning of the opinion calls for

a reversal of this judgment.

In the course of his opinion the judge said that the rule of

damages, as laid down by the trial court, following the case of

Markham v. Jaudon, supra, had "been recognized and adopted

in several late adjudications in this state in actions for the

conversion of property of fluctuating value; but its soundness,

as a general rule applicable to all cases of conversion of such

property, has been seriously questioned, and is denied in va-

rious adjudications in this and other states." The rule was

not regarded as one of those settled principles in the law, as

to the measure of damages, to which the maxim stare decisis

should be applied. The principle upon which the case was

decided rested upon the fundamental theory that in all cases

of the conversion of property (except where punitive damages

are allowed), the rule to be adopted should be one which af-
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fords the plaintiff a just indemnity for the loss he has sustained

by the sale of the stock ; and in cases where a loss of profits

is claimed, it should be, when awarded at all, an amount suf-

ficient to indemnify the party injured for the loss which is

the natural, reasonable, and proximate result of the wrong-

ful act complained of, and which a proper degree of prudence

on the part of the complainant would not have averted.

The rule thus stated, in the language of Judge Rapallo, he

proceeds to apply to the facts of the case before him. In stat-

ing what, in his view, would be a proper indemnity to the

injured party in such a case, the learned judge commenced

his statement with the fact that the plaintiff did not hold the

stocks for investment, and he added, that if "they had been

paid for and owned by the plaintiff, different considerations

would arise; but it must be borne in mind that we are treat-

ing of a speculation carried on with the capital of the broker

and not of the customer. If the broker has violated his con-

tract, or disposed of the stock without authority, the customer
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is entitled to recover such damages as would naturally be sus-

tained in restoring himself to the position of which he has been

deprived. He certainly has no right to be placed in a better

position than he would be in if the wrong had not been done. ' '

The whole reasoning of the opinion is still based upon the

question as to what damages would naturally be sustained by

the plaintiff' in restoring himself to the position he had been

in; or in other words, in repurchasing the stock. It is assumed

in the opinion that the sale by the defendants was illegal and

a conversion, and that plaintiff had a right to disaffirm the

sale, and to require defendants to replace the stock. If they

failed, then the learned judge says the plaintiff's remedy was

to do it himself, and to charge the defendants with the loss

necessarily sustained by him in doing so. Is not this equally

the duty of a plaintiff who owns the whole of the stock that

has been wrongfully sold? I mean, of course, to exclude all

question of punitive damages resting on bad faith. In the

one ease the plaintiff had a valid contract with the broker to

hold the stock, and the broker violates it, and sells the stock.

The duty of the broker is to replace it at once upon the de-

mand of the plaintiff. In case he does not, it is the duty of

the plaintiff to repurchase it. "Why should not the same duty

rest upon a plaintiff who has paid in full for his stock, and

has deposited it with another conditionally? The broker who

purchased it on a margin for the plaintiff violates his contract

and his duty when he wrongfully sells the stock, just as much
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as if the whole purchase price had been paid by the plaintiff.

His duty is in each case to replace the stock upon demand,

and in case he fails so to do, then the duty of the plaintiff

springs up, and he should repurchase the stock himself. This

duty, it seems to me, is founded upon the general duty which

one owes to another, who converts his property under an honest

mistake, to render the resulting damage as light as it may be

reasonably within his power to do.

It is well said by Earl, J., in Parsons v. Sutton, 66 N. Y. 92,

that "the party who suft'ers from a breach of contract must so

act as to make his damages as small as he reasonably can.

He must not, by inattention, want of care, or inexcusable neg-

ligence, permit his damage to grow, and then charge it all to

the other party. The law gives him all the redress he should

have by indemnifying him for the damage which he neces-

sarily sustains. ' ' See also Dillon v. Anderson, 43 Id. 231 ;

Hogle V. New York Central etc. R. R. Co., 28 Hun, 363, the

latter case being an action of tort. In such a case as this,
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whether the action sounds in tort or is based altogether upon

contract, the rule of damages is the same: Per Denio, C. J.,

in Scott V. Rogers, 31 N. Y. 676; and per Rapallo, J., in Baker

V, Drake, supra. The rule of damages as laid down in Baker v.

Drake, supra, in cases where the stock was purchased by the

broker on a margin for plaintiff, and where the matter was evi-

dently a speculation, has been affirmed in the later cases in this

court : Gruman v. Smith, 81 N. Y, 25 ; Colt v, Owens, 90 Id,

368. In both cases the duty of the plaintiff to repurchase the

stock within a reasonable time is stated, I think the duty

exists in the same degree where the plaintiff had paid in full

for the stock, and was the absolute owner thereof. In Baker

v, Drake, supra, the learned judge did not assume to declare

that in a case where the pledgor was the absolute owner of the

stock, and it was wrongfully sold, the measure of damages

must be as laid down in the Romaine case. He was endeavor-

ing to distinguish the cases, and to show that there was a dif-

ference between the case of one who is engaged in a specula-

tion with what is substantially the money of another, and the

case of an absolute owner of stock which is sold wrongfully by

the pledgee. And he said that at least the former ought not

to be allowed such a rule of damages. It can be seen, how-

ever, that the judge was not satisfied with the rule in the Ro-

maine case, even as applied to the facts therein stated. In his

opinion he makes u^e of this language: "In a case where the

loss of probable profits is claimed as an element of damage, if
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it be ever allowable to mulct a defendant for such a conjec-

tural loss, its amount is a question of fact, and a finding in

regard to it should be based upon some evidence. ' ' In order to

refuse to the plaintiff in that case, however, the damages

claimed, it was necessary to overrule the IMarkham case, which

was done.

Now, so far as the duty to repurchase the stock is concerned,

I see no difference in the two cases. There is no material dis-

tinction in the fact of ownership of the whole stock which

should place the plaintiff outside of any liability to repurchase

after notice of sale, and should render the defendant con-

tinuously liable for any higher price to which the stock might

rise after conversion and before trial. As the same liability

on the part of defendant exists in each case to replace the

stock, and as he is technically a wrong-doer in both cases, but

in one no more than in the other, he should respond in the

same measure of damages in both cases, and that measure is

the amount which, in the language of Rapallo, J., is the
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natural, reasonable, and proximate result of the wrongful act

complained of, and which a proper degree of prudence on the

part of the plaintiff would not have averted. The loss of a

sale of the stock at the highest price down to trial would seem

to be a less natural and proximate result of the wrongful act

of the defendant in selling it when plaintiff had the stock for

an investment than when he had it for a speculation ; for the

intent to keep it as an investment is at war with any intent to

sell it at any price, even the highest. But in both cases the

qualification attaches that the loss shall only be such as a

proper degree of prudence on the part of the complainant

would not have averted; and a proper degree of prudence on

the part of the complainant consists in repurchasing the stock

after notice of its sale, and within a reasonable time. If the

stock then sells for less than the defendant sold it for, of course

the complainant has not been injured, for the difference in the

two prices inures to his benefit. If it sells for more, that dif-

ference the defendant should pay.

It is said that as he had already paid for the stock once, it

is unreasonable to ask the owner to go in the market and re-

purchase it. I do not see the force of this distinction. In the

ease of the stock held on margin, the plaintiff has paid his

margin once to the broker, and so it may be said that it is un-

reasonable to ask him to pay it over again in the purchase of

the stock. Neither statement, it seems to me, furnishes any

reason for holding a defendant liable to the rule of damages
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stated in this record. The defendant's liability rests upon the

ground that he has converted, though in good faith and under

a mistake as to his rights, the property of the plaintilf. The

defendant is, therefore, liable to respond in damages for the

value. But the duty of the plaintiff to make the damages as

light as he reasonably may rests upon him in both cases; for

there is no more legal wrong done by the defendant in selling

the stock which the plaintiff has fully paid for than there is

in selling the stock which he has agreed to hold on a margin,

and which agreement he violates by selling it. All that can

be said is, that there is a difference in amount, as in one case

the plaintiff's margin has gone, while in the other the whole

price of the stock has been sacrificed. But there is no such

difference in the legal nature of the two transactions as should

leave the duty resting upon the plaintiff in the one case to

repurchase the stock, and in the other case should wholly

absolve him therefrom. A rule which requires a repurchase

of the stock in a reasonable time does away with all questions

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:38 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

as to the highest price before the commencement of the suit,

or whether it was commenced in a reasonable time or prose-

cuted with reasonable diligence, and leaves out of view any

question as to the presumption that plaintiff would have kept

his stock down to the time when it sold at the highest mark

before the day of trial, and would then have sold it, even

though he had owned it for an investment. Such a presump-

tion is not only of quite a shadowy and vague nature, but is

also, as it would seem, entirely inconsistent with the fact that

he was holding the stock as an investment. If kept for an in-

vestment, it would have been kept down to the day of trial;

and the price at that time there might be some degree of pro-

priety in awarding, under certain circumstances, if it were

higher than when it was converted. But to presume in favor

of an investor that he would have held his stock during all of

a period of possible depression, and would have realized upon

it when it reached the highest figure, is to indulge in a pre-

sumption which, it is safe to say, would not be based on fact

once in a hundred times. To formulate a legal liability based

upon such presumption, I think is wholly unjust in such a case

as the present. Justice and fair dealing are both more apt

to be promoted by adhering to the rule which imposes the

duty upon the plaintiff to make his loss as light as possible,

notwithstanding the unauthorized act of the defendant, assum-

ing, of course, in all cases that there was good faith on the part

of the defendant.

It is the natural and proximate loss which the plaintiff is
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to be indemnified for, and that cannot be said to extend to

the highest price before trial, but only to the highest price

reached within a reasonable time after the plaintiff has learned

of the conversion of his stock within which he could go in the

market and repurchase it. What is a reasonable time when

the facts are undisputed, and different inferences cannot rea-

sonably be drawn from the same facts, is a question of law:

Colt V. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368; Hedges v. Hudson River R. R.

Co., 49 Id. 223.

We think that, beyond all controversy in this case, and

taking all the facts into consideration, this reasonable time

had expired by July 1, 1878, following the 9th of May of the

same year. The highest price which the stock reached during

that period was $2,795, and as it is not certain on what day

the plaintiff might have purchased, we think it fair to give

him the highest price it reached in that time. From this

should be deducted the amount of the cheek and interest to

the day when the stock was sold, as then, it is presumed, the
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defendant paid the check with the proceeds of the sale.

In all this discussion as to the rule of damages, we have as-

sumed that the defendant acted in good faith, in an honest

mistake as to its right to sell the stock, and that it was not a

case for punitive damages. A careful perusal of the whole

case leads us to this conclusion. It is not needful to state the

evidence; but we cannot see any question in the case showing

bad faith, or indeed, any reason for its existence. The fact is

uncontradicted that the defendant sold the stock upon what

its officers supposed Avas the authority of the owner thereof

given to them by Elliott.

The opinion delivered by the learned judge at general term,

while agreeing with the principle of this opinion as to the rule

of damages in this case, sustained the verdict of the jury

upon the theory that if the plaintiff had gone into the market

within a reasonable time, and purchased an equivalent of the

stocks converted, he would have paid the price which he re-

covered by the verdict. This left the jury the right to fix

what was a reasonable time, and then assumed there was evi-

dence to support the verdict. In truth there was no evidence

which showed the value of the stock to have been anything

like the amount of the verdict, for the evidence showed it was

generally very much less, and sometimes very much more.

But fixing what is a reasonable time ourselves, it is seen that

the stock within that time was never of any such value.

The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted,

with costs to abide the event.
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X30. NORTON V. BAXTER,

41 Minn. 146; 42 N. W. B. 863; 16 Am. St. R. 679. 1SS9.

Action of foreclosure on a note and mortgage which had been

pledged to Baxter, who on default of the pledgor held a pre-

tended sale. Further facts are stated in the opinion.

Dickinson, J. This is an action to foreclose a mortgage

upon a lot of land, designated as lot 14, executed by the de-

fendants Tousley and wife to the plaintiff, in August, 1887, and

to bar or enjoin these appellants, Lucy Baxter and Stephen

H. Baxter, from proceeding to enforce an earlier mortgage, ex-

ecuted by one Nye, in 1866, under circumstances to be here-

after referred to. This appeal by the two defendants just

named is from a judgment granting that relief. The mort-

gage last referred to, which the appellants claim the right to

enforce as the earlier lien, was executed under these circum-

stances: September 20, 1886, Tousley and wife conveyed sev-

eral lots of land, including this lot 14, to one Nye, without

consideration, and for the use and benefit of the grantor, Tous-
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ley. The same day Nye gave to Tousley her (Nye's) promis-

sory note for two thousand five hundred dollars, for the ac-

commodation only of the payee, and executed to him a mortgage

upon the same land, in terms securing the payment of the note.

Subsequently, prior to Tousley 's mortgage to the plaintiff, Nye

reconveyed the property to Tousley. Wliile Tousley held the

accommodation note of Nye and the mortgage securing it, in

October, 1886, he borrowed seven hundred dollars from the de-

fendant Stephen H. Baxter, and a brother, William Baxter,

giving to them his note therefor, payable to the defendant Lucy

Baxter. As collateral security, Tousley executed an assign-

ment to Lucy Baxter of the Nye note and mortgage, and deliv-

ered it to the Baxter brothers. Lucy Baxter had no interest

in this transaction, and knew nothing of it, her name being

employed for the benefit of the brothers. An agreement ac-

companied the assigned note and mortgage, authorizing the

sale of the pledge after notice, upon default of Tousley to

pay the debt secured thereby. June 22, 1888, W. H. Baxter,

assuming to act in behalf of Lucy, after notice to Tousley, of-

fered the pledged note and mortgage for sale at auction. Tous-.

ley bid $800 for it, and no other bona fide bid was made; but

the note and mortgage were struck off to one Prouty, at $817.

The securities were then assigned to him, although he paid noth-

ing therefor, and he reassigned the same to Stephen H. Baxter.
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June 29, 1888, Tousley tendered to the Baxter brothers, who

then had possession of the Nye note and mortgage, and to

Stephen H. Baxter, the sum of $820 in payment of his own

note, which the Nye note and mortgage had been pledged to

secure. This tender was sufficient in amount to pay his debt.

The tender was refused.

The pretended sale of the pledged securities to Prouty, and

the assignment of the same to him, and by him to Stephen H.

Baxter, were not effectual as a sale of the securities so as to

extinguish or prejudice the previously existing rights of the

pledgor. The general property in the pledge remained in the

pledgor after as well as before default. The default of the

pledgor to pay his debt at maturity in no way affected the

nature of the pledgee's rights concerning the property, except

that he then became entitled to proceed to make the securities

available, in the manner prescribed by law or by the terms of

the contract. It is not the case of a defeasible title becoming

absolute at law by default in the performance of the pre-
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scribed condition. The property w-as held as security before

default. It was held only as security after default. The

pledgee was authorized to sell the securities, and by a sale in

good faith the pledgor would have been divested of his prop-

erty. But the pledgee could not give it away, so as to afi'ect

the rights of the pledgor, nor could a pretended and merely

colorable sale, without consideration, divest the pledgor of his

rights as such, or confer upon the pretended purchaser any

greater interest than that held by the pledgee.

The question which the appellants now present is, whether,

upon tender of payment of the principal debt, the pledged

note and mortgage ceased to be available and enforceable as

collateral securities. It is a general principle that tender of

payment of a debt, to secure which personal property has been

pledged, discharges the lien, terminating the special property

rights of the pledgee: Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 917;

EatclifP V. Davies, Cro. Jac. 244 ; Hancock v. Franklin Insurance

Co., 114 Mass. 155; Plathaway v. Fall River Nat. Bank, 131

Mass. 14; Ball v. Stanley, 5 Yerg. 199 ; 26 Am. Dec. 263 ; Mitchell

V. Roberts, 17 Fed. Rep. 776; Loughborough v. McNevin, 74

Cal. 250 ; 15 Pac. R. 773 ; 5 Am. St. Rep. 435 ; Ratcliff v. Vance,

2 Const. S. C. 239; Kortright v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 343; 78 Am.

Dec. 145 ; Cass v. Higenbotam, 100 N. Y. 248 ; 3 N. E. R. 189 ;

Moynahan v. Moore, 9 Mich. 8; 77 Am. Dec. 468; Stewart v.

BrowTi, 48 Mich. 383; 12 N. W. R. 499. The appellants con-

cede that while the general rule is that tender of the amount
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due, at the time it becomes due, discharges the lien of col-

lateral securities, yet contend that such is not the effect of

a tender after that time. Such a distinction has been recog-

nized in respect to mortgages, based upon the fact that the

legal title has become vested in the mortgagee. No such dis-

tinction can be made in the case of bailments of personal

property as security. The relations and rights of the parties

are unchanged by the occurrence of the default. The pledgee

has not even after default the absolute legal title. The char-

acter of the bailment is not changed. It is still a pledge, and

can be enforced or made available only as such. But the very

terms of the contract in this case were, that if the debt should

be paid "before the sale of said property," the property should

be returned.

The appellants rely, also, upon the fact that, so far as ap-

pears, the tender of Tousley was not kept good. There is some

conflict in the authorities at the present day as to the neces-

sity for this, in general, in order that the lien of the pledge
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may be discharged. We deem it unnecessary to determine

whether the strict rule of the common law has been modified.

It may be conceded, for the purposes of this case, that upon

equitable grounds a pledgor, whose tender has been refused,

should not be allowed affirmative relief, especially of an equit-

able nature, unless he has kept good his tender, or at least

comes before the court in an attitude of willingness to pay

what is due from him: Tuthill v. Morris, 81 N. Y. 94. The

defendants in this case are not entitled to favor upon equit-

able grounds. The tender made by Tousley, the common debtor

of both parties, was sufficient, and, so far as appears, there

was nothing to justify the refusal to accept it or to qualify

the strict legal effect of the refusal. After an unauthorized,

and as it would seem a fraudulent, sale, Baxter, who was a

party to it, refusing to accept from Tousley the payment of

his debt, asserts in this action the right to hold and enforce

the pledged securities, not merely as securities for his debt of

seven hundred dollars, but as his own property, the mortgage

being an encumbrance of two thousand five hundred dollars,

with interest. This plaintiff' has nof been in default. He

owes nothing to the defendants, and is not chargeable with

fault because the debtor did not keep his tender good. He

also is a creditor of Tousley, having mortgage security junior

to that which was pledged to the defendants. Tousley, the com-

mon debtor, was bound to pay both. The unjustified refusal

of Baxter to accept payment was prejudicial to the plaintiff
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holding the junior mortgage. The pledged note and mortgage

of Nye, if released from the pledge, would not, as to the plain-

tiff, have been available in Tousley's hands as a senior encum-

brance upon the land, having been executed for the accommo-

dation of Tousley. In view of the relations between the plain-

tiff and Baxter, there appears to be nothing to modify the strict

rule of the common law, that a tender of payment of the debt

discharges the pledge, so far, at least, as it affects the plaintiff.

Of course the debt of Tousley was not thus discharged.

Judgment affirmed.

31. ROBINSON V. HURLEY,

11 la. 410; 79 Am. D. 497. 1860.

Action for $554.69 due on promissory note. Plea of payment

and set-off. As security for the note defendant gave plaintiff

t\^'^o city orders on the treasurer of Dubuque city for $500 and

$250, respectively, with right, if note was not paid at maturity,

to sell at private sale, and satisfy the note and costs out of the

proceeds. The note was not paid, and six months later plaintiff
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sold the scrip at 45 cents on the dollar. Evidence that it was

Vv'orth 75 to 80 cents at the maturity of the note, and 40 cents

at the time it was sold, was excluded. Verdict of $77.50 for

defendant.

By Court, Lowe, C. J. Upon the foregoing facts, the court, at

the request of the defendant, gfve the following instructions as

the law of this case, to wit : That under the receipt offered in

evidence by defendant, if the plaintiff sold the scrip at all, he

was re(iuired by the terms of the receipt to sell the same at or

about the time of the maturity of the note; and that if they

(the jury) find from the evidence that said plaintiff had not

sold the scrip, he was liable for the value of said scrip at or

about the time of the maturity of the note. The court also

refused to charge the jury that the value of the scrip, at the

time it was sold by the plaintiff, was the measure of his lia-

bility to the defendant for the same.

If the plaintiff acted tortiously or misappropriated the scrip

in disposing of it at the time he did, the above rule of damages

would seem to be proper and just. But if it was his right.

Tinder the law which governs pledges, even as modified by the

contract of the parties in this case, to sell these collateral se-

curities at the time and under the circumstances which he did,

then there was no misappropriation, and a different criterion
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of damages obtains, to wit, the value of the scrip at the time of

its conversion.

That we may arrive at a better nnclerstanding of the rights,

duties, and obligations of the parties under the receipt in ques-

tion, let us inquire what they would be under the law in the

absence of such a contract. After the debt falls due, the

pledgee, under the law, has his election to pursue one of three

courses: 1. To proceed personally against the pledgor for his

debt, without selling the collateral security; or 2. To file a bill

in chancery, and have a judicial sale under a regular decree of

foreclosure; or 3. To sell without judicial process, upon giving

reasonable notice to the debtor to redeem: 2 Kent's Com., 9th

ed., 785 ; Tucker v. Wilson, 1 P. Wms. 261 ; Lockwood v. Ewer,

2 Atk. 303. The plaintiff, in executing said receipt, did not

waive his right of adopting either of the above methods to

satisfy his claim. The only change made in the rights and

obligations of the parties by this instrument was simply to

dispense with notice to the debtor to redeem before the credi-
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tor could sell. There is nothing in the language or terms of

this receipt which obliged the plaintiff to sell these collaterals

at the maturity of the note. He simply reserved the right to

do so, a right which the law gave him, without such reserva-

tion, upon giving notice to redeem. A postponement of the

exercise of this right is a thing of which the debtor cannot

very well complain ; it only enlarges his opportunity to redeem,

and thereby prevent any sacrifice that might result from a

forced sale of the pledge. The depreciation in this case which

the scrip in question suffered, between the maturity of the

note and the sale of the same, was without the fault or power

of prevention on the part of the plaintiff. He was only bound

to that attention and diligence in the preservation of the thing

pledged which a careful man bestows upon his own property,

for the reason that the arrangement or contract was recipro-

cally beneficial to both parties. We conclude, therefore, that

the plaintiff, in selling the collateral securities at the time and

under the circumstances which he did, violated no obligation

or duty growing out of the understanding of the parties, or

expressed by the receipt or law itself. And if we are right in

this conclusion, it follows that the measure of his liability for

said scrip is the value thereof at the time of conversion. This

rule of damages in cases of this kind is well established : See

Sedgwick on Damages, 365, 366, 480, 481, and authorities there

cited.

Judgment reversed, and new trial granted.
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32. MARYLAND INSURANCE CO. V. DALRYMPLE,

25 Md. 242; 89 Am. D. 779. 1866.

Action on counts in trover for conversion and in tort for dam-

ages for the illegal sale and conversion of 325 shares of Balti-

more and Ohio Railroad stock, pledged to the company to secure

the repayment of a loan to Dalrymple of $19,500.00. The pledgee

was given the right, if the loan was not promptly paid, on one

day's notice to sell the collaterals without further notice. From

the date of the loan, June 12th, 1860, to November 15th, 1860,

the market price of the stock steadily declined from $79 per

share to $56% per share. Frequent calls were made on Dalrym-

ple to return the loan, and he made ineffectual attempts to

negotiate, but these had ceased, and final notice to pay had been

given by the company and received by Dalrymple before No-

vember 20th, 1860. On that day the company had the shares

publicly sold at the board of brokers, and bid in for themselves

by. a broker at the highest obtainable price, $55 per share. An

account was rendered Dalrymple showing a balance due from
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him of $1,774.50, payment of which was demanded. The com-

pany held the stock till the spring of 1862, when they had it sold

publicly at the board of brokers at from $60 to $67 per share,

yielding in all $19,943.75 net. Two dividends were received by

defendants during this time. December 16th, 1862, Dalrymple

tendered defendants the loan with interest, and demanded the

stock. The tender was refused. The stock at this time was

worth $78 per share, and at the time of the trial, $115 per share.

From the verdict for plaintiffs both parties appealed.

By Court, Bartol, J. (After stating the facts and various

prayers of the parties.) The court below seems to have con-

sidered the sales in 1860 and 1862 as wholly void and inoperative

and the bailment still continuing, and instructed the jury that

upon proof of the pledge, and the tender, demand, and refusal

in December, 1862, the plaintiff was entitled to recover, and the

measure of damages was the market value of the stock at that

time, together with the dividend received by the defendant in

April, 1861, deducting therefrom the amount of the loan and

interest. Having thus stated the positions taken by the parties

in their several prayers, and by the court below in its instruc-

tion to the jury, we shall proceed to express as briefly as we

can the judgment of this court upon the questions involved,

so far as they are deemed material to the decision of the case.
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In doing so, we shall confine ourselves mainly to a statement

of the conclusions we have reached after a careful examina-

tion of all the authorities cited in argument, without attempt-

ing to refer to them particularly, or to reconcile them where

they may be in conflict. To do so would require this opinion

to be extended to very great length without, perhaps, subserv-

ing any good purpose.

The first question that naturally presents itself for our con-

sideration is the effect of the sale and purchase of the stock

made by the defendant in November, 1860. By the terms of

the contract, the loan was payable on one day's notice, and if

not paid according to the agreement, the defendant was au-

thorized without further notice to sell the stock pledged for

the purpose of satisfying the same. Unquestionably, the notice

given on the 13th of November was sufficient, under the con-

tract, to entitle the defendant to sell on the 20th.

In the absence of any express agreement to the contrary, it

has been held in some cases to be necessary for a pledgee be-
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fore exercising the power of sale to give notice to the pledgor

of the time and place of sale: Washburn v. Pond, 2 Allen, 474;

and the same rule was announced by the superior court of

New York in Wheeler v. Newbould, 5 Duer, 29 ; and by the court

of appeals in the same case, 16 N. Y. 392. Without express-

ing any opinion upon the law as laid down in those cases, it

is clear it can have no application to a case where such notice

is dispensed with by the contract of the parties. Here by

the words of the agreement authorizing the defendant upon

default to sell without further notice, we understand that when

the power to sell arose, all notice of the time and place of sale

was waived and dispensed with by the plaintiff, leaving upon

the defendant the obligation to sell publicly and fairly for the

best price he could obtain: See 2 Kent's Com, 582, 583.

A sale at the board of brokers, publicly and fairly made,

would, in our opinion, have been legal and valid; and if the

sale of the 20th of November had been made to a third person,

it would have been a legal sale under the contract, vesting a

good title in the purchaser, and terminating the bailment. It

was contended by the plaintiff's counsel that the sale must

in all cases be made at public auction, and that a sale at the

broker's board would not be legal; and some decisions in New

York were cited in support of this view.

In Brown v. Ward, 3 Duer, 660, it was said that a "custom

has grown up [in New York], and been sanctioned by the courts,

of selling stock at the Merchants' Exchange."
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There is no evidence of any such custom in Baltimore, and

considering the requirements of the law, and the reason and

nature of the transaction, we are of the opinion that the most

proper and suitable place for a sale of stock is at the board of

brokers. There is the stock market, — the mart to which ven-

dors and purchasers resort, by their agents, to buy and sell

stock, where competition among bidders is most apt to be found,

— such sales are public, and unless there be in the particular

case some ground for impeaching their fairness, we are of

opinion they are reasonable and ought to be supported.

But, as we have seen, the defendant became itself the pur-

chaser of the stock, and the question arises, Wliat was the legal

effect of the proceeding? Did it amount to a valid and effect-

ual sale so as either to vest in the defendant, as purchaser, an

absolute title, or to operate as a conversion of the property,

break up the bailment, and the relation of bailor and bailee

between the parties?

The doctrine that trustees, executors, administrators, and
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others holding fiduciary relations are incompetent to purchase

the property held by them in trust is well settled: See Story's

Eq. Jur., sees. 321-323, where the cases are collected. In sec-

tion 323 the learned author says: "There are many other

cases of persons standing in regard to each other in like con-

fidential relations in which similar principles apply." Lord

Chancellor Cottenham, in Greenlaw v. King, 5 Jur. 18, cited

in Torrey v. Bank of Orleans, 9 Paige, 663, held that "the prin-

ciple was not confined to a particular class of persons, such as

guardians, trustees, or solicitors, but was a rule of universal

application to all persons coming within the principle, which

is, that no party can be permitted to purchase an interest where

he has a duty to perform inconsistent with the character of

purchaser." See also Keighler v. Savage Mfg. Co., 12 Md. 384

[71 Am. Dec. 600] ; Hoffman S. C. Co. v. Cumberland C. & I.

Co., 16 Id. 456; Cumberland C. & I. Co. v. Sherman, 20 Id. 117

[77 Am. Dec. 311]. This rule rests upon grounds of public

policy, and is enforced without regard to the question of ho7ia

fides in the particular case. It is clear, both upon reason and

authority, that the case of pledgor and pledgee comes within

the rule.

In Story on Bailments, sec. 319, it is said: "In respect of

sales, also, there is a salutary restraint upon the pawnee to

secure his fidelity and good faith that he can never become a

purchaser at the sale. This rule will be found recognized equally

in the common law and the Roman law. ' '
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It has been argued, on the part of the defendant, that this

is a purely equitable doctrine, to be enforced only in courts of

equity on grounds not cognizable at law; and while such sales

are voidable in equity, they must be treated in this forum as

valid.

This question is not free from difficulty, but the conclusion

we have reached from an examination of the cases is clearly

expressed in the third point of the plaintiff's brief.

While in eases of pure trust, where exclusive jurisdiction is

in equity, resort must be had to that tribunal for relief, and

sometimes, in cases of quasi trust, that court will grant relief

where there are special circumstances requiring such inter-

ference, as in Hasbrouck v, Vandevoort, 4 Sand. 74, yet the

relation of pledgor and pledgee, being a legal relation, its rights

and duties are defined by law, and the remedies for violation

of such duties are ordinarily in a court of law.

The sale of the pledge by the defendant to itself was con-

trary to the faith of the bailment, forbidden, as we have shown
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by the citation from Story, by the common law, and might be

treated by the bailor at his election as a tortious conversion of

the property. In this case, no such election was made by the

plaintiff. There was no transmutation of title or change of

possession, and the sale being inoperative to work a conver-

sion, the relation of the parties remained unchanged thereby.

The defendant remained in possession of the stock as before,

in the same manner as if the sale had been attempted, and

both in fact and in contemplation of law the bailment con-

tinued. This point was decided in Middlesex Bank v. Minot,

4 Met. 325. That decision was followed by the supreme court

of Iowa in Bank v. Dubuque & P. U. U. Co., 8 Iowa, 277.

Looking at the reasoning upon which those decisions rest,

and the rules and principles of the law governing contracts of

this description, we are of opinion that the decision of Middle-

sex Bank v. Minot, 4 Met. 325, so far as this point is concerned,

was correct. The sale of the 20th of November did not oper-

ate either to vest the title in the defendant as purchaser, or to

work a conversion of the stock. The bailment continued, and

if nothing more had been done subsequently, and the stock

had remained in the defendant's possession, there ean be no

doubt that the tender and demand made on the 16th of De-

cember, 1862, would have been valid, and the refusal on the

part of the defendant at that time would have given a good

cause of action to the plaintiff. But it appears from the proof

that before that time, in the spring of 1862, the defendant
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caused the stock to be sold publicly at the board of brokers,

and it was transferred to the several purchasers. What wai

the effect of those sales? Having given notice to pay the loan

in November, 1860, the defendant was not bound to keep the

pledge; the attempted sale of the 20th of November being

inoperative, and the plaintiff continuing in default, the power

to sell conferred by the contract still continued, and was in

fact executed by the sales made in 1862. As we have already

said, no further notice was required by the contract, nor can

any valid objection be made to the place and mode of sale,

the same not being impeached on the ground of unfairness or

bad faith. By those sales the bailment was ended; and being

made, as we have said, in the lawful and valid exercise of the

power of sale, there was no violation of the contract on the

part of the defendant, or any tortious conversion of the stock;

and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to recover in this

form of action ; and the fifth prayer of the defendant ought to

have been granted.
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The sales and transfer of the stock made in 1862 being

valid and legal, the plaintiff would have the right to recover

in an action ex contractu any excess which might remain in

the hands of the defendant arising from the proceeds of these

sales, including the dividend received on the 16th of April,

ISGl, with which the defendant would be chargeable after de-

ducting the amount of the loan and interest due at that time;

such excess would be simply money had and received by the

defendant to the use of the plaintiff, under and in conform-

ity with the contract; even if the sales had been tortious, we

entertain the opinion that the true measure of damages would

be as stated in the defendant's fourth prayer, which asserts

the right of the defendant to recoup from the damages the

amount of the debt; but that question does not arise in this

case; the sales not being tortious, there could be no question

of the right of the defendant to retain out of the sums which

came to its hands the amount of the loan and interest; and

even in a proper form of action, the excess only could be re-

covered. But the question arising upon the pleadings is not

of any practical importance in this case, because it is evident

from a simple calculation that the money which actually came

to the defendant's hands from the sales of the stock and the

dividend of April, 1861, w^as less than the debt and interest

due, and nothing, therefore, could be recovered by the plaintiff

in any form of action.

The conclusion from this opinion is, that there was no error
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in rejecting the plaintiff's prayers, and the first, second, third,

and fourth prayers of the defendant. But the court below

erred in rejecting the fifth prayer of the defendant, and in the

instruction given to the jury; the judgment will therefore be

reversed on the defendant's appeal.

Judgment reversed.
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B. LOCATIO, OR HIRING.

CHAPTER VII.

OF LOCATIO REI.

33. COBB V. WALLACE,

5 Coldwell (Tenn.) 539; 98 Am. D. 435. 1868.

Action for value and hire of a barge on counts for breach

of contract in failing to redeliver, for negligence in keeping and

for conversion of the barge. Verdict for defendants.

By Court, Andrews, J. . . . The evidence in the record

tends to show the following state of facts: —

In December, 1863, the plaintiffs' barge being at Hawesville,

Kentucky, a place on the Ohio River, and having then on board

a load of coal, the defendant purchased the coal from the plain-

tiffs, and at the same time hired the barge at the rate of three

dollars per day, for the purpose of conveying the coal to Nash-

ville. These bargains were made in parol between the defend-

ant in person and D. Looney & Co., the agents of the plaintiffs.

There is evidence tending to prove that this parol contract of

hiring was that the defendant should employ the barge to con-
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vey said load of coal to Nashville, and that the barge should be

returned to the plaintiff's, at Hawesville, as . soon as the coal

could be taken to Nashville and discharged, and that no author-

ity was given to defendant to use the barge in any other man-

ner, or for any other purpose. Soon after the making of these

contracts, the barge with its cargo of coal was delivered to J.

W. Ross, the agent of the defendant, who executed and delivered

to D. Looney & Co. the following receipt : —

"Hawesville, December 12, 1863,

"Received from D. Looney & Co., one barge, Aurora, No. 8,

containing 1,166 bushels of coal, which I agree to pay D. Looney

& Co., at Louisville, at the rate of twenty cents per bushel.

And I further agree to hire said barge, Aurora, No. 8, and pay

D. Looney & Co. three dollars per day from this date until the

barge is returned at Hawesville, in good order.

" J. W. Ross, agent of W. B. Wallace."
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The barge arrived at Nashville, and was unloaded early in

January, 1864. The defendant then retained it, and for some

length of time employed it in the business of transporting

wood upon Stone River. Looney, one of the plaintiffs' agents,

called upon defendant frequently, both by letter and personal

application, for the return of the barge, within six weeks of the

hiring, and frequently after that time, until he heard of its seiz-

ure, as hereinafter stated. About the middle of April, 1864,

the defendant sent the barge from Nashville in charge of his

agent, on its way to Hawesville, for the purpose of delivering

it to the plaintiffs. But on its way thither the barge was seized

by persons in the military service of the United States, by

what authority does not appear, and was appropriated to the

use of the military authorities, and has never been recovered or

returned to the plaintiff's.

(After deciding that parol evidence was admissible where the

original contract is in part only reduced to writing and the parol

evidence does not contradict or vary the terms of the written
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instrument.)

But we think that the circuit judge also erred in his con-

struction of the writing in question, even if we were compelled

to consider it as the only evidence of a contract in the case.

He instructed the jury, in substance, that under it the defend-

ant had it at his option to say when the contract was at an

end, and might continue to use the barge so long as he paid

the stipulated hire; and that the contract for the hire would

not be terminated until the defendant so elected.

In cases of bailment, where the contract is indefinite as to

the time of its continuance, the bailee has not the arbitrary

and exclusive right to determine at what time it shall termi-

nate. If the bailment is for an explicitly declared purpose, it

terminates whenever that purpose is accomplished. If the time

be not fixed by agreement, or by the nature of the object to be

accomplished, then the bailee must return the property when-

ever called upon, after a reasonable time; and what time is

reasonable must be determined by the circumstances of each par-

ticular case: 2 Parsons on Contracts, 128, 129. And there-

fore to recur again to a question already discussed, if the written

contract does not in its terms specify the time of its continu-

ance, parol evidence becomes necessary in order to enable the

jury to determine what length of time is reasonable under the

circumstances.

Still another objection may be urged against the charge of

the circuit judge in this case. The jury were instructed, in
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substance, that the fact that the plaintiffs had written letters

to the defendant, demanding the boat, after the commission of

the act claimed by the plaintiffs as a conversion, was a waiver

of the conversion.

We are not aware of the existence of such a doctrine. If the

owner, with knowledge of the facts constituting the conversion,

again take possession of the property converted, as owner, this

will be evidence of a waiver of the conversion : Traynor v. John-

son, 1 Head, 51. But we know of no case where it is held that a

demand on the part of the owner for the return of his property,

or any other effort made by him for its recovery, would be of

itself a waiver of a previous conversion. The law attaches no

such penalty to attempts by the owner of wrongfully appro-

priated property to recover its possession. Demand must be

made in a large class of cases before an action can be main-

tained for conversion. Still the demand and refusal do not in

themselves constitute the conversion, but are only the evidence

of it: 2 Greenl. Ev., sec. 644; 1 Chitty's Pleading, 158. And
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it cannot be held that the demand, which the law requires to

be made before suit, should of itself operate to bar the right

of action. If the defendant, without the consent of the plain-

tiffs, and in violation of his contract, detained the barge, and

employed it in a different place, and for a totally dift'erent pur-

pose from that contemplated by the contract, the jury would

have been authorized to find him guilty of a conversion, inde-

pendently of the evidence furnished by repeated demand for

its return, and the defendant 's refusal to return it : 2 Greenl.

Ev., sec. 642. See the cases in Tennessee, collected in 1 Heis-

kell's Dig., 237. And we think such conversion would not be

waived by a subsequent demand of the property.

The judgment of the circuit court must be reversed, and the

cause remanded for a new trial.

/ 34. SPOONER V. MANCHESTER.

133 Mass. 270; 43 Am. R. 514. 1882.

Trover for a hired horse. Judgment for plaintiff below.

Field, J. This case apparently falls within the decision in

Hall V. Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251 ; 9 Am. Rep. 30, except that

this defendant unintentionally took the wrong road on his

return from Clinton to Worcester, and when after traveling on

it five or six miles, he discovered his mistake, he intentionally
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took what he considered the best way back to Worcester, which

was by a circuit through Northborough.

The case has been argued as if it were an action of tort in the

nature of trover, and although the declaration is not strictly in

the proper form for such an action, both parties desire that it

should be treated as if it were, and we shall so consider it.

As the horse was hired and used on Sunday, and it does not

appear that this was done from necessity or charity, and also

as it does not appear that the horse was injured in consequence

of any want of due care on the part of the defendant, or that

the defendant was not in the exercise of ordinary care when

he lost his way, the question whether the acts of the defendant

amounted to a conversion of the horse to his own use is vital.

The distinction between acts of trespass, acts of misfeasance

and acts of conversion is often a substantial one. In actions in

the nature of trespass or case for misfeasance, the plaintiff re-

covers only the damages which he has suffered by reason of

the wrongful acts of the defendant ; but in actions in the nature
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of trover, the general rule of damages is the value of the prop-

erty at the time of the conversion, diminished when as in this

case the property has been returned to and received by the

owner by the value of the property at the time it was returned,

so that after the conversion and until the delivery to the owner

the property is absolutely at the risk of the person who has

converted it, and he is liable to pay for any depreciation in

value, whether that depreciation has been occasioned by his

negligence or fault, or by the negligence or fault of any other

person, or by inevitable accident or the act of God. Perham v.

Coney, 117 Mass. 102.

The satisfaction by the defendant of a judgment obtained for

the full value of the property vests the title to the property

in him by relation as of the time of the conversion. Conversion

is based upon the idea of an assumption by the defendant of

a right of property or a right of dominion over the thing con-

verted, which casts upon him all the risks of an owner, and it is

therefore not every wrongful intermeddling with, or wrongful

asportation or wrongful detention of personal property, that

amounts to a conversion. Acts which themselves imply an asser-

tion of title or of a right of dominion over personal property,

such as a sale, letting or destruction of it, amount to a conver-

sion, even although the defendant may have honestly mistaken

his rights; but acts which do not in themselves imply an asser-

tion of title, or of a right of dominion over such property, will

not sustain an action of trover, unless done with the intention
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to deprive the owner of it permanently or temporarily, or unless

there has been a demand for the property and a neglect or refusal

to deliver it, which are evidence of a conversion, because they

are evidence that the defendant in withholding it claims the

right to withhold it, which is a claim of a right of dominion

over it.

In Spooner v. Holmes, 102 Mass. 503; 3 Am. Rep. 491,

Mr. Justice Gray says that the action of trover "cannot be

maintained without proof that the defendant either did some

positive wrongful act with the intention to appropriate the

property to himself or to deprive the rightful owner of it, or

destroyed the property," and the authorities are there cited.

Fouldes V. Willoughby, 8 M. & W. 540, is a leading case, estab-

lishing the necessity in order to constitute a conversion, of prov-

ing an intention to exercise some right or control over the prop-

erty inconsistent with the right of the lawful owner, when the

act done is equivocal in its nature. See also Simmons v. Lilly-

stone, 8 Exch. 431 ; Wilson v. McLaughlin, 107 Mass. 587.
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It is argued that the act of the defendant in this case was a

user of the horse for his own benefit, inconsistent with the terms

of the bailment, and that the defendant's mistake in taking the

wrong road was immaterial, and these cases are cited : Wheelock

V. Wheelwright, 5 Mass. 104; Homer v. Thwing, 3 Pick. 492;

Lucas V. Trumbull, 15 Gray, 306 ; Hall v. Corcoran, uhi supra.

In each of these cases, there was an intentional act of dominion

exercised over the horse hired, inconsistent with the right of the

owner.

In Wellington v. Wentworth, 8 Mete. 548, a cow, going at

large in the highway without a keeper, joined a drove of cattle,

in May or June, 1842, without the loiowledge of the owner of

the drove, and was driven into New Hampshire and pastured

there, during the season with the defendant's cattle, and in the

autumn returned with the drove and was delivered to the plain-

tiff; and it was held that there was no conversion. Chief Jus-

tice Shaw says, however, that "it was the plaintiff's own fault

that his cow was at large in the highway, and entered the de-

fendant's drove." Yet if the defendant had driven the cow

to New Hampshire and pastured her there with his cattle, know-

ing that she belonged to the plaintiff and intending to deprive

him of her, there can be no doubt that it would have been a

conversion.

Parker v. Lombard, 100 Mass. 405, and Loring v. Mulcahy,

3 Allen, 575, were both decided upon the ground that the de-
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fendant either assumed to dispose of the property as his own,

or intended to withhold the property from the plaintiff.

Nelson v. Whetmore, 1 Rich. 318, was an action of trover for

the conversion of a slave, who was travelling as free in a public

conveyance, and was taken as a servant by the defendant; and

the decision was, that to constitute a conversion the defendant

must have kno^^^l that he was a slave.

In Gilmore v. Newton, 9 Allen, 171, 85 Am. D. 749, the de-

fendant not only exercised dominion over the horse, by holding

him as a horse to which he had the title by purchase, but also

by letting him to a third person. The defendant actually in-

tended to treat the horse as his own.

If a person wrongfully exercises acts of ownership or of do-

minion over property under a mistaken view of his rights, the

tort, notwithstanding his mistake, may still be a conversion, be-

cause he has both claimed and exercised over it the rights of an

owner; but whether an act involving the temporary use, con-

trol or detention of property implies an assertion of a right of
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dominion over it, may well depend upon the circumstances of

the case and the intention of the person dealing with the prop-

erty. Fouldes V. Willoughby, ithi supra; "Wilson v. IMcLaughlin,

ul)i supra; Nelson v. Merriam, 4 Pick. 249; Houghton v. But-

ler, 4 T. R. 364 ; Heald v. Carey, 11 C. B. 977.

In the case at bar, the use made of the horse by the defendant

was not of a different kind from that contemplated by the con-

tract between the parties, but the horse was driven by the de-

fendant, on his return to "Worcester a longer distance than was

contemplated, and on a different road. If it be said that the de-

fendant intended to drive the horse w^here in fact he did drive

him, yet he did not intend to violate his contract or to exercise

any control over the horse inconsistent with it. There is no evi-

dence that the defendant was not at all times intending to re-

turn the horse to the plaintiff according to his contract, or that

wliatever he did was not done for that purpose, or that he ever

intended to assume any control or dominion over the horse

against the rights of the owner. After he discovered that he

had taken the wrong road, he did what seemed best to him in

order to return to "Worcester. Such acts cannot be considered

a conversion.

Whether a person who hires a horse to drive from one place

to another is not bound to know or ascertain the roads usually

travelled between the places, and is not liable for all damages

proximately caused by any deviation from the usual ways, need

not be considered.
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An action on the case for driving a horse beyond the place

to which he was hired to go, was apparently known to the

common law a long time before the declaration in trover was in-

vented. 21 Edw. IV, 75, pi. 9.

Exceptions sustained.

'i 35. DAVIS V. GARRETT,

6 Bingham 716; 19 E. C. L. 321. 1830.

Action for the value of a barge of lime lost in a storm at

sea. Verdict for plaintiff.

TiNDALL, C, J. There are two points for the determination

of the court upon this rule ; first, whether the damage sustained

by the plaintiff was so proximate to the wrongful act of the

defendant as to form the subject of an action; and, secondly,

whether the declaration is sufficient to support the judgment of

the Court for the plaintiff.

As to the first point, it appeared upon the evidence that the

master of the defendant's barge had deviated from the usual

and customary course of the voyage mentioned in the declaration
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without any justifiable cause ; and that afterwards, and whilst

such barge was out of her course, in consequence of stormy

and tempestuous weather, the sea communicated with the lime,

which thereby became heated, and the barge caught fire, and the

master was compelled for the preservation of himself and the

crew to run the barge on shore, where both the lime and the

barge were entirely lost.

Now the first objection on the part of the defendant is not

rested, as indeed it could not be rested, on the particular cir-

cumstances which accompanied the destruction of the barge;

for it is obvious, that the legal consequences must be the same,

whether the loss was immediately, by the sinking of the barge

at once by a heavy sea, when she was out of her direct and

usual course, or whether it happened at the same place, not in

consequence of an immediate death's wound, but by a connected

chain of causes producing the same ultimate event. It is only a

variation in the precise mode by which the vessel was destroyed,

which variation will necessarily occur in each individual case.

But the objection taken is, that there is no natural or neces-

sary connection between the wrong of the master in taking the

barge out of its proper course, and the loss itself; for that the
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same loss might have been occasioned by the very same tempest,

if the barge had proceeded in her direct course.

But if this argument were to prevail, the deviation of the

master, which is undoubtedly a ground of action against the

owner, would never, or only under very peculiar circumstances,

entitle the plaintiff to recover. For if a ship is captured in the

course of deviation, no one can be certain that she might not have

been captured if in her proper course. And yet, in Parker v.

James, 4 Camp. 112, where the ship was captured whilst in the

act of deviation, no such ground of defense was even suggested.

Or, again, if the ship strikes against a rock, or perishes by storm

in the one course, no one can predicate that she might not equally

have struck upon another rock, or met with the same or another

storm, if pursuing her right and ordinary voyage.

The same answer might be attempted to an action against a

defendant who had, by mistake, forwarded a parcel by the

wrong conveyance, and a loss had thereby ensued; and yet the

defendant in that case would undoubtedly be liable.
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But we think the real answer to the objection is, that no

wrong-doer can be allowed to apportion or qualify his own wrong ;

and that as a loss has actually happened whilst his wrongful

act was in operation and force, and which is attributable to

his wrongful act, he cannot set up as an answer to the action

the bare possibility of a loss, if his wrongful act had never been

done. It might admit of a different construction if he could

show, not only that the same loss might have happened, but that

it must have happened if the act complained of had not been

done ; but there is no evidence to that extent in the present case.

(Omitting a question of practice.) Judgment for plaintiff.

Rule for new trial and for arrest of judgment discharged. /"

1ST

CHAPTER VIII.

OF LOCATIO OPERIS.

36. SICKELS V. PATTISON,

U Wend. (N. Y.) 257; 28 Am. D. 527. 1835.

Action for services in transporting lumber. Defendant set

up damage due to plaintiff's failure to fully perform the con-

tract. Judgment for defendants for $34.94. Plaintiffs bring

error.

By Court, Nelson, J. The testimony of Richards was suffi-

cient proof of the contract between the plaintiffs and the de-

fendant, as to the transportation of the lumber to market, to

justify the court in submitting the fact to the jury. When the

plaintiffs purchased the boats, they agreed to assume the contracts

made by Richards, one of which was with the defendant ; and

they afterwards admitted that they had renewed them with the

persons concerned.

The charge, however, of the court to the jury was erroneous.

It assumed the principle, that if the contract was entire and

not fulfilled by the plaintiff's, they were not only bound to re-
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fund the amount paid towards freight, but were also liable to

damages for the non-fulfillment. The defendant having paid

thirty dollars towards the transportation of the lumber, a sub-

sequent failure to perform the whole contract would not entitle

him to recover it back; for if he undertook to recover back the

amount paid, under the idea of a rescindment of the contract,

he would be met by the equity growing out of the services

actually rendered, and which should be taken into consideration

in adjusting the rights of the parties. The true remedy in such

a case is an action for damages for the violation of the agree-

ment; or, as in this case, the defendant may, if he chooses, set

up the breach and claim damages, for the purpose of diminish-

ing or even extinguishing any amount which the plaintiffs seek

to recover for the freight of the lumber.

It is true, if the contract was entire, a failure to perform

would of itself be an answer to a recovery for the remainder

of the freight money, as the plaintiffs could not maintain an
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action upon such a contract, after they had broken it. The com-

pensation in this case, I am inclined to think, did not depend

upon the transportation of all the lumber. The stipulation was

for a fixed sum for one thousand pieces, and no time of pay-

ment was mentioned. In contemplation of law it would prob-

ably be due on the delivery of the lumber at market. The

delivery of the whole lumber at market was not a condition

precedent to the payment of the freight. It would become due,

and be demandable as fast as delivered. If so, the plaintiffs

would be entitled to prosecute for the freight of the quantity

delivered. If the jury were satisfied that by the contract the

whole that was ready to be transported to market by the canal

could have been carried, then the defendant would be entitled to

damages ; and it would be proper to prove them, with the view

of reducing the amount claimed, or even extinguishing it, if

the damages were large enough to cover it: 8 Wend. 109. As to

the charge for the use of the landing, the testimony is not very

clear upon the point. It would seem, from the testimony of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:38 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

Richards, that he was to charge nothing for the use of his land-

ing for the lumber of the persons with whom he contracted;

and if so, it necessarily follows, from the evidence, that the

plaintiffs are not entitled to make any charge, as they took his

place. This, however, is a question of fact for the jury to de-

termine.

Judgment reversed, and venire de novo.

yC 37. SENSENBEENNER V. MATTHEWS,

48 Wis. 250; 3 N. W. B. 599; 33 Am. R. 809. 1879.

Replevin by plaintiff against Matthews, a deputy sheriff, for

a buggy taken under a writ of replevin secured by one Henry.

Plaintiff owned a building, part of which he occupied with a

blacksmith shop. Another part he leased to Schweitzer & Co.

as a wagon shop, who in turn sublet the second story to Max-

well for a paint shop. This was connected with the blacksmith

shop by a trap door through which Maxwell had the right to

take and return articles for painting. Maxwell employed

Schweitzer & Co. to do the wood work and Sensenbrenner to do

the iron work on the buggy, after the completion of which he

removed it to his shop, painted it, and sold it to Henry. Plaintiff

forbade its removal until Maxwell should settle with him for the

iron work, but Matthews and Henry, by virtue of a writ of
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replevin, peaceably removed the buggy from the shop in the

plaintiff's absence. Judgment for defendant.

Ryan, C. J. The shops of the appellant, Schweitzer and Max-

well, although in the same building, were held by them respec-

tively in severalty; and the right of way of Maxwell, although

passing through the shops of the appellant or Schweitzer, was

part of his holding and used by him of his own right.

The buggy belonging to ]\Iaxwell was delivered to him through

the right of way by the appellant, after it had been ironed by the

latter. It was delivered with the expectation that it should be

painted by Maxwell; but Maxwell owed no duty, either to

Schweitzer or the appellant, to paint it. The delivery was un-

conditional, and the buggy must be taken to have been delivered

to Maxwell in his right as owner of it.

This delivery operated as an absolute waiver of all lien of tli.e

appellant for ironing the buggy. The essence of lien^ in such

cases, is possession. Lien cannot survive possession ; and except

in case of fraud, and perhaps mistake, such a lien cannot be
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restored by resumption of possession. "Lien is a right to hold

possession of another's property for the satisfaction of some

charge attached to it. The essence of the right is possession;

and whether that possession be of officers of the law or of the

person who claims the right of lien, the chattel on which the

lien attaches is equally regarded as in the custody of the law.

Lien is neither a jus ad rem nor a jus in re, but a simple right

of retainer." 3 Pars, on Cont. 234.

I "The voluntary parting with the possesion of the goods will

lamount to a waiver or surrender of a lien; for as it is a right

('founded upon possession, it must ordinarily cease when the pos-

(session ceases. ' ' Story on Agency, sec. 367.

As this disposes of the lien set up by the appellant to support

this action, it is immaterial how the respondents came into pos-

session. In replevin, a plaintiff recovers on his own right of pos-

session, not on the weakness of the defendant's right.

By the Court. — The judgment of the court below is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

-/ 38. SMALL V. ROBINSON,

69 Me. 425; 31 Am. R. 299. 1879.

Appleton, Ch. J. This is an action of replevin for a pair of

wheels and other parts of a hack, upon which the defendant

claims a lien, by reason of work done by him upon them.
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The plaintiff is the owner of the hack. It was left for repairs

by one Staples, who was in possession under a contract of pur-

chase, the terms of which were unperformed. The defendant

was aware of the plaintiff's title. The presiding justice found

that the plaintiff had never given Staples any authority to sub-

ject the hack to a lien for repairs, and ruled that no such au-

thority was to be implied as a matter of law, from the relation

of the parties.

"A lien," observes Shaw, Ch. J., in Hollingsworth v. Dow, 19

Pick. 228, "is a proprietary interest, a qualified ownership, and

in general, can only be created by the owner, or by some person

by him authorized." Here the fact of authority is negatived.

The plaintiff' never became the debtor of the defendant, and

never authorized the imposition of any lien on his property.

Globe Works V. Wright, 106 Mass. 207, A mortgagor of horses

cannot, without the knowledge, acquiescence and consent of the

mortgagee, intrust the horses to be boarded so as to subject

them to a lien for keeping, as against the mortgagee. Sargent v.
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Usher, 55 N. H. 287 ; 20 Am. Rep. 208. Gushing, Gh. J., in the

case last cited, says: *'I have seen no case in which it has been

held that a party who permits another to have possession of his

personal property, by so doing in law, constitutes that other his

agent to sell or pledge the property." So a bailee can give no

lien upon property bailed, as against the owner. Gilson v.

Gwinn, 107 Mass. 126, 9 Am. R. 13.

The defen dant could acquire no title from Staples, when he

h ad n one. ■ . •

The exceptional case of the inn-keeper rests upon the principle

that as he is by law bound to receive a guest and his goods, and

might be liable to indictment for not so receiving them, he shall

have a lien on such goods as he is bound to receive_ whether

owned by his guest or not.

Exceptions overruled.

39. WILLIAMS V. ALLSUP,

10 C. B. (N. S.) 417; 100 E. C. L. 417. 1861.

Action for the value of a steamboat.

Erle, G. J. This is an action by the mortgagee of a steam-

vessel against a shipwright who had done certain repairs on the

vessel at the request of the mortgagor, who had been allowed to

be in the possession and apparent ownership. The defendant
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claims a lien upon the ship for the price of these repairs ; and I

am of the opinion that the claim is well founded. There is, it

seems, no authority to be found bearing upon the question,

though I presume it must have arisen many times. I should

rather expect that it had never been made the subject of liti-

gation because the right of a lien has always been admitted to

attach. I put my decision on the ground suggested by Mr.

Mellish, viz., that the mortgagee having allowed the mortgagor

to continue in the apparent ownership of the vessel, making it

a source of profit and a means of earning wherewithal to pay

off the mortgage-debt, the relation so created by implication

entitles the mortgagor to do all that may be necessary to keep

her in an efficient state for that purpose. The case states that

the vessel had been condemned as unseaworthy by the govern-

ment surveyor, and so was in a condition to be utterly unable

to earn freight or be an available security or any source of profit

at all. Under these circumstances, the mortgagor did that which

was obviously for the advantage of all parties interested : he puts
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her into the hands of the defendant to be repaired; and, ac-

cording to all ordinary usage, the defendant ought to have a

right of lien upon the ship, so that those who are interested in

the ship, and who will be benefited by the repairs, should not

be allowed to take her out of his hands without paying for them.

The 70th section of the Merchant Shipping Act, 17 & 18 Vict. c.

104, does not appear to me at all to interfere with this view. It

does not to my mind establish the right of the mortgagee to the

possession of the ship, or negative the lien of the person doing

the repairs. That section enacts that ''a mortgagee shall not

by reason of his mortgage be deemed to be the owner of a ship

or any share therein, nor shall the mortgagor be deemed to have

ceased to be the owner of such mortgaged ship or share, except

in so far as may be necessary for making such ship or share

available as a security for the mortgage-debt." The implica-

tion upon which I found my judgment is quite consistent with

that provision. The vessel has been kept in a state to be avail-

able as a security to the mortgagee, by her destruction being pre-

vented by the repairs which the defendant has done to her. I

think there is nothing in the 92d section to affect this question.

There is, no doubt, some difficulty in the case. But it is to be

observed that the money expended in repairs adds to the value of

the ship ; and, looking to the rights and interests of the parties

generally, it cannot be doubted that it is much to the advantage

of the mortgagee that the mortgagor should be held to have

power to confer a right of lien upon the ship for repairs neces-
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sary to keep her seaworthy. For these reasons, I am of the

opinion that the defendant is entitled to judgment.

(WiLLES, J., and Byles, J., rendered concurring opinions.)

Judgment for the defendant.

;^40. GRINNELL V. COOK,

3 Hill (N. Y.) 485; 38 Am. D. 663. 1842.

Case, to recover the value of horses taken and sold by Cook,

a deputy sheriff, under a writ against their owner, Tyler. Grin-

nell, an inn-keeper, claimed a lien for boarding the horses five

weeks in his stable. Writ of error from a non-suit of plaintiff.

By Court, Bronson, J. It is said that Martin proves an ex-

press promise to pay for the keeping of the horses. If that were

so, it would not aid the- plaintiff' in this action. This is not

assumpsit, but an action on the case where the plaintiff seeks to

recover on the ground of a lien. And besides, Martin was not

the agent of the plaintiff, and what the defendant said to him

seems not to have been intended for the plaintiff, but for Shel-

don, who had receipted the horses to the constable. The con-
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versation was not communicated to the plaintiff, and he will

never be able to make anything out of it: Stafford v. Bacon,

1 Hill, 532 [37 Am. Dec. 366], certainly not in this action.

The innkeeper is bound to receive and entertain travelers, and

is answerable for the goods of the guest although they may be

stolen or otherwise lost without any fault on his part. Like a

common carrier, he is an insurer of the property, and nothing

but the act of God or public enemies will excuse a loss. On

account of this extraordinary liability the law gives the innkeeper

a^lien_on _th^ goods of the^guest for the satisfaction of his rea=..

sonable j;harges.^ It was once held that he might detain the per-

son of a guest, but that doctrine is now exploded, and the lien

is confined to the goods. The inquiry then is, whether the

plaintiff received and kept the horses as an innkeeper. In other

words, was he bound to receive and take care of them, and would

he have been answerable for the loss if the horses had been

stolen without any negligence on his part? The lien and the

liability must stand or fall to gethe r. Innkeepers can not claim

the one with any just expectation of escaping the other.

Tyler, who owned the property, was not a traveler, nor was he

in any sense a guest in the plaintiff 's house ; and I think it quite
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clear that the plaintiff was not bound to receive and take care of

the horses. We are referred to the case of Peet v. McGraw, 25

Wend. 653, to prove that it is not necessary to the lien, or the

liability of the innkeeper, that the owner should be a guest.

The case decides no such thing. It turned on the construction

of the plea, and we thought the words of the plea equivalent to

an averment that the owner was a guest. A single expression

of the chief justice, which was not necessary to the decision of

the cause, is separated from the context, and pressed into the

plaintiff's service. But neither the chief justice nor any other

member of the court intended to say, that either the lien or the

liability could exist where the owner of the goods was not either

actually or constructively the guest of the innkeeper. There

must be such a relation ; but it is not necessary to its existence

that the owner of the goods should be actually infra hospitium

at the time the loss happened, or the lien accrued. For example,

if a traveler leave his horse at the inn, and then go out to

dine or lodge with a friend, he does not thereby cease to be a
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guest, and the rights and liabilities of the parties remain the

same as though the traveler had not left the inn. And if the

owner leave the inn and go to another town, intending to be

absent two or three days, it seems that the same rule holds

good, so far as relates to property for the care and keeping of

which the host is to receive a compensation; but it is otherwise

in relation to inanimate property from which the host derives no

advantage, and if that be stolen during such absence of the

guest, the innkeeper will not be answerable : Gelley V. Clerk,

Cro. Jac. 188; Noy, 126; Yorke v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym.

866; 1 Salk. 388, by the name of York v. Grindstone; Bac.

Abr., Inns and Innkeepers (C), 5, 7th Lond. ed. The case

of Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280 [20 Am. Dec. 471], goes still

further. There the traveler never went to the inn, but stopped

as a visitor with a friend, and sent her horse and carriage to the

inn. After four days she sent for the property, and found that

a part of it had been stolen; but still the innkeeper was held

liable. This ease rests on the dictum of Powell and Gould, JJ.,

against the opinion of Lord Holt, in Yorke v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld.

Raym. 866, that "if a man set his horse at an inn, though he

lodge in another place, that makes him a guest, and the inn-

keeper is obliged to receive him [the horse] ; for the innkeeper

gains by the horse, and therefore makes the owner a guest,

though he was absent." But the deision turned on the con-

struction of the avowry and the proper mode of pleading. The

two judges held, "that since the matter shown makes it appear

that he was a guest, it is enough, though it is not expressly

141

GEINNELL v. COOK. § -0

averred that he was a guest." But Holt said: ''This matter is

but evidence of it, that he was a guest, and is not traversable ;

but guest or not, is the most material part of the avowry, and

traversable ; and therefore there ought to be a positive averment

that he was a guest." This is not all. The two judges gave as

the authority for their dictum the ease of Robinson v. Walter,

Poph. 127. The point there decided was, that the innkeeper had

a lien on the plaintiff's horse, although the animal was brought

to the inn by one who took him wrongfully. And that is good

law at this day, if the innkeeper have no notice of the wrong,

and act honestly : Johnson v. Hill, 3 Stark. 172. He is bound to

receive the guest, and cannot stop to inquire whether he is the

right owner of the property he brings. But not one word was

said in the case of Robinson v. Walter, in support of the posi-

tion that the owner or person who brings the property need not

be a guest. The subject was not even mentioned, so far as ap-

pears by the report in Popham. But by the report of the same

case in 3 Bulst. 269, it appears affirmatively that the wrong-doer
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who brought the horse to the inn actually became a guest,

and afterwards went away, leaving the horse behind. Now

when a man, after he has actually become a guest and de-

livered his property to the host, goes away for a brief period

leaving his goods behind him, the law is chargeable with no ab-

surdity in considering him as still continuing a guest so far as

relates to the rights and liabilities of the parties. And if one

send his horse or his trunk in advance to the inn, saying he will

soon be there himself, it may be that he should be deemed a

guest from the time the property is taken in charge by the host.

But when, as in Mason v. Thompson, the owner has never been

at the inn, and never intends to go there as a guest, it seems

to me little short of a downright absurdity to say, that in legal

contemplation he is a guest. If our law-givers had intended that

the innkeeper should be answerable as such for everything he

received in charge, guest or no guest, they would have said so.

They would not have taken the roundabout mode of saying that

he must answer for the goods of the guest, and that every one is

a guest who has goods in his hands. Now in this case, Tyler, who

owned the horses, never was the plaintiff's guest; nor was he a

traveler or transient person. He was the plaintiff's neighbor.

In this respect the case differs from Mason v. Thompson, though

I should feel no disposition to follow that decision if this dif-

ference did not exist. I think the extraordinary liability of

the innkeeper does not attach until he actually has a guest, and

without such liability the innkeeper, as such, has no lien on
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the goods. Whether he has a lien in any other character remains

to be considered.

The right of lien has always been admitted where the party

w^as bound by law to receive the goods; and in modern times

the right has been extended so far that it may now be laid down

as a general rule, that every bailee for hire who by his labor

and skill has imparted an additional value to the goods, has a

lien upon the property for his reasonable charges. This in-

cludes all such mechanics, tradesmen, and laborers as receive

property for the purpose of repairing, or otherwise improving

its condition. But the rule does not extend to a livery-stable

keeper, for the reason that he only keeps the horse^, without,

imparting any new value to the animal. And besides, he does

not come within the policy of the law, which gives the lien for

the benefit of trade. Upon the same reasons the agister or

farmer who pastures the horses or cattle of another has no lien

for their keeping, unless there he a special agreement to that

effect. This doctrine was laid down in Chapman v. Allen, Cro.
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Car. 271. And in Yorke v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 868, Lord

Holt said, a livery-stable keeper has no lien. See the remarks of

Lord Lyndhurst, C. B., upon this case in Judson v. Etheridge,

1 Cromp. & ]\Iee. 743. I am not aware that this rule has ever

been departed from, though it has been suggested that it would

be well enough to place the livery man on the same footing

with other persons who bestow their labor and care upon the

property entrusted to their keeping: Cowen's Tr. 299, 2d ed.

But the question has recently undergone a good deal of dis-

cussion in England, and the result is that the old cases remain

unshaken, and it must now be regarded as the settled doctrine

that agisters and livery-stable keepers have no lien unless there

be a special contract to that effect : Wallace v. Woodgate, 1 Car.

& P. 575; Ry. & M. 193; Bevan v. Waters, 3 Car. & P. 520;

Judson V, Etheridge, 1 Cromp. & M. 743 ; Jackson v. Cummins,

5 Mee. & W. 342. And see Jacobs v. Latour, 5 Bing. 130; 2

Moore & P. 201; Sanderson v. Bell, 2 Cromp. & M. 304; Scarfe

V. ]\Iorgan, 4 Mee. & W. 270. It will be seen from the cases

which have been mentioned, that a distinction, in relation to the

question of lien, lias been taken between the mare-keeper and

the trainer of a horse; and it is said that the latter has a lien,

because he has done something for the improvement of the ani-

mal. And in Judson v. Etheridge, it was suggested by Bolland,

B., that the doctrine might, perhaps, be extended to the case of

a breaker who takes a young horse to be broken, on the ground

that he makes it a different animal from what it was before, and

improves the animal by the application of labor and skill. On

146

BURDICT V. MUKEAY. §§ 40, ^l

the same principle it has been held, that if a farmer or stable-

keeper receive a mare for the purpose of being covered by hie

stallion, he has a specific lien for the charge of covering.

AMiether these distinctions were well taken or not, they show

that the courts have steadily adhered to the rule that one who

merely provides food and takes the care of an animal, as an

agister or livery-stable keeper, has no lien except by contract.

There is a further reason why there can be no lien in these

cases. When horses are kept at livery, the owner takes and uses

them at pleasure, and the bailee only has a lien so long as he

retains the uninterrupted possession. If the owner gets the

property into his hands without fraud, the lien is at an end, and

it wiUnatJaa revived hy_-lhfi.. return. jif_±l]Lfi_gQods.: Bevan v. Wa-

ters, 3 Car. & P. 520 ; Jones v. Thurloe, 8 Mod. 172 ; Jones v.

Pearle, 1 Stra. 556 ; Sweet v. Pym, 1 East 4. So in the case of

milch-cows, the agister has no lien, for the reason that the owner

has occasional possession for the purpose of milking them ; Jack-

son V. Cummins, 5 Mee. & W. 342 ; Cross on Lien, 25, 36, 332.
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Now here, from the nature of the case, the plaintiff was not

to have the continued and exclusive possession of the horses,

but Tyler was at liberty to take and use them when he pleased,

and he did in fact take them at pleasure. The witness says he

does not know that the plaintiff was at home when Tyler took the

horses, but there was no pretense that they were taken by fraud,

or against the will of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff can not stand upon any better footing than a

livery-stable keeper, and as such he had no lien.

Judgment affirmed.

5( 41. BURDICT V. MURRAY,

3 Vt. 302; 21 Am. D. 588. 1830.

Trespass for taking and carrying away sheep and goat skins

delivered to plaintiffs to be dressed into morocco. Before the

work was completed the owners turned the skins over to the de-

fendant, a creditor, who caused them to be attached. Verdict

directed for plaintiff. Defendants excepted.

By Court, Prentiss, C. J. It is the better opinion that he

who has a special property in goods may have an action of tres-

pass against him who has the general property, and upon the

evidence the damage shall be mitigated. Thus a bailee of a

chattel for a certain time, coupled with an interest, may support

the action against the bailor for taking it away before the time :
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1 Chit. PL 170. There is no doubt, therefore, but that the

plaintiffs in the case before us, if they had a special property

in the skins, were entitled to maintain this action, and recover

according to their interest, although the skins were turned out

to the defendants, on the writ of attachment, by Allen and

Warren Murray, the owners.

The plaintiffs, under the contract with the Murrays, were

bailees having an interest, and had a right to retain the skins

for the purpose for which they were bailed to them. Until the

skins were dressed and made into morocco, the plaintiffs were

entitled to the possession of them; and even then they would

have a lien upon the skins for the price agreed to be paid for

their labor upon them. A workman who has bestowed his labor

upon a chattel has a lien for the remuneration due to him,

whether the amount was fixed by the express agreement of the

parties or not; though it is otherwise if, by the bargain, a

future day of payment was agreed upon, for then the detention

of the chattel would be inconsistent with the terms of the
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contract: Chase v. Westmore, 5 Mau. & Sel. 180. Here there

was no particular time or mode of payment agreed upon, and

if the plaintiff's had completed the manufacture of the skins

according to the agreement, they would have had an unques-

tionable right to detain them until the price was paid, unless

they had already in their hands a balance sufficient to pay the

price. But the skins were in an unfinished state, and the

plaintiffs had a right, under the contract, to retain them to earn

the price. If at the time of taking the skins the Murrays had

offered and agreed to allow the plaintiffs the full price stipulated

to be paid for furnishing them, out of moneys actually in the

plaintiffs' hands sufficient to pay the price, it might have been

a good defense. But as no such offer appears to have been

made, the evidence proposed by the defendants could not avail

them.

Judgment affirmed.

^ 42. STEINMAN V. WILKINS,

7 Watts and S. (Pa.) 466; 42 Am. D. 254. 1844.

Trover for conversion of goods stored with defendant as ware-

houseman by plaintiff's assignors. Demand for the goods had

been made, but no tender of charges. Verdict for defendant.

By Court, Gibson, C. J. Though a plurality of the barons in

Rex. V. Humpheiy, 1 McCle. & Yo. 194, 195, dissented from the
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dictum of Baron Graham, that a warehouseman has a lien for a

general balance, like a wharfinger, I do not understand them

to have intimated that he has no lien at all. They spoke of it

as an entity; and seem to have admitted that he has a specific

lien, though not a general one. There is a well-known distinc-

tion between a commercial lien, which is the creature of usage,

and a common law lien, which is the creature of policy. The

first gives a right to retain for a balance of account ; the second,

for services performed in relation to the particular property.

Commercial or general liens, which have not been fastened on

the law merchant by inveterate usage, are discountenanced by

the courts as encroachments on the common law; and for that

reason it would be impossible to maintain the position of Baron

Graham, for there is no evidence of usage as a foundation for it,

and no text- writer has treated a warehouse room as a subject of

lien in any shape. In Rex. v. Humphery, it was involved in the

discussion only incidentally ; and I have met with it in no other

ease. But there is doubtless a specific lien provided for it by
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the justice of the common law. From the case of a chattel

bailed to acquire additional value by the labor or skill of an

artisan, the doctrine of specific lien has been extended to almost

every case in which the thing has been improved by the agency

of the bailee. Yet, in the recent case of Jackson v. Cummins, 5

Mee. & W. 342, it was held to extend no further than to cases in

which the bailee has directly conferred additional value by labor

or skill, or indirectly by the instrumentality of an agent under

his control ; in supposed accordance with which it was ruled that

the agistment of cattle gives no lien. But it is difficult to find

an argument for the position, that a man who fits an ox for the

shambles, by fattening it with his provender, does not increase its

intrinsic value by means exclusively within his control. There

are certainly cases of a different stamp, particularly Bevan v.

Waters, Moo. & M. 235, in which a trainer was allowed to re-

tain for fitting a race-horse for the turf.

In Jackson v. Cummins we see the expiring embers of the

primitive notion that the basis of the lien is intrinsic improve-

ment of the thing by mechanical means ; but if we get away from

it at all, what matters it how the additional value has been im-

parted, or whether it has been attended with an alteration in

the condition of the thing? It may be said that the condition

of a fat ox is not a permanent one ; but neither is the increased

value of a mare in foal permanent; yet in Scarfe v. Morgan, 4

Mee. & W. 270, the owner of a stallion was allowed to have a lien

for the price of the leap. The truth is, the modern decisions

evince a struggle of the judicial mind to escape from the narrow
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■ confines of the earlier precedents, but without having as yet

established principles adapted to the current transactions and

conveniences of the world. Before Chase v. AVestmore, 5 ]Mau.

& Sel. 180, there was no lien even for work done under a special

agreement ; now, it is indifferent whether the price has been

fixed or not. In that case, Lord Ellenborough, alluding to the

old decisions, said that if they "are not supported by law and

reason, the convenience of mankind certainly requires that our

decisions should not be governed by them;" and Chief Justice

Best declared in Jacobs v. Latour, 5 Bing. 132, that the doctrine

of lien is so just between debtor and creditor, that it can not be

too much favored. In Kirkman v. Shawcross, 6 T. R. 17, Lord

Kenyon said it had been the wish of the courts, in all cases and

at all times, to carry the lien of the common law as far as pos-

sible; and that Lord ^Mansfield also thought that justice required

it, though he submitted when rigid rules of law were against it.

What rule forbids the lien of a warehouseman? Lord Ellen-

borough thought in Chase v. AVestmore, supra, that every case
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of the sort was that of a sale of services performed in relation

to a chattel, and to be paid for, as in the case of any other sale,

when the article should be delivered. Now, a sale of warehouse

room presents a case which is bound by no pre-established rule

or analogy; and, on the ground of principle, it is not easy to

discover why the warehouseman should not have the same lien

for the price of future delivery and intermediate care that a

carrier has. The one delivers at a different time, the other at a

different place; the one after custody in a warehouse, the other

in a vehicle; and that is all the difference.

True, the measure of the carrier's responsibility is greater;

but that, though a consideration to influence the quantum of

his compensation, is not a consideration to increase the number

of his securities for it. His lien does not stand on that. He is

bound in England by the custom of the realm to carry for all

employers at established prices; but it is by no means certain

that our ancestors brought the principle with them from the

parent country as one suited to their condition in the wilderness.

We have no trace of an action for refusing to carry; and it is

notorious, that the wagoners who were formerly the carriers be-

tween Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, frequently refused to load

at the current price. Now, neither the carrier nor the ware-

houseman adds a particle to the intrinsic value of the thing. The

one delivers at the place, and the other at the time, that suits the

interest or the convenience of the o"\^Tier of it, in whose estima-

tion it receives an increase of its relative value from the services
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rendered in respect of it, else he would not have undertaken to

pay for them. I take it, then, that, in regard to lien, a ware-

houseman stands on a footing with a carrier, whom in this coun-

try he closel}^ resembles.

Now, it is clear from Sodergren v. Flight and Jennings, cited

6 East, 612, that where the ownership is entire in the consignee,

or a purchaser from him, each parcel of the goods is bound, not

only for its particular proportion, but for the whole, provided

the whole has been carried under one contract; it is otherwise

where to charge a part for the whole would subject a purchaser

to answer for the goods of another, delivered by the bailee with

knowledge of the circumstances. In this instance^ the entire

interest was in Hamilton & Humes, in whose right the plaintiff

sues; and the principle laid down by the presiding judge was

substantially right. On the other hand, the full benefit of it

was not given to the defendant in charging that the demand and

refusal was evidence of conversion. There was no evidence of

tender to make the detention wrongful; and the defendant
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would have had cause to complain, had the verdict been against

him, of the direction to deduct the entire price of the storage

from the value of the articles returned, and to find for the

plaintiff a sum equal to the difference. But there has been no

error which the plaintiff can assign.

Judgment affirmed. \/^ «

43. SCHMIDT V. BLOOD,

9 Wend. (N. Y.) 268; 24 Am. D. 143. 1832.

Replevin for six and one-half tons of hemp. Ninety-nine tons

had been stored with defendants as warehousemen, of which

their store-keeper had stolen ten tons. Plaintiffs demanded the

balance remaining in store and offered to pay storage on such

balance. Defendants refused to deliver until storage on all the

hemp stored had been paid. Verdict for plaintiffs, and motion

for new trial because of rejection of evidence of care by plaintiff

and usage in New York to retain balance as lien for whole stor-

age.

By Court, Sutherland, J. It appears to be well settled that

a warehouseman, or depositary of goods for hire, is responsible

only for ordinary care, and is not liable for loss arising from

accident when he is not in default : 2 Kent Com. 441 ; 4 T.

R. 481 ; Peake N. P. 114 ; 4 Esp. N. P. 262 ; and in Finueane v.
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Small, 1 Id. 315, it was held that if goods be bailed to be kept

for hire, if the compensation be for house room, and not a re-

ward for care and diligence, the bailee is bound only to take the

same care of the goods as of his own, and if they be stolen or

embezzled by his servant without gross negligence on his part,

he is not liable, and the onus of showing negligence seems to

be upon the plaintiff, unless there is a total default in deliver-

ing or accounting for the goods : 7 Cow. 500, note a, and cases

there cited: 3 Taunt. 264; 5 Barn. & Cress. 322; 1 H. Bl. 298;

Jones on Bailm. 106, n. 40; 2 Salk. 655; 1 T. R. 33. The de-

fendants' claim for storage, therefore, is not prejudiced by the

fact that a portion of the goods had been purloined or embez-

zled by the storekeeper or servant.

The defendants had a lien on the whole and every part of

the hemp for their storage of the whole ; it was but one parcel ;

the whole was deposited with them at the same time; it was

but one transaction. It is admitted that the defendants might

have refused to deliver any portion of the hemp until their
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storage for that particular portion was paid ; but having

parted with all but six and a half tons, it is contended that

they have no right to retain that for their charges in relation

to the other portions. This can not be ; it would be found

most inconvenient in practice. Restricting the lien to services

rendered in relation to the whole quantity deposited at the same

time, it becomes a just and reasonable rule, giving effect un-

doubtedly to the actual intentions and understanding of the

parties; and promoting the convenience of trade and business:

2 Kent Com. 495, 496.

New trial granted.

44. WHITLOCK V. HEARD,

13 Ala. 776; 48 Am. D. 73. 1848.

Trover for the conversion of stock which plaintiff left with

defendant to keep, with power to sell it to pay for the keeping

and a note given to satisfy a gaming debt of plaintiff's. Plain-

tiff notified defendant not to pay the note. Defendant sold the

stocks at public auction, bidding them in himself. The court

below ruled that this was not a sale. Plaintiff appealed.

By Court, Dargan, J. In an action of trover, it is necessary

for the plaintiff to show title to the property, an immediate

right of possession, and a conversion by the defendant. The
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plaintiff's title to the property in this ease, was not denied by

the charge of the judge, but the charge was calculated to induce

the belief, either that there was no conversion shown, or that

the plaintiff did not have an immediate right to the possession;

hence arises the necessity of examining this question. If one

deliver stock, or cattle, to another, to be kept or fed, with the

power to sell them to pay for their keep, will trover lie against

the party to whom they are so delivered, if he convert the cattle

to his own use without tendering pay for keeping them? It is

very clear, that if a factor, or other bailee, having a lien on

goods, sell them, or convert them to his own use, or destroy

the goods, as by drawing out a quantity of wine from a cask,

and filling it up with water, that the owner may bring trover

immediately, without regard to the lien: See Nash v. Mosher,

19 Wend. 431, and the cases there cited. And I think that any

act by a lien holder, inconsistent Math the character of his pos-

session, and denying the title of the owner, will justify the

owner in bringing trover, and that such conduct on the part of
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the lien holder destroys his lien. See Samuel v. Morris, 6 Car.

& P. 620.

This view is corroborated by Mr. Chitty, in his work on plead-

ing, page 152. It is there said, that if a person have goods in

his possession, on which he has a lien for the payment of a

debt, the owner can not bring trover without tendering the

money due on the goods. But if the party being applied to

for the goods refuses to deliver them for a different reason than

that he has a lien on them for his debt, and do not mention his

lien, he shall not be permitted to set up his lien afterwards, to

defeat the owner in an action of trover. See also Bac. Abr.,

tit. Trover. Now the reason of this can only be, that one being

applied to for the goods, the lien holder repudiated the title of

the owner, denied the character of his possession, and conse-

quently there was a clear conversion of the property. Hence,

trover would lie. Had there been no express agreement in this

case, that the mare and colts should be pledged to pay for keep-

ing them, with the power to sell, if necessary, to pay for their

keep, there would be no difficulty; for the conduct of the de-

fendant was such, as would have justified a jury in coming to

the conclusion, that he held the property, not in subordination

to the title of the owner, but that he had set up his own title as

adverse to that of the owner, and by such conduct, his lien

would have been no protection to him against this suit. But

here there was an express agreement, that the stock should be

liable for keeping them, with the power to sell them to pay the
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expenses. This is a contract, and is not a new lien, resulting

from the rules of law. By the terms of this contract, the de-

fendant had the right to sell so much of the stock as was neces-

sary to pay what might be due to him for keeping them. If

one of the horses was enough for this purpose, he should not

have sold more — but proceeding to sell all of them, which was

not necessary to pay the expense of their keeping, was an assump-

tion of ownership beyond the authority conferred on him by the

terms of the contract. The power to sell ceased with the extin-

guishment of his demand ; his debt for keeping the horses being

paid, he had no right to sell more, and his doing so was a con-

version of that portion of the stock sold by him, which was not

necessary to pay the debt due for keeping them. The circuit

court therefore erred in refusing to give the charge requested,

that the defendant was liable for such of the stock sold, as were

not necessary to pay the amount due for keeping them. The

view here taken, is sustained by the case of Roberts v. Beeson,

4 Port. (Ala.) 164. In that case it was decided, that an action of
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trespass would lie against a sheriff, who sold more of the defend-

ant's goods than was necessary to pay the execution. So it has

been held, that if a sheriff having a ^. fa, for forty shillings, sell

five yoke of oxen, one yoke being sufficient to satisfy the ft. fa.,

he may be considered as a trespasser, and sued as such, for the

value of the four. See the case referred to in 4 Port, and 20

Vin. Abr. 458.

The charge of the court as asked, admits the right of the de-

fendant to sell enough to pay his debt, but sought to charge

him for the conversion of that portion of the stock, sold after

he had raised money enough to extinguish it. The court did

not give this charge, because the defendant himself was the

purchaser. The sale was at public auction, and the defendant

the highest bidder. Such a sale is not absolutely void, but is

voidable at the election of the party whose title is sought to be

divested by such sale. The court should have given the charge

as requested, and for the refusal so to charge, the cause is re-

versed and remanded.

45. In Doane v. Russell, 3 Gray (Mass.) 382, 1855, Chief

Justice Shaw said :

We think the rule is generally stated by the text writers, that a party

having a lien only, without a power of sale superadded by agreement,

cannot lawfully sell the chattel for his reimbursement. It is so stated in

1 Chit. Gen. Pract. 492; and he advises carriers and others, entitled to a

lien, to obtain an express stipulation for a power of sale in ease the lien

is not satisfied. 2 Kent Com. (6th ed.) 642. Cross on Lien, 47. Woolrych

154

POTTS V. NEW YOKK AND NEW ENGLAND E. E. CO. §§45,46

on Com. & Merc. Law, 237. The language of the learned American com-

mentator, in summing up his article on lieu, is this : "I will conclude with

observing that a lien is, in many cases, like a distress at common law, and

gives the party detaining the chattel the right to hold it as a pledge or

security for the debt, but not to sell it."

If it be said that a right to retain the goods, without the right to sell,

is of little or no value; it may be answered that it is certainly not so

adequate a security as a pledge with a power of sale; still, it is to be

considered that both parties have rights which are to be regarded by the

law; and the rule must be adapted to general convenience. In the greater

number of cases, the lien for work is small in comparison with the value,

to the owner, of the article subject to lien; and in most cases it would be

for the interest of the owner to satisfy the lien and redeem the goods; as

in the case of the tailor, the coachmaker, the innkeeper, the carrier and

others. Whereas, many times, it would cause great loss to the general

owner to sell the suit of clothes or other articles of personal property. _ But

further, it is to be considered that the security of this lien, such as it is,

is superadded to the holder's right to recover for his services by action.
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And if the transaction be a large one, and of such a character as to

require further security, it may be provided for by an express stipulation

for a power of sale, under such limitations as the particular circumstances

of the case may indicate as suitable to secure the rights of all parties

concerned.

46. POTTS V. NEW YORK AND NEW ENGLAND RAIL-

ROAD CO.,

131 Mass. 455; 41 Am. R. 247. 1881.

Tort for conversion of coal. Judgment below for defendant.

Gray, C. J. A carrier of goods consigned to one person under

one contract has a lien upon the whole for the lawful freight and

charges on every part, and a delivery of part of the goods to the

consignee does not discharge or waive that lien upon the rest

without proof of an intention so to do. Sodergren v. Flight, cited

in 6 East, 622; Abbott on Shipping (7th ed.), 377; Lane v. Old

Colony R. R., 14 Gray, 143 ; New Haven & Northampton Co. v.

Campbell, 128 Mass. 104; 35 Am. Rep. 360. And when the

consignor delivers goods to one carrier to be carried over his

route, and thence over the route of another carrier, he makes

the first carrier his forwarding agent ; and the second carrier has

a lien, not only for the freight over his own part of the route,

but also for any freight on the goods paid by him to the first

carrier. Briggs v. Boston & Lowell R. R., 6 Allen, 246, 250, 83

Am. D. 626.

The right of stoppage in transitu is an equitable extension,

recognized by the courts of common law, of the seller's lien for

the price of goods of which the buyer has acquired the property,

but not the possession. Bloxam v. Sanders, 4 B. & C. 941, 948,

949, and 7 D. & R. 396, 405, 406 ; Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick.
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307, 313 (23 Am. Dec. 607). This right is indeed paramount

to any lien, created by usage or by agreement between the car-

rier and the consignee, for a general balance of account. Oppen-

heim v. Russell, 3 B. & P. 42 ; Jackson v. Nichol, 5 Bing. N. C.

508, 518, and 7 Scott, 577, 591. See also, Butler v. Woolcott,

2 B. & P. N. R. 64; Sears v. Wills, 4 Allen, 212, 216. But the

common-law lien of a carrier upon a particular consignment of

goods arises from the act of the consignor himself in delivering

the goods to be carried ; and no authority has been cited, and no

reason offered, to support the position that this lien of the car-

rier upon the whole of the same consignment is not as valid

against the consignor as against the consignee.

Judgment. for the defendant.

r-

47. AMERICAN DISTRICT TELEGRAPH CO. V.

WALKER,

72 Md. 454; 20 Atl. R. 1; 20 Am. St. R. 479. 1890.

Alvey, C. J. This action was brought by the appellee against
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the appellant to recover for injury to a pair of horses, and to a

surrey wagon, a vehicle to which the horses were attached at the

time of the accident. The question is, whether the defendant

is responsible for the consequences of the accident.

The defendant is a corporation, and it appears that it holds

itself out for the undertaking of the performance of various

services, such as the carriage of parcels, messages, and other

errands and commissions, upon call at district stations in the

city. The corporate name of the defendant would not appear

to indicate very clearly the nature of the duties that it assumes

to perform.

It appears that the plaintiff was the owner of a pair of valu-

able horses, which he kept at Little's livery-stable, on Howard

Street; and having the horses hitched to a surrey wagon hired

of the proprietor of the livery-stable, for a drive in the country,

upon his return he and his companions stopped at a restau-

rant on the corner of Calvert and German streets; and desir-

ing to have the horses and vehicle taken to the livery-stable,

he went to the nearest district office of the defendant and

asked for a boy competent to drive a pair of horses to Little's

stable, on Ho'^vard Street, and paid the customary charge for a

messenger service. The manager of the office responded, and

sent a boy to take the team, but on seeing the horses and be-
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ing asked if lie could drive, the boy said he could not drive a

double team, and thereupon he was sent back to the office by

the plaintiff, and the latter then determined to wait for the

driver from the stable ; but before such driver arrived, another

boy from the defendant's office called to take the team, who

said, in answer to an inquiry, that he had driven a double

team before; and the plaintiff gave the horses and vehicle in

charge of the boy, and gave him direction as to the course

he should take to get to the stable in order best to avoid

crowded streets. The boy started off with the team, but on

the way to the stable, the horses ran off, threw out the boy,

broke up the vehicle, and one of the horses was so seriously

injured that he had to be shot, and the other horse was ren-

dered unsafe to drive. There was evidence given tending to

show that the running away of the horses was caused by the

negligent or unskillful driving of the boy. It would appear

that the furnishing of boys to drive teams for customers was

part of the ordinary business of the defendant; for Little, the
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keeper of the livery-stable, testified that the defendant had a

call-box in his stable, and that he frequently called messenger-

boys of. the defendant to drive teams, and they were supplied,

and that he settled for such service monthly.

There was evidence offered by the defendant for the purpose

of proving previous knowledge on the part of the plaintiff of a

limitation as to the extent of damages for which the defend-

ant would contract to be answerable for any injury that might

be sustained in the course of its service. Such condition was

printed at the foot of its blank delivery tickets. But it was

not shown that there was any contract in this case, by ticket

or otherwise, containing any such limitation of liability, and

the evidence offered was therefore rejected, and we think prop-

erly so.

Upon the whole evidence, the court instructed the jury, upon

request of the plaintiff, that if they found from the evidence

that the defendant undertook, for a reward, to deliver the team

of horses and vehicle, as described in the evidence, to a per-

son designated by the plaintiff, and in the course of this un-

dertaking intrusted the driving of the team to one who, by

his negligence, permitted the horses to run away, whereby the

plaintiff' suffered damage, then the plaintiff was entitled to

recover, and the jury should allow such damages as they might

find, from the CAddence, the plaintiff suffered by reason of the

defendant's default in the premises.

The defendant offered six prayers, all of which were rejected

by the court. He also moved the court to exclude from the
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jury all the evidence on the part of the plaintiff which related

to the injury of the surrey wagon, and the expense incurred

in repairing the same. And to the refusal of its prayers, and

the motion to exclude the evidence, as well as to the instruction

given by the court to the jury, the defendant excepted.

This is a case of bailment for hire; but the defendant did

not, by its undertaking, incur the liability of a common car-

rier. This species of bailment is included in what Lord Holt,

. in the leading case of Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Kaym. 917, clas-

sifies as the fifth sort, viz., "a delivery to carry or otherwise

manage, for a reward to be paid to the bailee, ' ' and as to which,

said Lord Holt, the cases are of two sorts, "either a delivery

to one that exercises a public employment, or a delivery to a

private person. First, if it be to a person of the first sort, and

he is to have a reward, he is bound to answer for the goods at

all events." But as to the second sort he says 'Hhey are

bailiffs, factors, and such like," in which case the bailee is only

bound to take reasonable care; and "the true reason of the
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case is," says the learned judge, "it would be unreasonable to

charge him with a trust further than the nature of the thing

puts it in his power to perform it." And so Judge Story, in his

work on bailments, section 457, founding his text principally

upon Lord Holt's classification, states the same distinction.

He says: "Every such private person is bound to ordinary

diligence, and to a reasonable exercise of skill; and of course

he is not responsible for any losses not occasioned by the ordi-

nary negligence of himself or his servants. He will not, there-

fore, be liable for any loss by thieves, or for any taking from

him or them by force, or where the owner accompanies the

goods to take care of them, and is himself guilty of negligence.

This is the general rule; and it of course applies to all cases

where he has not assumed the character of a common carrier,

unless, indeed, he has expressly, by the terms of his contract,

taken upon himself any such risk." The application of the

principle of this species of bailment, and the extent of the

liability of the bailee, are well explained and illustrated by

the cases of Newton v. Pope, 1 Cow. 109 ; Brind v. Dale, 8 Car.

& P. 207 ; and Searle v. Laverick, L. R. 9 Q. B. 122 ; and those

cases show that if negligence or want of skill in the bailee or

his servant be the ground of action, the onus of proof is on

the plaintiff.

The instruction granted by the court is based exclusively

upon the alleged negligence of the boy in driving the horses.

There was evidence tending to prove such negligence, and we

perceive no error in the instruction. The boy was furnished
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from the defendant's office to take charge of and to drive the

team of horses to the livery-stable, and having assumed the duty

for a reward, the defendant was bound to furnish a driver both

competent and careful.

Nor do we perceive that there was any error committed by

the court in refusing to exclude from the consideration of the

jury the evidence in regard to the damage done to the surrey

wagon, and the expense of its repair. It,is true, the plaintiff

was not the general owner of the wagon, but having hired the

vehicle, he was bailee, and as such he had a special property

in it, which entitled him to recover for any injury to it, as

against a party without title. He was answerable to the gen-

eral owner, and was therefore entitled to recover of the de-

fendant to the full extent of the injury to the vehicle caused

by the negligent act of the defendant's servant: Harker v. De-

ment, 9 Gill, 7, 13 ; 52 Am. Dec. 670.

With respect to the prayers offered by the defendant, we

think there was no error in rejecting them. The instruction
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actually given by the court was as favorable to the defendant

as any that could well have been given, upon the facts of the

case, and which instruction rendered it wholly unnecessary

to grant the second and third prayers of the defendant; as by

the instruction given the defendant was only held to that

degree of care to which an ordinary bailee for hire is liable. And

as to the other prayers, clearly, in view of what we have said in

regard to the nature of the liability of the defendant, there

was no error in rejecting them. The judgment must therefore

be affirmed.

>C48. MORNINGSTAR V. CUNNINGHAM,

110 hid. 328;. 11 N. E. B. 593; 59 Am. R. 211. 1886.

Action on a note and mortgage. Defendant, Morningstar,

agreed with Henderson, Parks & Co., pork-packers, that if they

would advance the money he would buy and deliver to them for

slaughter fat hogs. They were to prepare the same for market,

sell on defendant's account, reimburse themselves for the money

advanced and account to defendant for the balance. They fur-

nished $25,000, but pork declined so that a sale then would not

reimburse them for the money advanced. Accordingly they ad-

vised Morningstar to execute to them the note and mortgage in

suit, and hold the product for a rise in the market. Morning-
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star charged that the packers had confused his product with

their own, thus converting his property of a value greater than

the amount of the note. To this it was replied that there was

no agreement to keep defendant's product separate, that his

entire product had been accounted for, and that it fell short

by $10,000 of the amount advanced under the contract. Judg-

ment for plaintiffs for $8,000.

Mitchell, J. (After stating the facts.) During the progress

of the trial the plaintiffs were permitted to prove that accord-

ing to the usual course of business, it was and always had been

the usage of the packing house of Henderson, Parks & Co. to

retain certain portions of hogs packed by them, such as the

bristles, feet, fat from the entrails, and other oft'al, as compensa-

tion for slaughtering and cleaning the hogs, and placing them

upon the hooks to cool, and afterward cutting them up.

Evidence was also given over objection, tending to prove that

the usage above mentioned was the common usage prevalent in

other similar packing houses in the State of Indiana, and that
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the retention of the offal was but reasonable compensation.

The plaintiff also offered evidence tending to prove that the

term "product" as applied to the pork-packing business, had a

known meaning peculiar to the trade, and did not include such

parts of slaughtered hogs as are mentioned above. Other evi-

dence involving similar principles was admitted.

It is to be observed that the contract, out of which the con-

troversy arose, was oral, and the evidence was such as to leave

the terms and meaning of the agreement ambiguous. In such

eases, evidence of the known and usual course of a particular

trade or business is competent, with a view of raising a pre-

sumption that the transaction in question was according to the

ordinary and usual course of the business to which it related.

Lyon V. Lenon, 106 Ind. 567, 7 N. E. R. 311 ; Mand v. Trail, 92

Ind. 521, 47 Am. Eep. 163; Wallace v. Morgan, 23 Ind. 399;

Lonergan v. Stewart, 55 111. 44; Jonsson v. Thompson, 97 N.

Y..642.

It is not essential that such a usage should be shown to be so

ancient ' ' that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, ' '

nor that it should contain all the other elements of a common-

law custom, as defined in the books. 1 Cooley Bl. Com. 76, and

note.

The distinction between a usage of trade and a common-law

custom has not always been observed. A custom is something

which has by its universality and antiquity acquired the force

and effect of law, in a particular place or country, in respect to
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the subject-matter to which it relates, and is ordinarily taken

notice of without proof. Thus when a payee indorses his name

on the back of a promissory note, the law by force of a pervad-

ing and universal custom, imports a well-recognized contract

into the transaction. Smji;he v. Scott, 106 Ind. 245, 6 N. E. R.

145 ; Walls V. Bailey, 49 N. Y. 464, 10 Am. Rep. 407 ; Hursh v.

North, 40 Penn. St. 241 ; Munn v. Burch, 25 111. 21.

Many other examples of such customs might be given. They

are distinguishable from a usage, such as concerns us here.

Where a usage in a particular trade or business is known, uni-

form, reasonable, and not contrary to law, or opposed to public

policy, evidence of such usage may be considered in ascertain-

ing the otherwise uncertain meaning of a contract, unless the

proof of such usage contradicts the express terms of the agree-

ment. This is so even though the usage be that of a particular

person, provided it be known to the parties concerned,

or provided it has been so long continued, or has become

so generally known and notorious in the place or neighborhood,
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as to justify the presumption that it must have been known to

the parties. Carter v. Philadelphia Coal Co., 77 Penn. St. 286;

Townsend v. Whitby, 5 Harr. (Del.) 55; McMasters v. Penn-

sylvania R. Co., 69 Penn, St. 374, 8 Am, Rep. 264; Lawson

Usages, 40.

Parties who are engaged in a particular trade or business, or

persons accustomed to deal with those engaged in a particular

business, may be presumed to have knowledge of the uniform

course of such business. Its usages may therefore in the absence

of an agreement to the contrary, reasonably be supposed to have

entered into and formed part of their contracts and understand-

ings in relation to such business, as ordinary incidents thereto.

East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Johnston, 75 Ala. 596, 51 Am,

Rep, 489 ; ]\Iooney v. Howard Ins, Co., 138 Mass. 375 ; 52 Am.

Rep. 277; Florence Machine Co. v, Dagget, 135 Mass. 582; Fit-

zimmons v. Academy, etc., 81 Mo, 37 ; Cooper v. Kane, 19 Wend,

386, 32 Am. Dec. 512; Kelton v, Taylor, 11 Lea, 264, 47 Am,

Rep. 284; 7 Cent. L. J. 383.

Thus where it was the uniform usage of a firm to extend a

definite credit, on the sale of goods, it was held competent, in

order to avoid the statute of limitations, to prove such usage,

and that the purchaser knew it. Hursh v. North, supra. So

in Walls v, Bailey, supra, it was held competent to show the

usage of plasterers in a particular place, in order to determine

the method of measuring plastering done under a contract which

stipulated that a certain price per yard should be paid. See also

Lowe v. Lerman, 15 Ohio St, 179 ; Hinton v, Locke, 5 Hill, 437 ;
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Barton v. McKelway, 2 Zab. (22 N. J.) 165; Ford v. Tirrell, 9

Gray, 401, 69 Am. Dec. 297.

In like manner it is competent to prove that the words in

which a contract is expressed, as respects the particular trade

or business to which it refers, are used in a peculiar sense, and

different from their ordinary import. Jaqua v. Witham, etc.,

Co., 106 Ind. 545 7 N. E. R. 314; Spartali v. Benecke, 10 C.

B. 212.

The evidence, the admission of which is complained of, was

not admitted for the purpose of showing a custom in the tech-

nical sense, but to show the general course and usage of the

business, as it was conducted by Henderson, Parks & Co. and

others, so as to authorize the presumption, in the absence of a

special contract, that the transaction in question was accord-

ing to the usual course of the business to which it referred.

There was evidence tending to show that the defendant had

knowledge of the usage in question, that he had dealt with the

firm of Henderson, Parks & Co., in respect to packing and
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slaughtering hogs before. It was also shown that the usage was

reasonable, and that it had been adopted generally by packing

houses, as the only practical method of conducting the business.

Wliere the only practical method of conducting a business,

such as receiving and storing wheat, and other articles of com-

merce, is to render to each bailor the amount of goods stored,

in kind and quality, it is not a conversion of the goods bailed,

if the bailee treat them according to the known and usual method

of conducting such business. To constitute a conversion, the

bailee's dealing with the property must have been wholly incon-

sistent with the contract under which he had the limited in-

terest. Rice V. Nixon, 97 Ind. 97, 49 Am. Rep. 430; Preston

v. Witherspoon, 109 Ind. 457, 9 N. E. R. 585 ; Pollock Torts, 296.

It was competent therefore in the absence of an agreement to

the contrary, to show that according to the course of business at

their pork-house, Henderson, Parks & Co. did not keep the prod-

uct of each customer's hogs separate, but that they accounted

in kind, quantity and quality to each, according to known, reas-

onable and recognized rules.

The other evidence in respect to the usage, in pursuance of

which certain offal was retained as compensation, was also prop-

erly admitted.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
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f^49. SHAW V. EAILROAD CO.,

101 XJ. 8. 557. 1879.

Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

This is an action of replevin brought by the Merchants' Na-

tional Bank of St. Louis, Missouri, against Shaw & Esrey, of

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to recover possession of certain cot-

ton, marked "W D I." One hundred and forty-one bales

thereof having been taken possession of by the marshal were

returned to the defendants upon their entering into the proper

bond. On Nov. 11, 1874, Norvell & Co., of St. Louis, sold to

the bank their draft for $11,947.43 on M. Kuhn & Brother, of

Philadelphia, and, as collateral security for the payment thereof

indorsed in blank and delivered to the bank an original bill of

lading for one hundred and seventy bales of cotton that day

shipped to the last-named city. The duplicate bill of lading

was on the same day forwarded to Kuhn & Brother by Norvell

& Co. The Merchants' Bank forwarded the draft, with the bill
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of lading thereto attached, to the Bank of North America. On

November 14, the last-named bank sent the draft — the original

bill of lading still being attached thereto — to Kuhn & Brother

by its messenger for acceptance. The messenger presented the

draft and bill to one of the members of that firm, who accepted

the former, but, without being detected, substituted the dupli-

cate for the original bill of lading.

On the day upon which this transaction occurred, Kuhn &

Brother indorsed the original bill of lading to Miller & Brother,

and received thereon an advance of $8,500. Within a few days

afterwards, the cotton, or rather that portion of it which is

in controversy, was, through the agency of a broker, sold by

sample with the approval of Kuhn & Brother to the defendants,

who were manufacturers at Chester, Pennsylvania. The bill

of lading, having been deposited on the same day with the

North Pennsylvania Railroad Company, at whose depot the

cotton was expected to arrive, it was on its arrival delivered to

the defendants.

The fact that the Bank of North America held the duplicate

instead of the original bill of lading was discovered for the first

time on the 9th of December, by the president of the plaintiff,

who had gone to Philadelphia in consequence of the failure of

Kuhn & Brother and the protest of the draft. Judgment for

plaintiff.
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Strong, J. The defendants below, now plaintiffs in error,

bought the cotton from Miller & Brother by sample, through a

cotton broker. No bill of lading or other written evidence of

title in their vendors was exhibited to them. Hence, they can

have no other or better title than their vendors had.

The inquiry, therefore, is, what title had Miller & Brother as

against the bank, which confessedly was the owner, and which

is still the owner, unless it has lost its ownership by the fraud-

ulent act of Kuhn & Brother. The cotton was represented by

the bill of lading given to Norvell & Co., at St. Louis, and by

them indorsed to the bank, to secure the payment of an ac-

companying discounted time-draft. That indorsement vested

in the bank the title to the cotton, as well as to the contract.

While it there continued, and during the transit of the cotton

from S. Louis to Philadelphia, the endorsed bill of lading was

stolen by one of the firm of Kuhn & Brother, and by them

indorsed over to Lliller & Brother, for an advance of $8,500.

The jury has found, however, that there was no negligence of
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the bank, or of its agents, in parting with possession of the bill

of lading, and that Miller & Brother knew facts from which

they had reason to believe it was held to secure the payment of

an outstanding draft; in other words, that Kuhn & Brother

were not the lawful owners of it, and had no right to dispose

of it.

It is therefore to be determined whether Miller & Brother,

by taking the bill of lading from Kuhn & Brother under these

circumstances, acquired thereby a good title to the cotton as

against the bank.

In considering this question, it does not appear to us necessary

to inquire whether the effect of the bill of lading in the hands

of Miller & Brother is to be determined by the law of Missouri,

where the bill was given, or by the law of Pennsylvania, where

the cotton was delivered. The statutes of both States enact

that bills of lading shall be negotiable by indorsement and deliv-

ery. The statute of Pennsylvania declares simply, they "shall

be negotiable and may be transferred by indorsement and deliv-

ery;" while that of Missouri enacts that "they shall be negoti-

able by written indorsement thereon and delivery, in the same

manner as bills of exchange and promissory notes." There is

no material difference between these provisions. Both statutes

prescribe the manner of negotiation; i. e., by indorsement and

delivery. Neither undertakes to define the effect of such a

transfer.

We must, therefore, look outside of the statutes to learn what

they mean by declaring such instruments negotiable. What
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is negotiability? It is a technical term derived from the usage

of merchants and bankers, in transferring, primarily, bills of

exchange and, afterwards, promissory notes. At common law-

no contract was assignable, so as to give to an assignee a right

to enforce it by suit in his own name. To this rule bills of

exchange and promissory notes, payable to order or bearer, have

been admitted exceptions, made such by the adoption of the

law merchant. They may be transferred by indorsement and

delivery, and such a transfer is called negotiation. It is a

mercantile business transaction, and the capability of being thus

transferred, so as to give to the indorsee a right to sue on the

contract in his own name, is what constitutes negotiability. The

term "negotiable" expresses, at least primarily, this mode and

effect of a transfer.

In regard to bills and notes, certain other consequences gen-

erally, though not always, follow. Such as a liability of the

indorser, if demand be duly made of the acceptor or maker,

and seasonable notice of his default be given. So if the indorse-
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pient- be made for value to a bona fide holder, before the matu-

rity of the bill or note, in due course pf. business,, the maker

or acceptor cannot set up against the indorsee any defense which

might have been set up against the payee, had the bill or note re-

mained in his hands.

So, also, if a note or bill of exchange be indorsed in blank, if

payable to order, or if it be payable to bearer, and therefore

negotiable by delivery alone, and then be lost or stolen, a bona

fide purchaser for value paid acquires title to it, even as against

the true owner. This is an exception from the ordinary rule

respecting personal property. But none of these consequences

are necessary attendants or constituents of negotiability, or

negotiation. That may exist without them. A bill or note

past due is negotiable, if it be payable to order, or bearer, but

its indorsement or delivery does not cut off the defences of the

maker or acceptor against it, nor create such a contract as re-

sults from an indorsement before maturity, and it does not give

to the purchaser of a lost or stolen bill the right of the real

owner.

It does not necessarily follow, therefore, that because a statute

has made bills of lading negotiable by indorsement and delivery,

all these consequences of an indorsement and delivery of bills

and notes before maturity ensue or are intended to result from

such negotiation.

Bills of exchange and promissory notes are exceptional in

their character. They are representatives of money, circulating

in the commercial world as evidence of money, "of which any
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person in lawful possession may avail himself to pay debts or

make purchases or make remittances of money from one country

to another, or to remote places in the same country. Hence, as

said by Story, J., it has become a general rule of thp commer-

cial world to hold bills of exchange, as in some sort, sacred

instrument in favor of bona fide holders for a valuable consider-

ation without notice." Without such a holding they could not

perform their peculiar functions. It is for this reason it is held

that if a bill or note, endorsed in blank or payable to bearer,

be lost or stolen, and be purchased from the finder or thief,

without any knowledge of want of ownership in the vendor, the

bona fide purchaser may hold it against the true owner. He

may hold it though he took it negligently, and when there were

suspicious circumstances attending the transfer. Nothing short

of actual or constructive notice that the instrument is not the

property of the i)erson who offers to sell it; that is, nothing_

short of mala fides will defeat his right. The rule is the same

as that which protects the bona fide indorser of a bill or note
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purchased for value from the true owner. The purchaser is not

bound to look beyond the instrument. Goodman v. Harvey, 4

Ad. & E. 870; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343; Murray v.

Lardner, 2 Wall. 110; Matthews v. Poythress, 4 Ga. 287. The

rule was first applied to the case of a lost bank-note (Miller v.

Kace, 1 Burr. 452), and put upon the ground that the interests

of trade, the usual course of business, and the fact that bank-

notes pass from hand to hand as coin, require it. It was subse-

quently held applicable to merchants' drafts, and in Peacock

V. Rhodes (2 Doug. 633) to bills and notes as coming within

the same reason.

The reason can have no application to the case of a lost or

stolen bill of lading. The function of that instrument is en-

tirely different from that of a bill or note. It is not a repre-

sentative of money, used for transmission of money, or for the

payment of debts or for purchases. It does not pass from hand

to hand as bank-notes or coin. It is a contract for the perform-

ance of a certain duty. True, it is a symbol of ownership of the

goods covered by it, — a representative of those goods. But if the

goods themselves be lost or stolen, no sale of them by the finder

or thief, though to a bojia fide purchaser for value, will divest

the ownership of the person who lost them. Or from whom they

were stolen. Why then should the sale of the symbol or mere

representative of the goods have such an effect? It may be

that the true owner by his negligence or carelessness may have

put it in the power of a finder or thief to occupy ostensibly the

position of a true owner, and his carelessness may estop him
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from asserting his right against a purchaser who has been mis-

led to his hurt by that carelessness. But the present is no

such case. It is established by the verdict of the jury that the

bank did not lose its possession of the bill of lading negligently.

There is no estoppel, therefore, against the bank's right.

Bills of lading are regarded as so much cotton, grain, iron,

or other articles of merchandise. The merchandise is very

often sold or pledged by the transfer of the bills which cover

it. They are, in commerce, a very different thing from bills of

exchange and promissory notes, answering a different purpose

and performing different functions. It cannot be, therefore,

that the statute which made them negotiable by indorsement

and delivery, or negotiable in the same manner as bills of ex-

change and promissory notes are negotiable, intended to change

totally their character, put them in all respects on the footing

of instruments which are the representatives of money, and

charge the negotiation of them with all the consequences which

usually attend or follow the negotiation of bills and notes.
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Some of these consequences would be very strange if not im-

possible. Such as the liability of indorsers, the duty of demand

ad diem, notice of non-delivery by the carrier, &c., or the loss

of the owner 's property by the fraudulent assignment of a thief.

If these were intended, surely the statute would have said

something more than merely make them negotiable by indorse-

ment. No statute is to be construed as altering the common

law, farther than its words import. It is not to be construed

as making any innovation upon the common law which it does

not fairly express. Especially is so great an innovation as

would be placing bills of lading on the same footing in all

respects with bills of exchange not to be inferred from words

that can be fully satisfied without it. The law has most care-

fully protected the ownership of personal property, other than

money, against misappropriation by others than the owner, even

when it is out of his possession. This protection would be

largely withdrawn if the misappropriation of its symbol or

representative could avail to defeat the ownership, even when

the person who claims under a misappropriation had reason

to believe that the person from whom he took the property had

no right to it.

We think, therefore, that the rule asserted in Goodman v.

Harvey, Goodman v. Simonds, Murray v. Lardner (supra), and

in Phelan v. Moss (67 Pa. St. 59, 5 Am. R. 402), is not applica-

ble to a stolen bill of lading. At least the purchaser of such a

bill, with reason to believe that his vendor was not the owner of

the bill, or that it was held to secure the payment of an outstand.
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ing draft, is not a bona fide purchaser, and he is not entitled to

hold the merchandise covered by the bill against its true owner.

In th present case there was more than mere negligence on

the part of Miller & Brother, more than mere reason for sus-

picion. There was reason to believe Kuhn & Brother had no

right to negotiate the bill. This falls very little, if any, short

of knowledge. It may fairly be assumed that one who has

reason to believe a fact exists, knows it exists. Certainly, if

he be a reasonable being.

(Omitting some minor considerations.) Judgment affirmed.
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PART m

OF EXTRAORDINARY BAILMENTS

CHAPTER IX.

OF ESTNS AND INNKEEPERS.

N^50. KISTEN V. HILDEBRAND.

9 B. Monroe (Ky.) 72; 48 Am. D. 416. 1848.

Case, against defendant as an innkeeper. Verdict for plain-

tiff. Error sued out by defendant.

By Court, Marshall, C. J. This action on the case was

brought to recover from Kisten, as an innkeeper, a large sum

of money alleged to have been taken, through the default and

negligence of the defendant, his servants, etc., from the trunk of

the plaintiff, in the inn of the defendant, he, the plaintiff, be-

ing then a guest therein. The form of proceeding against inn-

keepers in England, upon the custom of the realm, seems to have

been substantially pursued. The declaration sets out as the

foundation of the action, that "by the custom and law of this

commonwealth, innkeepers who keep common inns for enter-

taining men traveling through those parts where those inns are,
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and in the same abiding their goods and chattels and money,

within those inns being, are bound to keep, day and night,

without diminution or loss, so that through the default of the said

innkeepers, or their servants, damage to such guests might not,

in any manner, happen," etc., and alleges that through the de-

fault of the defendant and his servants, the money was taken

and carried away by certain malefactors. A demurrer to the

declaration was overruled, and a trial being had on the plea of

not guilty, filed with the demurrer, a verdict for three hundred

dollars was found against the defendant, who prosecutes this

writ of error for the reversal of the judgment rendered upon it.

As the custom of the realm of England, with regard to inns

and innkeepers, and the liability of the latter, was a general

custom, and therefore, a part of the common law, we assume
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that so far as it is applicable and not inconsistent with our own

local laws and usages, it is also a part of the common law of this

state. Under this assumption we are of opinion that taking

into view the preamble to the declaration, in which the defend-

ant is charged to be an innkeeper, a cause of action under the

law set forth, is substantially shown. The demurrer to the dec-

laration was, therefore, properly overruled — and we only remark

further, that it is no more necessary in this than in other cases,

to set out the law of the land on which the action is founded.

The law with regard to the liability of innkeepers being one of

extreme rigor, it is essential to the safety of all persons who may

be engaged in the business of entertaining others in their houses

for reward, that the extent of its application should be clearly

defined, and that it should not be carried beyond its proper

limits. An innkeeper is prima facie liable for all losses which

happen to the goods of his guests in his inn, all such being

attributed to him on the ground of public policy, and the con-

fidence necessarily reposed in him, and on account of thii-^iffi-
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culty of proving actual negligence. But he is not liable if the

loss be occasioned by external force or robbery — or if it be

attributable to the neglect of the guest, or to the act of his

servant or companion. This being the extent of his liability to

his guests, it is important to determine who is an innkeeper,

and who may claim the benefit of this liability.

It was laid down in Calye's Case, 8 Co. 32, that common inns

were instituted for passengers and wayfaring men. And we

think it will be found that the great liability imposed upon

them, is for the benefit of travelers and transient persons, who

are often compelled to resort to inns for shelter and entertain-

ment, without the means of knowing the character of the host;

and without the opportunity of securing themselves, against

loss or damage to their goods. A common innkeeper is defined

to be " a person who makes it his business to entertain travelers-

and passengers, and provide lodging and necessaries for them, ^

and their horses, and attendants:" Bacon's Abr., Inns and Inn-

keepers, B; Story on Bail., sec. 475. But it has been decided

that a man may be an innkeeper, and liable as such, though he

have no provision for horses. It is not necessary that he should

have a sign indicating that he is an innkeeper, but it must be

his business to entertain travelers and passengers. His duty

extends chiefly to the entertaining and harboring of travelers,

etc., and therefore, if one who keeps a common inn refuses to

receive a traveler, or to find him in victuals, etc., for a reason-

able price (v/ithout good excuse, as that his house is full), he is

liable not only to a civil action, but to an indictment. For hav-
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ing taken upon himself a public employment, he must serve the

public to the extent of that employment: Bacon's Abr., Inns

and Innkeepers, c. 1.

One who lodges and entertains strangers at a watering place,

who come to drink the waters, if he entertain no others, is not

thereby an innkeeper: Bacon's Abr., Inns and Innkeepers, B.

So the keeper of a coffee-house, or a boarding-house, is not as such

an innkeeper: Story on Bail., sec. 475. It must be a house kept

open publicly for the lodging and entertainment of travelers in

general for a reasonable compensation : 2 Kent's Com. 595. And

although the house be an inn, and the keeper an innkeeper, it

does not follow that he is under the same liability to all persons

who may be staying at the inn with their goods. The length of

time that a man stays at an inn does not make the difference,

"though he stays a week, or a month or more, so always though

not strictly transeuns, he retains his character as a traveler:"

Story on Bail., sec. 177; Bacon's Abr., Inns and Innkeepers, c. 5.

"But if a person comes upon a special contract to board and
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sojourn at the inn, he is not in the sense of the law a guest, but

a boarder:" Same authorities.

We greatly doubt whether the evidence in this case is suffi-

cient to authorize the conclusion that the defendant was an inn-

keeper, or that professedly, or in point of fact, he had assumed

the business of receiving and entertaining the traveling public

generally, or that his character or business or employment was

such as to preclude him from refusing to receive and entertain

any person at his own pleasure, or to render him liable either

to an action or an indictment for such refusal, as the keeper of

a common inn may have inmates of his house for a reward, to

whom he may not be under the strict liability of an innkeeper;

so may the keeper of a boarding-house occasionally entertain

transient persons without acquiring the character, or being

under the responsibilities of an innkeeper. And certainly a man

professing to be the keeper of a boarding-house, or a licensed

coffee-house, is not, though he also entertain travelers, liable

to his boarders as an innkeeper is liable to his traveling guests.

Conceding then, that the evidence authorized the jury to find

that the defendant was an innkeeper, because he occasionally

entertained travelers, it is also certain that his professed and

ordinary business was that of the keeper of a coffee-house and

boarding-house. And although the evidence is not very explicit

with regard to the character in which the plaintiff was an inmate

of the house, we think it was sufficient to authorize the jury to

infer that he was there as a boarder, and not as a traveler or

temporary trader. And as the instructions of the court sub-
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mitted to the jury as the decisive question, the single inquiry

whether the defendant was an innkeeper or not, and sustained,

or rather required a verdict against him if he was so found to

be, we think it was erroneous in withdrawing from the jury the

question whether the plaintiff was a guest entitled to the benefit

of the extreme liability imposed upon an innkeeper in favor of

travelers, or whether he was a mere boarder.

The instructions also assume that the plaintiff's money was

taken in defendant's house, which should have been left to the

jury, although this assumption is perhaps sufficiently authorized

by the evidence, and would not be deemed a ground of reversal.

We are also of opinon that the definition of an innkeeper, given

to the jury, though correct, should have been more explicit;

and that, as the court told the jury, that the calling of a house

a coffee-house or a boarding-house, did not change the liability

of the defendant if he was an innkeeper, they should also have

been told, that the occasional entertainment of travelers did not

make a boarding-house or a coffee-house, a common inn, and
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that if the plaintiff w^as a boarder and not a traveler, he could

not recover upon the general liability of an innkeeper. The

court having undertaken, on its own motion, to state the law to

the jury, should have stated the law as applicable to the whole

ease, leaving to them the decision of all questions of fact arising

on the evidence. And as the court had not stated the liability

of an innn-keeper, we think the incorrect statement of the plain-

tiff's counsel, in his concluding argument to the jury, should

have been corrected at the request of the defendant's counsel.

Wherefore the judgment is reversed, and the case remanded

for a new trial in conformity with this opinion.

51. MOWERS V. FETHERS,

61 N. Y. 34; 19 Am. B. 244. 1874.

Action for value of a stallion, harness and wagon, destroyed

by fire while in the barn of an innkeeper. The owner of the

stallion contracted for a stall in defendant's barn, feed for the

horse and board for himself on certain days each week. The

horse stood at the barn on these days to serve such mares as

might be brought. On a charge that the relation of innkeeper

and guest was established the court below directed a verdict

for plaintiff, which was affirmed at the General Term. Defend-

ant appealed.

Reynolds, C. An innkeeper at common law has been said
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to be the keeper of a common inn for the lodging and enter-

tainment of travelers and passengers, their horses and attend-

ants, for a reasonable compensation. 5 Bacon's Abr., Inns, etc.,

228; Story on Bailments, § 475. The person or persons un-

dertaking this public employment were bound to take in and

receive all travelers and wayfaring persons, and to entertain

them for a reasonable compensation, if by any possibility they

could be accommodated, and the innkeeper was bound to guard

the goods of his guests with proper diligence. 5 Term R. 274;

2 Barn. & Ad. 285; 1 Carr. & K. 404; 7 Carr. & P. 213; 4 Exch.

367. The common-law rule has been generally followed by the

courts in this country save so far as it has been modified by

statute. The duties, rights and responbilities of an innkeeper

are in most respects kindred to those of a common carrier, but

in order to enforce the strict common-law liability of an inn-

keeper, the technical relation of guest and innkeeper must be

established, and the question is, whether it existed in the present

case. I think it did not, for reasons now to be suggested.
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It seems to be apparent from the nature of the duties and

obligations of the keeper of a common or public inn, that he is

not, in his capacity of innkeeper, bound to receive or furnish

accommodations for persons desirous of exposing their com-

modities for sale, or bound to permit his establishment to be

made a depot for the propagation of horses.

He is doubtless bound to receive and entertain a strolling

pedler, and securely guard his pack of trinkets if brought

infra hospitium, so long as he remains a mere guest. So, also,

would he be bound to receive and entertain a wayfarer, incum-

bered with a stallion, but under no obligation as an innkeeper

to allow his curtilage to be turned into an asylum for the breed-

ing of horses. It is very manifest in this case that the sojourn

of. the plaintiff Eggner, with the horse, at the defendant's inn,

was not that of an ordinary traveler. The purpose and object

was entirely different, and the defendant, as an innkeeper, was

under no common-law obligation to receive and entertain the

plaintiff Eggner and his horse for such a purpose, and where

he is not bound to receive and entertain the person as his guest,

the strict rule of common-law liability for the preservation of

his property does not obtain. The obligation to respond for

injury to property depends upon his duty to receive and enter-

tain as an innkeeper, and they must stand or fall together. Grin-

nell V. Cook, 3 Hill, 485, 38 Am. D. 663 ; Ingalsbee v. Wood, 36

Barb. 455, 33 N. Y. 577, 88 Am. D. 409 ; Hulett v. Swift, id.

571, 88 Am. D. 405. The arrangement by which the plaintiff

Eggner, with his horse, occupied the premises of the defendant
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two days in each week, was made beforehand, and was to con-

tinue during the season, for serving mares that should be brought

to the inclosure. The stall that the horse was to occupy was

selected, and some other conveniences incident to the business

to be carried on were also provided for. The plaintiff Eggner

was himself to groom and take care of the horse, and when

occupying the stall selected for his accommodation he had it

under a lock and key of his own. The price of oats for the

horse and of meals for Eggner was fixed at prices less than

charged ordinary travelers. Under this condition of facts it

appears obvious that Eggner did not come for entertainment

at the defendant's inn as an ordinary wayfarer, but_under

a special arrangement previously made. In such case the utmost

limits of the defendant's liability was that of an ordinary bailee

for hire.

The case of "Washburn v. Jones, 14 Barb. 193, has no analogy

to this. There the defendant was made liable for negligence

in fact in the construction of the stall, by reason of which the
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horse received the injury, and that liability would follow if he

was to be regarded merely as an ordinary bailee.

In the case at bar, I think, there should be a new trial.

LoTT, Ch. C, and Gray, C, concur.

Earl and Dwight, CC, dissent.

Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered.

^^52. FAY V. PACIFIC IMPROVEMENT CO.,

93 Cal. 253; 26 Pac. R. 1099; 28 Pac. R. 943; 27 Am. St. R. 198.

1892.

Action against an innkeeper for damages to jewelry by fire.

The Court. Upon further consideration of this cause, after

hearing in Bank, we are satisfied with the conclusion reached

in Department, and with the opinion there rendered, and for

the reasons stated in said opinion the judgment and order ap-

pealed from are affirmed.

The following is the opinion of Department Two, above re-

ferred to, rendered on the 23d of June, 1891 : —

De Haven, J. The plaintiff recovered judgment against

the defendant for damages occasioned by the loss of her jew-

elry, wearing apparel, and other articles of personal property

needed for her personal use, consumed by fire at the burning

of the Hotel Del Monte, April 1, 1887, of which the defendant

was at that time the proprietor.
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The court below found that the Hotel Del Monte was, at the

date named, a public inn, and that plaintiff was a guest therein.

On this appeal the defendant claims that the evidence does

not sustain these findings; and also that the burning of the

hotel was an irresistible superhuman cause, for which it is not

liable, and that it is not, in any event, liable for plaintiff's dia-

monds and other jewelry, because not deposited in defendant's

safe.

1. An inn is a house which is held out to the public as a

place where all transient persons who come will be received

and entertained as guests for compensation, — a hotel. In Win-

termute v. Clark, 5 Sand. 247, an inn is defined as a public

house of entertainment for all who choose to visit it, and this

definition was quoted with approval by this court in Pinker-

ton V. Woodward, 33 Cal. 596; 91 Am. Dec. 657. The fact

that the house is open for the public, that those who patronize

it come to it upon the invitation which is extended to the gen-

eral public, and without any previous agreement for accommo-
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dation or agreement as to the duration of their stay, marks the

important distinction between a hotel or inn and a boarding-

house. This difference is thus stated in Schouler on Bailments :

"An inn is a house where a keeper holds himself out as ready

to receive all who may choose to resort thither and pay an ade-

quite price for the entertainment; while the keeper of a board-

ing-house reserves the choice of comers and the terms of ac-

commodation, contracting specially with each customer, and

most commonly arranging for long periods and a definite abode" :

Schouler on Bailments, 253.

We think the evidence in this case is full and complete to

the point that the Hotel Del Monte was a public inn. It not

only had a name indicating its character as such, but it was

also shown that it was open to all persons who have a right to

demand entertainment at a public house; that it solicited pub-

lic patronage by advertising and in the distribution of its busi-

ness cards, and kept a public register in which its guests entered

their names upon arrival and before they were assigned rooms;

that the hotel, at its own expense, ran a coach to the railroad

station for the purpose of conveying its patrons to and from

the hotel ; that it had its manager, clerks, waiters, and in its in-

terior management all the ordinary arrangements and appear-

ances of a hotel, and the prices charged were for board and

lodging. These facts were certainly sufficient to justify the

court in finding, as it did, that the appellant was an innkeeper:

Krohn v. Sweeny, 2 Daly, 200. Nor was the force of this evi-

dence in any wise modified by the fact that the hotel was not
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immediately upon a highway, or that the grounds upon which

it stood were inclosed and the gates closed at night. The loca-

tion of the hotel, the extent of the grounds surrounding it, and

the manner in which these grounds were improved, and reserved

for the exclusive use and enjo>Tnent of those who patronized it,

doubtless made the hotel more attractive to those who chose to

make a transient resort of it, but did not convert it into a mere

boarding-house. A hotel is none the less one because in some

respects it may be conducted differently or have more attractions

than other public hotels, so long as it is held out to the public

as a place for the entertainment of all transient persons who may

have occasion to patronize it.

"Modes of entertainment alter with the fashion of the age,

and to preserve a clear definition is not easy. It is not way-

farers alone, or travelers from a distance, that at the present

day give character to an inn, the point being rather that people

resort to the house habitually, no matter whence coming or

whither going, as for transient lodging and entertainment":
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Schouler on Bailments, 249.

2. The evidence shows that the plaintiff was a guest, and not

a boarder. The fact that upon her arrival, and before being

assigned to her room, she ascertained what she would have to

pay for the room and board is not sufficient of itself to show

that she was not received as a guest : Pinkerton v. Woodward,

33 Cal. 597 ; 91 Am. Dec. 657 ; Hancock v. Rand, 94 N. Y. 1 ;

46 Am. Rep. 112 ; Jalie v. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118 ; Hall v. Pike,

100 IMass. 495 ; Berkshire Woolen Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush. 417.

The Del Monte being a public hotel, in the absence of evidence

showing that plaintiff went there as a boarder, the presumption

would be that she went there as a guest : Hall v. Pike, 100 Mass.

495. Not only does the evidence fail to overthrow this pre-

sumption, but the testimony of the plaintiff shows that she was

there as a mere temporary sojourner, without any agreement as to

the time she should stay, and with only the intention on her

part of resting a week or two, and then proceeding to the East.

She obtained no reduction of price in consideration of an agree-

ment to remain a definite time, or as a boarder; nor was there

anything said from which it could be inferred that there was

any understanding between her and the defendant that she was

to be received as a boarder, and not as a guest.

3. Under section 1859 of the Civil Code, an innkeeper is liable

for the loss of personal property placed by his guests under

his care, ' ' unless occasioned by an irresistible superhuman cause,

by a public enemy, by the negligence of the owner, or by the

act of some one whom he brought into the inn."
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In this case, the loss was occasioned by the burning of the

hotel, and the origin of the fire is not shown, further than that

it broke out in one of the rooms in which there was nothing

except the batteries which supplied the bells with electricity.

Under this state of facts, the defendant is liable: Hulett v.

Swift, 33 N. Y. 571; 88 Am. Dec. 405. A fire thus occurring

cannot be considered an ' ' irresistible superhuman cause, ' ' within

the meaning of section 1859 of the Civil Code. The words "irre-

sistible superhuman cause" are equivalent in meaning to the

phrase "the act of God," and refer to those natural causes

the effects of which cannot be prevented by the exercise of pru-

dence, diligence, and care, and the use of those appliances which

the situation of the party renders it reasonable that he should

employ: 1 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 174. A loss arising

from an accidental fire is not caused by the act of God, unless

the fire was started by lightning or some superhuman agency:

Miller v. Steam Nav. Co., 10 N. Y.- 431 ; Chicago etc. R. R. Co.

V. Sawyer, 69 111. 285 ; 18 Am. Rep. 613.
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4, The court finds that the property lost was such as was

needed for the present personal use of the plaintiff. We can-

not say that the evidence does not support this finding. It

certainly cannot be said that jewelry worn by a woman daily

must, when not actually upon her person, be deposited with

the innkeeper, in order to make him responsible for its loss in

the inn. If worn daily, it does not cease to be needed for

present personal use when its possessor lays it aside upon re-

tiring for the night. Nor is it necessary, in order to render the

innkeeper liable, that the property should have been delivered

into his exclusive personal possession.

"The guest may retain personal custody of his goods within

the inn, — as of his trunk and its contents, his wearing ap-

parel, and other articles in his room, and any jewelry or valuables

carried or worn around his person, — without discharging the

innkeeper from responsibility"; Jalie v. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 126.

We have examined the other points made by appellant, but

do not think they call for special discussion.

The rule which makes an innkeeper liable for the value of the

property of his guest, in case of its loss by fire, may at first

thought be deemed a harsh one ; but the loss must fall somewhere,

and section 1859 of the Civil Code provides upon whom it should

properly fall, and the innkeeper's liability in this respect is

one of the burdens pertaining to the business in which he is

engaged, and in view of which it must be supposed that he regu-

lates his charges.

Judgment and order affirmed.

12 177
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53. PULLMAN PALACE CAR CO. V. SMITH,

73 111. 360; 24 Am. B. 258. 1874.

Smith bought of defendant car company a sleeping car ticket

from Chicago to St. Louis. During the trip $1,180 was stolen

from his pocket. The court below instructed the jury that, if

they found that plaintiff while sleeping in defendant's car on

the trip was robbed as charged, they should find a verdict for

him in such sum as they considered an ordinary and reasonable

sum for a traveler to carry, for traveling purposes only, upon

such a journey, with interest at six per cent for fourteen mouths.

Verdict of $277 for plaintiff.

Sheldon, J. The instruction which the court gave to the jury

made the company responsible as insurer for the safety of the

money, imposing upon it the severe liability of an innkeeper or

common carrier. And it is the position which appellee's counsel

take, that the relation between the parties in this case was that of

innkeeper and guest, and that the liability of the company is that

of an innkeeper.
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In order to ascertain whether the extraordinary responsibility

claimed here exists, it becomes important to inquire into the

nature of inns and guests, where this liability was imposed by the

common law, and see whether the description of the same prop-

erty applies here.

Kent, in defining an inn, says : ' ' It must a be house kept open

publicly for the lodging and entertainment of travelers in gen-

eral, for reasonable consideration. If a person lets lodgings

only, and upon a previous contract with every person who comes,

and does not afford entertainment for the public at large, indis-

criminately, it is not a common inn. ' ' 2 Kent 's Com. 595. This

is substantially the same definition as is given in all the books

upon the subject.

But the keeper of a mere coffee-house, or private boarding or

lodging-house, is not an innkeeper, in the sense of the law. Id.

596; Dansey v. Richardson, 3 Ellis & B. 144; E. C. L. vol. 77;

Holder v. Soulby, 98 E. C. L. 254; Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B.

Monr. 72, 48 Am. D. 416. It must be a common inn, that is, an

inn kept for travelers generally, and not merely for a short

season of the year, and for select persons who are lodgers. Story

on Bailm. § 475, and cases cited in note. The duty of innkeep-

ers extends chiefly to the entertaining and harboring of travelers,

finding them victuals and lodgings, and securing the goods and

effects of their guests; and, therefore, if one who keeps a com-
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mon inn refuses either to receive a traveler as a guest into his

house, or to find him victuals and lodging, upon his tendering

him a reasonable price for the same, he is not only liable to

render damages for the injury in an action on the case, at the

suit of the party grieved, but also may be indicted and fined at

the suit of the king. 3 Bac. Abr., Inns and Innkeepers, C. The

custody of the goods of his guest is part and parcel of the inn-

keeper's contract to feed, lodge and accommodate the guest for

a suitable reward. 2 Kent's Com. 592.

From the authorities already cited, it is manifest that this

Pullman palace car falls quite short of filling the character of

a common inn, and the Pullman Palace Car Company, that of an

innkeeper.

It does not, like the innkeeper, undertake to accommodate the

traveling public, indiscriminately, with lodging and entertain-

ment. It only undertakes to accommodate a certain class, those

who have already paid their fare and are provided with a first-

clas's ticket, entitling them to ride to a particular place.
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It does not undertake to furnish victuals and lodging, but

lodging alone, as we understand. There is a dining ear attached

to the train, as shown, but not owned by the Pullman company,

nor run by them. It belongs to another company, the Chicago

and Alton Dining Car Association. Appellant, as we under-

stand, furnishes no accommodation whatever, save the use of the

berth and bed, and a place and conveniences for toilet purposes.

We would not have it implied, however, that even were these

eating accommodations furnished by appellant, it would vary

our decision ; but the not furnishing entertainment is a lack of

one of the features of an inn.

The innkeeper is obliged to receive and care for all the goods

and property of the traveler which he may choose to take with

him upon the journey. Appellant does not receive pay for, nor

undertake to care for, any property or goods whatever, and

notoriously refuses to do so. The custody of the goods of the

traveler is not, as in the case of the innkeeper, accessory to

the principal contract to feed, lodge and accommodate the guest

for a suitable reward, because no such contract is made.

The same necessity does not exist here, as in the case of a

common inn. At the time when this custom of an innkeeper's

liability had origin, wherever the end of the day's journey of the

wayfaring man brought him, there he was obliged to stop for

the night, and intrust his goods and baggage into the custody of

the innkeeper. But here, the traveler was not compelled to ac-

cept the additional comfort of a sleeping car; he might have

remained in the ordinary ear; and there were easy methods
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within his reach by which both money and baggage could be

safely transported. On the train which bore him M^ere a baggage

and express car, and there was no necessity of imposing this

dnty and liability on appellant.

It cannot be supposed that any such measure of duty or lia-

bility attached to appellant, as is declared in the quotation cited

from Bacon's Abridgement to belong to an innkeeper. The

accommodation furnished appellee was in accordance with an

express contract entered into when he bought his berth ticket

at Chicago, which was for the use of a specified couch from

Chicago to St. Louis, and appellant did not render a service

made mandatory by law, as in the case of an innkeeper.

But if it should be deemed that, on principle merely, this

company would be required to take as much care of the goods

of a lodger, as an innkeeper of those of a guest, the same may

be said with reference to the keeper of a boarding-house, or of a

lodging-house. In Dansey v. Richardson, supra, where the inn-

keeper's liability was refused to be extended to a boarding-house
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keeper, it was said by Coleridge, J,: "The liability of the inn-

keeper, as, indeed, other incidents to his position, do not, how-

ever, stand on mere reason, but on custom, growing out of a state

of society no longer existing." In Holder v. Toulby, supra,

where it was held the law imposed no duty upon a lodging-house

keeper to take due care of the goods of a lodger, Calye's case,

8 Co. Rep. 32, was designated as fous juris upon this subject,

where it was expressly resolved, that, though an innkeeper is re-

sponsible for the safety of the goods of a guest, a lodging-house

keeper is not. And in Parker v. Flint, 12 Mod. 255, "if," says

Lord Holt, "one come to an inn and make a previous contract

for lodging for a set time, and do not eat or drink there, he is no

guest, but a lodger, and, as such, is not under the innkeeper's

protection ; but if he eat or drink there, it is otherwise, or if he

pay for his diet there, though he do not take it there."

The peculiar liability of the innkeeper is one of great rigor,

and should not be extended beyond its proper limits. We are

satisfied that there is no precedent or principle for the imposi-

tion of such a liability upon appellant.

Appellant is not liable as a carrier. It made no contract to

carry. Appellee was being carried by the railroad company;

and if appellant were a carrier, it would not be liable for the

loss in this case, because the money was not delivered into the

possession or custody of appellant, which would be essential

to its liability as carrier. Tower v. The Utica and Schenectady

Railroad Co., 7 Hill, 47, 42 Am. D. 36. In Redf. Am. Railw.

Cases, 138, it is said: "But it has never been claimed that the
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passenger carrier is responsible for the acts of pickpockets at

their stations, or upon steamboats and railway carriages."

It would be unreasonable to make the company responsible

for the loss of money which was never intrusted to its custody

at all, of which it had no information, and which the owner had

concealed upon his own person. The exposure to the hazard of

liability for losses through collusion, for pretended claims of

loss M'here there would be no means of disproof, would make

the responsibility claimed a fearful one. Appellee assumed the

exclusive custody of his money, adopted his own measures for

its safe-keeping by himself, and we think his must be the re-

sponsibility for its loss.

We hold the instruction to be erroneous, and the judgment of

the court below will be reversed, and the cause remanded.

Judgment reversed.

)C54. BLUM V. SOUTHERN PULLMAN PALACE CAR CO.,

1 Flippin (U. S. Circuit Court) 500. 1876.

Charge of the court delivered by Brown, J. —
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Gentleman of the jury: This is an action to recover of the

defendant the sum of $3,135, lost by the plaintiff while riding

upon a sleeping car owned and controlled by the defendant.

The plaintiff left Cairo, in the State of Illinois, about five

o'clock in the evening of March 28, 1873, taking the boat down

the river to Columbus, Kentucky. On the boat, he purchased

a through ticket by rail from Columbus to INIemphis, and,

shortly after midnight, entered the sleeping car of the defendant

at Humboldt, Tennessee, in which he was assigned a lower berth

in the section nearest the front end of the car. He disrobed

himself of his outer garments, placed his waistcoat, in an inside

pocket of which was a wallet containing the money in question,

under his pillow, lay down and went to sleep. The train ar-

rived at Memphis between three and four in the morning, but

the plaintiff did not rise, except for a temporary purpose here-

after explained, until about seven o'clock. Meanwhile, the

other passengers had all left the car. A conductor and porter

employed by the defendant had charge of the car, to which the

conductor and brakemen of the train also had access for the

purpose of collecting fares and regulating its movements. Prior

to entering his berth, plaintiff' paid the conductor of the car $2,

for his lodging, and at the same time handed him his through

ticket to IMemphis to be delivered to the conductor of the train.

In rising to dress himself, the plaintiff found his waistcoat and
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money were missing. The important question of law is pre-

sented as to the measure of defendant's liability.

The first count in the declaration charges defendant with the

responsibility of a common carrier, but there is no evidence to

support it, and it was virtually abandoned upon the argument.

The contract of carriage was with the railroad company. It re-

ceived the ticket of the plaintiff, offered him accommodation in

its passenger car, and was ready to receive his luggage in another

car adapted to that purpose. It drew the sleeping car of the

defendant, collected fares of its passengers, controlled its move-

ments and provided for its safety. Plaintiff's contract with the

railroad company was entirely distinct from that with the de-

fendant.

It is strenuously insisted by plaintiff's counsel, however, the

defendant should be held to the responsibility of an inn-keeper.

If the liability of an inn-keeper at common law does not extend

to all losses of his guests not caused by an act of God, the public

enemies or the negligence of the guest himself, as held by the
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older authorities, he is at least presumptively responsible for all

injuries happening to the goods of his guests entrusted to his

care, and can only exonerate himself by showing that he did

all to ensure their safety which it was in his power to do, and

that no default is attributable to his servants or guests. In re-

gard to goods stolen from his custody, without evidence to show

how, or by whom, it was done, his liability is the same as that

of a carrier. It is admitted that if the defendant is held as an

inn-keeper, it is liable for the loss of the money in question.

The plaintiff's counsel have produced no case directly in point,

nor has the defendant produced any authorities determining

definitely the scope of liability in such cases, although the Su-

preme Court of Illinois has recently decided that the responsi-

bility of a sleeping car company is not that of an inn-keeper.

The analogy is certainly a strong one between the hotel and

sleeping car. The passenger is invited to undress and go to sleep

in a bed provided for that purpose. To accept this invitation his

vigilance must be relaxed, and his clothing and purse exposed

to thieves. But the rigid responsibility of inn-keepers and car-

riers at common law was imposed in older and more troublous

times, when goods were carried in common wagons, passengers

traveled by coach, making frequent stops at houses of public

entertainment, whose proprietors frequently colluded with

thieves and highwayman to plunder their guests. While the

ancient rule is still enforced as against those classes of persons,

the tendency of modern legislation and judicial opinion has been

to limit it strictly to them. The keeper of a private boarding
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or lodging house, or of a restaurant or coffee house is not an inn-

keeper in the view of the law, notwithstanding he may furnish

lodgings or food, or both, for the entertainment of his guests.

It has also been held that the proprietor of a hotel, for summer

resort, is not an inn-keeper. Notwithstanding an inn-keeper

was responsible for the loss of the horses and carriage of his

guest, the keeper of a livery stable is liable only as bailee for

negligence. So, also, notwithstanding seeming analogies in their

positions, the liability of common carriers has not been extended

to warehousemen, wharfingers, telegraph companies or ordinary

bailees. In all these cases, except the last, the opportunities for

plunder are no less favorable than those of carriers and inn-

keepers. The liability of the inn-keeper, indeed, stands less

upon reason than upon custom growing out of a state of society

no longer existing.

There are good reasons for not extending such liability to

the proprietor df a sleeping car.

1st — The peculiar construction of sleeping cars is such as
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to render it almost impossible for the companj^ even with the

most careful watch, to protect the occupants of berths from be-

ing plundered by the occupants of adjoining sections. All the

berths open upon a common aisle, and are secured only by a

curtain, behind which a hand may be slipped from an adjoin-

ing or lower berth with scarcely a possibility of detection.

2d — As a compensation for his extraordinary liability, the

inn-keeper has a lien upon the goods of his guests for the price

of their entertainment. I know of no instance wdiere the pro-

prietor of a sleeping car has ever asserted such lien^ and it is

presumed that none such exists. The fact that he is paid in ad-

vance does not weaken the argument, as inn-keepers are also

entitled to pre-payment.

3d — The inn-keeper is obliged to receive every guest who

applies for entertainment. The sleeping car receives only first-

class passengers traveling upon that particular road, and it has

not yet been decided that it is bound to receive those.

4th — The inn-keeper is bound to furnish food as well as lodg-

ing and to receive and care for the goods of his guests, and, un-

less otherwise provided by statute, his liability is unrestricted in

amount. The sleeping car furnishes a bed only, and that, too,

usually for a single night. It furnishes no food, and receives no

luggage, in the ordinary sense of the term. The conveniences of

the toilet are simply an incident to the lodging.

5th — The conveniences of a public inn are an imperative

necessity to the traveler, who must otherwise depend upon pri-

vate hospitality for his accommodation, notoriously an uncertain
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reliance. The traveler by rail, however, is under no obligation

to take a sleeping car. The railway offers him an ordinary

coach, and cares for his goods and effects in a van especially pro-

vided for that purpose.

6th — The inn-keeper may exclude from his house every one

but his own servants and guests. The sleeping car is .oJiliged

to admit the employees of the train to collect fares and control

its movements.

7th — The sleeping car can not even protect its guests, for

the conductor of the train has a right to put them off for non-

payment of fare, or violation of its rules and regulations.

I hold, therefore, that sleeping car companies are not subject

to the responsibility of inn-keepers at common law, and that

defendant cannot be held liable upon that ground.

The scope of the liability of companies of this kind, so far

as I know, has never been judicially determined. It is, un-

doubtedly, the law that where a passenger does not deliver his

property to a carrier, but retains the exclusive possession and
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control of it himself, the carrier is not liable in case of a loss,

as, for instance, when a passenger's pocket is picked, or an

overcoat or satchel is taken from a seat occupied by him. Upon

this theory, it is insisted by defendant that it can not be held

liable for negligence, inasmuch as the clothing and effects of its

guests are never formally delivered to it. I can not for a mo-

ment accede to this proposition. It is scarcely necessary to

say that a person asleep cannot retain manual possession or

control of anything. The invitation to make use of the bed

carries mtli it an invitation to sleep, and an implied agreement

to take reasonable care of the guest 's effects while he is in such a

state that care, upon his own part, is impossible. There is all

the delivery which the circumstances of the case admit. I think

it should keep a watch during the night, see to it that no un-

authorized persons intrude themselves into the car, and take rea-

sonable care to prevent thefts by the occupants. Defendant's

own testimony tends to show a custom on its part to keep a

man on watch all night, and to keep the rear door locked. Upon

the night in question, however, both the conductor and porter

were asleep at the rear end of the car for two or three hours

prior to the arrival of the train at Memphis, leaving the front

door unlocked and a brakeman sitting in the front end of the

car. If you find the loss was occasioned by the negligence of the

defendant in this particular, and that the plaintiff' himself was

guilty of no negligence, you will find for the plaintiff. It is

proved, however, that the plaintiff arose once or twice during the

night, either before or after the arrival of the train at Memphis,
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to get a drink of water at a washstand immediately adjoining

his section, but separated from it by a board partition, leaving

his waistcoat under his pillow. There is some conflict of evi-

dence as to whether he could see his berth from where he was

standing. If you find the plaintiff guilty of negligence in this^

regard, and that this negligence contributed to his. loss, then

he is not entitled to recover, notwithstanding the defendant was

also guilty of negligence in the particulars above specified.

The measure of damages only remains to be considered. The

plaintiff again claims the benefit of the law applicable to inn-

keepers, and insists upon his right to recover for the entire

amount of his loss. The same reasoning would entitle him to

recover a fortune if he had seen fit to carry it about his per-

son and lay it under his pillow, and this, too, in the absence of

notice to the company. The defendant, however, like a com-

mon carrier of passengers, is liable only for such property as

the passenger may reasonably be supposed to carry about his

person. It extends to his clothing and personal ornaments, the
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small articles of luggage usually carried in the hand, and a

reasonable sum of money for his traveling expenses. A man may

lawfully carry any sum he chooses about his person, but with

the modern facilities for obtaining drafts and sending money

by" express, it is, to say the least, imprudent to carry a large

amount. As defendant received but two dollars for the use

of its berth, it would be grossly unjust to mulct it in any sum

the plaintiff may choose to swear he has lost, when the charges,

simply, of transmitting this amount by express, might have

been double or quadruple the price paid for the accommodation.

The rule claimed by plaintiff would place carriers and owners

of sleeping cars completely at the mercy of unscrupulous and

designing men. It was, at least, the duty of the plaintiff to

notify the conductor of the amount he carried al)out him, though

even then it is very doubtful whether he could have charged him

with the responsibility.

The substance of the law, then, is this: the defendant was

not only bound to furnish the plaintiff with a berth for his

accommodation, but to keep watch and take reasonable care that

he suffered no loss. If plaintiff's loss was occasioned by the want

of such care, and his own negligence did not contribute to it.

he is entitled to recover such sum as you may deem reasonably

necessary for his personal expenses, considering the length of

his journey, and all the other circumstances of the case.

The jury returned a verdict for $100.
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>C55. CLARK V. BURNS,

118 Mass. 275; 19 Am. B. 456. 1875.

Action against defendants, owners of the Cunard line of

steamers, as common carriers, also as innkeepers, with counts

in tort for negligence. According to the agreed state of facts

plaintiff was a first class passenger on defendant's steamer

from Liverpool to New York. On retiring to bed he hung his

Avaistcoat, containing in a pocket the watch, on a hook in the

state room. According to the rules of the boat the state rooms

were not locked, so as to enable the steward to enter to light and

put out the lamps. In the morning the watch was missing. The

captain and purser were at once notified of the loss, and made

a careful but fruitless search. Qn these facts judgment was

ordered for defendants and plaintiff excepted.

Gray, C. J. The liabilities of common carriers and innkeepers,

though similar, are distinct. No one is subject to both liabilities

at the same time, and with regard to the same property. The

liability of an innkeeper extends only to goods put in his charge
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as keeper of a public house, and does not attach to a carrier

who has no house and is engaged only in the business of trans-

portation. The defendants, as owners of steamboats carrying

passengers and goods for hire, were not innkeepers. They

would be subject to the liability of common carriers for the

baggage of passengers in their custody, and might perhaps be

so liable for a watch of the passenger locked up in his trunk

with other baggage. But a watch, worn by a passenger on his

person by day, and kept by him within reach for use at night,

whether retained upon his person, or placed under his pillow,

or in a pocket of his clothing hanging near him, is not so in-

trusted to their custody and control as to make them liable for

it as common carriers. Steamboat Crystal Palace v. Vanderpool,

IGB. Mon. 302; Tower v. Utica Railroad, 7 Hill, 47, 42 Am. D.

36 ; Abbott V. Bradstreet, 55 Me. 530 ; Pullman Palace Car Co.

V. Smith, 24 Am. R. 258, 7 Chicago Legal News, 237.

Whether the defendants' regulations as to keeping the doors

of the state-rooms unlocked, the want of precautions against

theft, and the other facts agreed, were sufficient to show negli-

gence on the part of the defendants, was taking the most favor-

able view for the plaintiff, a question of fact, upon which the

decision of the court below was conclusive. Fox v. Adams Ex-

press Co., 116 Mass. 292. ,

Exceptions overruled. - — ..
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56. CURTIS V. MURPHY,

63 Wis. 4; 22 N. W. R. 825; 53 Am. B. 242. 1885.

Action against an innkeeper to recover money deposited in the

inn safe. Judgment for defendant.

Cole, C. J. The defendant in this action was the proprietor of

the St. James hotel in Milwankee. The plaintiff was a single

man, and kept a saloon not many blocks distant from the hotel.

The following facts are clearly shown by the plaintiff's own

testimony. About twelve o'clock at night on the 13th of March,

1882, the plaintiff came to the hotel with a disreputable woman

whom he had met on the street and whose name he did not know,

and registered himself and the woman as "Thomas Curtis and

wife, ' ' called for a room and it was assigned him by a person or

clerk who was in charge of the office. The plaintiff testified

that before going to his ::"oom he said to this clerk that he saw on

the top of the register that all moneys and jewels should be given

to the proprietor; when the clerk replied that the proprietor

was in bed and that he held the position of night clerk. There-
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upon the plaintiff handed the clerk $102 for safe-keeping and

took a receipt, which read, "I. 0. U. $102," signed by the clerk.

That night the clerk absconded with the money. The plaintiff

sues to recover it of the proprietor of the hotel.

The natural, perhaps necessary inference from the plaintiff's

own testimony is, that he went to the defendant's hotel at mid-

night with a prostitute, and engaged a room solely for the pur-

pose of having sexual intercourse with the woman. True, he says

that he went to the hotel as a guest and asked the clerk if he

"could stay there for bed and breakfast." But he lived near

by, gave no reason why he did not go to his usual lodging place,

therefore we feel entirely justified in assuming that he went

to the hotel for the unlawful purpose above indicated. This

being the case the question arises whether he was a guest in a

legal sense, and entitled to protection as such. The learned

counsel for the defendant insists that he cannot and should not

be deemed a guest rnder the circumstances, and entitled to the

rights and privileges of one. If the relation of innkeeper and

guest did exist between the parties, it is difficult to perceive

upon what ground the defendant can escape the responsibility

for the loss of the money handed to the clerk or person in charge

of the office ; for the common law, as is well known, on grounds

of public policy, for the protection of travellers imposes an ex-

traordinary liability on an innkeeper for the goods of his guest,

though they may have been lost without his fault.
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It is not easy, says Mr, Schouler, to lay do\YD. on the whole

who should be deemed a guest in the common-law sense ; the facts

in each case must guide the decision. Bailments, 256. A guest

is a "traveller or wayfarer, who puts up at an inn." Calye's

case, 8 Coke, 32. "A lodger or stranger in an inn." Jacob's

Law Diet. A traveller who comes to an inn and is accepted be-

comes instantly a guest. Story Bailments, § 477. "It is well

settled that if a person goes to an inn as a wayfarer and traveller,

and the innkeeper receives him into his inn as such, he becomes

the innkeeper's guest, and the relation of landlord and guest,

with all its rights and liabilities, is instantly established between

them." Jalie v. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118. "The cases show that

to entitle one to the privileges and protection of a guest he must

have the character of a traveller; one who is a mere temporary

lodger, in distinction from one who engages for a fixed period

at a certain agreed rate. The main distinction is the fact that

one is a wayfarer, or transicns, and it matters not how long

he remains, provided he assumes this character. ' ' Clute v. Wig-
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gins, 14 Johns 175, 7 Am. Dec. 448.

In these definitions the prominent idea is that a guest must be

a traveller, a wayfarer, or a transient comer to an inn for lodging

and entertainment. • It is not now deemed essential that a person

should have come from a distance to constitute a guest. "Dis-

tance is not material. A townsman or neighbor may be a travel-

ler and therefore a guest at an inn as well as he who comes

from a distance or from a foreign country. ' ' Walling v. Potter,

35 Conn. 183. Justice Wilde says, in Mason v. Thompson, 9

Pick. 283, 20 Am. Dee. 471, that "it is clearly settled that to

constitute a guest in legal contemplation, it is not essential that

he should be a lodger or haVe any refreshment at the inn. If he

leaves his horse there the innkeeper is chargeable on account of

the benefit he is to receive for the keeping of the horse. ' ' Judge

Bronson, in commenting on this case in Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill,

485, 490, 38 Am. Dec. 663, says where the owner of a horse

sent the animal to an inn to be kept, but never went there him-

self, and never intended to go there as a guest, it seemed but

little short of downright absurdity to say that in legal con-

templation he was a guest. On principle it would seem that a

person should himself be either actually or constructively at the

inn or hotel for entertainment in order to establish the relation

of landlord and guest. In Atkinson v. Sellers, 5 C. B. (N. S.)

442, CocKBURN, C. J., remarks: "Of course a man could not

be said to be a traveller who goes to a place merely for the pur-

pose of taking refreshment. But if he goes to an inn for refresh-

ment in the course of a journey, whether of business or of pleas-
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ure, he is entitled to demand refreshment and the innkeeper is

justified in supplying it."

If a traveller have no personal entertainment or refreshment at

an inn, but simply care and food for his horse, he may be a guest,

for he makes the inn his temporary abode — his home for the time

being. Ingalsbee v. Wood, 36 Barb. 452; Coykendall v. Eaton,

55 Barb. 188. And while the definition of guest has been some-

what extended from its original meaning, it does not include

every one who goes to an inn for convenience to accomplish some

purpose. If a man or woman go together or meet by concert at

an inn or hotel in the town or city where they reside, and take a

room for no other purpose than to have illicit intercourse, can

it be that the law protects them as guests ? Is the extraordinary

rule of lial)ility which was originally adopted from considera-

tions of public policy to protect travellers and wayfarers, not

merely from the negligence, but the dishonesty of innkeepers and

their servants, to be extended to such persons? If so, then for

a like reason it should protect a thief who takes a room at an
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inn and improves the opportunity thus given to enter the rooms

and steal the goods of guests and boarders. We do not think

that the relation of innkeeper and guest can or does arise in the

eases supposed. One whose status is a guest is a traveller or

transient comer who puts up at an inn for a lawful purpose, to

receive its customary lodging and entertainment. It is not one

who takes a room solely to commit an offense against the laws of

the state. So upon the facts detailed by the plaintiff himself,

we have no hesitation in saying that he was not a guest at the

hotel within the legal sense of the term. The relation of land-

lord and guest was never established between them.

We feel the more confidence in the correctness of this conclu-

sion when we consider the duties of an innkeeper. An innkeeper

is bound to take in all travellers and wayfaring persons and to

entertain them if he can accommodate them for a reasonable

compensation, and he must guard their goods with proper dili-

gence. Bac. Abr., tit. "Inns and Innkeepers (C.) ;" Story Bailm.,

§ 476. Now if the defendant had been aware of the purpose of

the plaintiff in applying for a room, could he not have refused

to receive him into his house? Nay, more; if the plaintiff had

been received by the clerk and a room had been assigned him,

could not the defendant on learning the purpose for which the

room had been taken, have incontinently turned the plaintiff

and the woman with him into the street, or have called the police

and had them arrested? It seems to us there can be no doubt

of the right of the defendant thus to have treated the plaintiff.

But if the plaintiff was a guest and entitled to the rights and
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privileges of a person having that status at the hotel, he could

not have been turned into the street, though his profligate con-

duct was outraging all decency and ruining the reputation of the

hotel.

The questions which have frequently come before the courts for

consideration were whether a person, upon the facts of the case,

was a traveller or a temporary sojourner so as to be deemed a

guest, or whether he was to be regarded as a boarder or one at

the hotel as a special customer. These questions are elaborately

examined in some of the cases above cited; also in McDaniels v.

Eobinson, 26 Vt. 316, 62 Am. D. 574; Berkshire Woolen Co. v.

Proctor, 7 Cush. 417 ; Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163 ; Pinker-

ton V. Woodward, 33 Cal. 547, 91 Am. D. 657 ; Hancock v. Rand,

94 N. Y. 1, 46 Am. Rep. 112; Smith v. Keyes, 2 T. & C. 650;

Fitch V. Casler, 17 Hun, 126; McDonald v. Edgerton, 5 Barb.

560; Shoecraft v. Bailey, 25 Iowa, 554; Manning v. Wells, 9

Humph. 746, 51 Am. Dec. 688.

It seems to have been taken for granted in the court below that
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the plaintiff was a guest at the hotel. But the learned County

Court held that § 1725, R. S., requires the guest to deliver his

money to the innkeeper himself, or to a clerk having authority

from the innkeeper to receive it. As it did not appear that the

clerk in this case had such authority, the defendant was relieved

from responsibility for the money lost by the clerk. We should

hesitate to affirm the correctness of this vicAV of the law. On the

contrary, we think a traveller when he goes to a hotel at night

and finds a clerk in charge of the office, assigning rooms, etc., has

the right to assume that such clerk represents the proprietor and

has authority to take charge of money which may be handed him

by a guest for safe-keeping. But still in the view which we have

taken of the character of the plaintiff, and that he was not a

guest at the hotel, this error of the court is immaterial. On the

whole record the judgment is right and must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

57. BENNET V. MELLOR,

5 Term Reports 273. 1793.

The defendant was an innkeeper, against whom the plaintiff

brought his action for the value of goods stolen out of the inn.

At the trial before Buller, J., at the last Lancaster assizes, it ap-

peared that the plaintiff's servant had taken the goods in ques-

tion to market at Manchester, and not being able to dispose of

them went with them to the defendant's inn, and asked the de-
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fendant's wife if he could leave the goods there till the week fol-

lowing (meaning the next market day) ; she said she could not tell,

for they were very full of parcels. The plaintiff's servant then

sat down in the inn, had some liquor, and put the goods on the

floor immediately behind him. When he got up after sitting there

a little while, the goods were missing. A verdict was found for

the plaintiff ; and in reporting this case upon a motion for a new

trial, Buller, J., observed that he was of opinion that if the de-

fendant's wife had accepted the charge of the goods upon the

special request made to her, he should have considered her as a

special bailee, and not answerable in this case, having been guilty

of no actual negligence; but that not being the case, he con-

sidered this to be the conunon case of goods brought into an

inn by a guest, and stolen from thence, in which case the inn-

keeper was liable to make good the loss.

AsHHURST, J. It does not appear to me that there is any

ground for granting a new trial. If it had appeared, as the de-

fendant's counsel have suggested, that these goods were lost
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through the mere negligence of the plaintiff's servants, the case

might have deserved greater consideration; but nothing of that

kind appears on the judge's report. According to the report,

the case was simply this: the plaintiff's servant came to the inn,

and desired to have the liberty of leaving the goods, which he

could not dispose of in the market, until the next week ; that pro-

posal was rejected; then he sat down in the inn as a guest, with

the goods behind him, and during that time the goods were taken

away. But, although his request was not complied with, he was

entitled to protection for his goods during the time he continued

in the inn as a guest,

Buller, J. Although the defendant refused to take charge of

the goods until the next week, the circumstances of this case dis-

tinguish it from that cited, where the innkeeper said his house

was full and refused to take in the guest ; that, if true, is a good

excuse; and if false, the innkeeper is liable to an action for re-

fusing to take in the guest. But here the request was merely to

take care of the plaintiff 's goods until the next week ; if the de-

fendant had taken the goods upon that request, he could only

have been liable as a bailee ; but that proposal was not accepted,

and then this case stands on general grounds. It is clear that

the goods need not be in the special keeping of the innkeeper

in order to make him liable; if they be in the inn, that is suf-

ficient to charge him. In Calve 's case it is said "Although the

guest doth not deliver his goods to the inn-holder to keep, nor

acquaints him with them, yet if they be carried away or stolen,
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the innkeeper shall be charged; and therewith agrees 42 Ed. 3.

11 a." There it is said that on the words of the writ the inn-

keeper is answerable for everything in his inn, but not for a horse,

which the owner orders to be put out to pasture. One of the

passages cited from Com. Dig. cannot be supported, if taken in

a general sense ; for all the authorities agree that it is not neces-

sary to prove negligence in the innkeeper.

Grose, J. Calye's case, which is a good comment on the writ

which gives this action, decides this present case. According to

that, if a man go into an inn and is accepted there as a guest,

the innkeeper is bound to take care of the goods of the guest;

and so says the case in Dyer. If indeed the innkeeper had re-

fused to take in the plaintiff's servant, as a guest, and he had

notwithstanding gone into the inn, the plaintiff could not have

charged the defendant with the loss of his goods ; in such a case

the innkeeper refuses at his peril, and if it be without reason,

an action lies for the refusal; but in this case there was no re-

fusal of the person ; the defendant merely refused to take care
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of the goods until the next week. And when the plaintiff's ser-

vant was sitting in the inn, with the consent of the innkeeper

(for the latter did not object to receive him) , he was in the same

situation as any other guest, and entitled to the same protection

for his goods.

Rule discharged.

58. BOWELL V. DE WALD ET AL.,

2 Ind. App. 303, 28 N. E. R. 430. 1891.

Action for money stolen from a satchel at an inn. One Cas-

well, a travelling salesman of De Wald & Co., had been collecting

for them, and became a guest of Bowell at the Ross House, giv-

ing the satchel containing .$252 to a servant of the inn. He put

it in the coat room adjoining the office. When Caswell called

for the satchel, he found it had been opened and the money ab-

stracted.

Robinson, J. (After stating the facts and disposing of mat-

ters of pleading and practice). There is some conflict in the eases

as to the extent of liabilities of innkeepers. In some it is held

that they are responsible to the same extent as common carriers.

In note 5 to section 472, Story Bail. (8th ed.), it is said that

some American cases seem to hold that the innkeeper may exon-

erate himself by positive proof that he was not in any way negli-

gent, citing a number of cases, among which is that of Laird v.
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Eichold, 10 Ind. 212, 71 Am. D. 323. That case decides that

although an innkeeper is prima facie liable for the loss of the

goods of his guest, yet that he may exonerate himself by show-

ing that the loss happened without any fault on his part, and

that he exercised the strictest care and diligence. Baker v. Des-

sauer, 49 Ind. 28.

It is said in 11 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 77, par. 51,

** According to one line of cases, perhaps constituting a majority

of the decisions, it is, as before explained, not necessary for the

guest to prove negligence to support his action for the loss of

his goods against the innkeeper ; nor will proof by the innkeeper

that he was guilty of no negligence be an excuse for him, unless

he brings himself within those cases excepted. But, according

to a different line of cases, the prima facie liability of the inn-

keeper is based on the presumption of his fault or negligence, and

that he may exonerate himself by positive proof that he was not

in any way negligent.

"The general rule of diligence, on the part of innkeepers,
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is that of 'uncommon care,' as Lord Holt has it, or 'the ex-

tremest care, ' as some of the books have it. But it has been laid

down that public utility 'requires that innkeepers be held liable

for all losses' which might have been prevented by ordinary

care.' "

The following cases, decided by the Supreme Court, have a di-

rect bearing upon this question: Hill v. Owen, 5 Blackf. 323,

35 Am. D. 124; Thickstun v. Howard, 8 Blackf. 535; Laird v.

Eichold, supra; Baker v. Dessauer, supra.

It seems clear that these cases, without conflict, declare the

rule of law to be that an innkeeper is prima facie liable for any

loss or injury to the goods of his guest, not occasioned by the act

of Providence, the public enemies or the fault of the guest, and

the prima facie liability is based upon the presumption that the

loss or injury arose from the negligence or fault of the innkeeper,

but that an innkeeper being thus prima facie liable may excul-

pate himself by proof that the loss did not happen through any

neglect or fault on his part, or that of his servants for whom he is

responsible. In Laird v. Eichold, supra, after stating the au-

thorities, the court says: "This, we think, is the correct doc-

trine, founded on principle, as well as authority. Innkeepers,

on grounds of public policy, are held to a strict accountability for

the goods of their guests. The interests of the public, we think,

are sufficiently subserved, by holding the innkeeper prima facie

liable for the loss or injury of the goods of his guest ; thus throw-

ing the burthen of proof upon him, to show that the injury or

loss happened without any default on his part, and that he ex-
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ercised the strictest care and diligence. And it is more in accord-

ance with the principles of natural justice, to permit him to ex-

onerate himself by making such proof, than to shut the door

against him and hold him responsible for an accident happening

entirely without his fault, and against which strict care and

prudence would not guard."

In Johnson v. Richardson, 17 111. 302, 63 Am. D. 369, the court

says : ' ' The general doctrine deducible from the authorities, an-

cient and modern, is, that keepers of public inns are bound well

and safely to keep the property of the guests accompanying

them at the inn ; and in case such property is lost or injured, the

innkeeper can only absolve himself from liability by showing

that the loss or injury occurred without any fault whatever on

his part; or, by the fault of the guest, his companions, or serv-

ants ; or, by superior force ; and the burden of proof to exonerate

the innkeeper is upon him, for in the first instance the law will

attribute the loss or injury to his default."

There are many other authorities in harmony with this doe-
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trine, but it is unnecessary to cite them.

It was not, therefore, necessary to allege in the complaint care-

lessness and negligence on the part of the appellant.

The sixth finding of the court reads as follows : ' ' That on said

day said baggage-room was not secured by lock or otherwise, and

it was open, and that said baggage-room had two exterior win-

dows facing the rear yard. There was a rear door to the of-

fice of the hotel which was about six feet from the door of said

baggage-room ; that, on the afternoon of the day said money was

taken, said clerk, who was a boy sixteen years of age, was for

a period of several hours the only person in charge of said office

and baggage-room, and he was absent from said office and bag-

gage-room several times during the course of the afternoon in

question on the front porch of the hotel, at one time for at least

twenty minutes, when he was the only person in charge of said

office and baggage-room, and the said baggage-room could have

been entered from the door of the rear of said office, when said

clerk was on the front porch, without his being able to see the

person so entering said baggage-room. Said defendant did not

issue any check to said Caswell for his valise. The guests of said

hotel were permitted at all times to enter said baggage-room, and

on said day there were twenty guests at said hotel, and the trav-

eling bags or valises of those who had such baggage were kept

in said baggage-room. Defendant had no safe in his hotel office

for keeping money or valuables of his guests, and the said Cas-
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well did not inform said defendant of the contents of his valise. ' '

Under the ease of Johnson v. Richardson, supra, and Coskery

V. Nagle, 30 Cent. Law. Jour. 158, the failure of the guest to in-

form the innkeeper or his servant that his valise contained val-

unables does not constitute negligence.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

59. SIBLEY V. ALDRICH,

33 N. H. 553; 66 Am. D. 745. 1856.

Case, for injury to a horse left by plaintiff's servant in the

stable of defendant's inn. It appeared that the horse was kicked

by the horse of another traveler, and his leg broken, but defend-

ant offered evidence, which was excluded, that there was no neg-

ligence on the part of himself or his servants. Verdict for plaint-

iff, by consent, judgment to be rendered thereon or verdict set

aside as court should see fit.

By Court, Perley, C. J. The defendant offered to prove that

the damage to the plaintiff's horse was not caused by any actual

negligence of himself or his servants. He did not offer to prove
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that it happened through the negligence or default of the plaint-

iff, direct or implied ; nor by irresistible force, inevitable accident,

or by the act of God or the public enemy. The question would

seem to be whether, as a general rule, and in all cases, an inn-

keeper can discharge himself from liability for the loss of his

guest's goods by showing that it did not happen by the actual

neglect or default of himself or his servants.

On this point the authorities are not unanimous. Story, in his

work on bailments, sec. 482, says : "By the common law, as laid

down in Calye's Case [8 Co. 32], an innkeeper is not chargeable

unless there is some default in him or in his servants, in the well

and safe-keeping and custody of his guest's goods and chattels

within his common inn, but he is bound to keep them safe, with-

out any stealing or purloining" — quoting thus far the language

of the report in Calye's Case, supra, and then he adds: "This

doctrine is, however, to be taken with the qualification that the

loss will be deemed prima facie evidence of negligence. ' ' And in

section 472, he says that this doctrine should be recfeived with

some hesitation, in view of the case of Richmond v. Smith, 8

Barn. & Cress. 9, where a different view of the law seems to

have been entertained. Story's authority on a question of this
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nature is undoubtedly of great weight; but it is to be observed

that he states his opinion with some hesitation, and he does not

appear to have reached a conclusion in this instance, after his

usual extensive and careful examination of the authorities.

In Dawson v. Chamney, 5 Ad. & EL, N. S., 165, it was held

that when goods have been deposited in a public inn, and there

lost or injured, the presumption is that the loss or damage was

caused by the negligence of the innkeeper or his servants; but

that this presumption may be rebutted, and if the jury find in

favor of the inmkeeper as to negligence, he is entitled to succeed

on a plea of not guilty. Lord Denman cited Story as authority

for this rule. The circumstances of Dawson v. Chamney, supra,

were much like those of the present case. The plaintiff gave his

horse in charge to the defendant's hostler, who placed him in a

stable with another horse, that kicked him and caused the injury

complained of. Metcalf v. Hess, 14 111. 129, is to the same point,

that an innkeeper may discharge himself by showing that the

loss happened without any default on his part. The foregoing
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authorities go to sustain the position of the defendant.

In Merritt v. Claghorn, 23 Vt. 177, the court held that an

action can not be maintained against an innkeeper to recover

for property lost by fire, which was occasioned by inevitable

casualty, or superior force, and w^ithout any negligence on the

part of the "innkeeper or his servants. This last case is put on

peculiar grounds, and can not be regarded as an authority for

the general position that an innkeeper may discharge himself

by showing that the loss did not happen by his default. The

fire took in another building and spread to the inn.

So in Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. Mon. 72, 48 Am. D. 416, it

was held that an innkeeper is prima facie liable, but not for a

loss by external force or robbery, or if the loss occur by the

neglect of the guest or his servants, or his companions: For-

ward V. Pittard, 1 T. R. 27, 31.

On the other hand, there are numerous authorities, direct and

strong, to the point that the innkeeper can not discharge himself

by showing that loss did not happen by his default, but that

he must go further, and show that it was caused by the default,

direct or implied, of the owner.

Thus Chancellor Kent, 2 Com, 574, says: "An innkeeper, like

a common carrier, is an insurer of the goods of his guest, and

can only limit his liability by express agreement or notice. Rig-

orous as this law may seem, and hard as it may actually be in

some instances, it is, as Sir William Jones observes, founded on

the principles of public utility to which all private considera-

tions ought to yield." Metcalf, in his note to Bedle v. Morris,
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Yelv. 162, places the liability of an innkeeper and common car-

rier on the same footing, and so does the civil law: Domat, B.

1, T. U., sec. 2, a, 1. Burgess v. Clements, 4 Man. & Sel. 306, was

much considered. The point there decided was, that an innkeep-

er is not answerable for the goods of his guest which are lost

through the negligence of the guest out of a private room in the

inn, chosen by the guest for the purpose of exhibiting the goods

for sale, the use of which room was granted by the innkeeper,

who, at the same time, told the guest that there was a key, and

that he might lock the door, which he neglected to do. In com-

menting on Calye's Case, 8 Co. 82, and the language of the old

writ. Lord Ellenborough is reported to have said : ' ' There can

be no doubt, also, that there may be circumstances, as if the

guest by his own neglect induces the loss, or himself introduces

the person who purloins the goods, which form an exception to

the general liability, as not coming within the words pro defectu

Jwspitatoris, and under such circmnstances the plaintiff shall not

complain of the loss," And Le Blanc, J., in the same case, says:
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"We must take the facts from the report, and also that the

judge stated to the jury that the innkeeper was responsible to

his guest for the safe custody of his goods, but that the guest

might by his own misconduct discharge the innkeeper from that

responsibility." Here the general responsibility of the innkeep-

er for the safety of his guest's goods is clearly conceded. The

decision is put on the ground of misconduct in the guest, which

caused the loss, without any intimation that mere want of negli-

gence in the innkeeper would discharge him. Farnworth v. Pack-

wood, 1 Stark. 249, is to the same point with Burgess v. Kent,

4 Mau. & Sel. 306.

In Richmond v. Smith, 8 Barn. & Cress. 9, Lord Tenterden

says : " It is clear that at common law, when a traveler brings

goods to an inn, the landlord is responsible for them. In this

respect I think the situation of the landlord was precisely analo-

gous to that of the common carrier;" and Bailey, J., in the same

case, says: "It appears to me that an innkeeper's liability very

closely resembles that of a common carrier. He is prima facie

liable for any loss not occasioned by the act of God or the king's

enemies, although he may be exonerated when the guest chooses

to have the goods under his own care."

In Kent v. Shuckard, 2 Barn. & Ad. 803, Lord Tenterden is

reported to have used the following language: "Innkeepers,

like common carriers, are liable by the custom of the realm. The

principle on which the liability of an innkeeper for the loss of

the goods of his guest is founded is, both by the civil and common

law, to compel the innkeeper to take care that no improper per-
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son be admitted into his house, and to prevent collusion between

him and other persons. In the Digest, L. 4, T. 9, sec. 1, after

stating the law that an innkeeper is liable for the goods of his

guest, it is said, Nisi hoc essct statiitum materia daretur cum

furihus adversus eos, quos rccipimit, coeundi."

Armistead v. Wliite, 6 Eng. L. & Eq. 349, was an action

against an innkeeper, and the judge charged the jury that if the

owner of the goods was guilty of gross negligence, the innkeeper

was discharged. The court held the instructions were sufficiently

favorable to the plaintiff, and queried whether it was necessary

that the negligence of the plaintiff should be gross, to discharge

the defendant. It is not easy to understand why the cause

should have been left to the jury in this way, if the doctrine of

the prior case of Dawson v. Chamney, 5 Ad. & EL, N. S., 165,

had been recognized for law, and it is worthy of remark that

no allusion is made to Dawson v. Chamney, supra, in the report

of Armistead v. White, supra.

In Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280, 20 Am. D. 471, it was
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decided that an innkeeper is liable for the loss of his guest's

goods committed to his care, unless the loss is caused by the act

of God or the common enemy, or by the fault of the guest. And

Wilde, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says that this

rule may undoubtedly in some eases subject the innkeeper to loss

without any negligence or default on his part; that innkeepers

as well as common carriers are regarded as insurers of property

committed to their care, and are bound to make restitution for

any loss or injury not caused by the act of God or the common

enemy, or the neglect or fault of the owner. And it was decided

in Washburn v. Jones, 14 Barb. 193, that an innkeeper is liable

for all losses and damages happening, even without his default,

excepting such as are caused by inevitable accident or the public

enemy.

The question was very fully and ably discussed in the recent

case of Shaw v. Berry, 31 Me. 478 [52 Am. Dec. 628], and the

court there came to the conclusion that to discharge an innkeeper

from liability for the loss of goods in his charge it is not sufficient

for him to show that the loss did not happen by his neglect or

default, but that he must go further and show that it happened

by the fault, direct or indirect, of the owner.

The leading case on this subject is Calye's Case, 8 Co. 32, a, in

which the point resolved was, that if a horse is put out to pas-

ture at the request of the owner by an innkeeper, and is stolen,

the innkeeper is not liable, because the horse, not being infra

hospitium, is not in the charge and custody of the innkeeper as

such, and his liability as an innkeeper does not attach. The re-
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port cites the words of the old writ, and states that by it all

the cases concerning hostlers may be decided. The part of the

writ which bore on the point resolved was that which limits the

liability of the innkeeper, by the custom of the realm, to goods

of the guest infra hospitium; and in commenting on the language

of the writ, the reporter says that "the innkeeper shall not be

charged unless there be a default in him or his servants in the

well and safe-keeping and custody of the guest's goods within

his common inn ; for the innkeeper is bound in law to keep them

safe there, without any stealing or purloining, but he ought to

keep his goods and chattels there in safety." Considering the

connection of these remarks with the point resolved in the case,

we think they could not have been intended to lay down any rule

defining the extent of the innkeeper's liability for goods in his

custody as such, but merely to state that his liability was con-

fined to goods deposited in the inn.

The case then proceeds to state an exception to the rule that

the goods within the common inn the innkeeper ought to keep in
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safety, to wit, that if the goods are stolen by one whom the

guest brings with him, the innkeeper is not liable, for then the

fault is the guest's. There is no statment in the report that ac-

tual negligence is necessary to charge the innkeeper, or that he

can discharge himself by showing that the goods were not lost by

his actual negligence.

The language of the old writ has sometimes been made the

ground of an inference that there must be actual negligence to

charge an innkeeper. The writ recites, "that by the custom of

the realm, innkeepers are bound to keep the goods of their

guests within their common inn, without substraction or loss, night

and day, ita quod pro defectu hujus modi Jiospitatorum sed servi-

entium suoruni" — no damage shall in any manner befall such

guest. The innkeeper is bound to keep the goods of his guest

so that no damage happen by his default or that of his servants.

The argument is, that the term pro defectu implies actual fault

and negligence. But the innkeeper is sued for neglecting to per-

form his legal duty; and the question occurs. What is the duty

which the law and the custom of the realm imposes on him?

If the law holds him to keep the goods of his guest at all events,

except in case where the loss happens by the act of God or the

public enemy, or by the fault of the guest, then if the goods are

lost by mere accident, or by robbery, without any want of actual

care on his part, the innkeeper has still failed to perform his

legal obligation, and the goods are lost by his neglect and failure

to perform the duty which the law imposes. The law, in such
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case, charges the innkeeper with the duty of keeping the goods

safely, and imputes to him the fault, if they are lost or damaged.

In this view of their meaning these words of the writ are by

no means idle and unmeaning, because the innkeeper is not in

all cases liable for the loss of goods intrusted to his care. The

loss may happen by the act of God, by the public enemy, or by

the fault of the owner, and in that case the damage does not

happen by the default of the innkeeper. If the declaration

should merely allege that the goods were lost or damaged, with-

out averring that the loss or damage happened by default of the

innkeeper or his servants, it is apprehended that it would be

substantially defective, and bad on demurrer, on the strictest

rule which has been applied to the innkeeper's liability.

This argument, from the form of pleading, might be urged

with equal force to show that a common carrier is only liable

for loss that happens by his actual negligence. In the settled

form of declaring in a case against a carrier, it is alleged that

the defendant, "neglecting his duty in that behalf, did not
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safely and securely carry," etc., "but so negligently and im-

properly conducted himself that by and through the negligence,

carelessness, and default of the defendant," the goods were lost

or damaged: Angell on Carriers, 429, note; Raphael v. Pick-

ford, 5 Man. & G. 551 ; 2 Ch. PI. 271, 272.

And in the ancient form of declaring against a common car-

rier, the custom of the realm is alleged to be that absque suh-

stractione, amissione, seu spoliatione, portare tenentur, ita quod

pro defectu dictorum communium postatorum, seu servienitum

suorum hujus modi bona et catalla, eis sic ut prefertur delib-

erata, non suit perdita, amissa, seu spoliata;" and in assigning

the breach it was alleged that "pro defectu honae custodiae

ipsius defendentis et servientium suorum perdita et amissa fue-

runt."

Three different rules appear to be laid down on this subject

in different authorities.

1. That the innkeeper is prima facie liable for the loss of

goods in his charge; but may discharge himself by showing that

the goods were not lost by his negligence or default, and this is

the ground taken by the defendant in the present case. This

view of the law is sustained by Dawson v. Chamney, 5 Ad. & El.,

N. S., 165, and by Metcalf v. Hess, 14 111. 129.

2, That the innkeeper is discharged by showing how the acci-

dent happened and that it happened by inevitable accident or

irresistible force, though the accident might not amount to what

the law denominates the act of God, and the force might not be

the power of a public enemy. This rule is countenanced by
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Merritt v. Claghorn, 23 Vt. 177, and Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B.

Mon. 72, 48 Am. D. 416.

3. That the innkeeper is liable, unless the loss was caused by

the act of God or the public enemy, or by the fault, direct or

implied, of the guest. This rule is maintained in Burgess v.

Clements, 4 Mau. & Sel. 306; Richmond v. Smith, 8 Barn. &

Cress. 9 ; Farnworth v. Packwood, 1 Stark. 249 ; Kent v. Shuck-

ard 2 Barn. & Ad. 803; Armistead v. Yv^hite, 6 Eng. L. & Eq.

349 ; Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280, 20 Am. D. 471 ; Shaw v.

Berry, 31 Me. 478, 52 Am. Dec. 628.

Of text-writers. Story, though with hesitation, goes for the

first rule. Kent states the third rule strongly,, and IMetcalf

adopts the same, and the civil law places the liability of the

innkeeper and the common carrier on the same footing.

It is somewhat singular that on a practical question, which

must be as old as the rudiments of the law, there should be

found at this day such diversity of opinion and decision. It is

probably OAving to the obscure way in which the subject is
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treated in the report of Calye's Case, 8 Co. 32, and the different

interpretations which have been put on that case. On the

whole, we think that the better rule is the strict one as laid down

in the elaborate and very satisfactory case of Shaw v. Berry,

supra. The weight of authority is heavily that way, and the pol-

icy and analogies of the law lead to the same conclusion.

Judgment on the verdict.

60. CUTLER Y. BONNEY,

30 Mich. 259; 18 Am. R. 127. 1874.

Action against an innkeeper for loss due to fire. Judgment

for defendants.

Campbell, J. Plaintiffs brought suit to recover the value of

certain horses, a wagon, and some goods destroyed by fire in the

barn of defendants, who were innkeepers. It is found by the

court that there was no fault or negligence in defendants or their

servants, the fire which destroyed the barn and its contents hav-

ing been either accidental or incidental, and taking from an alley

or public way outside. No question arises upon anything except

the obligation of innkeepers to respond to their guests for prop-

erty thus destroyed without negligence. It is admitted that the

property was in the custody of defendants in that capacity.

It is unfortunate that upon this subject there is some confu-
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sion, arising from the loose dicta in which many courts have

indulged, when dealing with cases involving the liability of inn-

keepers. It is unsafe to give any force to such remarks beyond

the analogies of the cases in which they are found. Upon all

questions not decided by recognized and accepted precedents,

we can only rest upon the ancient maxims of the common law.

In order to hold a bailee liable for that which is in no respect

to be imputed either to his own negligence, or to that of persons

for whom he is responsible, there should be found clear author-

ity. The common law has declared this liability against one

class of bailees, and has made common carriers responsible for

all losses not caused by public enemies, or some casualty in no

way arising out of human action. It is claimed by plaintiffs

that in this respect common carriers and innkeepers stand on

precisely the same footing ; and it is not claimed that defendants

can be made liable in the present case on any narrower ground.

There are many cases in which it has been said by judges that

the liability is not distinguishable. Most of these have been col-
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lected in the notes of Mr. Holmes to the last edition of Kent's

Commentaries. — 2 Kent, 596. But, except in the decisions to be

especially referred to hereafter, there is nothing in the facts of

any authority which we have discovered, which called for any

such remark, or which would justify the enforcement of a lia-

bility for such a loss as the present.

With one or two exceptions the cases referred to have arisen

from thefts or unexplained losses of property, while it was with-

in the legal custody or protection of the innkeeper. The rule ac-

tually applied in all of these cases has been that all such losses

were presumably due to the neglect of the innkeeper. Generally,

and perhaps universally, he has been held to an absolute responsi-

bility for all thefts from within, or unexplained, whether commit-

ted by guests, servants, or strangers. But he has quite as uni-

formly been discharged, by any negligence of the guest conducing

to the injury, and he has not been held for acts done by the ser-

vants of guests, or by those whom they have admitted into

their rooms. And in many cases he has been held discharged

where the guest has exercised any special control over his prop-

erty. The general principle seems to be that the innkeeper guar-

antees the good conduct of all persons whom he admits under his

roof, provided his guests are themselves guilty of no negligence

to forfeit the guarantee.

Beyond this, we have found no decided ease anywhere. We

have found no decision holding innkeepers liable for losses by

purely accidental casualties, or from riots, or acts of force from

without, such as have been from the beginning excepted by the
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text writers. These writers, or at least such of them as are of

recognized authority, have drawn a line between carriers and

innkeepers, resting on the distinction between absolute and quali-

fied responsibility. And none of the accepted writers have found

any authority for disregarding this distinction. The two classes

of bailees have been kept carefully separate.

Judge Story makes this very clear in his Treatise on Bail-

ments, § 472, where he refers to authorities which we think sus-

tain him. Dawson v. Chamney, 5 Q. B. 164, is directly in point,

and the language of the older decisions there referred to ex-

cludes the extreme measure of liability. Chancellor Kent is

equally explicit that the liability does not extend to robbery or

inevitable casualty. 2 Kent's Com. 593. The Eoman law, to

which both of them refer, included fire under this head. The

French law excludes liability for wrongs from without. Ferriere

Die, "Aubergistes;" Story on Bailm., § 465.

But all the modern authorities profess to take their departure

from Calye's Case, 8 Co. 32. The case declares that the original
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writ quoted in it, and found in Fitzherbert's N. B. 94 B., con-

tains the whole ground of the common law. Analyzing the writ,

the fourth heading is made to refer to the ground of liability

as the default of the innkeeper, "by which it appears that the

innholder shall not be charged, unless there be a default in him

or his servants, in the well and safe-keeping and custody of

their guests, goods and chattels within his common inn." The

language in Fitzherbert is "so that by the default of them,

the innkeepers or their servants, no damage may come in any

manner to their guests." Among the defenses given by Saun-

ders is that "defendant may show that his house was broken

open, and a forcible robbery of them committed by thieves."

2 Saund. PI. & E. 217. And the liability of innkeepers for the

acts of others is put by Blackstone on the ground that they were

bound to prevent misconduct by those under their control. 1 Bl.

430. Accidental fire stands on quite as strong grounds of ex-

emption as other mishaps.

The common law has in some things been modified by decisions,

but it is contrary to law to follow dicta made in cases calling for

no departure from the old law. It would be a manifest innova-

tion to create a liability where no possible default exists, and to

sustain such an innovation, there ought to be both reason and

authority. We can not object to follow settled law on our own

views of what policy ought to make it. But we are not prepared

to assume there is any policy which will compel persons who are

in no wise in fault to respond in damages, where the law is not

clear against them. And the authorities directly in point ou
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losses by fire are not numerous, and do not, in our judgment,

call for any such consequences.

The doctrine imposing such a liability may be said to rest en-

tirely on what was said by Justice Porter in Hulett v. Swift, 33

N. Y. 571, 88 Am. D. 405. In that case the subject is discussed

at some length, and with much ability. But no foundation is

shown there for the doctrine asserted, beyond remarks which are

confessedly opposed to the text-books, and which were foreign

to what was actually decided in the cases where they are found.

The whole opinion of the learned judge is open to the same criti-

cism; as he himself declares the point discussed did not really

arise, inasmuch as no proof was introduced changing the pre-

sumption raised by law against the defendant. The opinion was

not unanimous, and the dissent of Judge Denio would detract

much from its force, even if it had been pertinent to the facts.

Opposed to this is the case of Merritt v. Claghorn, 23 Vt. 177,

in which Judge Redpield, delivering the opinion of the court,

reached the conclusion that where there was no negligence there
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was no responsibility for loss by fire. This opinion is an able

one, and was not given beyond the facts. It has been both ap-

proved and criticised, but no occasion has heretofore arisen to

consider its correctness upon similar facts. Vance v. Throck-

morton, 5 Bush (Ky.), 42, 96 Am. D. 327, is to the same effect,

but there, too, the decision might have rested on other grounds,

and its authority is therefore diminished.

We regard the decision in Vermont as reasonable, and as with-

in the fair meaning of the common-law rule. We think the Cir-

cuit Court was right in taking the same view.

The judgment must be affirmed, with costs.

The other justices concurred.

Judgment affirmed.

61. MURCHISON V. SERGENT,

69 Ga. 206; 47 Am. R. 754. 1882.

Action for money and valuables lost at an inn.

Judgment for defendant.

• Jackson, C. J. The plaintiff in error sued the defendant to

recover some five hundred dollars of money and the value of a

gold watch and chain, which sum of money, together with the

watch and chain, was stolen from the plaintiff whilst lodging at

the hotel of the defendant and asleep at night in the room he oc-

cupied as a guest. The jury found for the defendant, and on the
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refusal of the city court of Savannah to grant the plaintiff a

new trial on the grounds set out in his motion therefor, he brings

the case to be reviewed here.

The facts briefly are that the plaintiff and his wife were on

their bridal tour, and remained a few days at the Screven House

in Savannah. The plaintiff on retiring to bed laid his clothing

watch and chain, and pocket book containing the money, with the

clothing on a lounge in the room; and in the morning while

dressing he discovered his loss. He testified that he locked and

bolted, as he thought, the door of his chamber on retiring, but

in the morning ascertained that the bolt did not work and could

not penetrate more than one-sixteenth of an inch, and was worn

so as to be insecure. A guest who had occupied the same room

a short time before also testified to the insecurity of the bolt,

going into detail in regard to repeated efforts to bolt the door

on his part whilst occupying the room, and after many efforts

and the exercise of a good degree of strength and skill, his suc-

cess at last in making the bolt enter an eighth of an inch —
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positively swearing to its insecurity. A former employee of the

house testified also to the insecurity of the bolt on the door

of this room.

On the other side, the proprietor of the hotel and the defend-

ant in this suit, with his clerk, and two or three detectives em-

ployed by him, swore that the lock and bolt were perfectly

good, and that the plaintiff said to them that he was uncertain

about having locked the door, but knew he had not bolted it.

The proprietor admitted that he had changed the notice in

some of the rooms. It was testified by the plaintiff and wife

that there was no notice of any sort on their door or in their

room when they went to breakfast, but after their loss was

known, on their return after breakfast they found one posted

on their door.

The motion for a new trial is based on grounds which may

be reduced to three: first, that the register of the hotel where

the plaintiff entered his name was admitted illegally in evi-

dence; secondly, that the charge of the court on the subject of

notice was erroneous; and thirdly, that the verdict is not sup-

ported by the evidence and is against the law of the ease.

[After holding that notice in the register was *'not posted"

as required by the statute]

3. This left as the sole questions for trial, was the plaintiff

negligent, and was the loss the consequence of that negligence?

The presumption of law is that the defendant, the landlord,

was negligent, and his negligence caused the loss. Code, §

2120. That section declares that "in case of loss the presump-
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tion is want of proper diligence in the landlord." So the ease

stands precisely as though the plaintiff had proved gross neg-

ligence on the defendant. What "negligence or default by the

guest himself, of which the loss is a consequence," and which

the same section 2120 enacts shall be "a sufficient defense," by

the landlord to show, in order to rebut the presumption the law

fixes on him, is proved in this record ? No regulation of the ho-

tel was made known to him; no express agreement was made

with him; the articles stolen were in the room assigned him.

Their deposits in that room, by section 2118 of the Code, was

a delivery to this innkeeper, and he must make good their loss,

unless the negligence of the guest caused it. and that the land-

lord must prove.

Was the plaintiff negligent in putting his clothes and watch

on the lounge? or in leaving his money in the pocketbook with

his clothes? or in not bolting the door, if he did not, in the ab-

sence of any notice of a regulation that he must? We can not

see, that whilst it may have been carelessness to some extent,
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any thing of this sort, in the absence of notice of some rule

or regulation, is such negligence as will relieve the landlord

of that gross negligence of which the law presumes him guilty.

The entire room is safe for the guest, if he comply with the

rules of the inn. The deposit of any thing in it is a deposit

with the landlord — a delivery to him; unless therefore notified

that he must not leave it in that room, it is not negligence to

do so.

Even if notice had been published to him according to law to

deposit valuables in another place, it would not apply to travel-

ing money and a watch of reasonable amount and value. Petti-

grew V. Barnum, 11 Md. 434, 69 Am. D. 212 ; Maltby v. Chap-

man, 25 id. 310 ; Berkshire Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush. 417 ; Wilkins

V. Earle, 44 N. Y. 172, 4 Am. R. 655.

In the absence of notice of a rule of the inn to lock and bolt

the door, the failure to do so is not legal negligence at common

law. Morgan v. Ravey, 6 H. & N. 265 ; Buddenburg v. Benner,

1 Hilt. 84; Classen v. Leopold, 2 Sweeny, 705; Gile v. Libby,

36 Barb. 70-78. Our statutes have not altered this rule. The

fact that negligence is a question for the jury under our law

and practice hardly can so alter the law as to prevent the courts

from supervising their finding and setting the verdict aside

where there is no evidence of legal negligence. So that con-

ceding that plaintiff did not lock and bolt his door, and that

the lock and bolt were perfect, in the absence of notice of a

regulation published to him according to law, he would not be

legally negligent in not doing so; and certainly in the absence
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of legal notice to deposit valuables in the safe or at the office,

he was not in the eye of the law negligent in not depositing

there the money he used on his travels, and the accompaniment

of his person, his watch.

[Omitting a question of evidence.]

On the conflict of testimony on these points, however, it is

not our habit to interfere with the finding of the jury; and a

reversal of the court below is put on the points that the register

was improperly admitted in evidence ; that the charge on the

subject of the notice, which the register was illegally admitted

to give, is therefore erroneous ; and that without notice of some

reasonable rule or regulation of the inn to the guest, there is

no sufficient proof in law of negligence in the plaintiff, which

caused his loss, to rebut and overcome that gross negligence

which the law fixes by its positive presumption upon the land-

lord.

Judgment reversed.
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OF COMMON CARRIERS.

CHAPTER X.

OF COMMON aVRRIERS OF GOODS.

(jlf 7C62. FISH V. CHAPMAN,

2 Ga. 349; 46 Am. D. 393. 1847.

Action on a special contract of carriage.

By Court, Nisbet, J. The plaintiff in error, William Fish,

received at the then head of the Central Railroad from the

agent of transportation on that road, certain packages of goods

belonging to the defendants in error, Chapman & Ross, which

by a special contract he promised to deliver in good order and

condition at Macon, unavoidable accidents only excepted. In

attempting to cross a stream his wagon was upset and the goods

damaged. Chapman & Ross brought suit against him to re-

cover the loss sustained by the injury done to the goods. A

number of points are made in the assignment, and some of

them of great practical importance in this community. They

grow out of the construction which the court below put upon
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the contract for the carrying of these goods above recited. I

shall not consider each point separately, believing that all of

them will be discussed and decided in those which I shall par-

ticularly notice.

The court below decided that the plaintiff in error under his

contract with Chapman & Ross was a common carrier, to which

opinion he excepts. The evidence upon this point is the con-

tract and nothing more. It does not appear that carrying was

his habitual business; all that does appear from the record is,

that he undertook upon a special contract, and upon this occa-

sion, to haul on his o"\vn wagon for a compensation specified,

the goods of the defendants from the then terminus of the Cen-

tral Railroad to the city of Macon. Does such an undertaking

make him a common carrier? That is the question, and w^e are

inclined to answer it in the negative. A common carrier is one

who undertakes to transport from place to place for hire, the
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goods of such persons as think fit to employ him. Such is a

proprietor of wagons, barges, lighters, merchant ships, or other

instruments for the public conveyance of goods. See Mr.

Smith's able commentary on the case of Coggs v. Bernard, 1

Smith's Lead. Cas. 369, 7th Am. ed. ; Forward v. Pittard, 1 T.

R. 27; Morse v. Slue, 2 Lev. 69; S. C, 1 Vent. 190; S. C, Id.

238 ; Rich v. Kneeland, Cro. Jac. 330 ; Maving v. Todd, 1 Stark.

72; Brooke v. Pickwick, 4 Bing. 218. Railway companies are

common carriers: Palmer v. Grand Junction Railway Co., 4

Mee. & W. 749.

"Common carriers (says Chancellor Kent) undertake gener-

ally and for all people indifiPerently, to convey goods and deliver

them at a place appointed, for hire, and with or without a

special agreement as to price:" 2 Kent, 598. "It is not (says

Mr. Justice Story) every person who undertakes to carry goods

for hire, that is deemed a common carrier. A private person

may contract with another for the carriage of his goods and in-

cur no responsibility beyond that of an ordinary b aile e for Jnre,
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that is to say, the responsibility of ordinary diligence. To bring

a person under the description of a common carrier, he must

exercise it as a public employment ; he must undertake to carry

goods for persons generally, and he must hold himself out as

ready to engage in the transportation of goods for hire, as a

business and not as a casual occupation pro hue vice:" Story on

Bail., sec. 495. A common carrier is bound to convey the goods

of any person offering to pay his hire, unless his carriage be al-

ready full, or the risk sought to be imposed upon him extraor-

dinary, or unless the goods be of a sort which he can not convey

or is not in the habit of conveying: Jackson v. Rogers, 2 Show.

327; Riley v. Home, 5 Bing. 217; Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym.

646; Edwards v. Sherratt, 1 East, 604; Batson v. Donovan, 4

Barn. & Aid. 21 ; 2 Kent, 598 ; Elsee v. GatWard, 5 T. R. 143 ;

Dwight v. Brewster, 1 Pick. 50, 11 Am. Dec. 133; Jencks v.

Coleman, 2 Sumn. 221 ; Story on Bail. 322, 323 ; Patton v. Ma-

grath, Dudley's L. and Eq. 159, 31 Am. Dec. 552.

It will be seen hereafter we hold that according to the com-

mon law, as of force in this country in 1776, a common carrier

can not vary or limit his liability by notice or special accept-

ance, and shall advert to this subject again. For the present

we state the proposition broadly, that he is in the nature of an

insurer of the goods intrusted to his care, and is responsible for

every injury sustained by them occasioned by any means what-

ever, except only the act of God and the king's enemies: 1 Inst.

89, Dale v. Hall, 1 Wils. 281 ; Covington v. Willan, Gow. 115 ;

Davis V. Garrett, 6 Bing. 716 ; 2 Kent. 597 ; Coggs v. Bernard,
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2 Ld. Raym. 918 ; Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R. 27 ; Trent Nav.

Co. V. Wood, 3 Esp. 127; Riley v. Ilorne, 5 Bing. 217. It is

from these definitions, and from the two propositions stated,

that we are to determine what constitutes a person a common

carrier. I infer then that the business of carrying must be

habitual and not casual. An occasional undertaking to carry

goods will not make a person a common carrier; if it did, then

it is hard to determine who, in a planting and commercial com-

munity like ours, is not one ; there are few planters in our own

state owning a wagon and team, who do not occasionally con-

tract to carry goods. It would be contrary to reason, and ex-

cessively burdensome, nay, enormously oppressive, to subject a

man to the responsibilities of a common carrier, who might

once a year, or oftener at long intervals, contract to haul goods

from one point in the state to another. Such a rule would be

exceedingly inconvenient to the whole community, for if estab-

lished, it might become difficult in certain districts of our state

to procure transportation.
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The undertaking must be general and for all people indiffer-

ently. The undertaking may be evidenced by the carrier's own

notice, or practically by a series of acts, by his known habitual

continuance in this line of business. He must thus assume to be

the servant of the public, he must undertake for all people. A

special undertaking for one man does not make a wagoner, or

anybody else, a common carrier. I am very well aware of

the importance of holding wagoners in this country to a rigid

accountability; they are from necessity greatly trusted, valu-

able interests are committed to them, and they are not always

of the most careful, sober, and responsible class of our citizens.

Still the necessity of an inflexible adherence to general rules

we can not and wish not to escape from. To guard this point,

therefore, we say, that he who follows wagoning for a liveli-

hood, or he who gives out to the world in any intelligible way

that he will take goods or other things for transportation from

place to place, whether for a year, a season, or less time, is a

common carrier and subject to all his liabilities. One of the

obligations of a common carrier, as we have seen, is to carry

the goods of any person offering to pay his hire; with certain

specific limitations this is the rule. If he refuse to carry, he is

liable to be sued, and to respond in damages to the person

aggrieved, and this is perhaps the safest test of his character.

By this test was Mr. Fish a common carrier? There is no evi-

dence to make him one but his contract with Chapman & Ross.

Suppose that after executing this contract, another application

had been made to him to carry goods, which he refused, could

210

FISH V. CHAPMAN. § 62

he be made liable in damages for such refusal upon this evi-

dence? Clearly not. There is not a case in the books, but one,

to which I shall presently advert, which would make him liable

upon proof of a single carrying operation.

The extent of his liability, and his inability to vary that lia-

bility by notice or special acceptance, is another test. A com-

mon carrier is liable at all events, but for the act of God and

the king's enemies; and he can not limit or vary that liability.

Whereas a carrier for hire in a particular case, is only answer-

able for ordinary neglect, unless he by express contract assumes

the risk of a common carrier; his liability may be regulated by

his contract. We do not think this undertaking would give to

Mr. Fish that character which would preclude him from defin-

ing his liability in any other contract. By this contract he may

be liable pro hac vice as a common carrier, for that is a different

thing. Upon these views we predicate the opinion, that the

plaintiff in error was not a common carrier. From the way in

which the opinion of the court is expressed in the bill of excep-
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tions, I am left somewhat in doubt whether the able judge pre-

siding in this cause intended to say that the plaintiff in error

was a common carrier, or that under his contract he was liable

as such. If the former, we think he erred; and if the latter,

as we shall mare fully show, we think with him. In either

event we shall not send the case back; for if he meant to say

that the plaintiff upon general principles was a common carrier,

thinking, as we do, that he is liable under this contract as such,

he will not be benefited by the case's going back.

In conflict with these views, it has been held in Pennsylvania,

that "a wagoner who carries goods for hire, is a common car-

rier, whether transportation be his principal and direct busi-

ness, or an occasional and incidental employment:" Gibson, C.

J., in Gordon v. Hutchinson, 1 Watts & S. 285, 37 Am. Dec.

464. This decision no doubt contemplates an undertaking to

carry generally, without a special contract, and does not deny

to the undertaker the right to define his liability. There are

cases in Tennessee and New Hampshire which favor the Penn-

sylvania rule, but there can be but little doubt that that case is

opposed to the principles of the common law, and its rule

wholly inexpedient : See Story on Bail., sees. 457, 495 ; Bac.

Abr., Carriei", A. ; Robinson v. Dunmore, 2 Bos. & Pul. 416 ;

Hodgson V. Fullarton, 4 Taunt. 787; Jones' Bail., 121; Satterlee

V. Groat, 1 Wend. 272; Hatchwell v. Cooke, 6 Taunt. 577; 2

Kent, 597. Assuming, then, that Mr. Fish was not a common

carrier, what is he? This is a bailment for hire, '^locatio operis

rnerciiim vehendaruni;" the fifth in the learned classification of
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bailments, made by Holt, C. J., in Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld.

Eaym. 918. Mr. Fish is a private person contracting to earrj-

for hire. The next question is, what are his liabilities? And

this brings us to the main point of error charged upon the court

below, and that is, that it erred in ruling that according to his

contract the plaintiff in error was liable as a common carrier.

In all cases of carrying for hire by a private person, we state

that he is bound to ordinary diligence and a reasonable exer-

cise of skill, and is not responsible for any losses DLOJt.aacasioned

by ordinary negligence, unless he has expressly, by -the terms

of his contract, taken upon himself such risk : Story on Bail.,

sec. 457 ; Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 917, 918 ; Hodg-

son V. Fullarton, 4 Taunt. 787 ; Hatchwell v. Cooke, 6 Id. 577 ;

2 Marsh. Ins. 293; Jones on Bail. 103, 106, 121; 1 Bell's Com.

461, 463, 467; Robinson v. Dunmore, 2 Bos. & Pul. 416; Brind

V. Dale, 8 Car. & P. 207 ; 2 Kent, 597.

In this case there is a special contract defining the party's lia-

bility, and he does not, therefore, come under the rule last
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stated; he is liable according, to his contract. There are two

things to be carefully noted in it, to wit: 1. The undertaking

of the bailee (having, as the receipt expresses it, received the

goods in "good order and condition"), to deliver them "in like

good order and condition ; " 2. The qualification of the liability

of the bailee, which is expressed in these words, to wit, "un-

avoidable accidents only excepted." As we understand it, the

contract means that the plaintiff in error will deliver the goods

in good order and condition, unless prevented by unavoidable

accident. If the exception were out of the contract, what then

would be the liability of Mr. Fish? Upon the authority of the

case of Robinson v. Dunmore, 2 Bos. & Pul. 416, I should be

inclined to hold that the undertaking to deliver the goods in

good order and condition, is equivalent to a warranty to carry

them safely, or to deliver them safely. If it is, Mr. Fish, ac-

cording to that ease, would be liable as a common carrier: See

Story on Bail., see. 457; Robinson v. Dunmore, 2 Bos. & Pul.

416, supra.

But we do not rest our decision upon this view of the con-

tract; we look at that with the exception in it. Wliat, then, is

the effect of the exception? "We think it is to make him liable

at all events, and for everything except for unavoidable acci-

dents. It remains, then, to inquire into and determine what is

the legal meaning and effect of these words. And, first, it may

be material to say, that the word unavoidable is not the word

usually used in the books in this connection, but inevitable.

And, further, to say, that these words are in legal as well as
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common parlance, synonymous. Unavoidable accidents are, in

our opinion, the acts of God. The latter words express the

same acts, and no more than the former ; the two phrases mean

the same thing: See Story on Bail., sees. 25, 511; 2 Kent. 597.

What, then, are acts of God or unavoidable accidents? For

it is from these only that this party is protected. By the act of

God is meant, any accident produced by physical causes which

are irresistible; such as lightning, storms, perils of the sea,

earthquakes, inundations, sudden death, or illness: Story on

Bail., sec. 25; 2 Kent, 597. The act of God excludes all idea

of human agency: McArthur and Hurlbut v. Sears, 21 Wend.

190. In this case it is said, "no matter what degree of pru-

dence may be exercised by the carrier or his servants, although

the delusion by which it is baffled, or the force by which it is

overcome be inevitable, yet, if it be the result of human means,

the carrier is responsible : ' ' See also Backhouse v. Sneed, 1 Mur-

phy, 173 ; 2 Bailey, 157 ; Id. 421. As the exception in this con-

tract extends only to unavoidable accident, or acts of God,
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and does not embrace the king's enemies, the bailee could not be

protected from liability of losses occasioned by them. Even if

the goods had been destroyed by the public enemy, he would

have, in that event, been liable. The liability of common car-

riers goes even yet further; for if goods committed to them

are lost by their neglect, through the agency of natural causes

which are in themselves irresistible, they are liable; so rigid and

severe are the obligations and duties of this common but not

very well understood calling. Our opinion is, then, that the

exception of unavoidable accidents excludes all other excep-

tions in this case, " expressio unius est exclusio alterius."

And that Mr. Fish was liable atall events and on every ac-

count, but for losses occasioned Tiyl'unavoidable accidents ; that

unavoidable or inevitable accidents are the same with the acts

of God; and as common carriers are liable for losses on every

account but for the acts of God and the king's enemies, so,

therefore, is his liability the same as that of a common carrier,

except in so far as it is greater in this, that he is not, by his

contract, protected as the common carrier is at common law,

against losses caused by the public enemy. The upsetting of

the wagon on a decayed bridge across a stream, which was the

accident which occasioned the loss in this case, is not, in our

judgment, an unavoidable accident. We therefore find no error

in the court, in holding that ]\Tr. Fish was on his contract liable'

as a common carrier. With these views of this contract, we do

not conceive that it is at all important to say a word upon the

question of negligence.
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I have said that a common carrier can not vary his liability,

as it existed at common law in 1776, by notice or special ?>«-

ceptance. On account of the importance of this subject, I

propose to give it a more minute exposition. This is an age of

railroads, steamboat companies, stage companies, locomotion,

and transportation. It is an era of stir — men and goods run to

and fro — and common carriers are multiplied. The convenience

of the people and safety of property depend more now, I ap-

prehend, upon the rules which regulate the liability of these

public ministers, than at any other period of the world's his-

tory. Steam, as a transporting power, has supplanted almost

all other agencies, and it is used for the most part by public

companies or associations. It is very important that their lia-

bility should not only be accurately defined, but publicly de-

clared. Anterior to 1776, the common carrier was an insurer

for the delivery of goods intrusted to him, and liable for losses

occasioned by all causes except the act of God and the king's

enemies, and without the power to limit his responsibility.
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That this was the law, is proven by the numerous authorities

which I have before referred to. No adjudication before that

time had relaxed its stringent but salutary severity. It is of

consequence to establish this fact, because the common law, as

it was usually of force before the revolution, is made obligatory

upon this court by our adapting statute. It is said by Mr.

Story, that Lord Coke recognized the right of modification, in

a note to Southcote's Case; and also, that this right was admit-

ted in Morse v. Slue, 1 Vent. 238. These are dicta which recog-

nized the right before the era of 1776. And these are not

adjudications — mere dicta, unsupported by authoritative decis-

ions — they reverse nothing, establish nothing. Mr. Story does

not himself claim that there was any modification of the rule

before that era. He does say, that the right to modify their

common law liability "is now (1832) fully recognized:" Story

on Bail., see. 549. All the cases (and they are numerous) in

support of his statement, are since our revolution. We do not,

however, question that statement. Chancellor Kent says: ''The

doctrine of the carrier's exemption by means of notice, from

his extraordinary responsibility, is said not to have been known

until the ease of Forward v, Pittard, 1 T. R. 27, in 1785, and

it was finally recognized and settled by judicial decision, in

Nicholson v. Willan, 5 East, 507, in 1804:" 2 Kent, 606.

The saying to which the chancellor has reference was made

in 1818 by Burrough, J., in Smith v. Home, 8 Taunt. 144, and

in this : ' ' The doctrine of notice was never known until the case

of Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R. 27, which I argued many years
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ago." "I lament that the doctrine of notice was ever introduced

into Westminster Hall." The case then of Forward v. Pittard

is the first in which the doctrine of notice is recognized accord-

ing to Mr. Justice Burrough, and that was in 1785. It was not

until 1804, that it was finally settled by judicial decision in

Nicholson v. Willan, 5 East, 507. Twenty-eight years after the

declaration of independence, the question of notice in all its

bearings was reviewed with great learning and ability in Ilollis-

ter V. Nowlen, 19 "Wend. 234, 32 Am. Dee. 455. I refer to that

case now simply for the purpose of saying that the learned judge

in that opinion declared "that the doctrine that a carrier may

limit his responsibility by notice, was wholly unknown to the

common law at the time of our revolution. Thus we think it is

made manifest, that in 1776, by the common law, a carrier could

not limit or modify his extraordinary responsibility by notice.

That it has been allowed since that time we admit, and to this

point see Nicholson v. Willan, 5 East, 507 ; Clay v. Willan, 1 H.

Bl. 298; Harris v. Packwood, 3 Taunt. 264; Evans v. Soule, 2
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Mau. & Sel. 1 ; Smith v. Home, 8 Taunt. 146 ; Batson v. Don-

ovan, 4 Barn. & Aid. 39 ; Riley v. Home, 5 Bing. 217 ; Bodenham

V. Bennett, 4 Price, 34; Down v. Fromont, 4 Camp. 41. Still,

however, in England, by common law, since the revolution, a

carrier can not by special agreement exempt himself from all re-

sponsibility, so as to evade altogether the policy of the law; he

can not exempt himself from liability in case of gross negligence

and fraud : Story on Bail., sec. 549 ; Eiley v. Home, 5 Bing. 218 ;

S. C, 2 Moo. & P. 331, 341 ; Sleat v. Fagg, 5 Barn. & Aid. 342 ;

Wright V. Snell, Id. 350 ; Birkett v. Willan, 2 Id. 356 ; Beck v.

Evans, 3 Camp. 267; S. C, 16 East, 244; Smith v. Home, 4

Price, 31 ; S. C, 2 Moore, 18 ; Newborn v. Just, 2 Car. & P. 76.

"It is perfectly well settled (we quote from Kent) that the car-

rier, notwithstanding notice has been given and brought home

to the party, continues responsible for any loss or damage re-

sulting from gross negligence or misfeasance in him or his serv-

ants:" 2 Kent, 607. The notices which are allowed in England

since the revolution, go only the length of protecting the car-

rier from that responsibility which belongs to him as an insurer.

A distinction is sought to be drawn in some of the books be-

tween a notice carried home to the knowledge of the bailor and

a special acceptance or contract. I can not see that there is any

diff^erence. A notice contains the terms and conditions upon

which the carrier will serve the public, or some limitation of his

extraordinary responsibility, which when known and acted upon

by his customer, is a contract, as much so as if the same stipu-

lations were made by a separate contract with each individual
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customer. The only difference is in the mode of proof; the rule

of evidence is different, and that is all. It has been so decided,

particularly in New York: Gould v. Hill, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 624;

Cole V. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 281, 32 Am. Dec. 470.

It may be safely asserted that the American decisions, with

scarcely an exception, sustain the old common-law doctrine.

Mr. Wallace, in his notes to Smith's Leading Cases, holds the

following language: "That it is possible for a common carrier

by either a general notice or a special acceptance to limit his ex-

traordinary liability, is a position which it is believed is not sup-

ported by the authority of any adjudged case in the United

States:" 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. 183. The reverse doctrine is

permanently settled in New York. We, then, adhere to the

sound principles of the common law, sifstained by the coTtfts^f

our oMTi union, and hold notices, receipts, and contracts, inje-

striction of the liability of a common carrier, as known and

enforced in 1776, void, because they contravene the policy_pf

the law : Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234, 32 Am. Dec. 455 ;
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Camden and Amboy Transportation Company v. Belknap, 21

Id. 355; Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Id. 251, 32 Am. Dec. 470; Gould

V. Hill, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 623; Alexander v. Greene, 3 Id. 9, 20;

Story on Bail., 4th ed., 558, note; Atwood v. Eeliance T. Co.,

9 Watts, 87 ; Barney v. Prentiss, 4 Harr. & J. 317, 7 Am. Dec.

670; Jones v. Voorhees, 10 Ohio, 145; 2 Kent, 608, note. The

British parliament, declaring the sense of the British lawyers

to a very great extent, has restored the old law as to the respon-

sibility of carriers. See stat. 11, Geo. IV., and stat. 1, Wm.

IV., c. 68; for these statutes, consult 1 Harr. Dig. 551, tit.

Carriers, 4th ed., 1837 ; also, Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 243,

249, 32 Am. Dec. 455; and Smith's Mercantile Law, 233, 238,

2d Lond. ed., 1838.

The only modification of the common law rule which we ad-

mit, is the right of the carrier, by notice brought home to the

passenger, to require the latter to state the nature and value of

the property bailed, and to avail himself of any fraudulent acts

or sayings of the bailor: Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251, 32

Am. Dec. 470; Camden etc. R. R. Co. v. Belknap, 21 Id.

354; Id. 153; Gould v. Hill, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 623. The reasons

given by eminent jurists in support of the law of carriers, as

we now hold it, are entirely satisfactory, and apply with far

greater force now than when they were announced. Holt,-C.

J., in his opinion in Coggs v. Bernard, an opinion which alone

has made him immortal, calls it, "a politic establishment, con-

trived by the policy of the law for the safety of all persons, the

uecessity of whose affairs oblige them to trust these sort of per-
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sons, that they may be safe in their ways of dealings, for else

these carriers might have an opportunity of undoing all per-

sons that had any dealings with them, by combining with

thieves, etc., and yet doing it in such a clandestine manner as

would not be possible to be discovered. And that is the reason

the law is founded upon in that point."

In Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R. 27, Lord Mansfield says: "The

law presumes against the carrier, to prevent litigation, collusion,

and the necessity of going into circumstance's impossible to be

unraveled." It is not the reward which he gets by virtue of

his contract which charges him as an insurer; it is true, that he

is paid for his risks, but it is because he is in fact a public offi-

cer, in whose fidelity the public is compelled to trust, and whose

infidelity it is so difficult, if not impossible, to establish by

proof. The place of the carrier is a public of^ce. In Ansell

V. Waterhouse, 2 Chit. 1, Holroyd, J., said: "This action is

founded on what is quite collateral to the contract, if any; and

the terms of the contract, unless changing the duty of a com-
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mon carrier, are in this case quite immaterial. The declaration

states an obligation imposed upon him by law. This is an action

against a person who, by ancient law, held as it were a public

office, and was bound to the public. This action is founded on

the general obligation of the law." The reasons of the rule may

be summed up as follows :

The carrier is recognized as a public agent; for his services

he is entitled to ample reward, and is not bound to perform

them unless it is paid or tendered; ex necessitate rei the most

unqualified confidence is reposed in him; this confidence is in-

dispensable to the exercise of his vocation. From the nature

of his calling, the utmost facilities are at his control for fraudu-

lent conduct and collusive combinations, and for the same rea-

son his frauds or combinations are difficult of proof. He enters

into this line of business voluntarily, and with a knowledge of

all its hazards, for he is justly presumed to know the laws of

the land. The law, then, looking to the great interests of com-

tnerse, and guarding with parental care the rights of the great-

est number, makes him an insurer of the property delivered to

him. With what resistless force does not this reasoning apply

to the ten thousand incorporations of our own country ? Strong

in associated wealth; strong in the mind which is usually en-

listed in their management; and yet stronger, far stronger, in

the large immunities and extraordinary privileges with which

their charters invest them. If these, as carriers, can vary their

liability at all, at what limits does the power stop? Wliere are

its boundaries 1 Outside of the obligations which their charters
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impose, there would be neither bounds not limitations; the citi-

zens would be at their mercy, bound by their power and subject

to their caprices. The inconveniences of the modern English

rule are well portrayed by Bronson, J., in his opinion in Hollis-

ter V. Nowlen, supra, while exhibiting its effects in England :

"Departing as it did (says Mr. Bronson) from the simplicity

and certainty of the common law rule, it proved one of the most

fruitful sources of legal controversy which has existed in mod-

ern times. "When it was once settled that a carrier might re-

strict his liability by a notice brought to his employer, a multi-

tude of questions sprung up in the courts which no human

foresight could have anticipated. Each carrier adopted such a

form of notice as he thought best calculated to shield himself

from responsibility without the loss of employment, and the

legal effect of each particular form of notice could only be set-

tled by judicial decision. Whether one who had given notice

that he would not be answerable for goods beyond a certain

value, unless specially entered and paid for, was liable in case
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of loss to the extent of the value mentioned in the notice, or

was discharged altogether; whether notwithstanding the notice

he was liable for a loss by negligence, and if so, what degree of

negligence would charge him ; what should be sufficient evidence

that the notice came to the knowledge of the employer ; whether

it should be left to the jury to presume that he saw it in a news-

paper which he was accustomed to read, or observed it posted

up in the office where the carrier transacted his business, and

then, whether it was painted in large or small letters; and

whether the owner went himself or sent his servant with the

goods, and whether the servant could read — these and many

other questions were debated in the courts whilst the public

suffered an almost incalculable injury in consequence of the

doubt and uncertainty which hung over this important branch

of the law." Well might the judges lament that the doctrine

was ever admitted into Westminster hall: See 1 Bell's Com.

474.

Thus, whether satisfactorily or not, have we disposed of the

real questions made in this cause. Let the judgment of the

court below be affirmed.
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63. ALLEN V. SACKRIDER,

37 N. Y. 311. 1867.

Parker, J. The action was brought against the defendants

to charge them, as common carriers, with damage to a quantity

of grain shipped by the plaintiffs in the sloop of the defendants,

to be transported from Trenton, in the province of Canada, to

Ogdensburgh, in this state, which accrued from the wetting

of the grain in a storm.

The case was referred to a referee, who found as follows:

"The plaintiffs in the fall of 1859 were partners, doing a busi-

ness at Ogdensburgh. The defendants were the owners of the

sloop Creole, of which Farnham was master. In the fall of

1859, the plaintiffs applied to the defendants to bring a load

of grain from the bay of Quinte to Ogdensburgh. The master

stated that he was a stranger to the bay, and did not know

whether his sloop had capacity to go there. Being assured by

the plaintiff's that she had, he engaged for the trip at three

cents per bushel, and performed it with safety. In November,
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1859, plaintiffs again applied to defendants to make another

similar trip for grain, and it was agreed at $100 for the trip.

The vessel proceeded to the bay, took in a load of grain, and on

her return was driven on shore, and the cargo injured to the

amount of $1,346.34; that the injury did not result from the

want of ordinary care, skill or foresight, nor was it the result

of inevitable accident or what in law is termed the act of God.

From these facts my conclusions of law are that the defendants

were special carriers, and only liable as such, and not as com-

mon carriers, and that the proof does not establish such facts

as would make the defendants liable as special carriers; and

therefore the plaintiffs have no cause of action against them."

The only question in the case is, were the defendants common

carriers? The facts found by the referee do not I think make

the defendants common carriers. They owned a sloop; but it

does not appear that it was ever offered to the public or to in-

dividuals for use, or ever put to any use, except in the two

trips which it made for the plaintiffs, at their special request.

Nor does it appear that the defendants were engaged in the

business of carrying goods, or that they held themselves out to

the world as carriers, or had ever offered their services as such.

This casual use of the sloop in transporting plaintiff's' property

falls short of proof sufficient to show them common carriers.

A common carrier' was defined in Gisbourn v. Hurst, 1 Salk.

249, to be "any man undertaking for hire, to carry the goods
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of all persons indifferently;" and in Dwight v. Brewster, 1 Pick.

50; 11 Am. Dec. 133, to be "one who undertook for hire to

transport the goods of such as choose to employ Mm from place

to place." In Orange Bank v. Brown, 3 Yfend. 161, Chief Jus-

tice Savage said: "Every person w^ho undertakes to carry for

a compensation, the goods of all persons indifferently, is as to the

liability imposed, to be considered a common carrier. The dis-

tinction between a common carrier and a private or special

carrier is, that the former holds himself out in common, that

is to all persons who choose to employ him, as ready to carry for

hire; while the latter agrees in some special case with some pri-

vate individual to carry for hire." Story Cont., § 752, a. The

employment of a common carrier is a public one, and he assumes

a public duty, and is bound to receive and carry the goods of

any one who offers. "On the whole," says Prof. Parsons, "it

seems to be clear that no one can be considered as a common

carrier, unless he has in some way held himself out to the

public as a carrier, in such a manner as to render him liable
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to an action if he should refuse to carry for any one who

wished to employ him." 2 Pars. Cont. (5th ed.) 166, note.

The learned counsel for the appellant in effect recognizes the

necessity of the carrier holding himself out to the world as such

in order to invest him with the character and responsibilities of

a common carrier; and to meet that necessity says: "The Cre-

ole was a freight vessel, rigged and manned suitably for carry-

ing freight from port to port; her appearance in the harbor of

Ogdensburgh, waiting for business, was an emphatic advertise-

ment that she sought employment." These facts do not appear

in the findings of the referee, and therefore can not, if they

existed, help the appellants upon this appeal.

It is not claimed that the defendants are liable unless as com-

mon carriers. Very clearly they were not common carriers;

and the judgment should therefore be affirmed.

All concurring.

Judgment affirmed.

7^4. HALE V. NEW JERSEY STEAM NAVIGATION CO.,

15 Conn. 539; 39 Am. D. 398. 1843.

Action on the case for the loss of two carriages by defendants

as common carriers.

Williams, C. J. This suit was brought for two carriages,

shipped on board the Lexington, against the defendants, as com-
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mon carriers, to be transported in said boat for hire, from New

York to Bo.':;ton or Providence. The boat and goods were de-

stroyed by fire in the sound ; and a verdict being given for the

plaintiff, the defendants excepted to the charge, and claimed:

1. That they were not common carriers, nor subject to the

rules that govern common carriers. It was long since settled,

that any man, undertaking for hire to carry the goods of all

persons indifferently, from place to place, is a common carrier;

Gisbourn v. Hurst, 1 Salk. 249. Common carriers, says Judge

Kent, consist of two distinct classes of men, viz., inland car-

riers by land or water, and carriers by sea, and in the aggregate

body are included the owners of stage-coaches, who carry goods,

as well as passengers, for hire, wagoners, teamsters, cartmen,

the masters and owners of ships, vessels and all water craft, in-

cluding steam vessels, and steam tow-boats belonging to inter-

nal, as well as coasting and foreign navigation, lightermen, and

ferrymen; 2 Kent's Com. 598, 2d ed. And. there is no, difference

bfitweoLa land_and-a water, carrier : Proprietors of Trent Navi-
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gation V. AA^ood, 3 Esp. Cas. 127 ; Elliott v. Rossell, 10 Johns, 7,

6 Am. Dec. 306 ; Story on Bail. 319, 323.

But it is said the rule established is a harsh one, and ought

not to be extended. Chancellor Kent takes a very different

view of it. He speaks of it as a great principle of public policy,

which has proved to be of eminent value to the morals and

commerce of the nation: 2d vol. 602; and with similar views,

this court has said, we are not dissatisfied with the reasons

which originated the responsibility of common carriers, and be-

lieve they apply, with peculiar force, at this day, and in this

country, as it respects carriers by water, more especially upon

which element a spirit of dangerous adventure has grown up,

which disregards the safety, not of property merely, but of

human life; Crosby v. Fitch, 12 Conn. 419, 31 Am. Dec. 745.

And while we are not called upon to extend the principle, j£e.

can not yield to the argument that common carriers are not to

be responsible when the loss arises from the producing agent

of the propelling power.

If the defendants are common carriers, the question must be

merely what are the liabilities of common carriers'? The an-

swer is, for all losses, even inevitable accidents, except they

arise from the act of God, or the public enemy: 2 T. R. 34; 2

Ld. Raym. 918. And by the act of God is meant, something

superhuman, or something in opposition to the act of man:

Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R. 33. In all cases except of that de-

scription^ the carriers warrant the safe delivery of the goods ; per

Kent, C. J., Elliott V. Rossell, 10 Johns. 7, 6 Am. D. 306; and
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masters and owners of vessels are liable as common carriers, as

well at sea as in port. And the chief justice says that the argu-

ment is not well supported, that this doctrine of the liability of

carriers, is, by the common law of England, to be confined to

transportations by water, without the jurisdiction of the realm.

All the books and all the cases, which touch the subject, lay down

the rule generally, and apply it, as well to shipments to and from

foreign ports, as to internal commerce. It is true that in Aymar

V. Astor, 6 Cow. 269, the then chief justice, without citing a

single authority, in giving the opinion of the court, says the

master of a vessel, I apprehend, is not responsible, as a common

carrier, for all losses, except they happen by the act of God or

the enemies of the country. That case has, it is believed, never

been treated as law in New York, or elsewhere. It is, indeed, re-

pugnant to prior decisions, says Judge Story. It is not to be

taken for sound law, says Judge Kent : 12 Conn. 414. And in

McArthur v. Sears, 21 Wend. 190, this case is treated as a con-

fessed anomaly, and disapproved as contrary to decisions in
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other states, and even in their own. And in a suit against the

owners of a steamboat on lake Erie, as common carriers, it was

held, that nothing would excuse them, except inevitable acci-

dent, without the intervention of man, and the act of public

enemies. Judge Cowen denies that this case tends to repeal the

law of liability of common carriers, and treats it as turning on

the exception in the bill of lading.

But it is said, there is no case where the liability is extended

to fire on the high seas. If the principle covers such cases, then

it is to be supposed the reason such cases are not to be found, is

that they have not occurred, or were not contested. If the car-

rier is subjected for the loss of goods burnt on land, where he

was in no fault, we see no reason for exempting the carrier at

sea, under similiar circumstances. We apprehend a rule of pol-

icy. Lord Mansfield says, in the case alluded to, to prevent liti-

gation, collusion, and the necessity of going into circumstances

impossible to be unraveled, the law presumes against the car-

riers. He is in the nature of an insurer. Every reason here

given applies as well to the OMOiers of a steamboat as to the

wagoner, whose carriage was burnt without his fault, in the

barn where he placed it — the same danger of collusion, of litiga-

tion, and the same difficulty in unraveling circumstances. If

the policy of the law requires that one shall be an insurer, we

think the same policy requires that the other should also be

so treated. And if it be true that trade will regulate itself

when the rule is understood, compensation will be made, not

only in proportion to the labor, but to the risk. And in a recent
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case in New York, steaiaboat owners are treated as other common

carriers: Powell et al. v. Myers, 26 Wend. 591.

It is stated, that by the laws of Louisiana a different rule pre-

vails in regard to steamboats ; but as the laws of that state are,

in a great measure, founded upon the civil law, they can have

but little influence here.

2. The defendants claim, in the next place, that they are not

liable because of the public notice which they gave, that they

would not be responsible for losses other than what arose from

the fault or negligence of their officers or servants; and they

claim, that by the common law a common carrier may limit his

responsibility, by express contract or by public notice given of

such intended limitation; in support of which they cite many

cases from the English books, where that doctrine, after some

diversity of opinion, has been recognized and settled. On the

part of the plaintiff, it is claimed that these decisions are mod-

ern — all since we were separated from that country — after a di-

versit}^ of opinion in the English courts, and now regretted by
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eminent judges, and not in accordance with the principles of the

common law; and that they have been rejected in New York as

not sound law; and that, as this contract was made in New

York, its construction must be regulated by that law. It be-

comes necessary, therefore, to determine by what law this con-

struction of the contract is to be governed.

It appears that this boat was in the business of transportation

from New York to Providence, that the plaintiff' owned car-

riages, which he wanted to have transported to Boston ; that the

defendants received them in New York, to convey them to Bos-

ton or Providence; and that they were lost in the sound off

Long Island, near Huntington; and the question is, by what

law is this contract to be governed? The rule upon that subject

is well settled, and has been often recognized by this court, that

contracts are to be construed according to the laws of the state

where made, unless it is presumed from their tenor, that they

were entered into with a view to the laws of some other state :

Bartsch v. Atwater, 1 Conn. 409, 416 ; Smith v. Mead, 3 Id. 255,

8 Am. Dec. 183; Brackett v. Norton, 4 Id. 520, 10 Am. Dec.

179. There is nothing in this case, either from the location of

the parties, or the nature of the contract, which shows, that they

could have had any other law in view, than that of the place

where it was made. Indeed, as the goods were shipped to be

transported from Boston to Providence, there would be the most

entire uncertainty what was to be the law of the case, if any

other rule was to prevail. We have, therefore, no doubt that

the law of New York, as to the duties and obligations of com-
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mon carriers, is to be the law of the case. And while we agree

with the defendants, that the modern English cases are as they

claim, and authorized the common carrier to limit his respon-

sibility by notice to that effect; we are equally clear, that the

courts in the state of New York have taken a very different view

of the subject, and held, that the rule of the common law as to

the liability of common carriers, was a rule founded upon sound

principles of policy, to protect the citizens from losses, the true

cause of which they could seldom detect; and that it ought not,

in this way, to be overthroT\'n or evaded. In Hollister v. Nowlen,

19 Wend. 23-i, 32 Am. Dec. 455, the supreme court of that

state decided, that where a_stage proprietor gave notice that jiU

baggage should be at the risk of the owner, no contract could

be implied from such notice, although it was brought home to

the owner. So, also, in the case of Cole v. Goodwin et ah. Id.

251, 32 Am. Dec. 470, a similar decision was made ; and no au-

thority or opinion in that state has been adduced to shake or in-

validate these decisions. Without, therefore, giving any opin-
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ion as to the law of this state, Avhich the case does not require,

we can not doubt that suchjinotice, by the laws, of N^w-York,

cann ot, in^apy manner, affect the liability of these defendants^

as common carriers. And these decisions are certainly sup-

ported, in a most able manner, by the learned judges who have

pronounced them.

3. On the trial below, the defendants also claimed, that a bill

of lading was gi^en restricting their liability, and by accepting

this, the plaintiffs- were precluded from any claim. On this

point the judge charged the jury, that by th^|,laws of New York,

-^ neither_thejLQtice, nor the^' bill of lading, would chiinge_the_

. liability of the defendants. To the last part of the charge, as

well as the first, the defendants object. But as the jury have

found there was no bill of lading, in this case, we do not see

any necessity for discussing that question; but will barely ad-

vert to the cases in the state of New York, which show the

ground upon which that opinion was based.

In Cole V. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251, 32 Am. Dee. 470, notice

was given, that all baggage was at the risk of the owner; of

which notice, it was proved, the plaintiff had knowledge. The

plaintiff got out of the stage, and left his trunk; and the car-

riage went on, and the trunk was lost; and Bronson. J., said,

that coach proprietors are answerable as common carriers, for

the baggage of passengers ; and that they can not limit their re-

sponsibility, by a general notice, brought home to the employ-

ers, are now settled questions, so far as this court is concerned.

And the court decided, that upon these facts, the plaintiff could
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recover. Judge Cowen, in an elaborate argument, held, that the

restrictions imposed upon common carriers for great public ob-

jects, can not be removed by any stipulations of the parties. It

is said, from what fell from Judge Bronson (who concurred in

the result) , in the former case, that he did not concur in this

opinion. In a subsequent case of Alexander v. Greene, 3 Hill,

20, Judge Bronson says, it is very questionable whether inn-

keepers and common carriers can contract for a limited liability.

And in a note, the reporter says, the case of Gould v. Hill, 2

Hill, 623, was not then decided. It was therefore thought, by

the judge who tried this cause, better that the jury should pass

upon the fact, and leave the question to be examined by this

court. As it is, we are not called upon to settle the law of New

York on the subject; much less would we intimate an opinion,

that it can be considered as the law of this state, though it is

supported with great learning and ingenuity.

4. The defendants, however, claim, that the court below, aside

from any question arising on the bill of lading, gave an opinion
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to the jury that, notwithstanding any stipulations of the par-

ties restricting the liability of the carriers, they would be liable

in this case. The judge who tried the cause below, had no idea

of any question of that kind. No claim was made but what

arose from the notice or the bill of lading. And we think, there

is nothing upon this motion which can be fairly referred to

anything else. What are the facts and claims stated in the

motion? The defendants claimed, they had given public notice

that they would not be liable for losses, except what arose

from want of care or liegligence on the part of their servants ;

and that their agents were not authorized to receive goods on

board, without delivering a bill of lading, containing such re-

strictions. They further claimed, that the plaintiff knew of

the notice given as above, and that they dealt with him upon

that understanding. They then complain, that as to the restric-

tions claimed by these notices in their bills of lading, they

could not, by the laws of Ncm'- York, limit their liability as com-

mon carriers. This charge met all the evidence offered by the

defendants; for the claim of the defendants is founded only

upon the notice and the bills of lading. They do, indeed, after

setting out their notice, claim, that the plaintiff dealt with

them upon that understanding. By this nothing can be meant

or intended, but the understanding which is implied from the

notice alluded to ; and any implication against the bailor, arising

from such knowledge or understanding, is explicitly repelled,

in the cases alluded to in Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234,

32 Am. Dec. 455. We think, therefore, that the question was
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fully presented to the jury. They have negatived the fact as

to the bill of lading; and the effect of the notice has been set-

tled by the supreme court of the state of New York. We do

not, therefore, see any ground for a new trial.

In this opinion the other judges concurred..

New trial not to be granted. \\ , - r*^ ^-^ •

G5. THOMPSON-HOUSTON ELECTRIC CO. V. SIMON.

20 Ore. 60; 25 Pac. B. 147; 23 Am. St. B. 86. 1890.

Lord, J. This is an action to condemn a right of way for

a street and suburban railway operated for the carrying of

passengers. A demurrer was filed to the complaint which was

sustained by the court below; and the plaintiff refusing to

proceed, judgment was rendered therein, from which this ap-

peal is taken. The contention of the plaintiff is, that our

statute authorizing the condemnation of land for a right of

way contemplates the exercise of such power as much by street

and suburban railways propelled by horse-power or electricity

as railroads where cars are propelled by steam. The argu-
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ment is, that section 3239, Hill's Code, which provides that

"a corporation organized for the construction of any railway"

may appropriate land for a right of way, by the use of the

phrase "any railway," ex vi termini includes street and subur-

ban railway corporations organized to transport passengers only,

and propelled by horse-power or electricity, as well as railroads

authorized to transport passengers and freight, and propelled

by steam; that the terms of the statute, viewed as a whole, in-

dicate and import that it was intended to authorize railway cor-

porations to condemn lands for the use of their road, whether

they were organized to carry passengers or freight, or both,

or whether they were propelled by steam or other power. To

strengthen the construction, that it is not necessary that the

railway corporation, however propelled, should be formed to

carry passengers and freight to entitle it to exercise the power

of eminent domain, and condemn lands for its use, the language

of section 3236 is relied upon as showing that this distinction

is not observed with reference to navigation corporations au-

thorized to construct portage railways, wherein it reads, ''for

the purposes of transporting freight or passengers across any

portage on the line of such navigation, .... in like manner

and with like effect as if such corporation had been formed

for such purpose." To this it is answered that every railway
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corporation for the construction of a railroad under the statute

for the condemnation of lands is a common carrier, and that

such a statute, being in derogation of common right, is

not to be extended by implication. Section 3254 of the statute,

authorizing the condemnation of land for a right of way, pro-

vides: "Every corporation formed under this chapter for the

construction of a railway, as to such road shall be deemed com-

mon carriers, and shall be entitled to collect and receive a just

compensation for transportation of persons or property over

such road." The argument is, that a common carrier is a car-

rier of goods for hire, and while a common carrier may

carry passengers, and combine the two employments of carry-

ing goods and passengers, as is almost universally done by rail-

roads, yet as a corporation for the construction of a railway it

can not be deemed a common carrier unless it is formed to carry

goods and passengers; that the legislature in delegating the

right of eminent domain intended only that such railroads

should be entitled to exercise it as were common carriers of
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freight and passengers; hence a corporation could not exercise

the right of eminent domain in the construction of a railway

organized to transport passengers only, and not freight. Much

of this argument is based on the technical definition of a com-

mon carrier, as one who undertakes for hire to transport the

goods of such as choose to employ him from place to place;

so that before a corporation can be deemed a common carrier,

it must of necessity include in its business the transportation

of goods or freight from place to place. There is usually in

a railway act some sections which have the efiPect of putting

the railway company on the footing of common carriers : 2 Rob.

Pr. 534. But whether made so by general statute or by their

charters, railroad companies are held to be common carriers: 2

Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 781. And it is said when they are

made so by the express provision of a statute, such provision will

be merely declaratory of the law as it already existed : Hutchin-

son on Carriers, sec. 67. A common carrier is such, because his

duties partake of a public character. "To bring a person,"

says Judge Story, "within the description of a common carrier,

he must exercise it as a public employment; he must undertake

to carry goods for persons generally, and must hold himself

out as ready to engage in the transportation of goods for hire

as a business, and not as a casual occupation pro hac vice":

Story on Bailments, sec. 495. To constitute one, then, a com-

mon carrier, it is necessary that he should hold himself out as

such. A carrier of passengers who undertakes to carry all per-

sons who apply to him for transportation is engaged in a pub-
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lie employment, and is a public or common carrier of passen-

gers.

"A common carrier of passengers," says Judge Thompson,

"is one who undertakes for hire to carry all persons, indiffer-

ently, who may apply for passage. Railroad companies, the own-

ers of ships, ferries, omnibuses, street-cars, and stage-coaches are

usually common carriers of passengers": Thompson on Carriers

of Passengers, 26, note 1.

It is true that carriers of passengers are not common carriers

as to the persons of those whom they carry. But common car-

riers are classified as carriers of goods and as carriers of pas-

sengers. The reason is, their employment is quasi public, and

the jjublic have an interest in the faithful discharge of their

duties. "Every common carrier," said Mulkey, J., "has the

right to determine what particular line of business he will

follow. If he elects to carry freight only, he will be under no

obligation to carry passengers, and vice versa. So if he holds

himself out as a carrier of a particular kind of freight, or of
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freight generally, prepared for carriage in a particular way,

he will only be bound to carry to the extent and in the man-

ner proposed. He will, nevertheless, be a' common carrier":

Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis U. R'y Co., 107 111. 451. A

common carrier, then, may be either a carrier of passengers or

freight, or both. The argument, then, that the plaintiff is not

the kind of a corporation authorized to exercise the power of

eminent domain because it is only a carrier of passengers, and

not of freight, would not deprive the plaintiff of its character

as a common carrier, and as such to be deemed within the stat-

ute. This would result in giving to the statute a construction

which would include both classes of carriers, but not necessarily

that such carriers should combine both employments; it might

be engaged in carrying passengers or freight or both, and still

be deemed a common carrier.

(The court determined, however, that the statute was not in-

tended to apply to such an electric street railway as that in

contemplation.) Judgment affirmed.

^ 66. CHRISTENSON V. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO.

15 Minn. 270; 2 Am. B. 122. 1870.

Action against defendants as common carriers for the loss of

two chests of tea. Defendants answered that they were not

common carriers, but forwarders, under a bill of lading exempt-
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ing them from liability for loss due to perils of navigation or

transportation. The tea was lost while in charge of defendants'

messenger on a steamboat not owned nor controlled by defend-

ants. Through negligence the steamboat struck a sunken snag,

causing the accident. Judgment for plaintiffs.

Berry, J. The defendants are an express company, engaged

generally, and publicly, in the business of transmitting, for hire,

goods from place to place, and, among others, from New York

to Llankato. At different points to which their business extends

they establish local offices, at which an agent is stationed, whose

duty it is to receive goods transmitted, and deliver the same to

the consignee, as well as to receive goods for transmission. The

defendants own no vehicles or other means of transportation,

except such as are kept at their local offices, and used solely for

the purpose of carrying goods to and from such offices, to and

from their customers, at the places where the offices are estab-

lished. The practice of the company is to transmit goods by

steamboats, railroads, coaches, etc., owned and controlled by
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other parties; and it receives to its own use the entire charges

for transportation. A messenger in the company's employ ac-

companies the goods as they are being transmitted, to take

general charge of the same, attend to their transhipment, and

to their delivery to the local agent at the point of destination. A

^qmmon carrier is defined to be "one who undertakes, for hire,

to transport the goods of such as choose to employ him, from

place to place." Dwight v. Brewster, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 50, 53, 11

Am. D. 133 ; 2 Parsons on Contracts, 163 ; 1 Smith L. Cases, 301.

In Buckland v. Adams Express Co., 97 Mass. 124, 93 Am. D.

68, it is held, that one whose business is for hire to take goods

from the custody of their owner, assume entire possession and

control of them, transport them from place to place, and deliver

them at a point of destination to consignees or agents, there

authorized to receive them, is a common carrier, although he

styles himself an express forwarder, and although he contracts

with others to transport the goods in vehicles of which they

are the owners, and the movements of which he himself does

not manage or control. These definitions are in our opinion cor-

rect, and the defendants, falling within them, must be re-

garded as common carriers. See, also, Sweet v. Barney, 23 N.

Y. 335; Russell v. Livingston, 19 Barb. 346; 2 Redf. on Rail-

ways, 19, 30.

This action is brought to recover $150, for two chests of tea

belonging to the plaintiffs, the receipt of which by the de-

fendants for transmission from New York to Mankato, and the
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total loss of which, by the sinking of a steamboat, not owned or

controlled by the defendants, but upon which the same were

being transmitted, are admitted. It is also admitted that the

boat sank in consequence of running upon a snag in the Min-

nesota river, but whether this was, or was not, owing to

negligence on the part of those managing the boat is a matter

of dispute, as to which the testimony is conflicting. Suffice

it to say, however, that there is evidence in the case reasonably

tending to sustain the finding of the referee, that the persons

operating the boat were guilty of negligence in running upon the

snag, so that there is no occasion to disturb the finding, on the

ground that it is unsupported by the evidence in this respect.

It is found by the referee that Bass and Clark, respondents' con-

signors, delivered the tea to the defendants at New York, con-

signed to plaintiffs at Mankato, and at the time of such delivery

took from defendants the following receipt :

American Express Company, e:^press forwarders and foreign

and domestic agents. Principal office Nos. 57, 59 and 61 Hud-
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son street. Branch offices, 124 Broadway and 542 Broadway.

New York, April 29, 1867.

Bass and Clark delivered to us two chests tea marked Christen-

son & Bro., Mankato, ]\Iinn., wdiich we are to forward to our

agency nearest or most convenient to destination, only perils of

navigation and transportation excepted, and it is hereby ex-

pressly agreed, and is part of the consideration of this contract,

that the American Express Company are not to be held liable

for any loss or damage, except as forwarders only, nor for any

loss or damage of any box, package or thing, for over $150, unless

the just and true value thereof is herein stated, nor for any loss

or damage by fire, the acts of God, or of the enemies of the

government, the restraint of the government, mobs, riots, insur-

rections, pirates or from any of the dangers incident to a time

of war, nor upon any property or thing, unless properly packed

and secured for transportation, nor upon any fragile article

consisting of or contained in glass.

For the company, SPENCE.

At common law a common carrier is an insurer of the goods

intrusted to him, and he is responsible for all losses of the

same, save such as are occasioned by the act of God or the pub-

lic enemy. Angell on Carriers, §§ 67, 148, 153; New Jersey

JSteam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 381.

After much controversy, it may now be taken as settled by tho

great preponderance of authority, that it is competent for a com-

mon carrier to modify or limit his common-law liability by spe-
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cial agreement with the owner of the goods. York Co. v. Cen-

tral R. R., 3 Wall. 112; Judson v. W. R. R. Co., 6 Allen (Mass.)

489, 83 Am. D. 646; Dorr v. N. J. Steam Nav. Co., 11 N. Y.

485, 62 Am. D. 125 ; 2 Redfield on Railways, 93 ; 2 Parsons on

Contracts, 233-237, notes and cases cited.

Wliile there is some conflict of opinion among courts and text

writers as to the extent to which the carrier may be permitted to

modify or limit his common-law liability as an insurer, we think

the better and wiser opinion is, that he shall not be permitted to

exonerate himself from liability for his own negligence, or the

negligence of the agents whom he employs to perform the trans-

portation. The undertaking is to carry the goods; and to re-

lieve the carrier from liability for loss or damage arising from

negligence in performing his contract is to ignore the contract

itself. It is to say that he shall not be liable for neglecting to do

that which he agreed to do, for which alone the goods were de-

livered to him, and for w^hich alone he has received, or is to

receive, compensation. This construction would not only be
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repugnant to the contract, but it would be contrary to the whole

spirit and policy of our laws, which make a person who under-

takes to do a particular thing answerable in damages if, through

his own fault or negligence, he fails to do it, or does it im-

properly. York Co. V. Central R. R., 3 Wall. 112; Laing v.

Colder, 8 Pa. St. 479, 49 Am. D. 533; New Jersey Steam

Nav. Co. V. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 382; 2 Redfield on Rail-

ways, 98-108; Wyld v. Pickford, 8 Mees. & Wels. 443; 2 Par-

sons on Contracts, 247, note ; Sager v. Portsmouth R. R. Co., 31

Me. 228 ; Farnham v. R. R. Co., 55 Penn. St. 53 ; Angell on Car-

riers, §§ 265, 267. j^nd he is responsible, notwithstanding the

special agreement, for ordinary neglect; that is to say, for the

want of ordinary diligence. Wyld v. Pickford, supra; Angell

on Carriers, §§ 54, 268; 2 Parsons on Contracts (5th ed.), 243,

note.

The special agreement may be in the form of a special ac-

ceptance of the goods by the carrier, as by a unilateral bill of

lading, or receipt. Dorr v. N. J. Steam Nav. Co., 11 N. Y. 485,

62 Am. D. 125 ; Boorman v. Am. Express Co., 21 Wis. 152 ; 2

Redfield on Railways, 28 ; Prentice v. Decker, 49 Barb. 30 ; Farn-

ham V. R. R. Co., 55 Penn. St. 53; Angell on Carriers §§ 54, 220.

But to bind the shipper by the terms of the special accept-

ance, he must expressly assent to it, or it must be brought

home to him under circumstances from which his assent is to be

implied. Judson v. W. R. R. Co., 6 Allen (Mass.) 489, 83 Am.

D. 646 ; New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How.,

supra; 2 Redfield on Railways, 22, 93.

231

§ 66 OF COMMON CAEEIEES OF GOODS.

In this case it appears that, simultaneously with the delivery

of the goods to the defendants, the receipt above recited was

delivered to the plaintiffs' consignors, and it was produced in

evidence by the plaintiffs upon the trial. In the absence of

evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the con-

signors were the plaintiff's' agents to contract for the transpor-

tation of the goods; and the delivery of the receipt to the con-

signors must be held to be equivalent to a delivery to the plain-

tiff's, to whose possession it appears to have come. And as there

is nothing tending to show that any objection was made to the

terms of the receipt, or that they escaped attention, the assent

of the consignors — the plaintiff' 's agents, and of the plaintiffs

throiigh their agents — to such terms is also to be presumed.

Gould V. Hill, 2 Hill, 623 ; 2 Parsons on Contracts, 234 ; 2 Red-

field on Railways, 22, 28; Boorman v. Am. Express Co., 21 Wis.

158 ; King V. Woodbridge, 34 Vt. 571 ; Shaw v. R. R. Co., 13 Ad.

& El. (N. S.) 347; Palmer v. Grand Junction R. W. Co., 4 M. &

W. 749 ; Dorr v. N. J. Steam Nav. Co., 1 Kern. 491, 62 Am. D.
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125. We are not, however, to be understood as determining

that the circumstances under which receipts of this character

are delivered may not sometimes be such as to repel any pre-

sumption of assent to their terms arising from the simple fact

of taking such receipts. And this brings us to the most difficult

question in the case, viz. : wdiat is the fair construction of the

receipt ?

The defendants style themselves "express forwarders," and

they agree to "forward" the goods. But this language does

not necessarily give them the character of simple forwarders,

nor prevent them from being treated as common carriers. Buck-

land V. Adams Express Co., supra; Read v. Spaulding, 5 Bosw.

404.

Then they agree to forward "only perils of navigation and

transportation excepted"; but while this exception embraces

more than the "act of God," it goes no further than to exempt

the carrier from liability for such perils as could not be fore-

seen or avoided in the exercise of care and prudence. The ex-

ception does not excuse the carrier for negligently running into

perils of the kind mentioned. The proper construction is anal-

ogous to that which is put upon the words "perils of the sea,"

or "dangers of the lake," in bills of lading. Fairchild v. Slo-

cum, 19 Wend. 332; S. C, 7 Hill 292; Wliitesides v. Thurlkill,

12 Smedes & Marsh, 599 ; Hays v. Kennedy, 41 Penn. St. 378 ;

Edwards on Bailments, 492-496, and cases cited; Angell on Car-

riers, §§ 166-174. While, then, it would seem very proper to hold

that a snag in one of our western rivers is a peril of navigation,
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as appears to have been done in Tennessee (see cases cited in

Edwards on Bailments, 492), if a vessel is wrecked upon one

through the negligence of the carrier, or of those whom he em-

ploys, as the referee finds in the case at bar, the carrier is not

absolved. Under such circumstances the loss is properly attrib-

uted to the agency of man, not to the peril of navigation. Hav-

ing undertaken to carry the goods, the carrier shall not be heard

to set up his own negligence to excuse him from responsibility.

The receipt goes on to say: "And it is hereby expressly

agreed, and is part of the consideration of this contract, that

the American Express Company are not to be held liable for

any loss or damage, except as forwarders only." By this clause

it is contended that the responsibility of the defendants is lim-

ited to that of forwarders, pure and simple; that pro hac vice

they are forwarders to all intents and purposes. Now a mere

forwarder is absolved from liability upon showing that he used

ordinary diligence in sending on the goods, by careful, suitable

and responsible carriers. Edwards on Bailments, 293; Roberts
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V. Turner, 12 Johns (N. Y.) 233, 7 Am. D. 311; Brown v. Den-

nison, 2 Wend. 594; Johnson v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 33 N. Y.

610, 88 Am. D. 416. And the defendants insist that the boat,

by the sinking of which the loss in this case was occasioned,

being staunch and strong, properly manned and equipped, and

run by a responsible company, they, the defendants, have done

all that was required of them, and are therefore not liable. But

looking at the whole scope of the receipt and at the mode in

which the defendants transact their business, we think the con-

struction contended for by the defendants cannot be allowed.

The defendants do not agree to simply forward the goods as

mere forwarders do, by delivering them to a carrier. In such

cases, if the forwarder has exercised due diligence in selecting

the carrier (when no particular carrier is designated by the

owner of the goods), his duty is discharged; his connection with

and responsibility for the goods cease ; he has no interest in the

freight, nor any thing to do with their ultimate delivery to the

consignee at the point of destination. But in this case the de-

fendants not only agree to forward the goods, but to forward

them to their ovvti agent. As the defendants state in their

answer, such agent is, according to their usual course of busi-

ness, to deliver the goods to the owner personally, and he receives

the entire charges.

A messenger in the employ of the defendants accompanies the

goods as they are being transported, to take general charge of

the same and attend to their transhipment and delivery to the

proper local agent. The defendants are not simply agents for
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the shipper to contract for the transportation of the goods. There

is no contract between the owner of the goods and the owners of

the vehicles or vessels which the defendants employ in conduct-

ing their business. The goods are delivered in the first in-

stance to the defendants; the defendants, through their messen-

ger, have charge of them during their transmission; the de-

fendants employ the vehicles and vessels used in transportation

for themselves, not for the shipper ; the goods, when they reach

the point of destination, are passed over by the messenger to

the defendants' local agent, and by him delivered to the con-

signee. As remarked in a former part of this opinion, the de-

fendants must, under this state of facts, be regarded as common

carriers. Their contract is to carry the goods, and having en-

tered into this contract they are not to be permitted to say that

they shall not be responsible for the negligence of themselves or

of the agencies employed by them in its performance, though

they may, by special agreement, modify and limit their common-

law liability as insurers of the goods.
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From the very nature of their business, and of the service

which they undertake to render to the plaintiffs, the rlpfendants

are not forwarders, but carriers, and when they assume to re-

strict their liability to that of forwarders, it is as much as to say

that they will not be responsible to the owners of the goods ac-

cording to their true character and to the actual relation which

they sustain to them. In our opinion, then, the effect claimed

for this clause of the receipt by the defendants is inconsistent

with, and repugnant to, the scope and intent of the receipt,

viewed as a whole, and in connection with the facts showing the

defendant's real character and mode of doing business. And

although the defendants' liability at common law, as common

carriers and insurers of the goods, is modified by other provi-

sions of the receipt, as well as possibly in some respects by the

clause under consideration, it is not so far modified by either

as to exempt the defendants from responsibility for their own

negligence, or the negligence of the agents employed by them in

the transmission of the goods. In fact, so far as the simple duty

of carrying is concerned, this clause would seem to have no bear-

ing or application. In Hooper v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 27 Cal. 11

75 Am. D. 211, M'here an express receipt contained a stipulation

that the express company were "not to be responsible except as

forwarders," it was held to mean that the "liability" shall be

governed by the principles of law applicable to forwarders;

that is, that they shall only be liable for losses arising from a

want of ordinary care on the part of themselves and in the

agencies made use of by them in the exercise of their ordinary,
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business of carriers. But though the view thus taken by the su-

preme court of California would, in the case at bar, lead to the

same conclusion to which we arrive, the construction strikes us

to be somewhat forced. We think the view which we take is the

more rational, and it is substantially the same sugrgested by Mr.

Redfield in his note to the case cited. 2 Redfield on Railways

(4th ed.), 25.

In the case at bar, then, the receipt, and, for the purposes of

this action, the value of the goods, and the loss by the sinking of

the boat being undisputed, and the fact being found by the ref-

eree that the loss was occasioned by the negligence of those who

were running the boat, judgment was properly rendered against

the defendants. We have not adverted to the finding that the

express messenger was also guilty of negligence, because that

finding is not necessary to support the judgment, as well as be-

cause we have great doubts whether it is supported by the evi-

dence in the case.

Judgment affirmed. • ll__i_r
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CHAPTER XI.

OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE COMMON CARRIER.

^ 67. GALENA AND CHICAGO UNION RAILROAD CO. V.

RAE.

18 III. 488; 68 Am. D. 574. 1857.

Action on the case for failure to supply grain cars. Judg-

ment for plaintiff.

By Court, Skinner, J. This was an action on the case against

the railroad company as common carriers, for refusal to carry,

and for delay in carrying, the grain of the plaintiff below from

Rockford to Chicago. The cause was tried by jury, who re-

turned a verdict of four thousand nine hundred and fifty dollars

against the company, upon which the court rendered judgment,

refusing to grant a new trial. The evidence is very voluminous,

and in the opinion of the court is insufficient to sustain a verdict

for the amount found.

The instructions in the record, and involved in the assign-

ments of error, are seventeen in number, and a critical exami-

nation of each, in our opinion, would embrace almost the entire
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law relating to common carriers. This court is under no obli-

gation to write a treatise upon this branch of the law, nor was

the court below bound to act upon instructions not necessary to

enlighten the jury of the law arising upon the evidence properly

before them. As the cause will be again for trial, we will state

those rules of law in controversy which are material to the case

made by the record.

The evidence shows that the company had the necessary means

and facilities for transporting with dispatch the amount of

freight ordinarily for carriage, and that at the period when

the wrong is charged to have been committed there was an un-

usual and extraordinary quantity of grain for shipment, owing

to the great harvest of that year and want of facilities for stor-

age in the country. In this respect the company was not in

default in regard to that duty it owed the public of affording

reasonable facilities for the transportation of freight. Neither

the common law nor the statute requires an}i;hing more than
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that the company shall furnish reasonable and ordinary facili-

ties of transportation — such as are adapted to its mode of con-

veyance and will meet the ordinary demands of the public. The

company was not bound to provide in advance for or anticipate

extraordinary occasions, or an unusual influx of freight to the

road : Wibert v. New York etc. R. R. Co. 19 Barb. 36 ; Stats.

1856, p. 1070.

Corporations for carrying are created for the public good, and

powers and privileges are given them in consideration of the

benefits they are expected to confer upon the public. Their ob-

ligations to the public require the use of their facilities fairly,

and in such manner as is best calculated, in the prosecution of

their business, to afford the largest public benefit. An honest

and fair endeavor in the course of their legitimate enterprise to

accomplish this is all that can be legally required of them.

If by reason of the condition of the country and the peculiar

occasion — an unusual quantity of grain on the line for shipment,

a want of means in the country for storing it, or other pressing
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cause — the company took grain from wagons, or from boats

from Oregon, while grain remained in private warehouses for

shipment, and in so doing acted in good faith, intending to af-

ford the largest public accommodation, and not from motives of

partiality or oppression, it has not thereby incurred legal liabil-

ity. If the plaintiff below has, in consequence of an extraor-

dinary occasion, or of the public necessities, and not from the

wrong of the company, sustained a loss, he must be content that

his loss is suffered for the public good.

The company is liable for the frauds and negligence of its

agents and employees, in the course of their employment; and

if those in charge of the company's cars, whose duty it was to

assign or give them out to be loaded with grain, through brib-

ery or from motives of partiality or oppression, gave them to

persons, by the course and usage of the company, or in fact, not

rightfully entitled to them, and thereby deprived the plaintiff

below of the facilities of shipping his grain he should have had,

he is entitled to such damages as he may have sustained there-

from : Middleton v. Fowler, 1 Salk. 282 ; Boson v. Sandford, 2

Id. 440; Story on Agency, §§ 139, 453; Parsons on Cont., 62, 63.

The company was bound to use due diligence in carrying the

grain taken to the place of destination ; and if for want of such

diligence the grain taken was not carried and delivered at Chi-

cago, in the usual and reasonable time, the company is liable for

the damages thereby sustained; and if unreasonable delay is

shown, the company, to discharge itself, must show a reasonable

excuse, arising from accident, or other cause, not the conse-
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quence of negligence : Parsons v. Hardy, 14 Wend. 216, 38 Am.

Dec. 521 ; Dows v. Cobb, 12 Barb. 310 ; Story on Bailm., § 509.

The company was bound to receive the grain of the plaintiff

according to its custom and usage ; and if that usage was to run

their cars upon a side-track to private warehouses, and there re-

ceive grain in the cars, a tender accordingly, or notice and read-

iness so to deliver, would impose obligations on the company to

take and carry the grain. Having adopted this mode, the com-

pany could not capriciously require that the grain should be

delivered in a different manner or at a different place: Mer-

riam v. Hartford etc. R. R. Co., 20 Conn. 354, 52 Am. Dec. 344;

Fulton Ins. Co. v. IMilner, 23 Ala. 420 ; Dixon v. Dunham, 14 111.

324. It was incumbent on the plaintiff below to prove a tender

of the customary price of carrying the grain offered to be

shipped, or a readiness and willingness to pay according to the

course and usage of the company in such case. The company

should have a lien upon the grain carried for reasonable charges,

and could withhold the same from delivery until paid. A readi-
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ness and willingness to pay the reasonable charges for carrying,

according to the usage of the company, would be sufficient to

impose the obligation to carry, unless the company required pre-

payment, and then the plaintiff would be required to offer and

be ready to pay accordingly. Slight evidence, however, of readi-

ness and willingness to pay would be sufficient, and they may be

presumed or inferred from surrounding circumstances tending

to raise such presumption: Story on Bailm., § 508; Angell &

Ames on Carriers, § 124; Parsons on Cont., § 548; Hough v.

Rawson, 17 111. 588.

The measure of damages in this case we regard as settled by

the case of Sangamon etc. R. R. Co. v. Henry, 14 111. 156. If

the grain shipped was not delivered in Chicago in reasonable

time for any fault of the company, the measure of damages is

the difference in the value of the grain at Chicago, when it was

in fact delivered, and when it should have been, in the usual

course of transportation, delivered there. If the company

wrongfully refused to carry the grain, the measure of damages

is the difference between the value at Chicago when, if carried,

it shoukVliave reached there, and its value at such time at the

place whence it should have been taken, including the necessary

expense of storage and deterioration, and the like, accruing by

reason of its detention, and deducting the reasonable expense of

transportation : Green v. Mann, 11 Id. 613.

There is no proof in the case that the grain was lost or dam-

aged by being detained at Roekford, and the jury probably based

their verdict upon the hypothesis that the company was bound
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to be ready at all events to carry whatever amount of freight

was for transportation, and when required.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

68. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD CO. V. FRANKEN-

BERG.

54 III. 88; 5 Am. B. 92. 1870.

Assumpsit against the railroad company for the value of cab-

bage spoiled through delay by a connecting line. The bill of

lading provided that for loss or damage the remedy should be

against that carrier in whose custody the packages might be at

the time of the injury. Defendant line delivered the cabbage in

good condition to the connecting line. Judgment for plaintiff.

Breese, Ch. J. The question presented by this record is one

of great importance to the public, and to the railroad interests of

the country, and has received our most careful consideration.

It is a question on which the courts of this country are not

in harmony with themselves, nor with those of England, to

whose decisions we are accustomed to refer as evidence of what
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the common-law is, on any subject which has engaged their de-

liberations.

The question is, as to the extent of the liability qi a railroad

company as common carriers of goods and property.

While there is no difficulty in defining, in general terms, when

the liability of a common carrier begins, the courts of this

country are not agreed as to the point when it terminates.

A common carrier is defined to be one who undertakes, for

hire, to transport the goods of such as choose to employ him,

from place to place. Railway companies are under obligations to

receive and transport all goods which may be offered to them

for such purpose, and without delay. They cannot lie by, as the

wagoners in early times were accustomed to do, for a rise in

the price of freights. They are regarded by all courts as com-

mon carriers, resting vmder a duty to transport such articles as

may be delivered to them in the course of their business, and

their liability commences when the goods are delivered to their

agent authorized to receive them. They may demand the freight

money in advance, and if not paid, may refuse to carry the

goods, but when they are received they are at the risk of the

carrier, and from which time he is regarded as an insurer, and

held to the most stringent responsibilities, from which he can

only be relieved by the operation of one of two causes, the act
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of God or the public enemy. Public policy has always de-

manded this rule, inasmuch as the goods are entirely in the

power of the carrier, and it being so easy for him to conceal

his fraud or misconduct, and so difficult for the owner to prove

it, that the law does not permit the inquiry, but supplies the

want of proof by a conclusive presumption. Porter v. Chicago

and Rock Island R. R. Co., 20 111. 407, 71 Am. D. 286 ; Baldwin

V. American Express Co., 23 111. 197, 74 Am. D. 190.

The liability of the carrier commencing with the receipt of

the goods, it necessarily continues until they are delivered by

him at their place of destination, where the owner or consignee

' is bound to be present and receive them and pay the freight

for them, if not previously paid. If he be not present to receive

the goods, they can be placed in a safe and sufficient warehouse,

when the liability of the carrier ceases and that of warehouse-

man begins.

The important question now arises, is he thus bound to carry

and deliver to a point or place not on his route ?
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This is a question not settled by the courts of this country,

though the received doctrine may be said to be, that the carrier

is not responsible beyond his own route, except upon his special

undertaking so to be liable.

By the law of common carriers, their liability was fixed on the

receipt of the goods to be carried. They are insurers of the

goods, and if not delivered at their place of destination, they are

accountable for them, and when called upon to account for them,

the onus of proof is upon them and they are chargeable with

their value, unless the loss was caused by a force superior to

human agency, which no foresight could have guarded against,

or by the public enemy.

This is the extent of the liability of common carriers by the

common-law. The receipt of goods by them is all that is neces-

sary to fix this liability, so that, if a parcel or package be de-

livered to a railroad at Chicago, marked for Louisville, Ken-

tucky, or any other place off their route, and they receive it to

carry, they are bound, by this rule of the common-law, if the

parcel or package be lost, to account to the owner for its value.

The contract of the shipper is with the carrier in whose custody

he placed the goods.

A responsibility so vast being cast upon carriers by the com-

mon-law, it soon became a question how they could remove or

lessen it. A resort was had to a general notice, which was held

by this court and other courts to be insufficient. Western Trans-

portation Co. V. Newhall, 24 111. 466, 76 Am. D. 760. But it

was held by this court, in the case of the Illinois Cent. R. R. Co.
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V. Morrison ct al, 19 id. 136, that such carriers may relieve

themselves from their general liability by special contract. In

that case, Morrison, by his writing, under seal, in consideration

of a reduction of the freight charges upon a lot of cattle, as-

sumed the risk of transportation, and released the company

from all claims which might arise from damage or injury to the

stock while in the cars, or for delay in its carriage, or for es-

cape from the cars, and, generally, from all claims except such

as might arise from the gross negligence or default of the

agents or officers of the company.

We have examined all the cases cited upon both sides of this

question, and pondered them, anxiously desiring to recognize

a rule which, while it shall not perplex and injure the commercial

interests of the country, shall, at the same time, protect the car-

rier's interest, or, at least, be of so much service to it that the

proprietors of that interest may know and understand the full

extent of their obligations to the public.

So long ago as 1860, this court, in the case of this same com-
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pany against Copeland, 24 111. 332, 76 Am. D. 749, expressed a

decided partiality for the rule in Muschamp's case, 8 Mees. &

Wels. 421, so much relied on by the appellee, and in which case

all the authorities, English and American, were fully examined,

and we said, though this point was not in the case, we were

inclined to yield to the force of the reasoning of the English

courts, on principles of public convenience, if no other, and to

hold, when a carrier receives goods to carry, marked to a par-

ticular place, he is prima facie bound to carry to, and deliver

at that place. By accepting the goods so marked, he impliedly

agrees so to do, and he ought to be answerable for the loss.

Again, in the case of the same company against Johnson, 34

id. 389, there was an express understanding to transport the

goods to Wheeling; but the court, referring to Copeland 's case,

supra, considered that case as holding that a carrier who re-

ceives goods to carry, marked to a particular place, was bound

to carry to, and deliver at that place ; that it was an agreement

implied from the mark or direction on the goods, and accepting

them so marked, that the liability arose.

Now, on the point of public convenience, which consideration

had great weight with us in determining which rule should be

adopted, it seems to us that consignors of the productions of our

country, or other property, by railroad, should not be required,

in case of loss or damage, to look for remuneration to any other

party than the one to w^hich they delivered the goods. It would

be a great hardship, indeed, to compel the consignor of a few

barrels of flour, delivered to a railroad in this State, marked to
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New York city, and which are lost in the transit, to go to New

York, or to the intermediate lines of road, and spend days and

weeks, perhaps, in endeavors to find out on what particular road

the loss happened, and, having ascertained it, in the event of a

refusal to adjust the loss, to bring a suit in the court of New

York for his damages. Far more just would it be to hold the

company who received the goods in the first instance, as the

responsible party and the intermediate roads its agents to

carry and deliver; and it is the most reasonable and just, for all

railroads have facilities, not possessed by a consignor, of trac-

ing losses of property conveyed by them, and all have, or can

have, running connections with each other. Above all, when it

is considered the receiving company can, at the outset, relieve

itself from its common-law liability by a special and definite

agreement, such a rule cannot prejudice them. The rule being

known, all parties can readily accommodate their business to it,

and no inconvenience can result to any one from its operation.

In the case of the Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Morrison, 19
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111. 136, there was a formal stipulation under hand and seal,

by which the consignor, for a valuable consideration, agreed to

release the company from their common-law liability as car-

riers.

In Adams Express Co. v. Haynes, 42 id. 90, it was said, if a

shipper takes a receipt for his goods from the company, with a

full knowledge of its terms and conditions, intending to assent

to the restrictions contained in it, then it becomes his contract

as fully as if he had signed it.

By such a contract, the rights and duties of the parties to it

must be governed; and if the stipulations in it go to limit the

common-law liability, and they plainly appear in the instru-

ment, and are not covertly inserted in it, and are understood by

the consignor, then it must be enforced as any other contract

of parties made in good faith.

Testing this case by these considerations, the receipt or bill

of lading executed by appellants and accepted by the consignors,

reciting, as it does, that the goods in question were consigned

to Pana, and charges paid to that point, and that appellants

should not be liable for loss or damage save on their own road,

amounts to a special contract, relieving the company from their

common-law duty.

It is a question for the jury to determine, whether the terms

of the receipt were understood by the consignors and assented

to by them. If they were, they are bound by them.

The fact that the charges were guaranteed from Pana, was not

for the benefit of appellants, but for the benefit of the connecting
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road, whose usage was to decline the receipt of perishable arti-

cles, as these were, unless the charges were guaranteed.

We think justice would be promoted by sending this cause

back for trial, in the light of the views here^presented, and of the

rule we think necessary to be established for the government

of all such transactions, and for that purpose reverse the judg-

ment and remand the cause.

Lawrence, McAlister and Thornton dissented from this

opinion.

Judgment reversed.

69. LOUISVILLE, EVANSVILLE & ST. LOUIS RAILROAD

CO. V. WILSON.

119 Ind. 352, 21 N. E. R. 341. 1889.

Action to recover $2,700 excess freight on lumber. Freight

was charged according to a public circular, but plaintiffs claimed

an oral agreement with the general freight agent to continue to

carry for plaintiffs at a former and lower rate.

Mitchell, J. (After stating the facts.) It is to be observed
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that the complaint was framed and that the action proceeded to

judgment upon the theory that the ties were shipped under an

oral agreement, by the terms of which the railroad company

bound itself to carry the plaintiff's freight at the rate of $14

per car-load. The action is to recover for overcharges made in

disregard of this agreement. The proof, however, shows, with-

out any contradiction whatever, that the shipments were made

— with possibly some exceptions, in which cases bills were de-

livered after the shipments had been made — pursuant to writ-

ten and printed bills of lading, signed by the company's agent

and delivered to the shipper before the transportation began, in

each instance.

The question presented at the threshold, therefore, is, was it

competent for the plaintiffs, without alleging any fraud, con-

cealment or mistake, to recover upon an oral contract made

prior to the issuing of the bills of lading, which are supposed

to set forth the terms and conditions upon which the goods were

to be transported, or must the rights of the parties be deter-

mined by the express terms and legal import of these instru-

ments? A bill of lading is twofold in its character. It is a re-

ceipt, specifying the quantity, character and condition of the

goods received; and it is also a contract, by which the carrier
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agrees to transport the goods therein described to a place named,

and there deliver them to a designated consignee upon the terms

and conditions specified in the instrument. The Delaware, 14

Wall. 579; O'Brien v. Gilchrist, 34 Me. 554, 56 Am. D. 676; 2

Am. and Eng. Encycl. Law, 228; Chandler v. Sprague, 5 Met.

(Mass.) 306, 38 Am. D. 404, and note; Friedlander v. Texas

& Pac. R. W. Co., 130 U. S. 416, 9 Sup. Ct. Repr. 570.

So far as a bill of lading is in the nature of a receipt, or an

acknowledgment of the quantity and condition of the goods

delivered, it may, like any other receipt, be explained, varied,

or even contradicted ; but as a contract, expressing the terms

and conditions upon which the property is to be transported, it is

to be regarded as merging all prior and contemporaneous agree-

ments of the parties, and, in the absence of fraud, concealment

or mistake, its terms or legal import, when free from ambiguity,

cannot be explained nor added to by parol. Snow v Indiana etc.

R. W. Co., 109 Ind. 422, and cases cited.

"Such a contract is to be construed, like all other written
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contracts, according to the legal import of its terms." It be-

comes the sole evidence of the undertaking, and all antecedent

agreements are extinguished by the writing. Lawson Contracts

of Carriers, § 113 ; Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N. Y. 200, 14 Am.

R. 224; Southern Ex. Co. v. Dickson, 94 U. S. 549; Bank of

Kentucky v. Adams Ex. Co., 93 U. S. 174; Kirkland v. Dins-

more, 62 N. Y. 171, 20 Am. R. 475. Thus, in Snow v. Indiana,

etc., R. W. Co., supra, the shipper of a car-load of horses, who

had received a bill of lading in which no route was designated

by which the car was to be forwarded after leaving the initial

carrier's line, offered to prove that a particular line had been

agreed upon. It was held that the silence of the bill of lading in

the respect mentioned was the same in legal effect as if a provi-

sion had been inserted therein authorizing the first carrier to

select, at its discretion, any customary or usual route which was

regarded as safe and responsible, by which to forward the car,

and that the provision thus imported into the bill of lading was

no more subject to be assailed by parol than was any of the

express terms of the contract. The cases which affirm this prin-

ciple are very numerous. They proceed upon the theory that,

in the absence of express stipulation, certain terms are or may

be annexed to e\ery contract by legal implication, and that stip-

ulations thus imported into a contract become as effectually a

part of the written agreement as though they were expressed

therein in terms. Long v. Straus, 107 Ind. 94, 6 N. E. R. 123,

57 Am. R. 87; Hudson Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 8

Wall. 276, 288 ; Hill v. Syracuse, etc., R. R." Co., 73 N. Y. 351,
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29 Am. R. 163. Thus, where, in a written contract for the sale

of property, no time is fixed for the payment of the purchase-

price, the law implies that the price is to be paid upon the de-

livery or transfer /of the property, and the purchaser, without

alleging fraud or mistake, would not be heard to prove by parol

that the sale was made on credit. An apparent exception to the

general rule occurs when proof of an agreement collateral to that

contained in the bill of lading is offered. Baltimore, etc.. Steam-

boat Co. V. Bro\^Ti, 54 Pa. St. 77; Lawson Contracts of Car-

riers, § 115.

As we have seen, all the bills of lading contain a stipulation

to the effect that the cross-ties are to be transported over the

defendant's road, and that they are to be delivered as therein

specified, upon payment of freight and charges in par funds.

In some of them the amount to be paid is not fixed, while in

others the charges actually collected were inserted in the bills

of lading before they were delivered to the plaintiffs, and be-

fore the ties were transported. Surely there can be no ground
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of recovery where the amount actually collected was stipulated

in the bills of lading beforehand. Nor was it competent to give

evidence of an oral agreement concerning the amount of freight

to be paid, with a view of establishing a right of recovery in re-

spect to those bills of lading in which the amount was not fixed

in express terms. The bills of lading must be regarded as com-

plete contracts into which all the oral negotiations of the pay-

ties are merged, or they are entirely without force or effect a«

evidence of the terms and conditions upon which the goods wei«i

to be transported. While it is true, the contract of a commor*

carrier to transport goods is equally binding whether it be by

parol or in writing (Mobile, etc., R. W. Co. v. Jurey, 111 U. S.

584), no good reason can be suggested in support of a rule

which should declare that part of the contract might be in writ-

ing, and part, covering the same subject-matter, by parol. Either

the bill of lading must be regarded as the sole repository of the

agreement of the parties, in respect to the terms upon which

the shipments were made, or it must be regarded as a receipt,

and nothing more. As a contract, a bill of lading, like other

written contracts, is presumed, in the absence of imjxosition or

mistake, to embody the entire agreement of the parties. Lawson

Contracts of Carriers, sections 112, 113 ; Long v. New York, etc.,

R. R. Co., 50 N. Y. 76.

The bills of lading involved in the present ease cover every

subject of the contract of shipment, except that some of them

are silent as to the amount of freight to be paid. If, in the ab-

sence of an agreem.ent, the law supplies this term by implication,
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then the writings constitute complete contracts, and parol evi-

dence is inadmissible to vary,^ control or contradict tiie terms

therein expressed, or those which the law certainly implies.

Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Remmy, 13 Ind. 518; Jefferson-

ville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Worland, 50 Ind. 339 ; Pemberton Co. v.

N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 104 Mass. 144.

The law makes it the duty of every common carrier to receive

and carry all goods, seasonably offered for transportation, and

authorizes a reasonable reward to be charged for the service.

The amount to be paid is, in a measure, subject to the agreement

of the parties; but when the amount is not fixed by contract,

the law implies that the carrier shall have a reasonable reward,

which is to be ascertained by the amount commonly, or cus-

tomarily, paid for other like services. Johnson v. Pensacola,

etc., R. R. Co. 16 Florida, 623, 26 Am. R. 731 ; Angell Carriers,

section 892 ; Lawson Contracts of Carriers, section 125.

Whether a railroad company may, in the absence of legisla-

tion, agree upon different rates of compensation for similar ser-
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vices for different persons, is a question we need not consider

in the present case. Fitchburg R. R. Co. v. Gage, 12 Gray, 393 ;

Spofford V. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 128 Mass. 326; Ragan v.

Aiken, 9 Lea. 609, 42 Am. Rep. 684.

Without regard to the rights of the shipper and carrier, as

they may appear under special contracts, the agreement which

the law imports into every bill of lading which does not stipu-

late the price to be paid for the service is, that the compensa-

tion shall be reasonable, and such as is customarily charged

others for like service under like conditions. London, etc., R.

W. Co. V. Evershed, L. R. 3 App. Cases, 1029. This is the con-

tract which the law makes for the parties, and which is imported

into every bill of lading which contains no express stipulation

covering the subject of the amount to be paid. The conclusion

which follows is, that in the absence of an express agreement

in respect to the amount to be charged written in the bills of

lading, the law implies that the amount shall be the reasonable

or customary charge. It is neither averred nor proved that the

amount collected was unreasonable, or more than the usual or

customary charge for like services. The plaintiffs were, there-

fore, not entitled to recover.

The judgment is reversed, with costs, with directions to the

court to sustain the motion for a new trial.
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70. MUNN V. ILLINOIS,

94 U. S. 113. 1876.

Action against Munn and Scott, owners of a grain elevator in

Chicago, for failing to take out a license under a statute passed

by the legislature in pursuance and under authority of an ar-

ticle of the constitution of Illinois, and for charging for storage

more than the rates fixed by such statute. The defendants were

found guilty and fined $100, and this was affirmed by the su-

preme court of Illinois. Munn & Scott sued out writs of error

to this court.

Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court.

The question to be determined in this case is whether the

general assembly of Illinois can, under the limitations upon the

legislative power of the states imposed by the Constitution of the

United States, fix by law the maximum of charges for the stor-

age of grain in warehouses at Chicago and other places in the

state having not less than one hundred thousand inhabitants,

"in which grain is stored in bulk, and in which the grain of
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different owners is mixed together, or in which grain is stored

in such a manner that the identity of different lots or parcels

cannot be accurately preserved."

It is claimed that such a law is repugnant —

1. To that part of sec. 8, art. 1, of the Constitution of the

United States w^hich confers upon Congress the power "to reg-

ulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several

states ; ' '

2. To that part of sec. 9 of the same article which provides

that "no preference shall be given by any regulation of com-

merce or revenue to the ports of one state over those of an-

other;" and

3. To that part of amendment 14 which ordains that no state

shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law, nor deny to any person within its juris-

diction the equal protection of the laws."

We will consider the last of these objections first.

Every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The courts

. ought not to declare one to be unconstitutional, unless it is

clearly so. If there is doubt, the expressed will of the legisla-

ture should be sustained.

The Constitution contains no definition of the word "de-

prive," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment. To determine

its signification, therefore, it is necessary to ascertain the effect
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which usage has given it, when employed in the same or a like

connection.

While this provision of the amendment is new in the Consti-

tution of the United States, as a limitation upon the powers of

the states, it is old as a principle of civilized government. It

is found in Magna Charta, and, in substance if not in form, in

nearly or quite all the constitutions that have been from time

to time adopted by the several states of the Union, By the Fifth

Amendment, it was introduced into the Constitution of the

United States as a limitation upon the powers of the national

government, and by the Fourteenth, as a guaranty against any

encroachment upon an acknowledged right of citizenship by the

legislature of the states.

When the people of the United Colonies separated from Great

Britain, they changed the form, but not the substance, of their

government. They retained for the purposes of government

all the powers of the British Parliament, and through their

state constitutions, or other forms of social compact, undertook
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to give practical effect to such as they deemed necessary for the

<?ommon good and the security of life and property. All the

powers which they retained they committed to their respective

states, unless in express terms or by implication reserved to

themselves. Subsequently, when it was found necessary to es-

tablish a national government for national purposes, a part of

the powers of the states and of the people of the states was

granted to the United States and the people of the United

States. This grant operated as a further limitation upon the

powers of the states, so that now the governments of the states

possess all the powers of the Parliament of England, except

such as have been delegated to the United States or reserved by

the people. The reservations by the people are shown in the

prohibitions of the constitutions.

When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts

with some rights or privileges, which, as an individual not af-

fected by his relations to others, he might retain. "A body poli-

tic," as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of

Massachusetts, " is a social compact by which the whole people

covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole peo-

ple, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common

good." This does not confer power upon the whole people to

control rights which are purely and exclusively private, Thorpe v.

Rutland & B. R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 143, 62 Am. D. 625 ; but it does

authorize the establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so

conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessar-

ily to injure another. This is the very essence of government,
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and has found expression in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum

non laedas. From this source come the police powers, which, as

was said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases, 5

How. 583, ' ' are nothing more or less than the powers of govern-

ment inherent in every sovereignty, . . . that is to say,

. the power to govern men and things." Under these

powers the government regulates the conduct of its citizens one

towards another, and the manner in which each shall use his own

property, when such regulation becomes necessary for the pub-

lic good. In their exercise it has been customary in England

from time immemorial, and in this country from its first col-

onization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers,

millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, &c., and in so doing to fix a

maximum of charge to be made for services rendered, accommo-

dations furnished, and articles sold. To this day, statutes are to

be found in many of the States upon some or all these subjects ;

and we think it has never yet been successfully contended that

such legislation came within any of the constitutional prohibi-
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tions against interference with private property. With the Fifth

Amendment in force, Congress, in 1820, conferred power upon

the city of Washington "to regulate . . . the rates of

wharfage at private wharves, . . . the sweeping of chim-

neys, and to fix the rates of fees therefor, . . . and the

weight and quality of bread," 3 Stat. 587, sec. 7; and, in 1848,

"to make all necessary regulations respecting hackney carriages

and the rates of fare of the same, and the rates of hauling by

cartmen, wagoners, carmen, and draymen, and the rates of com-

mission of auctioneers, ' ' 9 id. 224, sec. 2.

From this it is apparent that, down to the time of the adoption

of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was not supposed that statutes

regulating the use, or even the price of the use, of private prop-

erty necessarily deprived an owner of his property without due

process of law. Under some circumstances they may, but not

under all. The amendment does not change the law in this par-

ticular ; it simply prevents the States from doing that which will

operate as such a deprivation.

This brings us to inquire as to the principles upon which this

power of regulation rests, in order that we may determine what

is within and what without its operative effect. Looking, then,

to the common law, from whence came the right which the Con-

stitution protects, we find that when private property is "af-

fected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only."

This was said by Lord Chief Justice Hale more than two hun-

dred years ago, in his treatise De Portibus Maris, 1 Harg. Law

Tracts, 78, and has been accepted without objection as an essen-
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tial element in the law. of property ever since. Property does

become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to

make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large.

When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the

public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an in-

terest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the pub-

lic for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus

created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use ;

but, so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the con-

trol.

Thus, as to ferries. Lord Hale says, in his treatise Be Jure

Maris, 1 Harg. Law Tracts, 6, the king has ' ' a right of franchise

or privilege, that no man may set up a common ferry for all pas-

sengers, without a prescription time out of mind, or a charter

from the king. He may make a ferry for his own use or the use

of his family, but not for the common use of all the king's sub-

jects passing that way; because it doth in consequence tend to a

common charge, and is become a thing of public interest and
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use, and every man for his passage pays a toll, which is a com-

mon charge, and every ferry ought to be under a public regula-

tion, viz., that it give attendance at due times, keep a boat in

due order, and take but reasonable toll ; for if he fail in these he

is finable." So if one owns the soil and landing-places on both

banks of a stream, he cannot use them for the purposes of a pub-

lic ferry, except upon such terms and conditions as the body

politic may from time to time impose ; and this because the com-

mon good requires that all public ways shall be under the control

of the public authorities. This privilege or prerogative of the

king, who in this connection only represents and gives another

name to the body politic, is not primarily for his profit, but for

the protection of the people and the promotion of the general

welfare.

And, again, as to wharves and wharfingers. Lord Hale, in his

treatise Be Portihtis Maris, already cited, says :

"A man, for his own private advantage, may, in a port or

to"«Ti, set up a wharf or crane, and may take what rates he and

his customers can agree for cranage, wharfage, housellage, pe-

sage; for he doth no more than is lawful for any man to do,

viz., makes the most of his own. ... If the king or sub-

ject have a public wharf, unto which all persons that come to

that port must come and unlade or lade their goods as for the

purpose, because they are the wharfs only licensed by the queen,

or because there is no other wharf in that port, as it

may fall out where a port is newly erected; in that case there

cannot be taken arbitrary and excessive duties for cranage,
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wharfage, pesage, &c., neither can they be enhanced to an im-

moderate rate ; but the duties must be reasonable and moderate,

though settled by the king's license or charter. For now the

wharf and crane and other conveniences are affected with a pub-

lic interest, and they cease to be jiiris privati only ; as if a man

set out a street in new building on his own land, it is now no

longer bare private interest, but is affected by a public interest."

This statement of the law by Lord Hale was cited with ap-

probation and acted upon by Lord Kenyon at the beginning of

the present century, in Bolt v. Stennett, 8 T. R. 606.

And the sam.e has been held as to warehouses and warehouse-

men. In Allnutt V. Inglis, 12 East, 527, decided in 1810, it ap-

peared that the London Dock Company had built warehouses in

which wines were taken in store at such rates of charge as the

company and the owners might agree upon. Afterwards the

company obtained authority, under the general warehousing act,

to receive wines from importers before the duties upon the im-

portation were paid; and the question was, whether they could
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charge arbitrary rates for such storage, or must be content with

a reasonable compensation. Upon this point Lord EUenborough

said (p. 537) :

' ' There is no doubt that the general principle is favored, both in

law and justice, that every man may fix what price he pleases

upon his own property, or the use of it; but if for a particular

purpose the public have a right to resort to his premises and

make use of them, and he have a monopoly in them for that pur-

pose, if he will take the benefit of that monopoly, he must, as an

equivalent, perform the duty attached to it on reasonable terms.

The question then is, whether, circumstanced as this company is,

by the combination of the warehousing act with the act by which

they were originally constituted, and with the actually existing

state of things in the port of London, whereby they alone have

the warehousing of these wines, they be not, according to the

doctrine of Lord Hale, obliged to limit themselves to a reasonable

compensation for such warehousing. And, according to him,

whenever the accident of time casts upon a party the benefit

of having a legal monopoly of landing goods in a public port,

as where he is the owner of the only wharf authorized to receive

goods which happens to be built in a port newly erected, he is

confined to take reasonable compensation only for the use of the

wharf. ' '

And further on (p. 539) :

"It is enough that there exists in the place and for the com-

modity in question a virtual monopoly of the warehousing for

this purpose, on which the principle of law attaches, as laid down
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by Lord Hale in the passage referred to (that from De Portihus

Maris already quoted), which includes the good sense as well as

the law of the subject."

And in the same case Le Blanc, J., said (p. 541) :

"Then, admitting these warehouses to be private property,

and that the company might discontinue this application of them,

or that they might have made what terms they pleased in the

first instance, yet having, as they now have, this monopoly, the

question is, whether the warehouses be not private property

clothed with a public right, and, if so, the principle of law at-

taches upon them. The privilege, then, of bonding these wines

being at present confined by the act of Parliament to the com-

pany 's warehouses, is it not the privilege of the public, and shall

not that which is for the good of the public attach on the monop-

oly, that they shall not be bound to pay an arbitrary but a reas-

onable rent? But upon this record the company resist having

their demand for warehouse rent confined within any limit ; and,

though it does not follow that the rent in fact fixed by them is
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unreasonable, they do not choose to insist on its being reasonable

for the purpose of raising the question. For this purpose, there-

fore, the question may be taken to be whether they may claim

an unreasonable rent. But though this be private property, yet

the principle laid down by Lord Hale attaches upon it, that

when private property is affected with a public interest it ceases

to be juris privati only; and, in case of its dedication to such a

purpose as this, the owners canot take arbitrary and excessive

duties, but the duties must be reasonable."

We have quoted thus largely the words of these eminent ex-

pounders of the common law, because, as we think, we find in

them the principle which supports the legislation we are now

examining. Of Lord Hale it was once said by a learned Ameri-

can judge :

"In England, even on rights of prerogative, they scan his

words with as much care as if they had been found in Magna

Charta ; and the meaning once ascertained, they do not trouble

themselves to search any further." 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 536, note.

In later times, the same principle came under consideration in

the Supreme Court of Alabama. That court was called upon,

in 1841, to decide whether the power granted to the city of

Mobile to regulate the weight and price of bread was unconstitu-

tional, and it was contended that "it would interfere with the

right of the citizen to pursue his lawful trade or calling in the

mode his judgment might dictate;" but the court said, "there

is no motive . . . for this interference on the part of the

legislature with the lawful actions of individuals, or the mode
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in which private property shall be enjoyed, unless such calling

affects the public interest, or private property is employed in

a manner which directly affects the body of the people. Upon

this principle, in this State, tavern-keepers are licensed; . . .

and the County Court is required, at least once a year, to settle

the rates of innkeepers. Upon the same principle is founded the

control which the legislature has always exercised in the estab-

lishment and regulation of mills, ferries, bridges, turnpike roads

and other kindred subjects." Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. N. S. 140.

From the same source comes the power to regulate the charges

of common carriers, which was done in England as long ago as

the third year of the reign of "William and ]\Iary, and continued

until within a comparatively recent period. And in the first stat-

ute we find the following suggestive preamble, to wit :

"And whereas divers wagoners and other carriers, by combi-

nation among themselves, have raised the prices of carriage of

goods in many places to excessive rates, to the great injury of

the trade : Be it, therefore, enacted, " &c. 3 W. & M. c. 12, § 24 ;
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3 Stat, at Large (Great Britain), 481.

Common carriers exercise a sort of public office, and have dut-

ies to perform in which the public is interested. New Jersey

Nav. Co. V. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 382. Their business is,

therefore, ' ' affected with a public interest, ' ' within the meaning

of the doctrine which Lord Hale has so forcibly stated.

But we need not go further. Enough has already been said

to show that, when private property is devoted to a public use,

it is subject to public regulation. It remains only to ascertain

whether the warehouses of these plaintiffs in error, and the busi-

ness which is carried on there, come within the operation of this

principle.

For this purpose we accept as true the statements of fact con-

tained in the elaborate brief of one of the counsel of the plain-

tiffs in error. From these it appears that "the great producing

region of the West and North-west sends its grain by water and

rail to Chicago, where the greater part of it is shipped by vessel

for transportation to the seaboard by the Great Lakes, and some

of it is forwarded by railway to the Eastern ports.

Vessels, to some extent, are loaded in the Chicago harbor, and

sailed through the St. Lawrence directly to Europe. .

The quantity [of grain] received in Chicago has made it the

greatest grain market in the world. This business has created

a demand for means by which the immense quantity of grain can

be handled or stored, and these have been found in grain ware-

houses, which are commonly called elevators, because the grain

is elevated from the boat or car, by machinery operated by
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steam, into tlie bins prepared for its reception, and elevated from

the bins, by a like process, into the vessel or car which is to carry

it on. . . . In this way the largest traffic between the citi-

zens of the country north and west of Chicago and the citizens

of the country lying on the Atlantic coast north of Washington

is in grain which passes through the elevators of Chicago. In

this way the trade in grain is carried on by the inhabitants of

seven or eight of the great States of the West with four or five of

the States lying on the sea-shore, and forms the largest part of

inter-state commerce in these States. The grain warehouses or

elevators in Chicago are immense structures, holding from 300,-

000 to 1,000,000 bushels at one time, according to size. They are

divided into bins of large capacity and great strength.

They are located with the river harbor on one side and the rail-

way tracks on the other ; and the grain is run through them from

car to vessel, or boat to car, as may be demanded in the course of

business. It has been found impossible to preserve each owner's

grain separate, and this has given rise to a system of inspection
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and grading, by which the grain of different owners is mixed,

and receipts issued for the number of bushels which are negotia-

ble, and redeemable in like kind, upon demand. This mode of

conducting the business was inaugurated more than twenty years

ago, and has grown to immense proportions. The railways have

found it impracticable to ovm such elevators, and public policy

forbids the transaction of such business by the carrier ; the own-

ership has, therefore, been by private individuals, who have em-

barked their capital and devoted their industry to such business

as a private pursuit."

In this connection it must also be borne in mind that, although

in 1874 there were in Chicago fourteen warehouses adapted to

this particular business, and owned by about thirty persons, nine

business firms controlled them, and that the prices charged and

received for storage were such "as have been from year to year

agreed upon and established by the different elevators or ware-

houses in the city of Chicago, and which rates have been annu-

ally published in one or more newspapers printed in said city,

in the month of January in each year, as the established rates

for the year then next ensuing such publication." Thus it is

apparent that all the elevating facilities through which these

vast productions "of seven or eight great States of the West"

must pass on the way "to four or five of the States on the sea-

shore" may be a "virtual" monopoly.

Under such circumstances it is difficult to see why, if the

common carrier, or the miller, or the ferrjonan, or the inn-

keeper, or the wharfinger, or the baker, or the cartman, or the
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hackney-coachman, pursues a public employment and exercises

"a sort of public office," these plaintiffs in error do not. They

stand, to use again the language of their counsel, in the very

' ' gateway of commerce, ' ' and take toll from all who pass. Their

business most certainly "tends to a common charge, and is

become a thing of public interest and use." Every bushel of

grain for its passage "pays a toll, which is a common charge,"

and, therefore, according to Lord Hale, every such warehouse-

man ' ' ought to be under public regulation, viz., that he * * *

take but reasonable toll." Certainly, if any business can be

clothed "with a public interest, and cease to be juris privati

only," this has been. It may not be made so by the operation

of the Constitution of Illinois or this statute, but it is by the

facts.

We also are not permitted to overlook the fact that, for some

reason, the people of Illinois, when they revised their Constitu-

tion in 1870, saw fit to make it the duty of the general assem-

bly to pass laws ' ' for the protection of producers, shippers, and
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receivers of grain and produce," art. 13, sect. 7; and by sect. 5

of the same article, to require all railroad companies receiving

and transporting grain in bulk or otherwise to deliver the same

at any elevator to which it might be consigned, that could be

reached by any track that was or could be used by such com-

pany, and that all railroad companies should permit connec-

tions to be made with their tracks, so that any public ware-

house, &c., might be reached by the cars on their railroads. This

indicates very clearly that during the twenty years in which

this peculiar business had been assuming its present "immense

proportions, ' ' something had occurred which led the whole body

of the people to suppose that remedies such as are usually em-

ployed to prevent abuses by virtual monopolies might not be

inappropriate here. For our purposes we must assume that,

if a state of facts could exist that would justify such legislation,

it actually did exist when the statute now under consideration

was passed. For us the question is one of power, not of expe-

diency. If no state of circumstances could exist to justify such

a statute, then we may declare this one void, because in excess

of the legislative power of the State. But if it could, we must

presume it did. Of the propriety of legislative interference

within the scope of legislative power, the legislature is the ex-

clusive judge.

Neither is it a matter of any moment that no precedent can

be found for a statute precisely like this. It is conceded that

the business is one of recent origin, that its growth has been

rapid, and that it is already of great importance. And it must
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also be conceded that it is a business in which the whole public

has a direct and positive interest. It presents, therefore, a

case for the application of a long-known and well-established

principle in social science, and this statute simply extends the

law so as to meet this new development of commercial progress.

There is no attempt to compel these owners to grant the pub-

lic an interest in their property, but to declare their obligations,

if they use it in this particular manner.

It matters not in this case that these plaintiffs in error had

built their warehouses and established their business before the

regulations complained of were adopted. What they did was

from the beginning subject to the power of the body politic to

require them to conform to such regulations as might be estab-

lished by the proper authorities for the common good. They

entered upon their business and provided themselves with the

means to carry it on subject to this condition. If they did not

vfish to submit themselves to such interference, they should not

have clothed the public with an interest in their concerns. The
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same principle applies to them that does to the proprietor of a

hackney-carriage, and as to him it has never been supposed that

he was exempt from regulating statutes or ordinances because

he had purchased his horses and carriage and established his

business before the statute or the ordinance was adopted.

It is insisted, however, that the owner of property is entitled

to a reasonable compensation for its use, even though it be

clothed with a public interest, and that what is reasonable is a

judicial and not a legislative question.

As has already been shown, the practice has been other-

wise. In countries where the common law prevails, it has

been customary from time immemorial for the legislature to

declare what shall be a reasonable compensation under such

circumstances, or, perhaps more properly speaking, to fix a

maximum beyond which any charge made would be unreason-

able. Undoubtedly, in mere private contracts, relating to mat-

ters in which the public has no interest, what is reasonable

must be ascertained judicially. But this is because the legis-

lature has no control over such a contract. So, too, in matters

which do affect the public interest, and as to which legislative

control may be exercised, if there are no statutory regulations

upon the subject, the courts must determine what is reasonable.

The controlling fact is the power to regulate at all. If that

exists, the right to establish the maximum of charge, as one of

the means of regulation, is implied. In fact, the common-law

rule, which requires the charge to be reasonable, is itself a regu-

lation as to price. Without it the owner could make his rates
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at will, and compel the public to yield to his terms, or forego

the use.

But a mere common-law regulation of trade or business may

be changed by statute. A person has no property, no vested

interest, in any rule of the common law. That is only one of

the forms of municipal law, and is no more sacred than any

other. Rights of property which have been created by the

common law cannot be taken away without due process; but

the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will,

or even at the whim, of the legislature, unless prevented by

constitutional limitations. Indeed, the great office of statutes

is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed,

and to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances. To

limit the rate of charge for services rendered in a public em-

ployment, or for the use of property in which the public has an

interest, is only changing a regulation which existed before. It

establishes no new principle in the law, but only gives a new

effect to an old one.
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Judgment affirmed.

71. In Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minne-

sota, 134 U. S. 418, 10 S. Ct. R. 462, 702 (1889), the court con-

sidered the power of a Railroad and Warehouse Commission,

constituted by the Legislature of Minnesota, to regulate the

charges for carrying milk to St, Paul. Mr. Justice Blatchford,

speaking for the court, said, among other things (p. 456) :

' ' The construction put upon the statute by the Supreme Court

of Minnesota must be accepted by this court, for the purposes of

the present case, as conclusive and not to be re-examined here

as to its propriety or accuracy. The Supreme Court authoritative-

ly declares that it is the expressed intention of the legislature of

Minnesota, by the statute, that the rates recommended and pub-

lished by the commission, if it proceeds in the manner pointed

out by the act, are not simply advisory, nor merely prima facie

equal and reasonable, but final and conclusive as to what are

equal and reasonable charges ; that Xhe law neither contemplates

nor allows any issue to be made or inquiry to be had as to their

equality or reasonableness in fact; that, under the statute, the

rates published by the commission are the only ones that are

lawful, and, therefore, in contemplation of law the only ones

that are equal and reasonable; and that, in a proceeding for

a mandamus under the statute, there is no fact to traverse except

the violation of law in not complying with the recommendations

of the commission. In other words, although the railroad eom-
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pany'is forbidden to establish rates that are not equal and reas-

onable, there is no power in the courts to stay the hands of

the commission, if it chooses to establish rates that are unequal

and unreasonable.

This being the construction of the statute by which we are

bound in considering the present case, we are of opinion that,

so construed, it conflicts with the Constitution of the United

States in the particulars complained of by the railroad com-

pany. It deprives the company of its right to a judicial investi-

gation, by due process of law, under the forms and with the

machinery provided by the wisdom of successive ages for the

investigation judicially of the truth of a matter in controversy,

and substitutes therefor, as an absolute finality, the action of a

railroad commission which, in view of the powers conceded to

it by the state court, cannot be regarded as clothed with judicial

functions or possessing the machinery of a court of justice.

Under section 8 of the statute, which the Supreme Court of

Minnesota says is the only one which relates to the matter of
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the fixing by the commission of general schedules of rates, and

which section, it says, fully and exclusively provides for that

subject, and is complete in itself, all that the commission is re-

quired to do is, on the filing with it by a railroad company of

copies of its schedules of charges, to "find" that any part there-

of is in any respect unequal or unreasonable, and then it is au-

thorized and directed to compel the company to change the same

and adopt such charge as the commission "shall declare to be

equal and reasonable, ' ' and, to that end, it is required to inform

the company in writing in what respect its charges are unequal

and unreasonable. No hearing is provided for, no summons or

notice to the company before the commission has found what it

is to find and declared what it is to declare, no opportunity pro-

vided for the company to introduce witnesses before the commis-

sion, in fact, nothing which has the semblance of due process of

law; and although, in the present case, it appears that, prior to

the decision of the commission, the company appeared before

it by its agent, and the commission investigated the rates charged

by the company for transporting milk, yet it does not appear

what the character of the investigation was or how the result was

arrived at.

By the second section of the statute in question, it is provided

that all charges made by a common carrier for the transportation

of passengers or property shall be equal and reasonable. Under

this provision, the carrier has a right to make equal and reason-

able charges for such transportation. In the present case, the

return alleged that the rate of charge fixed by the commission was
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not equal or reasonable, and the Supreme Court held that the

statute deprived the company of the right to sliow that judicially.

The question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for trans-

portation by a railroad company, involving as it does the ele-

ment of reasonableness both as regards the company and as re-

gards the public, is eminently a question for judicial investiga-

tion, requiring due process of law for its determination. If the

company is deprived of the power of charging reasonable rates

for the use of its property, and such deprivation t^kes place in

the absence of an investigation by judicial machinery, it is de-

prived of the lawful use of its property, and thus, in substance

and effect, of the property itself, without due process of law and

in violation of the Constitution of the United States ; and in so

far as it is thus deprived, while other persons are permitted to

receive reasonable profits upon their invested capital, the com-

pany is deprived of the equal protection of the laws. ' '

Mr. Justice Bradley (Justices Gray and Lamar concurring)

vigorously dissented (p. 461) :
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"I cannot agree to the decision of the court in this case. It

practically overrules IMunn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, and the sev-

eral railroad cases that were decided at the same time. The

governing principle of those cases was that the regulation and

settlement of the fares of railroads and other public accommo-

dations is a legislative prerogative and not a judicial one. This

is a principle which I regard as of great importance. When a

railroad company is chartered, it is for the purpose of per-

forming a duty which belongs to the State itself. It is

chartered as an agent of the State for furnishing public accom-

modation. The State might build its railroads if it saw fit. It

is its duty and its prerogative to provide means of intercom-

munication between one part of its territory and another. And

this duty is devolved upon the legislative department. If the

legislature commissions private parties, whether corporations or

individuals, to perform this duty, it is its prerogative to fix the

fares and freights which they may charge for their services.

When merely a road or a canal is to be constructed, it is for the

legislature to fix the tolls to be paid by those who use it ; when

a company is chartered not only to build a road, but to carry on

public transportation upon it, it is for the legislature to fix the

charges for such transportation.

But it is said that all charges should be reasonable, and that

none but reasonable charges can be exacted; and it is urged

that what is a reasonable charge is a judicial question. On the

contrary, it is pre-eminently a legislative one, involving consid-

erations of policy as well as of remuneration ; and is usually de-
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termined by the legislature, by fixing a maximum of charges in

the charter of the company, or afterwards, if its hands are not

tied by contract. If this maximum is not exceeded, the courts

cannot interfere. When the rates are not thus determined, they

are left to the discretion of the company, subject to the express

or implied condition that they shall be reasonable ; express, when

so declared by statute; implied, by the common law, when the

statute is silent ; and the common law has effect by virtue of the

legislative w^l.

Thus, the legislature either fixes the charges at rates which

it deems reasonable ; or merely declares that they shall be reas-

onable ; and it is only in the latter case, where what is reasonable

is left open, that the courts have jurisdiction of the subject. I

repeat : When the legislature declares that the charges shall be

reasonable, or, which is the same thing, allows the common law

rule to that effect to prevail, and leaves the matter there; then

resort may be had to the courts to inquire judicially whether the

charges are reasonable. Then, and not till then, is it a judicial
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question. But the legislature has the right, and it is its preroga-

tive, if it chooses to exercise it, to declare what is reasonable.

This is just where I differ from the majority of the court. They

say in effect, if not in terms, that the final tribunal of arbitra-

ment is the judiciary ; I say it is the legislature. I hold that it is

a legislative question, not a judicial one, unless the legislature or

the law (which is the same thing), has made it judicial, by pre-

scribing the rule that the charges shall be reasonable, and leaving

it there."

72. CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY CO. V.

JENKINS.

103 III. 588. 1882.

Trover for conversion of a consignment of paper held for de-

murrage. Judgment for plaintiff.

Walker, J. It appears that Noyes & Messenger, a business

firm in Chicago, had consigned to them a quantity of paper,

from Clinton, Iowa, by the road of appellant. It arrived at its

depot in Chicago on the 4th of July, 1872. The consignees were

afterwards notified of its arrival. On the 11th of that month

they paid the freight and removed one dray load, but the com-

pany refused to deliver the balance of the paper until the con-

signees should pay five dollars a day for each day it remained

on the track after twenty-four hours from the time of its ar-
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rival, which was claimed for demurrage. This the consignees

refused to pay, and after a demand and refusal, brought trover

to recover damages for its conversion. The defendant pleaded

the general issue.

The case remained on the docket in this condition until in

April, 1874, when Noyes & Messenger were declared bankrupts

by the United States District Court, and appellee was appointed

assignee of their estate, and the requisite assignment was made

to him. No further action was taken in the case until on the 12th'

day of April, 1878, when, with the leave of the court, the com-

pany filed a plea that the plaintiffs had been adjudged bank-

rupts. Jenkins thereupon filed his petition for leave to be sub-

stituted as a party plaintiff, and to be permitted to prosecute

the suit, and the substitution was made, and the leave granted

by the court. (Passing over questions of practice.)

It is claimed that appellant had the right to hold the prop-

erty until its charges for demurrage were paid, — that they were

a lien on the property, and it was not required to make delivery
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until they were paid. The claim is based on rules and regu-

lations adopted and published by the company. It will be con-

ceded that all liens are created by law, or by contract of the

parties. Where the law gives no lien, neither party can create

it without the consent or agreement of the other. Noyes & Mes-

senger were therefore not bound by these rules unless they as-

sented to them when the contract for shipping the goods was

entered into by the parties, and such a contract is not claimed.

But it is insisted that as the rules were public, and generally

understood, it must be presumed they assented. For the purpose

of creating such a lien on property the law will never indulge

such presumptions. There is no evidence or agreement that

either the consignor or consignee ever had notice or knew of

such regulations. But even if they had, unless they agreed to

be bound by them the rule could create no such lien.

We held in the case of Illinois Central E. R. Co. v. Alexan-

der, 20 111. 23, that railroad companies, when they had carried

goods to their destination, if not removed by the consignee might

store them in their warehouses, and thus terminate their lia-

bility as common carriers, and thereby assume the relation and

liabilities of warehousemen. To the same effect is the case of

Richards v. Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana R. R.

Co. id. 404 ; and in the case of Porter v. Chicago and Rock Island

R. R. Co. id. 407, 71 Am. D. 286, it was held it was their duty

to do so, or remain liable for loss as common carriers. It was

held in the former of these cases, that when stored, and they

had placed the goods in their warehouse, they were entitled
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to charge the customary price for such services, and on such

charges being paid or tendered, and a refusal by the company

to deliver on demand, it became liable for a conversion.

The right to demurrage, if it exists as a legal right, is con-

fined to the maritime law, and only exists as to carriers by sea-

going vessels. But it is believed to exist alone by force of con-

tract. All such contracts of affreightment contain an agree-

ment for demurrage, or the custom of the port allowed the con-

signee to receive and remove the goods. But the mode of doing

business by the two kinds of carriers is essentially different.

Railroad companies have warehouses in which to store freight.

Owners of vessels have none. Railroads discharge cargoes car-

ried by them. Carriers by ship do not, but it is done by the

consignee. The masters of vessels provide in the contract for

demurrage, while railroads do not, and it is seen these essen-

tial differences are, under the rules of the maritime law, wholly

inapplicable to railroad carriers.

Perceiving no error in the record, the judgment of the Appel-
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late Court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed,

73. SCOFIELD V. RAILWAY CO.,

43 Ohio St. 571; 54 Am. B. 846. 1885.

Injunction to prevent the collection of freights. Relief

granted below.

Atherton, J. The main question in this case, and to which all

others are subordinate, is this:

Has the defendant a right to discriminate between its freight-

ers and customers, and furnish transportation to one at a less

rate than to others, in a case where such discrimination is in-

jurious to and destructive of the legitimate business of others?

That ultimate question requires the consideration of several

other propositions and queries, some of which may be stated as

follows :

1. What were the rights and duties of common carriers at

common law, and was the shipper entitled to have his goods

shipped at a rate equal to that charged to others, or was he en-

titled to any protection other than to have his goods transported

for a reasonable compensation ?

2. What changes, if any, have been made by statute in this

State touching the duties and liabilities of a common carrier at

common law?
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3. Is the contract made between the defendant and the Stand-

ard Oil Company, and mentioned in the pleadings, good in law,

or is it void on grounds of public policy ?

4. Can the remedy sought by plaintiffs in this case be ad-

ministered by a court of equity by means of an injunction?

The District Court has found that the defendant is a con-

solidated railroad company owning and operating a railroad ex-

tending from Buffalo, New York to Chicago, Illinois, passing

through Ohio and parts of Pennsylvania, Indiana, Michigan and

Illinois, with branches extending to Detroit and Grand Rapids,

and that defendant is a public corporation and a common carrier

in the business of transporting persons and property for hire

and reward over its line and branches.

The defendant having acquired through its charter the right

of eminent domain and the franchise to construct its road, and

to demand and receive tolls, is to be distinguished from a mining

or manufacturing or other private corporation. By accepting its

charter, and claiming and exercising the peculiar rights and
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privileges enjoyed by public corporations, and "being a creature

of the law and intrusted with the exercise of sovereign power to

subserve public necessities and uses, the defendant is bound to

conduct its affairs in furtherance of the public objects of its

creation. ' '

The legal theory seems to be that it is the duty or the right

of governments to provide improved facilities for the public

travel and transportation at the public expense, and this duty

has been discharged by all civilized governments. It was found

that these improved modes of travel and transportation could

not always be provided by private enterprise, and that to con-

struct canals, turnpikes, railroads, etc., required the exercise

of the right of eminent domain, and the powers of general taxa-

tion. In the further progress of events as private wealth in-

creased, it was found politic and convenient to intrust these

functions of the government to individuals united together as

public corporations under a grant of the government; the rail-

road corporation in consideration of the franchise received, giv-

ing the public the right to use its road, and subjecting itself to

the restraint of the government through its legislature and judi-

ciary to prevent any abuse of the powers so' granted.

"While the law affords railroad corporations adequate and

complete protection in the exercise of their chartered rights,

it also holds them to a strict performance of the public duties

enjoined upon them as a consideration for the rights and powers

thus granted. In cases of apparent confxict between the rights

and powers conferred and the duties imposed, the solution may
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oftentimes be rendered easy by regarding the admitted right of

public use as the touchstone of judicial interpretation." Rail-

road Comm. V. P. & 0. C. R. Co., 63 Me. 269-278, 18 Am. R. 208.

It is because of the fact that such corporations are public cor-

porations, being vested with a portion of sovereign power dele-

gated to them by the State, and owing duties to the public, that

they have been held subject to the right of mandamus to oblige

them to fairly and fully carry out the public object of their crea-

tion. Rex V. Barker, 3 Burr, 1267; State v. R. Co., 29 Conn.

538 ; Aug. & Ames Corp. 694.

It is on the same theory that acts of the legislature have been

sustained as constitutional, requiring railroad corporations to es-

tablish stations at particular places on their roads, and to supply

reasonable accommodations to the people of the smaller localities,

and to do justice to the different sections through which their

railroads pass. Commonwealth v. Eastern R. Co., 103 Mass. 258,

4 Am. Rep. 555.

The fact that parties using the road are required to pay fare
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for transportation in no way conflicts with the views expressed.

"The fare is the consideration for the service performed,

whether done by the State directly, or by a corporation under

a grant from the State ; it is simply a substitute for the tax

rendered necessary when the State builds and conducts railroads

at the public expense ; the corporation upon the payment of the

fare is under the same obligation to render the required service

for the public, that the State would be, if railroads were free

and conducted by State authority. Nor does the ownership of

railroads, whether it be in the State or a private corporation,

affect the nature of their use, since in either case the function

to be exercised and the uses to be subserved are public. ' ' Railr.

Comm. V. P. & 0. C. R. Co., supra, 275, 18 Am. R. 208.

' ' In considering the right of the public to the use of railroads,

and the public interest resulting from this right, it should not

be overlooked that the payment of fares is more than compen-

sated in general by the reduced expense of travel and transpor-

tation by this mode over other means of conveyance, in addition

to the other advantages, public, private and local, resulting from

the establishment of railroads. * * * This beneficial public

interest is intended, among others, to be secured under the fran-

chise granted to railroad corporations; and the public have an

interest that this result should be attained and maintained by

them." Railr. Comm. v. P. & 0. C. R. Co., supra, 276-7, 18 Am.

R. 208.

A similar doctrine is stated by the Supreme Court of Penn-

sylvania: ''Whenever a charter is granted for the purpose of
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constructing a railroad, and the corporation is clothed with the

power to take private property in order to carry out the object,

it is an inference of law from the extent of the power conferred,

and subject-matter of the grant, that the road is for the public

accommodation. The right to take tolls is the compensation to

be received for the benefits conferred. If the public are en-

titled to these advantages it results from the nature of the right

that the benefits should be extended to all alike, and that no

special privileges should be granted to one man or set of men and

denied to others." Sandford v. Railroad Co., 24: Penn. St. 378.

The learned Chief Justice Beasley, in pronouncing the judg-

ment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, said: "In my opin-

ion, a railroad company, constituted under statutory authority,

is not only by force of its inherent nature a common carrier *

* * but it becomes an agent of the public in consequence of

the powers conferred upon it. A company of this kind is in-

vested with important prerogative franchises, among which are

the rights to build and use a railway and to charge and take
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tolls and fares. These prerogatives are grants from the govern-

ment, and public utility is the consideration for them. Although

in the hands of a private corporation, they are still sovereign

franchises, and must be used and treated as such ; they must be

held in trust for the general good. If they had remained under

the control of the State, it could not be pretended that in the

exercise of them it would have been legitimate to favor one citi-

zen at the expense of another. If a State should build and ope-

rate a railroad, the exclusion of everything like favoritism with

respect to its use would seem to be an obligation that could not

be disregarded without violating natural equity and fundamental

principles. * * * In their very nature and constitution, as

I view this question, these companies become, in certain aspects,

public agents, and the consequence is they must in the exercise

of their calling observe to all men a perfect impartiality." Mes-

senger V. Penn. R. Co., 36 N. J. Law, 407, 13 Am. R. 457.

"A railroad corporation, in view of its origin, objects, uses

and the control of the government over it is a public corpora-

tion, though its shares may be owned by private individuals. It

is a governmental agency for public purposes." Talcott v.

Township of Pine Grove, 1 Flip. 120. See also McDuffee v. P.

& R. Co., 52 N. H. 430, 13 Am. R. 72.

The defendant's attorneys in their brief well said: "It can-

not be questioned that the reason why a common carrier is re-

stricted to a reasonable rate is the same that causes the limita-

tion at common law upon the rates charged by a wharfinger

licensed under the statute. In reference to a railroad company
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it may be trul}^ said that it exercises a quasi public employment.

While railroads are managed for private benefit, and their

profits arising from their operation go to individuals, yet they

are treated as merely a public convenience and agency in the

matter of State and inter-State commercial intercourse." And

see Erie & N. E. Railroad v. Casey, 26 Penn. St. 287.

The above authorities abundantly show that railroad com-

panies are common carriers, receiving from the State a delega-

tion of a portion of its sovereign powers for the public good.

That being public agents, and in the place and stead of the gov-

ernment exercising public duties, they are therefore subject to

the legislative and judicial authority to correct the abuse of

their privileges and powers.

The next question is, whether these quasi public agents are re-

quired to treat all citizens and customers alike as to terms upon

which they will transport freight.

It is claimed by the defendant that it is not bound to carry

freights for all freighters at the same rate, but its duty is fully
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discharged if it carries for all, charging none more than a reas-

onable rate. On the contrary, the plaintiffs contend, that at

least under the facts of this ease, they are entitled to the

same rates as their more favored rival. They allege and the

court find that they have been and are carrying on in a large

way, at Cleveland, Ohio, the business of refining crude petroleum,

and selling it in the region reached by the defendant's rail-

road, branches and connecting lines. That they have a large

capital so employed, and have established a large and profitable

trade throughout such territory. That their refinery cost about

$70,000, and that plaintiffs have a refining capacity of about

150,000 barrels per year. And it is contended, and the facts

would seem to establish, that the admitted difference of ten

cents a barrel between the rate charged plaintiffs and that

charged the Standard Oil Company would make to the plaintiffs,

if there was no discrimination practiced, a yearly sum of $15,000

on the output of plaintiff, or more than twenty-one per cent on

the capital used in their business. That the Standard Oil Com-

pany is and has been engaged in the same business at Cleveland

and elsewhere, and has manufactured and shipped nine-tenths

of all the oils manufactured at and shipped from Cleveland,

and that by the terms of an agreement entered into in 1875, the

defendant contracted with the Standard Oil Company that in

consideration of the promise of the company to ship all their

product of petroleum over the defendant's railroad, it under-

took to ship the same at an average rate of about ten cents per

barrel below its published rates; and that plaintiffs were com-
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pelled to pay at the same time according to the published rates.

Plaintiffs claim that by this discrimination in favor of the

Standard Oil Company, the latter are afforded an unfair dis-

crimination and advantage, and can put their product on the

market at a less price than the plaintiff's can aft'ord, and thereby

their profits are reduced; and by this unlawful discrimination

in favor of the Standard Oil Company, the defendant is inflict-

ing upon them great and irreparable damage, and renders it

impossible to successfully compete with that company in the mar-

ket, and thereby the business and trade of plaintiff's is being

injured and destroyed. It will be observed that the gist of

plaintiff' 's contention is not so much that the latter are charged

a rate of compensation for transportation unreasonable in itself,

as that by charging a lower rate to their more favored com-

petitor, the latter is enabled to and is supplying the market at

a price with which the plaintiff's cannot compete, and thus driv-

ing them out of the market and destroying the business and

trade they have built up. One of the questions at issue between

the parties is: What was the doctrine of the common law on
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the question of the compensation of a common carrier? Could

the freighter require any thing more than that he be charged

no more than a reasonable compensation, or could he demand

and have his goods transported at an equal rate with the favored

customer ?

In many cases it has been held that the customer was only

entitled to have his goods shipped at a reasonable rate, and not

necessarily at an equal rate with others; and that he was not

interested in the matter that somebody else was charged less.

Or in the incisive language of Crompton, J., to counsel in an

English case : ' ' The charging another person too little is not

charging you too much."

The question, so far as it related to railroads, w^as settled by

statute in England shortly after their introduction there; and

under the "equality clause" of the English statutes railroad

companies were bound to charge equally to all persons in respect

to all goods under like circumstances. Pickford v. Grand Junc-

tion R. Co., 10 M. & W. 399; Baxendale v. London & South-

western R. Co., L. R., 1 Ex. 137 ; London, etc., R. Co. v. Evershed,

3 App. Cas. 1029, 26 W. R. 863.

And by 17 and 18 Vict., ch. 31, §§ 2, 3 and 6, the Court of

Common Pleas was empowered to restrain by injunction any rail-

way or canal company from giving undue or unreasonable

preference to any particular person or description of traffic. See

notes to Coggs v. Bernard, 1 Smith L. C. 369. So for a long

period of time the English courts have had no occasion to exam-
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ine the condition of the common law upon the subject independ-

ent of the statute.

In C. & A. R. Co. V. People, 67 111. 11, 17, 16 Am. R. 599,

Lawrence, C. J., affirms: "Another perfectly well settled rule

of the common law in regard to common carriers is, that they

shall not exercise any unjust and injurious discrimination be-

tween individuals in their rates of toll. * * * While the

law now imposes, and always has imposed upon individuals

exercising the vocation of a common carrier, the obligation of

rendering service to all persons without injustice to any, how

utterly unreasonable it is to claim that a corporation is to be

permitted to discriminate in its tolls at its own discretion and

without regard to justice," etc.

In discussing the English "equity statute" before adverted

to, Beasley, C. J., pronouncing the opinion of the Supreme

Court of New Jersey, says: "But the courts of Pennsylvania

repeatedly declared that this act was but declaratory of the

doctrine of the common law. * * * In a more recent de-

cision, Mr. Justice Strong says that the special provisions which
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are sometimes inserted in railroad charters, in restraint of undue

preferences, are 'but declaratory of what the common law now

is.' This is the view which for reasons already given, I deem

correct." Messenger v. Penn. R. Co., 36 N. J. Law, 407-412, 13

Am. R. 457.

In some of the cases it is announced that the question of

whether the law requires the common carrier to transport goods

upon equal terms at all, or whether it only requires that the rate

shall be reasonable, but not necesarily equal to all, has been dif-

ferently determined by the courts of England and America.

Ragan v. Aiken, 9 Lea, 609, 42 Am. Rep. 684.

But be that as it may, the tendency and undoubted weight

of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a common carrier is

charged with quasi public duty to transport merchandise on

equal terms for all parties, where the carrying for some shippers

at a lower price than for others will create monopoly by injuring

or destroying the business of those less favored.

"An agreement by a railroad company to carry goods for cer-

tain persons at a cheaper rate than they will carry under the

same conditions for others, is void as creating an illegal prefer-

ence." Messenger v. Penn. R. Co., supra.

The court also cite and make extracts from McDuffee v. Rail-

road, supra; Carton v. B. & E. R. Co., 1 B. &. S. 112 ; Sandford

V. Railroad, 24 Penn. St. 378; Shipper v. Railroad, 47 Penn.

St. 338; Audenried v. Railroad, 68 Penn. St. 370, 8 Am. Rep.

195 ; N. E. Ex. Co. v. Railroad, 57 Me. 188, 2 Am. R. 31 ; Vincent
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V. Railroad, 49 111, 33; Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. People, 56 111.

365, 8 Am. Rep. 690; Dinsmore v. Railroad, 2 Fed. Rep. 465;

Crawford v. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 190, 98 Am. D. 103; Cent.

Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666 ; Great West. Ry. Co.

V. Sutton, 4 Eng. & Ir. App. 226.

Five cases, reported in 10 Fed. Rep. 210, were decided before

Justice Miller and Judges McCrary and Treat, arising in the

various Circuit Courts of the United States for Mississippi, Ar-

kansas, Kansas and Colorado; and Justice JMiller on p. 214,

states as the fifth point in his opinion:

"I am of the opinion that it is the duty of every railroad

company to provide such conveyances by special cars or other-

wise, * * * as are required for the safe and proper trans-

portation of this express matter on their roads, and that the use

of these facilities should be extended on equal terms to all who

are actually and usually engaged in the express business. ' '

The case of Hays v. Pennsylvania Company, 12 Fed. Rep. 309,

decided by Baxter, J., in the Circuit Court of the United States

for the northern district of Ohio, is important in respect to one
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element in this case. The defendant in the case at bar claims

that it was proper to enter into the contract it did with the

Standard Oil Company, on account of the very large amount

of freightage that company annually furnishes, and that it was

lawful to discriminate in their favor on that account. The plain-

tiffs in that case had been engaged for several years in mining

and shipping coal from Salineville, and the defendant's railroad

furnished them their only means of getting their coal to mar-

ket. The railroad company discriminated in favor of every

shipper who shipped five thousand tons or over, and the dis-

crimination was from thirty to seventy cents per ton, graduated

by the amount shipped.

Plaintiffs were required to and did under the discrimination

pay a higher rate than their more favored competitors. They

brought suit to recover for the discrimination, and under the in-

structions of the trial judge the jury returned a verdict for

plaintiffs.

The judge on a motion for a new trial said : ' ' The defendant

is a common carrier by rail. Its road, though owned by the

corporation, was nevertheless constructed for public uses, and

is in a qualified sense a public highway. Hence everybody con-

stituting a part of the public, for whose benefit it was author-

ized, is entitled to an equal and impartial participation in the

use of the facilities it is capable of affording. * * *

The discrimination complained of rested exclusively on the

amount of freight supplied by the respective shippers during
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the year. Ought a discrimination resting exclusively on such a

basis to be sustained? If so, then the business of the country

is in some degree subject to the will of railroad officials; for if

one man, engaged in mining coal and dependent on the same rail-

road for transportation to the same market, can obtain trans-

portation thereof at from twenty-five to fifty cents per ton less

than another competing with him in business, solely on the

ground that he is able to furnish and does furnish the larger

quantity for shipment, the small operator will, sooner or later,

be forced to abandon the unequal contest, and surrender to his

more opulent rival. If the principle is sound in its application

to rival parties engaged in mining coal, it is equally applicable

to merchants, manufacturers, millers, dealers in lumber and

grain, and to everybody else interested in any business requir-

ing any considerable amount of transportation by rail; and it

follows that the success of all such enterprises would depend as

much on the favor of railroad officials as upon the energies and

capacities of the parties prosecuting the same. It is not difficult

with such a ruling to forecast the consequences. The men who
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control railroads would be quick to appreciate the power with

which such a holding would invest them, and it may be not slow

to make the most of their opportunities; and perhaps tempted

to favor their friends to the detriment of their personal or polit-

ical opponents ; or demand a division of the profits realized from

such collateral pursuits as could be favored or depressed by dis-

criminations for or against them ; or else seeing the augmented

power of capital organize into overshadowing combinations and

extinguish all petty competition, monopolize business, and dic-

tate the price of coal and every other commodity to consumers.

We say these results might follow the exercise of such a right as

is claimed for railroads in this case. But we think no such power

exists in them ; they have been authorized for the common benefit

of every one, and cannot be lawfully manipulated for the ad-

vantage of any class at the expense of any other. Capital needs

no such extraneous aid. It possesses inherent advantages which

cannot be taken from it. But it has no just claim by reason of

its accumulated strength, to demand the use of the public high-

ways of the country, constructed for the common benefit of all,

on more favorable terms than are accorded to the humblest of

the land ; and a discrimination in favor of parties furnishing the

largest quantity of freight, and solely on that ground is a

discrimination in favor of capital, and is contrary to a sound

public policy, violative of that equality of right guaranteed to

every citizen, and a wrong to the disfavored party, for which

the courts are competent to give redress."
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The District Court, in their finding 101/2, state that ship

ment by the car-load was the manner in which nearly all busi-

ness was done. That on the request of either party to furnish

cars, the defendant had them switched to the refineries, and after

being loaded they were switched back and placed on defendant's

tracks for shipment on its road.

The manner of making shipments for plaintiffs and for the

Standard Oil Company was precisely the same, and the only

thing to distinguish the business of the one from the other was

the aggregate yearly amounts of freight shipped. We adopt the

reasoning of Baxter, J., as the better law, and hold that a dis-

crimination in the rate of freights resting exclusively on such a

basis ought not to be sustained. The principle is opposed to

sound public policy. It would build up and foster monopolies,

add largely to the accumulated power of capital and money, and

drive out all enterprise not backed by overshadowing wealth.

With the doctrine as contended for by the defendant recognized

and enforced by the courts, what will prevent the great interests

of the north-west, or the coal and iron interests of Pennsylvania,
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or any of the great commercial interests of the country, bound

together by the powder and influence of aggregate wealth, and

in league with the railroads of the land, from driving to the

wall all private enterprise struggling for existence, and with an

iron hand thrusting back all but themselves ?

The defendant can derive no benefit or advantage in this case

from its contract with the Standard Oil Company, and its dis-

crimination cannot be upheld because of the existence of the

same.

We have already held that the contract is opposed to public

policy and void. (Citing Crawford v. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 190,

98 Am. D. 103, and making extracts.)

Now let us look into this contract between defendant and the

Standard Oil Company, and see just what it is as shown by the

pleadings and findings in the case, and its aim and purpose as

shown by the subsequent acts of the parties to it. Defendant

having tariff rates for the public generally, in 1875, contracted

with the Standard Oil Company, that in consideration of the

company giving to the defendant its entire freight business in

the products of petroleum, they would transport such freights

for the company at certain rates dependent upon the fluctuation

of the rates, but about ten cents per barrel cheaper than for any

other customers ; and the defendant not only agreed and under-

took to carry for the company at the reduced rate, but also that

they would not ship for any others at less than the full tariff

rate, and if they did it was understood that the Standard Oil
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Company would take from the defendant all its business and

deprive it of all its "patronage. The understanding was to keep

the price down for the favored customer, but up for all others,

and the inevitable tendency and effect of this contract was to

enable the Standard Oil Company to establish and maintain an

overshadowing monopoly, to ruin all other operators and drive

them out of business in all the region supplied by the defendant 's

road, its branches and connecting lines. The active participa-

tion of the defendant, in the unlawful purposes of the Standard

Oil Company, is shown by the sequel. In 1883, the road of the

N. Y., C. & St. L. R. Co. was constructed. It might become an

active competitor for this business of transporting petroleum

for customers other than the Standard Oil Company. It might

establish such a tariff of rates that other operators in oil might

successfully compete with the Standard Oil Company. If how-

ever the contract of 1875 was in force, the defendant had an ex-

clusive right to all the freights of that company. Having

that exclusive right to do all the carrying for the company, the

District Court found, "that for the purpose of effectually se-
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curing at least the greater part of said trade, the defendant on

the completion of the N. Y., C. & St. L. Railway, a competing

line from Cleveland to the west, in the year 1883, entered into

a traffic arrangement with it giving to it a portion of the ship-

ments of said Standard Oil Company west, on a condition of

its uniting with it in carrying out of such understanding as to

reduced rates to said Standard Company, which arrangements

still exist." How peculiar? The defendant, by a contract made

in 1875, was entitled to all the freights of the Standard Oil Com-

pany, and yet say the District Court, "for the purpose of se-

curing the greater part of said trade," they entered into a con-

tract to divide with the new railroad, if the latter would only

help to keep the rates down for the Standard and up for every-

body eise.

Such a contract so carried out was, in the opinion of this

court, not only contrary to a sound public policy, but to !'he lax

demands of commercial honesty and ordinary methods of busi-

ness.

Defendant's counsel in his brief affirms: "We do not believe

a railroad company should act unjustly ; that it should favor one

man more than another; that it should favor one place more

than another place, or that it should crush out one person for

the purpose of advancing the fortunes of another." We affirm

that admitted doctrine, and upon it declare that contract void.

The cases before referred to, New England Express Company

V. Maine Central Railroad Company ; Sanford v. Railroad Com-
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pany ; Messenger v. Pennsylvania Co., all enforce and emphasize

the doctrine that prevents the defendant from in any way in-

trenching itself behind its arrangement vs^ith the Standard OiJ

Company. Neither of the parties to it can enforce its terms

against the other. It is void in law, and a void thing is no thing.

Neither does the fact found by the District Court, that the

contract "was not made or continued with any intention on the

part of the defendant to injure the plaintiffs in any manner,"

make any difference in the case. The plaintiffs were not doing

business in 1875, when the contract was entered into, and of

course it was not made to injure them in particular. If a man

rides a dangerous horse into a crowd of people, or discharges

loaded firearms among them, he might with the same propriety,

select the man he injures, and say he had no intention of wound-

ing him. And yet the law holds him to have intended the prob-

able consequences of his unlawful act as fully as if purposely

directed against the innocent victim, and punishes him accord-

ingly. And this contract, made to build up a monopoly for the

Standard Oil Company and drive its competitors from the field,
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is just as unlawful as if its provisions had been aimed directly

against the interests of the plaintiffs.

The effect of the provisions of the Ohio statutes upon the case

at bar do not seem to have been much relied on by plaintiff's

counsel. I think they can at least be looked to as indicative of

the tendency and direction~of the legislative policy of the State

upon questions we are investigating.

(Omitting this consideration.)

The defendant in this case relies for its defense not only upon

the doctrine so frequently found in the books declaring that com-

mon carriers are to be held to a reasonable compensation, but not

necessarily an equal compensation, but particularly on the cases

of Johnson v. Pensacola & Perdito R. Co., 16 Fla. 623,

26 Am. Rep. 731, and Ex parte Benson, 18 S. C. 38, 44 Am.

R. 564.

In the latter case a petition was filed against the receiver of

a railroad to compel him to pay to a shipper out of the "re-

ceiver's fund" an amount that had been promised as a draw-

back to procure his custom as a cotton shipper. The receiver

contested the claim on the ground that the discrimination was

unlawful, but no person was shown to have been injured by, and

no third person was complaining of the discrimination. Under

that state of facts the shipper had judgment for his drawback.

In the Florida case the discrimination w^as made in favor of a

shipper of lumber who under peculiar circumstances had fur-

nished the railroad company a sum of money to complete its road
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and was to have the loan repaid by freight at a reduced rate.

Complaints of loss and injury were made by another shipper,

but there was no proof or no satisfactory evidence to show the

complaining shipper was injured in his business by the lower rate

given to the other shipper. In both these cases reliance is placed

on the doctrine that discrimination is not necessarily unlawful,

and that all the freighter is entitled to is a reasonable rate not

necessarily equal to all ; and in the absence of any statute to the

contrary, we are not inclined to question the correctness of these

decisions. But if we should regard them as contrary to the doc-

trine we have indorsed, we would only say they would thus be

overcome by an overwhelming weight of authority.

I think however that all the cases that have been referred to

on their facts might be harmonized by observing the distinction

so often alluded to, that is to say, that as between a consignor

and the common carrier, where no other reason intervenes to en-

graft an exception on the rule, all the consignor can demand

of the common carrier is, that his goods shall be carried at a

reasonable rate, not necessarily at an equal rate with all others.
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But when the reduced rate is either intended to, or has a nat-

ural tendency to injure the plaintiff in his business and destroy

his trade, then a necessary exception is engrafted on the more

general rule, and the plaintiff has then the right to insist that

rates to all be made the same for goods shipped "under like cir-

cumstances." We can perhaps fully agree with defendant's

counsel, and with what he says in his brief :

"The important point to every freighter is that the charge

shall be reasonable, and a right of action will not exist in favor

of any one, unless it be shown that unreasonable inequality has

been made to his detriment. ' '

In the Florida case, supra, the court say, "most of the cases

treat the common-law rule strictly as between the parties, and

without comparison as to the charges against others."

The double aspect in which a case of discrimination is to be

viewed is well stated in the case of St. L., A. & T. H. R. Co. v.

Hill, 14 Bradw. 579, by BxVkee, J.: "The statement, one is a

common carrier, ex vi termini, imports a duty to the public, and a

corresponding legal right in the public; a right common to all.

One of the duties imposed upon the common carrier is, that he is

bound to carry for a reasonable remuneration, and is not al-

lowed to make unreasonable and excessive charges. He cannot,

like a merchant or mechanic, consult his pleasure or caprice in

the conduct of his business, and cannot even by special agree-

ment receive an excessive and extortionate price for his services.

Another duty imposed on him is to make no unjust, injurious, or
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arbitrary discriminations between individuals in his dealings

with the public. The right to the transportation services of

the carrier is a common right belonging to every one alike. ' '

Of a like tenor and effect is Ragan v. Aiken, supra, where the

question as to statutory regulation and the rules of the common

law were before the court. The railroad company or its man-

ager, to induce parties doing business in a particular locality,

and who could send by a different route, offered to carry their

goods for fifteen cents per one hundred. They accepted the

proposition and shipped accordingly. The complainants were

charged more, as were the balance of the public along the line of

the road. They charged that this discrimination was illegal, and

as in this case, prayed an injunction.

(Omitting extracts. It was held that only unreasonable ine-

qualities were unlawful.)

The doctrine here formulated will, in my opinon, reconcile all

the cases upon their facts (though not perhaps all the judges

have said in them), and make them consistent.

The question further presented is, if the plaintiffs have a right
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to relief, can they come into a court of equity and obtain it by

the extraordinary remedy of injunction; and a further question

is proposed by the District Court, whether section 3373 of the

Eevised Statutes was intended to apply to cases like the present,

and if so, whether under it there is any authority for the relief

of injunction. Waiving the first question for the present, we

affirm the law to be that if the right of the plaintiffs existed at

common law to relief by injunction, the enactment of section

3373, if that section applies to the case at all, affords only a

cumulative remedy, and that such a remedy by statute would in

no wise take away the remedy at common law.

So independent of the statute, we proceed to inquire whether

the plaintiff has a remedy by injunction. In the case of Sand-

ford v. R. Co., supra, and C. & A. R. Co. v. People, supra, relief

was sought and afforded by injunction.

In the case of McDuffee v. Railroad, supra, the court say, p.

451 : ' ' There might be cases where the discrimination would be

injurious; in such cases it would be actionable. There might

be cases where the remedy by civil suit for damages at common

law would be practically ineffectual, on account of the difSculty

of proving large damages, or the incompetence of a multiplicity

of such suits to abate a continual grievance, or for other reasons ;

in such cases there would be a plain and adequate remedy, where

there ought to be one, by the re-enforcing operation of an in-

junction, or by indictment, information, or other common, fa-

miliar, and appropriate course of law. ' ' See also 1 Pomeroy Eq.
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254, 255 ; Dodge v. Gardiner, 31 N. Y. 239 ; Third Ave. R. Co.

V. New York, 54 N. Y. 159 ; Woods v. Monroe, 17 Mich. 238.

We think the authorities abundantly show that in a case like

the one at bar the plaintiffs can seek relief by injunction, and

that it is an appropriate method to determine the rights of the

parties here without first resorting to an action at law. The

plaintiffs have a manufacturing capacity of 150,000 barrels per

year. Shall they be compelled to bring a separate action for

each car-load? What number of suits would it require? Are

the damages of plaintiffs for loss of profits susceptible of easy

proof, or even capable of any exact estimation? We think the

plaintiffs have a clear and undoubted right to come into a court

of equity and have the rights of the parties determined in a sin-

gle action.

A further question is presented, whether the decree for plain-

tiffs should be limited to and enforced only in this State, or shall

it extend to and be enforced against the defendant at all points

reached by defendant's railroad, its branches and connecting

lines? The District Court finds that the defendant is a consoli-
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dated company, its lines of roads extending from Buffalo to Chi-

cago, and extending to various points in Pennsylvania, New

York, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan and Illinois. It is an artificial

person, and the same person in all this territory, and this court

has acquired jurisdiction of the person of the corporation, and

the right to enforce all proper orders against it.

A similar question was determined by the Supreme Court of

New Hampshire in McDuffee v. Portland and Rochester R. Co.,

supra.

That was an action brought in the courts of New Hampshire

for an unreasonable discrimination practiced on that part of the

railroad situate in the State of Maine, and on demurrer it was

claimed the action could not be sustained, because the acts com-

plained of happened in the State of Maine.

(Omitting extracts holding that the court had jurisdiction of

the whole case.)

The railroad is an entirety, whether within the State or with-

out, and the artificial person, by the acts of the several States

authorizing consolidation, has been created one, and not two or

more; and no reason is perceived why it may not be dealt with

by the courts of either State that has procured jurisdiction.

This artificial person not only holds itself out, but does make

contracts for the transportation of freight over its connecting

lines as well as its own line, and it makes rates to points only

reached by connecting lines. No reason is perceived why it should

not be ordered to make no discriminations to the injury of plain-
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tiffs in its rates to points thus reached. Of course it may at any

time refuse to make any rates beyond its own lines, but if it

makes rates to points on connecting lines, the rates should be

equal to all. The order of the court is that the defendant be re-

strained, as prayed for in plaintiff's petition.

Judgment accordingly.

Compare with this Cleveland etc. Railway Co. v. Closser, 126

Ind. 348 ; 25 N. E. R. 159 ; 22 Am. St. R. 593, and Cook v. Rail-

way Co., § 74 post.

14:. COOK V. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC

RAILWAY CO.,

81 la. 551; 46 N. W. R. 1080; 25 Am. St. R. 512. 1890.

Action on the common law duty of common carriers. From

the judgment for plaintiff both parties appealed.

RoTHROCK, C.J. , . . It appears that one E. R. Clapp was

an employee of the defendant. He was located at Des Moines,

and was known among shippers of live-stock as the Iowa stock

agent of the defendant. Clapp was frequently along the rail-

road in conference with shippers of live-stock. He held this po-
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sition during the time that the plaintiffs made the shipments set

forth in their petition. There were a number of shippers of live-

stock in and about Newton, the principal station on the defend-

ant's road in Jasper County. During nearly the w'hole time

covered by this action, the tariff rate for shipment of live-stock

from Newton to Chicago was sixty dollars per carload. It was

practically the same from the stations next east and west of

Newton. There was at times a slight difference, but not enough

to be a material fact in the case. The freight charges, as given

by the defendant to its station agents, were, for the most of

the time, sixty dollars per car-load, and this rate was given

out by station agents to shippers as the charge made by the de-

fendant. All of the car-loads sent forward by all the shippers

were billed by the agents at the full rate given out by the com-

pany. The stock was shipped in the usual manner. No part

of the freight charges were in any case paid at the place of

shipment. The cars were billed to commission houses at the

Union stock-yards. The stock was sold by the commission men,

and after taking out their commission and paying the freight,

the balance of the proceeds of the sales were remitted to the

shipper. This was the uniform manner of transacting the

business. All of the shippers were dealt with in exactly the

same manner until the stock was sold, and the regular freight
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charges paid. There was no difference in the manner of the ser-

vice. All of the shippers were given the same kind of cars, and

the stock shipped by the plaintiffs was conveyed in the same

kind of trains, and on the same time, and with the same privi-

leges as to the free transportation of one or more men to take

care of the stock while in transit. In short, the plaintiffs had

no preference over other shippers in any respect. It appears

without conflict that at least three other firms or individuals

engaged in the same business at the same place, and in com-

petition with the plaintiffs, had private and secret agreements

with Clapp, the said stock agent, by which they were paid a

rebate of from three to twenty dollars on each car-load shipped.

These agreements were not uniform at all times. The amount

to be paid varied just as the parties were able to agree upon

the terms. So far as appears, Clapp always performed the con-

tracts. He paid the rebates sometimes in currency, at other

times by sending the money to the shippers by express. There

were short intervals during the time that no rebates were paid.

But these intervals were the exception and not the rule. And
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Clapp always exacted a promise from the favored shippers that

the fact of the payment of rebates must be kept secret. We

have not made a careful estimate of the number of car-loads

shipped by the favored shippers. Indeed, no exact estimate

could be made from the evidence. It is shown, however, b(*-

yond all question, that not less than eighteen hundred car-loads,

in the aggregate, were shipped by the favored shippers. The

plaintiffs made application to Clapp for better terms, and were

refused. He invariably stated in most positive terms that no

rebates nor concessions were allowed to any of the plaintiffs'

competitors. The referee found that the plaintiffs were entitled to

recover on part of the shipments at the rate of three dollars per

car, and on others at five dollars, and on the remainder at the

rate of ten dollars per car. The aggregate amount found to

be due, including interest, was $2,733.98. If the plaintiffs are

entitled to recover on the ground of unjust discrimination, the

evidence shows beyond all controversy that the judgment is not

excessive. Indeed, we do not understand appellant's counsel to

claim that the judgment is excessive.

The real question in the case is. Do the facts above recited

authorize a recovery on the part of the plaintiffs? It is well

to keep in mind the fact that the defendant is a public com-

mon carrier. At common law a public or common carrier is

bound to accept and carry for all upon being paid a reasonable

compensation. The fact that the charge is less for one than

another is only evidence to show that a particular charge is un-
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reasonable. In Story on Bailments, sec. 508, note 3, it is said :

"There is nothing in the common law to hinder a carrier from

carrying for favored individuals at an unreasonably low rate,

or even gratis." And in 1 Wood on Railroads, 566, it is said:

"A mere discrimination in favor of a customer is not unlaw-

ful, unless it is an unjust discrimination." In 2 Redfield on

Railways, 95, the following language is used: "It has been

held in this country, where there is no statutory regulation

affecting the question, that common carriers are not absolutely

bound to charge all customers the same price for the same ser-

vice. But as the rule is clearly established at common law that

a carrier is bound by law to carry everything which is brought

to him, for a reasonable sum to be paid to him for the same

carriage, and not to extort what he will, it would seem to fol-

low that he is bound to carry for all at the same price, unless

there is some special reason for the distinction. For unless this

were so, the duty to cany for all would not be of much value

to the public, since it would be easy for the carrier to select his

own customers at will, by the arbitrary discrimination in his
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prices. Hence it was held, at an early day, that all that could

be required on the part of the owner of the goods by way of

compensation was, that he should be ready and willing to pay a

reasonable compensation, and to deposit the money in advance,

if required. Carrying for reasonable compensation must imply

that the same compensation is accepted always for the same ser-

vice, else it could not be reasonable, either absolutely or rela-

tively." In Hutchinson on Carriers, 243, after a review of

the cases, it is said: "Hence we may conclude that in this

country, independently of statutory provisions, all common car-

riers will be held to the strictest impartiality in the conduct of

their business, and that all privileges or preferences given to

one customer, which are not extended to all, are in violation of

public duty." An examination of the authorities cited by these

learned authors leaves no doubt that a common carrier has no

right to make unreasonable charges for his services, and that

he cannot lawfully make unjust discrimination between his cus-

tomers. It is strenuously contended by counsel for appellant

that it is not charged in the petition as a substantial fact that

the rate charged the plaintiffs was unreasonable. It is dis-

tinctly averred that the rate charged the plaintiffs "was un-

reasonable, and is and was an unjust discrimination." This

appears to us to be a sufficient answer to the argument of

counsel to the effect that the action is founded solely upon

the fact of mere difference in rates. It appears to be con-

ceded that the defendant had no right to exact unreasonable
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rates, or to make unjust discriminations between shippers which,

in effect, compels one shipper to pay an unreasonable rate.

The above principles of law may be said to be fundamental,

and it is only necessary to apply the facts to reach the conclu-

sion that the rates paid by the plaintiffs were unreasonable and

unjust discrimination. It is not claimed that the favored ship-

pers were objects of the charity of the defendant. The payment

of the rebates cannot -be designated as ' ' alms-giving. ' ' It does

not appear that the concessions were made because the fav-

ored shippers furnished more shipments than the plaintiffs.

The fact is, that some of the others shipped less than the plain-

tiffs. In short, there is no reason for the discrimination. It

is true that it is claimed that the rebate shippers bought cattle

and hogs from territory in which shipments would ordinarily

be made upon other railroads, but the evidence shows that the

plaintiffs' field of operation was about the same as the other

shippers. It does not appear that the rebates were allowed

merely at times when there were cut rates or a war of rates

between the defendant and rival railroad lines. The rebates
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were paid regularly for years, with but short intervals. Is it

to be supposed that any court or jury under this state of facts

would solemnly find, declare, and adjudge that, after paying

the rebate, the defendant did not have a reasonable compensa-

tion if or the service ? The only finding that can in any fairness

be made is, that after deducting the rebate the rate was reason-

able, and that the exaction from the plaintiffs was unreason-

able, and the discrimination against them unjust. And the fact

that it was secretly done, and that it appeared to be neces-

sary to carry it on by lying and deceit, surely does not tend to

commend such a course of dealing to fair-minded men. We

have been cited to a number of adjudged cases by counsel for

the respective parties, and we think we may safely say that not

one of them is in conflict with the views we have herein expressed

upon this question. On the contrary, and in support of our

conclusion, see Sharpless v. Mayor, 21 Pa. St. 147, 59 Am. Dec.

759; New England Exp. Co. v. Maine etc. R'y Co., 57 Me. 188,

2 Am. Rep. 31; McDuffee v. Portland etc. R'y Co., 52 N. H. 430,

13 Am. Rep. 72; Messenger v. Pennsylvania R'y Co., 36 N. J.

L. 407, 13 Am. Rep. 457.

2. It is claimed in behalf of appellant that the payments by

the plaintiff were voluntarily made, and cannot be recovered

back. It is true, the money was paid Avithout duress of person

or goods, but it was paid, not only without knowledge that it

was a wrongful exaction, but in the belief of the truth of the

positive assertions of Clapp that no shipper was allowed any
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rebate. That such a payment is not voluntary, see 1 Parsons on

Contracts, 466, and Heiserman v. Burlington etc. E-'y Co., 63

Iowa 732, 18 N. W. R. 903.

*****

Modified and affirmed.

75. GIBSON V. STURGE,

10 Exchequer 622. 1855.

Action for freight claimed to be due on a cargo of wheat from

Odessa to Gloucester and measured at Odessa 2664 quarters.

The wheat was shipped on board the vessel while in quarantine

in an open roadsted, out of barges. The vessel proceeded direct

to Gloucester, where she arrived on the 1st of December, 1852,

when the cargo was claimed by the defendants under the bill

of lading. On unloading the vessel, the corn was measured, in

the presence of the defendants, by the Custom-house authorities,

at the Queen's beam, and was found to contain 27851/^ quar-

ters, the freight for which would be 1022L 19s. 5(Z. In the

course of the voyage, a large portion of the corn, from some

cause, of which there was no evidence, became heated and dam-
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aged. The defendants paid to the plaintiffs 978i. 8s., being the

freight upon 2664 quarters, but refused to pay the balance now

claimed, on the ground that the heated corn had increased the

bulk, and that they were only liable to pay for the invoice quan-

tity shipped at Odessa. The corn was afterwards dried, when

it was found to weigh less than the quantity shipped.

The learned Judge ruled that the defendants were liable to

pay freight for the quantity of corn delivered; and a verdict

was found for the plaintiff's for the amount claimed, leave be-

ing reserved to the defendants to move to enter a nonsuit.

(Martin, B., delivered an opinion in favor of computing

freight on the measurement at the port of delivery.)

Platt, B. — Freight has been well defined to be the price pay-

able for the carriage of goods from the port of loading to their

port of discharge. In ordinary cases it does not become payable

before the completion of the voyage and of the carriage of the

goods to their destination. From the very nature of the trans-

action, the goods shipped are alone subject of the carriage, and

for the carriage of them alone from the port of shipment to

the port of discharge is the freight payable. In conformity
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with these plain propositions they are described in the bill of

lading as shipped in good order and condition on board the

particular vessel, lying in a particular place, and bound on a

particular voyage from thence to a specified port, and as to be

conveyed on that voyage and delivered in like good order and

condition at such port. They must be shipped at the port of

departure and thence carried the whole way to the port of dis-

charge; and unless they are carried from the beginning to the

end of the voyage the freight is not earned.

But it is suggested, that the computation of the freight upon

any other measurement than one taken at the port of delivery,

would impose hardship on the owners, who might, by reason

of their receiving the cargo from boats in a roadstead, be unable

to ascertain the number of quarters taken on board. It seems,

however, to me, to be the duty of the master to ascertain, at

the time of loading, the quantity he receives; and the difficulty

in his so doing appears to be purely imaginary, as it can hardly

be supposed that the number of cubic feet which his vessel

is competent to afford for the stowage of grain could be unknown
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to him, so that he could not ascertain the cubic bulk of such a

commodity as grain when stowed.

The difficulty, however, never could arise in the present case ;

for, upon the facts raising the question for the Court's decision,

the quantity shipped was known, and the owner contended, that,

although they received and during the whole voyage have carried

that quantity only, yet, as by reason of the moisture having

in' the course of that voyage so operated upon the grain as to

increase its bulk, they are entitled to profit by that increase,

and claim freight according to the capacity of the cargo at the

port of discharge ; or, in other words, to be paid freight not only

for the grain shipped, but also for the water which they have

allowed to incorporate with it, and the increased bulk resulting

from that incorporation. Such a mode of payment would plain-

ly offer a premium to negligence in the treatment of a cargo

of this description during the voyage.

In this case the bulk received at the port of loading was the

only bulk carried during the whole of the voyage ; wherefore I

think the freight should have been computed upon the measure-

ment at that port, and not at the port of discharge ; and that the

rule obtained by the defendant should be made absolute.

Alderson, B. — In this case I have also the misfortune to dif-

fer with my learned Brother Martin as to the conclusion at which

he has arrived, and I shall state very shortly my reasons for so

doing. The contract for freight in this case is a contract for
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carrying a certain cargo of corn from Odessa to England. The

amount put on board at the port of loading was less by a certain

number of bushels than the am.ount delivered at the port of dis-

charge. Now, if the rule be, that, in the absence of any special

stipulations, the freight is due for that quantity which has been

carried for the whole voyage, as I think it is, it seems to me to

follow as a necessary consequence, that the less amount alone

falls within that category. It is true, perhaps, that the same

individual grains are carried throughout, but they measure

more in bulk on their arrival than at their loading. The case

seems to me to be in close analogy to that of the pregnant females

mentioned in Molloy, Bk. 2, Chap. 4, s. 8, where no freight is

payable for the infants of whom they are delivered during the

voyage. And, again, where freight is contracted for the trans-

porting of animals, and some die during the voyage, the freight

is payable only for those which arrive safe. And, again, where

goods, as in the case of molasses, have wasted in bulk during

the voyage, freight is payable for the amount which arrives.

These are admitted cases. Now, all these cases can only, as it
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seems to me, be reasonably explained on the principle, that, in

such cases, the freight is to be calculated and paid on that

amount only which is put on board, carried throughout the whole

voyage, and delivered at the end to the merchant.

It is said, that this will be found inconvenient in practice.

If it be so, it may easily be obviated by an express stipulation.

But the rule as it stands obviates an evil on the other side — that of

suffering the owner of the ship to gain by the want of care on

the part of his master and crew; for it may be that corn

shipped dry on board may, by the incautious or careless admis-

sion of water, be deteriorated in quality and increased in bulk,

so that, whilst there is a loss from the deterioration to the mer-

chant, the shipowner may, from the increased bulk, have a

benefit. This would be wrong as well as inconvenient; and the

rule proposed by my learned Brother would be open to this con-

sequence. For these reasons I cannot agree in the conclusion

at which he has arrived.

Pollock, C. B. — It is unnecessary further to allude to the

facts of this case, which have been fully and clearly stated by

my Brother Martin, from whose view of the subject I very re-

luctantly differ, as I think that his opinion on such a matter (a

question of commercial law) is entitled to the highest respect.

But, on the best consideration I can give to the subject in dis-

pute between the parties, I am of opinion that the rule ought

to be made absolute, as I think that the defendant has paid

all that the plaintiff was entitled to demand ; and that the claim

283

§ 75 EIGHTS AND DUTIES OF COMMON CAERIEE.

to be paid freight for the increased bulk, which the wheat ac-

quired during the voyage, cannot be sustained.

The remote cause of the increased bulk of the wheat does not

appear; but there is little doubt about the immediate cause. It

is clear, that there was not a real increase of the commodity; it

was an apparent increase only. From some cause (unknown)

the wheat, during the voyage (it may be during the last two or

three days of the voyage), probably imbibed a quantity of water,

which made it occupy a larger space ; and the shipowner claims

to be paid freight for the water imbibed during the voyage (and

possibly the last two or three days of it), as well as for the

wheat that was shipped on board and carried the whole voyage.

It may be conceded, that the cause of this is one for which the

plaintiff is not responsible; but, on the other hand, it must be

admitted that (whatever it was) it was not one for which the

defendant was responsible ; in this respect the parties stand

on an equal footing; and I agree with my Brother Martin, that

our decision ought to be founded on some principle, not imputing

in this respect any blame to either party.
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The first question is — Is this claim supported by the terms of

the bill of lading? And it appears to me that it is not. From

the terms of the bill of lading I infer that freight was to be paid

for the commodity sliipped, carried and delivered; and that all

these must concur to create a title to freight. If shipped and

carried, but not delivered, freight would not be payable ; so,

I think, if delivered, but not shipped, freight would not be pay-

able; and this agrees with the decisions (very few in number,

and none of them precisely in point), which are to be found in

the books on the subject of increase or decrease (during the

voyage) of the article to be carried. I agree, that the bulk or

weight, as appearing at the port of destination, may be prima

facie the criterion of the freight to be paid; but, when it is

proved that tliat test is fallacious and untrue, and that the real

quantity shipped was a different and smaller quantity (as the

jury in this case have actually found), then I think that the

freight ought to be calculated upon the true quantity shipped;

and in my judgment the captain's ignorance of the true quan-

tity (as expressed in the bill of lading) cannot entitle him to

charge freight according to a false estimate : whether the actual

quantity be stated and admitted in the bill of lading, or the con-

tents are stated to be unknown, appears to me to make no dif-

ference as to the principle which ought to govern our decision.

But it does appear to me to be contrary to the principles of

natural justice, that the ship-owner should acquire a right to

demand more freight, and the owner of the goods become liable
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to pay more freight, in consequence of a circumstance which is

an injury to the goods, and which has occurred to them while

they were in the care, custody, and keeping of the shipowner,

or those who represent him ; over the causes of which the owner

of the goods has no control, but some of the possible causes of

which are considerably, or entirely, under the control of the

captain and the crew.

I apprehend no one can entertain any doubt, that, if the water

which has caused the apparent increase were capable of separa-

tion from the wheat originally shipped, the defendant would be

entitled to reject it, and to accept and pay freight for the wheat

freed from this injurious addition. In the case of a cargo of

sponge shipped dry, and to be paid for by weight at the end of

the voyage, the consignee might surely squeeze out all the water

imbibed during the voyage (if any), and pay for sponge only.

It seems to me, that the right to demand, and the liability to

pay, additional freight, in a case where the goods have received

a damaging (but only an apparent) increase, cannot turn on the

mere difficult}^ of separation. If it can be accurately known and
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ascertained what ought to be separated, though the separation

cannot be made, it is known what ought to be deducted from

\he claim of freight, and the deduction (which is possible) ought

to be made. Here the measure of the wheat shipped was known

and has been proved, — all beyond that is water; and though

the water cannot be separated, the amount of freight charged

for the water can be ascertained, and, I think, ought to be de-

ducted from the claim founded on the mere measurement at the

port of discharge or delivery ; and I think it is no answer to this,

to say, that in many cases the quantity shipped would be un-

known, or would be ascertained with difficulty. Deal with those

cases as justice or convenience may require, but do not exclude

the truth, where accessible, because you cannot always obtain it.

If the experience of commerce has discovered that the measure-

ment at the port of destination was the most convenient, and had

established it by usage and custom, the parties would have been

bound by it, and the point would not have come before us for

our decision. From there being no evidence of any such usage

or custom, I infer that there is no such custom ; and that, there-

fore, there is no such convenience as ought to be the foundation

of a custom, or as ought to influence our decision in establish-

ing a rule for the first time. But, it is manifest, that a cargo

of wheat may be increased in bulk (and to the great injury of

the cargo) by the fraud or negligence of the captain and crew;

and I think that laws ought to be framed, and the decisions of

Courts of law (as far as possible) ought to be founded, on the
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same principles as we have no doubt prevail in the moral gov-

ernment of the universe, that, as far as possible, duty and in-

terest should not be opposed to each other. I think it would

be dangerous and mischievous to give a shipowner a right to

charge more freight for an injurious alteration in the commodity

carried, which he or his agents have always the means in their

own hands of producing.

I am, therefore, of opinion, that freight for this increase of

bulk cannot be claimed under the bill of lading ; and I think it

cannot be claimed on any principle recognized by the common

law. I think there is no contract, express or implied, to pay it.

Rule absolute.

76. UNION FREIGHT RAILROAD CO. V. WINKLEY,

159 Mass. 133; 34 N. E. R. 91; 38 Am, St. R. 398. 1893.

Action against a consignor of ice for the freight. Bills had

been sent to the consignee, with a demand for payment of the

freight.

Field, C. J. The plaintiff is the second in a line of three

connecting railroads over which the ice was transported, and
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the freight due to the first two roads has been paid by the last.

We assume, without deciding it, that the right of the plaintiff

to maintain this action is the same as if it were the first road,

and the freight had not been paid. With whom, then, did the

Boston and Maine Railroad make the contract for the trans-

portation, and who promised that company to pay the freight?

There was no express contract. The defendants, through their

servants, might have contracted with the railroad to pay the

freight, although as between themselves and Merrick he was

bound to pay it, but they made no such contract in terms. A

consignor of merchandise delivered to a railroad for transporta-

tion may be the owner and act for himself, or may be an agent

for the owner and act for him, and this may or may not be

known to the railroad company. In the present case the rail-

road company knew the name and residence of the consignee.

From the agreed facts, it appears that the title to the ice

passed to Merrick when it was put on board the car, and that

it was transported at his risk. The doctrine of the courts of the

United States seems to be that the property in goods shipped

is presumably in the consignee, although this presumption may

be rebutted by proof : Lawrence v. Minturn, 17 How. 100 ; Blum

V. The Caddo, 1 Woods, 64. In Dicey on Parties to Actions,
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87, 88, the result of the English decisions is stated to be as fol-

lows: "The contract for carriage is, in the absence of any ex-

press agreement, presumed to be between the carrier and the

person at whose risk the goods are carried, i. e., the person whose

goods they are, and who would suffer if the goods were lost. *

* * When, therefore, goods are sent to a person who has pur-

chased them, or are shipped under a bill of lading by a person's

order, and on his account, the consignee, as being the person at

whose risk the goods are, is considered the person with whom

the contract is made. He is liable to pay for the carriage, and

is the proper person to sue the carrier for a breach of contract."

And on page 90, note, "Where the consignor acts as agent of

the consignee, but contracts in his own name, it would appear

that either the consignor or the consignee may sue"; Dawes v.

Peck, 8 Term Rep. 330; Domett v. Beckford, 5 Barn. & Adol.

521 ; Coombs v. Bristol etc. Ry. Co., 3 Hurl. & N. 1 ; Sargent v.

Morris, 3 Barn. & Aid. 277 ; Dunlop v. Lambert, 6 Clark & F.

600; Great Western Ry. Co. v. Bagge, 15 Q. B. D. 625; Cork

Distilleries Co. v. Great Southern etc. Ry. Co., L. R. 7 H. L. 269.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:39 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

The cases generally are collected in Hutchinson on Carriers, sees.

448, et seq., 720, et seq. Most of the English cases were re-

viewed in Blanchard v. Page, 8 Gray, 281. That was a case

of the carriage of goods by sea under a bill of lading, and it

was held that the bill of lading was a contract between the ship-

per and the shipowner, and that, although it was shown that

the shipper acted as agent of the consignees, who had bought

and paid for the goods before shipment, yet he could bring an

action in his own name for breach of the contract of carriage

unless he was prohibited by his principal, and it was said that

he would be liable for the freight. In Wooster v. Tarr, 8 Allen,

270, 85 Am. Dec. 707, it was decided that under a bill of lad-

ing in the usual form the shipper was liable to the carrier for the

freight, although the bill contained the usual clause that the

goods were to be delivered to the consignees or their assignees,

"he or they paying freight for said goods," etc. It was said

"to be the settled doctrine that a bill of lading is a written

simple contract between a shipper of goods and a shipowner;

the latter to carry the goods, and the former to pay the stipu-

lated compensation when the service is performed." Both these

cases were upon express contracts.

The strongest case for the plaintiff is Finn v. Western R. R.

Co., 102 Mass. 283, 17 Am. R. 128. (For this reference see Finn

v. R. R., post § 177.

Although this was not a suit to recover freight, the principles

on which it was decided are applicable to such a suit, and the
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effect of this and the previous decisions, we think, is that in this

commonwealth, when the vendor of goods delivers them to a rail-

road to be carried to the purchaser, although the title passes to

the purchaser by the delivery to the railroad company, and the

name and address of the consignee who is the purchaser is known

to the company, the vendor is presumed to make the contract

for transportation with the company on his own behalf, and is

held liable to the company for the payment of the freight. This

presumption, however, is a disputable one, and may be rebutted

or disproved by evidence; and if the vendee has ordered the

goods to be sent at his risk and on his account, he also may be

held liable, as the real principal in the contract : See Byington

V. Simpson, 134 Mass. 169, 45 Am. Rep. 314. But whether the

presumption be one way or the other, it is a matter of inference

from the particular circumstances of the case, and the question

which is always to be considered is the understanding of the

parties : See Boston etc. R. R. Co. v. Whitcher, 1 Allen, 497.

In the present case there was no bill of lading or receipt signed

by the railroad company and accepted by the defendants. There
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was a waybill, but it does not appear that the names of the de-

fendants were in it. The freight charges w^ere made in every in-

stance to Merrick, the consignee, and the bills for freight were

sent to him. These facts, and perhaps some others stated in

the agreed facts, afford some evidence that the railroad com-

pany understood that Merrick was to pay the freight to the

company. Upon an agreed statement of facts this court cannot

draw inferences of fact, unless they are necessary inferences:

Old Colony R. R. Co. v. Wilder, 137 Mass. 536. The agreed

facts in this case, we think, contain some evidence that the un-

derstanding of all the parties was that Merrick should pay the

freight to the railroad company, and we cannot hold, as matter

of law, that the defendants made a contract on their own behalf

to pay the freight.

Judgment affirmed.

77. BRIGGS V. BOSTON & LOWELL RAILROAD CO.,

6 Allen (Mass.) 246; 83 Am. D. 626. 1863.

Trover for conversion of flour. Defendant appeals from judg-

ment for plaintiff.

By Court, INIerrick, J. The plaintiff, who resides at Racine,

in the state of Wisconsin, delivered the flour, the value of which

he seeks to recover in this action, to the Racine and Mississippi
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Railroad Company, taking from their agents a receipt, in which

they agreed to forward and deliver it to Franklin E. Foster,

at Williamstown, in this state. By mistake of the agents of that

company, the flour was erroneously directed or billed to Wil-

mington, where there is a freight station on the road of the de-

fendants. It was carried by the Racine and IMississippi com-

pany over their road, and at its eastern termination delivered to

the carriers next in succession in the line and route from Racine

to Wilmington. And it was thus transported by the successive

carriers in that line and route in their vessels and cars respect-

ively, according to the bills and directions under which it was

forwarded from Racine, until it arrived in due time at Groton,

the point of the commencement of the road of the defendants.

And it was there received by them, they paying the freight

earned by all the preceding carriers, and carried to Wilming-

ton, where it was duly deposited in their freight depot. But

Franklin E. Foster, to whom it was directed, did not reside

or have any place of business at Wilmington, and the defend-

ants were unable to find there any consignee who could be noti-
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fied of its arrival, or to whom it could be delivered. The de-

fendants' agents immediately instituted a diligent inquiry, but

they could not ascertain where the consignee, or any other per-

son entitled to have possession of the flour, was to be found,

or could be notified. At the time of its arrival at Wilmington

it was beginning to become sour, and would soon have greatly

deteriorated in value. The defendants kept it on hand in store

for about two months ; and at the expiration of that time, being

still unable to find either the owner or the consignee, and it be-

ing out of their power to procure a warehouse in which they

could store it for a longer time, they caused it to be sold at

public auction, and received the proceeds of the sale, which

they have since retained in their possession.

Upon these facts, the plaintiff in the first place contends that

as Williamstown was the place of destination of the flour under

the directions which he gave to' the Racine and Mississippi

Railroad Company, and according to their agreem^ent in the re-

ceipt given for it by them to him, the defendants had no right

to receive the flour at Groton, and were guilty of the unlawful

conversion of it to their own use by transporting it thence to

Wilmington; although in such reception and transportation of

it over their road they acted in good faith, and strictly in con-

formity to the bills and directions which were made and given

by the agents of the Racine and Mississippi company, and by

which it was regularly accompanied over each and all the lines

and routes of the successive carriers.
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The same person may be, and often is, not only a common car-

rier, but also the forwarding agent of the owner of the goods

to be transported : Story on Bailments, sees. 502, 537. He must

necessarily act in the latter capacity whenever he receives goods

which are to be forwarded, not only on his own line, but to

some distant point beyond it on the line of the next carrier,

or on that of the last of several successive carriers on the regu-

lar and usual route and course of transportation, to which they

are to be carried and there delivered to the consignee. The

owner generally does not and cannot always accompany them

and give his personal directions to each one of the successive

carriers. He therefore, necessarily, in his own absence, devolves

upon the carrier to whim he delivers the goods the duty and

invests him with authority to give the requisite and proper

directions to each successive carrier to whom, in due course of

transportation, they shall be passed over for the purpose of

being forwarded to the place of their ultimate destination. Other-

wise they would never reach that place. For the first carrier

can only transport the goods over his own portion of the line,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:39 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

and if he is not authorized to give the carrier with whose route

his own connects, directions in reference to their ' further trans-

portation, they must stop at that point; for although in general

every carrier is bound to accept and forward all goods which are

brought and tendered to him, yet he is not so bound unless he

is duly and seasonably informed and advised of the place to

which they are to be transported : Story on Bailments, sec. 532 ;

Judson V. Western Railroad, 4 Allen, 520, 81 Am. D. 718.

Hence it results by inevitable implication that when an owner

of goods delivers them to a carrier to be transported over his

route, and thence over the route of a succeeding car-

rier, or the routes of several successive carriers, he

makes and constitutes the persons to whom he delivers them

his forwarding agents, for whose acts in the execution of tlii*:

agency he is himself responsible. And therefore, if the several

successive carriers carry the goods according to the directions

which are given by the forwarding agents, they act under the

authority of the owner, and cannot in any sense be considered as

wrong-doers, although they are carried to a place to which he

did not intend that they should be sent. And in such case the

last carrier will be entitled to a lien upon the goods, not only

for the freight earned by him on his own part of the route,

but also for all the freight which has been accumulating from

the commencement of the carriage until he receives them, which,

according to a very convenient custom which is now fully recog-

nized and established as a proper and legal proceeding, he has
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paid to the preceding carriers : Stevens v. Boston and Worces-

ter R. R. Co., 8 Gray, 266.

Applying these rules and principles to the facts developed

in the present case, the conclusion is plain and inevitable. It

x»' conceded by the plaintiff, and agreed by the parties, that the

flour was carried by the Racine and Mississippi Railroad Com-

pany over their road, and was then delivered to the carrier with

whose route their own connected, and was thence transported in

strict compliance with and exactly accordingly to the directions

given by them and contained in the bills which they forwarded

with and caused to accompany the flour over the whole route

from Racine to Wilmington, by the several successive carriers,

and among others by the defendants. The Racine and Missis-

sippi company were the duly constituted forwarding agents of

the plaintiff ; and as the defendants acted under their authority,

they rightfully received the flour at Groton and carried it to Wil-

mington. And having under that authority paid all the freight

which had accumulated in the whole course of the conveyance,

including that which had been charged by the forwarding agent,
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up to the time when they received the flour, they were, as soon

as it was conveyed to and deposited in their own freight-house,

entitled to a lien thereon for the entire freight thus paid and

earned. And they cannot, either by the transportation of it

under such circumstances over their own road, or by the deten-

tion thereof for the purpose of enforcing their lien upon it, be

held to have unlawfully converted it to their own use.

This conclusion does not at all conflict with the decision in

the case of Robinson v. Baker, 5 Cush. 137, 51 Am. Dec. 54,

upon which the plaintiff, in support of his position, chiefly re-

lies. For there is an essential diff'erence between the facts in

the present and those which appeared in that case. There

it was shown that the plaintiff, the owTier of a parcel of flour,

delivered it at Black Rock, on board of one of their canal-boats,

to the Old Clinton Line Company, who gave for it bills of lading

in duplicate, wherein they undertook and agreed to transport

it to Albany, and there deliver it to Witt, the agent of the West-

ern Railroad. The plaintiff sent one of these bills of lading to

Witt, and the other to the consignee at Boston, thus reserving to

himself the right and assuming the responsibility of giving to

Witt the directions under which he was to act. The service

which the Old Clinton Line Company was to render was exclu-

sively in their capacity as commcn carriers. They had only to

carry the flour to Albany, and there deliver it to Witt. They

had no other duty to perform; no right to exercise any control

over it for any other purpose. They were not, therefore, the
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forwarding agents of the plaintiff, nor invested by him with iwiy

authority to give directions as to the further transportation of

the flour, or to make any other disposition of it than its de-

livery to Witt. Yet upon its arrival in Albany, in consequence

of the inability of Witt immediately to receive and take charge

of it, the agents of the Clinton Line Company, without right,

and in violation of their duty, shipped the flour to the city of

New York, and from there to Boston, in the schooner Lady Suf-

folk, whose owners claimed a right to detain it under a lien

upon it for the freight. But the court, upon the general prin-

ciple that if a carrier, though innocently, receives goods from a

wrong-doer without the consent of the owner, express or im-

plied, he cannot detain them against the true owners until the

freight or carriage is paid, determined that they had no lien

upon the flour, and that their claim to that efl^ect could not be

sustained. But if they had been the forwarding agents of the

owner, he would have been responsible for their acts, and his

consent to the diversion of the property from its intended route

of transportation would have resulted by implication from their
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directions, and the respective carriers would then have become

entitled to hold it under a lien to secure payment of the freight.

When the flour had been carried over their road to Wilmington,

and deposited at that place in their warehouse, the defendants

had, as has been shown above, a lien upon it for all the freight

which had been earned in its transportation from Racine. But

this gave them only a right to detain it until they were paid ; not

to sell it to obtain the remuneration to which they were entiled.

In the case of Lickbarrow v. Mason, 6 East, 21, note, it is said

by the court that an owner may sell or dispose of his property as

he pleases; but he who has a lien only on goods has no right

to do SO; he can only detain them until payment of the sum

for which they are chargeable. And the rule which is now well

established, that a party having a lien only, without a power

of sale superadded by special agreement, cannot lawfully sell

the chattel for his reimbursement, is as applicable to carriers

as it is to all other persons having the like claim upon property

in their possession: Jones v. Pearle, 1 Strange, 556; 2 Kent's

Com., 6th ed., 642 ; Doane v. Russell, 3 Gray, 382. It is in dis-

tinct recognition of this principle that the legislature have pro-

vided that when the owner or consignee of fresh meat, and of

certain other enumerated articles, liable soon to perish for want

of care, shall not pay for the transportation, and take them away,

common carriers who have a lien thereon for the freight may

sell the same without any delay, and hold the proceeds, subject

to their own lawful charges, for the use of the owner. And
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such also is the provision in relation to trunks, parcels, and

passengers' effects left unclaimed at any passenger station of a

railway company for a period of six months after arrival and

deposit therein : Gen. Stats., c. 80, sees, 1, 2, 5. This enumera-

tion of particular cases, in which the right to sell and dispose of

certain goods and chattels transported is conferred upon com-

mon carriers, operates, according to a familiar rule of law, as a

denial or exclusion of their right in all other instances.

None of the provisions of the statute referred to extends to

the case of flour transported in barrels as an article of merchan-

dise. And therefore the defendants had no authority under

the statute, and no right at law, to sell the flour which belonged

to the plaintifi", although they had a valid and subsisting lien

upon it, and were unable to find, after diligent inquiry, where

the person to whom it ought to be delivered resided or had his

place of business, and there was danger of its becoming worth-

less by longer detention of it in their warehouse. And conse-

quently, the sale which they made was an unlawful conversion

of it to their own use, which renders them liable in an action of
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tort to the owner for its value, or rather for the value of all the

right and interest which he at that time had in it, which is the

merchantable value less the amount of the lien upon it. The

plaintiff, therefore, may maintain this action, and is entitled

to recover as damages the balance left after deducting from the

sum which was the fair merchantable value of the flour at the

time of the conversion, the amount for which, upon the princi-

ples before stated, they had a lien upon it, with interest from

the time of demand, or the date of the writ. And as the sale

was unlawful, the expenses incurred in making it cannot be

proved for the purpose of diminishing the damages which the

plaintiff ought to recover.

Judgment is therefore to be rendered for him. Unless the

parties agree upon the amount, the cause must be sent to an

assessor, or submitted to a jury, if either party requires it, to

assess the damages.

78. RUCKER V. DONOVAN,

13 Kan. 251; 19 Am. R. 84. 1874.

Replevin by Donovan to recover turpentine and coal oil from

Rucker, a constable. On judgment for plaintiffs, Rucker took

the case up on error.

Brewer, J. This was an action of replevin brought by de-
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f endants in error in the District Court of Bourbon county. The

testimony is not in the record, and the case is before us on the

pleadings, the findings, and judgment. The petition alleges an

absolute ownership. The findings show that the goods were in

the possession of Rucker as constable by virtue of proper and

legal process against the firm of L. E. Conner & Co. Plain-

tiffs' title was based upon an attempted exercise of the right of

stoppage in transitu. The findings are, that plaintiffs at St.

Louis sold the goods to Conner & Co., and shipped them to Fort

Scott; that Conner & Co. were then insolvent, and that this in-

solvency was unknown to plaintiffs; that the goods never came

into the possession of Conner & Co., but were taken by the con-

stable from the carrier by virtue of his process; and that the

constable paid the freight-charges, and also that plaintiffs de-

manded possession of the goods from the constable before suit,

and while they were in his possession, but did not pay or tender

the freight-charges. These are all the facts upon which the

court based its conclusions of title and right of possession in the

plaintiffs. The first finding shows a passage of the title from
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plaintiffs to Conner & Co. ; and a reinvestment in plaintiffs of

title and right of possession is claimed only by virtue of an exer-

cise of the right of stoppage in transitu. Now, the mere insol-

vency of the vendee does not of itself amount to a stoppage in

transitu; there must be some act on the part of the vendor indica-

tive of his intention to repossess himself of the goods. 1 Parsons

on Contr. 478 ; 2 Kent, 543, and cases cited in notes. Actual

seizure of the goods before they come into the hands of the ven-

dee is not essential. A demand of the carrier, or notice to him

to stop the goods, or a claim and endeavor to get the possession,

is sufficient. No particular form of notice and demand is re-

quired. See same authorities. This right can be exercised only

during the transit, and before delivery, actual or constructive,

to the vendee. But a seizure by an officer under legal process

in favor of some other creditor does not destroy the right. Smith

V. Goss, 1 Camp. (N. P.), 282; Buckley v. Furniss, 15 Wend.

137; Aguirre v. Parmelee, 22 Conn. 473; Wood v. Yeatman,

15 B. Monr. 270. Demand must be made of the party in posses-

sion. It is not sufficient to make demand of the vendee. White-

head V. Anderson, 9 M. & W. 519 ; Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Denio,

629. Applying these rules to the facts of this case and it appears

that the transit had not ended; the goods were in possession of

an officer holding legal process in favor of another creditor; de-

mand was made of the party in actual possession. It would

seem therefore that the right of stoppage in transitu was not

gone, and that the plaintiffs took the necessary steps to assert
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that right. But it is insisted by counsel that this stoppage in

transitu is simply the exercise of a lien by the seller, and not a

rescission of the sale; that the petition alleges absolute owner-

ship while the findings only show the existence of a lien, a

variance that is fatal to the action. It must be conceded that

the great weight of authority supports the claim of counsel in

reference to the nature of stoppage in transitu, though there

is far from absolute unanimity on the question. But it does

not appear that any objection was made to proof of this kind

of interest in the property under the general allegation of owner-

ship ; no motion for a new trial was made, nor does it appear

that the attention of the District Court was called to this va-

riance, and it is one of those discrepancies which under almost

any circumstances might properly be corrected at the trial by

an amendment of the petition. As it does not appear by ex-

ception or otherwise that the findings are against the evidence,

we could not order a new trial, but must direct the judgment

that ought to be entered. It does not seem to us therefore that

we ought to disturb the judgment upon that ground.
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One question more remains for consideration. The constable

paid the freight-charges when he took possession of the goods

from the carrier. These charges were neither paid nor tendered

to him before the suit was commenced. Who then had the right

of possession at that time? Clearly the officer. The lien for

charges was prior to the claims of creditors, or the rights of the

vendor, 2 Kent, 541 ; Oppenheim v. Russell, 3 Bos. & Pul. 42.

The carrier's possession could not be disturbed until they were

paid. The officer was justified in paying them, and having

paid them was substituted to all the rights of the carrier. Be-

fore his possession then could be disturbed he must be reim-

bursed the money by him thus advanced. Now, the gist of the

action of replevin is the right of possession. Town of LeRoy

V. McConnell, 8 Kan. 273. Of course, questions of title may

also arise, but the action can never be maintained against any

one having the right of possession. The constable having the

right of possession was entitled to judgment. He should not be

subject to the expenses of a litigation which was not rightfully

commenced. The law will protect the possession in him until

these charges are paid. Having retained the property, the value

of this possession need not and could not properly be determined,

nor could any judgment be rendered for the return of the prop-

erty, or the recovery of the value thereof, or the value of the

possession. All that could properly be done was to render

judgment in his favor for costs. Such a judgment, upon this

ground alone, we are compelled to direct the District court to
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enter, and the case will be remanded for that purpose. We

have in this opinion discussed questions other than the one

necessary to be considered, in order that there might be no dis-

pute hereafter as to the matters decided and disposed of be-

tween these parties by this case.

All the Justices concurring.

^79. NEW JERSEY STEAM NAVIGATION CO. V. MER-

CHANTS' BANK OF BOSTON,

6 Howard (U. 8.) 343. 1848.

Mr, Justice Nelson. This is an appeal from the Circuit Court

of the United States, held in and for the District of Rhode

Island, in a suit originally commenced in the District Court in

admiralty, and in which the Merchants' Bank of Boston were

the libellants, and the New Jersey Steam Navigation Company

the respondents.

The suit was instituted upon a contract of affreightment, for

the purpose of recovering a large amount of specie lost in the

Lexington, one of the steamers of the respondents running be-

tween New York and Providence, which took fire and was con-
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sumed, on the night of the 13th of January, 1840, on Long

Island Sound, about four miles off Huntington lighthouse, and

between forty and fifty miles from the former city.

The District Court dismissed the libel pro forma, and entered

a decree accordingly. An appeal was taken to the Circuit Court,

where this decree of dismissal was reversed, and a decree en-

tered for the libellants for the sum of $22,224, with costs of

suit.

The case is now before this court for review.

William F. Harnden, a resident of Boston, was engaged in

the business of carrying for hire small packages of goods, specie,

and bundles of all kinds, daily, for any persons choosing to

employ him, to and from the cities of Boston and New York,

using the public conveyances between these cities as the mode

of transportation. For this purpose, he had entered into an

agreement with the respondents on the 5th of August, 1839,

by which, in consideration of $250 per month, to be paid month-

ly, they agreed to allow him the privilege of transporting in

their steamers between New York and Providence a wooden

crate of the dimensions of five feet by five feet in width and

height, and six feet in length, (contents unknown,) until the

31st of December following, subject to these conditions : —
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1. The crate with its contents to be at all times exclusively

at the risk of said Harnden, and the respondents not in any

event to be responsible, either to him or his employers, for the

loss of any goods, wares, merchandise, money, &c., to be con-

veyed or transported by him in said crate, or otherwise in the

boats of said company.

2. That he should annex to his advertisements published in

the public prints the following notice, and which was, also, to

be annexed to his receipts of goods or bills of lading : —

"Take notice. — ^William F. Harnden is alone responsible for

the loss or injury of any articles or property committed to his

care; nor is any risk assumed by, nor can any be attached to,

the proprietors of the steamboats in which his crate may be and

is transported, in respect to it or its contents, at any time."

This arrangement expired on the 31st of December, 1839, but

was on that day renewed for another year, and was in existence

at the time of the loss in question.

A few days previous to the loss of the Lexington, the libel-

lants employed Harnden in Boston to collect from the banks in

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:39 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

the city of New York checks and drafts to the amount of about

$46,000, which paper was received by him and forwarded to his

agent in that city, with directions to collect and send home the

same in the usual way. Eighteen thousand dollars of this sum

was put in the crate on board of that vessel on the 13th of Janu-

ary, for the purpose of being conveyed to the libellants, and

was on board at the time she was lost, on the evening of that

day.

Upon this statement of the case, three objections have been

taken by the respondents to the right of the libellants to re-

cover : —

1. That the suit is not maintainable in their names. That,

if accountable at all for the loss, they are accountable to Harn-

den, with whom the contract for carrying the specie was made.

2. That if the suit can be maintained in the name of the li-

bellants, they must succeed, if at all, through the contract with

Harnden, which contract exempts them from all responsibility

as carriers of the specie ; and,

3. That the District Court had no jurisdiction, the contract

of affreightment not being the subject of admiralty cognizance.

We shall examine these several objections in their order.

I. As to the right of the libellants to maintain the suit.

They had employed Harnden to collect checks and drafts on

the banks in the city of New York, and to bring home the pro-

ceeds in specie. He had no interest in the money, or in the

contract with the respondents for its conveyance, except what
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was derived from the possession in the execution of his agency.

The general property remained in the libellants, the real own-

ers, subject at all times to their direction and control; and any

loss that might happen to it in the course of the shipment would

fall upon them.

This would be clearly so if Harnden is to be regarded as a

private agent; and even if in the light of a common carrier of

this description of goods, the result would not be changed, so

far as relates to the right of property.

The carrier has a lien on the goods for his freight, if not paid

in advance; but subject to this claim he can set up no right of

property or of possession against the general owners. (Story

on Bailments, § 93, g.)

(After deciding that the action was properly brought in the

name of libellants.)

The cases are numerous in which the general owner has sus-

tained an action of tort against the wrong-doer for injuries to

the property while in the hands of the bailee. The above cases

show that it may be equally well sustained for a breach of con-
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tract entered into between the bailee and a third person. The

court look to the substantial parties in interest, with a view

to avoid circuity of action; saving, at the same time, to the de-

fendant all the rights belonging to him if the suit had been in

the name of the agent.

We think, therefore, that the action was properly brought in

the name of the libellants.

II. The next question is as to the duties and liabilities of the

respondents, as carriers, upon their contract with Harnden. As

the libellants claim through it, they must affirm its provisions,

so far as they may be consistent with law.

The general liability of the carrier, independently of any

special agreement, is familiar. He is chargeable as an insurer

of the goods, and accountable for any damage or loss that may

happen to them in the course of the conveyance, unless arising

from inevitable accident, — in other w^rds, the act of God or

the public enemy. The liability of the respondents, therefore,

would be undoubted, were it not for the special agreement un-

der which the goods were shipped.

The question is, to what extent has this agreement qualified

the common law liability?

We lay out of the case the notices published by the respond-

ents, seeking to limit their responsibility, because, —

1. The carrier cannot in this way exonerate himself from

duties which the law has annexed to his employment ; and,

2. The special agreement with Harnden is quite as compre-
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hensive in restricting their obligation as any of the published

notices.

A question has been made, whether it is competent for the car-

rier to restrict his obligation even by a special agreement. It

was very fully considered in the case of Gould and others v.

Hill and others, 2 Hill, 623, and the conclusion arrived at that

he could not. See also Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 240, 32

Am. D. 455, and Cole v. Goodwin, ib. 272, 282, 32 Am. D. 470.

As the extraordinary duties annexed to his employment con-

cern only, in the particular instance, the parties to the trans-

action, involving simply rights of property, — the safe custody

and delivery of the goods, — we are unable to perceive any

well-founded objection to the restriction, or any stronger reasons

forbidding it than exist in the case of any other insurer of

goods, to which his obligation is analogous; and which depends

altogether upon the contract between the parties.

The owner, by entering into the contract, virtually agrees,

that, in respect to the particular transaction, the carrier is not

to be regarded as in the exercise of his public employment;
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but as a private person, who incurs no responsibility beyond

that of an ordinary bailee for hire, and answerable only for mis-

conduct or negligence.

The right thus to restrict the obligation is admitted in a large

class of cases founded on bills of lading and charter-parties,

where the exception to the common law liability (other than

that of inevitable accident) has been, from time to time, en-

larged, and the risk diminished, by the express stipulation of

the parties. The right of the carrier thus to limit his liability

in the shipment of goods has, we think, never been doubted.

But admitting the right thus to restrict his obligation, it by

no means follows that he can do so by any act of his own. He

is in the exercise of a sort of public office, and has public duties

to perform, from which he should not be permitted to exonerate

himself without the assent of the parties concerned. And this

is not to be implied or inferred from a general notice to thp

public, limiting his obligation, which may or may not be as-

sented to. He is bound to receive and carry all the goods of-

fered for transportation, subject to all the responsibilities inci-

dent to his employment, and is liable to an action in case of

refusal. And we agree with the court in the case of Hollister

V. Nowlen, that, if any implication is to be indulged from the

delivery of the goods under the general notice, it is as strong

that the owner intended to insist upon his rights, and the duties

of the carrier, as it is that he assented to their qualification.

The burden of proof lies on the carrier, and nothing short
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of an express stipulation by parol or in writing should be per-

mitted to discharge him from duties which the law has an-

nexed to his employment. The exemption from these duties

should not depend upon implication or inference, founded on

doubtful and conflicting evidence; but should be specific and

certain, leaving no room for controversy between the parties.

The special agreement, in this case, under which the goods

were shipped, provided that they should be conveyed at the

risk of Harnden; and that the respondents were not to be ac-

countable to him or to his employers, in any event, for loss or

damage.

The language is general and broad, and might very well com-

prehend every description of risk incident to the shipment. But

we think it would be going farther than the intent of the parties,

upon any fair and reasonable construction of the agreement,

were we to regard it as stipulating for wilful misconduct, gross

negligence, or want of ordinary care, either in the seaworthiness

of the vessel, her proper equipments and furniture, or in her

management by the master and hands.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:39 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

This is the utmost effect that was given to a general notice,

both in England and in this country, when allowed to restrict

the carrier's liability, although as broad and absolute in its

terms as the special agreement before us (Story on Bailm.

§ 570) ; nor was it allowed to exempt him from accountability

for losses occasioned by a defect in the vehicle, or mode of con-

veyance used in the transportation. (13 Wend. 611, 627, 628.)

Although he was allowed to exempt himself from losses aris-

ing out of events and accidents against which he was a sort of

insurer, yet, inasmuch as he had undertaken to carry the goods

from one place to another, he was deemed to have incurred the

same degree of responsibility as that which attaches to a private

person, engaged casually in the like occupation, and was, there-

fore, bound to use ordinary care in the custody of the goods,

and in their delivery, and to provide proper vehicles and means

of conveyance for their transportation.

This rule, we think, should govern the construction of the

agreement in question.

If it is competent at all for the carrier to stipulate for the

gross negligence of himself, and his servants or agents, in the

transportation of the goods, it should be required to be done,

at least, in terms that would leave no doubt as to the meaning

of the parties.

The respondents having succeeded in restricting their liabil-

ity as carriers by the special agreement, the burden of prov-

ing that the loss was occasioned by the want of due care, or
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by gross negligence, lies on the libellants, which would be other-

wise in the absence of any such restriction. We have accord-

ingly looked into the proofs in the case with a view to the ques-

tion.

There were on board the vessel one hundred and fifty bales

of cotton, part of which was stowed away on and along side

of the boiler-deck, and around the steam-chimney, extending

to within a foot or a foot and a half of the casing of the same,

which was made of pine, and was itself but a few inches from

the chimney. The cotton around the chimney extended from

the boiler to within a foot of the upper deck.

The fire broke out in the cotton next the steam-chimney, be-

tween the two decks, at about half past seven o'clock in the

evening, and was discovered before it had made much progress.

If the vessel had been stopped, a few buckets of water, in all

probability, would have extinguished it. No effort seems to

have been made to stop her, but, instead thereof, the wheel was

put hard a-port, for the purpose of heading her to the land. In

this act, one of the wheel-ropes parted, being either burnt or
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broken, in consequence of which the hands had no longer any

control of the boat.

Some of them then resorted to the fire-engine, but it was

found to be stowed away in one place in the vessel, and the

hose belonging to it, and without which it was useless, in

another, and which was inaccessible in consequence of the fire.

They then sought the fire-buckets. Two or three only, in all,

could be found, and but one of them properly prepared and

fitted with heaving lines; and, in the emergency, the specie-

boxes were emptied, and used to carry water.

The act of Congress (5 Statutes at Large, 306, § 9) made it

the duty, at the time, of these respondents to provide, as a part,

of the necessary furniture of the vessel, a suction-hose and fire-

engine, and hose suitable to be worked in case of fire, and to

carry the same on every trip, in good order; and further pro-

vided, that iron rods or chains should be employed and used ini

the navigation of steamboats, instead of wheel or tiller ropes.

This latter provision was wholly disregarded on board the ves-"

sel during the trip in question ; and the former also, as we have

seen, for all practical or useful purposes.

"We think there was great want of care, and which amounted

to gross negligence, on the part of the respondents, in the

stowage of the cotton; especially, regarding its exposure to fire

from the condition of the covering of the boiler-deck, and the

casing of the steam chimney. The former had been on fire on

the previous trip, and a box of goods partly consumed. Also,
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for the want of proper furniture and equipments of the vessel,

as required by the act of Congress, as well as by the most pru-

dential considerations.

(After deciding that the court had jurisdiction.)

It is, indeed, difficult, on studying the facts, to resist the

conclusion, that, if there had been no fault on board in the

particulars mentioned, and the emergency had been met by the

officers and crew with ordinary firmness and deliberation, the

terrible calamity that befell the vessel and nearly all on board

would have been arrested.

We are of opinion, therefore, that the respondents are liable

for the loss of the specie, notwithstanding the special agree-

ment under which it was shipped.

Upon the whole, without pursuing the examination farther,

we are satisfied that the decision of the Circuit Court below

was correct, and that its decree should be affirmed.

Justices Catron, Daniel and Woodbury also delivered opin-

ions. , , w .

80. CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY CO.,
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APPELLANT, V. THE PEOPLE EX REL.

HEMPSTEAD,

56 III. 365; 8 Am. R. 690. 1870.

Lawrence, C. J. This was an application for a mandamus, on

the relation of the owners of the Illinois river elevator, a grain

warehouse in the city of Chicago, against the Chicago and North-

western Railroad Company. The relators seek by the writ to

compel the railway company to deliver to said elevator whatever

grain in bulk may be consigned to it upon the line of its road.

There was a return duly made to the alternative writ, a de-

murrer to the return, and a judgment pro forma upon the de-

murrer, directing the issuing of a peremptory writ. From that

judgment the railway company has prosecuted an appeal.

The facts as presented by the record are briefly as follows :

The company has freight and passenger depots on the west side

of the north branch of the Chicago river, north of Kinzie street,

for the use, as we understand the record and the maps which are

made a part thereof, of the divisions known as the Wisconsin

and ]\Iilwaukee division of the road, running in a north-westerly

direction. It also has depots on the east side of the north branch,

for the use of the Galena division, running westerly. It has
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also a depot on the south branch, near Sixteenth street, which it

reaches by a track diverging from the Galena line, on the west

side of the city. The map indicates a line running north from

Sixteenth street the entire length of West Water street, but we

do not understand the relators to claim their elevator should be

approached by this line, as the respondent has no interest in

this line south of Van Buren street.

Under an ordinance of this city, passed August 10, 1858, the

Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago company, and the Chi-

cago, St. Paul and Fond du Lac company (now merged in the

Chicago and Northwestern company), constructed a track on

West Water street, from Van Buren street north to Kinzie

street, for the purpose of forming a connection between the

two roads. The Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago company

laid the track from Van Buren to Randolph street, and the Chi-

cago, St. Paul and Fond du Lac company that portion of the

track from Randolph north to its own depot. These different

portions of the track were, however, constructed by these two

companies, by an arrangement between themselves, the precise
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character of which does not appear, but it is to be inferred from

the record that they have a common right to the use of the track

from Van Buren street to Kinzie, and do, in fact, use it in

common. The elevator of the relators is situated south of Ran-

dolph street and north of Van Buren, and is connected with the

main track by a side track laid by the Pittsburgh company, at

the request and expense of the owners of the elevator, and con-

nected at each end with the main track.

Since the 10th of August, 1866, the Chicago and Northwestern

company, in consequence of certain arrangements and agree-

ments on and before that day entered into between the com-

pany and the owners of certain elevators known as the Galena,

Northwestern, Munn & Scott, Union, City, ]\Iunger and Armor,

and Wheeler, has refused to deliver grain in bulk to any ele-

vator except those above named. There is also in force a rule

of the company, adopted in 1864, forbidding the carriage of

grain in bulk if consigned to any particular elevator in Chicago,

thus reserving to itself the selection of the warehouse to which

the grain should be delivered. The rule also provides that grain

in bags shall be charged an additional price for transportation.

This rule is still in force.

The situation of these elevators, to which alone the company

will deliver grain, is as follows: The Northwestern is situated

near the depot of the Wisconsin division of the road, north of

Kinzie street ; the Munn & Scott on West Water street, between

the elevator of relators and Kinzie street; the Union and City
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near Sixteenth street, and approached only by the track diverg-

ing from the Galena division, on the west side of the city, al-

ready mentioned; and the others are on the east side of the

north branch of the Chicago river. The Munn & Scott elevator

can be reached only by the line laid on West Water street under

the city ordinance already mentioned; and the elevator of re-

lators is reached in the same way, being about four and a half

blocks further south. The line of the Galena division of the

road crosses the line on West Water street at nearly a right

angle, and thence crosses the North Branch on a bridge. It

appears by the return to the writ that a car coming into Chi-

cago on the Galena division, in order to reach the elevator of

relators, would have to be taken by a draw-bridge across the

river on a single track, over which the great mass of the busi-

ness of the Galena division is done, then backed across the river

again upon what is known as the Milwaukee division of re-

spondent's road, thence taken to the track on West Water street,

and the cars, when unloaded, could only be taken back to the

Galena division by a similar, but reversed, process, thus neces-
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sitating the passage of the draw-bridge, with only a single line,

four times, and, as averred in the return, subjecting the com-

pany to great loss of time and pecuniary damage in the delay

that would be caused to its regular trains and business on that

division.

This seems so apparent that it cannot be fairly claimed the

elevator of relators is upon the line of the Galena division, in

any such sense as to make it obligatory upon the company to de-

liver upon West Water street freight coming over that division of

the road. The doctrine of The Vincent case, in 49 111., was, that a

railway company must deliver grain to any elevator which it

had allowed, by a switch, to be connected with its own line.

This rule has been re-affirmed in an opinion filed at the present

term, in the case of The People ex rel, Hempstead v. The Chicago

and Alton Railroad Co., 55 111. 95. But in the last case we

have also held that a railway company cannot be compelled to

deliver beyond its own line, simply because there are connect-

ing tracks over which it might pass by paying track service,

but which it has never made a part of its own line by use.

So far as we can judge from this record, and the maps show-

ing the railway lines and connections, filed as a part thereof,

the Wisconsin and Milwaukee divisions, running north-west,

and the Galena division, running west, though belonging to the

same corporation and having a common name, are, for the pur-

poses of transportation, substantially different roads, constructed

under different charters, and the track on West Water street
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seems to have been laid for the convenience of the Wisconsin

and Milwaukee divisions. It would be a harsh and unreason-

able application of the rule announced in The Vincent case,

and a great extension of the rule beyond any thing said in that

case, if we were to hold that these relators could compel the

company to deliver, at their elevator, grain which has been

transported over the Galena division, merely because the de-

livery is physically possible, though causing great expense to

the company and a great derangement of its general business,

and though the track on West Water street is not used by the

company in connection with the business of the Galena division.

What we have said disposes of the case so far as relates to the

delivery of grain coming over the Galena division of respond-

ent 's road. As to such grain the mandamus should not have been

awarded.

When, however, we examine the record as to the connection

between the relators' elevator and the Wisconsin and Milwaukee

divisions of respondent's road, we find a very different state of

facts. The track on West Water street is a direct continuation
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of the line of the Wisconsin and Milwaukee division; cars com-

ing on this track from these divisions do not cross the river.

The Munn & Scott elevator, to which the respondent delivers

grain, is, as already stated, upon a side track connected with

this track. The respondent not only uses this track to deliver

grain to the Munn & Scott elevator, but it also delivers lumber

and other freight upon this track, thus making it not only

legally, but actually, by positive occupation, a part of its road.

The respondent, in its return, admits, in explicit terms, that

it has an equal interest with the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and

Chicago railroad in the track laid in West Water street. It also

admits its use, and the only allegation made in the return for the

purpose of showing any difficulty in delivering to relators' ele-

vator the grain consigned thereto from the Wisconsin and Mil-

waukee divisions, is that those divisions connect with the line

on West Water street only by a single track, and that respond-

ent cannot deliver bulk grain or other freight to the elevator of

relators, even from those divisions, without large additional ex-

pense, caused by the loss of the use of motive power, labor of

servants, and loss of use of cars, w^hile the same are being de-

livered and unloaded at said elevator and brought back. As a

reason for non-delivery on the ground of difficulty, this is simply

frivolous. The expense caused by the loss of the use of motive

power, labor and cars, while the latter are being taken to their

place of destination and unloaded, is precisely the expense for

which the company is paid its freight. It has constructed this
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line on "West Water street in order to do the very work which

it now, in general terms, pronounces a source of large additional

expense; yet it does not find the alleged additional expense an

obstacle in the way of delivering grain upon this track at the

warehouse of Munn & Scott, or delivering other freights to

other persons than the relators. Indeed, it seems evident, from

the diagrams attached to the record, that three of the elevators,

to which the respondent delivers grain, are more difficult of

access than that of the relators, and three of the others have

no appreciable advantage in that respect, if not placed at a

decided disadvantage, by the fact that they can be reached only

by crossing the river.

We presume, however, from the argument, that the respond-

ent's counsel place no reliance upon this allegation of additional

expense, so far as the Wisconsin and Milwaukee divisions are

concerned. They rest the defense on the contracts made between

the company and the elevators above named, for exclusive deliv-

ry to the latter, to the extent of their capacity. This brings us

to the most important question in the case. Is a contract of this
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character a valid excuse to the company for refusing to deliver

grain to an elevator upon its lines, and not a party to the con-

tract, to which such grain has been consigned ?

In the oral argiunent of this case it was claimed, by counsel

for the respondent, that a railway company was a mere private

corporation, and that it was the right and duty of its directors

to conduct its business merely with reference to the pecuniary

interests of the stockholders. The printed arguments do not

go to this extent, in terms, but they are colored throughout by

the same idea, and in one of them we find counsel applying

to the supreme court of the United States, and the supreme

court of Pennsylvania, language of severe, and almost contemptu-

ous, disparagement, because those tribunals have said, that "a

common carrier is in the exercise of a sort of public office."

N. J. Steam Nav. Co. v. Merch. Bank, 6 How. 381 ; Sandford v.

Railroad Co., 24 Penn. 380, If the language is not critically

accurate, perhaps we can pardon these courts, when we find

that substantially the same language was used by Lord Holt,

in Coggs V. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, the leading case in all

our books on the subject of bailments. The language of that

case is, that the common carrier "exercises a public employ-

ment. ' '

We shall engage in no discussion in regard to names. It is

immaterial whether or not these corporations can be properly

said to be in the exercise of "a sort of public office," or whether

they are to be styled private, or quasi public corporations. Cer-
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tain it is, that they owe some important duties to the pul^lic,

and it only concerns us now to ascertain the extent of these

duties as regards the ease made upon this record.

It is admitted by respondent's counsel, that railway com-

panies are common carriers, though even that admission is some-

what grudgingly made. Regarded merely as a common carrier

at common law, and independently of any obligations imposed

by the acceptance of its charter, it would owe important duties

to the public, from which it could not release itself, except with

the consent of every person who might call upon it to perform

them. Among these duties, as well defined and settled as any-

thing in the law, was the obligation to receive and carry goods,

for all persons alike, without injurious discrimination as to

terms, and to deliver them in safety to the consignee, unless

prevented by the act of God or the public enemy. These obli-

gations grew out of the relation voluntarily assumed by the

carrier toward the public, and the requirements of public policy,

and so important have they been deemed, that eminent judges

have often expressed their regret that common carriers have
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ever been permitted to vary their common-law liability, even

by a special contract with the OAvner of the goods.

Regarded, then, merely as a common carrier at common law,

the respondent should not be permitted to say, it will deliver

goods at the warehouse of A and B, but will not deliver at the

warehouse of C, the latter presentihg equal facilities for the dis-

charge of freight, and being accessible on respondent's line.

But railway companies may well be regarded as under a higher

obligation, if that were possible, than that imposed by the

common law, to discharge their duties to the public as common

carriers fairly and impartially. As has been said by other

courts, the State has endowed them with something of its own

sovereignty, in giving them the right of eminent domain. By

virtue of this power, they take the lands of the citizen against

his will and can, if need be, demolish his house. Is it supposed

these great powers Avere granted merely for the private gain of

the corporators? On the contrary, we all know the companies

were created for the public good.

The object of the legislature was to add to the means of travel

and commerce. If, then, a common carrier at common law came

under obligations to the public from which he could not dis-

charge himself at his own volition, still less should a railway

company be permitted to do so, when it was created for the pub-

lic benefit and has received from the public such extraordinary

privileges. Railway charters not only give a perpetual existence

and great power, but they have been constantly recognized by
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the courts of this country as contracts between the companies

and the State, imposing reciprocal obligations.

The courts have always been, and we trust always will be,

ready to protect these companies in their chartered rights, but,

on the other hand, we should be equally ready to insist that they

perform faithfully to the public those duties which were the

object of their chartered powers.

We are not, of course, to be understood as saying or inti-

mating, that the legislature, or the courts, may require from

a railway company the performance of any and all acts that

might redound to the public benefit, without reference to the

pecuniary welfare of the company itself. We hold, simply, that

it must perform all those duties of a common carrier to which

it knew it would be liable when it sought and obtained its char-

ter, and the fact that the public has bestowed upon it extraor-

dinary powers is but an additional reason for holding it to a

complete performance of its obligations.

The duty sought to be enforced in this proceeding is the de-

livery of grain in bulk to the warehouse to which it is consigned,
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such warehouse being on the line of the respondent's road, with

facilities for its delivery equal to those of the other warehouses

at which the company does deliver, and the carriage of grain in

bulk being a part of its regular business. This, then, is the

precise question decided in The Vincent case, 49 111., and it is

unnecessary to repeat what was there said. We may remark,

however, that, as the argument of counsel necessarily brought

that case under review, and as it was decided before the reorgani-

zation of this court under the new constitution, the court as

now constituted has re-examined that decision, and fully con-

curs therein. That case is really decisive of the present, so far

as respects grain transported on the Wisconsin and Milwaukee

divisions of respondent's road. The only difference between

this and the Vincent case is, in the existence of the contract for

exclusive delivery to the favored warehouses, and this contract

can have no effect when set up against a person not a party to

it, as an excuse for not performing toward such person those

duties of a common carrier prescribed by the common law, and

declared by the statute of the State.

The contract in question is peculiarly objectionable in its

character, and peculiarly defiant of the obligations of the re-

spondent to the public as a common carrier. If the principle

implied in it were conceded, the railway companies of the State

might make similar contracts with individuals at every impor-

tant point upon their lines, and in regard to other articles of

commerce besides grain, and thus subject the business of the

308

C. AND N. W. R. CO. v. THE PEOPLE. § 80

State almost wholly to their control, as a means of their own

emolument. Instead of making a contract with several elevators,

as in the present case, each road that enters Chicago might con-

tract with one alone, and thus give to the owner of such ele-

vator an absolute and complete monopoly in the handling of

all the grain that might be transported over such road. So too,

at every important town in the interior, each road might con-

tract that all the lumber carried by it should be consigned to a

particular yard. How injurious to the public would be the crea-

tion of such a system of organized monopolies in the most im-

portant articles of commerce, claiming existence under a per-

petual charter from the State, and, by the sacredness of such

charter, claiming also to set the legislative will itself at defiance,

it is hardly worth while to speculate. It would be difficult to

exaggerate the evil of which such a system would be the cause,

when fully developed, and managed by unscrupulous hands.

Can it be seriously doubted whether a contract, involving such

a principle and such results, is in conflict with the duties which

the company owes to the public as a common carrier? The fact
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that a contract has been made is really of no moment, because,

if the company can bind the public by a contract of this sort,

it can do the same thing by a mere regulation of its own, and

say to these relators that it will not deliver at their warehouse

the grain consigned to them, because it prefers to deliver it

elsewhere. The contract, if vicious in itself, so far from excus-

ing the road, only shows that the policy of delivering grain exclu-

sively at its chosen warehouses is a deliberate policy to be

followed for a term of years, during which these contracts run.

It is, however, ^rged very strenuously by counsel for the re-

spondent, that a common carrier, in the absence of contract, is

bound to carry and deliver only according to the custom and

usage of his business ; that it depends upon himself to establish

such custom and usage; and that the respondent, never having

held itself out as a carrier of grain in bulk, except upon the

condition that it may itself choose the consignee, this has become

the custom and usage of its business, and it cannot be required

to go beyond this limit. In answer to this position, the fact

that the respondent has derived its life and powers from the

people, through the legislature, comes in with controlling force.

Admit, if the respondent were a private association, which had

established a line of wagons for the purpose of carrying grain

from the Wisconsin boundary to the elevator of Munn & Scott,

in Chicago, and had never offered to carry or deliver it else-

where, that it could not be compelled to depart from the custom

or usage of its trade. Still the admission does not aid the re-
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spondent in this case. In the case supposed, the carrier would

establish the terminal points of his route at his own discretion,

and could change them as his interests might demand. He oiTers

himself to the public only as a common carrier to that extent,

and he can abandon his first line and adopt another at his own

volition. If he should abandon it, and, instead of offering to

carry grain only to the elevator of Munn & Scott, should offer

to carry it generally to Chicago, then he would clearly be obliged

to deliver it to any consignee in Chicago to whom it might be

sent, and to whom it could be delivered, the place of delivery

being upon his line of carriage.

In the case before us, admitting the position of counsel that a

common carrier establishes his own line and terminal points,

the question arises, at wdiat time and how does a railway com-

pany establish them? We answer, when it accepts from the

legislature the charter which gives it life, and by virtue of such

acceptance. That is the point of time at which its obligations

begin. It is then that it holds itself out to the world as a com-

mon carrier, whose business will begin as soon as the road is
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constructed upon the line which the charter has fixed. Suppose

this respondent had asked from the legislature a charter authoriz-

ing it to carry grain in bulk, to be delivered only at the elevator

of Munn & Scott, and nowhere else in the city of Chicago. Can

any one suppose such charter would have been granted? The

supposition is preposterous. But, instead of a charter making

a particular elevator the terminus and place of delivery, the

legislature granted one which made the city of Chicago itself

the terminus, and when this charter was accepted there at once

arose, on the part of the respondent, the corresponding obliga-

tion to deliver grain at any point within the city of Chicago,

upon its lines, with suitable accommodations for receiving it,

to which such grain might be consigned. Perhaps grain in

bulk was not then carried in cars, and elevators may not have

been largely introduced. But the charter was granted to pro-

mote the conveniences of commerce, and it is the constant duty

of the respondent to adapt its agencies to that end. When these

elevators were erected in Chicago, to which the respondent's

line extended, it could only carry out the obligations of its

charter by receiving and delivering to each elevator whatever

grain might be consigned to it, and it is idle to say such obliga-

tion can be evaded by the claim that such delivery has not been

the custom or usage of respondent. It can be permitted to

establish no custom inconsistent with the spirit and object of

its charter.

It is claimed by counsel that the charter of respondent au-
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thorizes it to make such contracts and regulations as might be

necessary in the transaction of its business. But certainly we

cannot suppose the legislature intended to authorize the making

of such rules or contracts as would defeat the very object it

had in view in granting the charter. The company can make

such rules and contracts as it pleases, not inconsistent with its

duties as a common carrier, but it can go no further, and any

general language which its charter may contain must neces-

sarily be construed with that limitation. In the case of The

City of Chicago v. Rumpff, 45 111. 94, this court held a clause

in the charter, giving the common council the right to control

and regulate the business of slaughtering animals, did not au-

thorize the city to create a monopoly of the business, under pre-

tense of regulating and controlling it.

It is unnecessary to speak particularly of the rule adopted by

the company in reference to the transportation of grain. What

we have said in regard to the contract applies equally to the

rule.

The principle that a railroad company can make no injurious
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or arbitrary discrimination between individuals, in its dealings

with the public, not only commends itself to our reason and

sense of justice, but is sustained by adjudged cases. In Eng-

land, a contract which admitted to the door of a station, within

the yard of a railway company, a certain omnibus, and ex-

cluded another omnibus was held void. Marriott v. L. & S. W.

R. Co., 87 Eng. Com. Law, 498.

In Carton v. Bristol & Exeter Eailroad Company, 95 Eng.

Com. Law, 641, it was held that a contract with certain iron

mongers to carry their freight for a less price than that charged

the public was illegal, no good reason for the discrimination

being shown.

In Crouch v. The L. & N. W. R. Co., 78 Eng. Com. Law. 254,

it was held a railway company could not make a regulation for

the conveyance of goods which, in practice, affected one individ-

ual only.

In Sandford v. Railroad Company, 24 Penn. 382, the court

held that the power given in the charter of a railway company

to regulate the transportation of the road did not give the right

to grant exclusive privileges to a particular express company.

The court say: "If the company possesses this power, it might

build up one set of men and destroy others, advance one kind

of business and break down another, and make even religion and

politics the tests in the distribution of its favors. The rights

of the people are not subject to any such corporate control."

We refer also to Rogers' Locomotive Works v. Erie R. R.
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Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 380, and State v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co., 29

Conn. 538.

It is insisted by counsel for the respondent that, even if the

relators have just cause of complaint, they cannot resort to the

writ of mandamus. We are of opinion, however, that they can

have an adequate remedy in no other way, and that the writ

will, therefore, lie.

The judgment of the court below awarding a peremptory man-

damus must be reversed, because it applies to the Galena division

of respondent's road as well as to the Wisconsin and Milwau-

kee division. If it had applied only to the latter, we should

have affirmed the judgment. The parties have stipulated that,

in case of reversal, the case shall be remanded, with leave to

the relators to traverse the return. We, therefore, make no

final order, but remand the case, with leave to both parties to

amend their pleadings, if desired, in view of what has been said

in this opinion.

Judgment reversed.

81. JUDSON V. WESTERN RAILROAD CORPORATION,
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4 Allen (Mass.) 520; 81 Am. D. 718. 1862.

Action on a contract of carriage for goods lost by fire in de-

fendant's warehouse.

By Court, Merrick, J. It is, undoubtedly, a general rule

that the liability of a common carrier for goods received by

him begins as soon as they are delivered to him, his agents or

servants, at the place appointed or provided for their reception,

when they are in a fit and proper condition and ready for im-

mediate transportation: Redfield on Railways, 246. But like

all other general rules, it is subject to modifications resulting

from the express stipulations of the parties, or from the course

and usages of trade and business. And as it sometimes happens

that a party is at once a warehouseman and a carrier, and that

goods received by him are lost and destroyed before they are

put in itinere, a very important question may in such case

arise, whether the receiver is liable in the one or the other ca-

pacity ; for his responsibility is not co-extensive in each of those

relations: Story on Bailments, sec. 535. This must always be

a question of fact to be determined upon proof of the actual

and surrounding circumstances, the material point of inquiry

being whether the one or the other character predominated

312

JUDSON V. WESTERN E. R. COEPOEATION. § 81

in the particular stage of the transaction when the disaster

occurred: Id., sec. 536. There are well-settled rules which

will afford some aid in the solution of such a question. If a

common carrier receives goods into his own warehouse for the

accommodation of himself and his customers, so that the de-

posit there is a mere accessory to the carriage, and for the pur-

pose of facilitating it, his liability as a carrier will commence

with the receipt of the goods : Id., sec. 536 ; Fitchburg and Wor-

cester R. R. V. Hanna, 6 Gray, 539, 66 Am. Dec. 427. But on

the contrary, if the goods, when so deposited, are not ready for

immediate transportation, and the carrier cannot make ar-

rangements for their carriage to the place of destination until

something further is done, or some further direction is given or

communication made concerning them, by the owner or con-

signor, the deposit must be considered to be in the mean time

for his convenience and accommodation, and the receiver, until

some change takes place, will be responsible only as a warehouse-

man.

These being the rules by which the rights of the parties are
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to be determined, it can of course make no difference by whom

the property is delivered, whether it be by the owner himself, or

by his agent or servant, nor whether that agent be himself a

carrier or acts in any other capacity. It is the paramount dutj'

of a common carrier to receive and carry all goods offered

him for transportation, upon the payment or tender of a suit-

able fare or compensation; and he must so receive them, by

whomsoever they are brought to the place where he makes ar-

rangements to receive them for transportation : Story on Bail-

ments, sec. 508. It is upon this principle, where no special

obligation is imposed by acts of legislation, that one corpora-

tion whose railroad connects with or is near to the termination

of the railroad of another corporation is obliged to accept and

receive for transportation any goods which may be brought and

tendered to it by the servants of the latter. But in this as in

all other cases the party bringing the goods must first do what-

ever is essential to enable the carrier to commence or to make

needful preparations for commencing the service required of

him, before he can be made liable or subjected to responsibility

in that capacity. When goods are received by a railroad com-

pany which are to be transported to a place beyond their owe

road over a railroad which connects with theirs, or over suc-

cessive roads or lines of transportation, each company will be

responsible for them while in its own possession, and will not

be liable for any loss which may occur after a due delivery of

them upon another line and to another carrier : Nutting v. Con-
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necticiit River R. K, 1 Gray, 502. If after being once laden

for carriage they are transported over successive roads in the

same car or vehicle without being shifted or changed from one

to another, the successive carriers, as they severally receive

them, will be liable for the goods in that capacity as soon as

delivered ; so that during the whole transit or journey some one

will be constantly liable for them as a common carrier. But it

is otherwise when one has performed his whole duty as a carrier,

and has relieved himself from all liability in that capacity, by

depositing the goods at the end of the journey in h-is own ware-

house, from which they are to be taken by the owner or con-

signee, or by other carriers who are to continue the transporta-

tion to a still distant point. In such case, the liability of a

warehouseman will succeed, and will continue until they come

into the possession of some one who is responsible as a common

carrier : Norway Plains Co. v. Boston and Maine R. R., 1 Gray,

263, 61 Am. Dec. 423 ; Garside v. Trent and Mersey Nav. Co., 4

Term. Rep. 581 ; Hyde v. Trent and Mersey Nav. Co., 5 Id. 389 ;

Denny v. New York Cent. R. R., 13 Gray, 481, 74 Am. Dec. 645.
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And so it may occur that one party will be liable only as a ware-

houseman after he shall have completed all the services in the

way of transportation which can be required of him, and another

liable only in the same relation before the further transporta-

tion has commenced, or before he has become responsible in

another and distinct relation.

In applying these principles to the facts which were devel-

oped upon the trial of the present action, there is no difficulty

in determining what are the rights and obligations of the parties.

From the statements in the bill of exceptions, it appears that

the plaintiff's goods, contained in two boxes marked "G. C.

Judson, Springfield, Mass., by railroad," were delivered at

Fonda in the state of New York, to the New York Central Rail-

road Company for transportation. That company gave to the

plaintiff upon receiving the goods a "shipping receipt," by the

terms of which they agreed to transport them to their ware-

house at Albany, to be there delivered to the party then entitled

to receive them. The defendants' road was the connecting line

over which the transportation of the goods was to be continued

to the plaintiff at Springfield. But the two railroads do not

unite by coming into any actual connection with each other.

The former terminates at its freight-house in the city of Al-

bany on the western side, and the latter terminates at its

freight-house on the eastern side of the Hudson River. So that

goods which are brought over the road of the former company,

and are to be carried forward to some point or station on the

314

JUDSON V. WESTEEN K. E. COEPOEATION. § 81

road of the latter, must be unladen from the cars in which they

are brought to Albany, and carried across the river and de-

posited in the freight-house of the Western railroad, and there

be again laden in their cars. While remaining in their ware-

house, the goods may therefore be in their possession as ware-

housemen. Whether they are liable in that capacity, or as com-

mon carriers, must be determined upon the facts relating to

each particular transaction.

It appears from the evidence produced at the trial that by

the course of business between these two roads it is the prac-

tice of the Central road, upon the arrival of freight from points

on the line of its road destined for points on the line of the

Western Railroad, to make out bills called expense bills, con-

taining the freight charges of the Central road upon each

parcel or lot of freight, and to send the goods by carmen with

the expense bills across the river to the freight-house of the

Western railroad, where the goods are compared by the agents

of the latter road, and if found to be correct, are checked and

handed to a clerk, who enters them on the books of freight
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received, from which the way-bills are made out. Upon the

arrival of the plaintiffs' goods at Albany, they were sent across

the river by the New York Central Railroad Company in the

usual manner, and were delivered at the freight-house of the

defendants at the usual place of depositing such freight, and

notice thereof was given to their proper servants. Upon the

question whether the expense bills were delivered to any such

agent or servant before the loss and destruction of the goods

by the fire, which occurred while they remained in the freight

house, the evidence was conflicting and contradictory. The

defendants requested the court to instruct the jury, that in

view of the course of business and usage between the two roads,

although the goods were delivered to the proper agent of the

defendants, yet if the expense bills were not also delivered before

the occurrence of the fire by which they were destroyed, the goods

were not in condition for immediate transportation, and the de-

fendants were therefore liable only in their capacity ^is ware-

housemen. To this request the court declined to accede.

The general instructions which were given to the jury re-

specting the liability of the defendants and the capacity in

which they were liable, whether as carriers or as warehouse-

men, were correct. But it is apparent from the uncontested

evidence in the case that according to the usage and the gen-

eral course of business, and from the regulations established

by the two companies, until the expense bill was furnished to

the defendants, the goods delivered at their ii'cight-station were
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not in condition for immediate transportation. That docu-

ment was indispensably necessary to them, to enable them to

undertake the transportation of the goods. It was indispensa-

ble in order to identify the package or parcel to be carried, and

also to show the amount of the lien upon them in favor of the

Central company for the previous transportation from Fonda

to Albany, and for which, upon accepting them, the defend-

ants, by the usage between the two companies, would become

responsible; and it afforded the only means by which they

could make out their own freight-bill, or know what disposition

was to be made of the goods, or what was the place of destina-

tion to which they were to be carried. Until that instrument

was sent to them, they could make no arrangement for the trans-

portation of the goods; and because they were not, for want of

it, ready to be immediately transported, the defendants could

only suffer the boxes to remain in the freight-house for the

convenience and accommodation of the owner or consignor, until

he or his agents should give them the information and direc-

tions which were indispensable to enable them to take any
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action in reference to the goods. In the mean time, from the

very nature and provisions of the arrangement adopted by the

two companies, the defendants necessarily held and had pos-

session of the goods merely as warehousemen; for they could,

under such circumstances, have charge of them only in their

latter capacity. If the expense bill was delivered to them

simultaneously with the delivery of the goods, or if afterwards

and before the occurrence of the fire by which they were de-

stroyed it had been duly delivered to any of their agents or ser-

vants, the goods would have been in condition for immediate

transportation, and their liability as carriers would thereupon

have at once attached. But before that was done, their re-

sponsibility was of a different and more limited character. The

instructions asked for ought, therefore, to have been given to

the jury, who would thereby have been brought directly to the

determination of the question in controversy between the parties,

and respecting w^hich the evidence was conflicting and contra-

dictory. If, upon that evidence, the jury should find that the

expense bill was delivered to the defendants before the fire

occurred, they would have been liable as carriers, but otherwise

as wa.rehousemen only.

It is obvious that in the conduct of business of such magni-

tude, and in the care and transportation of the great number

and variety of goods and packages which are continually pass-

ing from one railroad to another over any great line of travel

and transportation, there must be some general and certain
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and well-understood arrangement between the proprietors of the

connecting roads, to avoid inextricable confusion, and to enable

the carriers to protect both their own rights and the rights of

their customers. The arrangement which these two companies

made, and which was fully proved at the trial, appears to have

been a reasonable and necessary provision; and therefore it

was one to which all parties were bound to conform; and con-

sequently the defendants have a right to insist that their lia-

bility shall not be extended in any particular instance beyond

the obligation which such conformity imposes upon them. For

these reasons, their exceptions to the ruling of the court must

be sustained, and a new trial ordered.

82. TATE V. YAZOO AND MISSISSIPPI VALLEY RAIL-

ROAD CO.,

78 Miss. 842; 29 So. R. 392; 84 Am. St. E. 649. 1901.

Action against a carrier for a carload of cotton destroyed by

fire. Judgment directed for defendants.

Terral, J. The appellee in this case recovered judgment

by a peremptory instruction, and the appellants insist that a
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peremptory instruction should have been given in their behalf.

On the 28th of September, 1897, the appellants loaded upon a

car of the defendant company, at Clack's station, twenty-four

bales of cotton. The loading of the car was finished after sun-

down, and after the local freight train of that day, which was

accustomed to take loaded cars from Clack's, had passed on its

return trip to Memphis, and no other local freight train, by

which alone cotton was shipped from Clack's, would arrive at

said station until the evening of the next succeeding day. Early

on the morning of the 29th of September the carload of cotton

was wholly consumed by fire, and this suit, being a consolidation

of five suits, is to recover its value. Tate & Co. operated a pub-

lie gin at Clack's, where the defendant company had a siding,

but it had no station-house or agent at that point. Japson and

Keesee, who were in charge of Tate & Co. 's gin and plantation

at Clack's, testified that when it was desired to ship cotton,

one of them would inform the conductor of the local freight

train, and the conductor would set out there an empty car for

loading, and that when the car was loaded and readj^ for trans-

portation, the local freight train desired to take the loaded
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car would be flagged, and the conductor of it informed that

the car was ready for transportation, when the conductor would

sign the shipper's loading account, if found correct, and attach

the car to his train, and transport it to its destination. The

contention of the appellants is that they had delivered the

twenty-four bales of cotton to the defendant company, and that

the cotton was burned while in its custody; that the cotton was

actually or constructively delivered to the railway company,

and that it is chargeable for the loss. We think, however, that

it is quite clear that the railway company had never come into

possession of the cotton for transportation. The car, it was true,

was the car of the company, and it was placed upon the com-

pany's siding at Clack's for being loaded, and the cotton was

loaded into the car, but no servant of the company had any

notice of the car being loaded and ready for shipment. Keesee

testified that his recollection was (the trial being had some

time after the loss), that, when the car was loaded, a man was

left there with it, with the shipping account filled out, in order

to stop the train and get the conductor's receipt for it. And it
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appears that the flagging of the local freight train and delivery

of the shipper's loading account to the conductor was an essen-

tial feature of the shipping of cotton at Clack's. But Japson

and others conclusively show that the local freight train for

that day had already passed before the car was loaded, and no

other train that could have been expected to take the car would

come by there until after the car was burned. There was no

constructive delivery of the cotton to the railroad company.

Its proper servant, the conductor of the local freight train,

by which it was desired to have this cotton transported, knew

nothing of its being loaded into the car for shipment, and

there could be no acceptance of the cotton for shipment with-

out such knowledge, unless, indeed, there had been an agree-

ment between the parties making the mere loading of the car

an acceptance of the freight for transportation. But no such

agreement was shown. On the contrary, the clear course of

dealing between the parties at Clack's showed that the shipper

was to flag the proper local freight train, and deliver to the

conductor of the train the car to be transported, with the ship-

per's loading account thereof. A bill of lading is not essential

to charge the carrier with the duty of safely transporting the

property delivered for carriage, but the doing of the several

acts entitling the shipper to a bill of lading is necessary to

charge the carrier with the safety of the articles intrusted to

him. In this case, according to the course of dealing between

the parties, there could have been no delivery of the cotton
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to the railroad company, until it was loaded and the local freight

train conductor had notice of the items of freight, its destina-

tion and of its readiness for transportation. Parties desiring

to hold common carriers to a stricter responsibility than that

imposed by the common law should provide therefor by con-

tract, for, unless bound by contract, otherwise a carrier is not

responsible for the safety of articles intended for shipment

until a delivery of them to him, and an acceptance thereof,

and there can be no acceptance until he has knowledge of their

readiness for transportation, and the shipper's desire therefor:

Hutchinson on Carriers, c. 4; Schouler on Bailments and Car-

riers, c. 3; Angell on Carriers, c. 140; 2 Kent's Commentaries,

608 ; Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Smyser, 38 111. 354, 87 Am. Dec.

301, 303.

Affirmed.

83. MORGANTON MANUFACTURING CO. V. OHIO RIVER

AND CHARLESTON RAILWAY CO.,

121 N. G. 514; 28 8. E. B. 474; 61 Am. St. B. 679. 1897.

Action against a terminal carrier for injury to a consignment
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of glass. Plaintiff had judgment.

Faircloth, C. J. A box of plate glass was shipped from

New York City to Marion, North Carolina. The Pennsylvania

Railroad Company, the initial carrier, received and transferred

the case to the Norfolk & Western Road at Hagerstown. Then

the car containing the box was transferred at Roanoke to the

Cape Fear & Yadkin Valley road and by them brought to the

Seaboard Air Line Road at Sanford with the seal of the latter

on the car at Shelby, North Carolina. At that place the agent

of the defendant broke the seal and checked off the contents of

the car on the waybill and examined the box and found it in

apparent good order. He said in his testimony that there were

no marks of rough usage on the outside of the box — ^that he took

a copy of the waybill and delivered it to the defendant's con-

ductor, who carried the car and copy of the waybill to Marion,

and that he (the agent) marked the waybill 0. K. ; also that he

did not examine the contents of the box, and that his company

did not require him to give a receipt for freight transferred to

defendant from connecting lines. The defendant's agent at

Marion testified that he received the box, and that the glass

was not damaged in taking it off the car, nor while it was in the

depot at Marion; that ten days thereafter he and plaintiff's

319

§ 83 EIGHTS AND DUTIES OF COMMON CAREIEE.

agent opened the box and found the glass badly damaged. A

contractor and builder examined the box, and said it must have

fallen and struck something hard, causing the break in the glass.

The agent of the first carrier at New York sent a bill of lading

with the package, stamped on its face "Released," and gave a

receipt for the box "in apparent good order (contents and con-

dition of contents unknown) to be transported to and delivered

at the regular freight station of the company at , subject

to all the conditions," etc., among which were these words:

"No carrier shall be liable for loss or damage not occurring

on its own road or its portion of the through route," etc. This

action is against the terminal carrier.

The defendant contends that it is not liable unless it be

shown that the damage occurred on its line, and that there is no

evidence that that was so.

We understand "released" to mean exemption from the com-

mon-law liability as an insurer. It seems to be agreed that

0. K. means all right or in good condition: Baxter v. Ellis, 111

N. C. 124. It must be admitted that the present system of rapid
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transit, consisting of through lines, connecting lines, associated

lines, and the like, makes it difficult in some cases to locate the

line on which the damage occurs, and it would seem practicable

for the interested lines to make some arrangement for their own

benefit and the public convenience by prorating the freight

charges and also the damages, when they cannot be located, and

thereby avoid the inconvenience of actual inspection at every

transfer, which would not only be inconvenient and cause much

delay but serious loss to the consignee.

This case illustrates the difficulty. The glass, being very

thick, could not have been broken without a severe jar, and,

looking at the evidence, it is scarcely possible to see where or

how it occurred.

The ease does not fall within the principle of Roclvy IMount

Mills V. Wilmington etc. R. R. Co., 119 N. C. 693, 25 S. E. R.

854, 56 Am. St. Rep. 682, where it was held that the associated

companies were partners, and each one liable for the negligence

of either of the other lines. We are not required to discuss the

liability of the other lines which handled the package of glass.

The first discovery of damage was when the goods were at the

terminal point of the defendant's line.

A bill of lading is something more than a simple receipt. It

is a receipt and a contract. As a contract, in which the carrier

agrees to transport and deliver the goods to the consignee upon

the terms and conditions specified in the instrument, it is a

merger of prior and contemporaneous agreements of the parties.
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and, being in writing, cannot be explained by parol evidence,

and thereby change its legal import, in the absence of fraud

or mistake. It also, by the terms of the writing, as in this case,

excludes the common-law liability of the carrier, because it is a

special contract governed by its own limitations. The bill,

as a receipt, is an acknowledgment of the quantity, character,

and condition of the articles delivered and received, and as such

may be explained, varied, or contradicted like other receipts.

This exemption from the common-law liability may be enforced,

if it be reasonable and does not involve exemption from negli-

gence: Ray's Negligence of Imposed Duties, 93-95; Pollard v.

Vinton, 105 U. S. 7 ; Elliott on Railroads, sec. 1415,

The defendant's agent having received the box apparently in

good condition and marked the bill of lading "O. K." was an

adoption of the terms and conditions specified in writing by the

initial carrier, and these facts raise a rebuttable presumption

that the damage occurred thereafter. The defendant endeavored

to meet and overcome this presumption with evidence, and went

to the jury with his evidence. The court charged the jury that
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among connecting lines the carrier, in whose hands the prop-

erty is found damaged, is presumed to have caused the dam-

age, and that the burden is upon the defendant to rebut this

presumption and satisfy the jury that the glass was not dam-

aged in its possession. In response to the inquiry of the jury,

the court charged them that, if the condition of the contents

was unknown to the defendant, liability could have been guarded

against by examination or stipulation, and that failure to do so

was negligence. This we think was correct according to the au-

thorities and the facts.

The instructions asked for by defendant were not suited to

the facts, and ignored the presumption just pointed out, and

were properly refused. It has been held that the stipulation

above stated is a reasonable one and consistent with public

policy: Phifer v. Carolina Cent. R. R. Co., 89 N. C. 311, 45

Am. Rep. 687. It has also been held by this court that, if the

contents and their condition be unknoMoi, liability may be

avoided by examination or by a stipulation, and that it is negli-

gence in a receiving line not to observe these precautions : Dixon

V. Richmond etc. R. R. Co., 74 N. C. 538.

Affirmed.
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84. FRIEDLANDER V. TEXAS AND PACIFIC RAILWAY

CO.,

130 U. S. 416; 9 S. Ct. R. 570. 1888.

Action by plaintiffs as assignees for value of a bill of lading

for the non-delivery of cotton. Defendants' agent, Easton, had

colluded with one Lahnstein to issue the bill of lading without

receiving any cotton for transportation. Judgment for defend-

ants.

Fuller, C. J. The agreed statement of facts sets forth "that,

in point of fact, said bill of lading of November 6, 1883, was

executed by said E. D. Easton, fraudulently and by collusion

with said Lahnstein and without receiving any cotton for trans-

portation, such as is represented in said bill of lading, and

without the expectation on the part of the said Easton of re-

ceiving any such cotton;" and it is further said that Easton

and Lahnstein had fraudulently combined in another case, where-

by Easton signed and delivered to Lahnstein a similar bill of

lading for cotton "which had not been received, and which

the said Easton had no expectation of receiving;" and also
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' ' that, except that the cotton was not received nor expected to be

received by said agent when said bill of lading was by him

executed as aforesaid, the transaction was, from first to last,

customary." In view of this language, the words "for trans-

portation, such as is represented in said bill of lading" cannot

be held to operate as a limitajtion. The inference to be drawn

from the statement is that no cotton whatever was delivered

for transportation to the agent at Sherman station. The ques-

tion arises, then, whether the agent of a railroad company

at one of its stations can bind the company by the execution

of a bill of lading for goods not actually placed in his posses-

sion, and its delivery to a person fraudulently pretending in

collusion with such agent that he had shipped such goods, in

favor of a party without notice, with whom, in furtherance

of the fraud, the pretended shipper negotiates a draft, with

the false bill of lading attached. Bills of exchange and promis-

sory notes are representatives of money, circulating in the com-

mercial world as such, and it is essential, to enable them to

perform their peculiar functions, that he who purchases them

should not be bound to look beyond the instrument, and that

his right to enforce them should not be defeated by anything

short of bad faith on his part. But bills of lading answer
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a different purpose and perform different functions. They are

regarded as so much cotton, grain, iron or other articles of

merchandise, in that they are symbols of ownership of the

goods they cover. And as no sale of goods lost or stolen, though

to a bona fide purchaser for value, can divest the ownership of

the person who lost them or from whom they were stolen, so the

sale of the symbol or mere representative of the goods can have

no such effect, although it sometimes happens that the true

owner, by negligence, has so put it into the power of another

to occupy his position ostensibly, as to estop him from asserting

his right as against a purchaser, who has been misled to his

hurt by reason of such negligence. Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101

U. S. 557, 563; Pollard v. Vinton, 105 U. S. 7, 8; Gurney v.

Behrend, 3 El. & Bl. 622, 633, 634. It is true that while not

negotiable as commercial paper is, bills of lading are commonly

used as security for loans and advances ; but it is only as evi-

dence of ownership, special or general, of the property mentioned

in them, and of the right to receive such property at the place

of delivery.
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Such being the character of a bill of lading, can a recovery

be had against a common carrier for goods never actually in

its possession for transportation, because one of its agents, hav-

ing authority to sign bills of lading, by collusion with another

person issues the document in the absence of any goods at all ?

It has been frequently held by this court that the master of

a vessel has no authority to sign a bill of lading for goods not

actually put on board the vessel, and, if he does so, his act does

not bind the owner of the ship even in favor of an innocent

purchaser. The Freeman v. Buckingham, 18 How. 182, 191 ;

The Lady F«-anklin, 8 Wall. 325 ; Pollard v. Vinton, 105 U. S.

7. And this agrees with the rule laid down by the English

courts. Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63; Grant v. Norway,

10 C. B. 665; Cox V. Bruce, 18 Q. B. D. 147. "The receipt

of the goods," said Mr. Justice Miller, in Pollard v. Vinton,

supra, "lies at the foundation of the contract to carry and de-

liver. If no goods are actually received, there can be no valid

contract to carry or to deliver." "And the doctrine is ap-

plicable to transportation contracts made in that form by rail-

way companies and other carriers by land, as well as carriers

by sea, ' ' as was said by Mr. Justice Matthews in Iron Mountain

Railway v. Knight, 122 U. S. 79, 87; 7 S. Ct. R. 1132, he adding

also : "If Potter (the agent) had never delivered to the plaintiff

in error any cotton at all to make good the 525 bales called for

by the bills of lading, it is clear that the plaintiff in error

would not be liable for the deficiency. This is well established
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by the cases of The Schooner Freeman v. Buckingham, 18 How.

182, and Pollard v. Vinton, 105 U. S. 7."

It is a familiar principle of law that where one of two inno-

cent parties must suffer by the fraud of another, the loss should

fall upon him who enabled such third person to commit the

fraud; but nothing that the railroad company did or omitted

to do can be properly said to have enabled Lahnstein to impose

upon Friedlander & Co. The company not only did not author-

ize Easton to sign fictitious bills of lading, but it did not as-

sume authority itself to issue such documents except upon the

delivery of the merchandise. Easton was not the company's

agent in the transaction, for there was nothing upon which

the agency could act. Railroad companies are not dealers in

bills of exchange, nor in bills of lading; they are carriers only,

and held to rigid responsibility as such. Easton, disregarding

the object for which he was emploj'^ed, and not intending by his

act to execute it, but wholly for a purpose of his own and of

Lahnstein, became particeps criminis with the latter in the

commission of the fraud upon Friedlander & Co., and it would
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be going too far to hold the company, under such circumstances,

estopped ^rom denying that it had clothed this agent with ap-

parent authority to do an act so utterly outside the scope of

his employment and of its own business. The defendant can-

not be held on contract as a common carrier, in the absence of

goods, shipment and shipper; nor is the action maintainable on

the ground of tort. "The general rule," said Willes, J., in

Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L. R. 2 Ex. 259, 265, "is

that the master is answerable for every such wrong of the ser-

vant or agent as is committed in the course of the service and

for the master's benefit, though no express command or privity

of the master be proved." See also Limpus v. London General

Omnibus Co., 1 H. & C. 526. The fraud was in respect to a

matter within the scope of Easton 's employment or outside of

it. It was not within it, for bills of lading could only be issued

for merchandise delivered; and being without it, the company,

which derived and could derive no benefit from the unauthor-

ized and fraudulent act, cannot be made responsible. British

Mutual Banking Co. v. Charnwood Forest Railway Co., 18 Q.

B. D. 714.

The law can punish roguery, but cannot always protect a

purchaser from loss, and so fraud perpetrated through the

device of a false bill of lading may work injury to an innocent

party, which cannot be redressed by a change of victim.

Under the Texas statutes the trip or voyage commences from

the time of the signing of the bill of lading issued upon the
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delivery of the goods, and thereunder the carrier cannot avoid

his liability as such, even though the goods are not actually on

their passage at the time of loss, but these provisions do not

affect the result here.

We cannot distinguish the case in hand from those heretofore

decided by this court, and in consonance with the conclusions

therein announced this judgment must be affirmed.

85. AYRES V. CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RAIL-

WAY CO.,

71 Wis. 372; 37 N. W. B. 432; 5 Am. St. R. 227. 1888.

Action against defendant as a common carrier of live stock

for damages due to delay in furnishing seven cars ordered for

the shipment of live stock. Two cars were furnished at the re-

quired time, but the other five were not, nor was plaintiff notified

that the cars could not be furnished as ordered, in consequence

of which he brought sufficient live stock to the stations to load

all the cars. Verdict of $825.97 for plaintiff because of cost

of care and feeding, and depreciation in value and shrinkage

due to the delay.
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Cassoday, J. There is no finding of any agreement on the

part of the defendant to have the cars in readiness at the sta-

tions on Tuesday morning, October 17, 1882. There is no testi-

mony to support such a finding. One of the plaintiffs testified,

in effect, that he told the agent that he would want the cars

on the morning of the day named; that the agent took down

the order, put it on his book, and said: "All right," he would

try and get them, but that they were short because they were

then using more cars for other purposes; that nothing more

was said. It appears in the case that the cars were in fact

furnished. It also appears that, as the shipments were made,

special written contracts therefor were entered into between

the parties, whereby it was, in effect, agreed and understood

that the plaintiffs should load, feed, water, and take care of

such stock at their owoi expense and risk, and that they would

assume all risk of injury or damage that the animals might do

to themselves or each other, or which might arise by delay of

trains ; that the defendants should not be liable for loss by jump-

ing from the cars or delay of trains not caused by the defendant's

negligence. The court, in effect, charged the jury that there

was no evidence of any negligence on the part of the defend-
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ant causing delay in any train after shipment, and hence that

the delay of the two cars admitted to have been furnished in

time was not before them for consideration. This relieves the

case from all liability on contract. It also narrows the case

to the defendant's liability for the delay of two days in fur-

nishing the five cars at the stations named, as ordered by the

plaintiffs, and in the absence of any contract to do so.

In Richardson v. Chicago etc. R'y Co., 61 Wis. 601, 18 Am.

& Eng. R. R. Cas. 530, 21 N. W. R. 49, it was, in effect, held

competent for a railroad company engaged in the business of

transporting live-stock to exempt itself by express contract

"from damage caused wholly or perhaps in part by the in-

stincts, habits, propensities, wants, necessities, vices, or locomo-

tion of such animals. ' ' And it was then said : ' ' Since the action

is not based upon contract, the plaintiff must recover, if at all,

by reason of the defendant's liability as a common carrier upon

mere notice to furnish cars, and a readiness to ship at the time

notified. Did such notice and readiness to ship create such

liability? We have seen that a carrier of live-stock may, to
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at least a certain extent, limit its liability. Whether the de-

fendant was accustomed to so limit its liability, or to carry all

live-stock tendered upon notice, without restriction, does not

appear from the record. If it was accustomed to so limit, and

the limitation was legal, it should at least have been so al-

leged, together with an offer to comply with the customary

restriction. If it was accustomed to carry all live-stock of-

fered upon notice and tender, and without restriction, then it

would be difficult to see upon what ground it could discrimi-

inate against the plaintiff by refusing to do for him what it

was constantly in the habit of doing for others. ' '

In that case, there was a failure to allege any such custom or

holding out on the part of the defendant, or that reasonable

notice had been given to the defendant to furnish suitable cars

to the person applying therefor, or that the same was within

its power to do so; and hence the demurrer was sustained.

The allegations thus wanting in that case are present in this

complaint. It is, moreover, in effect admitted that the defend-

ant was at times, when able to do so, engaged in the transpor-

tation of live-stock over its roads, one line of which runs through

the stations in question ; that it was accustomed to furnish suit-

able cars therefor, upon reasonable notice, when within its power

to do SO; and to receive, transport, and deliver such live-stock

with reasonable dispatch, but only upon special contracts at the

time entered into between the shipper and the defendant, and

upon such terms and conditions as should be agreed upon in
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writing. It is, moreover, manifest that the defendant actually

undertook to furnish the cars at the time designated by the

plaintiffs ; that it succeeded in furnishing two of them on time :

that there was a delay of two days in furnishing the other five ;

and that the plaintiffs were willing to and did submit to the

terms and conditions of carriage imposed by the defendant by

signing the special written contracts mentioned. It must be

assumed, also, that such special written contracts were substan-

tially the same as all contracts made by the defendant at that

season of the year for the shipment of similar live-stock under

similar circumstances. Otherwise the defendant would be justly

chargeable with unlawful discrimination; the right to do which

the learned counsel for the defendant frankly disclaimed upon

the argument.

We are therefore forced to the conclusion that, at the time

the plaintiffs applied for the cars, the defendant was engaged

in the business of transporting live-stock over its roads, in-

cluding the line in question, and that it was accustomed to

furnish suitable cars therefor, upon reasonable notice, when-
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ever it was within its power to do so; and that it held itself

out to the public generally as such carrier for hire, upon such

terms and conditions as were prescribed in the written con-

tracts mentioned. These things, in our judgment, made the

defendant a common carrier of live-stock, with such restric-

tions and limitations of its common-law duties and liabilities

as arose from the instincts, habits, propensities, wants, neces-

sities, vices, or locomotion of such animals, under the contracts

of carriage. This proposition is fairly deducible from w^hat

was said in Richardson v. Chicago etc. R'y Co., supra, and is

supported by the logic of numerous cases : North Pennsylvania

R. R. Co. V. Commercial Bank, 123 U. S. 727, 8 S. Ct. R. 266 ;

Moulton V. St. Paul etc. R. R. Co., 31 Minn. 85, 16 N. W. R. 497,

12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 13 ; Lindsley v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co.,

36 Minn. 539, 32 N. W. R. 7 ; Evans v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., Ill

Mass. 142, 15 Am. R. 19; Kimball v. Rutland, etc. R. R. Co.,

26 Vt. 247, 62 Am. Dec. 567 ; Rixford v. Smith, 52 N. H. 355,

13 Am. R. 42; Clarke v. Rochester etc. R. R. Co., 14 N. Y. 570,

67 Am. Dec. 205 ; South & N. A. R. R. Co. v. Henlein, 52 Ala.

606, 23 Am. R. 578 ; Baker v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 10 Lea, 304,

16 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 149; Philadelphia etc. R. R. Co. v.

Lehman, 56 Md. 209, 40 Am. R. 415 ; McFadden v. M. P. R. R.

Co., 92 Mo. 343, 4 S. W. R. 698, 3 Am. & Eng. Cyclop. Law,

1-10, and the cases there cited. This is in harmony with the

statement of Parke, B., in the case cited by counsel for the de-

fendant, that "at common law a carrier is not bound to carry
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for every person tendering goods of any description, but his

obligation is to carry according to his public profession ' ' : John-

son V. Midland R. K Co., 4 Ex. 372. Being a common carrier of

live-stock for hire, with the restrictions and limitations named,

and holding itself out to the public as such, the defendant is

bound to furnish suitable cars for such stock, upon reasonable

notice, whenever it can do so with reasonable diligence without

jeopardizing its other business as such common carrier: Texas

etc. R. R. Co. V. Nicholson, 61 Tex. 491 ; Chicago etc. R. R. Co.

V. Erickson, 91 111. 613, 33 Am. R. 70; Ballentine v. N. M. R.

R. Co., 40 Mo. 491, 93 Am. D. 315 ; Guinn v. W., St. L. & P.

R. R. Co., 20 Mo. App. 453.

Whether the defendant could with such diligence so furnish

upon the notice given, was necessarily a question of fact to be

determined. The plaintiffs, as such shippers, had the right to

command the defendant to furnish such cars. But they had

no right to insist upon or expect compliance, except upon giving

reasonable notice of the time when they would be required. To

be reasonable, such notice must have been sufficient to enable
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the defendant, with reasonable diligence under the circum-

stances then existing, to furnish the cars without interfering

with previous orders from other shippers at the same station,

or jeopardizing its business on other portions of its road.

It must be remembered that the defendant has many lines

of railroad scattered through several different states. Along

each and all of these different lines it has stations of more or

less importance. The company owes the same duty to ship-

pers at any one station as it does to the shippers at any other

station of the same business importance. The rights of all

shippers applying for such cars under the same circumstances

are necessarily equal. No one station, much less any one ship-

per, has the right to command the entire resources of the com-

pany to the exclusion or prejudice of other stations and other

shippers. Most of such suitable cars must necessarily be scat-

tered along and upon such different lines of railroad, loaded

or unloaded. Many will necessarily be at the larger centers

of trade. The conditions of the market are not always the same,

but are liable to fluctuations, and may be such as to create a

great demand for such cars upon one or more of such lines,

and very little upon others. Such cars should be distributed

along the different lines of road, and the several stations on each,

as near as may be in proportion to the ordinary business re-

quirements at the time, in order that shipments may be made

with reasonable celerity. The requirement of such fair and

general distribution and uniform vigilance is not only mutually
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beneficial to producers, shippers, carriers, and purchasers, but

of business and trade generally. It is the extent of such busi-

ness ordinarily done on a particular line, or at a particular sta-

tion, which properly measures the carrier's obligation to fur-

nish such transportation. But it is not the duty of such carrier

to discriminate in favor of the business of one station to the

prejudice and injury of the business of another station of the

same importance. These views are in harmony with the adjudi-

cations last cited.

The important question is, whether the burden was upon

the plaintiffs to prove that the defendant might, with such

reasonable diligence, and without thus jeopardizing its other

business, have furnished such cars at the time ordered and

'upon the notice given; or whether such burden was upon the

defendant to prove its inability to do so. We find no direct

adjudication upon the question. Ordinarily, a plaintiff alleg-

ing a fact has the burden of proving it. This rule has been

applied by this court, even where the complaint alleges a nega-

tive, if it is susceptible of proof by the plaintiff: Hepler v.
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State, 58 Wis. 46, 16 N. W. E. 42. But it has been held other-

wise where the only proof is peculiarly within the control of

the defendant : Mecldem v. Blake, 16 Id. 102, 82 Am. D. 707 ;

Beckman v. Henn, 17 Id. 412 ; Noonan v. Ilsley, 21 Id. 144, 84

Am. D. 742 ; Great Western R. R. Co. v. Bacon, 30 111. 352, 88

Am. D. 199; Brown v. Brown, 30 La. Ann. 511. Here it may

have been possible for the plaintiffs to have proved that there

were, at the times and stations named, or in the vicinity, empty

cars, or cars which had reached their destination, and might

have been emptied with reasonable diligence, but they could

not know or prove, except by agents of the defendant, that any

of such cars were not subject to prior orders or superior ob-

ligations. The ability of the defendant to so furnish with or-

dinary diligence upon the notice given, upon the principles

stated, was, as we think, peculiarly within the knowledge of the

defendant and its agents, and hence the burden was upon it to

prove its inability to do so. Where a shipper applies to the

proper agency of a railroad company engaged in the business of

such common carrier of live stock for such cars to be furnished

at a time and station named, it becomes the duty of the com-

pany to inform the shipper within a reasonable time, if prac-

ticable, whether it is unable to so furnish, and if it fails to give

such notice, and has induced the shipper to believe that the

ears will be in readiness at the time and place named, and the

shipper, relying upon such conduct of the carrier, is present

with his live-stock at the time and place named, and finds
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no cars, there would seem to be no good reason why the company

should not respond in damages. Of course, these observations do

not involve the question whether a railroad company may not

refrain from engaging in such business as a common carrier;

nor whether, having so engaged, it may not* discontinue the

same.

The court very properly charged the jury, in effect, that if

all the cars had been furnished on time, as the two were, it was

reasonable to presume, in the absence of any proof of actionable

negligence on the part of the defendant, that they would have

reached Chicago at the same time the two did, to wit, Thursday,

October 19, 1882, A. M., whereas they did not arrive until Fri-

day evening. This was in time, however, for the market in

Chicago on Saturday, October 21, 1882. This necessarily lim-

ited the recovery to the expense of keeping, the shrinkage, and

depreciation in value from Thursday until Saturday: Chicago

etc. R. R. Co. V. Erickson, 91 111. 613 ; 33 Am. R. 70. The trial

court, however, refused to so limit the recovery, but left the jury

at liberty to include such damages down to Monday, October 23,
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1882. For this manifest error, and because there seems to have

been a mistrial in some other respects, the judgment of the cir-

cuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new

trial.

By the Court. Ordered accordingly.

> 86. EXPRESS CASES,

117 U. S. 1, 6 S. Ct. R. 542. 1885.

These cases were begun by the Southern Express Co. against

the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railroad Co. and the

Memphis & Little Rock Railroad Co., and by the Adams Express

Co. against the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. to com-

pel them to give them the express facilities which they had pre-

viously enjoyed by contract, and of which they had been d^ispos-

sessed by notice given in accordance with the terms of the con-

tracts. Judgment below in favor of the Express companies.

Waite, C. J. . . . The evidence shows that the express

business was first organized in the United States about the year

1839. The case of New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v.

Merchants' Baric, 6 How. 344, grew out of a loss by the burning

of the steamboat Lexington on Long Island Sound in January,

1840, of $18,000 in gold and silver coin, while in charge of Wm.

F. Harnden, an express carrier, for transportation from New
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York to Boston. In the report of this case is found a copy of one

of the earliest advertisements of the express business as pub-

lished in two of the Boston newspapers in July, 1839. It is as

follows :

"Boston and New York Express Package Car. — Notice to

Merchants, Brokers, Booksellers, and all Business Men.

"Wm. F. Harnden, having made arrangements with the New

York and Boston Transportation and Stonington and Providence

Railroad Companies, will run a car through from Boston to

New York and vice versa, via Stonington, with the mail train

daily, for the purpose of transporting specie, small packages of

goods, and bundles of all kinds. Packages sent by this line will

be delivered on the following morning, at any part of the city,

free of charge. A responsible agent will accompany the car, who

will attend to purchasing goods, collecting drafts, notes and bills,

and will transact any other business that may be intrusted to

him.

"Packages for Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, New

Haven, Hartford, Albany and Troy will be forwarded immedi-
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ately on arrival in New York.

(For the remainder of this agreement see ante § 79.)

Such was the beginning of the express business which now has

grown to an enormous size, and is carried on all over the United

States and in Canada, and has been extended to Europe and the

West Indies. It has become a public necessity, and ranks in

importance with the mails and with the telegraph. It employs

for the purposes of transportation all the important railroads

in the United States, and a new road is rarely opened to the pub-

lie without being equipped in some form with express facilities.

It is used in almost every conceivable way, and for almost every

conceivable purpose, by the people and by the government. All

have become accustomed to it, and it cannot be taken away with-

out breaking up many of the long settled habits of business, and

interfering materially with the conveniences of social life.

In this connection it is to be kept in mind that neither of the

railroad companies involved in these suits is attempting to de-

prive the general public of the advantages of an express busi-

ness over its road. The controversy, in each case is not with the

public, but with a single express company. And the real ques-

tion is not whether the railroad companies are authorized by law

to do an express business themselves; nor whether they must

carry express matter for the public on their passenger trains, in

the immediate charge of some person specially appointed for that

purpose; nor whether they shall carry express freights for ex-

press companies as they carry like freights for the general pub-
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lie ; but whether it is their duty to furnish the Adams Company

or the Southern Company facilities for doing an express business

upon their roads the same in all respects as those they provide

for themselves or afford to any other express company.

When the business began railroads were in their infancy. They

were few in number, and for comparatively short distances.

There has never been a time, however, since the express business

was started that it has not been encouraged by the railroad com-

panies, and it is no doubt true, as alleged in each of the bills

filed in these cases, that "no railroad company in the United

States . . . has ever refused to transport express matter

for the public, upon the application of some express company, of

some form of legal constitution. Every railroad company . . .

has recognized the right of the public to demand transportation

by the railway facilities which the public has permitted to be

created, of that class of matter which is known as express mat-

ter." Express companies have undoubtedly invested their capi-

tal and built up their business in the hope and expectation of se-

curing and keeping for themselves such railway facilities as
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they needed, and railroad companies have likewise relied upon

the express business as one of their important sources of income.

But it is neither averred in the bills, nor sho^vn by the testi-

mony, that any railroad company in the United States has ever

held itself out as a common carrier of express companies, that

is to say, as a common carrier of common carriers. On the con-

trary it has been shown, and in fact it was conceded upon the

argument, that, down to the time of bringing these suits, ^o

railroad company had taken an express company on its road for

business except under some special contract, verbal or written,

and generally written, in which the rights and the duties of the

respective parties were carefuly fixed and defined. These con-

tracts, as is seen by those in these records, vary necessarily in

their details, according to the varying circumstances of each par-

ticular case, and according to the judgment and discretion of the

parties immediately concerned. It also appears that, with very

few exceptions, only one express company has been allowed by

a railroad company to do business on its road at the same time.

In some of the States* statutes have been passed which, either

in express terms or by judicial interpretation, require railroad

companies to furnish equal facilities to all express companies,

Gen. Laws N. H., 1878, ch. 163, § 2 ; Rev. Stat. Maine, 1883, 494,

eh. 51, § 134; but these are of comparative recent origin, and

thus far seem not to l^ave been generally adopted.

(Omitting the constitutional and statutory provisions in cer-

tain states.)

332

EXPRESS CASES. § 86

The reason is obvious why special contracts in reference to

this business are necessary. The transportation required is of

a kind which must, if possible, be had for the most part on pas-

senger trains. It requires not only speed, but reasonable cer-

tainty as to the quantity that will be carried at any one time. As

the things carried are to be kept in the personal custody of the

messenger or other employee of the express company, it is im-

portant that a certain amount of car space should be specially

set apart for the business, and that this should, as far as prac-

ticable, be put in the exclusive possession of the express man in

charge. As the business to be done is ''express," it implies ac-

cess to the train for loading at the latest, and for unloading at

the^earliest, convenient moment. All this is entirely inconsistent

with the idea of an express business on passenger trains free to

all express carriers. Eailroad companies are by law carriers of

both persons and property. Passenger trains have from the be-

ginning been provided for the transportation primarily of pas-

sengers and their baggage. This must be done with reasonable

promptness and with reasonable comfort to the passenger. The
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express business on passenger trains is in a degree subordinate

to the passenger business, and it is consequently the duty of a

railroad company in arranging for the express to see that there

is as little interference as possible with the wants of passengers.

This implies a special understanding and agreement as to the

amount of car space that will be afforded, and the conditions on

which it is to be occupied, the particular trains that can be used,

the places at which they shall stop, the price to be paid, and all

the varying details of a business which is to be adjusted between

two public servants, so that each can perform in the best man-

ner its own pai'ticular duties. All this must necessarily be a mat-

ter of bargain, and it by no means follows that, because a rail-

road company can serve one express company in one way, it can

as well serve another company in the same way, and still perform

its other obligations to the public in a satisfactory manner. The

car space that can be given to the express business on a passen-

ger train is, to a certain extent, limited, and, as has been seen,

that which is allotted to a particular carrier must be, in a meas-

ure, under his exclusive control. No express company can do

a successful business unless it is at all times reasonalDly sure of

the means it requires for transportation. On important lines

one company will at times fill all the space the railroad company

can well allow for the business. If this space had to be divided

among several companies, there might be occasions when the

public would be put to inconvenience by delays which could oth-

erwise be avoided. So long as the public are served to their
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reasonable satisfaction, it is a matter of no importance who serves

them. The railroad company performs its whole duty to the

public at large and to each individual when it affords the public

all reasonable express accommodations. If this is done the rail-

road company owes no duty to the public as to the particular

agencies it shall select for that purpose. The public require the

carriage, but the company may choose its own appropriate means

of carriage, always provided they are such as to insure reasonable

promptness and security.

The inconvenience that would come from allowing more than

one express company on a railroad at the same time was ap-

parently so well understood both by the express companies and

the railroad companies that the three principal express compa-

nies, the Adams, the American and the United States, almost

immediately on their organization, now more than thirty years

ago, by agreement divided the territory in the United States trav-

ersed by railroads among themselves, and since that time each

has confined its own operations to the particular roads which,

under this division, have been set apart for its special use. No
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one of these companies has ever interfered with the other, and

each has worked its allotted territory, always extending its lines

in the agreed directions as circumstances would permit. At the

beginning of the late Civil War the Adams Company gave up

its territory in the Southern States to the Southern Company,

and since then the Adams and the Southern have occupied, under

arrangements between themselves, that part of the ground orig-

inally assigned to the Adams alone. In this way these three or

four important and influential companies were able substantially

to control, from 1854 until about the time of the bringing of

these suits, all the railway express business in the United States,

except upon the Pacific roads and in certain comparatively lim-

ited localities. In fact, as is stated in the argument for the ex-

press companies, the Adams was occupying when these suits

were brought, one hundred and fifty-five railroads, with a mile-

age of 21,216 miles; the American two hundred roads, with a

mileage of 28,000 miles, and the Southern ninety-five roads, with

a mileage of 10,000 miles. Through their business arrangements

with each other, and with other connecting lines, they have been

able for a 'long time to receive and contract for the delivery of

any package committed to their charge at almost any place of

importance in the United States and in Canada, and even at some

places in Europe and the West Indies. They have invested mil-

lions of dollars in their business, and have secured public con-

fidence to such a degree that they are trusted unhesitatingly by

all those who need their services. The good will of their business
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is of great value if they can keep their present facilities fur

transportation. The longer their lines and the more favorable

their connections, the greater will be their own profits, and the

better their means of serving the public. In making their in-

vestments and in extending their business, they have undoubtedly

relied on securing and keeping favorable railroad transporta-

tion, and in this they were encouraged by the apparent willing-

ness of railroad companies to accommodate them; but the fact

still remains that they have never been allowed to do business

on any road except under a special contract, and that as a rule

only one express company has been admitted on a road at the

same time.

The territory traversed by the railroads involved in the present

suits is part of that allotted in the division between the express

companies to the Adams and Southern companies, and in due

time after the roads were built these companies contracted with

the railroad companies for the privileges of an express business.

The contracts were all in writing, in which the rights of the

respective parties were clearly defined, and there is now no
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dispute about what they were. Each contract contained a pro-

vision for its termination by either party on notice. That notice

has been given in all the cases by the railroad companies, and

the express companies now sue for relief. Clearly this cannot

be afforded by keeping the contracts in force, for both parties

have agreed that they may be terminated at any time by either

party on notice; nor by making new contracts, because that is

not within the scope of judicial power.

The exact question, then, is whether these express companies

can now demand as a right what they have heretofore had only

as by permission. That depends, as is conceded, on whether all

railroad companies are now by law charged with the duty of

carrying all express companies in the way that express carriers

when taken are usually carried, just as they are with the duty

of carrying all passengers and freights when offered in the

way that passengers and freight are carried. The contracts

which these companies once had are now out of the way, and

the companies at this time possess no other rights than such as

belong to any other company or person wishing to do an express

business upon these roads. If they are entitled to the relief they,

iask it is because it is the duty of the railroad companies to furJ

jnish express facilities to all alike who demand them. '

The constitutions and the laws of the States in which the roads

are situated place the companies that own and operate them on

the footing of common carriers, but there is nothing which in

positive terms requires a railroad company to carry all express
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companies in the way that under some circumstances they may

be able without inconvenience to carry one company. In Kansas,

the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Company must furnish sufficient

accommodations for the transportation of all such express freight

as may be offered, and in each of the States of Missouri, Arkan-

sas and Kansas railroad companies are probably prohibited from

making unreasonable discriminations in their business as car-

riers, but this is all.

Such being the case, the right of the express companies to a

decree depends upon their showing the existence of a usage, hay-

ing the force of law in the express business, which requires rail-

road companies to carry all express companies on their passen-

ger trains as express carriers are usually carried. It is not

enough to establish a usage to carry some express company, or

to furnish the public in some way with the advantages of an

express business over the road. The question is not whether these

railroad companies must furnish the general public with reason-

able express facilities, but whether they must carry these particu-

lar express carriers for the purpose of enabling them to do an
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express business over the lines.

In all these voluminous records there is not a syllable of evi-

dence to show a usage for the carriage of express companies on

the passenger trains of railroads unless specially contracted for.

While it has uniformly been the habit of railroad companies to

arrange, at the earliest practicable moment, to take one express

company on some or all of their passenger trains, or to provide

some other way of doing an express business on their lines, it

has never been the practice to grant such a privilege to more

than one company at the same time, unless a statute or some

special circumstances made it necessary or desirable. The ex-

press companies that bring these suits are certainly in no situa-

tion to claim a usage in their favor on these particular roads,

because their entry was originally under special contracts, and

no other companies have ever been admitted except by agree-

ment. By the terms of their contracts they agreed that all

their contract rights on the roads should be terminated at the

will of the railroad company. They were willing to begin and to

expand their business upon this understanding, and with this

uncertainty as to the duration of their privileges. The stoppage

of their facilities was one of the risks they assumed when they

accepted their contracts, and made their investments under

them. If the general public were complaining because the rail-

road companies refused to carry express matter themselves on

their passenger trains, or to allow it to be carried by others, dif-

ferent questions would be presented. As it is, we have only to
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decide whether these particular express companies must be car-

ried notwithstanding the termination of their special contract

rights.

The difficulty in the cases is apparent from the form of the

decrees. As express companies had always been carried by rail-

road companies under special contracts, which established the

duty of the railroad company upon the one side, and fixed the

liability of the express company on the other, the court, in de-

creeing the carriage, was substantially compelled to make for

the parties such a contract for the business as in its opinion they

ought to have made for themselves. Having found that the rail-

road company should furnish the express company with facili-

ties for business, it had to define what those facilities must be,

and it did so by declaring that they should be furnished to the

same extent anfl upon the same trains that the company ac-

corded to itself or to any other company engaged in conducting

an express business on its line. It then prescribed the time and

manner of making the payment for the facilities and how the

payment should be secured, as well as how it should be measured.
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Thus, by the decrees, these railroad companies are compelled to

carry these express companies at these rates, and on these terms,

so long as they ask to be carried, no matter what other express

companies pay for the same facilities or what such facilities may,

for the time being, be reasonably worth, unless the court sees fit,

under the power reserved for that purpose, on the application

of either of the parties, to change the measure of compensation.

In this way, as it seems to us, "the court has made an arrange-

ment for the business intercourse of these companies, such as,

in its opinion, they ought to have made for themselves," and

that, we said in Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe R. R. Co. v.

Denver & New Orleans R. R. Co., 110 U. S. 667, 4 S. Ct. R. 185,

followed at this term in Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Missouri

Pacific Ry. Co., 115 U. S. 587, 6 S. Ct. R. 194, could not be done.

The regulation of matters of this kind is legislative in its char-

acter, not judicial. To Avhat extent it must come, if it comes at

all, from Congress, and to what extent it may come from the

States, are questions we do not now undertake to decide; but

that it must come, when it does come, from some source of legis-

lative power, we do not doubt. The legislature may impose a

duty, and when imposed it will, if necessary, be enforced by

the courts, but, unless a duty has been created either by usage or

by contract, or by statute, the courts cannot be called on to give

it effect.

The decree in each of the cases is reversed, and the suit is re-

manded, with directions to dissolve the injunction, and,
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after adjusting the accounts between the parties for business

done while the injunctions were in force, and decreeing the

payment of any amounts that may be found to be due, to

dismiss the bills.

Mr. Justice Miller filed an opinion vigorously dissenting,

with which Mr. Justice Field concurred.

87. HART V. CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RAIL-

WAY CO.,

69 Iowa 485, 29 N. W. R. 597. 1886.

On the eighteenth day of April, 1883, plaintiff delivered to

defendant, at the city of Des Moines, one car-load of property,

which the latter undertook to transport to the town of Miller,

in Dakota territory. The property shipped in the car consisted

of six horses, two wagons, three sets of harness, a quantity of

grain, a lot of household and kitchen furniture, and personal

effects. The contract under which the shipment was made pro-

vided that the horses should be loaded, fed, watered and cared

for by the shipper at his own expense, and that one man in

charge of them would be passed free on the train that carried
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the car. It also provided that no liability would be assumed

by the defendant on the horses for more than $100 each, unless

by special agreement noted on the contract, and no such special

agreement was noted on the contract. Plaintiff placed a man

in charge of the horses, and he was permitted to, and did, ride

in the car with them. When the train reached Bancroft, in this

state, it was discovered that the hay which was carried in the

ear to be fed to the horses on the trip was on fire. The car was

broken open and the man in charge of the horses was found

asleep. The trainmen and others present attempted to extin-

guish the fire, but before they succeeded in putting it out the

horses were killed, and the other property destroyed. This ac-

tion was brought to recover the value of the property. There

was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant ap-

peals.

Reed, J. — I. There was evidence which tended to prove that

the fire was communicated to the car from a lantern which the

man in charge of the horses had taken into the car. This lantern

was furnished by plaintiff, and was taken into the car by

his direction. Defendant asked the circuit court to instruct the

jury that if the fire which destroyed the property was caused

by a lighted lantern in the sole use and control of plaintiff's ser-
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vant, who was in the car in charge of the property, plaintiff

could not recover. The court refused to give this instruction

but told the jury that, if the fire was occasioned by the fault

or negligence of plaintiff's servant, who was in charge of the

property, there could be no recovery. The jury might have

found from the evidence that the fire was communicated to the

hay from the lantern, but that plaintiff' 's servant was not guilty

of any negligence in the matter. The question presented by this

assignment of error, then, is whether a common carrier is re-

sponsible for the injury or destruction of property, while it

is in the course of transportation, w^hen the injury is caused

by some act of the owner, but which is unattended with any

negligence on the part of the owner.

The carrier is held to be an insurer of the safety of the prop-

erty while he has it in possession as a carrier. His undertaking

for the care and safety of the property arises by the implication

of law out of the contract for its carriage. The rule which holds

him to be an insurer of the property is founded upon considera-

tions of public policy. The reason of the rule is that, as the
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carrier ordinarily has the absolute possession and control of the

property while it is in course of shipment, he has the most

tempting opportunities for embezzlement or for fraudulent col-

lusion with others. Therefore, if it is lost or destroyed while in

his custody, the policy of the law imposes the loss upon him.

Coggs V. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym., 909; Forward v. Pittard, 1

Durn. & E., 27 ; Riley v. Home, 5 Bing., 217 ; Thomas v. Railway

Co., 10 Met. (Mass.) 472, 43 Am. D. 444; Roberts v. Turner, 12

Johns. (N. Y.) 232, 7 Am. D. 311; Moses v. Railway Co., 24 N.

H. 71, 55 Am. D. 222 ; Rixford v. Smith, 52 N. H. 355, 13 Am. R.

42. His undertaking for the safety of the property, however, is

not absolute. He has never been held to be an insurer against

injuries occasioned by the act of God, or the public enemy, and

there is no reason why he should be ; and it is equally clear, we

think, that there is no consideration of policy which demands

that he should be held to account to the owner for an injury

which is occasioned by the owner's own act; and whether the

act of the owner by which the injury was caused amounted to

negligence is immaterial also. If the immediate cause of the loss

was the act of the owner, as between the parties, absolute justice

demands that the loss should fall upon him, rather than upon

the one who has been guilty of no wrong; and it can make no

difference that the act cannot be said to be either wrongful or

negligent. If, then, the fire which occasioned the loss in ques-

tion was ignited by the lantern which plaintiff's servant, by his

direction, took into the car, and which, at the time, was in the
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exclusive control and care of the servant, defendant is not lia-

ble, and the question whether the servant handled it carefully

or otherwise is not material. This view is abundantly sustained

by the authorities. See Hutch. Carr., § 216, and cases cited in

the note; also Lawson Carr. §§ 19, 23.

(Omitting other questions.) Judgment reversed.

88. FORWARD V. PITTARD,

1 Term Rep. 27. 1785.

This was an action on the case against the defendant, as a

common carrier, for not safely carrying and delivering the

plaintifiP's goods. The action was tried at the last summer assizes

at Dorchester, before Mr. Baron Perryn, when the jury found n.

verdict for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court on

the following case:

"That the defendant was a common carrier from London to

Shaftesbury. That on Thursday, the 14th of October, 1784, the

plaintiff delivered to him on Weyhill twelve pockets of hops

to be carried by him to Andover, and to be by him forwarded

to Shaftesbury by his public road wagon, which travels from
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London through Andover to Shaftesbury. That, by the course

of traveling, such wagon was not to leave Andover till the Sat-

urday evening following. That in the night of the following

day after the delivery of the hops, a fire broke out in a booth

at the distance of about 100 yards from the booth in which the

defendant had deposited the hops, which burnt for some time

with unextinguishable violence, and during that time communi-

cated itself to the said booth in which the defendant had de-

posited the hops, and entirely consumed them without any actual

negligence in the defendant. That the fire was not occasioned

by lightning."

Lord Mansfield. After stating the case. The question is,

whether the common carrier is liable in this case of fire? It ap-

pears from all the cases for 100 years back that there are events

for which the carrier is liable independent of his contract. By

the nature of his contract, he is liable for all due care and dili-

gence ; and for any negligence he is suable on his contract. But

there is a further degree of responsibility by the custom of the

realm, that is, by the common law; a carrier is in the nature

of an insurer. It is laid down that he is liable for every acci-

dent, except by the act of God, or the King's enemies. Now,
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what is the act of God ? I consider it to mean something in oppo-

sition to the act of man; for everything is the act of God that

happens by his permission; everything, by his knowledge. But

to prevent litigation, collusion, and the necessity of going into

circumstances impossible to be unravelled, the law presumes

against the carrier unless he shows it was done by the King's

enemies or by such act as could not happen by the intervention

of man, as storms, lightning, and tempests.

If an armed force come to rob the carrier of the goods, he

is liable ; and a reason is given in the books, which is a bad one,

viz., that he ought to have a sufficient force to repel it ; but that

would be impossible in some cases, as for instance in the riots

in the year 1780. The true reason is, for fear it may give room

for collusion, that the master may contrive to be robbed on pur-

pose, and share the spoil.

In this case, it does not appear but that the fire arose from

the act of some man or other. It certainly did arise from some

act of man ; for it is expressly stated not to have happened by

lightning. The carrier therefore in this case is liable, inasmuch
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as he is liable for inevitable accident.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

89. RAILROAD CO. V. REEVES,

10 Wallace (U. 8.) 176. 1869.

Reeves sued the Memphis and Charleston Railroad Company

as a common carrier for damage to a quantity of tobacco re-

ceived by it for carriage, the allegation being negligence and

want of due care. The tobacco came by rail from Salisbury,

North Carolina, to Chattanooga, Tennessee, reaching the latter

place on the 5th of March, 1867. At Chattanooga it was re-

ceived by the INIemphis and Charleston Railroad Company on

the 5th of :March, and reloaded into two of its cars, about five

o'clock in the afternoon.

One Price, who as agent of Reeves was attending and looking

after the tobacco along the route, testified (though his testimony

on this point was contradicted) that the agent of the company

at Chattanooga promised that, if the bills were brought over in

time, the tobacco should go forward at six o'clock that evening;

and shortly before that time informed him that the bills had

come over, and assured him that the tobacco would go off at that

hour. Had it gone off the evening of the 5th it would not have
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been damaged. An unprecedented flood submerged the track

and injured the tobacco.

Verdict for plaintiff.

Miller, J. (Omitting a preliminary point) . As to the charge

given by the court, the language of the exception is more

general than we could desire. And if the errors of this

charge were less apparent, or if there was any reason to suppose

they were inadvertent, and might have been corrected if speci-

fied by counsel at the time, we would have some difficulty in

holding the exception to it sufficient. But the whole charge

proceeds upon a theory of the law of common carriers, as it re-

gards the effect of loss from the act of God, on the contract,

so different from our views of the law on that subject, that

it needs no special effort to draw attention to it, and it is so

clearly and frankly stated as to have made it the turning-point

of the case.

We are of opinion, then, that both the refusal to charge as re-

quested and the charge actually given are properly before us

for examination. As regards the first, we will only notice one
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of the rejected instructions, the fourth. It was prayed in these

words :

"When the damage is shown to have resulted from the im-

mediate act of God, such as a sudden and extraordinary flood,

the carrier would be exempt from liability, unless the plaintiff

shall prove that the defendant was guilty of some negligence

in not providing for the safety of the goods. That he could do

so must be proven by the plaintiff, or must appear in the facts

of the case."

It is hard to see how the soundness of this proposition can

be made clearer than by its bare statement. A common carrier

assumes all risks except those caused by the act of God and the

public enemy. One of the instances always mentioned by the

elementary writers of loss by the act of God is the case of loss

by flood and storm. Now, when it is shown that the damage re-

sulted from this cause immediately, he is excused.

What is to make him liable after this? No question of his

negligence arises unless it is made by the other party. It is

not necessary for him to prove that the cause was such as re-

leases him, and then to prove affirmatively that he did not con-

tribute to it. If, after he has excused himself by showing the

presence of the overpowering cause, it is charged that his negli-

gence contributed to the loss, the proof of this must come from

those who assert or rely on it.

The testimony in the case, wholly uncontradicted, shows one
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of the most sudden, violent, and extraordinary floods ever known

in that part of the country. The tobacco was being transported

from Salisbury, North Carolina, to Memphis, on a contract

through and by several railroad companies, of which defendant

was one. At Chattanooga it was received by defendant, and

fifteen miles out the train was arrested, blocked by a land slide

and broken bridges, and returned to Chattanooga, when the

water came over the track into the car and injured the tobacco.

The second instruction given by the court says that if, while

the cars were so standing at Chattanooga, they were submerged

by a freshet which no human care, skill, and prudence could

have avoided, then the defendant would not be liable; but if

the cars were brought within the influence of the freshet by the

act of defendant, and if the defendant or his agent had not so

acted the loss would not have occurred, then it was not the

act of God, and defendant would be liable. The fifth instruc-

tion given also tells the jury that if the damage could have been

prevented by any means within the power of the defendant

or his agents, and such means were not resorted to, then the jury
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must find for plaintiff.

In contrast with the stringent ruling here stated, and as ex-

pressive of our view of the law on this point, we cite two de-

cisions by courts of the first respectability in this country.

In Morrison v. Davis & Co., 20 Pa. St. 171, 57 Am. D. 695,

goods being transported on a canal w^ere injured by the wrecking

of the boat, caused by an extraordinary flood. It was shown

that a lame horse used by defendants delayed the boat, which

would otherw^ise have passed the place W'here the accident oc-

curred in time to avoid the injury. The court held that the

proximate cause of the disaster was the flood, and the delay

caused by the lame horse the remote cause, and that the maxim,

causa proxima, non remota spectatur, applied as well to con-

tracts of common carriers as to others. The court further held,

that when carriers discover themselves in peril by inevitable

accident, the law requires of them ordinary care, skill, and fore-

sight, which it defines to be the common prudence which men of

business and heads of families usually exhibit in matters that

are interesting to them.

In Denny v. New York Central R. E. Co., 13 Gray 481, 74 Am.

D. 645, the defendants were guilty of a negligent delay of six

days in transporting wool from Suspension Bridge to Albany,

and while in their depot at the latter place a few days after it

was submerged by a sudden and violent flood in the Hudson

River. The court says that the flood was the proximate cause of

the injury, and the delay in transportation the remote one ; that
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the doctrine we have just stated governs the liabilities of com-

mon carriers as it does other occupations and pursuits, and it

cites with approval the case of Morrison v. Davis & Co.

Of the soundness of this principle we are entirely convinced,

and it is at variance with the general groundwork of the court's

charge in this case.

As the case must go back for a new trial, there is another

error which we must notice, as it might otherwise be repeated.

It is the third instruction given by the court, to the effect that

if defendant had contracted to start with the tpbacco the evening

before, and the jury believe if he had done so the train would

have escaped injury, then the defendant was liable. Even if

there had been such a contract, the failure to comply would

have been only the remote cause of the loss.

But all the testimony that was given is in the record, and we

see nothing from which the jury could have inferred any such

contract, or which tends to establish it, and for that reason no

such instruction should have been given.

Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered.
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90. PINGREE V. DETROIT, LANSING AND NORTHERN

RAILROAD CO.,

66 Midi. 143; 33 N. W. B. 298; 11 Am. St. B. 479. 1887.

Case, against a common carrier for failure to deliver a con-

signment of boots and shoes to plaintiffs.

Campbell, C. J. This case presents a single question on facts

found.

Plaintiffs had a chattel mortgage against Francis M. and

Myron C. Butts, which was made on August 4, 1886. The next

day, the two Butts made a transfer of the property to one Steere.

Plaintiffs replevied from Steere, and on August 12 shipped

the goods by defendant's railroad from Edmore, directed to

Detroit, taking the usual bill of lading. On the same day, the

goods were taken by the sheriff at Stanton, on an attachment

against said F. M. and M. C. Butts, in favor of John W. Fuller

and others. Defendant notified plaintiffs of this seizure. Plain-

tiffs now sue defendant for not delivering the goods at Detroit.

The question is, whether the seizure by the sheriff' exonerated

defendant from such delivery. The court below held that it

did.

There seems to be a little apparent conflict between the cases
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on this question, but there can be no doubt where the rule of

justice lies. If the carrier could rely against all the world

upon the right of the consignor to intrust him with possession,

then it would be reasonable to hold him estopped from question-

ing that title. But there is no authority for such immunity.

The true owner may take his property from a carrier as well as

from any one else. If a carrier gets property from a person

not authorized to direct its shipment, he has been declared by

the supreme court of this state to have no lien for his services,

and no right to retain the property : Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Doug.

1; 40 Am. Dec. 33. There is no sense or justice in enabling a

consignor to compel a carrier, at his peril, to defend a title that

he knows nothing about, and has no means of defending, unless

the consignor gives it to him. In the present case, the attach-

ment was against plaintiffs' mortgagors, and was regular. It

must have been levied on the claim that plaintiffs had no right

to the goods. Defendant could not have resisted the seizure with-

out incurring the risk of serious civil, and perhaps criminal, lia-

bility; and if plaintiff's' claim is correct, this must have been
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done at defendant's own risk and expense.

This precise question was decided in favor of the carrier in

Stiles v. Davis, 1 Black, 101, upon the ground that defendant

was not required to resist the sheriff, and could not properly

do so. This rule has been adhered to by the United States su-

preme court, and followed to a considerable extent. It is the

only rule compatible with public order. A carrier must other-

wise resist the officer, or find some one who will swear out a re-

plevin, which a carrier usually has not knowledge enough to

justify. If the carrier cannot call on the consignor to defend,

and must take the risk and the loss, his position would be one

of hopeless weakness. If he declines to accept custody of goods,

he runs the risk of an action ; and if a wrongful holder, by doubt-

ful title, or even by theft, compels him to receive the consign-

ment, he can get the value from the carrier who has had them

seized by the true owner, unless the carrier has means of proof,

that he never can be presumed to have, of the lack of interest

in the shipper.

Whatever may be a carrier's duty to resist a forcible seizure

without process, he cannot be compelled to assume that regular

process is illegal, and to accept all the consequences of resisting

officers of the law. If he is excusable for yielding to a public

enemy, he cannot be at fault for yielding to actual authority

what he may yield to usurped authority.

I think the judgment should be affirmed.

345

f 91 EIGHTS AND DUTIES OF COMMON CAEEIEB.

91. STILES V. DA^^S,

1 Black i r. S.) lul. 1S61.

Tkovzr against defendants, common carriers, for goods of the

ralue of $4,0OC». Verdict for plaintiff for ^3,041.14.

Nelson, J. The case was tins: The plaintiffs below, Davis

and Barton, had purchased the remnants of a store of dry goods

of the assignee of a firm at JanesTille. Wisconsin, who had failed,

and made an assignment for the benefit of their creditors. The

goods were packed in boxes, and delivered to the agents of the

Union Despatch Company to be conveyed by railroad to Ilion,

Herkimer county. New York.

On the arrival of the goods in Chicago, on their way to the

place of destination, they were seized by the sheriff", under an

attachment issued in behalf of the creditors of the insolvent

firm, at Janesville, as the property of that firm, and

the defendant, one of the proprietors and agent of the Union

Despatch Company at Chicago, was summoned as garnishee.

The goods were held by the sheriff, under the attachment, until

judgment and execution, when they were sold. They were at-
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tached, and the defendant summoned on the third of Novem-

ber, 1S57 ; and some days afterwards, and before the commence-

ment of this suit, which was on the sixteenth of the month, the

plaintiffs made a demand on the defendant for their goods, which

was refused, on the ground he had been summoned as garnishee

in the attachment suit.

The court below charged the jur^-, that any proceedings in

the State court to which the plaintiffs were not parties, and of

which they had no notice, did not bind them or their property ;

and further, that the fact of the goods being garnished, as the

propeiiy of third persons, of itself, under the circumstances of

the case, constituted no bar to the action : but said the jury might

weigh that fact in determining whether or not there was a con-

version.

TVe think the court below erred. After the seizure of the

goods by the sheriff, under the attachment, they were in the

custody of the law and the defendant could not comply with

the demand of the plaintiff's without a breach of it, even admit-

ting the goods to have been, at the time, in his actual possession.

The case, however, shows that they were in the possession of

the sheriff's officer or agent, and continued there until disposed

of under the judgment upon the attachment. It is tme. that

these goods had been delivered to the defendant, as carriers, by
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the plaintiffs, to be conveyed for them to the place of destina-

tion, and were seized under an attachment agaiast third per-

sons ; but this circumstance did not impair the legal effect of the

seizure or custody of the goods under it, so as to justify the de-

fendant in taking them out of the hands of the sheriff. The

right of the sheriff' to hold them was a question of law, to be de-

termined by the proper legal proceedings, and not at the will

of the defendant, nor that of the plaintiffs. The law on this

subject is well settled, as may be seen on a reference to the cases

collected in sections 453, 290, 350, of Drake on Attach 't, 2d

edition.

This precise question was determined in Yerrall v. Robinson

(Turwhitt's Exch. R., 1069; 4 Dowling, 242. S. C). There the

plaintiff was a coach proprietor, and the defendant the owner

of a carriage depository in the city of London. One Banks hired

a chaise from the plaintiff, and afterwards left it at the de-

fendant's depositor}'. "While it remained there, it was attached

in an action against Banks; and, on that ground, the defendant

refused to deliver it up to the plaintiff' on demand, although he
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admitted it to be his proper^.'.

Lord Abinger, C. B., observed, that the defendant's refusal to

deliver the chaise to the plaintiff was grounded on its being on

his premises, in the custody of the law. That this was no evi-

dence of a wi'ongful conversion to his own use. After it was

attached as Bank's property, it was not in the custody of the

defendant, in such a manner as to permit him to deliver it up

at all. And Alderson, B.. observed: Had the defendant de-

livered it, as requested, he would have been guilty of a breach of

law.

The plaintiff's have mistaken their remedy. They should have

brought their action against the officer who seized the goods, or

against the plaintiffs in the attachment suit, if the seizure was

made under their direction. As to these parties, the process be-

ing against third persons, it would have furnished no justifica-

tion, if the plaintiff' could have maintained a title and right to

possession in themselves.

Judgment of the court below reversed, and vcriire de novo, etc.

^ 92. BENNETT V. AAIERICAN EXPRESS CO.,

83 Me. 236; 22 Atl B. 159; 23 Am. St. E. 774. 1891.

Foster. J. It is undisputed that the plaintiff was lawfully pos-

sessed and the owner of the saddles of three deer which were
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legally killed under the laws of this state; that the same were^

closely boxed, in good condition for shipment, and delivered by

the plaintiff onto the platform of the Maine Central Railroad

Company, at Newport station, plainly marked to the consignees

in Boston, The defendants' agent was notified that the box was

left for transportation, and thereupon he delivered it into the

defendants' car, on the arrival of the train, but no receipt or

bill of lading was ever given to the plaintiff. Upon the arrival

of the train at Augusta, the saddles were seized by a game war-

den, and by him removed from the defendants' car, without

a-ny search warrant or other legal process, and without objec-

tions from the defendant company or their agents, and have

never since been delivered, either to the consignees or the ex-

press company.

Upon the facts thus stated, the defendants' liability is fully

established. * The plaintiff's ownership of the property, its de-

livery to the defendants for transportation, and their accept-

ance for that purpose, and its non-delivery to the consignees, are

prima facie evidence of negligence. The burden is therefore
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upon the defendants to show facts exempting them from liabil-

ity : Little v. Boston and Maine R. R. Co., 66 Me. 241.

The property of the plaintiff while in the hands of the de-

fendants as common carriers, in transitu, was seized by an officer,

without any warrant or other legal process. Nor does it appear

that any was ever obtained. The officer was, therefore, a mere

trespasser, and the defendants were liable, under the rule of the

common law, in the same manner as if they had allowed any

other trespasser to take the property out of their custody: Ed-

wards V. White Line Transit Co., 104 Mass. 163, 6 Am. Rep. 213.

As against the plaintiff, the seizure was of no more validity than

a trespass of an unofficial person. There has never been any

adjudication from any tribunal that the property seized was

contraband, or other than the lawful property of the plaintiff.

The common carrier is not relieved from the fulfillment of his

contract, or his liability as such carrier, any more than if the

loss had occurred from fire, theft, robbery, or accident. He

stands in the relation of insurer, where, as in this case, no special

contract is shown, and, upon grounds of public policy, is liable

for all losses resulting from accident, trespass, theft, or any kind

of unlawful dispossession of the property intrusted to him to

carry, — excepting only such as arise by the act of God or public

enemies: Adams v. Scott, 104 Mass. 166; Kiff v. Old Colony

and Newport R'y Co., 117 Mass. 593, 19 Am. Rep. 429; Fille-

brown v. Grand Trunk R'y Co., 55 Me. 462, 92 Am.'Dec. 606.

In the case of Edwards v. White Line Transit Co., 104 Mass.
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163, 6 Am. Rep. 213, it was held that while the carrier was not

liable in trover for conversion of the property, he was, neverthe-

less, liable on his contract or obligation as common carrier, where

the officer seizing the property was a trespasser. "The owner

may, it is true," say the court, "maintain trover against the

officer who took the property from the carrier; but he is not

obliged to resort to him for his remedy. He may proceed di-

rectly against the carrier upon his contract, and leave the car-

rier to pursue the property in the hands of those who have

wrongfully taken it from him."

(After deciding that the game laws would not justify de-

fendants in refusing to ship the property.)

The box was delivered to and received by the company. No

information was asked concerning its contents, and none given.

If the plaintiff knew by report, when he delivered the property

to the defendants, that their agents had been directed not to

receive any deer or parts thereof, yet there was no limitation of

the company's responsibility by special contract, or such knowl-

edge brought home to this plaintiff, and assented to by him, as
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would be necessary to limit such responsibility: Fillebrown v.

Grand Trunk R'y Co., 55 Me. 462, 92 Am. Dec. 606. "A com-

mon carrier may limit his responsibility for property intrusted

to him," says Bigelow, C. J., in Buckland v. Adams Exp. Co.,

97 Mass. 125, 93 Am. Dec. 68, "by a notice containing reasonable

and suitable restrictions, if brought home to the owner of goods

delivered for transportation, and assented to clearly and un-

equivocally by him. It is also settled that absent is not neces-

sarily to be inferred from the mere fact that knowledge of such

notice on the part of an owner or consignor of goods is shown.

The evidence must go further, and be sufficient to show that

the terms on which the carrier proposed to carry the goods were

adopted as the contract between the parties according to which

the service of the carrier was to be rendered."

It is undoubtedly the right of the carrier to require good

faith on the part of those who deliver goods to be carried, or

enter into contracts with him. The degree of care to be exer-

cised, as well as the amount of compensation for the carriage of

property, depends largely on its nature and value, and no fraud

or cleception should be used which would mislead the carrier as

to the extent of his duties or the risks which he assumes. But

we fail to see any such evidence of fraud or deception in this

case as would exonerate these defendants.

This property was lawfully the property of the plaintiff; it

was delivered to and accepted by the defendant company for

transportation to a point beyond the limits of this state. Their
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liability as common carriers held them to a strict fulfillment of

their obligation in relation to the property in their charge. That

obligation was not merely to transport the property in this state,

but to a point outside of its limits, in another state. It had law-

fully conmieneed to move as an article of commerce from one

state to another. From that moment it became the subject of

interstate commerce, and, as such, was subject only to national

^regulation, and not to the police power of the state. The same

is unquestionably true in relation to whatever agency or instru-

mentality may be used as the means of transporting such com-

modities as may lawfully become the subject of purchase, sale,

or exchange, under the commerce clause of the constitution of the

United States. The transportation of the subject of interstate

commerce, where it is such as may lawfuly be purchased, sold,

or exchanged, is, without doubt, a constituent of commerce itself,

and is protected by and subject only to the regulation of Con-

gress : The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 565 ; Bowman v. Chicago

etc. Ry. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 485, 8 S. Ct. R. 689; County of

Mobile V. Kimball, 102 IT. S. 691 ; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S.
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275 ; Coe V. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 6 S. Ct. R. 475 ; Leisy v. Hardin,

135 U. S. 100, 10 S. Ct. R. 681.

Defendants to be defaulted; damages to be assessed at nisi

prius.

93. ORANGE CO. BANK V. BROWN,

9 Wend. (N. Y.) 85, 24 Am. D. 129. 1832.

Case, against a carrier for negligence resulting in the loss of

a. trunk containing $11,250. The plaintiff bank had requested one

Phillips to bring to it from the Bank of America seven sealed

packages of bank notes of the above value, advising him to put

them in charge of the captain of defendant's steamboat. He

informed the captain or clerk that he had a trunk *'of impor-

tance ' ' which he wished to put in the office. At their suggestion

he put the trunk behind the door till they should get under way.

He then went ashore for a few minutes and on returning found

the trunk was gone.

By Court, Nelson, J. This case is peculiar in many of its

features, and must be determined by a recurrence to some of

the general and fundamental principles which govern actions

of this kind. The rule of the common law in relation to com-

mon carriers has been frequently pronounced a rigorous one,

and its vindication by Lord Holt affords abundant evidence, if
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any were wanting, of the truth of the observation. He says, in

Lane v. Cotton, 1 Vin. Abr. 219, though one may think it a

hard case that a poor carrier that is robbed on the road, with-

out any manner of default in him, should be answerable for all

the goods he takes, yet the inconveniency would be far more

intolerable if it were not so, for it would be in his power to

combine with robbers, or to pretend a robbery or some other

accident, without a possibility of remedy to the party, and the

law will not expose him to so great a temptation. This reason,

which I believe is the only one that has ever been given for the

origin of the rule, and which probably had much foundation

in fact in the early and rude age in which it must have been

established, it is obvious, at this day, is nearly as applicable to

every person intrusted with the property of another, as it is to

the common carrier. In proportion, however, to the rigor of

the liability, was exacted the compensation for it and the means

of enforcing payment, which affords a sort of equivalent for the

harshness of the rule. Accordingly we find it frequently laid

down in actions of this kind, as a fundamental proposition, that
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the common carrier is liable in respect to his reward, and that

the compensation should be in proportion to the risk. So strictly

was this rule adhered to that it was repeatedly decided by

Lord Holt that the hackney coachman was not liable for the

traveling trunk of the passenger which was lost, unless a dis-

tinct price had been paid for the trunk as well as for the per-

son ; and that where it was the custom of the stage coach for pas-

sengers to pay for baggage above a certain weight, the coachman

was responsible only for the loss of goods beyond such weight :

1 Vin. Abr. 220, and cases there cited. So in the analogous case

of the innkeeper, if a guest stops at an inn, and departs for a

few days, leaving his goods; if they are stolen during his ab-

sence, the landlord is not liable as innkeeper, for at the time

of the loss the owner was not his guest, and he had no benefit from

the keeping of the goods : Cro. Jac. 188 ; 1 Vin. Abr. 225. It has

since been determined that the stage coachman is responsible

for the baggage of the passenger, though no distinct price was

paid for it, upon the ground, however, still consistent with the

principle of the above cases, to wit, that the reward for carrying

the same was included in the fare for the passenger: 1 Wheat.

Selw. 301, n. 1.

Now, upon the ground that the defendants in this case have

received no compensation or reward from the plaintiffs or any

other person for the transportation or risk of the money in

question, and that they were deprived of such reward by the

unfair dealing of the agent of the plaintiffs with the defend-
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ants, I am of opinion the plaintiffs cannot recover, and that

they were properly nonsuited upon the trial. As a general rule,

where there has been no qualified acceptance of goods by special

agreement, or where an agreement cannot be inferred from

notice, the carrier is bound to make inquiry as to the value of the

box or article received, and the owner must answer truly at his

peril; and if such inquiries are not made, and it is received at

such price for transportation as is asked with reference to its

bulk, weight, or external appearance, the carrier is responsible

for the loss, whatever may be its value. If he has given general

notice that he will not be liable over a certain amount, unless the

value is made known to him at the time of delivery, and a premi-

um for insurance paid, such notice, if broi\ght home to the knowl-

edge of the owner (and courts and juries are liberal in inferring

such knowledge from the publication of the notice), is as ef-

fectual in qualifying the acceptance of the goods as a special

agreement, and the owner, at his peril, must disclose the value,

and pay the premium. The carrier in such case is not bound to

make the inquiry, and if the owner omits to make known the
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value, and does not therefore pay the premium at the time of

the delivery, it is considered as dealing unfairly with the car-

rier, and he is liable only to the amount mentioned in his notice,

or not at all, according to the terms of his notice : 1 Wheat. Selw.

305, 306, 308, and notes; 6 Com. L. R. 333 (1st Am. Ed.) ; 4

Burr. 2298 ; 5 Com. L. R. 476 ; 8 Pick. 182 ; 11 Com. L. R. 243.

In this case no notice has been given by the defendants limiting

their responsibility, and they are no doubt liable to the full value

of the baggage of the passenger lost, or of the goods lost, which

they have received without any special agreement qualifying

the risk for transportation. The defendants cannot succeed upon

this ground. But in the absence of notice, if any means are used

to conceal the value of the article, and thereby the owner avoids

paying a reasonable compensation for the risk, this unfairness

and its consequence to the defendants, upon the principles of

common justice as well as those peculiar to this action, will ex-

e]npt them from the responsibility ; for such a result is alike due

to the defendants, who have received no reward for the risk,

and to the party who has been the cause of it by means of dis-

ingenuous and unfair dealing. Thus, where the plaintiff deliv-

ered to the carrier a box, telling him there was a book and to-

bacco in it, when it contained one hundred pounds, and it was

lost, he should not recover. It is true that in such a case a party

did recover, though Rolle, C. J., considered it a cheat; but it is

clear that at this day he could not recover : 4 Burr. 2301.

So, where a box, in which there was a large sum of money,
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was brought to a carrier, who inquired its contents, and was an-

swered it was filled with silk, upon which it was taken and lost, it

was held the owner could not recover: 4 Burr. 2301. So where

a bag sealed was delivered to a carrier, and was said to contain

two hundred pounds, and a receipt was given for the same,

when, in fact, it contained four hundred pounds, and it was

lost, the carrier was held answerable only for the two hundred

pounds, as the reward extended no farther: Id.; Selw. 305 (n.)

These cases all proceed upon the ground that the carrier is de-

prived of his reward for the extra value of the article, and con-

sequent extra risk incurred, by means of the unfair if not fraud-

ulent conduct of the owner, and therefore the rigor of the com-

mon law rule is not applied to him, and he is only held responsi-

ble for the loss in case of gross negligence. If the defendants

are to be made responsible to the plaintiffs through the medium

and acts of their agent, who was employed to carry the money

from New York to the bank, the plaintiffs also must be held re-

sponsible to' the defendant for his conduct ; the obligation must

be reciprocal. Instead of committing the several packages of
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money to the captain, which of themselves generally indicat.:^

their value, and in this case would have done so, as the figures

(by which I understand the quantity of money in each package)

could be seen upon them, and thereby enable the captain to exact

a reasonable compensation for the risk, and apprise him of the

necessity of greater care and caution in the safe conveyance of

the money, which he naturally would bestow in proportion to the

value, the agent of the plaintiffs put them into his trunk, and

committed it to the captain as his baggage, affording no other

indication of the value of its contents than that it was a trunk

of importance. This was enough to attract the attention of the

felon who might be standing by to its contents, but certainly was

not calculated to afford information to the captain of the ex-

traordinary character and value of those contents. The captain

might understand he had a costly wardrobe and other neces-

saries and conveniences for traveling of great value, but not that

the trunk contained eleven thousand dollars in bank bills, which

the traveler was carrying for hire or friendship, and not as

traveling expenses.

It may be difficult to define with technical precision what may

legitimately be included in the term baggage, as used in connec-

tion with traveling in public conveyances; but it may be safely

asserted that money, except what may be carried for the ex-

penses of traveling, is not thus included, and especially a sum

like the present, which was taken for the mere purpose of trans-

portation. We have already seen that formerly so strict was
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tlie rule that tlie carrier was liable only in respect to the reward

adhered to, that he was not held liable for the loss of the bag-

gage of the passenger unless a distinct price was paid for it. The

law is now very properly altered, as a reasonable amount of bag-

gage, by custom or the courtesy of the carrier, is considered as in-

cluded in the fare for the person; but courts ought not to per-

mit this gratuity or custom to be abused, and under pretense of

baggage to include articles not within the sense or meaning of

the term, or within the object or intent of the indulgence of the

carrier, and thereby defraud him of his just compensation, and

subject him to unknown and illimitable hazards. If the amount

of money in the trunk in this case is not fairly included under

the term baggage, as used in the connection we here find it (and

I cannot think it is), then the conduct of the agent was a virtual

conceabnent of that sum ; his representation of his trunk and the

contents as baggage, was not a fair one; and was calculated to

deceive the captain ; and it would be a violation of first principles

to permit the plaintiffs to recover. The case of Miles v. Cattle

et al., 19 Com. L. R. 219, in some respects resembles this case.
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The plaintiff was going to L., and took a seat in a public con-

veyance. He had with him a bag labeled "T. Miles, traveler,"

containing clothes worth about fifteen pounds. Before he started,

G. delivered hira a parcel containing a fifty-pound bank note,

addressed to an attorney in L., which the plaintiff was desired

to book at the defendants' office, and to be forwarded by the de-

fendants to L. The plaintiff, instead of doing so, put the parcel

in his own bag, intending to convey it to L. himself. If the

parcel had been sent by the defendants, it would have cost four

shillings and six pence. The bag and contents were lost. The

verdict was found for the fifteen pounds, with leave to apply to

increase it, on the facts in the case, by adding the fifty pounds.

The court denied the application, principally upon the ground

that the plaintiff had no interest in the fifty pounds. But it was

conceded by the court that the owner could not recover on the

facts. Tindale, J., says, in violation of his trust the plaintiff

thought proper not to deliver the parcel to the defendants, but

to deposit it in his own bag ; thereby depriving the owner of any

remedy he might have had against the defendants, and the de-

fendants of the sum they would otherwise have earned for the

carriage of the parcel. In this case the president of the bank

directed Phillips to commit the packages directed to the captain,

and had he followed such directions, the captain would have

been enabled to charge a reward for the carriage of the same,

and the captain, or the defendants, would have been responsible

for its safety. His omission to follow the directions was a viola-
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tion of liis trust, for which the defendants are not accountable.

It was decided in Sewall v. Allen et al., in the court of errors,

6 Wend. 335, that the Dutchess and Orange Steamboat Com-

pany, and the members thereof, were not liable for the loss of

packages of bank bills intrusted to the captain of the boat, on

the ground that the carriage of bank bills was not within the

ordinary business of the company, and so far as the usage ex-

tended, it was a personal trust committed to the captain, who

alone received the compensation, or in other words, the com-

pany were neither by their charter or usage under it, common

carriers of bank bills. From the facts appearing in that case,

I presume the principle here decided by the highest judicial

tribunal in the state, would be equally applicable to this com-

pany, though from the direction the cause took upon the trial,

facts sufficient do not appear to raise the question. If so, it

seems to me impossible to maintain the proposition that the

defendants would be holden responsible for the loss of an article

in the trunk of a passenger, which in no sense of the term can

be considered a part of the baggage of the passenger, and for
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the transportation of which no compensation is received by the

company, when confessedly they would not be accountable for

the same article, if it had been committed directly to the care of

the captain, and a reasonable reward paid him for transportation.

If it is said the difference between the cases consists in this, that

in the one case it is a part of the baggage of the passenger, the

carrying of which is within the ordinary business of the com-

pany, and for which they receive the reward, and in the other,

it is a private transaction between the owner and the captain;

the answer I think is, that putting the article in the trunk does

not make it baggage. If it is included within that term, it is as

much baggage when distinctly committed to the care of the

captain as when in the trunk ; the place in which it is cannot, in

this instance, at least, vary the character of the article or the

transaction ; the object is the transportation of the money, with-

out reference to a connection with the person of the passenger.

Having come to the conclusion upon what I view as the merits

and principle of the case, that the plaintiffs cannot recover, it is

unimportant to examine any other question discussed upon the

argument.

Motion for new trial denied.
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4. 94. EVANS V. FITCHBURG RAILROAD CO.,

Ill Mass. 142; 15 Am. B. 19. 1872.

Tort to recover for injuries to plaintiff's horse. He had

delivered two horses to defendant, and tied them in the car.

He offered to prove that one had been injured by kicks from

the other, and that both had previously been kind. The na-

ture of the charge and refusal to charge by the judge below

are sufficiently indicated in the opinion. Judgment for plaintiff.

Ames, J. According to the established rule as to the liability

of a common carrier, he is understood to guarantee that (with

the well-known exception of the act of God and of public ene-

mies) the goods entrusted to him shall seasonably reach their

destination, and that they shall receive no injury from the man-

ner in which their transportation is accomplished. But he is

not, necessarily and under all circumstances, responsible for the

condition in which they may be found upon their arrival. The

ordinary and natural decay of fruit, vegetables and other per-

ishable articles; the fermentation, evaporation or unavoidable

leakage of liquids; the spontaneous combustion of some kinds
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of goods; are matters to which the implied obligation of the

carrier, as an insurer, does not extend. Story on Bailments,

§§ 492 a, 576. He is liable for all accidents and mismanage-

ment incident to the transportation and to the means and ap-

pliances by which it is effected; but not for injuries produced

by, or resulting from, the inherent defects or essential qualities

of the articles which he undertakes to transport. The extent

of his duty in this respect is to take all reasonable care and uge

all proper precautions to prevent such injuries, or to diminish

their effect, as far as he can; but his liability, in such cases, is

by no means that of an insurer.

Upon receiving these horses for transportation, without any

special contract limiting their liability, the defendants incurred

the general obligation of common carriers. They thereby became

responsible for the safe treatment of the animals, from the mo-

ment they received them, until the carriages in which they were

conveyed were unloaded. Moffat v. Great Western Railway Co.,

15 Law T. (N. S.) 630. They would be unconditionally liable

for all injuries occasioned by the improper construction or un-

safe condition of the carriage in which the horses were con-

veyed, or by its improper position in the train, or by the want

of reasonable equipment, or by any mismanagement, or want

of due care, or by any other accident (not within the well-
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known exception) affecting either the train generally or that par-

ticular carriage. But the transportation of horses and other

domestic animals is not subject to precisely the same rules as

that of packages and inanimate chattels. Living animals have

excitabilities and volitions of their own which greatly increase

the risks and difRculties of management. They are carried in

a mode entirely opposed to their instincts and habits; they may

be made uncontrollable by fright, or notwithstanding every pre-

caution, may destroy themselves in attempting to break loose,

or may kill each other. If the injury in this case was produced

by the fright, restiveness, or viciousness of the animals, and if

the defendants exercised all proper care and foresight to pre-

vent it, it would be unreasonable to hold them responsible for

the loss. Clarke v. Rochester & Syracuse Railroad Co., 14 N.

Y. 570, 67 Am. Dec. 205. Thus it has been held that if horses

or other animals are transported by water, and in consequence

of a storm they break down the partition between them, and by

kicking each other some of them are killed, the carrier will not

be held responsible. Laurence v. Aberdein, 5 B. & Aid. 107;
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Story on Bailments, § 576 ; Angell on Carriers, 214 a. The car-

rier of cattle is not responsible for injuries resulting from their

viciousness of disposition, and the question what was the cause

of the injury is one of fact for the jury. Hall v. Renfro, 3

Mete. (Ky.) 51. And in a New York case, Conger v. Hudson

River Railroad Co., 6 Duer, 375, Mr. Justice Woodruff says,

in behalf of the court: "We are not able to perceive any rea-

son upon which the shrinkage of the plaintiff's cattle, their dis-

position to become restive, and their trampling upon each other

when some of them lie down from fatigue, is not to be deemed

an injury arising from the nature and inherent character of the

property carried, as truly as if the property had been of any de-

scription of perishable goods."

It appears to us, therefore, that the first instruction which the

defendants requested the court to give should have been given.

If the jury found that the defendants provided a suitable car,

and took all proper and reasonable precautions to prevent the

occurrence of such an accident, and that the damage was caused

by the kicking of one horse by another, the defendants were en-

titled to a verdict. That is to say, they might be held to great

vigilance, foresight and care ; but they were not absolutely liable

as insurers against injuries of that kind. As there was evidence

also tending to show that the halter was attached by the plaintiff

to the jaw of one of the horses in a manner which might cause

or increase restiveness and bad temper, and also evidence that

their shoes were not taken off, the defendants were entitled to
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the instruction that if the injuries were caused by the fault or

neglect of the plaintiff in these particulars, he could not recover.

This court has recently decided that for unavoidable injuries

done by cattle to themselves or each other, in their passage, the

common carrier is not liable. Smith v. New Haven & North-

ampton Railroad Co., 12 Allen, 531. This is another mode of

saying that a railroad corporation, in undertaking the transpor-

tation of cattle, does not insure their safety against injuries

occasioned by their viciousness and unruly conduct. Kendall

v. London & Southwestern Railroad Co., L. R. 7 Ex. 373. The

jury should therefore have been instructed that if the injury

happened in that way, and if the defendants exercised proper

care and foresight in placing and securing the horses while under

their charge, they are not to be held liable in this action. Upon

this point the burden of proof may be upon the defendants, but

they should have been permitted to go to the jury upon the ques-

tion whether there had been reasonable care on their part.

It appears to us also that the instruction actually given was not

a full equivalent for that which was requested and which, as we
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have seen, should have been given. It was not necessary to the

defense to show that the injury was caused in "an outburst of

viciousness." The proposition should have been stated much

more generally, and the jury should have been told that if from

fright, bad temper, viciousness, or any other cause without fault

on the part of the defendants, the horses became refractory and

unruly, and the kicking and injury were occasioned in that man-

ner, it was an unavoidable accident, for which the defendants

were not liable.

Exceptions sustained.

95. KANSAS PACIFIC RAILWAY CO. V. NICHOLS,

9 Kan. 235; 12 Am. E. 494. 1872.

Action for damages for cattle lost through negligence of the

carrier. Judgment for plaintiff.

Valentine, J. (After deciding an unimportant point of prac-

tice.) The main question in this case is, whether the railway

company, when it took the cattle of the plaintiff below for the

purpose of transporting them over its road, assumed the re-

sponsibilities of a common carrier or not. We think it did.

This question has already been decided in this court in the case

of The Kansas P. Railway Co. v. Reynolds, 8 Kan. 623. In the

case of Kimball v. The Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co., 26 Vt.
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247, 62 Am, D. 567, et seq., the court decided that "a railway-

company that transport cattle and live stock for hire, for such

persons as choose to employ them, thereby assume and take upon

themselves the relation of common carriers, and v/ith the re-

lation the duties and obligations which grow out of it ; and they

are none the less common carriers from the fact that the trans-

portation of cattle is not their principal business or employ-

ment." See also Welsh v. Pittsburg, Ft. Wayne & C. R. R. Co.,

10 Ohio St. 65, 75 Am. D. 490. In the case of the Great West-

ern Railway Co. v. Hawkins, 18 Mich. 427, 433, the supreme

court of Michigan use the following language: "The company

in this case must be regarded as common carriers, and liable

as such, except so far as that liability was qualified by the special

contract." The special contract just mentioned was a contract

to transport nineteen horses from Paris, Canada, to Detroit,

Michigan, and there is nothing in the contract or in the report

of the case that tends to show that the company held themselves

out as common carriers of live stock, or that they anywhere

agreed or admitted that they were such carriers, and they car-
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ried these horses under a special contract. See also the authori-

ties cited in the brief of defendants in error, and 2 Redf. on

Railways (4th ed.), 144, note 2, and cases there cited; Wilson

V. Hamilton, 4 Ohio St. 738; Sager v. Portsmouth R. R. Co., 31

Me. 228, 50 Am. D. 659 ; Clarke v. Rochester & Syracuse R. R.

Co., 14 N. Y. 570, 67 Am. D. 205 ; North Mo. R. R. Co. v. Akers,

4 Kan. 453, 96 Am. D. 183 ; Keeney v. The Grand Trunk Rail-

way Co., 59 Barb. 104; Welsh v. Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne & C. R.

R. Co., 10 Ohio St. 65, 75 Am. D. 490. It is claimed that a

different doctrine has recently been held in Michigan. Mich,

So. & North Ind. R. R. Co. v. McDonough, 21 Mich. 165, 4 Am.

R. 466. This is certainly true with respect to the railroad then

under consideration by the court ; but whether it is true with

regard to all railroads in the state of Michigan is not so certain.

See pages 189, 198 and 199 of the opinion, and the comments

of the court on the provisions of the charter of the Michigan

Southern Railroad Co., and the act consolidating it with the

Northern Indiana Railroad Company. But if this decision does

apply to all the railroads of Michigan as well as to the Michigan

Southern & Northern Indiana Railroad Company, under its

peculiar charter, does it in any manner indicate what the law

is in Kansas? We think not, or but very little at most. In

Michigan, since April, 1870, railroads have not been public

purposes, or public uses, in the sense that they are such in the

other states of the Union. In that state they are purely and

strictly private purposes or uses. People v. Salem, 20 Mich.
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452; 4 Am. Rep. 400. The supreme court of that state say,

that, "they (railroad companies) are public agents in the same

sense that the proprietors of many other kinds of private busi-

ness are, and not in any other or different sense." "Our policy

in that respect, ' ' say the court, ' ' has changed ; railroads are no

longer public works, but are private property." Eailroads are

private, according to that decision, in the same sense that the

different kinds of business of hackmen, draymen, proprietors of

stage coaches, merchants, newspaper proprietors, physicians,

manufacturers, mechanics, hotel-keepers, millers, etc., are pri-

vate. Railroads in IMichigan seem from that decision to be such

private corporations as are described in the case of Leavenworth

Co. V. Miller, 7 Kan. 534, 535. If they are such private corpora-

tions as there described, of course they have a right to be com-

mon carriers of just such property as they choose, no more and

no less. This is not so in Kansas. The railroads of Kansas are

organized upon a different basis. In Kansas they are endowed

with a kind of quasi public as well as private character. In

Kansas they are so far public that the sovereign power of emi-
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nent domain may be exercised for their benefit, and they are so

far public that other public aid may be extended to them. It

is believed that no railroad has yet been built in Kansas that has

not been aided both by the exercise of the power of eminent do-

main, and by other public aid, such as lands and county or muni-

cipal bonds. Railroads are public purposes in no sense except

in the sense of being common carriers of freight and passengers.

It is true that there are incidental public benefits arising from

the creation and operation of railroads, such as the increase in

the value of property along their routes, the increase of the

public revenues, etc., but these are only incidental benefits, and

are not at all what make railroads public purposes. And this

public character of railroads is stamped upon them at their very

creation. It is stamped upon them by. the sovereign power where

it authorizes their coming into existence ; for otherwise they could

receive no public aid until the roads should be constructed and

in operation, and until the roads should become public purposes

by virtue of becoming common carriers of freight or passengers.

And if they were created absolutely private corporations they

could become common carriers only by holding themselves out

as such, and by actually carrying freight or passengers. We

suppose it will not be contended that any kind of public

aid could be extended to a purely private corporation. If a

railroad company is created as a private carrier, and not as a

public or common carrier, we suppose that no one will contend

that the sovereign power of eminent domain could be exercised
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for its benefit in its construction, or that any public aid of any

kind whatever could be extended to it. That railroads are created

common carriers of some kind, we believe, is the universal doc-

trine of all the courts. The main question is always, whether

they are common carriers of the particular thing then under

consideration? The question in this case is, whether they are

common carriers of cattle ? So far as our statutes are concerned

no distinction is made between the carrying of cattle and that of

any other kind of property. Under our statutes a railroad may

as well be a common carrier of cattle as of goods, wares and

merchandise, or of any other kind of property. Now, as no dis-

tinction has been made by statute between the carrying of

the different kinds of property, we would infer that railroads

were created for the purpose of being common carriers of all

kinds of property which the wants or needs of the public require

to be carried, and which can be carried by the railroads; and

particularly we would infer that railroads were created for the

purpose of being common carriers of cattle. As Kansas, and

all the surrounding states and territories, with their boundless
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prairies and nutritious grasses, are destined to be great stock-

growing countries, it can scarcely be supposed that the legisla-

ture, in providing common carriers for the property of the

public, should have omitted to provide for one of the most im-

portant kinds of property, a vast source of unbounded wealth.

We have no navigable streams within the boundaries of Kansas

upon which to transport cattle, and hence they must be trans-

ported by railroad, if transported by any means except by driv-

ing them on foot.

It is claimed, however, that "the transportation of cattle and

live stock by common carriers by land was unknown to the com-

mon law. ' ' Suppose it was ; what does that prove ? The trans-

portation of thousands of other kinds of property, either by land

or water, was unknown to the common law, and yet such kinds

of property are now carried by common carriers, and by rail-

roads every day. We get our common law from England. It

was brought over by our ancestors at the earliest settlement of

this country. It dates back to the fourth year of the reign of

James the First, or 1607, when the first English settlement was

founded in this country at Jamestown, Virginia. The body of

the laws of England, as they then existed, now constitute our

common law. It is so fixed by statute in this state (Comp. Laws,

678; Gf^n. Stat. 1127, § 3), and is generally so fixed by statute

or by judicial decisions in the other states. The reason why

cattle and live stock were not transported hy land by common

carriers at common law, was because no common carrier, at the
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time our common law was formed, had any convenient means

for such transportation. Among the other kinds of property

not transported by common carriers, either by land or water,

at the time our common law was formed, are the following:

Reapers, mowers, wheat drills, corn planters, cultivators, thresh-

ing machines, corn shellers, gypsum, guano, Indian corn, pota-

toes, tobacco, stoves, steam engines, sewing machines, washing

machines, pianos, reed organs, fire and burglar-proof safes, etc. ;

and yet no one would now contend that railroads are not com-

mon carriers of these kinds of articles. At common law the

character of the carrier was never determined by the kind of

property that he carried. He might have been a private or spe-

cial carrier of goods, wares and merchandise, or of any other

kind of property, or he might have been a public or common car-

rier of cattle, live stock or any other kind of property, just as

he chose. All personal property was subject to be carried by

a common carrier, and no personal property was exempt.

"Whether a person was a common carrier depended wholly upon

whether he held himself out to the world as such, and not upon
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the kind of property that he carried. A common carrier was

such as undertook, ''generally, and not as a casual occupation,

and for all people indifferently, to convey goods and deliver

them at a place appointed, for hire, as a business, and with or

without a special agreement as to price." 2 Kent's Com. 598.

And he could hold himself out as a common carrier by engag-

ing in the business generally, or by announcing or proclaiming

it to the world by the issuing of cards, circulars, advertisements,

etc., or by any other means that would let the public know that

he intended to be a common or general carrier for the public.

Eailroads hold themselves out as common carriers by an act

irrevocable on their part in their very creation and organiza-

tion. The very nature of their business is such that by en-

gaging in it, or offering to engage in it, they hold themselves

out as common carriers. But let us return to the point more

especially under consideration. At common law no person was

a common carrier of any article unless he chose to be, and un-

less he held himself out as such; and he was a common carrier

of just such articles as he chose to be, and no others. If he held

himself out as a common carrier of silks and laces, the common

law would not compel him to be a common carrier of agricul-

tural implements, such as plows, harrows, etc.; if he held him-

self out as a common carrier of confectionery and spicfe, the

common law would not compel him to be a common carrier of

bacon, lard, and molasses. Tunnel v. Pettijohn, 2 Harrington

(Del.), 48. And it seems to us clear beyond all doubt, that if

362

KAN. PAC. EY. CO. v. NICHOLS. § 95

any person had in England, prior to the year 1607, held himself

out as a common carrier of cattle and live stock by land, the

common law would have made him such. If so, where is the

valid distinction that is attempted to be made between the carry-

ing of live stock and the carrying of any other kind of personal

property? The common law never declared that certain kinds

of property only could be carried by common carriers, but it

permitted all kinds of personal property to be so carried. At

common law any person could be a common carrier of all kinds,

or any kind, and of just such kinds of personal property as he

chose, no more, no less. Of course, it is well known that at the time

when our common law had its origin, that is, prior to the year

1607, railroads had no existence. But when they came into ex-

istence it must be admitted that they would be governed by the

same rules, so far as applicable, which govern other carriers of

property. Therefore it must be admitted :;hat railroads might

be created for the purpose of carrying one kind of property

only, or for carrying many kinds, or for carrying all kinds of

property which can be carried by railroads, including cattle,
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live stock, etc. In this state it must be presumed that they were

created for the purpose of carrying all kinds of personal prop-

erty. It can hardly be supposed that they were created simply

for the purpose of being carriers of such articles only as were

carried by common carriers under the common law prior to the

year 1607 ; for if such were the case they would be carriers of

but very few of the innumerable articles that are now actually

carried by railroad companies. And it can hardly be supposed

that they were created for the mere purpose of taking the place

of pack-horses, or clumsy wagons, often drawn by oxen, or such

other primitive means of carriage and transportation as were

used in England prior to that year. Railroads are undoubtedly

created for the purpose of carrying all kinds of property which

the common law would have permitted to be carried by common

carriers in any mode, either by land or water, which probably

includes all kinds of personal property. Our decision, then,

upon this question is, that whenever a railroad company receive

cattle or live stock to be transported over their road from one

place to another, such company assume all the responsibilities

of a common carrier, except so far as such responsibilities may

be modified by special contract.

(The court then considered an instruction as to the damages,

and reversed the judgment for error therein.)
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96. In Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad

Co. V. McDonough, 21 Mich. 165, 4 Am. R. 466 (1870), it was

said by Christiancy, J., in delivering the opinion of the court :

"As the plaintiffs did not seek to prove an express contract in

support of their declaration, it devolved upon them to prove the

delivery of the property to the company and their acceptance

of it, under circumstances from which the law implies the con-

tract declared upon; and this could only be done by showing

that the company received the property as common carriers, that

is to say, under circumstances which made it their duty to take

care of the property in its transportation and delivery, and to

protect it from all injury and loss not occasioned by the act of

God or of the public enemy — or at least, from all loss or injury

which, in this mode of transporting this kind of property,

might be avoided by human agency. It is unnecessary to dis-

cuss the question of proof upon any other feature of the con-

tract alleged, since, if proved in all other respects, but not in

this, the contract alleged, being an entire thing, is not proved.

For the purpose of this case it may be assumed that this com-
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pany, by their charter and act of consolidation, are required to

take upon themselves the business of common carriers, and to

transport, as such, all such property tendered to them for that

purpose as was usually transported by railroads, as common car-

riers, at the date of the charter of the Michigan Southern

Railroad Company in 1846, and any other kind of property

which, in the progress of invention and business, might be ten-

dered for such carriage, which should not, from its nature, im-

pose risks of a different character, or require an essentially dif-

ferent mode of managing their road, or the incurring of extra

expenses on account of the different character of such new kinds

of property.

But the transportation of cattle and live stock by common car-

riers by land was unknown to the common law, when the duties

and responsibilities of common carriers were fixed, making them

insurers against all losses and injuries not arising from the act

of God or of the public enemies. These responsibilities and

duties ivere fixed with reference to kinds of property involving,

in their transportation, much fewer risks and of quite a different

kind, from those which are incident to the transportation of

live stock by railroad. Animals have wants of their own to be

supplied ; and this is a mode of conveyance at which, from their

nature and habits, most animals instinctively revolt; and cat-

tle especially, crowded in a dense mass, frightened by the noise

of the engine, the rattling, jolting, and frequent concussions of
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the cars, in their frenzy injure each other by trampling, plung-

ing, goring or throwing down; and frequently, on long routes,

their strength exhausted by hunger and thirst, fatigue and

fright, the weak easily fall and are trampled upon, and unless

helped up, must soon die. Hogs also swelter and perish. See

per Parke, B., in Carr v. Lancashire & York Railway Co., 7

Exch. 712, 713; Denio, J., in Clarke v. Rochester & S. Railway

Co., 14 N. Y. 573, 67 Am. D. 205. It is a mode of transportation

which, but for its necessity, would be gross cruelty and indict-

able as such. The risk may be greatly lessened by care and

vigilance, by feeding and watering at proper intervals, by get-

ting up those that are down, and otherwise. But this imposes

a degree of care and an amount of labor so different from what

is required in reference to other kinds of property, that I do not

think this kind of property falls within the reasons upon which

the common law liability of common carriers was fixed. . . .

Unless, therefore, there be something in the defendant's

charter, or the act of consolidation, or some other statute ap-

plicable to the case — a question I shall hereafter consider — the
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company were not bound to receive or transport cattle or hogs,

as common carriers, but they might legally refuse to carry

them in that or any other capacity."

^ 97. HINKLE V. SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO.,

126 N. C. 932; 36 8. E. B. 348; 78 Am. St. B. 685. 1900.

Action to recover damages due to delay in shipment of a car-

load of cattle. The cattle were injured, had to be fed en route

and missed the Saturday market. The contract on the bill of

lading provided against liability for all injuries not caused by

the fraud or gross negligence of the railroad company, and

required the shipper to give written notice of any loss. Judg-

ment for plaintiff in the sum of $225.00.

Douglas, J. This case was submitted to us on printed briefs

for the plaintiffs, but was argued in behalf of the defendant

both orally and by brief. It is perhaps proper to say that almost

the entire brief of the defendant was devoted to proving a

proposition that we have no disposition to deny, that is, that a

common carrier can, by special contract, reasonably limit its

common-law liability. But we cannot admit the assumed corol-

lary that thereby it ceases to be a common carrier, or ipso facto
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reverses the legal burden of proof. It is well established that

where the negligence of the defendant is the primary cause of

action, it must be alleged and proved by the plaintiff ; but here,

it is merely incidental to the cause of action; in fact, it arises

as a matter of defense. We must not lose sight of the real

cause of action, which is the injury resulting from the failure

of the defendant to seasonably transport and safely deliver live

stock received by it as a common carrier. The plaintiff's case

is fully made out when he has shown that the cattle were re-

ceived by the carrier, and not seasonably and safely delivered — •

that is, not delivered at all, or delivered in a damaged condition,

and after an unreasonable delay. The burden is then upon the

defendant, and if it wishes to escape any part of its common-law

liability by showing a special contract, it must affirmatively

prove such contract, and bring the injury clearly within the

terms of it exemptions. These principles have been so recently

and so fully discussed by this court in Mitchell v. Carolina Cent.

R. R. Co., 124 N. C. 236, 32 S. E. R. 671, that any further

elaboration seems nee.dless, at least for the present. The essen-
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tial principle is tersely and strongly stated by Chief Justice

Faircloth in Morganton Mfg. Co. v. Ohio River, etc., Ry. Co.,

121 N. C. 514, 28 S. E. R. 474, 61 Am. St. R. 679, where, speak-

ing for a unanimous court, he says: "Among connecting lines

of common carriers, that one in whose hands goods are found

damaged, is presumed to have caused the damage, and the bur-

den is upon it to rebut the presumption."

The rule is well stated in Greenleaf on Evidence, fourteenth

edition, section 219, in the following language: "And if the

acceptance was special, the burden of proof is still on the carrier

to show, not only that the cause of loss was within the terms of

the exception but also that there was on his part no negligence

or want of due care." ^

That this rule, which at first was seriously questioned, is re-

ceiving almost general acceptance, would appear from the recent

work of Elliot on Railroads, where the authors say in section

1548, on page 2403 : * ' There is some conflict among the authori-

ties as to the burden of proof in such cases; but the prevailing

rule where the owner or his agent does not go with the stock is,

that when the animals are shown to have been delivered to the

carrier in good condition and to have been lost or injured on

the way, the burden of proof then rests upon the carrier to

show that the loss or injury was not caused by its own negli-

gence. ' ' This rule, which is the natural result of the prima facie

liability of the common carrier, is further strengthened by the

universal acceptance of the principal that where a particular
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fact, necessary to be proved, rests peculiarly within the knowl-

edge of a party, upon him rests the burden of proof: 5 Am. &

Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed,, 41; Best on Evidence, sec. 274;

1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 79 ; Starkie on Evidence, sec. 589 ;

Rice on Evidence, sec. 77 ; Selma, etc. R. R. Co. v. United States,

139 U. S. 560, 567, 11 S. Ct. R. 638 ; State v. McDuffie, 107 N.

C. 885, 888, 12 S. E. R. 83 ; Govan v. Gushing, 111 N. G. 458,

461, 16 S. E. R. 619 ; Mitchell v. Carolina Cent. R. R. Co., 124

N. G. 236, 32 S. E. R. 671. Some of the earlier cases appear

to take the view that a common carrier ceases to be such when

it makes a special contract and becomes a private carrier for

hire. Whatever foundation may have existed for such an idea

in the earlier days of the law, when common carriers were pri-

vate individuals and carried their shipments in wagons or boats

on the ordinary public highway, without receiving or asking any

special privileges, has long since disappeared. A railroad com-

pany is at least a quasi public corporation, exercising one of the

highest prerogatives of the sovereign — that of eminent domain.

It is purely a creature of the law, and has no existence outside
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of its public capacity. It is a common carrier by virtue of its

charter, and not by any supposed usage or contract with the

shipper. Its character as such is fixed by its contract with the

state, and cannot be waived either by the corporation or the

shipper. It may limit its liability to a certain extent by special

contract, but cannot change its character. All such contracts

of limitation, being in derogation of common law, are strictly

construed, and never enforced unless shown to be reasonable :

Any doubt or ambiguity therein is to be resolved in favor of the

shipper, and it has further been held that the burden of

proof rested upon the carrier of showing that all such stip-

ulations and exemptions were reasonabl-e: Campania etc. La

Flecha v. Brauer, 168 U. S. 104, 118, 18 S. Gt. R. 12; 4 Elliott

on Railroads, sec. 1424; Cox v. Central etc. R. R. Co., 170

Mass. 129, 49 N. E. R. 97, 9 Am. & Eng. R. R. Gases,

N. S. 591, 600 ; Texas etc. Ry. Go. v. Reeves, 15 Tex. Civ. App.

157, 39 S. W. R. 135, 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Gases, N. S. 429;

5 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 326. Stipulations in a bill

of lading are similar in their nature to conditions in a policy

of insurance. It is^ well settled by the highest authority that

if a policy is so drawn as to require interpretation and to be

fairly susceptible of two different constructions, the one will

be adopted that is most favorable to the insured, and against

the construction which would limit the liability of the insurer:

Imperial Fire Ins. Go. v. Coos Co., 151 U. S. 452, 14 S. Gt.

367

§ 97 EIGHTS ANJ) DUTIES OF COMMON CAEKIEE.

R. 379; London Assur. Assn. v. Companhia de Moagens do

Barreiro, 167 U. S. 149, 17 S. Ct. R. 785.

In the case at bar it does not appear necessary for the plain-

tiff to resort to the burden of proof, as the unreasonable deten-

tion is in itself evidence of negligence. It appears from the evi-

dence that the cattle were four days and three nights, that is,

eighty-four hours, in reaching their destination, a distance of

four hundred miles. At the present day the transportation of

live stock over a great trunk line of railway at an average rate

of less than five miles an hour cannot be considered reasonable

diligence, in the total absence of explanation.

The only remaining question is whether the failure of the

plaintiff to give formal written notice of his loss or intention

to demand compensation is an absolute bar to his recovery, if

otherwise entitled. We think not. The object of such a stipu-

lation is not to relieve the carrier from its just liability, for

such a purpose would be clearly unlawful, but simply to give

it such notice as will enable it by proper investigation to protect

itself against unjust claims. It is not denied that the plaintiff
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signed the receipt for the cattle under protest. These words

written upon the receipt would be ample notice to the defendant

that the plaintiff' intended to enforce his rights. The meaning

of those words is too well known in the business world to be

capable of misconstruction. In the present instance they clearly

meant that the plaintiff objected to receiving the cattle in their

damaged condition, but did so under compulsion of circum-

stances to prevent still further loss, but at the same time retain-

ing all his rights of action against the defendant. If the de-

fendant's agent had desired any more specific notice or infor-

mation, he might have asked for it after having been put upon

notice, but this he did not see fit to do. Even if the protest had

been merely verbal and not in writing, the stipulation might well

have been deemed to have been waived under the circumstances.

It appears from the uncontradicted testimony that the plaintiff

suffered the injury and gave actual notice to the defendant of

his claim for damages. We do not see why he cannot recover.

Any other construction would convert what, properly construed,

is a reasonable stipulation for the proper protection of the car-

rier into an instrument of fraud and a shield of wrong. This

is so clearly explained by Justice Furches, speaking for the

court, in Wood v. Southern Ry. Co., 118 N. C. 1056, 1063, 24 S.

E. R. 704, as to require no further comment. Judgment of the

court below is affirmed.
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98. BENNETT V. BYRAM & CO.,

38 Miss. 17; 75 Am. D. 90. 1859.

By Court, Harris, J. The defendants in error brought their

action in the circuit court against the plaintiff in error, to re-

cover damages against him as a common carrier by steamboat,

for the non-delivery of goods according to contract.

The defendant filed his answer, a general denial of the state-

ment of the cause of action in the complaint; upon which issue

was joined, and the jury found a verdict for plaintiff.

It is assigned for error that the jury found contrary to law

and evidence; that the court erred in giving the charges asked

by plaintiff below, and in refusing charges asked by the de-

fendant below; and lastly, that the court erred in refusing to

grant a new trial.

It appears by the record that on the fourth day of June, 1855,

the plaintiff in error, as master of the Eliza No. 2, a steam-

boat navigating the Tombigbee river between Mobile and Aber-

deen, by bill of lading of that date, contracted to deliver certain

goods as a carrier to the defendants in error.
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The boat proceeded on her way as far as Gainesville, and was

unable to proceed farther on account of the low stage of water.

The goods were stored in the warehouse of McMahon in June,

1855; the water remaining too low for steamboat navigation

for several months thereafter.

On the twenty-first of August, 1855, defendants in error sent

an order to McMahon for all the goods except the iron, and re-

ceived and hauled them to Aberdeen. And afterwards, in Jan-

uary, 1856, the iron was shipped to plaintiffs by the steamboat

Champion. In this action, it is sought to recover all the ex-

penses which defendants in error incurred after receiving the

goods at Gainesville, and indeed after they were left there by

the plaintiff in error, as well as a small amount of damage sus-

tained by the rusting of the iron. It is not claimed that any

other damage was suffered.

There is no proof of damage by negligence or other improper

conduct on the part of plaintiff in error, unless his failure to

reach Aberdeen with the goods intrusted to his care is to be so

regarded. We lay out of view all that is said in this record and

in argument as to the alteration of the bill of lading, and the

circumstances under which the bill was signed, as wholly imma-

terial in this case. The addition of the words ''water permit-

ting" did not change the character of the contract, as they are
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embraced under the general exception, "the act of God:" See

Angell on Carriers, sees. 289, 333, and note 2.

The first question for our determination upon the record be-

fore us, which it is material to consider, is what was the obliga-

tion of the plaintiff in error under this contract as a common

carrier.

Admitting that this bill of lading was intended as a contract

to deliver the goods to the defendants in error at Aberdeen

(which seems not to have been expressed on its face), the car-

rier was bound first to proceed without deviation from the usual

and ordinary course to the place of delivery. He was next

bound to deliver the goods to the consignees in safety at all

events, excepting the act of God, the public enemies, and the

act or conduct of the owners. He was bound to make delivery

in a reasonable time and with reasonable expedition, as no time

of delivery is specified in the contract. For, says Mr. Angell,

in his work on carriers, sec. 283, the duty to deliver, within a

reasonable time, is a term ingrafted by legal implication upon a

promise or duty to carry generally. See also Hand v. Baynes,
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4 Whart. 204, 33 Am. Dec. 54, cited in note, and numerous

other cases cited. "What would be reasonable time must be de-

termined, under all the circumstances, with a view to the condi-

tion of the river, the season of the year, the state of the

weather," etc.: See Angell on Carriers, sec. 289, and notes p.

288; Hadley v. Clarke, 8 T. R. 259; Story on Bailments, sec.

545 a.

Again: the obligation of the carrier to deliver according to

his contract is only suspended during any temporary obstruc-

tion. It is not thereby avoided: Angell on Carriers, sec. 289,

and cases cited. Hence, plaintiff in error was bound, notwith-

standing the hinderance of navigation by low water, to deliver

defendant's goods in safety as soon as he could by reasonable

diligence after the removal of the unavoidable cause of delay:

See also Id., sec. 294.

From the obligation to deliver, at all events, the carrier may^

under certain circumstances, be excused. And among these,

the same learned author mentions the following: "If the owner

or shipper is induced from any cause to accept the goods short

of the place to which they were first intended to be conveyed,

the carrier is not only discharged from liability further, but is

entitled to a 'pro rata compensation for the transportation as far

as it has been continued:" Angell on Carriers, p. 330, sec. 331.

The acceptance of the ^oods voluntarily from the warehouse-

man, knowing tfiat the voyage had been abandoned on account

of the low water, and paying these charges for storage, will ex-
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euse delivery, and discharge the carrier from further liability

therefor: See Rossiter v. Chester, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 154; Parsons

V. Hardy, 14 Wend. 215, 28 Am. Dec. 521 ; Hunt v. Haskell, 24

Me. 339, 41 Am. Dec. 387 ; Lorent v. Kentring, 1 Nott & M. 132.

In the ease before us, the proof is clear, by the testimony

of the parties themselves, that they did accept the goods at

Gainesville, paid the freight and storage, and hauled the goods

to Aberdeen — all except the iron — long before the plaintiff in

error could have complied with his contract, or was bound to

have made delivery under the facts in proof. By this accept-

ance, we have seen that the plaintiff in error was discharged from

all subsequent liability or responsibility on account of his con-

tract. Until the goods were so accepted, the carrier was en-

titled to no compensation before delivery, and was bound for

all charges and expenses incurred in the preservation of the

goods, and all damage or injury impairing their value while in

his possession. After acceptance, he was only entitled to his

pro rata share of the freight. If he received more than the usual

freight from Mobile to Gainesville, he is liable to the defendants
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in error for such overplus, if they have been compelled to pay

it, or have paid it to him or to his agents or factors, in order

to obtain their goods.

After acceptance of the goods at Gainesville by the owners,

the carrier was not bound for the expenses of transportation

from thence to Aberdeen.

In view of the case here presented, the fourth, fifth, sixth,

seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth instructions were erroneous,

and the verdict of the jury for a greater sum than the testimony

warranted under the principles above stated.

Let the judgment be reversed, cause remanded, and a venire

de novo awarded.

99. GEISMER V. LAKE SHORE AND MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO.,

102 N. Y. 563; 7 N. E. R. 828; 55 Am. R. 837. 1886.

Action for delay in transporting live stock. Judgment for

plaintiff.

Earl, J. We are of opinion that the learned trial judge fell

into error as to rules of law of vital and controlling importance

in the disposition of this cause.

A railroad carrier stands upon the same footing as other
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carriers, and may excuse delay in the delivery of goods by acci-

dent or misfortune not inevitable or produced by the act of

God. All that can be required of it in any emergency is that

it shall exercise due care and diligence to guard against delay

and to forward the goods to their destination; and so it has

been uniformly decided. Wibert v. N. Y. & Erie Railroad Co.,

12 N. Y. 245; Blackstock v. N. Y. & Erie Railroad Co., 20 N.

Y., 48, 75 Am. Dec. 372.

In the absence of special contract there is no absolute duty

resting upon a railroad carrier to deliver the goods entrusted to

it within what, under ordinary circumstances, would be a rea-

sonable time. Not only storms and floods and other natural

causes may excuse delay, but the conduct of men may also do

so. An incendiary may burn down a bridge, a mob may tear

up the tracks or disable the rolling stock or interpose irresisti-

ble force or overpowering intimidation, and the only duty rest-

ing upon the carrier, not otherwise in fault, is to use reasonable

efforts and due diligence to overcome the obstacles thus inter-

posed, and to forward the goods to their destination.
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While the court below conceded this to be the general rule,

it did not give the defendant the benefit of it because it held

that the men engaged in the violent and riotous resistance to the

defendant were its employees for whose conduct it was responsi-

ble, and in that holding was the fundamental error committed

by it. It is true that these men had been in the employment

of the defendant. But they left and abandoned that employ-

ment. They ceased to be in its service or in any sense its agents,

for whose conduct it was responsible. They not only refused

to obey its orders or to render it any service, but they wilfully

arrayed themselves in positive hostility against it, and intimi-

dated and defeated the efforts of employees who were willing to

serve it. They became a mob of vicious law breakers to be

dealt with by the government, whose duty it was, by the use

of adequate force, to restore order, enforce proper respect for

private property and private rights and obedience to law. If

they had burned down bridges, torn up tracks, or gone into pas-

senger cars and assaulted passengers, upon what principle

could it be held that as to such acts they were the employees

of the defendant for whom it was responsible? If they had

sued the defendant for wages for the eleven days when they

were thus engaged in blocking its business, no one will claim

that they could have recovered.

It matters not, if it be true, that the strike was conceived

and organized while the strikers were in the employment of

the defendant. In doing that they were not in its service or
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seeking to promote its interests or to discharge any duty they

owed it ; but they were engaged in a matter entirely outside of

their employment and seeking their own ends and not the inter-

ests of the defendant. The mischief did not come from the

strike — from the refusal of the employees to work, but from

their violent and unlawful conduct after they had abandoned

the service of the defendant.

Here upon the facts, which we must assume to be true, there

was no default on the part of the defendant. It had employees

who were ready and willing to manage its train and carry for-

ward the stock, and thus perform its contract and discharge its

duty; but they were prevented by mob violence which the de-

fendant could not by reasonable efforts overcome. That under

such circumstances the delay was excused has been held in sev-

eral cases quite analogous to this which are entitled to much

respect as authorities. Pittsburgh & C. R. Co. v. Hazen, 84 111.

36, 25 Am. Rep. 422; Pittsburg, C. W. St. L. R. Co. v. Hol-

lowell, 65 Ind. 188, 32 Am. Rep. 63; Bennett v. Lake Shore,

etc., R. Co., 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 391; I. & W. L. R. Co. v.
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Juntgen, 10 Bradwell (111. App.), 295.

The cases of Weed v. Panama R. Co., 17 N. Y. 362, 72 Am.

Dec. 474, and Blackstock v. N. Y. & Erie R. Co., 1 Bosw.

77; affirmed, 20 N. Y. 48, 75 Am. Dec. 372, do not sustain

the plaintiff's contention here. If in this ease the employees of

the defendant had simply refused to discharge their duties,

or to work, or had suddenly abandoned its service, offering no

violence, and causing no forcible obstruction to its business

those authorities could have been cited for the maintenance of

an action upon principles stated in the opinions in those cases.

We are therefore of opinion that this judgment should be

reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide event.

All concur.

Judgment reversed.
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CHAPTER XII.

^IB. LIABILITY UNDER SPECIAL CONTRACT.

Ms' 7' 100. HOLLISTER V. NOWLEN,

19 Wend. (N. Y.) 234; 32 Am. D. 455. 1838.

Action against the proprietors of a stage-coach as common

.carriers for the loss of a trnnk which had been strapped in the

hoot of the stage. Three miles out it was discovered that the

Entraps had been cut and the trunk stolen. Notices that baggage

was carried at the risk of the owner were posted in the stage

office and in other public places.

By Court, Bronson, J. Stage-coach proprietors, and other

carriers by land and water, incur a very different responsibility

in relation to the passenger and his baggage. For an injury to

the passenger, ±hey are answerable only where there has been a

want of proper care, diligence, or skill; but in relation to bag-

gage they are regarded as insurers, and must answer for any loss

not occasioned by inevitable accident, or the public enemies.

As the point, though made, was not discussed by the defendant's

counsel, I shall content myself with referring to a few cases to

prove that they are liable, as common carriers, for the loss or
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injury of the property of the passenger: Orange Co. Bank v.

Brown, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 85, 24 Am. D. 129; Camden Company

V. Burke, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 611, 28 Am. D. 488; Brooke v.

Pickwick, 4 Bing. 218; 4 Esp. 177; 2 Kent, 601. The fact that

the owner is present, or sends his servant to look after the prop-

erty, does not alter the case : Robinson v. Dunmore, 2 Bos. &

Pul. 418. Chambre, J., said: "It has been determined, that if

a man travel in a stage-coach and take his portmanteau with him,

though he has his eye upon the portmanteau, yet the carrier is

not absolved from his responsibility, but will be liable if the

portmanteau be lost." The liability of a carrier is like that of

an inn-keeper; and it was said in Cayle's Case, 8 Co. 63, that "it

is no excuse for the inn-keeper to say that he delivered the guest

the key of the chamber in which he lodged, and that he left the

door open; but he ought to keep the goods and chattels of his

guest there in safety. ' ' When there is no fraud, the fact that

the owner accompanies the property, can not affect the prin-

ciple on which the carrier is charged^in_case of loss.
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The principal question in the cause arises out of the notice

given by the coach proprietors, that baggage carried by the Tele-

graph line would be at the risk of the owner; and the first in-

quiry is, whether there was sufficient evidence to charge the

plaintifi" with a knowledge of the notice. If we are to follow the

current of modern English decisions on this subject, it cannot be

denied that there was evidence to be left to a jury, and upon

which they might find that the plaintiff had seen the notice.

But I think the carrier, if he can by any means restrict his lia-

bility, can only do so by proving actual notice to the owner of the

property. I agree to the rule laid down by Best, C. J., in Brooke

V. Pickwick, 4 Bing. 218, decided in 1827, when the courts of

Westminster hall had commenced retracing their steps in re-

lation to the liability of carriers, and were endeavoring to

get back on the firm foundation of the common law. He said:

"If coach proprietors wish honestly to limit their responsibility,

they ought to announce their terms to every individual who

applies at their office, and at the same time to place in his

hands a printed paper, specifying the precise extent of their
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engagement. If they omit to do this, they attract customers un-

der the confidence inspired by the extensive liability which the

common law imposes upon carriers, and then endeavor to elude

that liability by some limitation which they have not been at

the pains to make known to the individual who has trusted

them. ' '

I should be content to place my opinion upon the single

ground, that if a notice can be of avail, it must be directly

brought home to the owner of the property ; and that there was

no evidence in this case which could properly be submitted to a

jury to draw the inference that the plaintiff knew on what

terms the coach proprietor intended to transact his business.

But other questions have been discussed; and there is another

case before the court where the judge at the circuit thought

the evidence sufficient to charge the plaintiff with notice. It

will therefore be proper to consider the other questions which

have been made by the counsel.

Can a common carrier restrict his liability by a general no-

tice, in any form, brought home to the opposite party ? Without

intending to go much at large into this vexed question, it will be

necessary to state some leading principles relating to the duties

and liabilities of the carrier, and the ground upon which his re-

sponsibility rests. The rules of the common law in relation

to common carriers are simple, well defined, and what is no less

important, well understood. The carrier is liable for all losses

except those occasioned by the act of God or the public ene-
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mies. He is regarded as an insurer of the property committed

to his charge, and neither destruction by fire, nor robbery by

armed men, will discharge him from liability. Holt, C. J., in

pronouncing his celebrated judgment in the case of Coggs v.

Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 918, said: "This is a politic establish-

ment, contrived by the policy' of the law, for the safety of all

persons, the necessity of whose affairs obliges them to trust these

sorts of persons, that they may be safe in their ways of deal-

ing. ' ' In Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R. 27, where the carrier was

held liable for a loss by fire. Lord Mansfield said, that "to pre-

vent litigation, collusion, and the necessity of going into cir-

cumstances impossible to be unraveled, the law presumes against

the carrier, unless he shows it was done by the king's enemies,

or by such act as could not happen by the intervention of man, as

storms, lightnings, and tempests." And in relation to a loss by

robbery he said : "The true reason is, for fear it may give room

for collusion, that the master may contrive to be robbed on pur-

pose, and share the spoil." The rule has been fully recognized

in this state: Colt v. McMechen, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 160, 5 Am.
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D. 200; Elliot V. Rossell, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 1, 6 Am. D. 306;

Kemp V. Coughtry, 11 Id. 107. In Roberts v. Turner, 12 Johns.

(N. Y.) 232, 7 Am. D. 311, Spencer, J., said, the carrier, "is

held responsible as an insurer of the goods, to prevent combi-

nations, chicanery, and fraud."

A common carrier exercises a public employment, and conse-

quently has public duties to perform. He cannot, like the

tradesman or mechanic, receive or reject a customer at pleasure,

or charge any price that he chooses to demand. If he refuse to

receive a passenger or carry goods according to the course of his

particular employment, without a sufficient excuse, he will be

liable to an action ; and he can only demand a reasonable com-

pensation for his services, and the hazard which he incurs : 2 Ld.

Raym. 917; Bac. Abr., Carriers B, Skin. 279; 1 Salk. 249,

250 ; 5 Bing. 217 ; 3 Taunt. 272, per Lawrence, J. ; 2 Kent. 599 ;

Story on Bail. 328; Jeremy on Carriers, 59.

It has been said that the carrier is liable in respect of his

reward: Lane v. Cotton, 1 Salk. 143. Lord Coke says, "he hath

his hire, and thereby implicitly undertaketh the safe delivery of

the goods delivered to him:" Co. Lit. 89 a. The carrier may

no doubt demand a reward proportioned to the services he ren-

ders and the risk he incurs; and having taken it, he is treated

as an insurer, and bound to the safe delivery of the property.

But the extent of his liability does not depend on the terms of

his contract : it is declared by law. His undertaking, when re-

duced to form, does not differ from that of any other person
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who may agree to cany goods from one place to another; and

yet, one who does not usually exercise this public employment,

will incur no responsibility beyona that of an ordinary bailee

for hire; he is not answerable for a loss by any means against

which he could not have guarded by ordinary diligence. It is

not the form of the contract, but the policy of the law which de-

termines the extent of the carrier's liability. "-ia_Ansell v. Water-

house, 2 Chit. 1, which was an action on the case against the

proprietor of a stage-coach for an injury to the plaintiff's wife,

Holroyd, J., said : ' ' This action is founded on what is quite

collateral to the contract, if any; and the terms of the contract,

unless changing the duty of a common carrier, are in this case

quite immaterial. The declaration states an obligation imposed

upon him by the law. This is an action against a person, who,

by an ancient law, held, as it were, a public office, and was

bound to the public. This action is founded on the general ob-

ligation of the law." In Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R. 27, Lord

Mansfield said : "It appears from all the cases for one hundred

years back, that there are events for which the carrier is liable
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independent of his contract. By the nature of his contract,

he is liable for all due care and diligence ; and for any negligence

he is suable on his contract. But there is a further degree of re-

sponsibility by the custom of the realm, that is, by the common

law; a carrier is in the nature of an insurer." See also Hide

V. Proprietors etc., 1 Esp. 36.

The law in relation to carriers has in some instances operated

with severity, and they have been charged with losses against

which no degree of diligence could guard. But cases of this

description are comparatively of rare occurrence ; and the rea-

f'on why they are included in the rule of the common law, is

not because it is fit in itself that any man should answer without

a fault, but because there are no means of effectually guarding

the public against imposition and fraud, without making the

rule so broad, that it will sometimes operate harshly. It was

well remarked by Best, C. J., in Riley v. Home, 5 Bing. 217,

that "when goods are delivered to the carrier, they are usually

no longer under the eye of the owner ; he seldom follows or sends

any servant with them to their place of destination. If they

should be lost or injured by the grossest negligence of the car-

rier or his servants, or stolen by them, or by thieves in collusion

with them, the owner would be unable to prove either of these

causes of loss. His witnesses must be the carrier's servants, and

they, knowing that they could not be contradicted, would excuse

their masters and themselves." These remarks lose little of their

force vv'hen applied to the case of passengers in stages, steam-
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boats, and railroad cars. For although they are in the neigh-

borhood of their property, it is neither under their eye, nor

have they any efficient means of protecting it against the eon-

sequences of negligence and fraud. The traveler is usually

among strangers; his property is in the hands of men who are

sometimes selected with little regard to their diligence and fidel-

ity; and if the remedy of the owner in case of loss depend on

the question of actual negligence or fraud, he must make out

his right to recover by calling the very men whose recklessness

or frailty has occasioned the injury. It was remarked by Best,

C. J., in Brooke v. Pickwick, 4 Bing. 218, that "though coach

proprietors of the present day are a respectable and opulent

class, many of the persons employed by them resemble those

whom the common law meant to guard against."

There is less of hardship in the case of the carrier than has

sometimes been supposed; for while the law holds him to an ex-

traordinary degree of diligence, and treats him as an insurer

of the property, it allows him, like other insurers, to demand a

premium proportioned to the hazards of his emploj'^ment. The
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rule is founded upon a great principle of public policy; it has

been approved by many generations of wise men; and if the

courts were now at liberty to make instead of declaring the law,

it may well be questioned whether they could devise a system,

which, on the whole, would operate more beneficially. I feel

the more confident in this remark from the fact that in Great

Britain, after the courts had been perplexed for thirty years

with various modifications of the law in relation to carriers, and

when they had wandered too far to retrace their steps, the legis-

lature finally interfered, and in all its most important features

restored the salutary rule of the common law.

The doctrine that a carrier might limit his responsibility by a

general notice brought home to the employer prevailed in Eng-

land for only a short period. In Smith v. Home, 8 Taunt. 144,

Burrough, J., said : ' ' The doctrine of notice was never known

until the case of Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R. 27, which I argued

many years ago." That case was decided in 1785, and it is

remarkable that it does not contain one word on the subject of

notice. If that question was in any form before the court, it is

not mentioned by the reporter ; and the decision was against the

carrier, although the loss was occasioned by fire, without his de-

fault. The doctrine was first recognized in Westminster HaU,

in 1804, when the ease of Nicholson v. Willan, 5 East, 507, was

decided. Lord Ellenborough said, the practice of making a

"special acceptance" had prevailed for a long time, and that

there was "no case to be met with in the books in which the
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right of a carrier thus to limit by special contract his own re-

sponsibility, has ever been by express decision denied." What-

ever may be the rule where there is in fact a special contract,

the learned judge could not have intended to say, that a carrier

had for a long time been allowed to limit his liability by a gen-

eral notice, or that a special contract had been implied from

such a notice ; for he refers to no case in support of the position,

and would have searched in vain to find one. Only eleven years

before (in 1793), Lord Kenyon had expressly laid down a dif-

ferent rule in Hide v. Proprietors etc., 1 Esp. 36. He said,

* ' There is a difference where a man is chargeable by law general-

ly, and where on his contract. Where a man is bound to any duty

and chargeable to a certain extent by the operation of law, in

such case, he can not by any act of his own discharge himself."

And he put the case of common carriers, and said, they cannot

discharge themselves "by any act of their own, as by giving no-

tice, for example, to that effect." This case was afterwards be-

fore the king's bench, but on another point: 1 T. R. 389.

The doctrine in question was not received in Westminster
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Hall without much doubt, and although it ultimately obtained

something like a firm footing, many of the English judges have

expressed their regret that it was ever sanctioned by the courts.

Departing as it did from the simplicity and certainty of the

common law rule, it proved one of the most fruitful sources of

legal controversy which has existed in modern times. When it

was once settled that a carrier might restrict his liability by a

notice brought home to his employer, a multitude of questions

sprung up in the courts which no human foresight could have

anticipated. Each carrier adopted such a form of notice as he

thought best calculated to shield himself from responsibility

without the loss of employment; and the legal effect of each

particular form of notice could only be settled by judicial de-

cision. Wliether one who had given notice that he would not be

answerable for goods beyond a certain value unless specially en-

tered and paid for, was liable in case of loss to the extent of the

value mentioned in the notice, or was discharged altogether;

whether, notwithstanding the notice he was liable for a loss by

negligence, and if so, what degree of negligence would charge

him; what should be sufficient evidence that the notice came to

the knowledge of the employer, whether it should be left to the

jury to presume that he saw it in a newspaper which he was ac-

customed to read, or observed it posted up in the office where

the carrier transacted his business; and then, whether it was

painted in large or small letters, and whether the owner went

himself or sent his servant with the goods, and whether the ser-
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vant could read ; these, and many other questions were debated

in the courts, while the public suffered an almost incalculable

injury in consequence of the doubt and uncertainty which hung

over this important branch of the law: See 1 Bell's Com. 474.

After years of litigation, parliament interfered in 1830, and

relieved both the courts and the public, by substantially re-

asserting the rule of the common law: Stat. 1, Wm. IV., c. 68.

Without going into a particular examination of the English

cases, it is sufficient to say that the question has generally been

presented, on a notice by the carrier that he would not be re-

sponsible for any loss beyond a certain sum, unless the goods

were specially entered and paid for; and the decisions have for

the most part only gone far enough to say, that if the owner do

not comply with the notice by stating the true value of the

goods, and having them properly entered, the carrier will be

discharged. In these cases, the carrier had not attempted to

exclude all responsibility. But there are two nisi prius de-

cisions which allow the carrier to cast off all liability whatever.

In Maving v. Todd, 1 Stark. 72, the defendant had given notice
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that he would not answer for a loss by fire, and such a loss hav-

ing occurred, Lord Ellenborough thought that carriers might

exclude their liability altogether, and nonsuited the plaintiff.

In Leeson v. Holt, 1 Stark. 186, tried in 1816, he made a like

decision; though he very justly remarked, that "if this action

had been brought twenty years ago, the defendant would have

been liable ; since by the common law a carrier is liable in all

cases except two." We have here, what will be found in many

of the cases, a very distinct admission that the courts had de-

parted from the law of the land, and allowed, what Jeremy's

Treatise on Carriers, 35, 36, very properly terms "recent inno-

vations. ' '

Some of the cases which have arisen under a general notice

have proceeded on the ground of fraud : Batson v. Donovan, 4

Barn. & Aid. 21 ; others on the notion of a special acceptance or

special contract: Nicholson v. Willan, 5 East, 507; Harris v.

Packwood, 3 Taunt. 271 ; while in some instances it is difficult to

say what general principle the court intended to establish.

So far as the cases have proceeded on the ground of fraud,

and can properly be referred to that head, they rest on a solid

foundation ; for the common law abhors fraud, and will not fail

to overthrow it in all the forms, whether new or old, in which

it may be manifested. As the carrier incurs a heavy responsi-

bility, he has a right to demand from the employer such in-

formation as will enable him to decide on the proper amount of

compensation for his services and risk, and the degree of care
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which he ought to bestow in discharging his trust; and if the

owner give an answer which is false in a material point, the

carrier will be absolved from the consequences of any loss not

occasioned by negligence or misconduct. The case of Kenrig v.

Eggleston, Aleyn, 93, was decided in 1649. The plaintiff deliv-

ered a box to the porter of the carrier, saying, "there was a book

and tobacco in the box, ' ' when in truth it contained one hundred

pounds in money, besides. Rolle, J., thought the carrier was

nevertheless liable for a, loss by robbery; "but in respect of the

intended cheat to the carrier, he told the jury they might con-

sider him in damages." The jury, however, found the whole

sum (abating the carriage), for the plaintiff, quod durum vi-

dehatur circumstantihus. In Gibbon v. Paynton, 4 Burr. 2298,

Lord Mansfield said, this was a case of fraud and he "should

have agreed in opinion with the circumstantihus." In Tyly v.

Morrice, Garth. 485, two bags of money sealed up were delivered

to the carrier, saying- they contained two hundred pounds, and

he gave a receipt for the money. In truth the bags contained

four hundred and fifty pounds, and the carrier having been
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robbed, paid the two hundred pounds ; and in this action brought

to recover the balance, the chief justice told the jury, that

"since the plaintiffs had taken this course to defraud the car-

rier of his reward, they should find for the defendant." And

the same point was decided in another action against the same

carrier. In Gibbon v. Paynton, 4 Burr, 2298, one hundred

pounds in money was hid in hay in an old nail-bag, which fact

the plaintiff concealed from the carrier; and the money having

been stolen, the court held that this fraud would discharge the

defendant. In the case of the Orange Co. Bank v. Brown, 9

Wend. (N. Y.) 85, 24 Am. D. 129, the agent of the plaintiffs

put eleven thousand dollars in bank bills in his trunk, and de-

livered it to the captain of the steamboat as his baggage. The

court held that the term baggage would only include money for

the expenses of traveling, and not a large sum, as in this case,

taken for the mere purpose of transportation; and it was said

that the conduct of the plaintift"s agent was a virtual conceal-

ment as to the money, that ' ' his representation of his trunk and

the contents as baggage, was not a fair one, and was calculated

to deceive the captain. ' ' The owner is not bound to disclose the

nature or value of the goods; but if he is inquired of by the

carrier, he must answer truly: Phillips v. Earle, 8 Pick, 182.

Fraud cannot, I think, be imputed to the owner from the

mere fact that he delivers goods after having seen a general

notice published by the carrier, whatever may be its purport. If

the carrier wishes to ascertain the extent of his risk, he should
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inquire at the time the goods are delivered ; and then if he is not

answered truly he will have a defense : See 4 Bing. 218. A

different rule practically changes the burden of proof. At the

common law, it is enough that the owner prove the undertaking

of the carrier, and that the goods did not reach their destination.

But this doctrine of implying fraud from a notice, requires him

to go further, and show that he complied with the terms of the

advertisement. He may have informed the carrier truly of the

value of the goods: there may be no fraud, but still he is re-

quired to prove himself innocent before he can recover. Inde-

pendent of a notice, the onus would rest, where upon general

principles it ought to rest, on him who imputes fraud; and the

carrier could not discharge himself without showing some actual

misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment. It does not lie on

the employer to show how the loss was occasioned, or that he

has acted properly; but the law presumes against the carrier,

until he proves that the loss happened by means or under cir-

cumstances for which he is not answerable : 1 T. R. 33 ; Murphy

V. Staton, 3 Munf. (Va.) 239; Story on Bail. 338.
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But it is enough for this case, that the question of fraud can

never arise under such a notice as was given by the defendant.

He did not say to the public that he would not be answerable

for baggage beyond a certain sum, unless the owner disclosed

the value ; he said he would not be answerable in any event. It

was, in effect, a notice that he would not abide the liabilities

which the law, upon principles of public policy, had attached to

his employment. If the notice can aid the defendant in any

form, it certainly does not go to the question of fraud.

The only remaining ground of argument in favor of the car-

rier is, that a special contract may be inferred from the notice.

Independent of the modern English cases, it seems never to have

been directly adjudged that the liability of the carrier can be

restricted by a special contract. Nox (IMaxims), 92, after speak-

ing of a loss by negligence, says : * ' If a carrier would refuse to

carry unless a promise were made to him that he should not be

charged with any such miscarriage, that promise were void. ' ' If

he cannot stipulate for a partial, it is difficult to see how he can

for a total exemption from liability. In Nicholson v. Willan, 5

East, 513, Lord Ellenborough found no direct adjudication in

favor of the position that a carrier may limit his responsibility

by a special contract ; but he relied on the fact that such an ex-

emption had never been "by express decision denied." Al-

though this mode of reasoning is not the most conclusive, I shall

not deny that the carrier may, by express contract, restrict his

liability; for, though the point has never been expressly ad-
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judged, it has often been assumed as good law: Aleyn, 93; 4

Co. 84, note to Southcote's case; 4 Burr. 2301, per Yates, J; 1

Vent. 190, 238; Peak. N. P. Cas. 150; 2 Taunt. 271; 1 Stark.

186. If the doctrine be well founded, it must, I think, proceed

on the ground that the person intrusted with the goods, al-

though he usually exercises that employment, does not in the

particular case act as a common carrier. The parties agree that

in relation to that transaction he shall throw off his public

character, and like other bailees for hire, only be answerable

for negligence or misconduct. If he act as a carrier, it is diffi-

cult to understand how he can make a valid contract to be dis-

charged from a duty or liability imposed upon him by law.

But conceding that there may be a special contract for re-

stricted liability, such a contract cannot, I think, be infferred

from a general notice brought home to the employer. The ar-

gument is, that where a party delivers goods to be carried after

seeing a notice that the carrier intends to limit his responsibility,

his assent to the terms of the notice may be implied. But this

argument entirely overlooks a very important consideration.
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Notwithstanding the notice, the owner has a right to insist that

the carrier shall receive the goods subject to all the responsibili-

ties incident to his employment. If the delivery of goods under

such circumstances authorizes an implication of any kind, the

presumption is as strong, to say the least, that the owner in-

tended to insist on his legal rights, as it is that he was willing to

yield to the wishes of the carrier. If a coat be ordered from a

mechanic after he has given the customer notice that he will not

furnish the article at a less price than one hundred dollars, the

assent of the customer to pay that sum, though it be double the

value, may perhaps be implied; but if the mechanic had been

under a legal obligation, not only to furnish the coat, but to do

so at a reasonable price, no such implication could arise. Now

the carrier is under a legal obligation to receive and convey the

goods safely, or answer for the loss. He has no right to prescribe

any other terms ; and a notice can at the most only amount to a

proposal for a special contract, which requires the assent of the

other party. Putting the matter in the most favorable light for

the carrier, the mere delivery of goods after seeing a notice, can

not warrant a stronger presumption that the owner intended to

assent to a restricted liability on the part of the carrier, than it

does that he intended to insist on the liabilities imposed by law ;

and a special contract cannot be implied where there is such an

equipoise of probabilities.

Making a notice the foundation for presuming a special con-

tract, is subject to a further objection. It changes the burden
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cf proof. Independent of the notice, it would be sufficient for

the owner to prove the delivery and loss of the goods; and it

would then lie on the carrier to discharge himself by showing

a special contract for a restricted liability. But giving effect to

the notice, makes it necessary for the owner to go beyond the

delivery and loss of the goods, and prove that he did not assent

to the proposal for a limited responsibility. Instead of leaving

the 071US of showing assent on him who sets up that affirmative

fact, it is thrown upon the other party, and he is required to

prove a negative, that he did not assent.

After all that has been or can be said in defense of these no-

tices, whether regarded either as a ground for presuming fraud

or implying a special agreement, it is impossible to disguise the

fact that they are a mere contrivance to avoid the liability which

the law has attached to the employment of the carrier. If the

law is too rigid, it should be modified by the legislature and not

by the courts. It has been admitted over and over again by the

most eminent English judges, that the effect given to these no-

tices was a departure from the common law ; and they have often
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regretted their inability to get back again to that firm founda-

tion. The doctrine that a carrier may limit his responsibility

by a notice, was wholly unknown to the common law at the time

of our revolution. It has never been received in this, nor, so far

as I have observed, in any of the other states. The point has

been raised, but not directly decided: Barney v. Prentiss, 4

Har. & J. (Md.) 317, 7 Am. D. 670; Dwight v. Brewster, 1 Pick.

(Mass.) 50, 11 Am. D. 133. Should it now be received among

us, it will be after it has been tried, condemned, and abandoned

m that country to which we have been accustomed to look for

light on questions of jurisprudence.

The act of parliament already mentioned enumerates various

articles of great value in proportion to the bulk, and others

which are peculiarly exposed to damage in transportation, and

declares that the carrier shall not be liable for the loss or injury

of those articles when the value exceeds ten pounds, unless at

the time of delivery the owner shall declare the nature and value

of the property, and pay the increased charge which the carrier

is allowed to make for his risk and care. If the owner complies

with this requirement, the carrier must give him a receipt for the

goods, "acknowledging the same to have been insured;" and if

he refuse to give the receipt, he remains "liable and responsible

as at the common law." The provision extends to the proprie-

tors of stage-coaches as well as to all other carriers, and to prop-

erty which may "accompany the person of any passenger" as

well as other goods; and the statute declares that after the first
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day of September, 1830, "no public notice or declaration here-

tofore made, or hereafter to be made, shall be deemed or con-

strued to limit, or in any wise affect the liability at common

law" of any carriers; but that all and every such carrier shall

be "Jiable as at the common law to answer" for the loss or in-

jury of the property, ' ' any public notice or declaration by them

made and given contrary thereto, or in any wise limiting such

liability, notwithstanding." The only modification of the com-

mon law rule in relation to carriers made by this statute, is that

which requires the owner, without a special request, to disclose

the nature and value of the package, when it contains articles

of a particular description. The premium for care and risk, the

carrier might have required before. In relation to all articles

not enumerated, and in relation to those also, if the owner com-

ply with the requirements of the act, the carrier is declared lia-

ble as an insurer, and must answer "as at the common law."

The whole doctrine which has sprung up under notices, is cut up

by the roots; and in such language as renders it apparent that

the legislature deemed it an innovation on the law of the land.
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If after a trial of thirty years the people of Great Britain,

whose interests and pursuits are not very dissimiliar to our own,

have condemned the whole doctrine of limiting the carrier's lia-

bility by a notice; if after a long course of legal controversy

they have retraced their steps, and returned to the simplicity

and certainty of the common law rule ; we surely ought to profit

by their experience, .and should hesitate long before we sanction

a practice which not only leads to doubt and uncertainty con-

cerning the rights and duties of the parties, but which en-

courages negligence, and opens a wide door to fraud.

If the policy of the law in relation to carriers were more

questionable than I think it is, it would be the business of the

legislature, and not of the courts, to apply the proper remedy.

The plaintiff is entitled to judgment in pursuance of the stipu-

lation contained in the case.

The chief justice conciirred.

CowEN, J., concurred in the result for the reasons assigned by

him in the case of Cole v. Goodwin and Story, 19 Wend. 251, 32

Am. D. 470.

Judgment for the plaintiff.
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101. BOSTWICK V. BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAIL-

ROAD CO.,

45 N. Y. 712. 1871.

Action to recover the value of 16 bales (part of 54 bales) of

cotton, shipped from Cincinnati to New York, and lost at sea

between Baltimore and New York. No bill of lading was de-

livered at the time, but one or two days afterward the agent

of defendant sent to plaintiff bills of lading containing printed

conditions limiting liability to the carrier in whose possession

the goods might be at the time of loss, and excusing from loss

or damage by the dangers of navigation. Judgment for de-

fendant.

Rapallo, J. (Omitting a question of agency.) There was no

contradiction attempted of the evidence of the plaintiff that he

made a verbal contract with Cooke for the transportation of the

fifty-four bales through to New York by "all rail," and agreed

to pay the all rail route. The goods were shipped under this

verbal agreement, before any written contract or bill of lading

had been tendered to the plaintiff. The verbal agreement had
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been acted upon, and under it the plaintiff had parted with all

control over his goods. The rule that prior negotiations are

merged in a subsequent written contract does not apply to such a

case as this.

If the plaintiff had expressly assented to the terms of the bill

of lading subsequently delivered to him, such assent would ope-

rate as a change of the terms of the contract originally made, and

under which he had parted with his property. But after the

verbal agreement had been consummated and rights had ac-

crued under it, the mere receipt of the bill of lading, inad-

vertently omitting to examine the printed conditions, was not

sufficient to conclude the plaintiff from showing what the actual

agreement was under which the goods had been shipped.

In the case of Corey v. The N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., decided in

April, 1871, not reported, we held that conditions contained

in a bill of lading, not delivered until after the shipment and

loss of the goods, though before the loss was known, did not con-

trol the rights of the shippers.

The present case is analogous in principle to the one cited.

The goods having been shipped under an agreement that they

should be carried "all rail," a loss occasioned by their being

carried by sea is no excuse for their non-delivery to the plaintiff.
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There was also some evidence of delay in sending forward the

portion of the goods which was lost. This delay, unexplained,

tended to show negligence on the part of the defendant. It

is true that there is no allegation of negligence in the com-

plaint. But the complaint alleges the non-delivery of the goods,

which was a breach of duty on the part of the defendant, unless

excused.

The defendant sets up, in excuse, the conditions of the bill

of lading, and the loss of the goods by the dangers of naviga-

tion. Even if the conditions were binding upon the plaintiff, it

was competent to rebut this defense by showing that the goods

became exposed to the danger by reason of the default of the

defendant, and that if they had been forwarded with due dili-

gence, they would not have been on board of the vessel which

was lost. (Michaels v. The N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 30 N Y

564, 86 Am. D. 415).

If there was negligence on the part of the defendant in send-

ing forward the goods, the conditions of the bill of lading would

not exempt the defendant from liability.
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The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered,

with costs to abide the event.

/ 102. RANCH AU V. RUTLAND RAILROAD CO.,

71 Yt. 142; 43 Atl. R. 11; 76 Am. St. B. 761. 1899.

Case, for loss of a box checked by plaintiff on a ticket from

Burlington, Vermont, to Fitchburg, Massachusetts. It appeared

that no such box was put on the train on which plaintiff trav-

eled, and no trace of it could be found,

Ross, C. J., (Omitting questions of pleading.) 3. The ticket

sold by the defendant to the plaintiff contained a clause stating

that the defendant, "in selling the ticket and checking baggage

hereon .... acts as agent, and is not responsible beyond its

own line." The verdict of the jury finding that the loss oc-

curred on the defendant's own line, renders a consideration of

this clause immaterial. It also contains a clause stating, "Bag-

gage liability of any company is limited to wearing apparel

not exceeding one hundred dollars in value." The special ver-

dict finds that the plaintiff's damages were one hundred and

fifty-eight dollars, of which one hundred and forty-three dollars

was for wearing apparel. The defendant contends that the

court erroneously, against its exception, rendered a judgment
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for the largest sum named. This attempt of the defendant to

limit its common-law liability as a common carrier must be con-

sidered with reference to the other undisputed facts stated in

the exceptions. It is there stated that the evidence tended to

show that the plaintiff could neither read nor write; that the

tickets were not read to him by any person, and that he did not

know the provisions of the tickets. With this testimony in the

case, the defendant was not entitled to have the court comply

with its four requests : "That the plaintiff is bound by the terms

of the contract set forth on his ticket; that by said contract the

defendant is only liable for loss of baggage occurring on its own

line; that defendant's liability is limited to wearing apparel as

specified in the contract ; that the defendant 's liability is limited

to wearing apparel not exceeding one hundred dollars in value."

These requests all assume that such a contract existed between

the plaintiff and defendant. This assumption was not war-

ranted by the testimony in the case.

The defendant by its charter became a common carrier of

passengers and their baggage, subject to the common-law rules
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in regard to liability therefor. By nearly universal concur-

rence of decisions of courts of final resort, including the deci-

sions of this court, such carrier may by contract reasonably

limit and vary its common-law liability, except as to its own

negligence. But, being by its charter and occupation subject

to the common-law liability, it will be held to that liability

unless it establishes that it has limited or varied it by a contract,

express or implied, existing between it and its passenger. The

ordinary passenger ticket does not profess to contain the con-

tract by which, the passenger obtains his right to carriage over

the road of the carrier. It is only a receipt, or token, given by

the carrier for the passenger to show to its servants and man-

agers of its trains, that he has purchased the right to be safely

carried on its trains between the stations specified. In this re-

spect it is different from a bill of lading for the carriage of

freight. "Whatever is printed on passenger tickets has usually

been regarded as a notice by the carrier of its desire to limit or

vary its common-law liability. To effect such limitation, the

carrier must show that the passenger, when he paid his money

and received the ticket, did it under such circumstances that

he assented to the conditions named upon the ticket. Wliether

such assent is established depends upon the circumstances of

each case. Assent will not be presumed unless a knowledge of

the proposed conditions and limitations are known by the pas-

senger, and then much will depend upon whether they are rea-

sonable or unreasonable. If not entirely reasonable, assent will
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not be presumed from knowledge merely, because the carrier

without such assent is under the common-law liability, and has

the passenger at a disadvantage. The passenger's circum-

stances and necessities may be such as would compel him to as-

sent to almost any conditions or limitations. Hence, when the

conditions or limitations are not entirely reasonable, it is gen-

erally held thajt the assent to them will not be implied from a

knowledge oT tliem; but express assent must be established.

As the defendant took no exceptions to the charge on the sub-

ject of the special findings of the jury, it is to be presumed

that the court stated the law correctly in regard thereto, and

that the jury found, as the plaintiff's testimony tended to show,

that he had no knowledge of the conditions placed by the de-

fendant upon his ticket at the time he purchased it. He must

have had knowledge of them at the time he paid his money.

"When purchasing the ticket, the passenger frequently has no

opportunity nor time to examine it. He has a right to under-

stand, unless directly informed to the contrary, that the car-

rier's undertaking has the common-law liability. It is unreason-
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able to hold, if the conditions printed on the ticket come to his

knowledge first after he has entered upon his journey, that he

should be held to have assented thereto.

His assent may well be assumed when he knows that the

carrier is selling special tickets at reduced rates, with the con-

ditions and limitations plainly stated in the notices of the sale

of such special tickets : 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, tit. Bag-

gage, Duty to Carry, 543, and notes, Limitation of Liability,

554, and notes; 5 Am. & Eng. Eney. of Law tit. carriers of

passengers. Limitations of Liability, 608, 612, and notes ; Bissell

V. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 442, 82 Am. Dec. 369,

and note; Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 234, 32 Am.

Dec. 455, and note; Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 251, 32

Am. Dec. 470, and note; Newell v. Smith, 49 Vt. 255; Mann

V. Birchard, 40 Vt. 326, 94 Am. Dec. 398 ; Kimball v. Rutland

etc. R. R. Co., 26 Vt. 247, 62 Am. Dec. 567; Farmers' etc. Bank

V. Champlain Transp. Co., 23 Vt. 186, 56 Am. Dec. 68 ; Bluraen-

thai v. Brainerd, 38 Vt. 402, 91 Am. Dec. 349 ; Ouimit v. Hen-

shaw, 35 Vt. 605, 84 Am. Dec. 646; Thorp v. Concord R. R.

Co., 61 Vt. 378, 17 Atl. R. 791 ; Gillis v. Western Union Tel. Co.,

61 Vt. 461, 17 Atl. R. 736, 15 Am. St. R. 917 ; Hodd v. Express

Co., 52 Vt. 335, 36 Am. Rep. 757; Davis v. Central Vermont R. R.

Co., 66 Vt. 290, 29 Atl. R. 313, 44 Am. St. R. 852; In Davis

V. Central Vt. R. R. Co., where a bill of lading is considered, it

is said in regard to notices : ' ' Notice, unless brought distinctly

to the knowledge of the consignor in such a manner that the law
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will imply his assent to the limitation contained in the notice,

will not be considered as entering into and forming a part of

the contract." The special verdict does not establish that the

plaintiff had knowledge of the conditions printed upon his

ticket, and his assent thereto will not be implied. The defendant

rests under the common-law liability in regard to the loss of the

baggage. That liability, as held in Ouimit v. Henshaw, 35 Vt.

605, 84 Am. Dec. 646, entitles the plaintiff to recover for the

bedding lost, or for his entire loss. . . .

Reversed and cause remanded because of improper remarks

of plaintiff 's counsel.

103. RAILROAD CO. V. LOCKWOOD,

17 Wallace (U. 8.) 357. 1873.

Error to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New

York; the case being thus:

Lockwood, a drover, was injured whilst traveling on a stock

train of the New York Central Railroad Company, proceeding

from Buffalo to Albany and brought this suit to recover dam-

ages for the injury. lie had cattle in the train, and had been
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required, at Buffalo, to sign an agreement to attend to the load-

ing, transporting, and unloading of them, and to take all risk

of injury to them and of personal injury to himself, or to whom-

soever went with the cattle; and he received what is called a

drover's pass; that is to say, a pass certifying that he had

shipped sufficient stock to pass free to Albany, but declaring

that the acceptance of the pass was to be considered a waiver

of all claims for damages or injuries received on the train. The

agreement stated its consideration to be the carrying of the

plaintiff's cattle at less than traiff rates. It was shown on the

trial, that these rates were about three times the ordinary rates

charged, and that no drover had cattle carried on those terms;

but that all signed similar agreements to that which was signed

by the plaintiff, and received similar passes. Evidence was

given on the trial tending to show that the injury complained

of was sustained in consequence of negligence on the part of

the defendants or their servants, but they insisted that they

were exempted by the terms of the contract from responsibility

for all accidents, including those occurring from negligence,

at least the ordinary negligence of their servants ; and requested

the judge so to charge. This he refused, and charged that if the

jury were satisfied that the injury occurred without any negli-
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gence on the part of the plaintiff, and that the negligence of the

defendants caused the injury, they must find for the plaintiff,

which they did. Judgment being entered accordingly, the rail-

road company took this writ of error.

Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court.

It may be assumed in limine, that the case was one of carriage

for hire ; for though the pass certifies that the plaintiff was en-

titled to pass free, yet his passage was one of the mutual terms

of the arrangement for carrying his cattle. The question is,

therefore, distinctly raised, whether a railroad company carry-

ing passengers for hire, can lawfully stipulate not to be answer-

able for their own or their servants' negligence in reference to

such carriage.

As the duties and responsibilities of public carriers were pre-

scribed by public policy, it has been seriously doubted whether

the courts did wisely in allowing that policy to be departed

from without legislative interference, by which needed modifica-

tions could have been introduced into the law. But the great

hardship on the carrier in certain special cases, where goods of
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great value or subject to extra risk were delivered to him with-

out notice of their character, and where losses happened by sheer

accident without any possibility of fraud or collusion on his

part, such as by collisions at sea, accidental fire, &c., led to a

relaxation of the rule to the extent of authorizing certain ex-

emptions from liability in such cases to be provided for, either

by public notice brought home to the owners of the goods, or

by inserting exemptions from liability in the bill of lading, or

other contract of carriage. A modification of the strict rule of

responsibility, exempting the carrier from liability for acci-

dental losses, where it can be safely done, enables the carrying

interest to reduce its rates of compensation ; thus proportionally

relieving the transportation of produce and merchandise from

some of the burden with which it is loaded.

The question is, whether such modification of responsibility

by notice or special contract may not be carried beyond legiti-

mate bounds, and introduce evils against which it was the direct

policy of the law to guard ; whether, for example, a modification

which gives license and immunity to negligence and carelessness

on the part of a public carrier or his servants, is not so evidently

repugnant to that policy as to be altogether null and void; or,

at least null and void under certain circumstances.

In the case of sea-going vessels. Congress has, by the act of

1851, relieved ship-owners from all responsibility for loss by

fire unless caused by their own design or neglect ; and from re-
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sponsibility for loss of money and other valuables named, un-

less notified of their character and value; and has limited their

liability to the value of ship and freight, where losses happen

by the embezzlement or other act of the master, crew, or passen-

gers ; or by collision, or any cause occurring without their privity

or knowledge; but the master and crew themselves are held re-

sponsible to the parties injured by their negligence or miscon-

duct. Similar enactments have been made by state legis-

latures. This seems to be the only important modification of pre-

viously existing law on the subject, which in this country has

been effected by legislative interference. And by this, it is seen,

that though intended for the relief of the ship-owner, it still

leaves him liable to the extent of his ship and freight for the

negligence and misconduct of his employees, and liable without

limit for his own negligence.

It is true that the first section of the above act relating to loss

by fire has a proviso, that nothing in the act contained shall

prevent the parties from making such contract as they please,

extending or limiting the liability of ship-owners. This proviso,
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however, neither enacts nor affirms anything. It simply ex-

presses the intent of Congress to leave the right of contracting

as it stood before the act. •

The courts of New York, where this case arose, for a long

time resisted the attempts of common carriers to limit their

common-law liability, except for the purpose of procuring a dis-

closure of the character and value of articles liable to extra haz-

ard and risk. This, they were allowed to enforce by means of

a notice of non-liability, if the disclosure was not made. But

such announcements as "all baggage at the risk of the owner,"

and such exceptions in bills of lading as "this company will not

be responsible for injuries by fire, nor for goods lost, stolen, or

damaged," were held to be unavailing and void, as being against

the policy of the law.

But since the decision of the case of The New Jersey Steam

Navigation Company v. Merchants' Bank, by this court, in Jan-

uary Term, 1848, 6 How. 344, it has been uniformly held, as well

in the courts of New York as in the Federal courts, that a com-

mon carrier may, by special contract, limit his common-law lia-

bility; although considerable diversity of opinion has existed as

to the extent to which such limitation is admissible.

The case of the New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v.

Merchants' Bank, above adverted to, grew out of the burning

of the steamer Lexington. Certain money belonging to the

bank had been intrusted to Harnden's Express, to be carried

to Boston, and was on board the steamer when she was de-

392

EAILEOAD CO. v. LOCKWOOD. § 103

troyed. By agreement between the steamboat company and

Harnden, the crate of the latter and its contents were to be

at his sole risk. The court held this agreement valid, so far

as to exonerate the steamboat company from the responsibility

imposed by law; but not to excuse them from misconduct or

negligence, which the court said it would not presume that the

parties intended to include, although the terms of the contract

were broad enough for that purpose; and that inasmuch as the

company had undertaken to carry the goods from one place to

another, they were deemed to have incurred the same degree

of responsibility as that which attaches to a private person en-

gaged casually in the like occupation, and were, therefore,

bound to use ordinary care in the custody of the goods, and in

their delivery, and to provide proper vehicles and means of

conveyance for their transportation ; and as the court was of

opinion that the steamboat company had been guilty of negli-

gence in these particulars, as well as in the management of the

steamer during the fire, they held them responsible for the loss.

As this has been regarded as a leading case, we may pause
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for a moment to observe that the case before us seems almost

precisely within the category of that decision. In that case,

as in this, the contract was general, exempting the carrier from

every risk and imposing it all upon the party; but the court

would not presume that the parties intended to include the

negligence of the carrier or his agents in that exception.

It is strenuously insisted, however, that as negligence is the

only ground of liability in the carriage of passengers, and as the

contract is absolute in its terms, it must be construed to em-

brace negligence as well as accident, the former in reference to

passengers, and both in reference to the cattle carried in the

train. As this argument seems plausible, and the exclusion

of a liability embraced in the terms of exemption on the ground

that it could not have been in the mind of the parties is some-

what arbitrary, we will proceed to examine the question before

propounded, namely, whether common carriers may excuse them-

selves from liability for negligence. In doing so we shall first

briefly review the course of decisions in New York, on which

great stress has been laid, and which are claimed to be decisive

of the question. Whilst we cannot concede this, it is, never-

theless, due to the courts of that state to examine carefully

the grounds of their decision and to give them the weight which

they justly deserve. We think it will be found, however, that

the weight of opinion, even in New York, is not altogether on

the side that favors the right of the carrier to stipulate for ex-
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emption from the consequences of his own or his servants' negli-

gence.

The first recorded ease that arose in New York after the

before-mentioned decision in this court, involving the right of

a carrier to limit his liability, was that of Dorr v. The New

Jersey Steam Navigation Company, 4 Sandf. 136, decided in

1850. This case also arose out of the burning of the Lexington,

under a bill of lading which excepted from the company's risk

"danger of fire, water, breakage, leakage, and other accidents."

Judge Campbell, delivering the opinion of the court, says: "A

common carrier has in truth two distinct liabilities, — the one for

losses by accident or mistake, where he is liable as an insurer;

the other for losses by default or negligence, where he is an-

swerable as an ordinary bailee. It would certainly seem rea-

sonable that he might, by express special contract, restrict his

liability as insurer; that he might protect himself against

misfortune, even though public policy should require that he

should not be permitted to stipulate for impunity where the

loss occurs from his own default or neglect of duty. Such we
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understand to be the doctrine laid down in the case of The New

Jersey Steam Navigation Company v. The Merchants' Bank, in

6th How^ard, and such we consider to be the law in the present

case." And in Stoddard v. Long Island Railroad Company, 5

Sandf. 180, another express case, in which it was stipulated that

the express company should be alone responsible for all losses,

Judge Duer, for the court, says: "Conforming our decisions to

that of the Supreme Court of the United States, we must, there-

fore, hold : 1st. That the liability of the defendants as common

carriers was restricted by the terms of the special agreement be-

tween them and Adams & Co., and that this restriction was valid

in law. 2d. That by the just interpretation of this agreement

the defendants were not to be exonerated from all losses, but

remained liable for such as might result from the wrongful acts,

or the want of due care and diligence of themselves or their

agents and servants. 3d. That the plaintiffs, claiming through

Adams & Co., are bound by the special agreement." The same

view was taken in subsequent cases, all of which show that no

idea was then entertained of sanctioning exemptions of liability

for negligence. 13 Barb. 353, 14 Barb. 524.

It was not till 1858, in the case of Welles v. New York Central

Railroad Company, 26 Barb. 641, that the Supreme Court was

brought to assent to the proposition that a common carrier may

stipulate against responsibility for the negligence of his servants.

That was the case of a gratuitous passenger traveling on a free

ticket, which exempted the company from liability. In 1862 the
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Court of Appeals, 24 N. Y. 181, by a majority affirmed tliis judg-

ment, and in answer to the suggestion that public policy required

that railroad companies should not be exonerated from the duty

of carefulness in performing their important and hazardous du-

ties, the court held that the ease of free passengers could not

seriously affect the incentives to carefulness, because there were

very few such, compared with the great mass of the traveling

public. Perkins v. The New York Central Railroad Company,

24 N. Y. 196, 82 Am. D. 281, was also the case of a free passen-

ger, with a similar ticket, and the court held that the indorsement

exempted the company from all kinds of negligence of its agents,

gross as well as ordinary; that there is, in truth, no practical

distinction in the degrees of negligence.

The next cases of importance that arose in the New York

courts were those of drovers' passes, in which the passenger took

all responsibility of injury to himself and stock. The first was

that of Smith v. The New York Central Railroad Company,

29 Barbour, 132, decided in March, 1859. The contract was

precisely the same as that in the present case. The damage
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arose from a flattened wheel in the car, which caused it to jump

the track. The Supreme Court, by Hogeboom, J., held that the

railroad company was liable for any injury happening to the

passenger, not only by the gross negligence of the company's

servants, but by ordinary negligence on their part. "For my

part," says the judge, "I think not only gross negligence is not

protected, by the terms of the contract, but what is termed

ordinary negligence, or the withholding of ordinary care, is not

so protected. I think, notwithstanding the contract, the carrier

is responsible for what, independent of any peculiar responsi-

bility attached to his calling or employment, would be regarded

as fault or misconduct on his part." The judge added that he

thought the carrier might, by positive stipulation, relieve him-

self to a limited degree from the consequences of his own negli-

gence or that of his servants. But, to accomplish that object,

the contract must be clear and specific in its terms, and plainly

covering such a case. Of course, this remark was extrajudicial.

The judgment itself was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in

1862 by a vote of five judges to three. 24 N. Y. 222. Judge

Wright strenuously contended that it is against public policy for

a carrier of passengers, where human life is at stake, to stipulate

for immunity for any want of care. "Contracts in restraint of

trade are void," he says, "because they interfere with the wel-

fare and convenience of the State ; yet the State has a deep inter-

est in protecting the lives of its citizens." He argued that it was

a question affecting the public, and not alone the party who is
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carried. Judge Sutherland agreed in substance with Judge

Wright. Two other judges held that if the party injured had

been a gratuitous passenger the company would have been dis-

charged, but in their view he was not a gratuitous passenger.

One judge was for affirmance, on the ground that the negligence

was that of the company itself. The remaining three judges

held the contract valid to the utmost extent of exonerating the

company, notwithstanding the grossest neglect on the part of

its servants.

In that case, as in the one before us, the contract was general

in its terms, and did not specify negligence of agents as a risk

assumed by the passenger, though by its generality it included

all risks.

The next case, Bissell v. The New York Central R. R. Co., 29

Barb. 602, first decided in September, 1859, differed from the

preceding in that the ticket expressly stipulated that the railroad

company should not be liable under any circumstances, ' ' wiiether

of negligence hy their agents, or otherwise/' for injury to the

person or stock of the passenger. The latter was killed by the
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express train running into the stock train, and the jury found

that his death was caused by the gross negligence of the agents

and servants of the defendants. The Supreme Court held that

gross negligence (whether of servants or principals) cannot be

excused by contract in reference to the carriage of passengers

for hire, and that such a contract is against the policy of the

law, and void. In December, 1862, this judgment was reversed

by the Court of Appeals, 25 N. Y. 442, 82 Am. D. 369, four

judges against three ; Judge Smith, w^ho concurred in the judg-

ment below, having in the meantime changed his views as to the

materiality of the fact that the negligence stipulated against was

that of the servants of the company, and not of the company

itself. The majority now held that the ticket was a free ticket,

as it purported to be, and, therefore, that the case was governed

by Welles v. The Central Railroad Company ; but whether so, or

not, the contract was founded on a valid consideration, and the

passenger was bound by it even to the assumption of the risk

arising from the gross - negligence of the company 's servants.

Elaborate opinions were read by Justice Selden in favor, and by

Justice Denio against the conclusion reached by the court. The

former considered that no rule of public policy forbids such con-

tracts, because the public is amply protected by the right of every

one to decline any special contract, on paying the regular fare

prescribed by law, that is, the highest amount which the law al-

lows the company to charge. In other words, unless a man

chooses to pay the highest amount which the company by its
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charter is authorized to charge, he must submit to their terms,

however onerous. Justice Denio, with much force of argument,

combated this view, and insisted upon the impolicy and immor-

ality of contracts stipulating immunity for negligence, either of

servants or principals, where the lives and safety of passengers

are concerned. The late case of Poucher v. New York Central

Railroad Company, 49 N. Y. 263, 10 Am. R. 364, is in all essen-

tial respects a similar case to this, and a similar result was

reached.

These are the authorities which we are asked to follow. Cases

may also be found in some of the other State courts which, by

dicta or decision either favor or follow, more or less closely, the

decisions in New York. A reference to the principal of them

is all that is necessary here.

A review of the cases decided by the courts of New York

shows that though they have carried the power of the common

carrier to make special contracts to the extent of enabling him

to exonerate himself from the effects of even gross negligence,

yet that this effect has never been given to a contract general
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in its terms. So that if we only felt bound by those precedents,

we could, perhaps, find no authority for reversing the judgment

in this case. But on a question of general commercial law, the

Federal courts administering justice in New York have equal

and co-ordinate jurisdiction with the courts of that State. And

in deciding a case which involves a question of such importance

to the w^hole country; a question on which the courts of New

York have expressed such diverse views, and have so recently

and with such slight preponderancy of judicial suffrage, come to

the conclusion that they have, we should not feel satisfied with-

out being able to place our decision upon grounds satisfactory

to ourselves, and resting upon what we consider sound principles

of law.

In passing, however, it is apposite to call attention to the

testimony of an authoritative witness as to the operation and

effect of the recent decisions referred to. "The fruits of this

rule, ' ' says Judge Davis, ' ' are already being gathered in increas-

ing accidents, through the decreasing care and vigilance on the

part of these corporations; and they will continue to be reaped

until a just sense of public policy shall lead to legislative re-

striction upon the power to make this kind of contracts." 32 N.

Y. 337, 88 Am. D. 332.

(Omitting the consideration of eases decided in other states.)

The question arose in England principally upon public notices

given by common carriers that they would not be responsible

for valuable goods unless entered and paid for according to
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value. The courts held that this was a reasonable condition,

and, if brought home to the owner, amounted to a special con-

tract valid in law. But it was also held that it could not ex-

onerate the carrier if a loss occurred by his actual misfeasance

or gross negligence. Or, as Starkie says, "proof of a direct mis-

feasance or gross negligence is in effect an answer to proof of

notice." But the term "gross negligence" was so vague and

uncertain that it came to represent every instance of actual neg-

ligence of the carrier or his servant— or ordinary negligence in

the accustomed mode of speaking. Justice Story, in his work

on bailments, originally published in 1832, says that it is now

held that, in cases of such notices, the carrier is liable for

losses and injury occasioned not only by gross negligence, but

by ordinary negligence ; or, in other words, the carrier is bound

to ordinary diligence.

In estimating the effect of these decisions it must be remem-

bered that, in the cases covered by the notices referred to, the

exemption claimed was entire, covering all cases of loss, negli-

gence as well as others. They are, therefore, directly in point.
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In 1863, in the great case of Peek v. The North Staffordshire

Railway Company, 10 H. L. Cas. 473, Mr. Justice Blackburn, in

the course of a very clear and able review of the law on the sub-

ject, after quoting this passage from Justice Story's work, pro-

ceeds to say : " In my opinion, the weight of authority was, in

1832, in favor of this view of the law, but the cases decided in our

courts between 1832 and 1854 established that this was not the

law, and that a carrier might, by a special notice, make a contract

limiting his responsibility even in the cases here mentioned, of

gross negligence, misconduct or fraud on the part of his servants ;

and, as it seems to me, the reason why the legislature intervened

in the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, was because it

thought that the companies took advantage of those decisions

(in Story's language), 'to evade altogether the salutary policy

of the common law.' "

This quotation is sufficient to show the state of the law in

England at the time of the publication of Justice Story's work;

and it proves that, at that time, common carriers could not stip-

ulate for immunity for their own or their servants' negligence.

But in the case of Carr v. Lancashire Railroad Company, 7 Ex.

707, and other cases decided whilst the change of opinion alluded

to by Justice Blackburn was going on (several of which related to

the carriage of horses and cattle) , it was held that carriers could

stipulate for exemption from liability for even their own gross

negligence. Hence the act of 1854 was passed, called the Rail-

way and Canal Traffic Act, declaring that railway and canal
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companies should be liable for negligence of themselves or their

servants, notwithstanding any notice or condition, unless the

court or judge trying the cause should adjudge the conditions

just and reasonable. Upon this statute ensued a long list of

cases deciding what conditions were or were not just and rea-

sonable. The truth is, that this statute did little more than bring

back the law to the original position in which it stood before the

English courts took their departure from it. But as we shall

have occasion to advert to this subject again, w^e pass it for

the present. It remains to see what has been held by this court

on the subject now under consideration.

We have already referred to the leading case of The New Jer-

sey Steam Navigation Company v. Merchants' Bank. On the

precise point now under consideration, Justice Nelson said, *'If

it is competent at all for the carrier to stipulate for the gross

negligence of himself and his servants or agents, in the trans-

portation of goods, it should be required to be done, at least, in

terms that would leave no doubt as to the meaning of the

parties. ' '
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As to carriers of passengers, Mr. Justice Grier, in the case

of Philadelphia and Reading Railroad v. Derby, 14 How. 486, de-

livering the opinion of the court, said : ' ' When carriers under-

take to convey persons by the powerful but dangerous agency of

steam, public policy and safety require that they be held to the

greatest possible care and diligence. And whether the considera-

tion for such transportation be pecuniary or otherwise, the per-

sonal safety of the passengers should not be left to the sport of

chance, or the negligence of careless agents. Any negligence, in

such cases, may well deserve the epithet of ' gross. ' ' ' That was

the case of a free passenger, a stockholder of the company, taken

over the road by the president to examine its condition; and it

was contended in argument that, as to him, nothing but "gross

negligence" would make the company liable. In the subsequent

case of The Steamboat New World v. King, 16 How. 469, 474,

which w^as also the case of a free passenger, carried on a steam-

boat, and injured by the explosion of the boiler, Curtis, Justice,

delivering the judgment, quoted the above proposition of Jus-

tice Grier, and said: "We desire to be understood to reaffirm

that doctrine, as resting not only on public policy, but on sound

principles of law,"

In York Company v. Central Railroad, 3 Wall. 113, the court,

after conceding that the responsibility imposed on the carrier of

goods by the common law may be restricted and qualified by ex-

press stipulation, adds: "When such stipulation is made, and it

does not cover losses from negligence or misconduct, we can
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perceive no just reason for refusing its recognition and en-

forcement." In the case of Walker v. The Transportation Com-

pany, 3 ib. 150, decided at the same term, it is true, the owner of

a vessel destroyed by fire on the lakes, was held not to be responsi-

ble for the negligence of the officers and agents having charge of

the vessel; but that was under the act of 1851, which the court

held to apply to our great lakes as well as to the sea. And in Ex-

press Company v. Kountze Brothers, 8 ib. 342, 353, where the

carriers were sued for the loss of gold-dust delivered to them on a

bill of lading excluding liability for any loss or damage by fire,

act of God, enemies of the government or dangers incidental to

a time of war, they were held liable for a robbery by a predatory

band of armed men (one of the excepted risks) , because they neg-

ligently and needlessly took a route which was exposed to such

incursions. The judge, at the trial, charged the jury that al-

though the contract was legally sufficient to restrict the liability

of the defendants as common carriers, yet if they were guilty of

actual negligence, they were responsible; and that they were

chargeable with negligence unless they exercised the care and
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prudence of a prudent man in his own affairs. This was held by

this court to be a correct statement of the law.

Some of the above citations are only expressions of opinion,

it is true ; but they are the expressions of judges whose opinions

are entitled to much weight; and the last-cited case is a judg-

ment upon the precise point. Taken in connection with the con-

curring decisions of State cour!:s before cited, they seem to us

decisive of the question, and leave but little to be added to the

considerations which they suggest.

It is argued that a common carrier, by entering into a special

contract with a party for carrying his goods or person on modi-

fied terms, drops his character and becomes an ordinary bailee

for hire, and, therefore, may make any contract he pleases. That

is, he may make any contract whatever, because he is an ordinary

bailee ; and he is an ordinary bailee because he has made the

contract.

We are unable to see the soundness of this reasoning. It

seems to us more accurate to say that common carriers are such

by virtue of their occupation, not by virtue of the responsibilities

under which they rest. Those responsibilities may vary in dif-

ferent countries, and at different times, without changing the

character of the employment. The common law subjects the com-

mon carrier to insurance of the goods carried, except as against

the act of God or public enemies. The civil law excepts, also,

losses by means of any superior force, and any inevitable acci-

dent. Yet the employment is the same in both eases. And If
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by special agreement the carrier is exempted from still other

responsibilities, it does not follow that his employment is

changed, but only that his responsibilities are changed. The

theory occasionaly announced, that a special contract as to the

terms and responsibilities of carriage changes the nature of the

employment, is calculated to mislead. The responsibilities of a

common carrier may be reduced to those of an ordinary bailee

for hire, whilst the nature of his business renders him a common

carrier still. Is there any good sense in holding that a railroad

company, whose only business is to carry passengers and goods,

and which was created and established for that purpose alone,

is changed to a private carrier for hire by a mere contract with

a customer, whereby the latter assumes the risk of inevitable ac-

cidents in the carriage of his goods? Suppose the contract re-

lates to a single crate of glass or crockery, whilst at the same

time the carrier receives from the same person twenty other

parcels, respecting which no such contract is made. Is the com-

pany a public carrier as to the twenty parcels and a private car-

rier as to the one ?
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On this point there are several authorities which support our

view, some of which are noted in the margin. (2 Ohio St. 131, 4

id. 362, 2 Rich. 286, 9 id. 201, 37 Ala. 247.)

A common carrier may, undoubtedly, become a private car-

rier, or a bailee for hire, when, as a matter of accommodation or

special engagement, he undertakes to carry something which

it is not his business to carry. For example, if a carrier of pro-

duce, running a truck boat between New York City and Nor-

folk, should be requested to carry a keg of specie, or a load of

expensive furniture, which he could justly refuse to take, such

agreement might be made in reference to his taking and carry-

ing the same as the parties chose to make, not involving any

stipulation contrary to law or public policy. But when a car-

rier has a regularly established business for carrying all or cer-

tain articles, and especially if that carrier be a corporation cre-

ated for the purpose of the carrying trade, and the carriage of

the articles is embraced within the scope of its chartered powers,

it is a common carrier, and a special contract about its responsi-

bility does not divest it of the character.

But it is contended that though a carrier may not stipulate

for his own negligence, there is no good reason why he should

not be permitted to stipulate for immunity for the negligence

of his servants, over whose actions, in his absence, he can exer-

cise no control. If we advert for a moment to the fundamental

principles on which the law of common carriers is founded, it

will be seen that this objection is inadmissible. In regulating
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the public establishment of common carriers, the great object

of the law was to secure the utmost care and diligence in the

performance of their important duties — an object essential to

the welfare of every civilized community. Hence the common-

law rule which charged the common carrier as an insurer. Why

charge him as such ? Plainly for the purpose of raising the most

stringent motive for the exercise of carefulness and fidelity in

his trust. In regard to passengers the highest degree of care-

fulness and diligence is expressly exacted. In the one case the

securing of the most exact diligence and fidelity underlies the

law, and is the reason for it ; in the other it is directly and ab-

solutely prescribed by the law. It is obvious, therefore, that

if a carrier stipulate not to be bound to the exercise of care and

diligence, but to be at liberty to indulge in the contrary, he seeks

to put off the essential duties of his employment. And to as-

sert that he may do so seems almost a contradiction in terms.

Now, to what avail does the law attach these essential duties

to the employment of the common carrier, if they may be waived

in respect to his agents and servants, especially where the car-
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rier is an artificial being, incapable of acting except by agents

and servants? It is carefulness and diligence in performing the

service which the law demands, not an abstract carefulness and

diligence in proprietors and stockholders who take no active

part in the business. To admit such a distinction in the law

of common carriers, as the business is now carried on, would

be subversive of the very object of the law.

It is a favorite argument in the cases which favor the exten-

sion of the carrier's right to contract for exemption from liabil-

ity, that men must be permitted to make their own agreements,

and that it is no concern of the public on what terms an indi-

vidual chooses to have his goods carried. Thus, in Dorr v. The

New Jersey Steam Navigation Company, supra, the court sums

up its judgment thus: ''To say the parties have not a right to

make their own contract, and to limit the precise extent of their

own respective risks and liabilities, in a matter no way affecting

the public morals, or conflicting with the public interests, would,

in my judgment, be an unwarrantable restriction upon trade and

commerce, and a most palpable invasion of personal right."

Is it true that the public interest is not affected by individual

contracts of the kind referred to? Is not the whole business

community affected by holding such contracts valid? If held

valid, the advantageous position of the companies exercising

the business of common carriers is such that it places it in their

power to change the law of common carriers in effect, by intro-

ducing new rules of obligation.
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The carrier and his customer do not stand on a footing of

equality. The latter is only one individual of a million. He

cannot afford to higgle or stand out and seek redress in the

courts. His business will not admit such a course. He prefers,

rather, to accept any bill of lading, or sign any paper the car-

rier presents; often, indeed, without knowing what the one or

the other contains. In most cases, he has no alternative but to

do this, or abandon his business. In the present case, for ex-

ample, the freight agent of the company testified that though

they made forty or fifty contracts every week like that under

consideration, and had carried on the business for years, no other

arrangement than this was ever made with any drover. And

the reason is obvious enough — if they did not accept this, they

must pay tariff rates. These rates were 70 cents a hundred

pounds for carrying from Buffalo to Albany, and each horned

animal was rated at 2000 pounds, making a charge of $14 for

every animal carried, instead of the usual charge of $70 for a

car-load ; being a difference of three to one. Of course no drover

could afford to pay such tariff rates. This fact is adverted to
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for the purpose of illustrating how completely in the power of

the railroad companies parties are ; and how necessary it is to

stand firmly by those principles of law by which the public

interests are protected.

If the customer had any real freedom of choice, if he had

a reasonable and practicable alternative, and if the employment

of the carrier were not a public one, charging him with the duty

of accommodating the public in the line of his employment;

then, if the customer chose to assume the risk of negligence, it

could with more reason be said to be his private affair, and no

concern of the public. But the condition of things is entirely

different, and especially so under the modified arrangements

which the carrying trade has assumed. The business is mostly

concentrated in a few powerful corporations, whose position in

the body politic enables them to control it. They do, in fact,

control it, and impose such conditions upon travel and trans-

portation as they see fit, which the public is compelled to accept.

These circumstances furnish an additional argument, if any

were needed, to show that the conditions imposed by common

carriers ought not to be adverse (to say the least) to the dictates

of public policy and morality. The status and relative position

of the parties render any such conditions void. Contracts . of

common carriers, like those of persons occupying a fiduciary

character, giving them a position in which they can take undue

advantage of the persons with whom they contract, must rest

upon their fairness and reasonableness. It was for the reason
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that the limitations of liability first introduced by common car-

riers into their notices and bills of lading were just and reason-

able, that the courts sustained them. It was just and reasonable

that they should not be responsible for losses happening by

sheer accident, or dangers of navigation that no human skill or

vigilance could guard against; it was just and reasonable that

they should not be chargeable for money or other valuable arti-

cles liable to be stolen or damaged, unless apprised of their char-

acter or value; it was just and reasonable that they should not

be responsible for articles liable to rapid decay, or for live ani-

mals liable to get unruly from fright and to injure themselves

in that state, when such articles or live animals became injured

without their fault or negligence. And when any of these just

and reasonable excuses were incorporated into notices or special

contracts assented to by their customers, the law might well give

effect to them without the violation of any important principle,

although modifjdng the strict rules of responsibility imposed

by the common law. The improved state of society and the bet-

ter administration of the laws, had diminished the opportunities
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of collusion and bad faith on the part of the carrier, and ren-

dered less imperative the application of the iron rule, that he

must be responsible at all events. Hence, the exemptions re-

ferred to were deemed reasonable and proper to be allowed.

But the proposition to allow a public carrier to abandon alto-

gether his obligations to the public, and to stipulate for ex-

emptions that are unreasonable and improper, amounting to an

abdication of the essential duties of his employment, would

never have been entertained by the sages of the law.

Hence, as before remarked, we regard the English statute

called the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, passed in 1854, which

declared void all notices and conditions made by common car-

riers except such as the judge, at the trial, or the courts should

hold just and reasonable, as substantialy a return to the rules

of the common law. It would have been more strictly so, per-

haps, had the reasonableness of the contract been referred to

the law instead of the individual judges. The decisions made

for more than half a century before the courts commenced the

abnormal course which led to the necessity of that statute, giv-

ing effect to certain classes of exemptions stipulated for by the

carrier, may be regarded as authorities on the question as to

what exemptions are just and reasonable. So the decisions of

our own courts are entitled to like effect when not made under

the fallacious notion that every special contract imposed by the

common carrier on his customers must be carried into effect, for

the simple reason that it was entered into, without regard to the
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character of the contract and the relative situation of the parties.

Conceding, therefore, that special contracts, made by common

carriers with their customers, limiting their liability, are good

and valid so far as they are just and reasonable; to the extent

for example, of excusing them for all losses happening by acci-

dent, without any negligence or fraud on their part ; when they

ask to go still further, and to be excused for negligence — an ex-

cuse so repugnant to the law of their, foundation and to the

public good — they have no longer any plea of justice or reason

to support such a stipulation, but the contrary. And then, the

inequality of the parties, the compulsion under wdiich the cus-

tomer is placed, and the obligations of the carrier to the public,

operate with full force to divest the transaction of validity.

On this subject the remarks of Chief Justice Redfield, in his

recent collection of American Railway Cases, seem to us emi-

nently just. "It being clearly established, then," says he,

"that common carriers have public duties which they are bound

to discharge with impartiality, we must conclude that they can-

not, either by notices or special contracts, release themselves
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from the performance of these public duties, even by the con-

sent of those who employ them ; for all extortion is done by the

apparent consent of the victim. A public officer or servant, who

has a monopoly in his department, has no just right to impose

onerous and unreasonable conditions upon those who are com-

pelled to employ him." And his conclusion is, that notwith-

standing some exceptional decisions, the law' of to-day stands

substantially as follows: "1. That the exemption claimed by

carriers must be reasonable and just, otherwise it will be re-

garded as extorted from the owners of the goods by duress of

circumstances, and therefore not binding. 2. That every attempt

of carriers, by general notices or special contract, to excuse them-

selves from responsibility for losses or damages resulting in any

degree from their o^^m want of care and faithfulness, is against

that good faith which the law requires as the basis of all con-

tracts or employments, and, therefore, based upon principles and

a policy which the law will not uphold. ' '

The defendants endeavor to make a distinction between gross

and ordinary negligence, and insist that the judge ought to have

charged that the contract was at least effective for excusing the

latter.

We have already adverted to the tendency of judicial opinion

adverse to the distinction between gross and ordinary negligence.

Strictly speaking, these expressions are indicative rather of the

degree of care and diligence which is due from a party and which

he fails to perform, than of the amount of inattention, careless-
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ness, or stupidity which he exhibits. If very little care is due

from him, and he fails to bestow that little, it is called gross

negligence. If very great care is due, and he fails to come up

to the mark required, it is called slight negligence. And if or-

dinary care is due, such as a prudent man would exercise in his

own affairs, failure to bestow that amount of care is called or-

dinary negligence. In each case, the negligence, whatever epi-

thet we give it, is failure to bestow the care and skill which the

situation demands; and hence it is more strictly accurate per-

haps to call it simply "negligence." And this seems to be the

tendency of moderij authorities. If they mean more than this,

and seek to abolish the distinction of degrees of care, skill, and

diligence required in the performance of various duties and

the fulfilment of various contracts, we think they go too far;

since the requirement of different degrees of oare in different sit-

uations is too firmly settled and fixed in the law- to be ignored

or changed. The compilers of the French Civil Code undertook

to abolish these distinctions by enacting that "every act what-

ever of man that causes damage to another, obliges him by whose
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fault it happened to repair it." Toullier, in his commentary

on the code, regards this as a happy thought, and a return to

the law of nature. But such an iron rule is too regardless of

the foundation principles of human duty, and must often ope-

rate with great severity and injustice.

In the case before us, the law, in the absence of special con-

tract, fixes the degree of care and diligence due from the rail-

road company to the persons carried on its trains. A failure

to exercise such care and diligence is negligence. It needs no

epithet properly and legally to describe it. If it is against the

policy of the law to allow stipulations which will relieve the com-

pany from the exercise of that care and diligence, or which, in

other words, will excuse them for negligence in the performance

of that duty, then the company remains liable for such negli-

gence. The question whether the company was guilty of negli-

gence in this case, which caused the injury sustained by the

plaintiff, was fairly left to the jury. It was unnecessary to tell

them whether, in the language of law writers, such negligence

would be called gross or ordinary.

The conclusions to which we have come are —

First. That a common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for

exemption from responsibility when such exemption is not just

and reasonable in the eye of the law.

Secondly. That it is not just and reasonable in the eye of

the law for a common carrier to stipulate for exemption from

responsibility for the negligence of himself or his servants.
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Thirdly. That these rules apply both to carriers of goods and

carriers of passengers for hire, and with special force to the

latter.

Fourthly. That a drover traveling on a pass, such as was

given in this case, for the purpose of taking care of his stock

on the train, is a passenger for hire.

These conclusions decide the present case, and require a judg-

ment of affirmance. We purposely abstain from expressing any

opinion as to w^hat would have been the result of our judgment

had we considered the plaintiff a free passenger instead of a

passenger for hire,

"Judgment affirmed.

^04. MYNARD V. SYRACUSE, ETC., RAILROAD CO.,

71 N. Y. 180; 27 Am. R. 28. ' 1877.

Action to recover from a common carrier for the loss of a

steer resulted in judgment foi" defendant.

Church, C. J, The parties stipulated that the animal was lost

by reason of the negligence of some of the employees of the de-

fendant without the fault of the plaintiff. The defense rested
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solely upon exemption from liability contained in the contract

of shipment by which, for the consideration of a reduced rate,

the plaintiff agreed to "release and discharge the said company

from all claims, demands and liabilities of every kind whatso-

ever for or on account of, or connected with, any damage or

injury to or the loss of said stock, or any portion thereof, from

whatsoever cause arising."

The question depends upon the construction to be given to

this contract, whether the exemption ' ' from whatever cause aris-

ing" should be taken to include a loss accruing by the negligence

of the defendants or its servants. The language is general and

broad. Taken literally it would include the loss in question,

and it would also include a loss accruing from an intentional

or willful act on the part of servants. It is conceded that the

latter is not included. We must look at the language in con-

nection with the circumstances and determine what was in-

tended, and whether the exemption claimed was within the

contemplation of the parties.

The defendant was a common carrier, and as such was abso-

lutely liable for the safe carriage and delivery of property in-

trusted to its care, except for loss or injury occasioned by the
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acts of God or public enemies. The obligations are imposed by

law, and not by contract. A common carrier is subject to two

distinct classes of liabilities — one where he is liable as an insurer

without fault on his part; the other, as an ordinary bailee for

hire, when he is liable for default in not exercising proper care

and diligence ; or, in other words, for negligence. General words

from, whatever cause arising may well be satisfied by limiting

them to such extraordinary liabilities as carriers are under with-

out fault or negligence on their part.

"When general words may operate without including the negli-

gence of the carrier or his servants, it will not be presumed that

it was intended to include it. Every presumptiop. is against an

intention to contract for immunity for not exercising ordinary

diligence in the transaction of any business, and hence the gen-

eral rule is that contracts will not be so construed, unless ex-

pressed in unequivocal terms. In New Jersey Steam Navigation

Co. V. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. (U. S.) 344, a contract that

the carriers are not responsible in any event for loss or dam-

age, was held not intended to exonerate them from liability for
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want of ordinary care. Nelson, J., said: "The language is

general and broad, and might very well comprehend every de-

scription of risk incident to the shipment. But we think it

would be going further than the intent of the parties upon any

fair and reasonable construction of the agreement, were we to

regard it as stipulating for wilful misconduct, gross negligence,

or want of ordinary care, either in the seaworthiness of the ves-

sel, her proper equipments and furniture, or in her management

by the master and hands." This rule has been repeatedly fol-

lowed in this State. In Alexander v. Green, 7 Hill 533, the stip-

ulation was to tow plaintiff's canal boat from New York to Al-

bany at the risk of the master and owners, and the Court of Er-

rors reversed a judgment of the Supreme Court with but a

single dissenting vote, and decided that the language did not in-

clude a loss occasioned by the negligence of the defendants or

their servants. In one of several opinons delivered by members

of the court, it was said, in respect to the claim for immunity for

negligence : "To maintain a proposition, m extravagant as this

would appear to be, the stipulation of the parties ought to be

most clear and explicit, showing that they comprehend in their

arrangement the case that actually occurred."

Wells V. Steam Nav. Co., 8 N. Y. 375, expressly approved of

the decision of Alelxander v. Greene, and reiterated the same

principle. Gardner, J., in speaking of that case, said: "We

held, then, if a party vested with a temporary control of an-

other's property for a special purpose of this sort would shield
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himself from responsibility on account of the gross neglect of

himself or his servants, he must show his immunity on the face

of his agreement; and that a stipulation so extraordinary, so

contrary to usage and the general understanding of men of

business, would 'not be implied from a general expression to

which effect might otherwise be given."

So, in the Steinweg Case, 43 N. Y. 123, 3 Am. R. 673, the con-

tract released the carrier "from damage or loss to any article

from or by fire or explosion of any kind," and this court held

that the release did not include a loss by fire occasioned by the

negligence of the defendant ; and, in the ]\Iagnin Case, still more

recently decided by this court (56 N. Y. 168), the contract with

the express company contained the stipulation "and, if the value

of the property above described is not stated by the shipper, the

holder thereof will not demand of the Adams Express Com-

pany a sum exceeding fifty dollars for the loss or detention of,

or damage to, the property aforesaid."

It was held, reversing the judgment below, that the stipnlation

did not cover a loss accruing through negligence, Johnson, J.,
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in the opinion, saying: "But the contract will not be deemed

to except losses occasioned by the carrier 's negligence, unless that

he expressly stipulated. ' ' In each of these eases, the language of

the contract was sufficiently broad to include losses occasioned

by ordinary or gross negligence, but the doctrine is repeated

that, if the carrier, asks for immunity for his wrongful acts, it

must be expressed, and that general words will not be deemed

to have been intended to relieve him from the consequences of

such acts.

These authorities are directly in point, and they accord with

a wise public policy, by which courts should be guided in the

construction of contracts designed to relieve common carriers

from obligations to exercise care and diligence in the prosecu-

tion of their business, which the law imposes upon ordinary

bailees for hire engaged in private business. In the recent case

of Lockwood V. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 357, the Supreme Court

of the United States decided that a cxxmrnon carrier cannot law-

fully stipulate for exemption from responsibility for the negli-

gence of himself or his servants. If we felt at liberty to review

the question, the reasoning of Justice Bradley in that case would

be entitled to serious consideration ; but the right thus to stipu-

late has been so repeatedly affirmed by this court, that the ques-

tion cannot with propriety be regarded as an open one in this

State. 8 N. Y. 375 ; ,11 id. 485 ; 24 id. 181-196 ; 25 id. 442 ; 42

id. 212 ; 49 id. 263 ; 51 id. 61.

The remedy is "with the legislature, if remedy is needed. But,
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Yipon the question involved here, it is correctly stated in that

case, that "a review of the cases decided by the courts of New

York shows that, though they have carried the power of the

common carrier to make special contracts to the extent of enab-

ling him to exonerate himself from the effects of even gross

negligence, yet that this effect has never been given to a contract

general in its terms." Such has been the uniform course of

decisions in this and most of the other States, and public policy

demands that it should not be changed. It cannot be said that

parties, in making such contracts, stand on equal terms. The

shipper, in most cases, from motives of convenience, necessity

or apprehended injury, feels obliged to accept the terms pro-

posed by the carrier, and practically the contract is made by

one party only, and should, therefore, be construed most strongly

against him; and especially should he not be relieved from the

consequences of his own wrongful acts under general words or

by implication.

There was a period when the courts of England were inclined

to relax this rule, and this led to the adoption of an act of
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Parliament on this subject, under which the courts have since

acted. See 10 House of Lords Cases, 473.

It is argued that the rule does not apply to the carriage of ani-

mals ; that, in respect to such property, the common-law liabili-

ties of common carriers do not attach; that the carrier is only

liable for negligence, and hence that the stipulation can apply

to nothing else.

There might be some force in this point, if the position that

carriers of animals are only liable for negligence or miscondtict

is correct. But that positiori cannot be maintained. The liabil-

ity of carriers of animals is modified only so far as the cause of

damage for which recompense is sought, is a consequence of the

conduct or propensities of the animals undertaken to be carried.

In other respects, the common-law responsibilities of the car-

rier will attach. This was expressly held in Clarke v. Rochester

& S. E. R. Co., 14 N. Y. 573, 67 Am. D. 205, Denio, J., said:

"But the rule which would exempt the carrier altogether from

accidents arising out of the peculiar character of the freight,

irrespective of the question of negligence, would be equally un-

reasonable. It would relieve the carrier altogether from those

necessary precautions which any person becoming the bailee for

hire of animals is bound to exercise; and the owner, where he

did not himself assume the duty of seeing to them, would be

wholl}^ at the mercy of the carrier. The nature of the case does

not call for any such relaxation of the rule ; and, considering the

law of carriers to be established upon consideration of sound
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policy, we would not depart from it, except where the reason

upon which it is based wholly fails, and then no further than

the cause for the exemption requires." The case of Palmer v.

Railway Co., 4 Mees. & AVels. 749, is cited, where the same

principle is decided. Aninuils may die of fright, by refusing to

eat, or break from their fastenings, and kill themselves, although

every proper precaution was used ; but there may be many acci-

dents producing loss or injury to animals which are not attrib-

utable to acts of God, and which were not caused by the peculiar

character of the property. By the act of God is meant some-

thing which operates without any aid or interference from man.

Merritt v. Earle, 29 N. Y. 115, 86 Am. D. 292. In that case it

Avas held that the carrier was liable for the value of a span of

horses lost by the sinking of a steamboat, caused by coming in

contact with the mast of a sloop which had been sunk in a squall

two days before. The court decided that sinking the steam-

boat was not caused by the act of God, and that the sinking of

the sloop, although by the act of God, was too remote, and many

accidents might happen producing loss to animals for which the
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carrier would be liable, although no fault or negligence could be

imputed ; and in respect to such, the common-law liability would

attach. Angell on Carriers, p. ISO, lays down the same rule.

The sanae qualification of liability applies to all property.

The carrier is excused ^rom liability for loss caused by inher-

ent infirmity or tendency to decay. It has been held that a car-

rier is not responsible for the evaporation of liquids, nor for the

diminution of molasses, caused by the oozing through vent holes

necessary to prevent th& bursting of barrels (Angell on Carriers,

§ 211, and cases cited) ; and exemptions from liability for loss by

inherent qualities of animals, rests upon the same principle. Be-

yond this the common-law liabilities exist against the carrier of

animals the same as the carrier of other property, and the clause

in the contract can, therefore, operate in many cases where neg-

ligence cannot be imputed.

In Massachusetts in Smith v. R. R. Co., 12 Allen, 531, the

court says: "The common-law liability of a carrier for the

delivery of live animals is the same as thaY for the delivery of

merchandise. Upon undertaking their transportation he as-

sumes the obligation to deliver them safely against all con-

tingencies, except such as would excuse the non-delivery of

other property." The qualification above referred to, excusing

the carrier from liability of loss occasioned by the nature and

character of the property, is recognized. The qualification or

exception, as before stated, is applicable to all property, and does

not affect the common-law liabilities to any greater extent than
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in respect to otlier property, except that the instances may bn

more numerous where the carrier will be excused. In Angell on

Carriers, § 214, it is said: "Such a case would seem to be anal-

ogous to the case of loss of merchandise owing to some inherent

defect which caused the destruction of it while in transit." As

well might carriers be exempted from common-law liabilities for

loss of inanimate property as for animals, if immunity from

loss from inherent defects, or from the nature and character of

the property, will produce that result.

The only authority seeming to favor the position of the re-

spondent is in Cragin v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 51 N. Y. 61, 10 Am.

R. 559. The loss of the hogs in that case was caused by heat,

and the negligence attributed was in not cooling them off with

water. We do not think, under the peculiar stipulation, and the

character of the property in that case, that it is in conflict within

the views before expressed.

The judgment of the General Term must be reversed, and that

of the county court affirmed.

All concur, except Andrews, J., taking no part ; Folgee, and
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Miller, JJ., absent.

Judgment accordingly.

7 105. HART V. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO.,

112 JJ. S. 331, 5 8. Ct. B. 151. 1884.

Action to recover $19,800 for the death of one race horse and

the injury of four others through the negligence of defendant

in transporting them. The court below excluded evidence that

the horse killed was worth $15,000 and the others from $3,000 to

$5,000 each. Verdict for plaintiff for $1,200.

Blatchford, J. It is contended for the plaintiff that the bill

of lading does not purport to limit the liability of the defendant

to the amounts stated in it, in the event of loss through the

negligence of the defendant. But we are of opinion that the

contract is not susceptible of that construction. The defendant

receives the property for transportation on the terms and con-

ditions expressed, which the plaintiff accepts, "as just and rea-

sonable." The first paragraph of the contract is that the plain-

tiff is to pay the rate of freight expressed, "on the condition

that the carrier assumes a liability on the stock to the extent of

the following agreed valuation : if horses or mules, not ex-

ceeding two hundred dollars each. . . . If a chartered car,

on the stock and contents in same, twelve hundred dollars for
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the car load. ' ' Then follow in the first paragraph these words :

' ' But no carrier shall be liable for the acts of the animals them-

selves, or to each other, such as biting, kicking, goring or smoth

ering, nor for loss or damage arising from condition of the ani-

mals themselves, which risks, being beyond the control of the com-

pany, are hereby assumed by the owner, and the carrier released

therefrom. ' ' This statement of the fact that the risks from the

acts and condition of the horses are risks beyond the control of

the defendant, and are, therefore, assumed by the plaintiff, shows,

if more were needed than the other language of the contract, that

tlie ri&ks and liability assumed by the defendant in the remainder

of the same paragraph are those not beyond, but within, the

control of the defendant, and, therefore, apply to loss through

the negligence of the defendant.

It must be presumed from the terms of the bill of lading, and

without any evidence on the subject, and especially in the ab-

sence of any evidence to the contrary, that, as the rate of freight

expressed is stated to be on the condition that the defendant as-

sumes a liability to the extent of the agreed valuation named, the
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rate of freight is graduated by the valuation. Especially is this

so, as the bill of lading is what its heading states it to be, "a

limited liability live-stock contract," and is confined to live-

stock. Although the horses, being race-horses, may, aside from

the bill of lading, have been of greater real value than that spe-

cified in it, whatever passed between the parties before the bill

of lading was signed was merged in the valuation it fixed; and

it is not asserted that the plaintiff named any value, greater or

less, otherwise than as he assented to the value named in the bill

of lading, by signing it. The presumption is conclusive that,

if the lial^ility had been assumed on a valuation as great as that

now alleged, a higher rate of freight would have been charged.

The rate of freight is indissolubly bound up with the valuation.

If the rate of freight named was the only one offered by the

defendant, it was because it was a rate measured by the valua-

tion expressed. If the valuation was fixed at that expressed,

when the real value was larger, it was because the rate of freight

named was measured by the low valuation. The plaintiff cannot

claim, a higher valuation, on the agreed rate of freight.

It is further contended by the plaintiff, that the defendant

was forbidden, by public policy, to fix a limit for its liability

for a loss by negligence, at an amount less than the actual loss

by such negligence. As a minor proposition, a distinction is

sought to be drawn between a case Vv^here a shipper, on require-

ment, states the value of the property, and a rate of freight is

fixed accordingly, and the present case. It is said, that, while
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in the former ease the shipper may be confined to the value he

so fixed, in the event of a loss by negligence, the same rule does

not apply to a case where the valuation inserted in the contract

is not a valuation previously named by the shipper. But we see

no sound reason for this distinction. The valuation named was

the ''agreed valuation," the one on which the minds of the

parties met, however it came to be fixed, and the rate of freight

was based on that valuation, and was fixed on condition that

such was the valuation, and that the liability should go to that

extent and no further.

We are, therefore, brought back to the main question. It is

the law of this court, that a common carrier may, by special

contract, limit his common-law liability; but that he cannot

stipulate for exemption from the consequences of his own negli-

gence or that of his servants. New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v.

Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344; York Co. v. Central R. R. Co., 3

Wall. 107; Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; Express Co.

V. Caldwell, 21 AVall. 264; Railroad Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 123;

Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Co., 93 U. S. 174 ; Railway
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Co. V. Stevens, 95 U. S. 655.

In York Co. v. Central Railroad, 3 Wall. 107, a contract was

upheld exempting a carrier from liability for loss by fire, the

fire not having occurred through any want of due care on his

part. The court said, that a common carrier may "prescribe

regulations to protect himself against imposition and fraud, and

fix a rate of charges proportionate to the magnitude of the risks

he may have to encounter. ' '

In Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, the following prop-

ositions were laid down by this court: (1) A common carrier

cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from responsibility

when such exemption is not just and reasonable, in the eye of

the law; (2) It is not just and reasonable in the eye of the law,

for a common carrier to stipulate for exemption from responsi-

bility for the negligence of himself or his servants; (3) These

rules apply both to carriers of goods and to carriers of passen-

gers for hire, and with special force to the latter. The basis

of the decision was, that the exemption was to have applied to

it the test of its justness and reasonable character. It was said,

that the contracts of the carrier "must rest upon their fairness

and reasonableness"; and that it was just and reasonable that

carriers should not be responsible for losses happening by sheer

accident, or chargeable for valuable articles liable to be dam-

aged, unless apprised of their character or value. That case was

one of a drover traveling on a stock train on a railroad, to look

after his cattle, and having a free pass for that purpose, who
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had signed an agreement taking all risk of injury to his cattle

and of personal injury to himself, and who was injured by the

negligence of the railroad company or its servants.

In Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264, this court held, that

an agreement made by an express company, a common carrier

in the habit of carrying small packages, that it should not be held

liable for any loss or damage to a package delivered to it, unless

claim should be made therefor within ninety days from its de-

livery to the company, was an agreement which the company

could rightfully make. The court said: "It is now the settled

law, that the responsibility of a common carrier may be limited

by an express agreement made with his employer at the time

of his accepting goods for transportation, provided the limita-

tion be such as the law can recognize as reasonable and not in-

consistent with sound public policy." It was held that the

stipulation as to the time of making a claim was reasonable and

intrinsically just, and could not be regarded as a stipulation for

exemption from responsibility for negligence, because it did not

relieve the carrier from any obligation to exercise diligence, fidel-
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ity and care.

On the other hand, in Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express

Co., 93 U. S. 174, it was held that a stipulation by an express

company that it should not be liable for loss by fire could not

be reasonably construed as exempting it from liability for loss

by fire occurring through the negligence of a railroad company

which it had employed as a carrier.

To the views announced in these cases we adhere. But there

is not in them any adjudication on the particular question now

before us. It may, however, be disposed of on principles which

are well established and which do not conflict with any of the

rulings of this court. As a general rule, and in the absence of

fraud or imposition, a common carrier is answerable for the loss

of a package of goods though he is ignorant of its contents, and

though its contents are ever so valuable, if he does not make a

special acceptance. This is reasonable, because he can always

guard himself by a special acceptance, or by insisting on being

informed of the nature and value of the articles before receiving

them. If the shipper is guilty of fraud or imposition, b}-- mis-

representing the nature or value of the articles, he destroys his

claim to indemnity, because he has attempted to deprive the car-

rier of the right to be compensated in proportion to the value

of the articles and the consequent risk assumed, and what he

has done has tended to lessen the vigilance the carrier would

otherwise have bestowed. 2 Kent's Comm. 603, and cases cited;

Relf V. Rapp, 3 Watts. & Serg. (Pa.) 21, 37 Am. D. 528; Dunlap
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V. International Steamboat Co., 98 Mass. 371 ; Railroad Co. v.

Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24. This qualification of the liability of the

carrier is reasonable, and is as important as the rule which it

qualifies. There is no justice in allowing the shipper to be paid

a large value for an article which he has induced the carrier to

take at a low rate of freight on the assertion and agreement that

its value is a less sum than that claimed after a loss. It is just

to hold the shipper to his agreement, fairly made, as to value,

even where the loss or injury has occurred through the negli-

gence of the carrier. The effect of the agreement is to cheapen

the freight and secure the carriage, if there is no loss; and the

effect of disregarding the agreement, after a loss, is to expose

the carrier to a greater risk than the parties intended he should

assume. The agreement as to value, in this; case, stands as if

the carrier had asked the value of the horses, and had been told

by the plaintiff the sum inserted in the contract.

The limitation as to value has no tendency to exempt from

liability for negligence. It does not induce want of care. It ex-

acts from the carrier the measure of care due to the value agreed
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on. . The carrier is bound to respond in that value for negli-

gence. The compensation for carriage is based on that value.

The shipper is estopped from saying that the value is greater.

The articles have no greater value, for the purposes of the con-

tract of transportation, between the parties to that contract.

The carrier must respond for negligence up to that value. It is

just and reasonable that such a contract, fairly entered into, and

where there is no deceit practised on the shipper, should be

upheld. There is no violation of public policy. On the contrary

it would be unjust and unreasonable, and would be repugnant

to the soundest principles of fair dealing and of the freedom

of contracting, and thus in conflict with public policy, if a ship-

per should be allowed to reap the benefit of the contract if there

is no loss, and to repudiate it in case of loss.

The principle is not a new one. In Gibbon v. Paynton, 4

Burrows, 2298, the sum of £100 was hidden in some hay in an

old mail-bag and sent by a coach and lost. The plaintiff knew

of a notice by the proprietor that he would not be answerable

for money unless he knew what it was, but did not apprise the

pi'oprietor that there was money in the bag. The defence was

upheld, Lord Mansfield saying: "A common carrier, in re-

spect of the premium he is to receive runs the risque of the

goods, and must make good the loss, though it happen without

any fault in him, the reward making him answerable for their

safe delivery. His warranty and insurance is in respect of the

reward he is to receive, and the reward ought to be proportion-
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able to the risque. If he makes a greater warranty and insur-

ance, he will take greater care, use more caution, and be at the

expense of more guards or other methods of security ; and, there-

fore, he ought, in reason and justice, to have a greater reward."

To the same effect is Batson v. Donovan, 4 B. & A. 21.

The subject-matter of a contract may be valued, or the dam-

ages in ease of a breach may be liquidated in advance. In the

present case, the plaintiff accepted the valuation as "just and

reasonable."" The bill of lading did not contain a valuation of

all animals at a fixed sum for each, but a graduated valuation

according to the nature of the animal. It does not appear that

an unreasonable price would have been charged for a higher

valuation.

The decisions in this country are at variance. The rule which

we regard as the proper one in the case at bar is supported in

Newburger v. Howard, 6 Philadelphia Rep. 174; Squire v. New

York Cent. R. R. Co., 98 Mass. 239, 93 Am. D. 162 ; Hopkins v.

Westcott, 6 Blatchford, 64; Belger v. Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 166,

10 Am. R. 575 ; Oppenheimer v. U. S. Express Co., 69 111. 62, 18
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Am. R. 596 ; T^Iagnin v. Dinsmore, 56 N. Y. 168, and 62 N. Y. 35,

20 Am. R. 442, and 70 N. Y. 410, 26 Am. R. 608 ; Earnest v. Ex-

press Co., 1 "Woods, 573; Elkins v. Empire Transportation Co.,

81 Penn. St. 315 ; South & North Alabama R. R. Co. v. Henlein,

52 Ala. 606, 23 Am. R. 578 ; Same v. Same, 56 Id. 368 ; Muser v.

Holland, 17 Blatchford, 412; Harvey v. Terre Haute R. R. Co.,

74 Missouri, 538; and Graves v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. R. Co.,

137 ]\Iass. 33, 50 Am. R. 282, The contrary rule is sustained in

Southern Express Co. v. Moon, 39 Miss. 822 ; The City of Nor-

wich, 4 Ben. 271 ; United States Express Co. v. Backman. 28 Ohio

St. 144; Black v. Goodrich Transportation Co., 55 Wis. 319, 13 N.

W. R. 244, 42 Am. R. 713 ; Chicago, St. Louis & N. 0. R. R. Co. v.

Abels, 60 ]\riss. 1017 ; Kansas City etc. Railroad Co. v. Simpson,

30 Kan. 645, 2 Pac. R. 821, 46 Am. R. 104; and IMoulton v. St.

Paul etc. R. R. Co., 31 Minn. 85, 16 N. W. R. 497, 47 Am. R. 781.

We have given consideration to the views taken in these cases,

but are unable to concur in their conclusions. Applying to the

case at hand the proper test to be applied to every limitation of

the common-law liability of a carrier — its just and reasonable

character — we have reached the result indicated. In Great

Britain, a statute directs this test to be applied 1\y the courts.

The same rule is the proper one to be applied in this country, in

the absence of any statute.

As relating to the question of the exemption of a carrier from

liability beyond a declared value, reference may be made to

section 4281 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (a re-
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enactment of section 69 of the act of February 28, 1871, ch. 100,

16 Stat. 458), which provides, that if any shipper of certain

enumerated articles, which are generally articles of large value

in small bulk, "shall lade the same, as freight or baggage, on

any vessel, without at the time of such lading giving to the mas-

ter, clerk, agent, or owner of such vessel receiving the same, a

written notice of the true character and value thereof, and hav-

ing the same entered on the bill of lading therefor, the master

and owner of such vessel shall not be liable as carriers thereof in

any form or manner, nor shall any such master or owner be

liable for any such goods beyond the value and according to the

character thereof so notified and entered." The principle of

this statute is in harmony with the decision at which we have

arrived.

The plaintiff did not, in the course of the trial, or by any re-

quest to instruct the jury, or by any exception to the charge,

raise the point that he did not fully understand the terms of

the bill of lading, or that he was induced to sign it by any fraud

or under any misapprehension. On the contrary, he offered and
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read in evidence the bill of lading, as evidence of the contract

on which he sued.

The distinct ground of our decision in the case at bar is, that

where a contract of the kind, signed by the shipper, is fairly

made, agreeing on the valuation of the property carried, with

the rate of freight based on the condition that the carrier as-

sumes liability only to the extent of the agreed valuation, even

in case of loss or damage by the negligence of the carrier, the

contract will be upheld as a proper and lawful mode of securing

a due proportion between the amount for which the carrier may

be responsible and the freight he receives, and of protecting him-

self against extravagant and fanciful valuations. Squire v.

NeAv York Cent. R. R. Co., 98 Mass. 239, 245, 93 Am. D. 162, and

cases there cited.

There was no error in excluding the evidence offered, or in

the charge to the jury, and the judgment of the Circuit Court

is affirmed. ^n

106. MOULTON V. ST. PAUL, MINNEAPOLIS & MANI-

TOBA RAILWAY CO.,

31 Minn. 85; 47 Am. B. 781. 1883.

Action for the value of horses lost through the negligence

of the carrier. Plaintiff secured a verdict for full value of

horses.
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Dickinson, J. The plaintiffs shipped two ear-loads of horses

at St. Paul, over defendant's line of road, to points in Dakota.

Two of the horses died by reason of prolonged exposure to cold

weather, as is claimed, caused by defendant's negligent deten-

tion of the train during transportation. The action is for the

recovery of the value of these two horses, which appears to have

been $200 each. For the purposes of this appeal, we are to

consider the negligence of the defendant as established, and are

to determine whether the defendant is liable for its negligence,

and the measure or extent of its liability under the contract

made by the parties.

The contract under which the property was shipped, and

which was executed by both plaintiffs and defendant, contained

the provisions that in consideration that the defendant would

transport the property at the rate of $75 per car-load, ' ' the same

being a rate given, subject to the conditions of this contract,"

the plaintiffs released the defendant from the liability of a com-

mon carrier, and from any liability for any delay in shipping the

stock after its delivery to the defendant, and agreed that the
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liability of the defendant should be only that of a private car-

rier for hire. The plaintiff's contracted to assume all risk of

damage which might be sustained by reason of any delay in

transportation, and all risk of damage from any other cause,

not resulting from the willful negligence of the agents of the

defendant. It was further agreed, that in case of total loss, the

damage Should in no case exceed the sum of $100 per head, and

in ease of partial loss, damage should be measured in the same

proportion. A printed "regulation" of the defendant, attached

to the contract, provided that the defendant would not assume

any liability over $100 per head on horses and valuable live-

stock, except by special agreement. B}^ the contract of the

parties the owner of the horses attended and cared for them

upon the passage, without extra charge for his own transporta-

tion.

A railroad company which undertakes to transport live-stock

for hire, for such persons as choose to employ it, assumes the re-

lation of a common carrier, and becomes chargeable with the

duties and obligations which are incident to that relation. Kim-

ball V. Eutland & B. R. R. Co., 26 Vt. 247, 62 Am. D. 567; Rix-

ford V. Smith, 52 N. H. 355, 13 Am. R. 42 ; Clarke v. Rochester

& S. R. R. Co., 14 N. Y. 570, 67 Am. D. 205 ; Evans v. Fitchburg

R. R. Co., Ill Mass. 142, 15 Am. R. 19 ; St. Louis & S. E. Ry,

Co. V. Dorman, 72 111. 504; Powell v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co.,

32 Pa. St. 414, 75 Am. D. 564; Great Western Ry. Co. v. Haw-

kins, 18 Mich. 427, 433.

^19

§ 106 LIABILITY UNDER SPECIAL CONTEACT,

By this it is not meant that the carrier is an insurer of the

property as respects injury which it may suffer from all causes.

Such a liability does not exist without qualification as to per-

sonal property generally in the hands of a carrier. He is not,

for instance, an insurer in respect to any injury unavoidablj'

resulting from the essential nature of the property itself, such

as the natural decay of fruit, although he should use reasonable

care for its preservation. For like reasons as those upon which

rest the exceptions to the absolute obligation of the carrier, as

respects property generally, it is undoubtedly true that the

ordinary common-law liability of the carrier is subject to some

modifications arising from the nature and propensities of the

animals, and their capacity for inflicting injuries upon them-

selves and upon each other, when live-stock is the subject of

transportation. What may be the nature and extent of such

modifications we have no occasion now to consider. For our

present purposes it is enough to say that cases where the injury

is the result of want of ordinary care on the part of the car-

rier are aqt within the exceptions to the rule. See cases above
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cited. '

The recovery in this ease rests alone upon the neglect of the

defendant to transport the horses to their destination within a

reasonable time, whereby, from exhaustion and exposure to cold,

they died. The law has been determined in this State, and in

most of the United States, as well as in the Federal Supreme

Court, to be that a common carrier of goods cannot by contract

relieve himself from liability for his own negligence. Cliristen-

son v. American Express Co., 15 Minn, 270, 2 Am. E. 122 ;

Shriver v. Sioux City & St. P. R. R. Co., 24 Minn. 506, 31 Am.

R. 353 ; Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 ; Bank of Ken-

tucky V. Adams Exp. Co., 93 U. S. 174. Nor is there any reason

why a different rule should prevail in respect to the transporta-

tion of live-stock, or of property under the care of the owner.

The rule itself rests upon considerations of public policy, and

upon the fact that to allow the carrier to absolve himself from

the duty of exercising care and fidelity is inconsistent with the

very nature of his undertaking. These reasons apply with

undiminished force where the property is live-stock, or is under

the care of the owner, who has not the direction or control of

the agencies and the operation of the transportation. To what-

ever extent such facts might modify or affect the liability of

the carrier for accidents, or for injuries not the result of his

own negligence, they would not qualify his responsibility for

his own neglect of duty. The agreement discharging the de-

fendant from the liability of a common carrier cannot avail to
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divest the carrier of his real character, nor indirectly relieve

him from responsibilities from which he cannot directly by

contract free himself. Christenson v. American Express Co.,

supra; Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Co., supra.

Our conclusion therefore is that the defendant was responsible

in damages for its negligence, notwithstanding the contract.

The same reasons which forbid that a common carrier should,

even by express contract, be absolved from liability for his own

negligence, stand also in the way of any arbitrary preadjustment

of the measure of damages, where the carrier is partially re-

lieved from such liability. It would indeed be absurd to say

that the requirement of the law as to such responsibility of the

carrier is absolute, and cannot be laid aside, even by the agree-

ment of the parties, but that one-half or three-fourths of this

burden, which the law compels the carrier to bear, may be laid

aside, by means of a contract limiting the recovery of damages

to one-half or one-fourth of the known value of the property.

This would be mere evasion, which would not be tolerated. Yet

there is no reason why the contracting parties may not in good
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faith agree upon the value of the property presented for trans-

portation, or fairly liquidate the damages recoverable in ac-

cordance with the supposed value. Such an agreement would

not be an abrogation of the requirements of the law, but only the

application of the law as it is by the parties themselves to the

circumstances of the particular ea%e. But that the requirements

of the law be not evaded, and its purposes frustrated, contracts

of this kind should be closely scrutinized.

Upon the face of the contract under consideration, it is ap-

parent that it was not the purpose of the parties to liquidate

the damages recoverable, with reference to the value of the prop-

erty consigned to the carrier. Its provisions are somewhat con-

tradictory, and not easily reconciled. The general regulation

attached to the contract, to the effect that the company ''will not

assume any liability over one hundred dollars per head on horses

and valuable live-stock except by special agreement," is plainly

opposed to the law as established, so far as regards the negligence

of the carrier. As a regulation it is therefore of no effect. The

law declares that the carrier shall be liable to the extent of the

value of the property, although there be no special agreement.

We do not question the right of a carrier to require the dis-

closure, by the consignor, of the value of the property presented

for transportation, where its value is not apparent and well

known. This is reasonable, both to the end that proper care may

be taken of the property while it is in the hands of the carrier,

and because the proper charges for transportation may often
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depend largely upon value. We see nothing, however, in this

contract which can be regarded as having been intended as call-

ing for such a disclosure on the part of the plaintiffs, or as estop-

ping them from claiming a recovery, upon the ground of the

carrier's negligence, of the actual value of the horses. In

terms, the contract purports to relieve the defendant from lia-

bility, even for its own negligence, and at the same time, if a

recovery shall be had notwithstanding this agreement, then the

amount of such recovery is limited to the sum of $100 per head

These stipulations cannot naturally be applied to a case involv-

ing as the cause of action the negligence of the carrier, without

making them, in effect, to be an agreement in the first place for

absolute exemption from liability (except for willful negli-

gence) ; and if notwithstanding the agreed exemption a recovery

should be awarded, it shall not exceed the sum named; that is

to say (as applied to a case of negligence), it is, in effect, an

agreement for absolute exemption, and that failing to be sus-

tained, then for a partial exemption from the liability which

the law imposes in such cases, and which cannot be laid aside
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by the mere consent of parties. Such a contract cannot be

sustained.

Order affirmed.

Compare with Hart v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 112 U. S.

331, ante § 105. See also Alair v. Northern Pacific Railroad

Co., 53 Minn. 160, 54 N. W. R. 1072, 39 Am. St. R. 588.

107. HANSEN V. FLINT AND PERE MARQUETTE RAIL-

ROAD CO.,

73 Wis. 346; 41 N. W. E. 529; 9 Am. St. R. 791. 1889.

Action to recover the value of goods shipped over defendant's

line and partially destroyed by fire. Judgment for plaintiffs.

Orton, J. The facts are substantially as follows: Roundy,

Peckham & Co., merchants of the city of Milwaukee, on No-

vember 2, 1887, upon an order from Hansen and Kirsh, the re-

spondents, of Onekama, Michigan, shipped to them by the ap-

pellant company a large bill of goods, Roundy, Peckham & Co.,

on that day, sent the goods to the warehouse of the appellant

by their drayman, and received in return the following receipt :

"Original. — Milwaukee, , 188—, — Shipped by Roundy,

Peckham & Co. the following articles, in good order, to be de-

livered in like good order, as addressed, without unnecessary de-
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lay. —Consigned to Hansen & Kirsh, Onekama, Mich. — Descrip-

tion of articles. — Weight. ' ' Here follows a list of the articles

shipped, covering four sheets of paper, upon each of which is

the same heading as above, and on the face of the re-

ceipt, and on each page or sheet, is stamped by the agent of the

appellant company the following: "F. & P. M. R. R. Co. —

Rec'd. Nov. 2, 1887.— By Agent— Milwaukee." On the face of

the stamp is written the letter "P." The stamp was affixed to

the receipt by a Mr. Pawlett, the agent of th. appellant com-

pany, on that day, who wrote the letter "P." thereon as his

initial letter, and the stamp used by him was the one cus-

tomarily used by the agent for such purpose. A portion only

of the goods arrived at Onekama, their destination, the re-

mainder having been burned or damaged at Manistee, Michigan,

by fire. The value of the goods so lost was $651.74, for which,

and interest of $45.62, making a total of $697.36, the jury ren-

dered a verdict for the plaintiffs by direction of the court, and

from the judgment thereon this appeal is taken.

The contention of the learned counsel of the appellant is,
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that the defendant was entitled to show that its route and line

as a carrier extended no farther than IManistee, Michigan, and

that said goods were safely carried to that point, and deposited

in a warehouse, and in a place set apart for the use of the

captain and proprietor of a boat called Adriene, which plied

between Manistee and Onekama, who receipted for the goods,

and was in the act of removing them, and had removed a part

onto his boat, when the warehouse was totally destroyed by

fire, and the goods not then removed were destroyed or injured

without negligence of the defendant; and that the defendant

was entitled to show further that Roundy, Peckham & Co.

well understood that the custom was between the defendant's

line and such connecting carrier that such connecting carrier

had nothing to do with the defendant's line, and the circum-

stances connected with the giving of the receipt, and that the

agent, Pawlett, had no authority to make a through bill of

lading between Milwaukee and Onekama. This evidence was

ruled out by the court, and proper exceptions taken. The ad-

missibility of this evidence depends upon the legal character

of the receipt as being a full and perfect contract to carry the

goods through the entire route, or otherwise. If the receipt

constitutes a through bill of lading of the goods from Mil-

waukee to Onekama, then it could not be contended that any

parol evidence could be given to explain or vary it, and what

is established by contract cannot be changed or affected by

custom. The general usage of a railroad company in respect
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to forwarding goods marked for points beyond its terminus

will be deemed to enter into its contract of transportation :

Hooper v. Chicago & N. W. R'y Co., 27 Wis. 81, 9 Am. Rep.

439 ; Wood V. Milwaukee & St. Paul R'y Co., 27 Wis. 541, 9 Am.

Rep. 465, Nor could it be contended that the express au-

thority of the agent must be proved when he acted as such

in the proper place for receiving goods for the company, and

was in possession of the company's stamp to be used on such

receipts, and the company took possession of the goods and

caused them to be shipped with knowledge of the receipt,

which it must be presumed the company had before they were

so shipped. No other proof of agency is necessary than that the

agent's acts justify the party dealing with him in believing that

he had authority : Kasson v. Noltner, 43 Wis. 646.

The sole question, therefore, is. Does the receipt import a

full and complete contract to carry the goods to their destina-

tion, or such a contract that it was fully performed by a de-

livery of the goods to the connecting carrier? I cannot well

see how a receipt or bill of lading could be drawn to make a
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through-contract if this receipt does not. It has all the usual

terms. The destination, and the consignees at that place are

named. The goods are ''shipped" by Roundy, Peckham & Co.,

"in good order, to be delivered in like good order, as addressed,

without unnecessary delay.'.' The address is "Hansen & Kirsh,

Onekama, Mich.," as the consignees. Outside of the stamp upon

it, it is more like a shipping bill or a bill of lading than a mere re-

ceipt. The goods are not received, but shipped by Roundy, Peck-

ham & Co. The stamp is marked "Rec'd. Nov. 2, 1887, by agent,

P., Milwaukee." All the apt words to make a perfect, through-

contract are used, and none omitted. Manistee, as the

destination, is not mentioned, nor is it found in the contract

anywhere, for any purpose, nor is it knouTi from the receipt

or contract, that there was any connecting carrier on the route,

or if so, what one, by water, from Manistee. The respondents

took no responsibility of carriage beyond Manistee, but the

company assumed it and contracted for it. Even within the

rule contended for by the learned counsel of the appellant, —

which is claimed to be the general rule by the authorities, —

"that where a carrier receives goods for transportation beyond

his own line he is not responsible for any loss occurring be-

yond his line, unless there is a special contract or some usage

of business which shows that such carrier takes the goods for

the whole route," the defendant was bound to carry the goods

the whole route; for there was a special contract to that effect,

as we have seen. In Wahl v. Holt, 26 Wis. 703, the bill of
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lading, or "shipping-receipt," as it is called in the opinion,

had the same apt words: "To be delivered in good order and

condition as when received, as addressed on the margin, or to

his or their consignees." On the margin was: "Account C.

Wahl, George F. Wilson, Providence, R. I." But the receipt in

that case had also, "Care A. T. Co., Bufifalo," and, "By the

Commercial Line of Propellers from Milwaukee to Buffalo."

These words were held to mean only that the line of pro-

pellers by which the goods were shipped ran "from Milwau-

kee to Buffalo," and "were not intended to define the points

between which the commercial line had undertaken to transport

the goods" ; and it was held that the proprietor of the Commercial

Line contracted to carry the goods to Providence, Rhode Island.

In that case, as in this, there was mixed land and water trans-

portation by connecting lines. The shipping-receipt or bill of

lading in the present case is more explicit, definite, and complete,

as a through-contract, than that in the above case, and there is no

mention of an intermediate point at the termination of the de-

fendant's line to break the continuity between Milwaukee and

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:40 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

Onekama. It is very clear that that case rules this, and is

sufficient authority for holding that this is a through-contract,

without citing other authorities. That case as well as this is

readily distinguishable from Parmelee v. Western Transp. Co.,

26 Wis. 439, as well as from all other cases in which the end of

the route was held to be an intermediate point, or the end of

the defendant's line. We think that the court was warranted in

directing a verdict for the plaintiffs.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
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CHAPTER XIII.

3. TERMINATION OF THE RELATION.

108. FISK V. NEWTON,

1 Denio (N. Y.) 45; 43 Am. D. 649. 1845.

Action agrainst a common carrier running a line of freight

barges on the Hudson for the non-delivery of certain kegs

marked for plaintiff, care of H. S. Field, New York. The kegs,

according to a usage (which was proved) in case the consignee

could not be found, were delivered to storekeepers. They sold

them, credited the proceeds to the line of boats, and became in-

solvent. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed on certiorari by

the superior court. Plaintiff then brought error.

By Court, Jewett, J. It is well settled that, prima facie, a

common carrier is bound not only safely to convey, but safely

to deliver a parcel which he has undertaken to carry, at the

place to which it is directed, to the consignee personally: Gib-

son v. Culver, 17 Wend. 305, 31 Am. Dec. 297, and the cases

there cited. Personal delivery, however, is sometimes dispensed

with, in the case of carriers by ships and boats. Notice given

to the consignee of the arrival and place of deposit, comes in
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lieu of personal delivery: 2 Kent's Com. 605, 3d ed. So when

goods are safely conveyed to the place of destination, and the

consignee is dead, absent, or refuses to receive, or is not known

and cannot after due efforts are made be found, the carrier may

discharge himself from further responsibility, by placing the

goods in store with some responsible third person in that busi-

ness, at the place of delivery, for and on account of the owner.

Wlien so delivered, the storehouse-keeper becomes the bailee

and agent of the owner in respect to such goods. In this case,

the wharf was the place of delivery, and H. S. Field, the per-

son to whom, from the directions of the plaintiff, the goods

were to be delivered. Field was unknown to the carrier. He

did not call at the place of delivery for the goods. The con-

signor had omitted to inform the defendant of the particular

residence of Field, or of his occupation or place of business.

He was a mere clerk, having no place of business, his name not
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in the city directory, and was not discovered by the carrier

although reasonable efforts were made to find him. The con-

signor had misinformed Field as to the line by which the goods

had been sent, and the person to whose care they were directed

to be delivered; by reason of which Field did not receive the

goods. The defendant put the goods in store with a responsible

third person, for and on account of the owner, according to

the usage of the trade at that place under such circumstances.

Then the goods are lost, through the insolvency of the store-

house-keeper, occurring several months after the delivery. I

think the risk of the carrier, from the facts in the case, ceased

on the delivery of the goods in store, and that the plaintiff

failed in his action.

The judgment of the superior court must therefore be af-

firmed.

109. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. V. HOCKETT,

30 Ind. 250; 95 Am. D. 691. 1868.

By Court, Elliott, J. Hockett sued the American Express

Company to recover the value of a package containing one hun-
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dred dollars in currency, received by the company at Chilli-

eothe, Missouri, to be carried and delivered to Hockett at Ander-

sontown, Indiana, which the company failed to do.

An answer was filed, to which a demurrer was sustained, and

the company excepted. On a refusal of the company to answer

further, judgment was rendered for Hockett. The company ap-

peals. The ruling of the court on the demurrer to the answer

presents the only question in the case.

The answer alleges "that the package of money mentioned

in the complaint was duly received at the office of the defendant

in Anderson, Madison County, Indiana. The defendant, upon

inquiry, could not find the residence of said plaintiff to be in

said town of Anderson, or in the vicinity; and being ignorant

of the real place of residence or postoffice address of said plain-

tiff, the said defendant, on the day of the arrival of said pack-

age, wrote a notice informing the plaintiff of the arrival of

said package of one hundred dollars at the said office of said de-

fendant, and that the same was ready for delivery, and then and

there inclosed the said notice in an envelope, indorsed 'Jona-

than Hockett, Anderson, Indiana,' and then and there duly

stamped the same, and when so directed and stamped, dropped

the same into the postoffice at Anderson; and then and there
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placed said package of money in a safe owned by the defendant,

wherein said defendant placed and kept all money packages

arri\'ing by express for parties, and then and there safely locked

the same; said package remaining in said safe thus securely

locked up for several days, no one calling for the same until

after said package had been stolen by thieves and burglars, who

in the night-time violently broke into the office of said defendant

where said safe was situate, and without the knowledge of said

defendant, broke open said safe, and feloniously stole, took,

and carried away said package of money, without any fault or

neglect of the defendant," etc.

Express companies in this state are declared by statute (1

G. & H. 327) to be ''common carriers, and subject to all the

liabilities to which common carriers are subject according to

law." As a general rule, common carriers by land are bound

to deliver the goods to the consignee at his residence or place

of business, where, from the nature of the parcels, this is the

more appropriate place for their delivery. Nor is it sufficient

that they are left at the public office of the carrier, unless by
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express permission, or a usage so established and well known

as to be equivalent to such permission : 1 Parsons on Contracts,

3d ed., 660. Goods carried by railroad companies form such an

exception : Bansemer v. Toledo etc. E. R. Co., 25 Ind. 434, 87

Am. Dee. 367. But if the consignee is absent, and the carrier

after diligent inquiry cannot find him, or ascertain the place

of his residence or business, then the liability as carrier is

deemed at an end ; but it is the duty of the carrier to take care

of the goods, by holding them himself, or depositing them with

some suitable person for the consignee, and in such case the

person holding the goods becomes the bailee of the owner or

consignee, and is only bound to reasonable diligence.

The answer in this case alleges that the defendant, "upon

inquiry," could not find the residence of the consignee to be

in the town of Anderson, or in the vicinity, and being ignorant

of his real place of residence or postoffice address, etc. The

inference from the answer is, that the inquiry, whatever it was,

was made of some one at defendant's office, for it seems that

immediately after the arrival of the package, the inquiry was

made, the package deposited in the safe, and the notice pre-

pared to be dropped in the postoffice. But if not made there,

where and of whom was it made ? Did the agent of the company

who made it content himself with asking the first person he met,

whether resident or stranger, or did he make the inquiry of

several? or in other words, did he make diligent and careful

inquiry to ascertain the residence of the consignee? The law
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required this to be done, but the answer does not aver that it

was done. Again, the answer does not aver that the plaintiff,

or his place of business, if any, could not easily have been found.

For aught that appears in the answer, the consignee may have

had an office or place of business in Anderson, where he could

readily have been found.

Nor does the answer show that reasonable care was taken

of the package. It alleges that it was deposited in a safe in the

company's office, in which other money packages received by

the company were deposited, and the safe securely locked, where

it remained until the office and safe were broken open by burg-

lars and the package stolen, without the knowledge of the com-

pany. What was the character of the office building? "Was

it so constructed and guarded as to make it a reasonably safe

place in which to leave money packages unguarded? The answer

is silent in this respect ; and we cannot infer that it was an ap-

propriate or safe building for such a purpose. Nor does it

appear that the safe in which the money was deposited was such

that persons of ordinary prudence would have risked it in such
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deposits. It is called a safe, yet, for anything shown by the

answer, it may have been an insecure wooden box. The building

was unguarded, and if, as alleged in the answer, the company

was accustomed to leave the money packages received in the

course of its business deposited there, it might reasonably be

expected that thieves and burglars would closely scrutinize its

condition, and common prudence would require that either the

building or the safe should be such as would likely resist such

an attack ; but there is nothing in the answer showing that such

was the character of either. So that if the facts alleged in the

answer could be deemed sufficient to discharge the appellant

from liability as a carrier, still it fails to show that it exercised

reasonable care with the package as bailee. It follows that, in

any view of the case, the answer is bad, and the demurrer to it

was correctly sustained.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

110. SCHEU V. BENEDICT,

116 N. Y. 510; 22 N. E. R. 1073; 15 Am. St. R. 426. 1889.

Haight, J. This action was brought to recover damages al-

leged to have been sustained by reason of a cargo of malt becom-

ing damp and wet. The defendants were common carriers of

freight upon the Erie Canal and Hudson River, and as such
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owned and ran the canal-boat W. W. Beebe. On the sixteenth

day of June, 1882, they received from the plaintiff thirteen

thousand bushels of Canada barley malt, in good order, to be

transported to the city of New York. Thereafter, and on the

twenty-ninth day of June, the cargo arrived, and notice was

given to the consignees of such arrival, who immediately, and

on the same day, commenced to unload the same, taking out

two thousand four hundred bushels. At the usual hour the

men stopped worked, and did not appear again to continue the

unloading of the cargo until the sixth day of July, being the

seventh day after breaking bulk. It was then found that the

malt had been injured by water, and the consignees refused to

receive it.

The bill of lading provided that the consignees should have

five week-days, regardless of weather, in which to discharge the

cargo without liability for demurrage. In discharging the cargo

the malt had to be shoveled into bags and taken and carted away.

Upon the trial, questions arose as to whether the grain was

received in good order, and as to whether it was damaged upon
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the voyage or after it arrived in New York, all of which we

must regard as settled by the verdict of the jury.

In submitting the case, the court was requested by the de-

fendant to charge that "if the jury should find that the carriers

offered to deliver the cargo after its arrival in New York,

and, receiving instructions as to its disposal, proceeded in pur-

suance thereof to a place designated, and commenced to dis-

charge the cargo, then the mere liability as common carrier ceased

after a reasonable time had elapsed to unload." This request

was refused under the circumstances of the case, and an ex-

ception was taken. The court had instructed the jury that the

consignees were entitled to a reasonable time in which to dis-

charge the cargo, and that the jury were the judges as to what

was a reasonable time, which must be determined under all

of the circumstances of the case; that the defendants were re-

sponsible for the cargo until it was delivered in some form or

another; that the mere putting of it at the disposal of the

plaintiff's agent to take out the cargo did not relieve the de-

fendants of their responsibility to take care of it while it lay

in the harbor of New York, and was not yet taken out of the boat,

and until it was removed either by the plaintiff or defendants

they were liable for the proper condition of the cargo ; and that

if it was damaged by rain whilst lying in New York, the de-

fendants were liable. Exceptions were taken to these charges,

and also to the refusal of the court to charge that "after bulk

had been broken and part of it removed, and after a reasonable
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time had then elapsed to unload or remove the remainder of the

cargo, the liability of the carrier, as such, ceased." It does

not appear to us that these charges, when read and considered

together, present any ground for error which calls for a reversal

of the judgment.

The rule, doubtless, is, that the common carrier of freight

by boat must, in order to relieve himself from liability, deliver

the goods at the place designated in good condition. Undoubted-

ly there may be a constructive delivery which would terminate

his responsibility as a carrier, but it must be such as would

in law be recognized as a delivery. If the consignee neglect

to accept or to receive the goods, the carrier is not thereby

justified in abandoning them or in negligently exposing them

to injury. If they are not accepted and received when notice

is given of their arrival, he may relieve himself from responsi-

bility by placing the goods in a warehouse for and on account

of the consignee, but so long as he has the custody a duty de-

volves upon him to take care of the property and preserve it

from injury : Tarbell v. Royal Ex. Shipping Co., 110 N. Y. 170-
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182, 17 N. E. R. 721, 6 Am. St. R. 350; Hathorn v. Ely, 28

N. Y. 78; Fisk v. Ne\Ai;on, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 45, 43 Am. Dec. 649;

Price V. Powell, 3 N. Y. 322 ; Fenner v. Buffalo etc. R. R. Co.,

44 N. Y. 505, 4 Am. Rep. 709.

As to whether or not the consignees proceeded with reason-

able diligence to unload the cargo was, as the trial court stated,

a question, under the circumstances of the case, for the jury.

In order to remove the malt from the boat, it had to be bagged

and carted away. Whether this could be done with safety, in

a rainy day, was a question of fact. It appears that Sunday

and one holiday had intervened, and that one or two days had

been rainy, so that we think a finding that the consignees had

not unreasonably delayed the unloading of the boat is justified

by the evidence. On the sixth day of July, as we have seen,

the cargo was found so damp as to cause it to be rejected by

the inspector of the parties. The consignees had the right to

have the malt inspected as it was taken from the boat before

accepting it. The entire cargo could not well be inspected at

the same time, for that which was on top may have been dry

and in good order, whilst that in the bottom of the boat might

have been wet and spoiled. The inspector stood by and ex-

amined it as it was taken from the boat, and it was only such

as passed his inspection that was accepted by the consignees.

That which remained in the boat at the close of work on the

twenty-ninth day of June remained in the custody and posses-

sion of the defendants, whose duty it was to exercise ordinary
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care to preserve and protect it from injury, and to allow the con-

signees a reasonable time within which to inspect it and take

it away, and in case they neglected to receive or take it within

such time, then it was the duty of the defendants to discharge

it in store or warehouse where it would still be protected from

the elements.

It consequently appears to us that the defendants have no

ground of complaint as to the charges made, and that the

judgment should be affirmed, with costs. ^

111. ZINN V. NEW JERSEY STEAMBOAT CO.,

49 N. Y. 442; 10 Am. B. 402. 1872.

Action for damages for neglect of defendant to make delivery

or give notice of arrival of merchandise. The boxes were

shipped from Augusta, Michigan, October 15, 1866, were de-

livered to defendants at Albany October 27, arrived in New

York October 28, and were stored with public warehousemen

October 30. Plaintiffs first learned of their arrival February

16, 1867, and received them April 15 following. The goods

had constantly depreciated in value. Judgment for plaintiffs.
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Allen, J. Common carriers assume not only the safe carriage

and delivery of property to the consignee, but also that mer-

chandise and other property received by them for transporta-

tion shall be carried to the place of destination and delivered

with reasonable dispatch ; and for any unreasonable delay, either

in the transportation or its delivery after its arrival at the ter-

minus of the route, they are responsible. Hand v. Baynes, 4

Whart. (Pa.) 204, 33 Am. D. 54; Raphael v. Pickford, 6 Scott

N. R. 478 ; Blackstock v. N. Y. & E. R. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 48, 75

Am. D. 372 ; Black v. Baxendale, 1 Exch. 410. The liability of

the carrier to answer for the non-delivery of goods, or the want

of reasonable expedition in their delivery, after their arrival at

the place of their destination, was not controverted upon the

trial.

The defendant in this action was not bound to deliver the mer-

chandise to the consignees at their place of business. A delivery

or offer to deliver at the wharf would have discharged the car-

rier from all responsibility as such carrier. Carriers by water or

railroad are not held to a delivery of goods to the consignees

at any place other than at the wharf of the vessel or the rail-

road station, and a notice to the consignee of the arrival of the
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goods, and of a readiness to deliver, comes in place of a per-

sonal delivery, so far as to release the carrier from the extraor-

dinary and stringent liability incident to that class of bailees.

Gibson v. Culver, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 305, 31 Am. D. 297; Fisk v.

Newton, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 45, 43 Am. D. 649; Fenner v. Buffalo

& St. L. R. R. Co., 44 N. Y. 505, 4 Am. R. 709.

If the consignee is present the goods may be tendered or de-

livered to him personally, and he is bound to remove them within

a reasonable time. If he is not present he is entitled to reason-

able notice from the carrier of their arrival, and a fair oppor-

tunity to take care of and remove them. If the consignee is un-

known to the carrier, the latter must use proper and reasonable

diligence to find him ; and if, after the exercise of such diligence,

the consignee cannot be found, the goods may be stored in a

proper place, and the carrier will have performed his whole

duty, and will be discharged from liability as a carrier. But for

want of diligence in finding the consignee and giving notice of

the arrival of the goods, the carrier is liable for the damages

resulting from a delay in the receipt of the goods by the con-
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signee, occasioned by such want of diligence. He can only re-

lieve himself from liability by storing the goods, after, by the

use of reasonable diligence, he is unable to find the consignee.

Witbeck v. Holland, 45 N. Y. 13, 6 Am. R. 23. A common

carrier has not performed his contract as carrier until he has

delivered or offered to deliver the goods to the owner, or done

what the law esteems equivalent to a delivery. Smith v. Nashua

& Lowell R. R., 7 Foster (27 N. H.) 86, 59 Am. D. 364; Price

V. Powell, 3 N. Y. 322. When the consignee is unknown to the

carrier, a due effort to find him is a condition precedent to a

right to warehouse the goods, and, as notice to the consignee

takes the place of a personal delivery of the goods, and as a due

and unsuccessful effort to find the consignee will alone excuse

the want of such notice, it follows that if a reasonable and dili-

gent effort is not made to find the consignee, the carrier is liable

for the consequence of the neglect. What is a due, a reasonable

effort, c^nd what is proper and reasonable diligence, depends

necessarily very much upon the circumstances of each case, and,

in the nature of things, is a question of fact for the jury, and

not of law for the court. What would be reasonably sufficient

in one place might be entirely inadequate and insufficient in

another, and the extent and character of the inquiries to be

made, in the exercise of a reasonable diligence on the part of

the carrier, cannot be regulated or prescribed by any fixed

standard, as the standard must shift with the varying circum-

stances of each case. The law cannot and does not define the
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measure of duty, making it the same in all cases and under all

circumstances, in cases like the present; and, therefore, the

question whether the defendant did use proper and reasonable

diligence to find the consignee was properly submitted to the

jury. Witbeck v. Holland, 45 N. Y. 13, 6 Am. R. 23; West

Chester and Phila. Railroad Co. v. McElwee, 67 Penn. St. 311 ;

Hill V. Humphreys, 5 Watts. & Serg. (Pa.) 123, 39 Am. D. 117.

The motion for a non-suit at the close of the plaintiff's case

was properly denied. It had then been proved that the goods

had been brought to New York by the defendant as a common

carrier, and been put in store ; that the plaintiffs, the consignees,

had had no notice or knowledge of their arrival or of their stor-

age, and that, between the time of their landing in New York

and their receipt by the plaintiffs, they had greatly depreciated

in value. No attempt had been made to show notice of the ar-

rival of the goods, or that the consignees were unknown or

could not be found.

The doctrine of concurrent negligence has no application to

the case. It was several weeks after the landing of the goods
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from the defendant's steamer on the wharf in New York that

the plaintiffs learned or knew of their arrival, in any view of the

evidence, and at that time the goods had become, in a measure,

unsalable, and their market value was diminished. From the

time the plaintiffs had notice of the arrival of the goods and that

they were subject to their orders, and a reasonable time had

elapsed for their removal, they were at the risk of the plaintiffs,

and no liability attached to the defendant for subsequent de-

preciation in value. The concurrent acts of the plaintiffs and

defendant could not contribute to the same injury; their duties

were not concurrent, but in succession. The defendant's duty

was to give the plaintiffs notice or make due diligence to find

them, and until that was done the goods were at its risk; and

when the duty was fully performed and the goods put in store,

the liability of the carrier ceased, and the risk of loss by de-

preciation in value was upon the plaintiffs. The duty and lia-

bility of the one grew out of the performance of duty by the

other.

The defendant gave evidence of all that was done to find the

consignees, and the effort made was very slight, and would not

have justified the court in ruling, as matter of law, that due and

reasonable diligence had been used for that purpose. The in-

quiries made were casual, and no serious attempt was made to

find the consignees or to give them notice of the arrival of the

goods. Indeed, on cross-examination, the freight agent of the

defendant testified that it was not their custom to give notice
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to the people in the city, and doubtless the agents and servants

of the company acted under a mistake as to the duty and legal

liability of the carrier.

There was no question touching the extraordinary liability

of carriers in the case. The claim was not against the defend-

ant as an insurer of the safety of the property, but for want

of ordinary and reasonable diligence in the performance of a

duty resulting, by implication, from the contract of carriage.

The judge, therefore, properly refused to instruct the jury

upon the subject of the extraordinary liability of the defendant

as a common carrier. As the goods had been shipped from

Michigan by railroad, and the plaintiffs had no knowledge that

they had been transferred to the defendant at Albany, and

were not expecting them by steamboat, there was no occasion

for them to be on the look-out for them on the defendant's

wharf, or on the arrival of the boats of the company. There

was nothing to justify the submission of any question to the

jury on this branch of the case. There was no complaint, or

reason for complaint, of the manner in which the cause was sub-
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mitted to the jury, and the verdict is conclusive upon the

questions of fact.

The judgment must be affirmed.

All concur, except Peckham, J., not sitting, and Grover, J.,

not voting.

112. MOSES V. BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD CO.,

32 N. H. 523; 64 Am. D. 381. 1854.

Action on the case for the value of ten bags of wool burned

in defendant's freight depot in Boston. A public notice, of

which plaintiff had knowledge, read : ' ' Articles of freight must

be taken away within twenty-four hours after being unladen from

the cars, on arriving at their place of destination, the company

reserving the right, if they see fit, of charging storage after

that lapse of time. The company will not hold themselves re-

sponsible, as common carriers, for goods after their arrival at

their place of destination, and unloading in the company's ware-

house or depot." Five questions were submitted to the jury, by

consent. 1. Was the wool carried over the road, and then re-

moved from the cars to the platform of the freight depot in

Boston, and separated from the other goods before the fire?

2. Was it so carried and removed from the cars a sufficient time

before the fire to enable Townsend & Son to obtain possession of

it by the exercise of reasonable diligence on the part of the

plaintiff and of Townsend & Son ? 3. Did the wool fail of being
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delivered to Townsend & Son by reason of the want of ordinary

care and prudence of the defendants'? 4. Was any portion of

the wool sold by the defendants ? 5. Did the plaintiff have any

knowledge of the printed notice before the wool was sent over

the road ? They could not agree upon the first, answered ' ' yes ' '

to the third and * ' no " to the others. Verdict for plaintiff".

By Court, Sawyer, J. (After stating the facts.) The po-

sition taken at the trial, that the defendants had limited

their liability as common carriers to the time when the wool

was taken into the depot by a public notice to that effect,

would not have availed the defendants if the finding of

the jury upon the fifth question had established the fact

that the notice was brought to the knowledge of the plain-

tiff before the wool was sent. In the case of Moses v. Bos-

ton etc. R. R. Co., 24 N. H. 71, 55 Am. Dec. 222, it was expressly

decided that a public notice to the effect that the railroad com-

pany would not be responsible for loss or injury to goods in

their hands as carriers, except such as might arise

from negligence, would not have the effect thus to limit their
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common-law liability, even when brought home to the knowledge

of the owner. This renders it unnecessary to consider any ques-

tion arising upon the character of the instructions given upon

the fifth question; and the only remaining point in the case,

considered as an action against the defendants as carriers, upon

the original count and the second and fourth amended counts,

is that involved in the second question, raising the principal

inquiry in the case, when does the liability of a railroad com-

pany as carriers of goods terminate?

The wool in this case was received and conveyed by the de-

fendants in their ordinary employment as common carriers. It

was not of a value disproportionate to its bulk, and was such

that no deception could have been practiced upon them as to the

extent of the risk they incurred. In the transportation of such

commodities their responsibility as carriers commences with the

receipt of the goods, though not put by them immediately on the

transit, and it ceases only when they have reached their destina-

tion and their control over them as carriers has terminated.

That control must continue until delivery, or a tender or offer

to deliver, or some other act which the law can regard as equiva-

lent to a delivery. The delivery of goods conveyed by railroad

is necessarily confined to certain points on the line of the rail-

road track. Railroad companies cannot, like wagoners, pass

from warehouse to warehouse, and there discharge their freight

to the various consignees upon their own premises. They con-
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sequently establish certain points as places of delivery, and there

unlade their cars of such of the freight as may most conveniently

find its ultimate destination from those respective points. But

while it is in the process of unloading, and afterwards, while

awaiting removal, it must be protected from the weather and

from depredation. Freight is brought over the road at all

hours, by night as well as by day, and the trains must necessar-

ily be more or less irregular in the hours of their arrival. It

cannot be required of the consignee to attend at the precise

mpment when his goods arrive, to receive and take care of them,

and the company cannot discharge themselves from responsi-

bility by leaving them in an exposed condition in the open air.

Until the goods have passed out of their custody and control

into the hands of the proper person to receive them, they have

a duty to perform in the preservation and protection of the

property even after their responsibility as common carriers is

at an end : Smith v. Nashua etc. R. R. Co., 27 N. H. 86, 59 Am.

Dee. 364. It thus becomes a matter of necessity for them to

provide depots, or warehouses, for the reception of freight at
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the stations established for its delivery. If the owner or con-

signee, or other person authorized to receive the goods, is pres-

ent at the time of the arrival, and has opportunity to see that

they have arrived, and to take them away, this may be regarded

as equivalent to a delivery. They must be understood after this

to remain in the charge of the company, for his convenience, as

depositaries or bailees for hire. In such case, the grounds upon

which the common-law liability of the carrier is made to rest

have so far ceased to exist that there is no longer any just oc-

casion for holding the company to that stringent responsibility

in reference to these goods. They are no longer in the course

of transporation, beyond the reach of the owner, and under the

exclusive control and observation of the carrier. The owner has

again got sight of his property, and is in a situation, to some ex-

tent, to oversee and protect it. Nor is he any longer under the

difficulties and embarrassments in attempting to make proof of

subsequent fraud or negligence as when it was on its passage

beyond the reach of his observation and under the private con-

trol of the carrier. The facilities and temptations to fraud and

collusion in the embezzlement or larceny of the goods are also

removed, or at least greatly diminished.

It is upon these considerations that the strict liability of the

carrier is founded. "It is a politic establishment," says Lord

Holt, in Coggs V. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 918, "contrived by the

policy of the law for safety of all persons, the necessity of

whose affairs obliges them to trust these sorts of persons, that
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they may be safe in their ways of dealings ; for else the carrier

might have opportunity of undoing all persons who had any

dealings with him, by combining with thieves, etc., and yet doing

it in such a clandestine way as would not be possible to be dis-

covered. ' '

In Kent's Com. 602, it is said that the rule subjecting the

carrier to this strict responsibility is founded on broad princi-

ples of public policy and convenience, and was introduced to

prevent the necessity of going into circumstances impossible to

be unraveled. If it were not for the rule, the carrier might

contrive, by means not to be detected, to be robbed of his goods

in order to share the spoils.

That the danger of loss by such collusion is not now so

prominent a consideration as in the semi-barbarous times, when

the rule was first adopted, is quite probable. But upon this

point it is well said by the court in Moses v. Boston etc. R. R.

Co., 24 N. H. 71, 55 Am. Dec. 222, before cited, that the im-

mense increase of this business, the great value of the commod-

ities now necessarily intrusted to the charge of common carriers,
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and the vast distances to which they are to be transported, have

multiplied the difficulties of the owner who seeks to recover for

the loss of his goods, and have added greatly to the oppor-

tunities and temptations of the carrier who might be disposed

to neglect or violate his trust. The reasons upon which the rule

is founded apply in all their force to railroad companies as car-

riers, and the same considerations of public policy which lead

to its adoption continue to require that it be maintained in all

its rigor as to them. Any relaxation of the rule must be at-

tended only with mischief. Many of the most eminent English

judges, prior to the acts of 2 Geo. IV. and 1 Wm. IV., expressed

regret that their courts had sanctioned the doctrine that the

carrier had the right to limit his liability by a public notice,

and predicted the necessity for the legislative interference which

resulted in those acts restoring the strict responsibility of the

ancient rule, in order to remedy the mischiefs Avhich that relax-

ation had introduced. Moses v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., supra.

The inquiry then is. At what moment after the goods con-

veyed by a railroad company in their cars have reached the point

on the line of the railroad where they are to be delivered may

the reasons upon which the common-law liability of the carrier

is founded be said to cease, when there is no person present at

their arrival authorized to receive them, and ready to take them

away ?

That it is the duty of the consignee to come for them is clear,

but it would be quite as impracticable for him to be at the
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place of delivery at the precise moment of tlieir arrival, or of

their being unladen from the cars, without actual notice to him

of their arrival, as it would be for the company to diverge from

their line of road in order to deliver them at his place of busi-

ness, or to send notice to him of their arrival, before proceeding

to unload them. The arrival may be in the night, or after the

expiration of business hours at the station, or at so late a period

before it as to render it impossible for him to get them away

within the hours of business. If, under such circumstances,

they have been removed from the cars and placed in the ware-

house, it cannot be said that they are so placed and kept there

until the gates are opened, and business resumed upon the fol-

lowing day, for any purpose having reference to the convenience

and accommodation of the owner or consignee, nor can the pro-

ceeding, upon any sound view, be considered as equivalent to

a delivery. The same persons — ^the servants of the company —

continue in the exclusive possession and control of the goods

as when they were on their transit,, and they are equally shut up

from the observation and oversight of all others. The consignee
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has had no opportunity to know that they have arrived, and in

what condition, and is in no better situation to disprove the fact,

or to question any account the servants of the company having

them in charge may choose to give of what may happen to

them after they are so removed from the cars, or what has hap-

pened prior thereto, than before. If purloined, destroyed, or

damaged by their fraud or neglect subsequently to their removal,

and before he can have had the opportunity to come for them,

he is left to precisely the same proof as if the larceny or injury

had occurred while they were actually in transitu — ^the declara-

tions of the servants of the company, they having, it may well

be supposed, feelings and interests adverse to him, and knowing

that he has no evidence at command from other sources to im-

peach their statement. It is obvious, too, that the opportunities

and facilities for embezzling the goods, and for other fraudulent

or collusive practices, must continue to be equally tempting

after their removal, under such circumstances, as before. The

risk of detection, in some respects, may be made even less than

before, by the greater facilities which the servant of the com-

pany in charge of the warehouse has of manufacturing evi-

dence of a burglary, or creating proof of the destruction of

the goods by fire, set by himself for the purpose of concealing

his agency in their larceny. For all purposes which have refer-

ence to the difficulties and embarrassments in the way of the

owner in attempti-ng to prove loss or damage by the fault or neg-

lect of the company, to his inability to give to them any over-
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sight or protection, and to his security against fraud and collu-

sion until he can have reasonable opportunity to see by his own

observation, or that of others than the servants of the company,

that they have arrived, and to send for and take them away,

he stands in the same relation to them as when they were ac-

tually in the course of transportation. The same broad prin-

ciples of public policy and convenience upon which the common-

law liability of the carrier is made to rest have equal appli-

cation after the goods are removed into the w^arehouse as before,

until the owner or consignee can have that opportunity, and

the same necessity exists for encouraging the fidelity and stim-

ulating the care and diligence of those who thus continue to re-

tain them in charge, by holding that they shall continue subject

to the risk.

It is no satisfactory answer to this view to say that the com-

pany, having provided a warehause in which to store the goods

for the accommodation of the owner, after the transit has ter-

minated, may be regarded, by their act of depositing them in

the warehouse, as having delivered them from themselves as
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carriers to themselves as warehousemen. The question still is.

When, having a proper regard to the principles which lie at the

basis of their carrier liability, and to the protection and secu-

rity of the owner, can this transmutation of the character in

which they hold the goods be said to take place, and this con-

structive delivery to be made ? If this is held to be at any point

of time before there can be opportunity to take them from the

hands of the company, then may the owner be compelled to

leave them in their possession, under the limited liability of

depositaries, or bailees for hire, contrary to his intention, and

Avithout any act or neglect on his part which may be considered

as indicative of his consent thereto. It may have been his

intention to take them from their possession at the earliest prac-

ticable moment, for the reason that he may not be disposed to

intrust them to their fidelity and care without the stimulus to

the utmost diligence and good faith afforded by the strict lia-

bility of carriers. If he neglects to take them away upon the

first opportunity that he has to do it, he may be said thereby to

have consented that they shall remain under the more limited

responsibility. But upon no just ground can this consent be

presumed when his only alternative is to be at the station where

they are to be delivered at the arrival of the train, at whatever

hour that may happen to be, whether in the night or the day,

in or out of business hours, and regardless of all the contin-

gencies upon which the regularity of its arrival may depend.

It is to be supposed that the consignee has been advised by the
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consignor of the fact that the goods have been forwarded, and

that he has taken, or is prepared to take, proper measures to look

for them upon their arrival, and to remove them as soon as he

can have reasonable opportunity to do so. It must be supposed,

too, that he is informed of the usual course of business on the

part of the company, and of their agents, in the hours estab-

lished for the arrival of the trains, and in unlading the cars,

and delivering out goods of that description, and that he will

exercise reasonable diligence in reference to all these particulars

to be at the place of delivery as soon as may be practicable after

their arrival, and take them into his possession. The extent of

the reasonable opportunity to be afforded him for that purpose

is not, however, to be measured by any peculiar circumstances in

his own condition and situation, rendering it necessary for his

own convenience and accommodation that he should have longer

time or better opportunity than if he resided in the vicinity of

the warehouse, and was prepared with the means and facilities

for taking the goods away. If his particular circumstances

require a more extended opportunity, the goods must be con-
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sidered after such reasonable time as but for those peculiar

circumstances would be deemed sufficient to be kept by the com-

pany for his convenience, and under the responsibility of depos-

itaries or bailees for hire only.

In the case now under consideration there was conflicting

evidence as to the time when the train by which the wool was

carried arrived at the depot in Boston. The evidence on the

part of the defense tended to show that it arrived at the usual

time — between one and two o'clock in the afternoon; while that

of the plaintiff tended to show that it did not arrive until three

o'clock. The gates of the depot were closed at five, and from

two to three hours were usually required for unloading the ears.

Upon the view of the evidence most favorable to the defendants,

there was but a period of from three to four hours at the longest

for the consignee to have come and taken away the wool, before

the gates were closed; and it was destroyed before they were

reopened for the purpose of delivering out the goods. This

view proceeds upon the supposition that the work of unlad-

ing the cars was commenced immediately upon their arrival;

and in the process of unloading, ordinarily occupying from two

to three hours, the wool happened to be the first article taken

from the cars, and was at once ready for delivery. Upon a

view less favorable to the defendants, the jury might have found,

upon the evidence in the case, that the train arrived at three,

and that the wool was unloaded at six — one hour after the clos-

ing of the gates. That the verdict, in answer to the second
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question submitted to the jury, was therefore warranted by the

evidence is quite clear ; and as there are no legal exceptions to

the proceedings upon the trial, so far as they relate to this

point, the answer of the jury to that question establishes the

fact that the consignees had no reasonable opportunity, after the

wool was taken from the cars, to come and inspect it so far

as to see whether from its outward appearance it corresponded

with the letter of advice from their consignor and to remove it

before it was destroyed. This fact being established, upon the

viewsk of the law entertained by the court the transit had not

terminated, and the defendants continued liable for the wool as

carriers down to and at the time of the loss; and the general

verdict entered for the plaintiff may well be sustained upon the

original and the second and fourth amended counts.

We are aware that this view of the liability of railroad com-

panies as carriers conflicts with the opinion of the suprome court

of Massachusetts, as pronounced by the learned chief justice of

that court in the recent case of Norway Plains Co. v. Boston etc.

R. R. Co., 1 Gray, 263, 61 Am. Dec. 423. In that case it was
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held that the liability as carriers ceases when the goods are

removed from the cars and placed upon the platform of the

depot ready for delivery, whether it be done in the day time or

in the night, in or out of the usual business hours, and conse-

quently irrespective of the question whether the consignee has

or not an opportunity to remove them. The ground upon

which the decision is based would seem to be the propriety of

establishing a rule of duty for this class of carriers of a plain,

precise, and practical character, and of easy application, rather

than of adhering to the rigorous principles of the common law.

That the rule adopted in that case is of such character is not to

be doubted; but with all our respect for the eminent judge by

whom the opinion was delivered, and for the learned court whose

judgment he pronounced, we cannot but think that by it the

salutary and approved principles of the common law are sacri-

ficed to considerations of convenience and expediency, in the

simplicity and precise and practical character of the rule which

it establishes.

It is unnecessary, then, to consider the exceptions taken upon

the other view of the case, as an action against the defendants

for negligence in their care of the wool after their liability as

carriers had ceased.

Judgment upon the verdict.

Perley, C. J., did not sit.

See also Norway Plains Co. v. Boston and Maine Railroad Co.,

§ 113, and McMillan v. M. S. & N. J. Railroad Co., § 114.
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X 113. NORWAY PLAINS CO. V. BOSTON AND MAINE

RAILROAD CO.,

1 Gray (Mass.) 263; 61 Am. D. 423. 1854.

Action for goods destroyed by fire in the freiglit depot of de-

fendant railroad company.

By Court, Shaw, C. J. The liability of carriers of goods by

railroads, the grounds and precise extent and limits of their re-

sponsibility, are coming to be subjects of great interest and

importance to the community. It is a new mode of transporta-

tion, in some respects like the transportation by ships, lighters,

and canal-boats on water, and in others like that by wagons on

land; but in some respects it differs from both. Though the

practice is new, the law by which the rights and obligations of

owners, consignees, and of the carriers themselves are to be gov-

erned is old and well established. It is one of the great merits

and advantages of the common law, that instead of a series of

detailed practical rules, established by positive provisions, and

adapted to the precise circumstances of particular cases, which

would become obsolete and fail when the practice and course
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of business to which they apply should cease or change, the

common law consists of a few broad and comprehensive princi-

ples, founded on reason, natural justice, and enlightened public

policy, modified and adapted to the circumstances of all the

particular cases which fall within it. These general principles

of equity and policy are rendered precise, specific, and adapted

to practical use, by usage, which is the proof of their general

fitness and common convenience, but still more by judicial ex-

position; so that, when in a course of judicial proceeding, by

tribunals of the highest authority, the general rule has been

modified, limited, and applied, according to particular cases,

such judicial exposition, when well settled and acquiesced in,

becomes itself a precedent, and forms a rule of law for future

cases under like circumstances. The effect of this expansive

and comprehensive character of the common law is, that whilst

it has its foundations in the principles of equity, natural justice,

and that general convenience, which is public policy — although

these general considerations would be too vague and uncertain

for practical purposes in the various and complicated eases of

daily occurrence, in the business of an active community — yet

the n_iles of the common law, so far as cases have arisen and

practices actually grown up, are rendered, in a good degree,

precise and certain, for practical purposes, by usage and judi-
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cial precedent. Another consequence of tliis expansive character

of the common law is, that when new practices spring up,

new combinations of facts arise, and cases are presented for

which there is no precedent in judicial decision, they must be

governed by the general principle applicable to cases most nearly

analogous, but modified and adapted to new circumstances, by

considerations of fitness and propriety, of reason and justice,

which grow out of those circumstances. The consequence of

this state of the law is, that when a new practice or new

course of business arises, the rights and duties of parties are

not without a law to govern them; the general considerations

of reason, justice, and policy, which underlie the particular rules

of the common law, will still apply, modified and adapted by

the same considerations to the new circumstances. If these are

such as give rise to controversy and litigation, they soon, like

previous cases, come to be settled by judicial exposition, and

the principles thus settled soon come to have the effect of pre-

cise and practical rules. Therefore, although steamboats and

railroads are but of yesterday, yet the principles which govern
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the rights and duties of carriers of passengers, and also those

which regulate the rights and duties of carriers of goods, and of

the owners of goods carried, have a deep and established foun-

dation in the common law, subject only to such modifications

as new circumstances may render necessary and mutually bene-

ficial.

The present is an action brought to recover the value of two

parcels of merchandise, forwarded by the plaintiffs to Boston in

the cars of the defendants. These goods were described in two

receipts of the defendants, dated at Rochester, New Hampshire,

the one October 31, 1850, and the other November 2, 1850.

By the facts agreed, it appears that the goods specified in the

first receipt were delivered at Rochester," and received into the

cars, and arrived in Boston seasonably on Saturday, the second

of November, and were then taken from the cars and placed in

the depot or warehouse of the defendants ; that no special notice

of their arrival was given to the plaintiffs or their agent; but

that the fact was known to Ames, a truckman, who was their

authorized agent, employed to receive and remove the goods,

that they were ready for delivery a least as early as Monday

morning, the fourth of November, and that he might then have

received them.

The goods specified in the other receipt were forwarded to

Boston on Monday, the fourth of November; the cars arrived

late; Ames, the truckman, kncAV from inspection of the way-bill

that the goods were on the train, and waited for them some
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time, but could not conveniently receive them that afternoon in

season to deliver them at the places to which they were directed,

and for that reason did not take them; in the course of the

afternoon they were taken from the cars and placed on the plat-

form within the depot; at the usual time at that season of the

year the doors were closed. In the course of the night the

depot accidentally took fire and was burned down, and the

goods were destroyed. The fire was not caused by lightning;

nor was it attributable to any default, negligence, or want of

due care on the part of the railroad corporation, or their agents

or servants.

We understand the merchandise depot to be a warehouse,

suitably inclosed and secured against the weather, thieves, and

other like ordinary dangers, with suitable persons to attend it,

with doors to be closed and locked during the night, like other

warehouses used for storage of merchandise; that it is fur-

nished with tracks on which the loaded cars run directly into the

depot to be unloaded ; that there are platforms on the sides

of the track on which the goods are first placed; that if not
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immediately called for and taken by the consignees, they

are separated according to their marks and directions, and

placed by themselves in suitable situations within the depot,

there to remain a reasonable and convenient time, without ad-

ditional charge, until called for by parties entitled to receive

them.

The question is, whether under these circumstances the de-

fendants are liable. That railroad companies are authorized by

law to make roads as public highways, to lay down tracks, place

cars upon them, and carry goods for hire, are circumstances

which bring them within all the rules of the common law, and

make them eminently common carriers. Their iron roads,

though built in the first instance, by individual capital, are yet

regarded as public roads, required by common convenience and

necessity, and their allowance by public authority can be only

justified on that ground. The general principle has been uni-

formly so decided in England and in this country ; and the point

is to ascertain the precise limits of their liability. This was

done to a certain extent in this court in a recent case, with

which, as far its it goes, we are entirely satisfied: Thomas v.

Boston & Providence R. R., 10 Met. 472.

Being liable as common carriers, the rule of the common law

attaches to them, that they are liable for losses occurring from

any accident which may befall the goods during the transit, ex-

cept those arising from the act of God or a public enemy. It

is not necessary now to inquire into the weight of those consid-
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erations of reason and policy on which the rule is founded; nor

to consider what casualty may be held to result from an act of

God or a public enemy; because the present case does not turn

on any such distinction. It is sufficient, therefore, to state and

affirm the general rule. In the present case, the loss resulted

from a fire, of which there is no ground to suggest that it was

an act of God ; and it is equally clear that it did not result from

any default or negligence on the part of the company, though

the goods remained in their custody. If at the time of the

loss they were liable as common carriers, they must abide by

the loss; because, as common carriers, they were bound as in-

surers to take the risk of fire not caused by the act of God, and

in such case no question of default or negligence can arise.

Proof that it was from a cause for which they, neither by them-

selves nor their servants, were in any degree chargeable could

amount to no defense, and would therefore be inadmissible in

evidence. If, on the contrary, the transit was at an end, if the

defendants had ceased to have possession of the goods as com-

mon carriers, and held them in another capacity as warehouse-
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men, then they were responsible only for the care and diligence

which the law attaches to that relation ; and this does not extend

to a loss by an accidental fire, not caused by the default or negli-

gence of themselves, or of servants, agents, or others, for whom

they are responsible.

The question then is, when and by what act the transit of the

goods terminated. It was contended in the present case that,

in the absence of express proof of contract or usage to the con-

trary, the carrier of goods by land is bound to deliver them to

the consignee, and that his obligation as carrier does not cease

till such delivery. This rule applies, and may very properly

apply, to the case of goods transported by wagons and other

vehicles traversing the common highways and streets, and which

therefore can deliver the goods at the houses of the respective

consignees. But it can not apply to railroads, whose line of

movement and point of termination are locally fixed. The na-

ture of the transportation, though on land, is much more like

that by sea, in this respect, that from the very nature of the

case the merchandise can only be transported along one line

and delivered at its termination, or at some fixed place by its

side, at some intermediate point. The rule in regard to ships

is very exactly stated in the opinion of Buller, J., in Hyde v.

Trent & Mersey Navigation, 5 T. R. 397 : "A ship trading from

one port to another has not the means of carrying the goods on

land ; and according to the established course of trade, a deliv-
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ery on the usual wharf is such a delivery as will discharge the

carrier. ' '

Another peculiarity of transportation by railroad is, that the

car can not leave the track or line of rails on which it moves ; a

freight train moves with rapidity, and makes very freqnent jour-

neys, and a loaded car, whilst it stands on the track, necessarily

prevents other trains from passing or coming to the same place ;

of course it is essential to the accommodation and convenience

of all persons interested that a loaded car, on its arrival at its

destination, should be unloaded, and that all the goods carried on

it, to whomsoever they may belong or whatever may be their

destination, should be discharged as soon and as rapidly as it can

be done with safety. The car may then pass on to give place

to others, to be discharged in like manner. From this necessary

condition of the business, and from the practice of these trans-

portation companies to have platforms on which to place goods

from the cars, in the first instance, and warehouse accommoda-

tion by which they may be securely stored, the goods of each

consignment by themselves, in accessible places, ready to be
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delivered, the court are of the opinion that the duty assumed

by the railroad corporation is — and this, being known to owners

of goods forwarded, must, in the absence of proof to the con-

trary, be presumed to be assented to by them so as to consti-

tute the implied contract between them — that they will carry the

goods safely to the place of destination, and there discharge

them on the platform, and then and there deliver them to the

consignee or party entitled to receive them, if he is there ready

to take them forthwith; or if the consignee is not there ready

to take them, then to place them securely and keep them safely

a reasonable time, ready to be delivered when called for. This,

it appears to us, is the spirit and legal effect of the public duty

of the carriers, and of the contract between the parties when

not altered, or modified by special agreement, the effect and

operation of which need not here be considered.

This we consider to be one entire contract for hire; and

although there is no separate charge for storage, yet the freight

to be paid, fixed by the company as a compensation for the whole

service, is paid as well for the temporary storage as for the car-

riage. This renders both the services, as well the absolute un-

dertaking for the carriage as the contingent undertaking for the

storage, to be services undertaken to be done for hire and re-

ward. From this view of the duty and implied contract of the

carriers by railroad, we think there result two distinct liabilities :

first, that of common carriers, and afterwards that of keepers
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for hire, or warehouse keepers ; the obligations of each of which

are regulated by law.

We may then say, in the case of goods transported by rail-

road, either that it is not the duty of the company as common

carriers, to deliver the goods to the consignee, which is more

strictly conformable to the truth of the fact; or, in analogy to

the old rule, that delivery is necessary, it may be said that de-

livery by themselves as common carriers, to themselves as keep-

ers for hire, conformably to the agreement of both parties, is a

delivery which discharges their responsibility as common car-

riers. If they are chargeable after the goods have been landed

and stored, the liability is one of a very different character, one

which binds them only to stand to losses occasioned by their

fault or negligence. Indeed, the same doctrine is distinctly laid

down in Thomas v. Boston & Providence K-. R., 10 Met. (Mass.)

472, 43 Am. D. 444, with the same limitation. The point that

the same company, under one and the same contract, may be

subject to distinct duties, for a failure in which they may be

liable to different degrees of responsibility, will result from a
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comparison of the two cases of Garside v. Trent & Mersey Navi-

gation, 4 T. E. 581, and Hyde v. Trent & Mersey Navigation,

5 Id. 389. See also Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill. 157;

McHenry v. Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore R. R., 4

Ilarr. (Del.) 448.

The company, having received an adequate compensation for

the entire service, if they store the goods, are paid for that

service; they are depositaries for hire, and of course respon-

sible for the security and fitness of the place and all precautions

necessary to the safety of the goods, and for ordinary care and

attention of their servants and agents, in keeping and deliver-

ing them when called for. This enforces the liability of com-

mon carriers, to the extent to which it has been uniformly

carried by the common law, so far as the reason and principle

of the rule render it fit and applicable, that is, during the

transit; and affords a reasonable security to the owner of goods

for their safety, until actually taken into his own custody.

The principle thus adopted is not new; many cases might

be cited: one or two will be sufficient. Where a consignee of

goods, sent by a common carrier to London, had no warehouse

of his own, but was accustomed to leave the goods in the wagon-

office or warehouse of the common carrier, it was held that the

transit was at an end when the goods were received and placed

in the warehouse : Rowe v. Pickford, 8 Taunt. 83. Though this

was a case of stoppage in transitu, it decides the principle.

But another case in the same volume is more in point : In re
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Webl), Id. 443. Common carriers agreed to carry wool from

London to Frome under a stipulation that when the consignees

had not room in their own store to receive it, the carriers, with-

out additional charge, would retain it in their own warehouse

until the consignor was ready to receive it. Wool thus car-

ried, and placed in the carriers' warehouse, was destroyed by an

accidental fire; it was held that the carriers were not liable.

The court say that this was a loss which would fall on them as

carriers, if they were acting in that character, but would not

fall on them as warehousemen.

This view of the law, applicable to railroad companies, as

common carriers of merchandise, affords a plain, precise, and

practical rule of duty, of easy application, well adapted to the

security of all persons interested; it determines that they are

responsible as common carriers until the goods are removed

from the cars and placed on the platform; that if, on account

of their arrival in the night, or at any other time when, by the

usage and course of business, the doors of the merchandise

depot or warehouse are closed, or for any other cause, they can
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not then be delivered ; or if, for any reason, the consignee is not

there ready to receive them — it is the duty of the company to

store them and preserve them safely, under the charge of com-

petent and careful servants, ready to be delivered, and actually

deliver them when duly called for by parties authorized and

entitled to receive them ; and for the performance of these duties

after the goods are delivered from the cars the company are

liable as warehousemen, or keepers of goods for hire.

It was argued in the present case that the railroad company

are responsible as common carriers of goods until they have

given notice to consignees of the arrival of goods. The court

are strongly inclined to the opinion that in regard to the trans-

portation of goods by railroad, as the business is generally con-

ducted in this country, this rule does not apply. The imme-

diate and safe storage of the goods on arrival, in warehouses

provided by the railroad company, and without additional ex-

pense, seems to be a substitute better adapted to the conven-

ience of both parties. The arrivals of goods at the larger places

to which goods are thus sent are so numerous, frequent, and

various in kind that it would be nearly impossible to send

special notice to each consignee of each parcel of goods or sin-

gle article forwarded by the trains. We doubt whether this is

conformable to usage; but perhaps we have not facts enough

disclosed in this case to warrant an opinion on that question.

As far as the facts on this point do appear, it would seem prob-

able that persons frequently forwarding goods have a general
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agent, who is permitted to inspect the way-bills, ascertain what

goods are received for his employers, and take them as soon as

convenient after their arrival. It also seems to be the practice

for persons forwarding goods to give notice by letter, and in-

close the railroad receipt, in the nature of a bill of lading, to a

consignee or agent, to warn him to be rea ly to receive them.

From the two specimens of the form of receipt given by these

companies produced in the present case, we should doubt whether

the name of any consignee or agent is usually specified in the

receipt and on the way-bill. The course seems to be to specify

the marks and numbers, so that the goods may be identified

by inspection and comparison with the way-bill. If it is not

usual to specify the name of a consignee in the way-bill as well

as on the receipt, it would be impossible for the corporation to

give notice of the arrival of each article and parcel of goods.

In the tM'o receipts produced in this case, which are printed

forms, a blank is left for the name of a consignee, but it is not

filled, and no consignee in either case is named. The legal

eiTeet of such a receipt and promise to deliver no doubt is to
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deliver to the consignor or his order. If this is the usual or

frequent course, it is manifest that it would be impossible to

give notice to any consignee; the consignor is prima facie the

party to receive, and he has all the notice he can have. But we

have thought it unnecessary to give a more decisive opinion on

this point, for the reason, already apparent, that in these re-

ceipts no consignee was named ; and for another, equally con-

clusive, that Ames, the plaintiff's authorized agent, had actual

notice of the arrival of both parcels of goods.

In applying these rules to the present case, it is manifest that

the defendants are not liable for the loss of the goods. Those

which were forwarded on Saturday arrived in the course of that

day, lay there on Sunday and Monday, and were destroyed in

the night between Monday and Tuesday. But the length of time

makes no difference. The goods forwarded on Monday were

unladen from the cars and placed in the depot before the fire.

Several circumstances are stated in the case, as to the agent's

calling for them, waiting, and at last leaving the depot before

they were ready. But we consider them all immaterial. The

argument strongly urged was, that the responsibility of common

carriers remained until the agent of the consignee had an oppor-

tunity to take them and remove them. But we think the rule

is otherwise. It is stated, as a circumstance, that the train ar-

rived that day at a later hour than usual. This we think im-

material; the corporation do not stipulate that the goods shall

arrive at any particular time. Further, from the very necessity
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of the case and the exigencies of the railroad, the corporation

must often avail themselves of the night, when the road is less

occupied for passenger cars; so that goods may arrive and be

unladen at an unsuitable hour in the night to have the depot

open for the delivery of the goods. We think, therefore, that

it would be alike contrary to the contract of the parties and the

nature of the carriers' duty to hold that they shall be respon-

sible as common carriers, until the owner has practically an op-

portunity to come with his v/agon and take the goods; and it

would greatly mar the simplicity and efficacy of the rule that

delivery from the cars into the depot terminates the transit. If

therefore, for any cause the consignee is not at the place to re-

ceive his goods from the car as unladen, and in consequence

of this they are placed in the depot, the transit ceases. In

point of fact, the agent might have received the second parcel

of goods in the course of the afternon on Monday, but not

early enough to be carried to the warehouses at which he was

to deliver them; that is, not early enough to suit his conven-

ience. But for the reasons stated, we have thought this cir-
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cumstance immaterial, and do not place our decision for the de-

fendants, in regard to this second parcel, on that ground.

Judgm'^nt for the defendants.

114. M'MILLAN V. MICHIGAN SOUTHERN AND NORTH-

ERN INDIANA RAILROAD CO.,

16 Mich. 79; 93 Am. D. 208. 1867.

By Court, Cooley, J. (After deciding that defendant rail-

road was subject to the general railroad law of the state by

which it was not permitted to abridge its common-law liability

as common carrier.) Wliat that liability is, when they have

transported property over their road and deposited it in their

warehouse to await delivery to the consignee, is the next ques-

tion demanding consideration.

On this point, three distinct views have been taken by dif-

ferent jurists, neither of which can be said to have been so far

generally accepted as to have become the prevailing rule of

the courts.

1. That when the transit is ended, and the carrier has placed

the goods in his warehouse to await delivery to the consignee,

his liability as carrier is ended also, and he is responsible as

warehouseman only. This is the rule of the Massachusetts

cases: Thomas v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 10 Met. (Mass.) 472,
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43 Am. D. 444, and Norway Plains Co. v. Boston and Maine

E. R. Co., 1 Gray (Mass.) 263, 61 Am. D. 423, and those whic^

follow them.

2. That merely placing the goods in the warehouse does not

discharge the carrier, but that he remains liable as such until

the consignee has had reasonable time after their arrival to

inspect and take them away in the common course of busi-

ness : Morris and Essex R. R. Co. v. Ayres, 29 N. J. L. 393, 80

Am. D. 215; Blumenthal v. Brainerd, 38 Vt. 413, 91 Am. D. 350;

Moses V. Boston and Maine R. R. Co., 32 N. H. 523, 69 Am. D.

331 ; Wood V. Crocker, 18 AVis. 345, 86 Am. D. 773 ; Redfield on

Railways, 3d ed., sec. 157.

3. That the liability of the carrier continues until the con-

signee has been notified of the receipt of the goods, and has

had reasonable time in the common course of business to take

them away after such notification: McDonald v. "Western R.

R. Corp., 34 N. Y. 497, and cases cited ; 2 Parsons on Contracts,

5th ed., 189; Angell on Carriers, sec. 313; Chitty on Carriers,

90.
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The rule as secondly above stated proceeds upon the idea

that the consignee will be informed by the consignor of any

shipment of freight, and that it then becomes the duty of the

former to take notice of the general course of business of the

carrier, the time of departure and arrival of trains, and when,

therefore, the receipt of the freight may be expected, and to

be on hand ready to take it away when received. It is as-

sumed to be simply a question of reasonable diligence with

the consignee whether he ascertains the receipt of his consign-

ment or not; the regularity of the trains being such as to

leave him without reasonable excuse, if he fails to inform him-

self.

There may be railroad lines in the country where the appli-

cation of this rule would do injustice to no one. If the busi-

ness is not so great but that freight trains can be run with the

same regularity as those for passengers, and the freight can al-

ways be sent forward immediately on being received for the

purpose, a notice from the consignor will usually apprise the

consignee with sufficient certainty when the goods may be

expected. But on the long through lines such regularity is

quite impracticable. Freight must be sent forward from the

carrier's warehouse with a promptness depending upon the

pressure of business; or in other words, as it may suit his

convenience and his interest to forward it. This may be many

days, or even weeks, after its receipt, or it may be immediately.

•z is not always in the power of the carrier to give reliable

4D2

M'MILLAN V. M. S. AND N. I. E. E. CO. § 114

information upon the subject, and unavoidable delays will fre-

quently intervene after the transit has commenced. To re-

quire the consignee to watch from day to day the arrival of

trains, and to renew his inquiries respecting the consignment,

seems to me to be imposing a burden upon him without in the

least relieving the carrier. For it can hardly be doubted that

it would be less burdensome to the carrier to be required to

give notice than to be subjected to the numberless inquiries and

examinations of his books which would otherwise be necessary,

especially at important points.

The rule that the liability of the carrier shall continue until

the consignee has had reasonable time after notification to

take away his goods is traceable to certain English decisions

having reference to carriers by water, whose mode of doing

business resembles that of railroad companies in the inability

to proceed with their vehicles to every man's door, and there

deliver his goods. It is a modification in favor of the carrier

by land of the obligation formerly resting upon him, and which

required, in the absence of special contract, an actual delivery
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to the consignee of the goods carried. The modern modes of

transportation render this impracticable, unless the carrier shall

add to his business that of drayman also, which is generally a

distinct employment. In lieu of delivery, therefore, the carrier

is allowed to discharge himself of his extraordinary liability

by notifying the consignee of the receipt of the goods, who is

then expected, in accordance with what is an almost universal

custom, to remove them himself. It is insisted, however, that

this rule, so far as it can be considered established by authority,

is applicable onty to carriers who have no warehouses of their

own, but make the wharf or platform their place of delivery,

and who therefore never become warehousemen, and are held

to a continued liability as carriers, as the only mode of insur-

ing watch and protection over the goods until the owner can

have opportunity to receive them. This distinction would not

be entirely without force, and would seem to be acted upon in

one state at least. Compare Scholes v. Ackerland, 13 111. 650,

and Crawford v. Clark, 15 Id. 561, with Eichards v. Michigan

etc. R. R. Co., 20 Id. 404, and Porter v. C. & R. I. R. R.

Co., 20 Id. 407. See also Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Warren, 16

111. 502, 63 Am. D. 317, where a railroad company was held to

the same measure of responsibility as a carrier by water, where

the property carried, instead of being placed in their warehouse,

■»vas left outside.

But it may well be doubted whether the distinction rests upon

sufficient reasons. The man who sends his goods by railroad
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and who desires to receive them as soon as they reach their

destination, has commonly no design to employ the railroad

company in any other capacity than that of carrier. If any

other relation than that is formed between them, it is one that

the law forms upon considerations springing from the usages

of business, and having reference to the due protection of the

interests of both. The owner wants storage only imtil he can

have time to remove the goods; and the warehousing is only

incidental to the carrying. Payment for the transportation

is payment also for the incidental storage. The owner has

been willing to trust the company as carriers because the law

makes them insurers ; but he might not be willing to trust them

as warehousemen under a liability so greatly qualified, and in

a trust which implies generally a considerable degree of per-

sonal confidence. As what he desires is, not to have the goods

remain in store, but to receive them personally as soon as they

can be carried, and as the railroad company, if they had no

warehouse, would continue to be liable as carriers until the

lapse of a reasonable time after notification, it would seem that
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if the company can claim any' exemption from the liability as

insurers, it must be, upon the ground that the erection of ware-

houses is for the benefit, not of the company, but of the public

doing business with them, and to facilitate delivery. But this,

as appears to me, would be taking a very partial and one-sided

view of the purpose of these structures.

If the road has no warehouse, the cars must remain stand-

ing on the track until the owner can come and receive his goods,

or if they are unloaded, the company must not only establish

a watch to prevent thefts, but at their peril must protect

against injuries by the elements. Landing the goods on the

platform, it is agreed on all hands, does not alone discharge the

carrier. And it seems to me that a consideration of the im-

mense carrying trade of the country will force one to the con-

clusion that it cannot possibly be either properly, expeditiously,

or profitably done except with the conveniences afforded by the

railroad warehouses, which afford the easiest, cheapest, and most

effective means by which carriers are enabled to protect them-

selves against losses in that capacity.

At the great centers of commerce it would be impossible to

transact the amount of business now done if the cars must

stand upon the track until the goods carried can be delivered

from thence to the consignees. Unloading them in immense

quantities upon open platforms would expose them to destruc-

tion. At the less important points the same thing is true, but

in less degree. It would seem, therefore, looking only to the
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interest of the carriers, that the reasons which require the con-

struction of warehouses are imperative. Only by means of

them can they keep their tracks clear for trains, or protect

against the destruction of goods of which they are insurers.

And wherever the business is large, warehouses are required

also, to enable the companies to carry out a system of separa-

tion and classification of goods received, without which it would

be quite impossible to conduct the business with facility or

profit. The warehouses are absolutely essential in connection

with the receipt and dispatch of goods to be sent from each

point, and in respect to which the railroad company are un-

questionably liable as carriers from the time of their receipt.

In every view, therefore, they seem indispensable to the busi-

ness of the carrier; and being constructed with reference to it,

they are properly nothing more than an extension of the plat-

forms upon which the companies receive and deliver goods,

with walls and roofs added to facilitate, guard, and to protect

against injuries by the elements.

The interest, on the other hand, which the consignee has in
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the warehouse, is much less direct and important. It may

facilitate the delivery of goods, but the carrier is liable if he

fail to deliver in reasonable time. The risk of loss and injury

will be less, but against these the carrier insures. In no proper

sense can the warehouse be said to be for his accommodation ;

and if the obligations of the carrier to him are to be dimin-

ished by its erection, he might well prefer that it should not

be built. The rule which changes the carrier into a ware-

houseman against the will of the owner of the property, on the

ground solely that he had erected convenient structures for

the storage, but which structures are absolutely essential to

his business as carrier, seems to me to be a departure from

the rule of the common law upon reasons which do not war-

rant it. It is a rule which allows the insurer to absolve him-

self from obligations to the insured, by supplying him with

conveniences for the transaction of his business, and with the

means of protection against loss or damage.

A critical examination of the cases on this subject would

scarcely be useful. As they cannot be reconciled, the court

must follow its own reasons. I am unable to discover any

ground which to me is satisfactory on which a common car-

rier of goods can excuse himself from personal delivery to the

consignee, except by that which usage has made a substitute.

To require him to give notice when the goods are received, so

that the consignee may know when to call for them, imposes

upon him no unreasonable burden. If by understanding with
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the consignee the goods were to remain in store for a definite

period, or until he should give directions concerning them, the

rule would be different, because the relation of warehouseman

would then be established by consent. In the absence of such

understanding, sound policy, I think, requires the carrier to

be held liable as such until he has notified the consignee that

the goods are received. If the nature of the bailment then

becomes changed through the neglect of the consignee to re-

move the goods, it will be by his implied assent. Such a rule

is just to both parties, and burdensome to neither, and it will

tend to promptness on the part of carriers in giving the notices,

which, Avhether compulsory or not, are generally expected from

them.

Whether the clause in the general railroad law forbidding

companies formed under it from lessening or abridging their

common-law liability as carriers prevents their entering into

contracts by which their employers release them from any of

their liability, is not clear upon the terms of the clause itself.

Such contracts are not expressly forbidden, and the general
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tendency of legislation in modern times has been to relax,

rather than to render more severe, the strict rules of the com-

mon law in regard to carriers, of which our own state presents

an example in the legislative exemption of the principal com-

panies from liability as carriers for goods in their warehouses

awaiting delivery. And a clause which should forbid parties

from entering into any such agreements with carriers as they

might conceive to be for their interest would hardly be looked

for in the general law, unless strong reasons were known to

have existed for its adoption.

When that law was passed, a controversy had been going

on between common carriers and the public in respect to the

notices given by the former by public advertisement and other-

wise, by which they sought to relieve themselves from some

portion of their common-law liability, whether those employ-

ing them assented or not. The courts in this country had gen-

erally held these notices ineffectual; but they still continued

to be given, and to be insisted upon as possessing legal force.

I do not perceive in the clause in question any intention to

go further than to put an end by the fundamental law of

these organizations to any further controversy upon that ground.

In view of the extent to which the courts had gone in Eng-

land in giving force to such notices, no one can say that the

precaution was needless. The companies are forbidden to lessen

or in any way abridge their liabilities as common carriers, but

the person sending goods by them is not forbidden to release
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tliem from such liatilities, or from any portion thereof, for

any consideration which to him is satisfactory. In other

words, the law compels these companies at all times, at the

option of those sending goods by them, to carry the goods as

insurers. If, on the other hand, the carriers can make it for

the interest of the party to relieve them from this liability wholly

or in part, a contract to that effect, if fairly made, and em-

bracing no unreasonable conditions, is not opposed to public

policy, and to forbid it would seem an unnecessary restraint

upon freedom of action: See Bissell v. New York Cent. R. R.

Co., 25 N. Y. 448, 82 Am. D. 369. The distinction between a

restriction by the carrier himself and a contract by which

another party releases him from obligations was pointed out by

this court in Michigan Cent. R. R. v. Hale, 6 Mich. 243, and

is the same which is applicable here. ]\Iany things are trans-

ported by railroad in respect to which it may be for the mutual

interest of both parties that special contracts be made. Live

stock are usually accompanied and cared for by the owner

or his agent under special agreements, and in some other cases
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the owner prefers to assume such general oversight and control

as is inconsistent with the full common-law liability of the

carrier. It has not been generally supposed that the clause

under consideration forbade special contracts in such cases, and

the legislature of 1867 must have considered them lawful when

they provided that all contracts modifying the common-law lia-

bility of railroad companies as carriers should be wholly in

writing: Laws 1867, p. 165. This enactment was evidently

designed, not to enlarge the powers of railroad companies, but

to impose restraints upon an existing authority to make con-

tracts.

A much more difficult question is, what shall constitute the

proof of a contract, in the absence of distinct evidence that

the parties have consulted and agreed upon terms. The prac-

tical difficulty, amounting almost to an impossibility, of bring-

ing the carrier and his employer together on every occasion

for the discussion of terms, has led to the adoption by carriers

of a printed form of contract, which is put into the hands of

the consignor, and by its terms purports to bind him to its

conditions; but it is strongly insisted that there ought to be

more satisfactory evidence of assent on the part of the con-

signor to modify any of his common-law rights than is derived

from the mere receipt of a paper from the carrier, framed to

suit the interest of the latter, and which the consignor may

never have read.

There are some matters in respect to which the carrier may
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qualify liis liability by mere notice. Mr. Greenleaf says: "It

is now well settled that a common carrier may qualify his

liability by a general notice to all who may employ him, of

any reasonable requisition to be observed on their part, in

regard to the manner of delivery and entry of parcels, and the

information to be given to him of their contents, the rates of

freight, and the like; as, for example, that he will not be re-

sponsible for goods above the value of a certain sum, unless

they are entered as such, and paid for accordingly": 2 Greenl.

Ev., sec. 235; see Western Transportation Co. v. Newhall, 24

111. 466, 76 Am. D. 760. These are but the reasonable regu-

lations which every man should be allowed to establish for

his business, to insure regularity and promptness, and to prop-

erly inform him of the responsibility he assumes. And it has

been held that notice derived from the usage of the carrier

may determine the manner in which he is authorized to make

delivery: Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank v. Champlain Trans.

Co., 16 Vt. 52, 42 Am. D. 491; 18 Vt. 131; 23 Id. 186,

56 Am. D. 68. But beyond the establishment of such rules,
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the force of a mere notice cannot extend. Subject to reason-

able regulations, every man has a right to insist that his prop-

erty, if of such description as the carrier assumes to convey,

shall be transported subject to the common-law liability. "A

common carrier has no right to refuse goods offered for car-

riage at the proper time and place, on tender of the usual and

reasonable compensation, unless the owner will consent to his

receiving them under a reduced liability; and the owner can

insist on his receiving the goods under all the risks and re-

sponsibilities which the law annexes to his employment": Pierce

on Railroads, 416; see Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. (N. Y.)

234, 32 Am. D. 455; Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 251,

32 Am. D. 470; Jones v. Voorhees, 10 Ohio, 145; Bennett v.

Button, 10 N. H. 487; New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v.

Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 382; Moses v. Boston etc. R. R. Co.,

24 N. H. 71, 55 Am. D. 222 ; Kimball v. Rutland etc. R. R. Co.,

26 Vt. 256, 62 Am. D. 576; Slocum v. Fairchild, 7 Hill, 292;

Dorr V. New Jersey Steam Nav. Co., 4 Sand. (N. Y.) 136, 11

N. Y. 485, 62 Am. D. 125 ; Michigan Cent. R. R. Co. v. Hale, 6

Mich. 243. The fact that a restrictive notice is shown to have

been actually received or seen by the owner of the goods will

not raise a presumption that he assents to its terms, since it is

as reasonable to infer that he intends to insist on his rights as

that he assents to their qualification, and the burden of proof

is upon the carrier to establish the contract qualifying his lia-
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bility, if he claims that one exists : New Jersey Steam Naviga-

tion Co. V. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 382, per Nelson, J.

The evidence of such a contract in the present case consists:

1. Of the defendant's mode of doing business; and 2. Of what

are called in the case bills of lading, and which contain the

supposed limitations. It is admitted by the plaintiffs that the

bills of lading in use by these defendants, and all the con-

tracts of affreightment, the instructions to agents, and the

printed rules posted in all the depots and station-houses of

defendants for the past ten years, have contained clauses ex-

empting them from liability or loss by fire, and providing that

when goods are in the depot awaiting delivery to consignees

the company will be liable as warehousemen only, and not as

carriers; and that plaintiffs have been accustomed to do busi-

ness with defendants, and to receive and send goods over their

road under bills of lading of this description.

There are several reasons why knowledge in plaintiffs of

defendants' usage to make restrictive contracts cannot control

the present case. In the first place, knowledge of such usage
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can in no case of the kind be allowed force beyond that which

could be given to notice of an intention on the part of the car-

rier to restrict his liability, brought home to the party in any

other mode; and we have already seen that the force of such

notices is exceedingly circiunscribed. And it can hardly be

seriously claimed that the plaintiffs, by accepting restrictive

contracts in some cases, have thereby debarred themselves from

insisting upon their common-law rights thereafter. In the second

place, the defendants have no power under the law to establish

a usage restricting their liability, as that would come directly

in conflict with the clause in the general railroad law heretofore

quoted. And in the third place, if this were otherwise, the

usage would be irrelevant to the present case, since the proof

relates to dealings between the parties to this suit at Detroit,

and to usages understood by the plaintiffs there, while the con-

tracts here in question were in each instance made with con-

signors at a distance, and in most cases by other railroad com-

panies, whose usages do not seem to be uniform.

It remains to be seen whether the conditions embodied in

the bills of lading are to be treated as a part of the contract

for transportation, and to be regarded as assented to by the

consignors, notwithstanding they may not have read them.

A bill of lading proper is the written acknowledgment of

the master of a vessel that he has received specified goods

from the shipper to be conveyed on the terms therein expressed

to their destination and there delivered to the parties therein
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designated: Abbott on Shipping, 322. It constitutes the con-

tract between the parties in respect to the transportation; and

is the measure of their rights and liabilities, unless where fraud

or mistake can be shown: Redfield on Railways, 307-309, and

notes; Angell on Carriers, sec. 223. It has acquired from

usage a negotiable character, and the carrier may be estopped

as against the indorsee for value from showing mistakes in

giving it: Redfield on Railways, 307. Whether the contracts

which railroad companies are accustomed to give on the receipt

of goods for transportation, and which are usually called by the

same name, are subject to all the same incidents as the bills of

lading proper, we need not now consider; but it will not be dis-

puted that they fix the rights and liabilities of the parties when

their terms have been agreed upon, and it is, I think, the weight

of authority, and certainly the rule in this state, that the car-

rier may stipulate in them for a limitation of his common-law

liability : Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Hale, 6 Mich. 243.

Bills of lading are signed by the carrier only; and where a

contract is to be signed only by one party, the evidence of
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assent to its terms by the other party consists usually in his

receiving and acting upon it. This is the case with deeds-

poll, and with various classes of familiar contracts, and the

evidence of assent derived from the acceptance of the con-

tract, without objection, is commonly conclusive. I do not

perceive that bills of lading stand upon any different footing.

If the carrier should cause limitations upon his liability to be

inserted in the contract in such a manner as not to attract the

consignor's attention, the question of assent might fairly be

considered an open one : Brown v. Eastern R. R. Co., 11 Cush.

97; and if delivery of the bill of lading was made to the con-

signor under such circumstances as to lead him to suppose

it to be something else, — as, for instance, a mere receipt for

money, — it could not be held binding upon him as a contract,

inasmuch as it had never been delivered to and accepted by

him as such: King v. Woodbridge, 34 Vt. 565. But except in

these and similar cases, it cannot become a material question

whether the consignor read the bill of lading or not. The

ground upon which it is claimed that this becomes important

seems to be that parties generally receive these contracts with-

out reading them or inquiring into their terms, — taking what-

ever the railroad companies see fit to give them; and that they

are thus liable to be imposed upon and defrauded, unless the

courts interfere to protect them. Or, if we may be allowed to

state the same thing in different words, as everybody is negli-

gent in these matters, and will not give the necessary attention
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to their contracts that is essential to the protection of their

interests, the courts must interfere to set them aside wherever

extraneous evidence of actual assent is not produced. If the

courts possess any such power, and it is expedient to exercise

it, it may be important to consider, at the outset, whither it

will lead us. Bills of lading are not the only contracts that

are received in this careless way. Deeds, mortgages, and bills

of sale are every day given and received without being read

by the parties, though they may contain provisions which

have not been the subject of special negotiation. Policies of

insurance, which more nearly resemble the instruments now

in question, are still more often received without examination.

In the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, no one ever sup-

posed it was competent for the courts to reform such instru-

ments in behalf of a party who would not inform himself of

their purport. Nothing would be certain or reliable in busi-

ness transactions if contracts were liable to be set aside on

grounds like these. The law does not assume to be the guar-

dian of parties compotes mentes in respect to the lawful con-
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tracts which they may make, but it proceeds upon the idea

that where fraud has not been practiced, and mistake has not

intervened, the general interests of the community are best

subserved by leaving every man to the protection of his own

observation and diligence.

It is argued that the consignor had no occasion to examine

the bill of lading, because he had a right to suppose it recog-

nized the common-law liability. But the common law does

not establish the rates of freight, or the place of delivery; and

for stipulations respecting these, at least, every man must

isxamine his bill of lading. Moreover, we cannot overlook the

facts that a large proportion of these instruments are issued

with restrictive clauses, and that carriers arrange their tariffs

of freights in the expectation that they will be accepted. These

facts are so well understood that a person exercising ordinary

diligence in his own affairs would not be likely to accept one

of these instruments without examination, if he expected to

hold the carrier to the liability which would rest upon him in

the absence of special contract.

I do not find any case in which a court has assumed to set

aside such a contract on the ground that the party had failed

to read it. An exemption from liability from losses arising

from specified causes, when embodied in the bill of lading,

has been frequently recognized as a part of the contract, though

it did not distinctly appear to have been brought to the con-

signor's notice: Davidson v. Graham, 2 Ohio St. 131; Parsons
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V. Monteath, 13 Barb. 353; York Co. v. Central R. R. Co., 3

Wall. 107 ; Dorr v. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co., 11 N. Y.

491, 62 Am. D. 125 ; and in the case last referred to, it is said

that the exemption, when embodied in the bill of lading, must be

deemed to have been assented to by the parties. The same pre-

sumption would seem to have been acted upon in Moore v.

Evans, 14 Barb. 524; Kallman v. United States Express Co., 3

Kan. 205, and Whitesides v. Thurlkill, 20 Miss. 599, 51 Am. D.

128 ; and it is in accordance with the general rule applicable to

written contracts.

It is said, however, that these special contracts must be held

void for want of consideration unless it is shown that, in re-

turn for the release of the carrier from his extraordinary lia-

bility, he on his part has made a deduction in the rates of freight.

What does appear in the present case is, that the carrier, in

consideration of the promise by the consignor to release him

from certain liabilities, and to pay him certain moneys, agrees

on his part to carry the goods for the sum named. I do not

see how we can assume that the charges are the same that
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they would have been had the release been omitted. If by the

charter of a railroad corporation maximum rates had been es-

tablished, and the corporation had attempted to charge these

rates for a restricted liability, a case would be presented com-

ing within the principle of this objection : Bissell v. New York

Central R. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 449, 82 Am. D. 369, per Selden,

J. ; but no such case is before us here, and a consideration

appears which, for aught that is shown by the record is suffi-

cient.

It was also said on the argument that a ru.e such as we have

now laid down would place the public at the mercy of the

railroad companies, who would refuse to give any other than

restricted bills of lading. It is enough for us to say in this

case that railroad companies chartered as common carriers

have no such power, and the consignor can assent to the re-

striction in each instance, or refuse to assent, at his option.

If the corporations decline to transport goods as common car-

riers when that is the condition upon which they hold their

franchises, there would be no difficulty, I apprehend, in apply-

ing the proper remedy.

It will now be necessary to examine the various bills of lad-

ing in reference to the particular limitations which they con-

tain. Two of those given by the' Cincinnati, Hamilton and

Dayton Railroad Company contain no restrictions; the other

excepts against liability for "unavoidable accident and fire in

depot." Those issued by the defendants contain, among others,
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a similar exception. It is claimed by the plaintiffs that these

and similar exceptions will not shield the defendants, because

the loss in the present case was the result of the negligence of

their officers or servants, against liability for which it was not

lawful for them to contract.

Whether the rule that a carrier, on grounds of public policy,

is not to be permitted to contract for exemption from liability

for his own negligence (Fairchild v. Slocum, 19 Wend. 329 ;

York Company v. Central R. R. Co., 3 Wall. 113 ; 3 Parsons on

Contracts, 5th ed., 249), can properly be so extended as to pre-

vent corporations contracting against liabilty for the negli-

gence of their officers or servants, or any classes of them, and if

not, then whether the general words of exemption here em-

ployed ought to be construed to embrace the negligence of such

officers and servants (Wells v. New Jersey Steam Navigation

Co., 8 N. Y. 379; Schieffelin v. Harvey, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 179,

5 Am. D. 206; Alexander v. Greene, 7 Hill, 533), are questions

I do not care to discuss in this case, inasmuch as I think no

such negligence is shown.
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What was relied upon was the fact that barrels of benzine

were carried over the road of defendants, landed in their depot

at Detroit, and then passed over to the Detroit and Milwaukee

Railroad Company, which occupied the other end of the same

warehouse; that some of these barrels were in a leaky condi-

tion; and that while being handled by the employees of the

latter company the escaping gas took fire from a lantern, and

resulted in the destruction of the warehouse and its contents.

From this it appears that the fire took place after the inflam-

mable fluid had passed out of the hands of the defendants.

The fact that they had carried it over their road had nothing

to do with its ignition. If it should be conceded to be negli-

gence in the company to receive so dangerous an article among

their freiglrts, yet if no loss resulted while it remained in their

custody, it would be difficult to hold them responsible for acci-

dents happening from its subsequent handling. When the

Detroit and Milwaukee company received it upon their prem-

ises, it was of no consequence from whence it came, and any

accident which might result would have no relation to the source

from which it was received. It would be as legitimate to hold

a merchant responsible from whom it might have been bought

as the carrier from whom it had been accepted. If we are to

trace causes back, we need not stop at the preceding carrier, but,

with similar reason, might hold the man liable who made the

leaky barrels, or the person from whom the first carrier re-

ceived them filled. The law can only look at the proximate
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causes of an injury, and not at those remote circumstances that

may have contributed to those causes: Ohnsted v. Brown, 12

Barb. 657; Butler v. Kent, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 223, 10 Am. D.

219 ; Whatly v. Murrell, 1 Strob. 389 ; Matthews v. Pass, 19 Ga.

141; Piatt V. Potts, 13 Ired. (N. C.) 455, 53 Am, D. 412.

Some question was made on the argument whether the con-

signors can be held, in the absence of explicit evidence on the

subject, to have authority to enter into special coni;racts with

the carrier which shall be binding on the consignee. His au-

thority, I think, is to be presumed; and the carrier is under no

obligation to inquire into it: Moriarty v. Harnden, 1 Daly,

227. It is a question of more difficulty whethet the Ohio bills

of lading would govern the transportation for the whole route.

By their terms the Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad

Company acknowledge the receipt of the goods in good order,

to be delivered in like good order "at Toledo for Detroit,"

unto the plaintiffs or their assigns, they paying freight. No

evidence is given of any custom that these contracts shall govern

the whole distance ; nor does the case show whether the rates of
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freight specified are for the delivery at Toledo or at Detroit.

The words employed only import that the goods are to be carried

to Toledo, and from thence forwarded; and in the absence of

any special custom on the subject, it would seem that the com-

pany giving these bills fully discharged their duty when they

had delivered the goods to the defendants at Toledo.

There is a number of English eases in which it has been

held, where carriers received goods and gave receipt therefor,

which specified that they were received to be sent to a point

beyond their line, and there delivered to the consignee, that

the contract was one for transportation the whole distance,

upon which the first carrier might be sued for a loss occurring

after the goods had passed out of his hands : Muschamp v.

Lancaster R. R. Co., 8 Mees. & W. 421 ; Collins v. Bristol etc.

R. R. Co., 11 Ex. 790; S. C. in House of Lords, 5 Hurl. & N.

969. The same ruling has been made in this country, where

the carrier had expressly agreed to carry to a point beyond

his line, for a compensation specified : Wilcox v. Parmelee, 3

Sand. 610; Mallory v. Burrett, 1 E. D. Smith, 234; Noyes v.

Rutland etc. R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 110. But the doctrine generally

accepted by the American courts is, that where a carrier re-

ceives goods marked for a particular designation beyond his

line, and does not expressly undertake to deliver them at the

point designated, the implied contract is only to transport over

his own line and forward from its terminus : Ackley v. Kellogg,

8 Cow. 223 ; Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill, 157 ; Hood v.
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New York etc. R. R. Co., 22 Conn. 1 ; Elmore v. Naugatnck R.

R. Co., 23 Conn. 457, 63 Am. D. 143; Farmers' and M. Bank v.

Champlain Trans. Co., 23 Vt. 209, 56 Am. D. 68; Brintnall v.

Saratoga R. R. Co., 32 Vt. 665 ; Nutting v. Connecticut River R.

R. Co., 1 Gray, 502; Briggs v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 6 Allen

(Mass.) 246, 83 Am. D. 626; Perkins v. Portland etc. R. R. Co.,

47 Me. 573, 74 Am. D. 507 ; American note to 11 Exch. 797. And

see Angle v. Mississippi etc. R. R. Co., 9 Iowa, 487.

In the case of 1 Gray the defendants receipted the goods

at a station on their line ''for transportation to New York," —

a point beyond their line. No connection in business was

shown between them and any other railroad company. The

defendants were accustomed to receive pay only over their

own road. The goods in question were delivered to a connect-

ing line, but only a portion of them reached New York. The

defendants were held not liable, on the ground that their un-

dertaking was to carry over their own road only. Whether

the receipt of freight by them for the whole distance would

have affected their liability may perhaps be an open question
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on the authorities. That circumstance has evidently been re-

garded as important in some cases: See Weed v. Saratoga

etc. R. R. Co., 19 Wend. 537, and Redfield on Railways, 286,

and note ; but in Hood v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 22 Conn. 1,

the first carriers, who received payment for transportation

over the connecting line, were regarded as having received it

as agent only, and not as compensation for an undertaking by

themselves to transport over such line.

In the present case, it is not shown that any connection in

business exists between the defendants and the Cincinnati, Ham-

ilton and Dayton Railroad Company. It is admitted that the

latter company "is one of those forming a transportation route

from Cincinnati to the city of Detroit"; but this would be true

whether the companies had business connections or not. It

does not appear that the freight was paid, and the contrary

is inferable. It does not even appear that the charges agreed

upon were for the whole route; and if they were, the case I

think would not be affected by that circumstance. The only

consequence would be to make the whole freight payable to

the defendants, who would deduct their own charges, and pay

over to the Ohio company what remained. Fixing upon the

price would only amount to an agreement by the Ohio com-

pany that the whole charges should not exceed that sum. In

the absence of agreement between the two companies on the

subject, the defendants would not be compelled to conform

their own rates to those agreed upon at Cincinnati.
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On this record as it stands, I think we must hold that the

bills of lading given at Cincinnati were fully complied with

when the Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Company had

carried the goods to Toledo, and there delivered them to the

defendants. If there is any exception to this statem.ent, it

must relate to the rates of freight; but even as to those, the

undertaking of the Ohio company would not bind the defend-

ants unless authority to bind them was shown. As there is

no evidence on that point, I think the defendants received the

goods at Toledo to be carried to Detroit under their liability as

carriers at the common law, and with the right to make such

reasonable charges as their regulations may have prescribed.

If reasonable charges over their own line would exceed the

amount specified, — and which would appear by the way-bill, —

they might refuse to receive the goods except upon prepay-

ment; but if they received and carried them with a notifica-

tion that certain rates only were to be charged for the whole

transportation, they would doubtless be limited in their col-

lection to that sum. But one company cannot possess power,
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arbitrarily and in the absence of consent, to fix the rates for

transportation by another, on the ground solely that the two

form a continuous line between two points. It must be equally

without power to make contracts diminishing the common-

law liability of the other; inasmuch as all such contracts

must be based upon a consideration, which only the party

himself or his agent duly authorized is competent to agree

upon. If the bills of lading in terms applied to the carriage

for the whole distance, we should be required to hold, I think,

that the defendants adopted their terms and consented to be

bound by them when they received and carried the goods

under them; but I have already said that such is not the case

in respect to the particular bills now under consideration.

I think, therefore, that the defendants should be held liable

for the wine, candles, and tobacco shipped from Cincinnati,

unless the plaintiffs had been duly notified of their receipt at

Detroit, and had had reasonable time after notice to remove

them before the fire had occurred. It is admitted that no

notice was given of the receipt of the wine and candles, but of

the arrival of the tobacco the plaintiffs were notified about half-

past three o'clock in the afternoon of the 26th of April. The

defendants were in the habit of closing their depot at six P. M.

The fire occurred on the same evening. I am of opinion that

a reasonable time was not afforded for the removal after the

notice. It might not be proper to attempt to lay down any

general rule as to what shall constitute reasonable notice in
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these cases, Avhere the record discloses so little which bears

upon the point; but it seems quite clear to my mind that two

hours and a half are not sufficient, especially in view of the

notice which defendants give to consignees, — that they will

charge for storage after twenty-four hours, — which may pos-

sibly have led to a general impression that the relation of

warehousemen was not to be considered as established until the

expiration of that time. I think, therefore, the plaintiffs should

have judgment for the value of the tobacco also. For the eggs

delivered to the defendants at Adrian and Hudson, under an

exemption from liability for losses in consequence of fire in the

depot, the defendants cannot be held liable under the principles

hereinbefore stated.

Christiancy, J., concurred.

115. BULLARD V. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO.,

107 Mich. 695; 65 N. W. B. 551; 61 Am. St. R. 358. 1895.

Case, against an express company for damages caused by the

refusal of defendant to collect and deliver packages at his place

of business. Verdict directed by court for defendant.
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Montgomery, J. This is an action in case, commenced in

justice's court. The declaration, in substance, alleges that plain-

tiff is a large shipper of celery by express from Kalamazoo

to places throughout the United States, upon lines of the de-

fendant, a common carrier; that the defendant, to collect celery

and other articles for shipment in the city of Kalamazoo, and

to deliver packages received by it, maintains and employs a large

number of men, horses and wagons; that since December 1,

1893, plaintiff's place of business has been at No. 506 Douglas

Avenue, in said city; that during the celery season plaintiff

makes large daily shipments over defendant's lines, and has con-

signed to him packages of money in payment of celery shipped

C. O. D., and other articles, of all of which defendant had

notice; that plaintiff repeatedly requested defendant to call

at his place of business for his shipments, and to deliver pack-

ages to him, which defendant refused to do; that defendant

collects for shipment from and delivers to a large number of

shippers of celery and other articles, under substantially the

same circumstances, conditions, and situation as the plaintiff,

and for shippers at a greater distance from his place of business

than plaintiff's place, and for shippers in the same locality as the

plaintiff, and has unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff
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by such refusal ; that plaintiff has been damaged by being com-

pelled to convey his celery to defendant's office for shipment, and

procure his packages from its office. The plaintiff had judgment

in the justice's court. In the circuit court the court directed

a verdict for the defendant.

The evidence on the trial showed that the defendant's agents,

acting in unison with the agents of other express companies,

had established limits in the city, beyond which they did not go

to receive goods for shipment or to deliver packages. In some

instances these limits extended a greater distance from the de-

fendant's office than plaintiff's place of business. It was also

in evidence that plaintiff knew of these limits before moving

into his present place of business, and before transacting the

business with defendant in which the inconvenience arose which,

it is alleged, caused damage to plaintiff.

At the common law, a carrier of goods was not bound to ac-

cept delivery at any place other than his place of business, or

the line of travel, in the absence of a custom of receiving goods

at other places : Hutchinson on Carriers, sees. 82, 87 ; Blanchard
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V. Isaacs, 3 Barb. 388. But it is insisted that the defendant in

this case, having practiced the custom of receiving goods for

shipment at other points in the city than its office, was bound

to furnish equal facilities to all shippers who occupy a similar

position. We are not impressed with the force of this reason-

ing, as applied to the facts in this case. We are cited to no

case in which it has been held that a carrier is bound to go be-

yond its line to receive goods, and, while it would not be com-

petent for a common carrier to discriminate against shippers

within its fixed limits, it is not perceived why, if the company

is entitled to limit its receipt of goods to its own office or place

of business, it may not enlarge these limits at its discretion,

without being bound to go beyond them.

The duty to deliver to the consignee is somewhat broader.

Carriers on land, receiving packages, were, at the common law,

generally bound to deliver to the consignee, at his residence or

place of business. This rule has not been applied to carriers by

water, or railroad companies, which must, of necessity, be con-

fined to a fixed route. It has been said, however, that express

companies owe their origin to this very fact, and that the nature

of their business is to furnish a means of transportation and

delivery to the consignee: Wood's Browne on Carriers, sec.

230 ; Hutchinson on Carriers, sec. 379. The question of how far

this duty may be escaped by usage is not well settled. It has

been held, however, that when the business of an office is so

small that the company cannot or does not keep a messenger to
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make personal delivery, it is not unreasonable to require the

consignee to call at the office: Hutchinson on Carriers, sec,

380. If this may be done, it would seem to follow that the

company may, so long as the public have notice of the custom,

fix limits beyond which its agents are not required to go for

delivery. If it cannot do this, it is difficult to say where would

be the limit. It is clear that a reasonable limit is not in all cases

the city limit. Conditions are often varied. If not the city

limit, can it be said that a certain number of miles from the

office, in either direction, would be a reasonable limit? We

think, where the company, in apparent good faith, has assumed

to fix limits, having regard to the public requirements, that,

with regard to persons who have dealt with it having knowledge

of this fact, it is not bound to deliver beyond these limits. We

do not determine what the rights of one not having knowledge

of these limits would be. This is not such a case. But in this

case we think the court committed no error in directing a ver-

dict for the defendant.

Judgment will be affirmed.
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Long, Grant, and Hooker, JJ., concurred.

McGrath, C. J., did not sit.

116. SWEET V. BARNEY,

23 N. r. 335. 1861.

Action against an express company as a common carrier for

the value of a package of money delivered to defendants, di-

rected to ''People's Bank, 173 Canal St., New York." The

plaintiffs, bankers in Dansville, sent the package, containing

$2,892 to their correspondent, the People's Bank, in New York

city. The express company delivered it at their office in that

city to one Messenger, an employee of the People's Bank, who

had within 18 days previous to the delivery of this package re-

ceived nine other packages in similar manner without objection

from the bank. This package was stolen by him. Defendants

had a verdict at the circuit, which was affirmed at the general

term by the Supreme Court in the seventh district. Appeal to

Court of Appeals.

James. J. That these defendants were common carriers can

hardly be doubted. Persons whose business it is to receive

packages of bullion, coin, bank notes, commercial paper and

such other articles of value as parties see fit to trust to their

care for the purpose of transporting the same from one place
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to another for a compensation, are common carriers, and re-

sponsible as such for the safe delivery of property intrusted

to them. (Russell v. Livingston, 19 Barb. 346; Sherman v.

Wells, 28 Id. 403.) Such was the business of these defendants,

and such their responsibility.

The consignee is the presumptive owner of the thing con-

signed; and when the carrier is not advised that any different

relation exists, he is bound so to treat the consignee; but this

presumption may be rebutted; and if in an action for non-de-

livery by the consignor against the carrier, that presumption

be overcome, the action is properly brought in the consignor's

name. (Price v. Powell, 3 N. Y. 322.) But in this case, unless

a delivery of the money be established, the plaintiffs' right to

recover was made out.

There was no notice that the contents of the package in ques-

tion belonged to the consignors ; nor was there any fact proved,

calculated to weaken the presumption of ownership in the con-

signee. The defendants were, therefore, not only authorized

but fully justified in treating the consignment as the property
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of the bank. The defendants could not know that they were

employed to make a deposit in the "People's Bank" for the

benefit of the assignors; or that this package was entitled to or

demanded a special delivery. There was, in fact, nothing in the

transaction to advise them that this package was to be treated

differently from other packages actually belonging to the bank ;

and, therefore, any delivery good against the bank discharged

the carrier.

The principal question then is, was there a delivery good

against the bank? If there was, the plaintiffs must follow the

bank; they have no cause of action against these defendants.

It is conceded that the liability of a carrier begins with the re-

ceipt of the goods by him, and continues until the delivery of

the goods by him, subject to the general exceptions. And an

express carrier is bound to deliver the goods at their destined

place, to the consignee, or as the consignee may direct. In gen-

eral, the delivery must be to the owner or consignee himself,

or to his agent (11 Mete. 509), or they must be carried to his

residence, or they may be taken to his place of business, when

from the nature of the parcels that is the appropriate place for

their delivery. But there is no rule of law requiring a delivery

at the consignee's residence or place of business, when he is

willing to accept it at a different place, or directs a delivery at

another place. The consignee, or his authorized agent, may

receive goods addressed to him in the hands of a carrier at any

place, either before or after their arrival at their place of des-
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tination, and such acceptance operates as a discharge of the

carrier from his liability. (Omitting a citation from Lewis v.

Western R. Corp., 11 Mete. 509.)

Had the consignee in this case received the package in ques-

tion at the defendants' office I think no one would doubt the de-

fendants were discharged. The case then turns upon Messen-

ger's agency. If an authorized agent in the premises, a delivery

to him was as effectual as a delivery to the principal. The

question of agency was a question of fact, and was settled by

the verdict of the jury.

We think the delivery at the office of the defendants to the

authorized agent of the consignee was proper, and operated

to discharge the defendants from their obligations as carriers.

This disposes of the case unless there was some error com-

mitted at Circuit in submitting the question of Messenger's au-

thority to the jury, or in the courts refusing to charge as re-

quested. I have been unable to discover any such error. The

evidence submitted was competent — it was of the most perfect

and satisfactory kind, and not only justified but required the
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verdict rendered. The judgment should be affirmed.

117. HASSE V. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO.,

94 Mich. 133; 53 N. W. Rep. 918; 34 Am. St. E. 32S. 1892.

Action against defendants as common carriers. Plaintiffs are

clothiers in Detroit. They sent three parcels of clothing marked

"C. O. D.," addressed, respectively, to McMillan, Wick and

Hart, Marquette. The first two were not at home, but returned

in about ten days, and went to the express office and notified

the agent to hold the package another week and they would pay

for the goods and take the same. Hart was unknown to the

company, and failed to respond to a written notice sent through

the mail. On the day that Mc^Millan and Wick called, the ex-

press agent notified plaintiffs by mail of these facts, and that

the packages remained in the office unpaid. That night, and

before the notices reached plaintiffs, the express office and the

three parcels were destroyed by fire. There was no fault on the

part of defendants. Verdict was directed for plaintiffs.

Grant, J. (After stating the facts.) The defendant's con-

tract as common carrier was to safely carry the goods to their

destination, to notify the consignees of their arrival, and to offer

delivery upon payment of the amounts. This duty it had fully

performed, and with such performance its liability as a common
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carrier terminated. Its further duty was to safely store and

care for the goods, hold them a reasonable time to enable the

consignees to pay, if they were not ready to pay immediately,

and then to notify the consignors. The liability meanwhile was

that of warehouseman : Hutchinson on Carriers, sec. 392 ; Weed

V. Barney, 45 N. Y. 344, 6 Am. R. 96 ; Zinn v. New Jersey Steam-

boat Co., 49 N. Y. 442, 10 Am. R. 402; Adams Express Co. v.

Darnell, 31 Ind. 20, 99 Am. D. 582 ; Marshall v. American Ex-

press Co., 7 Wis. 1, 73 Am. D. 381.

In Weed v. Barney, 45 N. Y. 344, 6 Am. R. 96, the goods were

sent C. O. D., arrived at their destination March 17th, the

consignees were promptly notified, and promised to take and

pay for them, and the goods remained in the storehouse .until

April 16th, when they were destroyed by an explosion without

the fault of the defendants. No notice had meanwhile been

given to the consignor. It was held that no notice was essential.

It is a matter of common knowledge that those sending goods

by express with instruction to collect their value before delivery

expect express companies to retain them in order to give the
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consignees an opportunity to pay for and take the goods. Con-

signors so sending goods understand that the goods must be

deposited in the storehouses of these companies. There is no

reason, under such circumstances, in holding these companies

to the strict liability of common carriers. We think that under

the agreed facts in this case the defendant is not liable.

Judgment reversed, and judgment entered here for the de-

fendant : with costs of both courts.

y^ 118. PACIFIC EXPRESS CO. V. SHEARER,

160 ni. 215; 43 N. E. R. 816; 52 Am. St. B. 324. 1896.

Action to recover from the express company $4,000 delivered

by it to an imposter. One Stubblefield had had business deal-

ings as a stockbuyer with Shearer & Co., and they had frequently

made him advances of money by draft, letter of credit or ex-

press. Stubblefield arrived at Chepota, Kansas, late one night

and retired at a hotel, without registering, and next morning left

Chepota. Another man got off the same train and went to

another hotel. Next day this last man claimed that his name was

Stubblefield, went to the telegraph office and telegraphed Shearer

& Co. to express him $4,000. He received an answer by tele-

graph with a request for particulars, to which he telegraphed,

"Bought 240 corn fed Texas, top of 300, at $20 a head." He
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also ordered stock ears on a side track for receiving cattle for

Stubblefield, and informed the landlord of his arrangements.

Later he called at the express office for the package. Asked to

identify himself, he stated his name, his initials, the amount of

the money, and exhibited the telegrams, and some accounts of

sales of stock between Stubblefield and Shearer & Co. He also

brought the landlord to testify to his identity, and to the fact

that he had stock cars on the side track awaiting his shipments.

The money was thereupon paid to him. The fraud was not dis-

covered until too late to prevent delivery of the package to the

imposter. Plaintiff recovered below.

Craig, C. J. (After stating some of the instructions and re-

fusals to instruct.) It is apparent from the record that the pack-

age was delivered to the person in response to whose telegraphic

order appellees sent the package, appellees at the time believing

such person to be J. C. Stubblefield ; and it is, no doubt, also true

that, at the time of delivery, the agent of appellant ascertained

that the person who demanded the package, and to whom it was

delivered, was the person in response to whose order appellees
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sent the same, and that appellees treated the order for the money

as the order of J. C. Stubblefield; and it may also be true that

the agent used reasonable diligence to ascertain the identity of

the person who demanded the package before it was delivered.

Would these facts relieve the carrier of liability for delivering

the package to a person to whom it was not consigned?

In Hutchinson on Carriers, section 344, the rule with refer-

ence to delivery is stated as follows: "No circumstance of fraud,

imposition, or mistake wall excuse the common carrier from re-

sponsibility for a delivery to the wrong person. The law exacts

of him absolute certainty that the person to whom the delivery

is made is the party rightfully entitled to the goods, and puts

upon him the entire risk of mistakes in this respect, no matter

from what cause occasioned, however justifiable the delivery may

seem to have been, or however satisfactory the circumstances or

proof of identity may have been to his mind, and no excuse has

ever been allowed for a delivery to a person for whom the goods

were not directed or consigned."

In United States Exp. Co. v. Hutchins, 67 111. 348, 350, where

an action was brought against the express company for its fail-

ure to deliver a package of money left with it to be carried and

delivered, this court said in regard to the liability of the com-

pany: "They became insurers for its safe delivery. Being so,

nothing can excuse them from their obligation safely to carry

and deliver, but the act of God or the public enemy. This rule
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of the common law, the rigid application of which has given so

much satisfaction and security to the commerce of nations, is

properly invoked in cases like this."

In Baldwin v. American Exp. Co., 23 111. 197, 74 Am. Dec.

190, where an action was brought against the company to recover

the value of a package of money which it, as common carrier,

undertook to carry from Chicago to Madison, Wisconsin, and

deliver to a certain named person, it was held to be the set-

tled doctrine of England and of this country that there must be

an actual delivery to the proper person, and in no other way can

the company discharge itself of responsibility as a common car-

rier, except by proving that it has performed such engagement,

or has been excused from the performance of it, or been pre-

vented by the act of God or the public enemy. After citing au-

thorities in support of this position, it is said : " It is necessary,

in order to give one security to property, this rigid rule should

obtain, and it has for years been enforced against common car-

riers. They are considered as insurers, and are under that re-

sponsibility. " In Gulliver v. Adams Exp. Co., 38 111. 503, the
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rule announced in the case last cited was sanctioned and ap-

proved.

In American etc. Exp. Co. v. Milk, 73 111. 224, an action was

brought against the company to recover for a package of money

delivered to the company in Du Page county, to be forwarded to

Kankakee. When the package arrived at its destination, the

agent of the company delivered it to a certain person on a forged

order of the consignee. It was held that it is the duty of an ex-

press company, upon receiving a package of money to be for-

warded, to safely carry and deliver it to the consignee, and the

only way it can relieve itself from responsibility as a common

carrier is by showing performance, or its prevention by the act

of God or the public enemy, and that it is not discharged by de-

livering the same to another on a forged order of the owner.

The same doctrine is announced in American etc. Exp. Co. v.

Wolf, 79 111. 430.

The decisions of this court are believed to be in harmony with

the law as declared in the text-books and as announced by a

large majority of the courts of last resort of the country. The

law requires at the hands of the carrier absolute certainty that

the person to whom the delivery is made is the real person to

whom the goods have been consigned, and the carrier cannot

escape liability on the ground that deception, imposition, or

fraud may have been resorted to by an impostor to obtain from

the agent of the carrier the goods intrusted to its care. The

business interests of the country, as well as the rights of a con-
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signer who pays a liberal price for the transmission of his prop-

erty, alike demand that the carrier should be held to a strict

accountability.

There are a number of cases in the books where a delivery of

goods has been made by the carrier to the wrong person under

circumstances not unlike the facts under which the money was

delivered here, where the carrier was held liable. In American

Exp. Co. V. Fletcher, 25 Ind. 493, a person pretending to be

J. 0. Riley called on the telegraph operator and agent of the

express company and sent a telegram to plaintiff requesting a

certain sum of money by express. In a short time, the same

agent received by express a package of money addressed to J. 0.

Riley. The person who had sent the telegram for the money

called on the agent and operator and demanded the package

of money, which was delivered over to him. Subsequently, it

turned out that the person who sent the telegram and to whom

the money was delivered was not J. 0. Riley, and the express

company was held liable for the money. In the decision of the

case, the court, among other things, said : ' ' The express under-
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taking of the appellant was to deliver the package to J. 0. Riley

in person. The utmost that the ansvv^er alleged was, that the

delivery was to another person who pretended to be Riley. He

identified himself merely as having so pretended on the day be-

fore, by transmitting a telegram in Riley's name. This was no

better evidence that his name was Riley than if he had so stated

to the express agent or any third person. That the package

had been sent in response to a telegram purporting to be from

J. 0. Riley simply proved that Riley had credit, or some arrange-

ment with the plaintiff to furnish him money, and that the pack-

age was sent to him — not that he was the person who sent the

dispatch or that anyone pretending to be him was to receive it. ' '

Southern Express Co. v. Van Meter, 17 Fla. 783, 35 Am. Rep.

107, is another case in point. There an instruction had been

given which was, substantially, that the express company, with-

out reference to the party who may have ordered the money

sent or who may have telegraphed for it, was bound to deliver to

the plaintiff if it was sent to him and he was the owner. On

behalf of the express company, it was insisted that the instruc-

tion did not announce a correct rule of law, but the court held

otherwise, and said : * ' This instruction, viewed in reference to

the testimony, is nothing more than that a forged telegram is no

excuse for the delivery to a party not the owner and to whom

it was the contract of the carrier to deliver it Notwith-

standing the forged telegram, this carrier, in making a personal

delivery, was bound by law to deliver to the person to whom
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the package was addressed, he being its true owner. It is the

settled doctrine of England and this country that there must

be an actual delivery to the proper person, .... and in no

other way can the carrier discharge his responsibility, except

by proving he has performed such engagement or has been ex-

cused from performance, or been prevented by the act of God

or a public enemy": See, also, American Exp. Co. v. Stack, 29

Ind. 27.

Price v. Oswego etc. Ry. Co., 50 N. Y. 213, 10 Am. Rep. 475,

is an interesting case on the question. There the person who

ordered the goods in the name of a fictitious firm, S. H. Wilson

& Co., was the same person who received and receipted therefor

in the name of such fictitious firm. It seems that the referee

found ' ' that the delivery by the carrier w^as to the same person

who made the order for the goods," and he also found, as a con-

clusion of law, that the delivery to such person, without notice

of fraud, relieved the carrier of liability. But the court of ap-

peals reversed the judgment and held the carrier liable, and,

among other things, said : "It would hardly be claimed, in case
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there had been a firm doing business at Oswego under the name

of S. H. Wilson & Co., a swindler would make himself consignee

of goods, or acquire any right whatever thereto, which were in

fact consigned to such firm, simply by showing that he had

forged an order in the n^me of the firm directing such consign-

ment. If he would not thereby acquire any right to the goods,

delivery to him would not protect the carrier any more than if

made to any other person."

Duff V. Budd, 3 Brod. & B. 177, 7 Eng. Com. L. 399, is also

a case in point. There the person who received the goods was

the same who ordered them in a fictitious name, but it was held

the carrier had no authority to deliver them to such person, and

the owner was entitled to recover of the carrier.

Dunbar v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 110 Mass. 26, 14 Am. Rep.

576, and Edmunds v. Merchants' etc. Co., 135 ]\Iass. 283, are re-

lied upon by the appellant to sustain the delivery of the package.

In the first case cited, one John P. Gorman called on Dunbar,

in Boston, and represented that he was John H. Young, of Prov-

idence, Rhode Island. He purchased on credit a quantity of

goods, and had them consigned to John H. Young, Providence,

Rhode Island. Upon the arrival of the goods in Providence,

Gorman, who had made the purchase in person, presented him-

self to the carrier, and, as the agent of Young, demanded the

goods. The goods having been delivered to him, Dunbar sued

the carrier for a misdelivery, but the court held that the action

would not lie. The decision, as we understand it, is predicated
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on the ground that the goods were consigned and delivered to

the person who actually, in person, made the purchase under an

assumed mime. In the other case it appeared that "a swindler,

claiming to be Edward Pape, of Dayton, Ohio, purchased goods

from plaintiff by personal negotiation. There was a man whose

true name was Edward Pape, in Dayton, Ohio — a reputable busi-

ness man, whom the plaintiff supposed the swindler to be. The

goods were delivered by plaintiff' to the defendant, to be carried

to Dayton and delivered to Edward Pape. The defendant de-

livered to the swindler." The court held that the carrier was

not liable. In the opinion the court said: "The sale was void-

al)le by the plaintiff, but the carrier, by whom they were for-

warded, had no duty to inquire into its validity. The person

who bought them, and who called himself Edward Pape, owned

the goods, and upon their arrival in Dayton had the right to de-

mand them of the carrier. In delivering them to him the car-

rier was guilty of no fault or negligence. It delivered them to

the person who bought and owned them, who went by the name

of Edward Pape, and thus answered the directions upon the
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package, and who was the person to whom the plaintiff sent

them." There is a marked distinction between these cases and

the one under consideration, and they cannot control here.

Another case relied upon is Samuel v. Cheney, 135 Mass. 278,

46 Am. Rep. 467. That case, in its facts, is more like the one

under consideration than any that has been cited by appel-

lant, .and it seems to sustain the position of appellant. But

while we recognize the ability of the court in which the case

Avns decided, we do not regard the rule laid down as the correct

one, and we are not inclined to follow it.

Some other cases have been cited in the argument of counsel,

but it will not be necessary to refer to them here. The cases

bearing on the question are not entirely harmonious, but the rule

adopted in this state and in the courts of many other states, that

the carrier is an insurer for the safe delivery of the goods to

the person to whom they are consigned, is, as we think, the only

safe rule to be adopted. This rule gives protection to the con-

signor, who pays his money to the carrier to transport and de-

liver goods to the consignee, and at the same time imposes no

unreasonable respouF'ibility on the carrier. When money or

goods have been delivered to a carrier to be carried and de-

livered to a certain named person, when they reach their des-

tination it is the business of the agent of the carrier to deliver

to the real person to whom they are consigned, and, as said by

Hutchinson, no circumstance of fraud, imposition, or mistake

will excuse the common carrier from responsibility for a de-
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livery to the wrong person. Where the consignee is unknown to

the agent of the carrier, it is his duty to hold the goods until

the consignee furnishes ample proof that he is the person to

whom the goods were consigned. When Shearer & Co. received a

telegram from J. C. Stubblefield, and forwarded a package of

money directed to J. C. Stubblefield, they supposed and believed

the order came from the man with whom they had previously

had dealings and with whom they were personally acquainted,

and, when they delivered the package to the carrier, it was con-

signed to him. The fact that an impostor had sent a telegram

in the name of J. C. Stubblefield, and a reply to J. C. Stubble-

field was returned which was delivered to the impostor, did not

authorize the agent of the carrier to deliver the package directed

to J. C. Stubblefield to an impostor representing that he was

J. C. Stubblefield. Here the package of money was consigned

to J. C. Stubblefield, and the carrier was directed to deliver the

money to him and to him onl3^ This was not done. The money

was never delivered to J. C. Stubblefield, but the agent of the

carrier delivered it to an impostor, and for a failure to deliver
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the package to J. C. Stubblefield the carrier is liable.

The judgment of the appellate court will be affirmed.

)( 119. HAWKINS V. HOFFMAN,

6 Hill (N. Y.) 586, 41 Am. D. 767. 1844.

Case, against defendant as a common carrier for the loss of a

trunk containing samples of goods used by one Mason in his busi-

ness as traveling salesman for plaintiff. The trunk was lost

while Mason was traveling with it on defendant's steamboat.

Plaintiff nonsuited below.

By Court, Bronson, J. Trover will lie where the goods have

been lost to the owner by the act of the carrier, though there

may have been no intentional wrong; as where the goods are

by mistake, or under a forged order, delivered to the vrrong

person : Youl v. Harbottle, Peak. Cas. 49 ; Devereux v. Barclay,

2 Barn. & Aid. 702 ; Stephenson v. Hart, 4 Bing. 476 ; Lubbock

V. Inglis, 1 Stark. 104. But it will not lie for the mere omission

of the carrier; as where the property has been stolen or lost

through his negligence, and so can not be delivered to the owner.

The remedy in such cases is assumpsit, or a special action on

the case: Anon., 2 Salk. 655; Ross v. Johnson, 5 Burr. 2825;

and see Dewell v. Moxon, 1 Taunt. 391; 2 Saund. 47, f; Mc-

Combie v. Davies, 6 East, 538. Mere non-feasance does not work
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a conversion of the property ; and although the owner may have

another action, he can not maintain trover. Here, the trunk

was lost, and the plaintiff can only recover, if at all, upon the

counts which charge the defendant as a carrier. A demand and

refusal would not alter the case, for as the trunk was either

stolen or lost, the defendant could not deliver it. Demand and

refusal are only evidence of a conversion where the defendant

was in such a condition that he might have delivered the prop-

erty if he would. If the defendant was a common carrier of the

lost trunk, it would then be important to inquire whether there

was a complete delivery of the property to ]\Iason at Poughkeep-

sie. If there was a full transfer from the custody of the boat-

men to the charge of the owner, the defendant's contract was

performed, and he was no longer answerable for the property as

a common carrier. But although the evidence tended pretty

strongly to show a complete delivery, I do not think it so con-

clusive as to warrant the judge in taking the question from the

jury, if the cause turned upon that point. He undoubtedly

went upon the ground that the defendant was not to be re-
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garded as a common carrier of the trunk; and that is the prin-

cipal question in the cause.

Although I do not find it stated in the case that Mason paid

anything to the boat-owner, either for freight or passage, yet

the whole argument, on both sides, went upon the ground that

he had paid the usual fare of a passenger, and nothing more:

that he neither paid, nor intended to pay anything for the

trunk; but designed to have the same pass as his baggage. It

was formerly held, that the owner of the boat or vehicle was

not answerable as a carrier for the luggage of the passenger,

unless a distinct price was paid for it. But it is now held that

the carrying of the baggage is included in the principal con-

tract in relation to the passenger ; and the carrier is answerable

for the loss of the property, although there was no separate

agreement concerning it. A contract to carry the ordinary

baggage of the passenger is implied from the usual course of

the business ; and the price paid for fare is considered as includ-

ing a compensation for carrying the freight. But this implied

undertaking has never been extended beyond ordinary baggage,

or such things as a traveler usually carries with him for his per-

sonal convenience in the journey. It neither includes money,

nor merchandise : Orange County Bank v. Brown, 9 Wend. 85,

24 Am. Dec. 129 ; Pardee v. Drew, 25 Id. 459.

It was suggested in the first case, that money to pay travel-

ing expenses might, perhaps, be included. But that may, I

think, be doubted. Men usually carry money to pay traveling
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expenses about their persons, and not in their trunks or boxes;

and no contract can be implied beyond such things as are usu-

ally carried as baggage. It is going far enough to imply an

agreement to carry freight of any kind from a contract to carry

the passenger ; for the agreement which is implied is much more

onerous than the one which is expressed. The carrier is only

answerable for an injury to the passenger, where there has been

some Avant of care or skill; but he must answer for the loss of

the goods, though it happened without his fault. Still, an

agreement to carry ordinary baggage may well be implied from

the usual course of business; but the implication can not be

extended a single step beyond such things as the traveler usu-

ally has wdth him as a part of his luggage. It is undoubtedly

difficult to define with accuracy what shall be deemed baggage

wathin the rule of the carrier's liability. I do not intend to say

that the articles must be such as every man deems essential to

his comfort; for some men carry nothing, or very little with

them when they travel, while others consult their convenience

by carrying many things. Nor do I intend to say that the rule
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is confined to wearing apparel, brushes, razors, writing appa-

ratus, and the like, which most persons deem indispensable. If

one has books for his instruction or amusement by the way, or

carries his gun or fishing tackle, they would undoubtedly fall

within the term baggage, because they are usually carried as

such. This is, I think, a good test for determining what things

fall within the rule.

In this case the plaintiff sent out IMason as his "traveler" or

agent to seek purchasers for his goods, and the trunk in ques-

tion contained samples of the merchandise which he wished to

sell. The samples were not carried for the personal use, con-

venience, instruction, or amusement of the passenger in his jour-

ney; but for the purpose of enabling him to make bargains in

the way of trade. Although the samples were not themselves to

be sold, they were used for the sole purpose of carrying on

traffic as a merchant. They were not baggage within the com-

mon acceptation of the term; and as they were not shipped or

carried as freight, the judge was right in holding that the plain-

tiff could not recover.

New trial denied.

120. M'ENTEE V. NEW JERSEY STEAIMBOAT CO.,

45 N. Y. 34, 6 Am. R. 28. 1871.

Action for conversion of some bundles of lath and blinds

shipped by one Sayer to "McEntee," New York. Plaintiff de-
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manded the goods and was refused. Evidence as to the form

of the refusal was conflicting, but there was evidence introduced

to show readiness to deliver if plaintiff would properly identify

himself as the consignee, or as having authority to receive the

goods. Upon a ruling that carriers had no right to insist upon

such identification verdict was rendered for plaintiff.

Allen, J. The defendants were charged for the conversion of

the goods upon evidence of a demand and a refusal to deliver

them. If the demand was by the person entitled to receive them,

and the refusal to deliver was absolute and unqualified, the con-

version was sufficiently proved, for such refusal is ordinarily

conclusive evidence of a conversion; but, if the refusal was

qualified, the question was, whether the qualification was reason-

able; and if reasonable and made in good faith, it was no evi-

dence of a conversion. Alexander v. Southey, 5 B. and Aid. 247 ;

Holbrook v. Wight, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 169, 35 Am. D. 607;

E£>gers V. Weir, 34 N. Y. 463; Mount v. Derick, 5 Hill, 455.

If, at the time of the demand, a reasonable excuse be made in

good faith for the non-delivery, the goods being evidently kept
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with a view to deliver them to the true owner, there is no con-

version.

This action is not upon the contract of the carriers, but for a

tortious conversion of the property ; but the rights and duties of

the defendants as carriers, are, nevertheless, involved.

The defendants were bailees of the property, under an obli-

gation to deliver it to the rightful owner. They would have been

liable had they delivered the goods to a wrong person. Common

carriers deliver property at their peril, and must take care that

it is delivered to the right person, for if the delivery be to the

wrong person, either by an innocent mistake or through fraud

of third persons, as upon a forged order, they will be responsible,

and the wrongful delivery will be treated as a conversion. Hawk-

ins V. Hoffman, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 586, 41 Am. D. 767; Powell v.

Myers, 26 Wend. 591 ; Devereux v. Barclay, 2 B. and Aid. 702 ;

Guillaume v. Hamburg and Am. Packet Co., 42 N. Y. 212, 1

Am. R. 512 ; Duff v. Budd, 3 Brod. and Bing. 177. The duties

of carriers may be varied by the differing circumstances of cases

as they arise; but it is their duty in all cases to be diligent in

their efforts to secure a delivery of the property to the person

entitled, and they will be protected in refu'^ing deli^^ry until

reasonable evidence is furnished them that the party claiming

is the party entitled, so long as they act in good faith and solely

with a view to a proper delivery. The circumstances of this

case, the very defective address of the parcels, and the omission
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of the plaintiff to produce any evidence of title to the property

or identifying him as the consignee, justified the defendants in

exercising caution in the delivery, and it should have been sub-

mitted to the jury whether the refusal was qualified, as alleged

by the defendants; and if so, whether the qualification was

reasonable, and was the true reason for not delivering the goods.

The judge also erred in his instructions to the jury as to the

duty of the defendants, as common .carriers, in the delivery of

goods. They may not properly, or without incurring liability to

the true owner, deliver goods to any person who calls for them,

other than the rightful owner. The judgment must be reversed

and a new trial granted, costs to abide event.

All the judges concurring, judgment reversed and new trial

ordered.

121. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO. V. STERN,

119 Pa. St. 24; 12 Atl. 756; 4 Am. St. R. 626. 1888.

Action for loss of consignment of bones improperly delivered

by the carrier. The court below ordered a verdict for plaintiffs.

Paxson, J. The only error assigned is to the charge of the
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court. It was in substance that the defendant company could

only deliver the merchandise upon the production of the bill of

lading, and that as there was nothing to excuse delivery without

a compliance with the terms, the jury should find for the plain-

tiffs.

We see no error in this. The plaintiffs shipped this carload

of dry bones from Bay City, Michigan, to Landenburg, Chester

County, Pennsylvania, consigned to themselves. At the same

time they drew on Whann for the amount, at forty-five dfiys.

There was a bill of lading attached to the draft, showing that

Stern and Spiegel, the shippers, had consigned said car to

themselves. The letter of the latter to Whann, and the invoice,

both of which were shown to the agent of the defendant com-

pany at Landenburg, were notice that there was a draft and

bill of lading, and that Whann was required to protect the draft.

The agent delivered the car to Whann without the bill of lading,

and without an acceptance of the draft. This he had no right

to do. The title to the property remained in the consignors until

delivery in accordance with the conditions. Bills of lading are

symbols of property, and when properly indorsed operate as a

delivery of the property itself, investing the indorsers with a

constructive custody, which serves all the purposes of an actual

possession, and so continues until there is a valid and complete
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delivery of the property under and in pursuance of tlie bill of

lading, and to the persons entitled to receive the same : Hieskell

V. Farmers' and Merchants' National Bank, 89 Pa. St. 155,

33 Am. Rep. 745. There could be no delivery except in accord-

ance with the bill of lading : Dows v. Milwaukee Bank, 91 U. S.

618; Stollenwerck v. Thatcher, 115 Mass. 224. The invoice

standing alone furnishes no proof of title : Benjamin on Sales,

sec. 332 ; Dows v. Milwaukee Bank, supra.

It was urged, however, that there was a course of dealing

between the parties that would take the case out of the rule

above stated. The attention of the court below does not appear

to have been callefl to this matter upon the trial. No reference

to it is to be found in the charge, nor was any point submitted

which would call it forth. There was evidence that • the de-

fendant company had on more than one occasion delivered goods

from the same shippers to Whann prior to the acceptance of

the drafts. No harm came of this, because the drafts were

afterwards accepted and paid. But this course of dealing be-

tween the company and Whann was not brought home to the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:40 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

knowledge of the plaintiffs in a way that would justify the

jury in finding that they had acquiesced in such an arrange-

ment, and that they had consented to the delivery of this par-

ticular car-load without the production of the bill of lading and

acceptance of the draft. The company delivered in their own

Wrong and assumed the risk.

Nor can we say as matter of law that plaintiffs suffered no

loss by reason of the improper delivery. If the draft had been

accepted, it might have been paid, notwithstanding the failure

of Whann, or the plaintiffs might have sold it without recourse.

Judgment affirmed.

122. DYER V. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY CO.,

, 51 Minn. 345; 53 N. W. B. 714; 38 Am. St. B. 506. 1892.

Collins, J. Plaintiffs were the consignors, one Colwell, the

consignee, and defendant, the common carrier, of a piano shipped

from Minneapolis to Anoka over its line of railway. When the

instrument was delivered to defendant for carriage, its agent

gave the usual bill of lading to plaintiff, and this was imme-

diately transmitted by them to Colwell, the consignee. Soon

after its arrival at Anoka, and before Colwell had the oppor-

tunity to remove it from the depot, the piano was destroyed

by fire. Thereupon Colwell made a claim upon defendant for
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its value, producing the bill of lading and an invoice, from which

it appeared that he had purchased the piano from plaintiffs,

and had partly paid for the same. The fact was that the sale

to Colwell was conditional, a written contract having been made

that the title to the instrument should remain in plaintiffs until

Colwell paid for it in full, and a copy of this contract had been

duly filed in the office of the proper city clerk a few days before

the fire, in compliance with the provisions of the statute: Gen.

Stats. 1878, c. 39, sees. 15, etc. Defendant had no actual knowl-

edge of this, and had not been advised in any manner as to

plaintiff's claim upon the piano when, in settlement of Col-

well 's demand, it paid to him its full value.

It is thoroughly settled that if no other facts appear the con-

signee, and not the consignor, of property delivered to a com-

mon carrier must be considered its owner: Benjamin v. Levy,

39 Minn. 11, 38 N. W. R. 702. The legal presumption is that

upon the delivery of goods to a common carrier the title thereto

vests in the consignee, and this presumption the carrier has a

right to rely upon, in the absence of express notice from the con-
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signor to the contrary. The carrier, therefore, has the right to

settle with the consignee in case the property is lost, stolen, or

destroyed : Scammon v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 84 Cal. 311, 24 Pac.

R. 284; Pennsylvania Co. v. Holderman, 69 Ind. 18; 2 Am. &

Eng. Ency. of law, 810, 811, and cases cited in notes. Again,

upon the stipulated facts, Colwell had a special property in the

instrument, and as a special owner could recover its full value

from the defendant : Chamberlain v. West, 37 Minn. 54, 33 N.

W. R. 114. See, also, Jellett v. St. Paul etc. Ry. Co., 30 Minn. 265,

15 N. W. R. 237 ; Brown v. Shaw, 51 Minn, 266, 53 N. W. R. 633 ;

Marsden v. Cornell, 62 N. Y. 215 ; Boston etc. R. R. Co. v. War-

rior Mower Co., 76 Me. 260 ; White v. Webb, 15 Conn. 305. Coun-

sel for respondents do not take issue upon these propositions, but

insist that, on the filing of a copy of the conditional contract of

sale, as before stated, defendant carrier had notice that their

clients retained title to the property, and was bound by such

notice. The statutes (Gen. Stats. 1878, sees. 15, etc.) have no

application. They were enacted for the benefit and protection

of the parties therein mentioned, namely, creditors of the vendee,

subsequent purchasers, and mortgagees in good faith, and the

well-established rules of law fixing defendant's liability as a

common carrier were in no manner affected by the provisions

therein contained.

Order reversed.
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123. CHAMPION V. BOSTWICK,

18 Wend. (N. Y.) 175, 31 Am. D. 376. 1837.

Case, by Bostwick and wife for injury to the latter from a

collision while she was in a stage coach. The injury was due to

the negligence of the driver. Verdict for defendant. New trial

denied, and defendants sued out a writ of error.

Walworth, Chancellor. The plaintiffs below have been per-

mitted to recover for an injury sustained by the wife in being

run over by the driver of a coach and horses, forming part of a

continuous line of stages between Utica and Rochester. The

injury took place on a part of the route between Utica and

Vernon; and was done by a coach and horses belonging to

Dodge, or which had been hired to him by the year, and by a

driver in his immediate employ. And the only question for the

consideration of this court is, whether the arrangement between

the owners of the different parts of the line between Utica and

Rochester was such as to render Champion and Ewers liable to

third persons for such an injury, as partners of Dodge in this

part of the line. From the nature of the arrangement between
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the different stage owners, it is very evident that, as between

themselves, Dodge alone ought to sustain the loss; and that if

the recovery had been against him solely, he would not have

been entitled to call upon the stage owners upon other parts of

the line for contribution; and in case this recovery against the

others is sustained, he would be bound to make good their loss

if he were not insolvent.

As between these different stage owners, Stevens, the driver,

was clearly the servant of Dodge only. Dodge, therefore, is

ultimately liable to them for any injury which they may sus-

tain by the carelessness of his servant while in his employ ; to the

same extent as if such injury had been occasioned by his own

carelessness while driving the coach and horses himself.

I think, however, that the arrangement made between the

stage owners, as to the division of the passage money received

upon any part of the line, was such as to render them all liable

to third persons, as copartners, for such an injury as this; or

for any injury to the passengers on any part of the route ; and

also rendered them liable for any contract made by either of

such owners which was directly connected with the receipt of

the passage money, or the increase of the profits on any part

of the entire route. By the agreement between them the passage

money received by either for the transportation of passengers
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over any part of the line constituted a common fund, out of

which the tolls on the whole route were first to be paid, and

the residue was then to be divided among the owners of the

different parts of the line in proportion to the distances run by-

each, whether such passage money was received for the trans-

portation of passengers over one part of the line or another.

This division of the whole passage money, after paying out of

the same the expenses of the tolls, was a division of the profits

of a joint concern, so as to constitute a partnership between

themselves as to that fund; to entitle either of them to an ac-

count ; and to render them liable to third persons as partners as

to everji;liing in which the different owners of that fund had a

joint or common interest. If Dodge had received the passage

money for the transportation of a passenger over his part of

the route only, he would have received it for the benefit of the

whole concern, as they all had a common interest in the profits

of that part of the line. All, therefore, would have been liable

to such passenger, as partners in this part of the route, for any

damage he might sustain in consequence of a refusal of Dodge
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to transport him from Utica to Vernon ; or for any injury which

might happen to him by the carelessness of Dodge or his driver,

or by reason of any defect in the coach or harness or the team.

The case would be entirely different if each stage owner was to

receive and retain the passage money earned on his part of the

line, and to sustain all the expenses thereof; and was only to

act as agent of the others in receiving the passage money for

them for the transportation of passengers over their parts of the

line. In that case there would be no joint interest, and no

liability to third persons as partners.

The case of Wetmore and Cheesebrough v. Baker and Swan, 9

Johns. 307, does not decide that there was no partnership in

that case. As to a part of the transaction there was a partner-

ship, not between the five persons, but between the two firms

of W. & C, and B. & S., and Ostrom. Ostrom was to run one

part of the route, W. & C. another part, and B. & S. ran the

residue of the route. But the expense of extra carriages was to

be borne by all of the parties jointly. To this extent there was

a copartnership between the three owners of different parts of

the route; and all would clearly have been liable to third per-

sons for the line of extra carriages, if any had been necessary.

But there was a settlement and an account stated between the

three parties to this arrangement, one of the partners in each of

the firms of W. & C. and B. & S. being present and agreeing to

such liquidation of the accounts. In conformity with which

settlement the money then in Albany was to be paid to B. & S. ;
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but it was afterwards received by the firm of W. & C, who

were sued by B. & S. for money had and received to their use.

The only question, therefore, was, whether the settlement and

adjustment of the joint concern by Cheesebrough, the partner

of Wetmore in their part of the route, was binding upon such

partner. In other words, whether the running of the stages on

the whole line was a joint concern between the five individuals

as copartners, or a joint concern between Ostrom and the two

firms of W. & C. and B. & S. And the court very correctly

decided that there was no partnership existing between the five

individuals which could interfere with a recovery in that suit.

It is not necessary to constitute a partnership that there

should be any property constituting the capital stock which

shall be jointly owned by the partners. But the capital may

consist in the mere use of property owned by the individual

partners separately. It is sufficient to cons'titute a partnership

if the parties agreed to have a joint interest in, and to share the

profits and losses arising from the use of property or skill,

either separately or combined. Here the capital which each
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contributed or agreed to contribute to the joint concern, was

the horses, carriages, harness, drivers, etc., which were neces-

sary to run his part of the route; and to be fed, repaired, and

paid at his own expense. The only debts or expenses for which

they were to be jointly liable as between themselves were the

tolls upon the whole line ; and the joint profits which they were

to divide, if any remained after paying the tolls, was the whole

passage money received upon the entire line. Although it may

be fairly inferred that each party supposed that the expenses

of running his part of the line, exclusive of the tolls, would be

equal to the distance run by him, it by no means follows that

any of them supposed that the actual passage money or profits

of the different parts of the line would be in the same propor-

tion; as it is a well-known fact that the number of passengers

who travel in public conveyances increase as you approach

large market towns, or other places of general resort. The only

object of the agreement to divide the passage money earned upon

the whole line among the different proprietors, must have been to

give to those who run that part of the line where there was the

least travel, a portion of the passage money on other parts of

the route, as a fair equivalent for their equal contribution of

labor and expense for the joint benefit of all. And as all the

owners of the line were thus interested in every part of the

route, and were liable to the passengers if they were unreason-

ably detained on the way, I am inclined to think that if the

driver of either had refused to carry on the passengers over his
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part of the line, without any sufficient excuse, either of the

other parties who happened to be present might have employed

another driver, at the common expense, to proceed with the

team to the end of that route, although as between themselves

the owner of that part of the line would be bound to pay such

extra expense. And the same right would have existed if the

driver, by reason of intoxication or otherwise, was incapable of

discharging his duty with safety to the passengers. Although

the title to the coach and horses for the time being might not

be so far vested in the partners as to authorize any of them to

take them out of the possession of the general owner himself,

under similar circumstances, the passengers might unquestion-

ably be sent on by either of the others at his expense ; or at the

expense of all the owners of the line who were interested in

having it done, if he was unable to pay the expense.

There is a class of cases in which it has been held, that a

person who merely receives a compensation for his labor, in pro-

portion to the gross profits of the business in which he is em-

ployed, is not a partner with his employer even as to third per-
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sons. The distinction appears to be between the stipulation for

a compensation proportioned to the profits, and a stipulation

for an interest in such profits so as to entitle him to an account

as a partner : 1 Rose, 91 ; a distinction which Lord Eldon says

is so thin that he can not state it as settled upon due con-

sideration. But he says it is clearly settled as to third persons,

though he regrets it, "that if a man stipvilates that as the re-

ward of his labor he shall have, not a specific interest in the busi-

ness, but a given sum of money, even in proportion to the quan-

tum of profits, that will not make him a partner; but if he agrees

for a part of the profits as such, giving him a right to an ac-

count though having no property in the capital, he is as to third

persons a partner ; and no arrangement between the parties them-

selves can prevent it:" Ex parte Hamper, Stark's Law of Part.

137. Gary, however, defends the principle upon which this dis-

tinction is based. He insists that as the person who is to receive

a compensation for his labor in proportion to the profits of the

business, without having a specific lien upon such profits to the

exclusion of other credito:^s, it is for their interest that he

should be compensated in that way, instead of receiving a fixed

compensation whether the business produced profits or other-

wise; on the other hand, that if he stipulates for an interest in

the profits of the business which would entitle him to an ac-

count, and give him a specific lien or a preference in payment

over other creditors, and giving him the full benefit of the in-

creased profits of the business without any corresponding risk
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in case of loss, it would operate unjustly as to other creditors;

and therefore, that it is perfectly right in- principle, that he

should be holden to be liable to third parties as a partner in

the latter case but not in the first: Gary on Part. 11, note i. I

am inclined to think this distinction is a sound one as regards

the rights of third persons. But as between the parties them-

selves it is perfectly competent for them to agree that one

shall have his full share of the anticipated profits as a com-

pensation for his labor or skill, without running any risk of

absolute loss, except as to third persons, if instead of producing

profits the business should prove a losing concern. Many of

the cases cited by the counsel for the plaintiffs in error, were

those in which the question arose between the immediate par-

ties to the agreement which was supposed to make them part-

ners as between themselves; and they may therefore be recon-

ciled with other cases in which they were held to be liable as

partners to third persons upon the principles before stated.

That one partner is liable in tort for the acts of his copartner

in the prosecution of the copartnership business, as well as upon

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:40 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

contracts for the benefit of the joint concern, appears to be well

settled. And the case of Waland v. Elkins, 1 Stark. 272,

Holt N. P. 227, is in point, to show that each is liable

in tort for the negligence of the servant employed and paid by

one of them exclusively, by which a third person is injured by

such servant while engaged in the business from which both

were to derive a profit. If one partner would be liable for the

negligence of his copartner in such a case, it seems to be a

necessary consequence that he should be liable for the same act

if done by the servant of such copartner. In relation to the

case of Barton v. Hanson, 2 Taunt. 49, in which it was held

that a party jointly interested in a stage coach which was

horsed by the proprietors separately on different parts of the

line, was not answerable for corn purchased by one of the pro-

prietors for the use of his own horses on his part of the line,

Chief Justice Gibbs says, when the case was cited by the counsel

for the defendant in Waland v. Elkins: ''I recollect the case

very well, but the decision there turned upon the inferior con-

tract, if I may so term it, between the parties. In that case there

was a particular contract between the parties, and it was known

in what situation they stood in respect to each other." In other

words, it was known in that case, as in this, that the different

proprietors were to run their several parts of the line with their

own teams and at their own expense ; and the plaintiff had fur-

nished one of the proprietors with grain for his horses, know-

ing that it was for his sole benefit ; and as it was furnished on
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his credit solely, the plaintiff had no just grounds for charging

the partnership therewith. It was in fact trusting the individual

with a part of the capital which he knew that individual had

agreed to contribute to the partnership; and which the other

partners are never liable for under such circumstances.

For these reasons, I think there was such a partnership be-

tween the plaintiffs in error in relation to the business in which

Stevens the driver was engaged, at the time this injury was

done, as to render them all liable to the defendants in error for

the consequences of his negligence; and that the judgment of

the supreme court should be affirmed.

On the question being put, Shall this judgment be reversed?

all the members of the court (twenty-four being present), with

but two dissenting voices, voted in the negative. Whereupon

the judgment of the supreme court was affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

y

124. NASHUA LOCK CO. V. WORCESTER AND NASHUA

RAILROAD CO.,
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48 N. H. 339, 2 Am. R. 242. 1869.

Action to recover the value of ten cases of locks consigned to

New York, and delivered to defendants at Nashua. The goods

were safely carried by defendants and the intermediate carrier

to the terminal carrier, the Norwich Transportation Company,

and were shipped on one of their steamers for New York. The

steamer came in collision with a sailing vessel, caught fire and

was destroyed with its freight.

Perley, C. J. According to the agreed ease, the three cor-

porations, the Worcester and Nashua railroad, the Norwich and

Worcester railroad, and the Norwich and New York Transporta-

tion company, were engaged as common carriers in the business

of transporting goods between Nashua and New York in a con-

tinuous line under an agreement by which they divided the price

paid for transportation through in proportions fixed by the

agreement. The agreement is not before us; but from the gen-

eral statement of it in the case it must be inferred that the

parties to it were mutually bound to transport goods on their

connected line according to the direction given by the owner,

when they were received for transportation in the usual course

of the business by any one of the parties. In this case it would

have been a violation of the agreement among the parties to the

continuous line, if either the Norwich and Worcester railroad

490

NASHUA LOCK CO. v. W. AND N. K. E, CO. § 124

or the transportation company had refused to receive and trans-

port the goods toward their destination in the usual course of

the business, as they were marked and directed when they w^ere

received by the defendants.

The contract between the plaintiffs and defendants must be im-

plied from the facts stated in the agreed case. There was no

special agreement, written or oral, that the goods should be

carried to New York, nor that the responsibility of the defend-

ants should end on delivery to the Norwich and Worcester rail-

road. The general question is, whether the defendants under-

took for the transportation of the goods through to New York, or

only agreed to carry and deliver, or tender, them to the Nor-

wich and Worcester railroad.

Had the defendants corporate authority to contract for the

transportation of the goods beyond their own line ? We have no

hesitation in holding that railroads may contract to carry goods

and passengers beyond their own lines. They could not answer

Ihe main objects of their incorporation without the exercise of

this power. They are laid out and established with reference
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to connections in business with other extended lines of trans-

portation, and the power to contract for transportation over

the connected lines is implied in the general grant of corporate

authority. On this point the authorities are nearly unanimous.

It has been held otherwise in Connecticut by the opinion of three

judges against two. Hood v. N. Y. & N. H. Railroad, 22 Conn.

1; Ehnore v. The Naugatuck Railroad, 23 Conn. 457, 63 Am.

D. 143; The Naugatuck Railroad v. The Button Company, 24

Id. 468. But in a later case (Converse v. The Norwich & N. Y.

Transportation Company, 33 Id. 166), the courts in that state

have shown some disposition to recede from the doctrine of

their earlier cases. No other authorities are cited by the defend-

ants to this point, and I have found no others that sustain their

view of this question. The authorities the other way are numer-

ous and decisive (Muschamp v. The Lancaster & Preston Rail-

way, 8 M. & W. 421 ; Weed v. The S. & S. Railroad, 19 Wend.

534; The F. & M. Bank v. The Ch. Transportation Co., 23 Vt.

186, 56 Am. D. 68 ; McCluer v. M. & L. Railroad, 13 Gray (Mass.)

124, 74 Am. D. 624; Noyes v. R. & B. Railroad, 27 Vt. 110; Wil-

cox v. Parmelee, 3 Sandf. 610 ; Perkins v. The P. S. & P. Rail-

road, 47 Me. 573, 74 Am. D. 507) ; and railroads may contract

for transportation beyond the limits of the states in w^hich they

are established (McCluer v. The M. & L. Railroad, 13 Gray

(Mass.) 124, 74 Am. D. 624; Burtis v. B. & S. L. Railroad, 24 N.

T. 269) ; and when a railroad makes a contract for transporta-
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tion beyond its own line it will be presumed that it had authority

to do it. McCliier v. M. & L. Railroad, qua supra.

In the agreed ease it is said the goods were received to be for-

warded, etc., and from this phrase an argument is drawn that the

agreement of the defendant was to forward to the next party in

the line, and not to carry through to New York. But here was no

express agreement in any particular terms, and we are not called

on to interpret the language used in any contract. The nature of

the undertaking must be inferred from the facts stated in the

agreed case, and cannot be determined by the phrase used in

stating them. Even in a written contract, where the term for-

ivardcd is used, if the thing to be done belongs to the business

of a carrier, he will be charged as such. In Wilcox v. Parmelee,

3 Sandf. 610, the court say: "The criticism of the defendant

on the word forwarded used in the contract is not just. It ap-

plies to the whole distance, as well to those portions of the route

where other parties were owners of the vessels, as to that portion

where he employed his own means of transportation. He was

to forward the goods from New York to Fairport, not to Buf-
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falo, which he now says was the terminus of his own immediate

route. The words used by him can only mean that he was to

carry or transport the goods, and whether in his own vessels

or in those of others was perfectly immaterial to the plaintiff."

In Schroeder v. The Hudson River Railroad, 5 Duer, 55, the

defendants gave a receipt for goods "to be forivarded per Hud-

son river freight train to Chicago;" and under this receipt it

was held that the defendants were bound to carry the goods to

Chicago. So in the recent case of Buckland v. The Adams Ex-

press Co., 97 Mass. 124, 93 Am. D. 68, the defendants were

charged as common carriers, though they described themselves in

the contract under which they received the goods, as "express

forwarders. ' ' In the present case the undertaking of the defend-

ants must be implied from the facts stated in the agreed case, and

the particular language used in stating them is of no materiality.

Since the introduction of steam as the means of transportation

by land and water the general question raised in this case has

been much considered in different jurisdictions, and there is no

little confusion and contradiction of authority respecting the

rule which shall govern the rights and liabilities of the parties,

where goods are put in the course of transportation to distant

places through connected lines associated in the business of

common carriers. Where such lines are engaged in carrying

passengers and their luggage the several parties to the continuous

line incur, it would seem, the same liabilities for damage and

loss of the luggage as in cases where ^hey sarry goods only.
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Darling v. The Boston & Worcester Railroad, 11 Allen, 295;

Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 312, 72 Am. D. 469 ; Weed v.

The Railroad, 19 Wend. 534 ; The 111. Central Railroad v. Cope-

land, 24 111. 332, 76 Am. D. 749 ; 111. Central Railroad v. John-

son, 34 Id. 389.

In England and in several of the United States it has been

held that when a railroad or other common carrier receives goods

marked or otherwise directed for a place beyond the carrier's

own line, this alone is prima facie evidence of a contract to carry

the goods to their final destination, though the freight money

for transportation through is not paid to the carrier that re-

ceives the goods, and though he is not shown to have any con-

nection in business with other parties beyond his own line,

Mushchamp v. The Lancaster and Preston Railway, 8 M. & W.

421; Watson v. The Ambergate, Nottingham and Boston Rail-

way, 3 L. & E. 497; Collins v. The Bristol and Exeter Rail-

way, 11 Exch. 790, 7 H. L. C. 194; Coxon v. The Great

Western Railway, 5 Hurl. & N. 274. These and several other

cases show that in England, after the fullest discussion in all
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the courts, the rule is firmly established that a carrier who re-

ceives goods marked for a place beyond his own line is prima

facie bound to carry them as directed to their final destination,

and it is there held that the contract in such case is entire, and

with the first carrier alone; that until some connection in the

business, which ha's the general nature, if not the technical char-

acter, of a partnership, appears between him and the subsequent

carriers, no action can be maintained against them by the owner,

though the goods were lost or damaged on their part of the route.

I have not met with an American case in which the rule has

been pressed to the extent of holding that the owner cannot come

on any carrier by whose default the loss or damage actually hap-

pened. There are, however, numerous authorities in the United

States for the general rule of Muschamp v. The Railway, that

the receipt of goods marked for a place beyond the line of the

carrier who receives them implies a contract to carry them to

their final destination, though no connection in business is shown

with other carriers beyond, and though the price for transporta-

tion through is not paid in advance.

In Foy V. The Troy and Boston Railroad, 24 Barb. 382, the

doctrine of the case is stated in the head note to be, that "where

a railroad company receives for transportation property ad-

dressed to a person at a point beyond the terminus of the road,

he will be understood, in the absence of any proof to the con-

trary, to have agreed to deliver the property, in the same order

and condition in which it was received, to the consignee." The
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court say: "It was no part of the plaintiff's business to inquire

how many different corporations made up the entire line of road

between Troy and Burlington, or, having ascertained this, to

determine at his peril which of said companies had been guilty

of the negligence which resulted in the injury to his wagon."

In Schroeder v. The Hudson River Railroad, 5 Duer, 55, the

agent of the defendants gave the following receipt at New York :

"Received of Schroeder six boxes — to be forwarded per Hudson

River Railroad freight train to Chicago, Illinois;" and it was

held that the defendants under this receipt were bound to trans-

port the goods to Chicago. No connection in business with other

carriers was relied on. In Kyle v. The Laurens Railroad, 10

Rich. (Law) 382, the rule of Muschamp v. The Railway was

approved. O'Niel, J., says: "The case of Muschamp v. The

Lancaster and Preston Junction Railway states, I think, the true

rule. ' ' The rule of Muschamp v. The Railway was approved and

adopted in the Central Railroad v. Copeland, 24 111. 332, 76 Am.

D. 749, in which it was held that ' ' a railroad corporation selling

tickets through over its own and other roads is liable for the
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safety of passengers and their baggage to the point of destina-

tion." The case was put on the same ground as when goods are

received marked for a place beyond the line of the carrier that

receives them. The court say: "We are inclined to yield to

the force of the reasoning of the English courts on principles of

public convenience, if no other, and to hold when a carrier re-

ceives goods to carry, marked for a particular place, he is bound

to carry and deliver at that place. By accepting the goods so

marked he impliedly agrees so to do, and he ought to be answer-

able for that loss. ' '

( The court also discussed The Central Railroad v. Johnson, 34

111. 389 ; Detroit and Milwaukee Railroad v. F. and M. Bank, 20

Wis. 122 ; Angle v. Mississippi and Missouri Railroad, 9 la. 487 ;

St. John V. Van Santvoord, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 660; 6 Hill (N.

Y.) 157.)

The American authorities above cited sustain the doctrine of

Muschamp v. The Railway, that, when a carrier receives goods

marked for a place beyond his own line, he is, prima facie and in

absence of other evidence, bound by an implied contract to carry

the goods to the place for which they are marked, though he has

no connection in business beyond his own line, and though he does

not receive pay for transportation through.

There is another class of American cases which hold that the

mere receipt of goods marked for transportation beyond the

line of the party that receives them is not evidence of a contract

to carry beyond his own line, if he has no connection in business
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with carriers beyond ; but that, if several carriers associate in a

continuous line, carry goods for one price through, and divide

the freight money among them in an agreed ratio, though they

may not be technically partners, but only quasi partners, yet, as

to third persons who intrust goods to them for transportation,

they are jointly liable for a loss that happens in any part of

the continuous line, though the freight money is not paid to the

first carrier on delivery of the goods to him.

In Champion v. Bostwick, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 571, 18 Id.

175, 31 Am. D. 376, several proprietors of different sections

in a connected line of stage coaches divided the receipts of the

whole route in proportion to the miles run by each; and it was

held that they were jointly liable as partners for an injury to a

third person, not a passenger, caused by the negligence of one

of them. It is to be observed, that in this case the receipts of

the way as well as the through travel were brought into the ac-

count; and on this a distinction has been taken between that

case and one where the receipts of the through travel only are

divided ; and for that reason it has been said that, in a case like
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the present, there is no partnership and no joint liability. But

as to parties who deal with the through line, it is of no con-

sequence how the other business is managed, or whether any

other business is done by the associated carriers. At most, the

distinction is merely technical and has no substance. Nor am I

acquainted with any legal principle to prevent one engaged in a

general business from having a partner in one distinct part of

it, like the through business in this case, without bringing all

his business of the same kind into the partnership account. I

take it to be no uncommon thing for a trader to have a partner

in his business done at one place, who has no concern in his busi-

ness of the same kind transacted at other places ; that attorneys

form partnerships limited to certain parts of their business, and

merchants, in the voyages, or in a single voyage, of one ship.

Hart V. The Rensselaer & Saratoga Railroad, 8 N. Y. 37,

59 Am. D. 447, is to the point that "where three separate rail-

road companies, owning distinct portions of a continuous

railroad route between two termini, run their cars over the

whole road, employing the same agents to sell passenger

tickets, and receive luggage to be carried over the entire

road, an action may be maintained against any one of

them for loss of luggage received at one terminus to be carried

over the whole road." Smith, J., delivering the opinion of the

court in McDonald v. The Western Railroad, 34 N. Y. 501, 502,

says : ' ' We may judicially take notice of the fact that the vast

business of inland transportation of goods is carried on mainly
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upon routes formed by successive lines belonging to different

owners, each of whom carries the goods over his own line and

delivers them to the next. Many of these routes extend over

thousands of miles. Their proprietors unite and receive goods for

transportation upon the promise, express or implied, that they

shall be carried safely to the place of delivery. The owner has

lost sight of his goods when he delivers them to the first carrier,

and has no means of learning their whereabouts till he or the con-

signee is informed of their arrival at the place of destination."

In ^"ibert v. The Erie Railroad, 12 N. Y. 256, it was said,

that, "where a carrier is in the habit of receiving and forward-

ing goods directed to any particular place, an agreement on his

part to take them there has been presumed; but where these

operations are entirely disconnected, there is no partnership. In

Bradford v. The Railroad Company, 7 Rich. (L) 201, it was

held that "an advertisement of a through line and the course

of the business is evidence to charge all the roads engaged in

the continuous line of transportation as jointly liable for carriage

through the whole route." Redfield, C. J., in delivering the
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opinion of the court in The F. M. Bank v. The Transportation

Company, 23 Vt. 186, 56 Am. D. 68, speaking of Weed v. The

S. & S. Railroad, 19 "Wend. 534, says: "That case is readily

reconciled with the general rule that such carrier is only bound

to the end of his o•\^•n route, by the consideration that in this

case there was a kind of partnership coyinedion between the first

compr/jy and the other companies constituting the entire route,

and 'I\s.o that the first carrier took pay and gave a ticket through,

whi/n is most relied on by the court; and in such cases where

the first company gives a ticket and takes pay through, it may

be fairly considered equivalent to an undertaking to carry

throughout the entire route." In a note to this case by Red-

field, C. J., he says: "In that case (Weed v. The Railroad)

the court seem to put the case more upon the fact of taking

fare and giving a ticket through, which, in practice, is seldom or

never done, except where there is a quasi partnership throughout

the route." This would seem to be a strong authority that where

there is a connected line of carriers, and a quasi, though it may

not be technical and legal, parttnership, they are liable jointly

for carriage through the whole connected route.

(Omitting the discussion of Burtis v. Buffalo and State Line

Railroad, 24 X. Y. 269; Smith v. N. Y. C. Railroad,43 Barb. 225;

Cincinnati, H. & D. Railroad v. Spratt, 2 Duval 4.)

In 2 Redfield on Railways, 104, the learned author sums up the

result of the American cases on this particular point as follows:

"The American cases upon the subject, with rare exceptions,
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recognize the right of a railroad company to enter into special

contracts to carry goods beyond the liiie of their road; and where

different roads are united in one continuous route, such an un-

dertaking, when goods are received and booked for any part

of the line, is almost a matter of course." In the present case

the defendants were united in a continuous line to New York;

the goods were received marked, which must be equivalent to

hooked, for New York ; and the case would seem to fall clearly

within the rule laid down in Redfield as the result of the Ameri-

can authorities.

There is still another class of cases, in which it is held that the

fact of a carrier's receiving pay for transportation to a place

bej'ond his own line implies a contract to carry to that place. In

the case of Hyde v. The Trent & ]Mersey Navigation Company,

5 T. R. 389, decided in 1793, the marginal note is as follows:

"Common carriers from A to B charge and receive for cartage

to the consignee's house at B from a warehouse there, where

they usually unloaded, but which did not belong to them; they

must answer for the goods if destroyed in the w^arehouse by an
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accidental fire, although they allow all the profits of the cartage

to another person, and that circumstance were kno^vn to the con-

signee. " The four judges delivered their opinions seriatim,

and all agreed that the charge for cartage to the house of the

consignee ' ' put the case out of all doubt, ' ' and bound the carriers

who made the charge to carry the goods to their final destination.

In answer to the argument that the carriers acted as agents of

the owner in forwarding the goods beyond their own line, Mr.

Justice BuLLER said: "According to the defendants' own argu-

ment great inconvenience would result to the public from adopt-

ing the other rule. According to their argument there must be

two contracts, where goods are sent by coach or wagon. But I

think the same argument tends to establish the necessity of

three; one with the carrier, another with the innkeeper, and a

third with the porter. But in fact there is but one contract;

there is nothing like any contract or communication between any

other person than the owner of the goods and the carrier. But

I rely on the charge which the defendants compelled the plaintiff

to pay before they would engage to deliver the goods. The dif-

ferent proprietors may divide the profits among themselves in

any way they choose, but they cannot exonerate themselves from

their liability to the owner of the goods." This case, coming

before the agitation of these questions on the introduction of

steam as a motive power, and decided on the general principle

applicable to the liability of carriers at common law, is certainly

of very great weight. It decides that when a carrier receives
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goods to be transported beyond his own line, and takes pay for

carrying them to their final destination, he agrees to do what he

has been paid for doing; and it repudiates the fanciful theory

of an agency for the owner to forward the goods, and in his be-

half procure them to be carried by others.

In Weed v. The Saratoga & Schenectady Railroad, 19 "Wend.

534, the plaintiff's agent took passage at Saratoga in the Sara-

toga and Schenectady railroad for Albany, and paid his fare

to Albany. The route to Albany consisted of the defendants'

and the Mohawk and Hudson River railroad. When the agent

arrived at Albany his trunk, containing money of the plaintiff,

was missing, and this action was brought to recover for the loss.

One ground taken for the defendants was, that there was no

evidence the trunk was lost on their road. There was no evidence

of a contract to carry to Albany except such as was implied from

the fact that the two roads made a continuous line to Albany,

and the defendants took the trunk for carriage to Albany and

received the pay for carrying through. It was held that the

payment and receipt of fare through bound the defendants as
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carriers over the other road through the whole continuous route.

Wilcox V. Parmelee, 3 Sandf. 610, is an authority to the same

point, that receiving pay for transportation to a place beyond

the line of the carrier w^ho receives it implies a contract to carry

to that place. The court say: "Besides, there is a fixed sum

which covers the whole charge; and it would be absurd to sup-

pose that the defendant was to receive the whole sum for merely

forwarding, that is, placing the goods on the vessels of some other

party to be carried to their place of destination."

Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill, 157, cited for the defend-

ants, recognizes the doctrine of Weed v. The Railroad. In his

opinion for reversing the judgment of the supreme court the

chancellor says: "In the case of Weed v. The Railroad, the

two lines were connected together by an arrangement between

themselves, and the agent of the defendant took the pay in ad-

vance for the conveyance of the plaintiff and his baggage the

whole distance. Or, if no actual connection between the two lines

was proved, it at least appeared that the defendant permitted

its agent to hold it out as a carrier of passengers and their bag-

gage for the whole distance, by taking pay therefor." It thus

appears that in Van Santvoord v. St. John, as in Hyde v. The

Navigation Company, taking pay for carriage to a place beyond

the line of the party that takes it is regarded as decisive of an

undertaking to carry to that place. Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17

N. Y. 315, 72 Am. D. 469, is to the same point, that receiving

pay for carriage through a continuous line imports a contract
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to carry through; and in Burtis v. The Buffalo & State Line

Railroad, 24 N. Y. 269, 278, Sutherland, J., says: "It would

appear to be settled by both the American and English cases

that when from usage in the particular business, or by receiving

pay to the place to which the goods are addressed, beyond the

railway company's road, or from any other circumstance, it is

to be presumed that the undertaking of the railway was to de-

liver at such place, they are responsible for the delivery of the

goods at such place, and are liable if the goods are lost after

leaving their road."

(Omitting discussion of Choteaux v. Leach, 18 Pa. St. 224;

Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Brown, 54 Pa, St.

77; Candee v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 21 Wis. 582, 94 Am. D.

566 ; Gary v. Cleveland and Toledo Railroad, 29 Barb. 36 ; Illinois

Central Railroad Company v. Copeland, 24 111. 332, 76 Am. D.

749; Wheeler v. Railroad, 31 Cal. 52, 89 Am. D. 147.)

In Carter v. Peck, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 203, 67 Am. D. 604, the

defendants received fare and gave a ticket to a point beyond

their own line ; it was held that they were liable for a detention
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beyond their own line. Harris, J., delivering the opinion of the

court, says : "When the defendants received the plaintiff's money

and gave him a through ticket, they thereby became bound for

his transportation over the entire line. The arrangement be-

tween the defendants and the proprietors of other portions of

the line was a matter with which the plaintiff had nothing to do.

He was no party to that arrangement, nor was he bound to look

to any person for the performance of the defendant's under-

taking to any person but themselves. ' '

Redfield (in Red. of Railways, 109) sums up the result of

the authorities on this point as follows : "It has generally been

considered, both in this country and in the English courts, that

receiving goods destined beyond the terminus of the particular

company, and giving a check or ticket through, does import an

undertaking to carry through, and that this contract is binding

on the company. ' '

Then, again, there are American cases which maintain the

doctrine that, though carriers are associated in a continuous

line, and one of them, on receiving goods marked for transpor-

tation through, takes pay for transportation through, which by

agreement of the parties to the continuous line is divided among

them in a fixed proportion, yet, in the absence of a positive agree-

ment, each carrier is liable for loss on his own line, and not for

a loss on any other part of the connected line.

This appears to be the settled rule in Connecticut.

(The court cited Hood v. New York & New Haven Railroad, 22
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Conn. 1 ; Elmore v. Naugatuck Railroad, 23 Conn. 457, 63 Am. D.

143 ; Naugatuck Railroad v. Button Co., 24 Conn. 468 ; Converse

V. Norwich and Worcester Transportation Co., 33 Conn. 166. A

single case in Maine — Perkins v. P. S. & P. Railroad, 47 Me. 573,

was considered indecisive of this question ; and in Massachusetts,

Nutting V. Connecticut River Railroad, 1 Gray (IMass.) 502 ; Dar-

ling V. Boston and Worcester Railroad, 11 Allen (Mass.) 295, and

Goss V. N. Y., Providence and Boston Railroad, 99 Mass. 220,

were cited as settling the rule in Massachusetts to be that a cor-

poration receiving goods directed to a point beyond its own line

does not become responsible beyond its own line, unless it make-

a positive agreement extending its liability.)

It has been said that the English rule on this subject has not

been generally adopted in this country. A review, however, of

the American cases shows but too plainly that if our courts have

differed from the English, they are far from agreeing among

themselves in any principle or doctrine that can be called the

American rule. There is not only much confusion, but no little

conflict, in the American authorities. A large proportion of
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them are not directly in point for the present case, which must

be decided on the facts found by agreement of the parties.

The following are the facts and circumstances from which

the contract between these parties must be inferred :

The three corporations were engaged as common carriers in the

transportation of goods in a connected line between Nashua and

New York, under an agreement among the parties to the con-

nected line;

In the present instance, and generally under the agreement,

one price was paid for transportation through;

The freight money was divided among the parties to the con-

nected line in proportions fixed by their agreement ;

The goods were received by the defendants for transportation

on the connected line marked for New York ;

The legal inference from the general statement of the agree-

ment is, that the parties to the continuous line were bound by

their mutual contract to take from each other and carry through

goods, so marked, that might be received by any one of them ;

The price for transportation to New York was paid to the

defendants, when they received the goods.

The American authorities are comparatively few, which hold

that when all these circumstances concur, the carrier who receives

the goods is not bound, by an implied agreement, to carry them,

or see that they are carried, over the connected line to their final

destination. I do not find that the decisions in any of the states
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sustain this defense, except in Connecticut, ]\Iaine and Massachu-

setts.

With regard to the cases in Connecticut, it cannot imply any

want of the respect due to the courts of that state, if I say that

for two reasons their cases on this point are not entitled to all

the deference that is paid to their decisions on other subjects.

In the first place, it is held there that railroad corporations have

no corporate authority to contract for the transportation of

goods or passengers beyond their own lines; a doctrine rejected

everywhere else.

(The court also pointed out that the Connecticut decisions

were rendered by three judges against two.)

But in Massachusetts the court, in a series of decisions, have

established the rule that a carrier, though associated with others

in a connected line of transportation, is not liable for a loss

happening beyond his own line wi^ut a positive agreement

to that effect ; and this rule is applied to the baggage of passen-

gers, and the undertaking of express companies that receive goods

for transportation beyond their own lines. The fact that, not-
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withstanding the earlier decisions, suits have continued to be

brought in that commonwealth against parties that have re-

ceived goods to be transported on continuous lines for losses

happening beyond their own lines, might seem to suggest a sus-

picion that the profession and the public had not readily acqui-

esced in the rule as there laid down ; but the court have adhered

firmly to the rule, and in some of the later cases have apparently

declined to enter on the discussion of the question, treating it as

finally settled ; and we must, therefore, consider the high author-

ity of that court as against the right of the plaintiffs to recover

in this action. So far, however, as that court may be under-

stood to have established the rule, that to bind a railroad for

transportation beyond its own line there must be an express

and positive agreement between the railroad and the owner of

the goods, and that such an undertaking is not to be implied

from facts such as are found in this case, the current of Ameri-

can authority, to say nothing of the English, appears to be strong

the other way. Excepting the cases in Connecticut and Maine,

which, when examined, do not, I think, give the Massachusetts

doctrine any very strong support, the authorities in other states,

though they differ much in other particulars, generally agree in

this, that where, as in the present case, there is a continuous line

of different carriers united by an agreement under which they

carry goods through the connected line for one price, which they

divide among themselves in proportions fixed in their agreement,

if one of the parties receiving goods to be transported on the
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continuous line, marked for any place in it, and on receiving the

goods takes pay for transporting them to that place, the party

so receiving the goods and the pay for transportation, is prima

facie bound by an implied agreement to carry the goods, or see

that they are carried, to the place for which they are marked,

and is liable for a loss happening on any part of the connected

line.

If the case were to be considered on authority only, we should

feel bound to decide for the plaintiffs, inasmuch as we find the

weight of authority to preponderate heavily in their favor; and

taking general principles and reasons of convenience and public

policy for our guide, we are led to the same conclusion.

In the view which the plaintiffs ask us to take of this case,

when the goods were received by the defendants, marked for

transportation to New York, and the price paid to the defendants

for transportation through on the continuous line, the plaintiffs

made one contract with the defendants, by which the defend-

ants agreed, either as joint carriers with the other associated

parties, or as undertaking for them to carry the goods through
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for the price paid, as goods were carried in the usual course of

the business on that line. In that view the plaintiffs would have

nothing further to do in the matter. Every thing else was pro-

vided for by the agreement among the associated carriers; for

by their agreement the defendants were bound to transport, and

the successive carriers would be bound to take and carry, the

goods from each other to their final destination. The price

through was paid, and belonged to the different carriers in pro-

portions fixed by their agreement, and this theory would agree

exactly with the facts; for the plaintiffs in fact made but one

agreement with one party to have the goods carried for one price

to New York. No further stipulation or direction on the part

of the plaintiffs was necessary, and none was ever in fact given

by owners of goods who put them in the course of transportation,

as these were put, in the continuous line.

According to the defendants' theory of the case, when the

plaintiffs delivered the goods marked for New York, and the de-

fendants received them and took pay for transportation through,

no contract was made with any party to carry the goods through ;

but the contract then made by the defendants was to carry the

goods to the next carriers on the connected line with the surplus

money, and, as agents of the plaintiff's, make a contract if they

could with the next carriers to take the goods and the money,

and carry them on in the same way through successive agencies

for the plaintiff to their final destination. If these agents should

consent to act for the plaintiffs, and be able to negotiate bargains
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with the other carriers for transportation through, the goods

would go to New York as was intended ; but they would go under

three separate contracts, made at different times through this

imaginary agency, with three different and independent parties.

The first objection to the defendants' theory of this transaction

is, that it is contrary to the fact. The owner of goods in a case

like this does not in fact appoint or employ the successive carriers

in the continuous line as his agents to hold his money for him,

and as his agents carry it forward and contract in his behalf

with the other roads for further transportation. He makes

but one contract for one price ; he pays the price, and the money

he has paid does not belong to him, but to the associated carriers,

in proportions fixed by their agreement. He does not inquire,

nor is he interested to know, how they divide the money. The

contract is entire and complete when he pays the price for trans-

portation through, and every thing to be done afterward is regu-

lated by the standing agreement among the associated carriers.

He has no control over them as his agents ; he does not and can-

not intermeddle with the manner in which they do the business

goods.
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or dispose of the money that he has paid for the carriage of his

Let us see what are some of the consequences that would fol-

low, if both parties in a case like this should act on the defend-

ants' view of their legal rights. Suppose in this case the goods

had been carried through to New York, and the defendants had

not paid to the next carriers the proportion of the freight money

which belonged to the other carriers; and then suppose that

the Norwich and Worcester railroad should sue the plaintiffs for

carrying the goods over their road. It would avail the plaintiffs

nothing to say that they had paid the freight through when the

goods were received at this end of the route. The ready answer

would be : " To be sure, you put money into the hands of your

agents, the Worcester and Nashua railroad, to pay us, but they

neglected their duty; your money is still in their hands, and

we are not paid." It is, however, quite clear, that the money

received by the defendants for transportation through on the

connected line would be held by them for all the parties to the

line; they would be bound to account for it under their agree-

ment as one partner accounts with his fellows for money received

on partnership account. Then, if the plaintiffs should undertake

to pay the different carriers, how are they to know the share of

each ? The proportions of the freight money belonging to them

respectively are regulated by a private agreement of which the

plaintiffs know nothing, and of which, in the way the business

is actually conducted, they have no need to be informed. If the

503

§ 124 TEEMINATION OF CAEEIER 'S RELATION.

plaintiffs had proposed when they delivered the goods to pay

the Worcester and Nashua road their proportion of the freight

money, and afterward to pay the other carriers their respective

shares, they probably would have found nobody to tell them what

the different shares were, or to receive the goods to be carried on

such terms. In truth, the connected line transacts business as

one joint concern, and the business cannot be transacted other-

wise with convenience either to the carriers or the owners of the

goods.

Then if we look to the remedy of the associated carriers for the

recovery of the freight money, each, on the theory of the defend-

ants, must bring a separate suit on the separate contract for his

proportion of the money. We have had occasion to learn, from

the facts stated in another case now pending before us, that there

is a connected line, consisting of six or seven different railways,

extending from Ogdensburgh in New York, through Vermont

and New Hampshire, to Boston in Massachusetts, in which one

price is paid for transportation through, and the money divided

by a standing agreement, as in this case. If goods are carried
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through on this route, and there are six or seven different con-

tracts, one with each road, then each road must bring a separate

action for its share of the freight money. If it should be said

that the remedy of the roads is to retain the goods at the end of

the route till the whole price for transportation through is paid,

this, in the first place, would show that these roads are so com-

bined that, for their own purposes, they are a unit, while they

insist that they are wholly separate and independent when the

owner seeks redress for the loss of his goods. And then again,

if the roads act separately, and are not jointly interested in the

business of the connected line, when one of the roads parts with

the possession of goods by delivery to another, it loses its lien

for the freight money, and cannot transfer it to another inde-

pendent carrier. Angell on Carriers, 357, 359, 609. This is

not at all like the maritime lien, when a voyage is broken up

and the cargo is put on board another vessel to be carried to the

port of destination. There the lien on the cargo for the whole

freight is transferred to the second vessel, which completes the

transportation under one contract.

The use of steam in carrying goods and passengers has pro-

duced a great revolution in the whole business. The amount

and importance of it have of late vastly increased, and are every

day increasing. The large business between different parts of

the country is done, as in this case, by parties who are associated

in long continuous lines, receiving one fare through, and divid-

ing it among themselves by mutual agreement. They act to-
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gether for all practical purposes, so far as tlieir own interests

are concerned, as one united and joint association. In managing

and controlling the business on their lines, they have all the

advantages that could be derived from a legal partnership. They

make such an arrangement among themselves as they see fit

for sharing the losses, as they do the profits, that happen in any

part of their route. If, by their agreement, each party to the

connected line is to make good the losses that happen in his part

of the route, the associated carriers, and not the owner of the

goods, have the means of ascertaining where the losses have

happened. And if this cannot be known, there is nothing un-

reasonable or inconvenient in their sharing the loss, as in case

of a legal partnership, in proportion to their respective interests

in the whole route.

They undertake the business of common carriers, and must be

understood to assume the legal liabilities of that business. They

transact the business under a change of circumstances ; but the

principles and the general policy of the common law, which, as

an elementary maxim, holds the common carrier liable for all
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accidental losses, must be applied to these new methods of trans-

acting the same business; and there is certainly nothing in the

present condition of the business which calls for any relaxation of

the old rule. The great value of commodities transported over

these connected lines — the increased risk of loss and damage from

the immense distances over which they carry goods — the fact that

where goods are once intrusted to carriers on these long

routes, they are placed beyond all control and supervision of

the owners, — are cogent reasons for holding those who associate

in these connected lines to a rule that shall give effectual and

convenient remedy to the owner, whose goods have been lost

or damaged in any part of the line. Any rule which should

have the effect to defeat or embarrass the o^\Tier 's remedy would

be in direct conflict with the principles and whole policy of the

common law.

What, then, is the situation of the owner, whose goods have

been damaged or lost on a continuous line of three or any larger

number of associated carriers, if he can look only to the carrier

on whose part of the route the damage may have happened?

In the first place, he must set about learning where his loss hap-

pened. This would often be difficult, and sometimes quite im-

possible. Suppose an invoice of flour, shipped in good order

at Ogdensburgh, were found, on arrival at Boston, to have been

damaged somewhere on the route; or suppose a trunk, checked

at Boston for Chicago, was broken open and plundered before

it reached Chicago, what v.'ould the owner's chance be worth of
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finding out in what particular part of the route the damage hap-

pened? He would have no means of learning himself; and he

would not, unless of a very confiding disposition, rely on any

very zealous aid in his search from the different carriers asso-

ciated in the connected line. And if he should have the luck

to make the discovery, he might be obliged to assert his claim

for compensation against a distant party, among strangers, in

circumstances such as would discourage a prudent man, and

induce him to sit down patiently under his loss rather than incur

the expense and risk of pursuing his legal remedy under the

rule set up by these defendants. The forlorn condition of the

owner in such a case is put in a strong light by Waite, C. J., in

his dissenting opinion, Elmore v. The Naugatuck Railroad, 23

Conn. 457, 63 Am. D. 143, where he says: "A merchant residing

in Cleveland, Toledo or Chicago, purchases goods in the city of

New York, which he washes to send to his place of business.

He enters into a contract with a railroad company for their

transportation, not to any given point on the route, but for the

whole distance. He delivers the goods to the company, and they
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are taken and locked up in freight cars. He does not accompany

them, and often sees and hears nothing more of them until they

are delivered to him at their place of destination. The cars in

which they are placed are often run over roads belonging to

different companies, to save trouble and expense of change of

cars. If the goods are lost or damaged on the route, he ordinarily

has no means of determining where or in whose custody the

injury occurred. The trouble and expense of ascertaining that

fact in many cases would amount to more than the whole dam-

age. As a prudent, cautious man, he would be unwilling to in-

trust his goods to the custody of others, unless he could find

some person or company that would be responsible for their

safe delivery." The remarks of Smith, J. (34 N. Y. 501) , before

cited, are of the same import, showing the difficulties and em-

barrassments of the owner, if he can only resort for compen-

sation to the carrier in the connected line on whose part of the

route the damage happened.

A rule which throws such difficulties in the way of the owner

who seeks to recover of common carriers for the loss of his goods,

I cannot but regard as a wide departure from the general doc-

trine of the common law on this subject ; and nothing is plainer

than the duty of courts to apply the general principles of the

common law to the new circumstances which are introduced

by changes in the manner of transacting any business.

Few things are of greater importance to the whole country

than the cheap, convenient and safe transportation of goods be-
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tween distant points. Vast sums of money are expended to pro-

mote this object. The business is already immense and con-

stantly increasing. Most of the business is done on connecting

lines of railroads and steamboats, and these by continuous lines

have a practical monopoly of the business on their respective

roads. The owner of goods must intrust them to these associated

carriers; they cannot be carried in any other way. Not only

those who are engaged directly in carrying and sending goods

are interested in this subject; all who produce and all who con-

sume are interested that goods should be carried as cheaply, as

conveniently and as safely as possible. Public policy and the

public interest concur with the general maxim of the law, that

those who transact this great business should be held to a rule

which shall give a ready and effectual remedy to the owner

whose goods have been lost or damaged in any part of these

connected lines of transportation.

There is a perplexing diversity of decision on this subject

in the different tribunals of this country. For instance, by the

law of New York, as we understand it to be established by the
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construction which the courts have given to their statute, if goods

are received in that state for transportation through on a con-

nected line of railroads, the road that receives the goods is liable

for loss or damage happening in any part of the connected line,

though beyond the limits of the state. Burtis v. The Buffalo &

State Line Railroad, qua supra. As has before been mentioned,

there is a connected line of six or seven railroads extending from

Ogdensburgh to Boston. If goods are received by the Ogdens-

burgh railroad for transportation to Boston, and are lost or dam-

aged on any part of the line, say on the Lowell railroad, the

Ogdensburgh railroad is liable for the loss. But if merchandise

is received at Boston by the Lowell railroad for transportation

to Ogdensburgh over the same connected line of railroads asso-

ciated under the same agreement, the owner would be left to

find out, if he could, on which of the six or seven connected

roads his goods were lost or damaged, and could claim for his

loss of that road alone. There w^ould seem to be no remedy for

this confusion and conflict of decisions unless the national legis-

lature can provide one under the power given by the constitution

to regulate commerce,

I come to the conclusion that, on the case stated, the plaintiffs

are entitled to recover; and such is the unanimous opinion of

the court.
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125. QUIMBY V. VANDERBILT,

17 N. Y. 306; 72 Am. D. 469. 1858.

Action on a contract to carry defendant from New York to

San Francisco via defendant 's steamer to the Isthmus of Panama,

thence by Accessory Transit Co. 's conveyance to the Pacific, and

to San Francisco by Pacific steamers. One agent acted for the

three lines, but sold three separate tickets, and accounted sep-

arately to the proprietors of each line for the tickets sold on

that line. Plaintiff was safely carried to the isthmus, but was

not promptly carried across and in consequence missed the

Pacific steamer. The jury found that defendant had made a

through contract and gave verdict for plaintiff.

By Court, Denio, J. The plaintiff relies upon an express

contract by which, as he alleges, the defendant engaged to cause

him to be carried from New York to San Francisco; and the

single question of law involved in the case is whether there was

evidence of such a contract proper to be submitted to the jury.

If it should be conceded that there was no such connection be-

tween the three lines of transportation as would entitle the
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defendant, as the representative of the whole, to contract in

their behalf for the carriage of persons and property the entire

distance from New, York to California, it was yet quite compe-

tent for him to bind himself to the plaintiff by an express con-

tract, not only to carry him over his own proper portion of the

line, but that the other transportation companies should succes-

sively take him up upon his arrival at the commencement of

their respective routes, and carry him over the same until he

should arrive at his destination at San Francisco. The English

courts hold that where property is embarked ujjon a railroad or

other line of transportation, addressed to a place beyond the

terminus of the line, but which may be reached by other lines

of carriage running in connection with it, a contract arises be-

tween the first-mentioned company and the owner of the prop-

erty that it shall be carried to its place of destination : Muschamp

V. Lancaster and Preston Railway Company, 8 Mee. & W. 421;

Watson V. Ambergate etc. Railway Company, 3 Eng, L. & Eq.

497 ; and this court has determined that the agent of a railway

company may bind his principals by a contract for carriage over

other roads running in connection with his own : Hart v. Rens-

selaer and Saratoga Railroad Company, 8 N. Y. 37, 59 Am. Dee.

447. The late court of errors, in my opinion very wisely, limited

the English rule above mentioned, by holding that evidence was
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admissilile to show that by the course of business a transporta-

tion line receiving property without any express contract, under-

took only to carry it over its own line, and then place it in the

hands of the carriers over the next route, and that it discharged

its obligation to the owners by delivering it to a responsible

company next in order in its passage to the place of destination :

Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill, 157. All the cases assume

that the company to which the goods are delivered may law-

fully contract for the performance of the other lines running in

connection with its own, as well as for its proper route; and

there is no difference in principle, in this respect, between con-

tracts for the carriage of persons and for the transportation of

property.

But the defendant's counsel contends that the tickets which

the plaintiff received for the passage over the several routes are,

in themselves, written evidence of the bargains by which he en-

gaged his passage, and that he is precluded from contradicting

them by parol testimony of an entire contract with the defend-

ant. We do not think this a sound position. The tickets do
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not purport to be contracts. They are rather in the nature of

receipts for the separate portions of the passage-money; and

their office is to serve as tokens to enable the persons having

charge of the vessels and carriages of the companies to recognize

the bearers as parties who were entitled to be received on board.

They are quite consistent with a more special bargain. Being

the usual permits which were issued for the guidance of the

masters of the vessels and the conductors of the carriages, they

would necessarily be given to the passenger to facilitate the

transaction of the business, whatever the nature of his arrange-

ment for passage may have been. Their character as mere

tokens is shown by the fact that the defendant received them in

large numbers of the Transit company, not as an agent of that

company for the purpose of making bargains in its behalf with

others, but to furnish them to persons with whom he expected

to deal on his own account. In Hart v. Rensselaer and Saratoga

Railroad Company, just referred to, the plaintiff had separate

tickets for each of the roads over which she traveled, but she

was permitted to recover against one of the companies, though

unable to show that her baggage was lost on the route of that

company. We do not say that the receiving of separate tickets

for the different lines is not evidence of some weight upon the

question whether the contract was entire, but we hold that it

does not come within the rule which excludes parol testimony

respecting a contract which has been reduced to writing.

There was positive evidence of a verbal contract between the
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plaintiff and Allen for carrying the former from New York to

San Francisco. The plaintiff applied at the office to obtain

such passage, and he was promised it for two hundred and fifty

dollars. The tickets were then given him to secure his admis-

sion to the different vehicles of the line. In this Allen pro-

fessed to act as the agent or clerk of some one. So far as

the steamships on the Atlantic were concerned, he was the

agent of the defendant, and no question is made but that he

was authorized to bind the defendant thus far. It is equally

clear to my mind that he was authorized to bind him by con-

tracts for carrying passengers across the isthmus. The Transit

company did not, as a general thing, sell any tickets to trav-

elers ; nor did they make any contracts for passage except with

the defendant. To him they sold tickets, in the nature of per-

mits for passage over their route, in such quantities as he chose

to purchase. It is proved that neither he nor Allen were agents

for the Transit company. When he dealt with a traveler, there-

fore, he bargained on his own account, and not on behalf of

the Transit company. He might have charged more or -less
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than he paid the company. It was certainly possible for him

to dispose of one of these permits by an arrangement with the

passenger so special that the latter should have no recourse to

him ; but if he engaged in terms that the purchaser should

be carried across the isthmus, and gave him one of the Transit

company's tickets to show his title to be admitted on board

their boats and carriages, he was the principal in that contract,

and must answer for its breach. He placed these tickets in the

hands of Allen, who was accustomed to deliver them to passen-

gers in connection with such contracts as the one he made with

the plaintiff. Allen admitted on his examination that he charged

the gross sum of two hundred and fifty dollars for the entire

passage, without any specification of the amount belonging to

the separate branches of the line; and there is not the slightest

evidence that on any occasion he sold the tickets to be taken

at the risk of the passenger, or in connection with any arrange-

ment except such as I have mentioned. The facts that the de-

fendant purchased the tickets of the Transit company; that

he placed them in the hands of his agent Allen for delivery to

passengers ; that the latter was accustomed to dispose of them in

connection with contracts for passage over the entire route ; and

that he transacted the business in an office occupied also by the

defendant, and acted under his general direction — were sufficient

prima facie to charge the defendant as principal in these con-

tracts.

As the detention, which prevented the plaintiff from reaching
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the steamship Independence before she sailed, occurred -upon

the isthmus, the defendant is chargeable in this action when it

is shown that such detention was a breach of his contract, even

though it should be held that the plaintiff contracted with other

parties for his passage upon the Pacific coast. But I think there

was sufficient evidence to enable the jury to find that the defend-

ant was the principal in the contract which Allen made with the

plaintiff for the entire passage. The terms of the card which

was given to the plaintiff when he received his ticket, and of the

advertisement which was posted at the door of the office, which

the plaintiff read when he went to secure his passage, looked to

contracts for the whole distance. The defendant's connection

with the office and with Allen was sufficient prima facie to charge

him with a knowledge of the contents of these papers, and he is

to be looked upon as their author. Being known to both parties

to the contract for passage, they afford the means of ascertaining

what that contract was if it were otherwise equivocal. If we

add to this evidence the fact that the defendant was the owner

of a moiety of two of the steamships which ran on the Pacific

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:40 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

side, and that he was a party to the arrangement by which the

Independence, owned substantially by the Schuylers, was em-

ployed in that navigation in connection with the other routes,

a case was made out which was not only suitable for the con-

sideration of the jury, but which, in our opinion, fully war-

ranted the verdict which they gave.

The judgment of the court of common pleas should be affirmed.

All the judges concurred.

126. CONDON V. MARQUETTE, HOUGHTON & ONTONA-

GON RAILROAD CO.,

55 Mich. 218; 54 Am. R. 367. 1884.

Action for value of freight.

Plaintiff shipped goods from New York over several connect-

ing lines to himself at Hancock, Michigan. They were delivered

to defendant March 12th, 1883, and carried to its terminus at

L'Anse next day. They were there stored in defendant's ware-

house awaiting their further carriage by the L 'Anse and Hough-

ton Overland Transportation Co., as there was no railroad be-

yond L'Anse. The Transportation Co. was accustomed to

examine the books of defendant to ascertain what goods were

to be taken by it, and to transport from the warehouse such

goods to Hancock or other places in sleighs or other vehicles,

511

§ 126 TEEMINATION OF CAERIEE'S RELATION.

March 20th, before the Transportation Co. had called for the

goods, they were destroyed by fire. No notice had been given

by defendant to plaintiff or to the Transportation Co. The

goods had simply remained in the warehouse. Plaintiff claimed

of defendant their value, and that being refused he brought

this suit. The court below instructed that if defendants re-

ceived the goods they remained common carriers during the

transportation of the goods, and after their arrival for such

reasonable time as, according to the usual course of business

with the Transportation Co., would enable defendant to deliver

the goods to that company, and no delay of the Transportation

Co. would exonerate defendant from this liability. Its duty was

to deliver or offer to deliver the goods to the Transportation

Co., and if they were not so delivered or offered plaintiff was

entitled to recover. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant

brings error.

CooLEY, C. J. (After stating the facts.) The question which

the instruction presents is one upon which the authorities are

somewhat divided. It received careful attention at the hands
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of the New York Court of Appeals in McDonald v. Western Rail-

road Corporation, 34 N. Y. 497, where several opinions were de-

livered. The facts upon which the decision was to be made

were in all respects similar to those now before us, and the

judges were unanimous in holding that the railroad company

was liable. Wright, J., said: "The goods had been received

by the defendants at Chatham, to be transported to Binghamton

by way of the Erie and Chenango canal. Their obligation there-

fore was to carry the goods safely to the end of their road and

deliver them to the next carrier on the route beyond. A carrier

in such case does not release himself from liability by simply

unloading the goods at the end of his route, and placing them

in his own storehouse, without delivery or notice to, or any at-

tempt to deliver to, the next carrier." Hunt, J., in a concurring

opinion, referring to Ladue v. Griffith, 25 N. Y. 364, 82 Am. D.

360, as a somewhat similar case, said: "The defendants in the

present case did no act indicating that they had renounced

the liability of a carrier. They simply unloaded and deposited

goods in their warehouse. Had this deposit been made in the

warehouse of a company engaged in canal transportation west-

wardly, it would have been an act of great significance. But

here the fact is expressly found that it was the custom of the

further carrier to take the goods from the defendant's depot.

The liability of the further carrier did not commence until he

removed the goods from the defendants' warehouse. The deposit

512

CONDON V. M., H. & 0. R. R. C § 126

therefore by the defendants in their own warehouse did not

afford any evidence of a renunciation of the carrier's liability."

And he added that the deposit of the goods in the warehouse was

to be considered a mere accessory to the carriage by defendant,

and their liability as carrier was therefore unbroken.

This decision was approved as sound and followed as authority

in Mills V. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 622, 6 Am. Rep.

152, and it is undoubtedly the settled law of New York at this

time. The same doctrine was laid down in Conkey v. Milwaukee,

etc., R. Co., 31 Wis. 619, 11 Am. Rep. 630, in a forcible

opinion by Dixon, C. J., and also in Irish v. Milwaukee, etc., R.

Co., 19 Minn. 376, 18 Am. Rep. 340, which cites with ap-

proval the case in 34 N. Y, Reports. The like doctrine also ap-

pears to be recognized in Erie Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 28 Ohio

St. 358 ; Brintnall v. Saratoga, etc., R. Co., 32 Vt. 665 ; Packard

V. Taylor, 35 Ark. 402, 37 Am. Rep. 37; and Louisville,

etc., R. Co. V, Campbell, 7 Heisk. 253. It was also affirmed in

Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 16 Wall 318. This

last case expresses views not in harmony with the opinion of this
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court respecting a certain clause in the charter of the Michigan

Central Railroad Company as expressed in Michigan Central

R. Co. V. Hale, 6 Mich. 243, and Same Company v. Lantz, 32

Mich. 503; yet as the question now under consideration was

considered and decided by the court upon common-law princi-

ples, the conflict of views on the question of construction is of no

importance in this case.

We think these cases lay down a rule which is just to shippers

of goods, and not unreasonably burdensome to carriers. The

shipper delivers his goods to a carrier, who becomes insurer for

their safe transportation; and if the operations of one carrier

cover a part only of the line of transit, and another is to receive

the goods from him, the shipper has a right to understand that

the liability of an insurer is upon some one during the whole

period. The duty of the one is not discharged until it has been

imposed upon the succeeding carrier; and this is not done until

there is delivery of the goods, or at least such a notification

to the succeeding carrier as, according to the course of the busi-

ness, is equivalent to a tender of delivery. There is nothing

in this which is burdensome to the carriers; for this is the cus-

tomary method in which the business is done ; and the rule only

requires that the customary method shall be pursued without

unreasonable delay or negligence.

The connecting carriers in this case appear to have established

a custom of their own, under which actual delivery of the goods

or notice to take them was dispensed with, and the one was to
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ascertain from the books of the other what goods were ready for

reception and further carriage. This, as between themselves,

was well enough while it worked well; but it was an arrange-

ment to which the plaintiff was not a party, and the defendant

could not by means of it relieve itself of any liability which

duty to the plaintiff imposed. And it was clearly its duty to the

plaintiff, as we think, to relieve itself of the responsibility of

the goods remaining for an unreasonable time in its warehouse;

and to do this, it was necessary that the responsibility be trans-

ferred to the carrier next in line. But the mere permission to

inspect its books and take whatever was ready for carriage

would not do this ; there should have been distinct notice which

would apprise the other carrier that defendant expected the

removal of the goods.

In this case there were no facts indicating a renunciation, as

to these goods, of the liability of common carrier by the defend-

ant, or that it was supposed by the agents of the defendant that

that character had been exchanged for any other. If it ever

was, it must have been at the moment the goods were received;
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for nothing took place afterward to change the relation of the

defendant to the goods until the fire took place. But we are not

ready to assent to the doctrine that a railroad company, as to

goods transported by it, ceases to be carrier the moment the

goods are received at its warehouse. "We do not think that is

the law, or that it ought to be.

The judgment should be affirmed.

127. MOORE V. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD

RAILROAD CO.,

173 Mass. 335; 53 N. E. R. 816; 73 Am. St. R.~ 298. 1899.

Holmes, J. This is an action by a passenger to recover for

damage to her luggage, suffered somewhere in the course of a

passage from Charleston, Tennessee, to Boston. The passage

was over six connecting railroads; it does not appear where the

damage was done, and the plaintiff seeks to recover upon a pre-

sumption that the accident happened upon the last road.

The so-called presumption was started and justified as a true

presumption of fact, that goods shown to have been delivered in

good condition remain so until they are shovni to be in bad

condition, which happens only on their delivery. But it was

much fortified by the argument that it was a rule of convenience,

if not of necessity, like the rule requiring a party who relies
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upon a license to show it: 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 79;

Pub. Stats., c. 214, sec. 12. As we, in common with many other

American courts, hold the first carrier not answerable for the

whole transit, and not subject to an adverse presumption

(Farmington Mercantile Co. v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 166 Mass.

154, 44 N. E. R. 131), it is almost necessary to call on the last

carrier to explain the loss, if the owner of the goods is to have

any remedy at all. To do so is not unjust, since whatever means

of information there may be are much more at the carrier's

command than at that of a private person. These considerations

have led most of the American courts that have had to deal with

the question to hold that the presumption exists : Smith v. New

York Cent. R. R. Co., 43 Barb. 225, 228, 229 ; affirmed, 41 N. Y.

620; Laughlin v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 28 Wis. 204, 9 Am. Rep.

493; Memphis etc. R. R. Co. v. Holloway, 9 Baxt. 188, 191;

Dixon v. Richmond etc. R. R. Co., 74 N. C. 538 ; Leo v. St. Paul

etc. Ry. Co., 30 Minn. 438 ; 15 N. W. R. 872 ; Montgomery etc.

Ry. Co. V. Culver, 75 Ala. 587, 51 Am. R. 483 ; Beard v. Illinois

Cent. Ry. Co., 79 Iowa, 518, 44 N. W. R. 800, 18 Am. St. R.
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381 ; Savannah etc. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 26 Fla. 148, 7 So. R. 544,

23 Am. St. R. 551; Faison v. Alabama etc. Ry. Co., 69 Miss.

569, 13 So. R. 37, 30 Am. St. R. 577 ; Forrester v. Georgia R. R.

etc. Co., 92 Ga. 699, 19 S. E. R. 811. In the opinion of the court,

the weight of argument and authority is on that side. Mr.

Justice Lathrop and I have not been able to free our minds from

doubt because we are not fully satisfied that the court has not

committed itself to a different doctrine. Still, it has not dealt

with it in terms. In Darling v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 11 Allen,

295, the only question discussed was a question of contract. In

Swetland v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 102 Mass. 276, the question

was as to frozen apples. It appeared that the weather had been

very cold before delivery to the defendant. The presumption

was not mentioned. These are the two nearest cases.

Judgment for plaintiff.

128. ALLEN V. MAINE CENTRAL RAILROAD CO.,

79 Me. 327; 9 Atl. R. 895; 1 Am. St. R. 310. 1887.

By Court, Emery, J. The only mooted question in this ease

is, whether the plaintiffs effectually exercised against the carrier

their clear right of stopping the goods in transitu.

The plaintiffs seasonably telegraphed and wrote the proper

officer of the defendant company (the carrier) to stop and

return the goods. The defendant company contend the notice
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was insufficient, because there was no statement of the nature

or basis of the claim to have the goods stopped. While such

a statement is probably usual, it does not seem necessary in this

ease. The carrier is presumed to know the law, and by such

a notice as was given here is effectually apprised of a claim

adverse to the consignee, as well as of a claim upon himself. In

Benjamin on Sales, 1276, while it is said that the usual mode

is a simple notice to the carrier, stating the vendor's claim, etc.,

it is also stated that "all that is required is some act or declara-

tion of the vendor countermanding the delivery." Brewer, J.,

in Rucker v. Donovan, 13 Kan. 251, 19 Am. Rep. 84, said: "A

notice to the carrier to stop the goods is sufficient. No particular

form of notice is required." In Clemintson v. Grand Trunk

R'y Co., 42 U. C. Q. B. 263, while it was held that the notice was

faulty in not identifying the goods, it was said that a specifica-

tion of the basis of the claim was not necessary.

The defendant further contends that the plaintiff's omission

to afterward prove to the carrier their right to stop the goods,

when requested by the carrier to do so, has vacated their claim,
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and released the carrier from liability. But the carrier is not the

tribunal to determine the rights of the consignor and consignee.

Neither of these parties can be required to plead or make proof

before the carrier. No man need prove his case to his adversary.

It is sufficient if he prove to the court. The carrier cannot con-

clusively adjudicate upon his own obligations to either party.

He is in the same position as is any man, against whom con-

flicting claims are made. If, as is alleged here, the circumstances

are such that he cannot compel them to interplead, he must in-

quire for himself, and resist or yield at his peril.

It is reasonable, however, that the person assuming the right

to stop goods in transit should act in good faith toward the

carrier. He should, if requested, furnish him,' in due time with

reasonable evidence of the validity of his claim, though it may

not amount to proof. Should the consignor refuse such reason-

able information as he may possess, such refusal might be con-

strued as a waiver of his peculiar right, and might justify the

carrier, after a reasonable time, in no longer detaining the goods

from the consignee. But there was no such refusal here. The

plaintiffs sent forward the invoice and their affidavit within a

reasonable time.

The plaintiffs have now proved their right to stop the goods,

and the defendant company, having denied that right without

good reason, must respond in damages.

Judgment for plaintiffs for $176.41, with interest from the

date of the writ.
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PART IV

OF QUASI-BAILEES

CHAPTER XIV.

OF CAKRIERS OF PASSENGERS.

129. HOAR V. MAINE CENTRAL RAILROAD CO.,

70 Me. 65; 35 Am. R. 299. 1879.

Appleton, C. J. The material and substantive allegations in

the several counts in the plaintiff's writs are that the defendants

are common carriers of passengers between Waterville and West

Waterville; that as such carriers they are bound to carry all

passengers and persons lawfully on their road carefully and

safely over the same ; that the plaintiff's intestate, being invited

by one Potter, a foreman of a section, in their employ and

trusted by them with the care and control of one of their hand-

cars, to ride with him on said hand-car from Waterville to West

Waterville, accepted the invitation; that the plaintiff's intestate

while riding was run over by one of the defendant's engines to

which a paymaster's car was attached, and injured so that he

died, and that this was through the negligence of the defendants

and their servants, the deceased being in the exercise of due
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care. To each count of the declaration the defendants filed a

general demurrer.

I. The liability of a railroad company differs as to their duty

to their servants and to passengers. They are liable to servants

for injuries resulting from want of due care in the selection of

fellow-servants, but if duly selected they do not guarantee against

their negligence. Blake v. M. C. R. R. Co., 70 Me. 60, 35 Am. R.

297. Not so as to passengers, to whom they are responsible for

injuries arising from their negligence or incapacity, irrespective

of the question of more or less care in their selection. It is ob-

vious that there is no defect in the declaration so far as it relates

to the negligence of the defendants, if they are to be deemed

common carriers by hand-cars.
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II. The plaintiff's intestate was to be carried gratuitously.

But that does not place him in a different position, so far as re-

lates to his right to protection from neglect, from a pay passen-

ger — if he is to be regarded as a passenger to be carried by the

defendants. Phil. & Read R. R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 468 ; Wil-

ton V. Middlesex R. R. Co., 107 Mass. 108, 9 Am. Rep. 11 ; Whart.

on Neg. § 355.

III. The plaintiff places her right to recover upon a neglect

by the defendants of their duties to the intestate as common

carriers. To impose upon the defendants the duties and respon-

sibilties of common carriers, they must be shown to be such.

The grave and important question, then, is whether the defen-

dants, though common carriers of passengers along their road

and in their cars for that purpose, are common carriers of pas-

sengers by their hand-cars used by their section men. Were

the defendants chartered as common carriers save by their cars

for passengers? Have they by their acts or conduct held out

to the public, or authorized their agents to hold out to the pub-

lic, that they were common carriers by their hand-cars? If they
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have not been chartered, and have not in any way held them-

selves out as common carriers by hand-cars, then the duties and

obligations resting upon them as carriers have not arisen.

If the defendants were common carriers in relation to the

plaintiff' 's intestate, they would be bound to carry all who should

apply. Were, then, the defendants bound to carry on their

hand-cars any one asking to be so conveyed ? Assuredly not.

In Graham v. Toronto, Grey & Bruce Railway Co., 23 Up. Can.

(C. P.) 541, the defendants agreed, with a contractor for the

construction of their railway, to furnish a construction train

for ballasting and laying the track for a portion of their road

then under construction ; the defendants to provide the conduc-

tor, engineer and fireman; the contractor furnishing the brake-

men. On October 31, 1872, after work was over for the day

and the train was returning to Owen Sound, where the plaintiff,

one of the contractor's workmen, lived, the plaintiff, with the

permission of the conductor but without the authority of the

defendants, got on. Through the negligence of the person in

charge of the train an accident happened, and the plaintiff was

injured. "The fact," remarks Haggerty, C. J., "that the de-

fendant's engine-driver or conductor allowed him to get on the

platform, does not alter my view of the case.

"I cannot distinguish it from the ease of a cart sent by its

owner under his servant's care to haul bricks or lumber for a

house he is building. A workman, either with the driver's as-

sent or without any objection from him, gets upon the cart. It
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breaks down, or by careless driving runs against another vehicle,

or a lamp-post, and the workman is injured. I cannot under-

stand by what process of reasoning the owner can in such case

be held to incur any liability to the person injured. Nor, in my

opinion, would the fact that the owner was aware that the driver

of his cart often let a friend or person doing the work at his house

drive in his cart, make any difference. * * * It could never

be, I think, in the reasonable expectation of these defendants

that they were incurring any liability as carriers of passengers,

or that they should provide against contingencies that might af-

fect them in that character."

A similar question arose in Sheerman v. Toronto, Grey &

Bruce Railway Co., 34 Up. Can. (Q. B.) 451, where one of the

workmen was being carried, without reward, on a gravel train,

and was injured so that he died, it was held that the deceased

was not lawfully on the cars with the consent of the defendants,

and a nonsuit was directed. "The workmen," observes Wil-

son, J., ''were not lawfully on the cars. They were not passen-

gers being carried by the defendants. They were acting on
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their own risk, not at the risk of the defendants, and however

unfortunate the disaster may have been, it is only right the legal

responsibility should fall on those who ought to bear it, and not

upon those upon whom it does not rest." In this case "it ap-

peared that it was not necessary the defendants should carry

the men to and from their work, and that they never agreed to

do more than to provide cars for carrying ballasting and mate-

rials for track laying."

The defendants not being common carriers, so far as relates

to their liability to the plaintiff's intestate, the declaration not

disclosing facts which show such liability, must be adjudged

bad. Eaton v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co., 57 N. Y. 382,

15 Am. Rep. 513 ; Union Pacif . R. R. Co. v. Nichols, 8 Kans. 505 ;

12 Am. Rep. 475; in Dunn v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 58 Me.

187, 4 Am. Rep. 267, the plaintiff was riding in a saloon

car attached to a freight train, and paid the customary fare for

conveyance in a passenger car,

IV. A master is bound by the acts of his servant in the course

of his employment, but not by those obviously and utterly out-

side of the scope of such employment. If not common carriers,

a section foreman with his hand-car has no right to impose upon

the defendants the onerous responsibilities arising from that re-

lation. He has no right to accept passengers for transportation

and bind the defendants for their safe carriage, and every man

may safely be presumed to know thus much.

If the risk is much greater by this mode of conveyance, the
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plaintiff's intestate by adopting it assumed the extra risks aris-

ing therefrom, and must be held to abide the unfortunate conse-

quences.

No one becomes a passenger except by the consent, express or

implied, of the carrier. There is no allegation of express con-

sent by the defendants, nor of anji;hing from which consent can

be implied that the plaintiff's intestate should be carried at their

risk by this unusual mode of conveyance.

Declaration bad.

Walton, Barrows, Virgin and Libbey, JJ., concurred.

130. BRICKER V. PHILADELPHIA AND READING

RAILROAD CO.,

132 Pa. St 1; 18 Atl. R. 983; 19 Am. St. R. 585. 1890.

Trespass, by Elizabeth S. Bricker to recover damages for the

death of her husband in a collision. A few moments before, feel-

ing ill, he had gone into the mail car, where the postal clerk gave

him some medicine. The conductor had not asked for his ticket,

but a ticket good for the transportation was found on the per-

son of the deceased. Appeal from a judgment of nonsuit.
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McCoLLUM, J. There is no evidence in this case which war-

rants an inference that the defendant company accepted Bricker

as a passenger on its train from Port Clinton to Tamaqua. He

entered a car which he knew was not provided for the transporta-

tion of passengers. He was on the train without the knowledge

or consent of the company, and in a place where its employees,

in the discharge of their ordinary duties, would not discover him.

It was a place devoted exclusively to the railway mail service,

and in charge of one of its employees. He was confronted by

an order of the superintendent of that service, forbidding him

to remain there. He was not there for any purpose which re-

lated to a duty of the company in the transportation of its pas-

sengers or their baggage.

Upon these undisputed facts appearing in the plaintiff's evi-

dence, no contract for safe carriage existed between the com-

pany and the deceased, A passenger, in the legal sense of the

word, is "one who travels in some public conveyance, by virtue

of a contract, express or implied, with the carrier, as the pay-

ment of fare or that which is accepted as an equivalent there-

for": Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Price, 96 Pa. St. 256. In Whar-

ton on Negligence, sec. 354, the undertaking of the carrier is
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thus defined: "A carrier, in undertaking to carry passengers

safely, undertakes to carry them safely if they place themselves

under his direction in particular places prescribed for the pur-

pose ; and he will not be held liable for damages accruing to an

interloper who, unnoticed by him, hides in the crevices of a loco-

motive or in the hold of a ship. In Patterson's Railway Acci-

dent Law, sec. 214, it is stated "that the existence of the rela-

tion of carrier and passenger is dependent upon the making of

a contract of carriage. From this it follows that railways are

not liable to persons who have not been accepted as passengers,

and the intention of the person to pay his fare, and his good

faith, are immaterial, where there has been no contract, express

or implied, on the part of the railway."

These quotations from standard text-books correctly state the

law on the subject to which they refer. As Bricker was not a

passenger, and was on the train without the consent, express or

implied, of the company, it owed him no duty, and the nonsuit

was rightly ordered. In this view of the case, it is unneces-

sary to consider whether, if he had been accepted as a pas-
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senger, he was guilty of negligence which contributed to the in-

jury he received, and which caused his death.

Judgment affirmed.

131. WARREN V. FITCHBURG RAILROAD CO.,

• 8 Allen (Mass.) 227; 85 Am. D. 700. 1864.

Tort for damages caused by being run over by defendant's

engine. The engineer testified that his train was going about

9 or 10 miles an hour, and that the whistle was blown and bell

rung as usual when approaching a station. Plaintiff testified

that he looked to see where he should take his train, which was

coming in an opposite direction on another track, that he saw

the train that injured him only 20 or 30 feet away and at the

same instant heard its whistle. Further facts appear in the

opinion. Verdict for plaintiff in $5,750 damages.

By Court, Hoar, J. The plaintiff could not recover unless

he was was himself using due care at the time when he received

the injury, even if the carelessness of the defendants occasioned

it. And the burden of proof was upon him to show that he

used this care. So much is clearly settled.

In several recent cases it has been held that if the whole evi-

dence introduced by the plaintiff has no tendency to show care
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on his part, but, on the contrary, shows that he was careless, it

is the duty of the court to direct the jury, as matter of law, to

return a verdict for the defendant: Lucas v. New Bedford and

Taunton R. R., 6 Gray (Mass.) 64, 66 Am. D. 406; Gahagan v.

Boston and Lowell R. R., 1 Allen (Mass.) 187, 79 Am. D^ 724;

Todd V. Old Colony and Fall River R. R., 3 Allen (Mass.) 18,

80 Am. D. 49; Wilson v. City of Charlestown, 8 Allen (Mass.)

137, 85 Am. D. 693.

We should have no doubt, if the evidence in the case at bar

had disclosed nothing more than that the plaintiff had crossed

a railroad track, with due notice of its existence, and without

looking to see whether a train were approaching, that the prin-

ciple of those cases would be applicable to this. Such evidence,

with nothing to explain or qualify it, would not have shown the

exercise of due care, but the contrary.

But we are of opinion that the other facts which appeared in

evidence had a very important bearing upon the propriety of the

plaintiff's conduct, and that all the circumstances taken together

presented a case which was proper to be submitted to the jury,
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and which the court could not rightfully withdraw from their

consideration.

It was shown that the plaintiff had purchased his ticket en-

titling him to a passage to Boston, and was waiting in the pas-

senger station for the arrival of the train ; that when the whistle

of the approaching train was heard, the station agent employed

by the defendants said to him: "The train is coming; we will

cross over." Upon receiving this information and direction, the

plaintiff followed the station agent from the room across toward

the train, which had arrived and stopped before he came out on

the platform. The path by which he went to the train was some-

what oblique, so that the engine which struck him came in a di-

rection partially behind him. Whether, in this condition of

things, in his anxiety seasonably to reach the train, which would

stop but a moment, the plaintiff, at a station with which he was

not familiar, would have been likely to be thrown off his guard

by the direction to cross over, given without any caution or qual-

ification; whether he might naturally, and without subjecting

himself to the imputation of want of care, have considered him-

self under the charge of the defendants' agent, with an assur-

ance that it was safe and proper to go directly to the cars, were

questions for the jury, and not for the court. They were sub-

mitted to the jury, with instructions which were appropriate

and sufficient, and to which, in the opinion of this court, the

defendants had no just ground of exception.

The next exception taken was to the instruction given to the
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jury, ' * that a person who had purchased a ticket entitling him to

a passage on a particular train was to be considered, while pass-

ing from the office or place of business where the purchase was

made to the train, to take his seat in one of the cars of which it

consists, as a passenger; and that the defendants were bound to

exercise the same degree of care in providing for him a safe and

convenient way and manner of access to the train, and in pre-

venting the interposition of any obstacle or obstruction which

would unreasonably impede him or expose him to harm or in-

jury while proceeding to take his seat in the cars, as in the subse-

quent transportation and carriage of him." We think this in-

struction, though not strictly correct as a general proposition

applicable to all cases of the kind, was not erroneous, if taken

with the qualifications which the particular case afforded, and

which must have been obviously understood as included in it.

As a general statement it was too broad, because a passenger

may buy his ticket at an office which is not in the same town, or

even in the same state, in which he intends to take the cars.

The railroad company have no control over his movements, and
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he does not, by the purchase of a ticket, put himself under their

charge. But if he is "passing from the office or place of busi-

ness where the purchase was made to the train, to take his seat

in the cars," on the premises belonging to the company, con-

nected with the railroad, and under the direction of the com-

pany's agents, given to him as a passenger with whom the com-

pany have made the contract for conveyance which the purchase

of the ticket creates, as was the case with the plaintiff, we think

he is to be considered as a passenger, and entitled to the rights

of a passenger while so passing. It is the duty of the railroad

company to afford to the passengers whom they undertake to

cany in their cars a reasonable and safe opportunity to pass

from the room or building in which they receive passengers for

transportation, to the cars, when the proper time comes for them

to take their seats. The purchasers of tickets are bound to com-

ply with all reasonable rules and orders of the company or their

agents, as much when going to the cars from the station-house,

or from the cars to a place of safety beyond the railroad track,

as they are when actually on board the train, and while the

transit continues. The instruction to the jury, therefore, seems

to have been sufficiently adapted to the circumstances of the

3ase, and this exception cannot be sustained.

The remaining exception was taken to the terms in which the

judge who presided at the trial defined the degree of care which

the law imposes upon carriers of passengers for hire. The lan-

guage used was precisely that in which the rule of law was laid
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down by this court in the case of Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Met. (Mass.)

1, 43 Am. D., 346. Upon a full examination and review of the

English and American cases, Mr, Justice Hubbard, in that case,

declared the result to be " that carriers of passengers for hire are

bound to use the utmost care and diligence in the providing of

safe, sufficient, and suitable coaches, harnesses, horses, and coach-

men, in order to prevent those injuries which human care and

foresight can guard against ' ' ; and the change of phraseology in

the case at bar was only that required to adapt this rule to the

circumstances of the carriage of passengers by railroad.

The rule in its full extent has been recognized and affirmed

in several subsequent decisions: McElroy v. Nashua and Low-

ell R. R., 4 Cush. (Mass.) 400, 50 Am, D. 794; Schopman v. Bos-

ton and Worcester R, R., 9 Cush. (Mass.) 24, 55 Am, D, 41.

The carriers of passengers are not, like the carriers of goods,

insurers against everything but the act of God and public ene-

mies. But they are bound to exercise reasonable care according

to the nature of their contract; and as their contract involves

the safety of the lives and limbs of their passengers, the law re-
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quires the highest degree of care which is consistent with the

nature of their undertaking.

The defendants object that they cannot be held to the exercise

of the utmost care and diligence which human care and fore-

sight are capable of. But such was not the language of the court.

They were only held to the utmost care in providing suitable

and proper carriages, engines, tracks, and agents, in order to

prevent those injuries which human care and foresight can

guard against. The object is to prevent such injuries as are the

subject of human care and foresight ; that is, such as are not in-

evitable. The duty is to use the utmost care in regard to the

ordinary and usual appliances and means of carrying on their

business. They are not to take every possible precaution to pre-

vent injury; for that would be inconsistent with the cheapness

and speed which are among the chief objects of railway trav-

eling. But their care is to be exercised in relation to such mat-

ters and in such ways as are appropriate to the business they

have undertaken, to afford proper and reasonable securities

against danger; and it is only in regard to these, from the im-

portance of the interests involved, that they are held to a pro-

portionate, that is, to the utmost care, and diligence.

Exceptions overruled.

524

MAGOFFIN V. MISSOUEI PACIFIC EY. CO. § 132

132. MAGOFFIN V. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY CO.,

102 Mo. 540; 15 8. W, E. 76; 22 Am. St. B. 798. 1890.

Sherwood, P. J. Action for five thousand dollars damages

for the death of plaintiff's husband, caused by a collision of two

of the trains of the defendant.

The cause was tried on this stipuation: ''1. Elijah H. Ma-

goffin, the husband of the plaintiff', was killed by a collision be-

tween two trains of cars of the defendant on the line of the de-

fendant's railroad between Greenwood, Jackson County, Mis-

souri, and Pleasant Hill, Cass County, Missouri, on the morning

of November 27, 1886. 2. At the time of the death of said Ma-

goffin he was in the employ of the United States of America as

a postal-clerk, and was in one of the mail-cars attached to one of

the trains of the defendant, and was en route from St. Louis,

Missouri, to Kansas City, Missouri ; and said passenger train and

a certain other train belonging to the defendant, and running

on its road, collided at the time and place aforesaid, and in the

collision the said Elijah H. Magoffin was instantly killed. The

said Elijah H. Magoffin paid no fare for his transportation, but
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was on the postal-car as an employee of the post-office depart-

ment of the government of the United States, with which the

defendant had a contract for the transportation of mails and

postal-clerfe. "

To further sustain the issues on her part plaintiff testified,

substantially, as follows: That she was thirty-seven years old;

had been married to deceased fifteen years; had four children,

the oldest fourteen, and the youngest two years of age ; that her

husband, at the time of his death, was employed as a pos1?al-clerk

by the United States government, and had been so employed

over a year, and received a salary of seventy-five dollars a month ;

that her husband left no fortune, and all they had to de-

pend upon was his salary; that there was no provision left her

by her husband ; that they had a few hundred dollars, but they

had to depend on his (her husband's) salary for a living; that

her husband was killed November 27, 1886.

This was all the testimony offered. Whereupon the plaintiff,

by leave of court, dismissed as to the second count of the peti-

tion. Whereupon, at the instance of the plaintiff, the court in-

structed the jury as follows: ''1. The court instructs the jury

that, under the undisputed evidence in the cause, the plaintiff

is entitled to recover, and the verdict of the jury should be in

her favor for five thousand dollars."
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The court refused instructions in the nature of a demurrer

to the evidence, and looking to a recovery of a less sum than five

thousand dollars. The jury found for the plaintiff in that sum ;

hence this appeal. The answer was simply a general denial.

The stipulation already set forth is sufficient, in and of itself,

to shift the burden of proof from the shoulders of the plaintiff

to those of the defendant, since the facts admitted therein made

out a case of prima facie negligence on the part of the defendant ;

and this being unrebutted and undisputed on the part of the lat-

ter, it was the duty of the court to direct the jury to find a ver-

dict for the plaintiff ; there was no other course left for the court

to pursue. This position is supported both by reason and au-

thority. And it is equally well settled that the deceased hus-

band occupied as advantageous a position as a passenger, if he

was not in fact one. He certainly was not an intruder; he was

there by virture of a contract made with the United States gov-

ernment for the transportation of the mails and postal-clerks;

and he was one of those clerks. The fact that the government

had contracted for his transportation along with the mails, to
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take charge thereof, did not make him any the less a passenger

nor diminish the duty which the defendant owed him to carry

him safely. Privity of contract is nonessential in such cases.

The case of Pennsylvania R. R. Co v. Price, 96 Pa. St. 256, is

not at all analogous to the present one ; for there a special statute

controlled, — a statute which excluded postal-agents from the

class designated as passengers. The same may be said of Price

V. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 113 U. S. 218 5 S. Ct. R. 427, where

the same statute was involved.

Nor can it be doubted that plaintiff was entitled to a recovery

of five thousand dollars for the death of her husband, under the

provisions of section 2 of the damage act: Carroll v. Missouri

Ry. Co., 88 Mo. 241, 57 Am. R. 382 ; Sullivan v. Missouri Pacific

Ry. Co., 97 Mo. 113, 10 S. W. R. 852.

The result is, that we affirm the judgment.

133. DOYLE V. FITCHBURG RAILROAD CO.,

162 Mass. 66; 37 N. E. E. 770; 44 Am. St. M. 335. 1894.

Tort for damages for death of Cornelius J. Doyle, who was

employed by defendant railroad. He lived in Waltham with

his father, riding back and forth daily on a monthly ticket which

the carrier was accustomed to furnish to its employees living

outside the city, and which contained on its back a condition
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that the free ticket is accepted on the express agreement that

the company should not be a common carrier as to him, or liable

under any circumstances, whether negligence of agents or other-

wise, for injury to the person or property of the passenger

using the ticket. Duties of deceased to defendant were entirely

confined to the day between 7 a. m. and 6 p. m. At 10 p. m.,

while returning from Boston on business of his own, he was

killed in a collision due to the gross carelessness of the engineer.

To a refusal of the court to rule that plaintiff could not recover

defendant excepted.

Morton, J. It is conceded that the death of the plaintiff's

intestate was due to the gross negligence of an engineer in the

employ of the defendant. The defense rests on two proposi-

tions: 1. That the plaintiff's intestate was not a passenger,

but an employee ; 2. If that is not so, that the defendant is not

liable by reason of the conditions on the back of the ticket.

The statute is as follows: "If by reason of the negligence

. . . . of a corporation operating a railroad, .... or of the

unfitness or gross negligence or carelessness of its servants, ....
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while engaged in its business, the life of a passenger, or of a per-

son being in the exercise of due diligence and not a passenger,

or in the employment of such corporation, is lost, the corpora-

tion shall be punished," etc: Pub Stats., c. 112, sec. 212. We

do not think that at the time of the injury the plaintiff's in-

testate was "in the employment" of the defendant within the

meaning of the statute. The defendant was not transporting

him to or from the place of his daily labor, pursuant to the ar-

rangement which existed between them. It had no control or

authority over him. He was not traveling on any service for

it. His time was his own, and the defendant was not paying him

for it, and he could use it as he saw fit, and he was passing over

the defendant's road entirely for his own business or pleasure.

So long as he was working from day to day for the defendant,

it might be said, in a popular sense, that he was in its employ-

ment. But we do not think that is the sense in which the words

are used in the statute. Otherwise, if at any time, under any

circumstances, passing over the railroad on a highway crossing

on Sunday, for instance, on an errand to get a doctor for his

father or a friend, he was injured by the gross negligence of the

defendant's servants while engaged in its business, he would have

no right of recovery. Nothing but the plainest language would

warrant such a construction.

Was he a passenger? This question is a more difficult one,

and there is force in the argument that to hold that he was a
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passenger would subject the defendant to a higher degree of

care toward him when traveling on its road on his own pleas-

ure than when traveling pursuant to some purpose con-

nected with his service as an employee. Nevertheless, we think

that he must be regarded as having been a passenger. It is

clear that a person may at one time be an employee when passing

over a railroad, and at another time in passing over the same

road be a passenger, though continuing all the while, in a pop-

ular sense, in the employment of the railroad company. The

ticket on which the plaintiff's intestate was riding was not a mere

gratuity. It furnished part of the consideration by which he

was induced to enter the employment of the defendant. A

ticket was given to him each month, and it contained more rides

than were necessary in traveling to and from his work. It is

expressly conceded that persons holding these tickets could use

them for their own private interest or pleasure; and we think

the result must be that the plaintiff's intestate held toward the

defendant the relation of a passenger at the time when he was

injured. The cases to which the defendant has referred us are
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distinguishable from this. Those in this state were where the

plaintiff was being transported in immediate connection with his

employment : Gillshannon v. Stony Brook R. H. Corp., 10 Cush.

228 ; Seaver v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 14 Gray, 466 ; Oilman

V. Eastern R. R. Corp., 10 Allen 233, 87 Am. Dec. 235; O'Brien

v. Boston & Albany R. R. Co., 138 Mass. 387, 52 Am. Rep.

279. In the cases in other states the circumstances under which

the injuries occurred were such that the plaintiff could at the

time fairly be said to be in the employ of the defendant: Rus-

sell V. Hudson River R. R. Co., 17 N. Y. 134; Vick v. N. Y. Cent,

etc. R. R. Co., 95 N. Y. 267 , 47 Am. Rep. 36 ; Abend v. Terre

Haute etc. Ry. Co., 17 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 614; Interna-

tional etc. Ry. Co. v. Ryan, 82 Tex. 565, 18 S. W. R. 219;

Kansas City etc. R. R. Co. v. Phillips, 98 Ala. 159, 13 So. R. 65 ;

Parkinson Sugar Co. v. Riley, 50 Kan. 401, 31 Pac. 1090, 34

Am. St. R. 123 ; Evansville etc. R. R. Co. v. Maddux, 134 Ind.

571 , 33 N. E. R. 345 ; Manville v. Cleveland etc. R. R. Co., 11

Ohio St. 417; O'Connell v. Baltimore etc. R. R. Co., 20 Md. 212;

83 Am. Dee. 549 ; Hutchinson v. York etc. Ry. Co., 5 Ex. 343 ;

Tunney v. Midland Ry. Co., L. R. 1 Com. P. 291.

In considering the contract on the back of the ticket, the fact

that the statute is a penal one must also be borne in mind. The

word "damages" is not used in a strictly legal sense: Sackett

V. Ruder, 152 Mass. 397, 403. 25 N. E. R. 736. Damages are to be

assessed not less and not more than a certain amount, and with

reference to the degree of culpability of the corporation, its ser-
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vants, or agents. Originally the remedy was by indictment.

Afterward it was extended to an action of tort : Stats. 1871, c.

381, sec. 49 ; Stats. 1874, c. 372, sec. 163 ; Stats. 1881, c. 199, sees.

1, 6. But only one of the remedies can be pursued by the ex-

ecutor or administrator. And whether the amount is recovered

by indictment or in an action of tort, it goes in either case to

the widow and children and next of kin, and the executor or ad-

ministrator has no interest in it. It is in substance a penalty

given to the widow and children and next of kin, instead of to

the commonwealth, and as such the intestate could not release

the defendant from liability for it: Commonwealth v. Vermont

etc. R. R. Co., 108 Mass. 7, 12 ; 11 Am. Rep. 311 ; Commonwealth

v. Boston etc. R. R. Corp., 134 Mass. 211 ;Littlejohn v. Fitchburg

R. R. Co., 148 Mass. 478, 482, 20 N. E. R. 103. Save as a matter

of convenience, the proceedings properly enough might be insti-

tuted by the widow and children or next of kin, if the statute

permitted it, as is done in certain instances under the employers'

liability act: Stats. 1887, c. 270, sec. 2. We have not found it

necessary to consider whether a release of damages for causing

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:40 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

the death of a human being is or is not justified by public pol-

icy, though a statute has been enacted recently which seems to

authorize such a release by express messengers: Stats. 1894, c.

469, sec. 2. Upon that, hoM^ever, we express no opinion. The

result is that we are of opinion that the exceptions must be over-

ruled, and it is so ordered.

134. WILLIAMS V. OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD

CO.,

18 Utah 210; 54 Pac. R. 991; 72 Am. St. B. 777. 1898.

Action for damages for personal injuries suffered by a passen-

ger because of the negligent running of a train. Judgment for

plaintiff.

Miner, J. (Omitting matters of pleading and practice).

3. The plaintiff gave testimony tending to show that in April,

1897, he applied to Mr. Boies, defendant's train master at Poea-

tello, Idaho, for employment. Boies agreed to give him employ-

ment as brakeman if he would go to Glenn's Ferry, Idaho. ThQ

plaintiff agreed to go to Glenn's Ferry, and Boies gave him a

pass from Pocatello to that place and return. Plaintiff did not

ask for the pass. The pass had an indorsement on the back of
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it. Plaintiff could not say that lie read it. It was usual, when

a man was employed on a railroad and went to a particular place,

to give him a pass to such place. Plaintiff's employment wag

to begin when he was put to work, and he was to begin work

when he arrived at Glenn's Ferry and when placed at work.

His time was not going on when the accident occurred. The

understanding was that the plaintiff's time would begin when

he was actually put to work. While traveling on a free pass in

pursuance of the agreement, on defendant's railroad to the place

of employment, and when near Malad bridge in Idaho, and be-

fore reaching Glenn's Ferry, the train was wrecked, and the

plaintiff was injured.

The signature of the plaintiff on the back of the pass was

admitted. The pass was received in evidence. But the follow-

ing conditions indorsed on the back of the pass were offered in

evidence, and on objection, were refused by the court:

"This ticket is not transferable, and it is void if presented by

any other than the person named, or if any alteration, addition,

or erasure is made upon it. The person accepting and using this
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ticket, in consideration of receiving the same, voluntarily as-

sumes all risk of accidents and damages, and expressly agrees

that the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company shall not be re-

garded as a common carrier, nor as liable to him for an injury

to his person, or any loss or damage to his baggage which may

occur while using this ticket, whether caused by the negligence

of the company's agents or otherwise. Not good unless signed

in ink by the person named on the pass.

"J. A. WILLIAMS."

Among other things, the court instructed the jury as fol-

lows: "I charge you that it was the duty of the defendant to

use the utmost care and skill which prudent men are ordinarily

accustomed to use in keeping its roadbeds, rails, and switch in

proper repair, and adequate for the purpose for which they are

used; and if you believe from the evidence that such care was

not exercised upon the part of the defendant, by reason of

which the train upon which the plaintiff was riding became de-

railed, which caused his injury, then I charge you that you

should find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff."

The appellant contends that the court erred in refusing to

admit in evidence the conditions on the back of the pass, and

in giving the jury the above instruction, requiring the greatest

care, as in case of a passenger, and claims that the plaintiff

was an employee and not a passenger, and therefore the de-

fendant only owed him the exercise of ordinary care at the
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time of the injury, and that the instruction is incorrect, except

when the relationship of passenger and carrier exists.

The testimony shows that the plaintiff had agreed to enter

the employment of the defendant as a brakeman at such time

as he could reach Glenn's Ferry, Idaho. Free transportation,

with the conditions attached thereto, was given the plaintiff by

the defendant, without request, for the purpose of enabling the

plaintiff to reach the agreed place, where the employment would

commence. Plaintiff's compensation was not to commence until

he reached Glenn's Ferry, and was there given employment on

the order given by the yard master. Therefore, the relation of

employee and employer, master and servant, had not yet at-

tached at the time of the injury which occurred at Malad

bridge. The intention was to employ and be employed, and

the pass was given with that expectation. The transportation

of plaintiff to Glenn's Ferry was not a matter of charity or

gratuity on the part of the defendant. The free pass was given

by virtue of an agreement by which the mutual interests of the

parties were considered. The plaintiff desired employment at
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Glenn's Ferry. The defendant desired plaintiffs' services at

Glenn's Ferry, and agreed to transport him there free of charge,

if he would go there and enter its employment after he arrived

there. The plaintiff agreed to this arrangement. The transac-

tion was a mutual benefit to both of the parties, and the pass

did not alter it. This was a case where the defendant, as a

common carrier of passengers, could not stipulate for the ex-

emption from liability on account of the negligence of his ser-

vants. The pass was simply the evidence of a right to be trans-

ferred over the road, but not of a contract by which the plain-

tiff was to assume, all the risks, and it would not have been

valid if it had been. Under these circumstances it was not

important what the back of the pass contained. Plaintiff's ac-

ceptance of the pass under the circumstances and conditions

would not prevent a recovery. There was a valid consideration

for the pass; the plaintiff was a passenger and entitled to that

degree of care covered by the instruction. Being such, the

defendant had no right to stipulate for the immunity expressed

on the back of the pass : Railway Co. v. Stevens, 95 U. S. 655 ;

Railway Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; 3 Wood on Railroads,

1696 ; 2 Wood on Railroads, 1203 ; Doyle v. Fitchburg R. R. 166

Mass. 492, 44 N. E. R. 611, 55 Am. St. R. 417 ; Denver etc. Co.

V. Dwyer, 20 Colo. 132, 36 Pac. R. 1106 ; Flint etc. R. R. Co. v.

Weir, 37 Mich. Ill, 26 Am. R. 499; State v. Western etc. R. R.

Co.. fiR Md. 433; Gillenwater v. Madison etc. Ry. Co., 5 Ind.

J39, 61 Am. D. lOi.

531

§ 134 OF CAERIERS OF PASSENGEES.

It is argued that even if the ticket was a free pass gratui-

tously possessed with the conditions printed thereon, still the

defendant could not escape liability for its negligence. We be-

lieve the plaintiff is correct in this contention. It is held to be

the general rule in most of the states that in the case of a per-

son riding on a free pass the carrier is under the same obliga-

tions, as to care and vigilance, as he is to a passenger for hire;

and as to a passenger to whom a pass is given, based upon any

consideration, he cannot absolve himself from liability for in-

juries resulting from gross negligence, by any notice to that

effect printed upon the pass, as such conditions are held to be

against public policy and void; 2 Wood on Railroads, 1208; 3

Wood on Railroads, 1696; Rose v. Des Moines etc. Ry. Co., 39

Iowa, 246 ; Railway Co. v. Wynn, 88 Tenn. 330 ; Annas v. Mil-

waukee etc. R. R. Co., 67 Wis. 46, 30 N. W. R. 282, 58 Am. R.

848 ; Railway Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 ; Gulf etc. Ry. Co. v.

McGown, 65 Tex. 640; Shearman and Redfield on Negligence,

sec. 492 ; State v. Western etc. R. R. Co., 63 Md. 433 ; Gillenwater

V. Madison etc. Ry. Co., 5 Ind. 339, 61 Am. D. 101; O'Donnell
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V. Allegheny Ry. Co., 50 Pa. St. 490; Hutchinson on Carriers,

sec. 566.

In Saunders v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 13 Utah 284, 44

Pac. R. 932, this court held, with reference to a drover's pass,

where like conditions were attached, that the holder of a pass

was a passenger, and entitled to protection as a passenger on such

train, regardless of any clause in the contract exempting the

carrier from liability from negligence of its servants, because

such clause is against the policy of the law and therefore void.

That when the passenger was received the company was liable

for any injury which might befall him through the negligence

of its servants, the same as though he actually paid his fare before

entering the cars, and as to him the company was bound to the

exercise of the same care: Hutchinson on Carriers, sec. 550b;

Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357.

Speaking of the duties of common carriers, in Railroad Co.

V. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, the court said: (For this quotation

see ante p. .)

From a review of the great weight of authority in this coun-

try, the general rule, with reference to the liability of common

carriers is held to be: 1. "That a common carrier cannot stipu-

late for exemption from responsibility, when such exemption is

not just and reasonable in the eye of the law"; 2. ''That it is

not just and reasonable in the eye of the law for the common

carrier to stipulate for exemption from responsibility for the

negligence of the master or his servants"; 3. "That these rules
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apply both to carriers of goods and carriers of passengers, and

with special force to the latter"; 4. "That where a person

agrees with a carrier to enter in its employment at a certain

place in the future, and in consideration of the mutual inter-

ests of both a free pass is given to the place of employment with

conditions on the back rendering the carrier nonliable for in-

juries caused by its negligence, or that of its agents, and in

traveling on the defendant's road to the place of employment

the person is injured by the negligence of the carrier's agents,

such person must be regarded as a passenger for hire and not

an employee, and the carrier is liable for damages caused the

passenger by its negligence." The conditions printed on the

back of the pass were properly rejected. The instructions were

not subject to the objection made.

We find no reversible error in the record. The judgment of

the district court is affirmed, with costs.

Zane, C. J., and Bartch, J., concur.

135. STEAMBOAT NEW WORLD V. KING,

16 Howard (U. S.) 469. 1853.
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Mr. Justice Curtis delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from a decree of the District Court of the

United States for the Northern District of California, sitting in

admiralty. The libel alleges that the appellee was a passenger

on board the steamer on a voyage from Sacramento to San Fran-

cisco, in June, 1851, and that, while navigating within the ebb

and flow of the tide, a boiler flue was exploded through negli-

gence, and the appellee grievously scalded by the steam and hot

water.

The answer admits that an explosion occurred at the time and

place alleged in the libel, and that the appellee was on board and

was injured thereby, but denies that he was a passenger for hire,

or that the explosion was the consequence of negligence.

The evidence shows that it is customary for the masters of

steamboats to permit persons whose usual employment is on

board of such boats, to go from place to place free of charge ; that

the appellee had formerly been employed as a waiter on board

this boat ; and just before she sailed from Sacramento he applied

to the master for a free passage to San Francisco, which was

granted to him, and he came on board.

It has been urged that the master had no power to impose
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any obligation on the steamboat by receiving a passenger without

compensation.

But it cannot be necessary that the compensation should be

in money, or that it should accrue directly to the owners of the

boat. If the master acted under an authority usually exercised

by masters of steamboats, if such exercise of authority must be

presumed to be known to and acquiesced in by the owners, and

the practice is, even indirectly, beneficial to them, it must be

considered to have been a lawful exercise of an authority incident

to his command.

It is proved that the custom thus to receive steamboat men is

general. The owners must therefore be taken to have known

it, and to have acquiesced in it, inasmuch as they did not forbid

the master to conform to it. And the fair presumption is, that

the custom is one beneficial to themselves. Any privilege gener-

ally accorded to persons in a particular employment, tends to

render that employment more desirable, and of course to enable

the employer more easily and cheaply to obtain men to supply

his wants.
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It is true the master of a steamboat, like other agents, has

not an unlimited authority. He is the agent of the owner to do

only what is usually done in the particular employment in which

he is engaged. Such is the general result of the authorities.

Smith on Mer. Law. 559 ; Grant v. Norway, 10 Com. B. 688,

2 Eng. L. and Eq. 337; Pope v. Nickerson, 3 Story, 475; Citi-

zens' Bank v. Nantucket Steamboat Co., 2 Story, 32. But dif-

ferent employments may and do have different usages, and con-

sequently confer on the master different powers. And when, as

in this case, a usage appears to be general, not unreasonable in

itself, and indirectly beneficial to the owner, we are of opinion

the master has power to act under it and bind the owner.

The appellee must be deemed to have been lawfully on board

under this general custom.

Wliether precisely the same obligations in all respects on the

part of the master and owners and their boat, existed in his case,

as in that of an ordinary passenger paying fare, we do not find

it necessary to determine. In the Philadelphia and Reading Rail-

road Company v. Derby, 14 How. 486, which was a case of

gratuitous carriage of a passenger on a railroad, this court said :

"When carriers undertake to convey persons by the powerful

but dangerous agency of steam, public policy and safety require

that they should be held to the greatest possible care and dili-

gence. And whether the consideration for such transportation

be pecuniary or otherwise, the personal safety of passengers

should not be left to the sport of chance or the negligence of

534

STEAMBOAT NEW WORLD v. KING. § 135

careless agents. Any negligence, in such cases, may well deserve

the epithet of gross."

We desire to be understood to reaffirm that doctrine, as rest-

ing, not only on public policy, but on sound principles of law.

The theory that there are three degrees of negligence, described

by the terms slight, ordinary, and gross, has been introduced

into the common law from some of the commentators on the

Roman law. It may be doubted if these terms can be usefully

applied in practice. Their meaning is not fixed, or capable of

being so. One degree, thus described, not only may be con-

founded with another, but it is quite impracticable exactly to dis-

tinguish them. Their signification necessarily varies according

to circumstances, to whose influence the courts have been forced

to yield, until there are so many real exceptions that the rules

themselves can scarcely be said to have a general operation. In

Storer v. Gowen, 18 Maine 177, the Supreme Court of Maine

say: "How much care will, in a given case, relieve a party from

the imputation of gross negligence, or what oanission will amount

to the charge, is necessarily a question of fact, depending on a
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great variety of circumstances which the law cannot exactly de-

fine." Mr. Justice Story (Bailments, § 11), says: "Indeed, what

is common or ordinary diligence is more a matter of fact than

of law." If the law furnishes no definition of the terms gross

negligence or ordinary negligence, wdiich can be applied in prac-

tice, but leaves it to the jury to determine in each case, what the

duty was, and what omissions amount to a breach of it, it would

seem that imperfect and confessedly unsuccessful attempts to de-

fine that duty, had better be abandoned.

Recently the judges of several courts have expressed their dis-

approbation of these attempts to fix the degrees of diligence by

legal definitions, and have complained of the impracticability of

applying them. Wilson v. Brett, 11 Meeson & Wels. 113 ; Wylde

V. Pickford, 8 lb. 443, 461, 462 ; Hinton v. Dibbin, 2 Q. B. 646,

651. It must be confessed that the difficulty in defining gross

negligence, which is apparent in perusing such cases as Tracy

et al. V. Wood, 3 Mason, 132, and Foster v. The Essex Bank, 17

Mass. 479, 9 Am. D. 168, would alone be sufficient to justify

these complaints. It may be added that some of the ablest com-

mentators on the Roman law, and on the civil code of France,

have wholly repudiated this theory of three degrees of diligence,

as unfounded in principles of natural justice, useless in practice,

and presenting inextricable embarrassments and difficulties. See

Toullier's Droit Civil, 6th vol. p. 239, &c.; 11th vol. p. 203, &c.

Makeldey, Man. Du Droit Romain, 191, &c.

But whether this term, gross negligence, be used or not, this
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particular case is one of gross negligence, according to the tests

which have been applied to such a case.

In the first place, it is settled, that "the bailee must proportion

his care to the injury or loss which is likely to be sustained by any

improvidence on his part. ' ' Story on Bailments, § 15.

It is also settled that if the occupation or employment be one

requiring skill, the failure to exert that needful skill, either be-

cause it is not possessed, or from inattention, is gross negligence.

Thus Heath, J., in Shields v, Blackburne, 1 H. Bl. 161, says : "If

a man applies to a surgeon to attend him in a disorder for a re-

ward, and the surgeon treats him improperly, there is gross

negligence, and the surgeon is liable to an action; the surgeon

would also be liable for such negligence if he undertook gratis to

attend a sick person, because his situation implies skill in surg-

ery. ' ' And Lord Loughborough declares that an omission to use

skill is gross negligence. ]\Ir. Justice Story, although he contro-

verts the doctrine of Pothier, that any negligence renders a gra-

tuitous bailee responsible for the loss occasioned by his fault, and

also the distinction made by Sir William Jones, between an un-
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dertaking to carry and an undertaking to do work, yet admits

that the responsibility exists when there is a want of due skill, or

an omission to exercise it. And the same may be said of Mr. Jus-

tice Porter, in Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Martin (N. S.) 75. This

qualification of the rule is also recognized in Stanton v. Bell, 2

Hawks (N. C.) 145, 11 Am. D. 744.

That the proper management of the boilers and machinery of

a steamboat requires skill, must be admitted. Indeed, by the act

of Congress of August 30, 1852, great and unusual precautions

are taken to exclude from this employment all persons who do

not possess it. That an omission to exercise this skill vigilantly

and faithfully, endangers, to a frightful extent, the lives and

limbs of great numbers of human beings, the awful destruction

of life in our country by explosions of steam boilers but too pain-

fully proves. "We do not hesitate, therefore, to declare that negli-

gence in the care or management of such boilers, for which skill

is necessary, the probable consequence of which negligence is

injury and loss of the most disastrous kind, is to be deemed culpa-

ble negligence, rendering the owners and the boat liable for

damages, even in case of the gratuitous carriage of a passenger.

Indeed, as to explosion of boilers and flues, or other dangerous

escape of steam on board steamboats, Congress has, in clear terms,

excluded all such cases from the operation of a rule requiring

gross negligence to be proved to lay the foundation of an action

for damages to person or property.

The thirteenth section of the act of July 7, 1838 (5 Stat, at
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Large, 306), provides: "That in all suits and actions against

proprietors of steamboats for injury arising to persons or prop-

erty from the bursting of the boiler of any steamboat, or the col-

lapse of a flue, or other dangerous escape of steam, the fact of

such bursting, collapse or injurious escape of steam shall be taken

as full prima facie evidence sufficient to charge the defendant, or

those in his employment, with negligence, until he shall show

that no negligence has been committed by him or those in his

employment. ' '

This case falls within this section; and it is therefore incum-

bent on the claimants to prove that no negligence has been com-

mitted by those in their employment.

Have they proved this ? It appears that the disaster happened

a short distance above Benicia; that another steamer called the

Wilson G. Hunt, was then about a quarter of a mile astern of

the New World, and that the boat first arriving at Benicia got

from twenty-five to fifty passengers. The pilot of the Hunt says

he hardly knows whether the boats were racing, but both were

doing their best, and this is confirmed by the assistant pilot, who
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says the boats were always supposed to come down as fast as pos-

sible ; the first boat at Benicia gets from twenty-five to fifty pas-

sengers. And he adds that at a particular place called "the

slough" the Hunt attempted to pass the New World. Fay, a pas-

senger on board the New World swears, that on two occasions,

before reaching "the slough" the Hunt attempted to pass the

New World and failed; that to his knowledge these boats had

been in the habit of contending for the mastery, and on this occa-

sion both were doing their best. The fact that the Hunt at-

tempted to pass the New World in "the slough" is denied by

two of the respondents' witnesses, but they do not meet the tes-

timony of Fay, as to the two previous attempts. Haskell, another

passenger, says, "about ten minutes before the explosion I was

standing looking at the engine, we saw the engineer was evi-

dently excited, by his running to a little window to look out

at the boat behind. He repeated this ten or fifteen times in a very

short time." The master, clerk, engineer, assistant engineer,

pilot, one fireman, and the steward of the New World, were ex-

amined on behalf of the claimants. No one of them, save the

pilot, denies the fact that the boats were racing. With the excep-

tion of the pilot and the engineer, they are wholly silent on the

subject. The pilot says they were not racing. The engineer says :

"We have had some little strife between us and the Hunt as to

who should get to Benicia first. There was an agreement made

that we should go first. I think it was a trip or two before. " Con-

sidering that the master says nothing of any such agreement,
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that it does not appear to have been known to any other person

on board either boat, that this witness and the pilot were both

directly connected with and responsible for the negligence

charged, and that the fact of racing is substantially sworn to by

two passengers on board the New World, and by the pilot and

assistant pilot of the Hunt, and is not denied by the master of

the New World, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the fact is

proved. And certainly it greatly increases the burden which

the act of Congress has thrown on the claimants. It is possible

that those managing a steamboat engaged in a race may use all

that care and adopt all those precautions which the dangerous

power they employ renders necessary to safety. But it is highly

improbable. The excitement engendered by strife for victory is

not a fit temper of mind for men on whose judgment, vigilance,

coolness and skill the lives of passengers depend. And when a

disastrous explosion has occurred in such a strife, this court can-

not treat the evidence of those engaged in it, and prima facie

responsible for its consequences, as sufficient to disprove their

own negligence, which the law presumes.
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We consider the testimony of the assistant engineer and fire-

man, who are the only witnesses who speak to the quantity of

steam carried, as wholly unsatisfactory. They say the boiler was

allowed by the inspector to carry forty pounds to the inch, and

that when the explosion occurred, they were carrying but twenty-

three pounds. The principal engineer says he does not re-

member how much steam they had on. The master is silent on

the subject and says nothing as to the speed of the boat. The

clear weight of the evidence is that the boat was, to use the lan-

guage of some of the witnesses, doing its best. We are not con-

vinced that she was carrying only twenty-three pounds, little

more than half her allowance.

This is the only evidence by which the claimants have endeav-

ored to encounter the presumption of negligence. In our opinion

it does not disprove it ; and consequently the claimants are liable

to damages, and the decree of the District Court must be af-

firmed.

136. PHILADELPHIA & READING RAILROAD CO. V.

DERBY,

14 Howard (U. S.) 468. 1852.

Mr. Justice Grier delivered the opinion of the court

This action was brought by Derby, the plaintiff below, to re-

cover damages for an injury suffered on the railroad of the
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plaintiffs in error. The peculiar facts of the case, involving the

questions of law presented for our consideration, are these:

The plaintiff below was himself the president of another rail-

road company, and a stockholder in this. He was on the road of

defendants by invitation of the president of the company, not in

the usual passenger cars, but in a small locomotive car used for

the convenience of the officers of the company, and paid no fare

for his transportation. The injury to his person was caused by

coming into collision with a locomotive tender, in the charge of

an agent or servant of the company, which was on the same track,

and moving in an opposite direction. Another agent of the com-

pany, in the exercise of proper care and caution, had given orders

to keep the track clear. The driver of the colliding engine acted

in disobedience and disregard of these orders, and thus caused

the collision.

The instructions given by the court below, at the instance of

plaintiff, as well as those reqliested by the defendant, and refused

by the court, taken together, involve but two distinct points,

which have been the subject of exception here, and are in sub-
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stance as follows :

1. The court instructed the jury, that if the plaintiff was law-

fully on the road at the time of the collision, and the collision and

consequent injury to him were caused by the gross negligence of

one of the servants of the defendants, then and there employed

on the road, he is entitled to recover, notwithstanding the cir-

cumstances given in evidence, and relied upon by defendant's

counsel as forming a defence to the action, to wit : that the plain-

tiff was a stockholder in the company, riding by invitation of the

president — paying no fare, and not in the usual passenger cars,

&e.

2. That the fact that the engineer having the control of the

colliding locomotive, was forbidden to run on that track at the

time, and had acted in disobedience of such orders, was not a

defence to the action.

1st. In support of the objections to the first instruction, it is

alleged, "that no cause of action can arise to any person by

reason of the occurrence of an unintentional injury, while he is

receiving or partaking of any of those acts of kindness which

spring from mere social relations ; and that as there was no con-

tract between the parties, express or implied, the law would raise

no duty as between them, for the neglect of which an action can

be sustained."

In support of these positions, the cases between innkeeper and

guest have been cited, such as I Rolle's Abr. 3, where it is said,

"If a host invite one to supper, and the night being far spent, he
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invites him to stay all night, and the guest be robbed, yet the

host shall not be chargeable, because the guest was not a traveler,"

and Cayle's case (4 Co. 52), to the same effect, showing that

the peculiar liability of an innkeeper arises from the considera-

tion paid for his entertainment of travelers, and does not exist

in the case of gratuitous lodging of friends or guests. The case

of Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R. R. Co., 4 Met. 49, 38 Am. D.

339, has also been cited, showing that the master is not liable for

any injury received by one of his servants, in consequence of the

carelessness of another, while both are engaged in the same ser-

vice.

But we are of opinion, that these cases have no application to

the present. The liability of the defendants below, for the negli-

gent and injurious act of their servant, is not necessarily founded

on any contract or privity between the parties, nor affected by

any relation, social or otherwise, which they bore to each other.

It is true, a traveler, by stage coach, or other public conveyance^,

who is injured by the negligence of the driver, has an action

against the owner, founded on his contract to carry him safely.
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But the maxim of ''respondeat superior," which, by legal impu-

tation, makes the master liable for the acts of his servant, is

wholly irrespective of any contract, express or implied, or any

other relation between the injured party and the master. If one

be lawfully on the street or highway, and another's servant care-

lessly drives a stage or carriage against him, and injures his prop-

erty or person, it is no answer to an action against the master

for such injury, either, that the plaintiff was riding for pleasure,

or that he was a stockholder in the road, or that he had not paid

his toll, or that he was the guest of the defendant, or riding in a

carriage borrowed from him, or that the defendant was the

friend, benefactor, or brother of the plaintiff. These argum'ents,

arising from the social or domestic relations of life may, in some

cases, successfully appeal to the feelings of the plaintiff, but will

usually have little effect where the defendant is a corporation,

which is itself incapable of such relations or the reciprocation of

such feelings.

In this view of the case, if the plaintiff was lawfully on the

road at the time of the collision, the court were right in instruct-

ing the jury that none of the antecedent circumstances, or acci-

dents of his situation, could affect his right to recover.

It is a fact peculiar to this case, that the defendants, who are

liable for the act of their servant coming down the road, are also

the carriers who were conveying the plaintiff up the road, and

that their servants immediately engaged in transporting the

plaintiff were not guilty of any negligence, or in fault for the
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collision. But we would not have it inferred, from what has

been said, that the circumstances alleged in the first point would

affect the case, if the negligence which caused the injury had been

committed by the agents of the company who were in the immedi-

ate care of the engine and car in which the plaintiff rode, and he

was compelled to rely on these counts of his declaration, founded

on the duty of the defendant to carry him safely. This duty does

not result alone from the consideration paid for the service. It is

imposed by the law, even where the service is gratuitous. "The

confidence induced by undertaking any service for another, is a

sufficient legal consideration to create a duty in the performance

of it." See Coggs v. Bernard, and cases cited in 1 Smith's Lead-

ing Cases, 95. It is true, a distinction has been taken, in some

cases, between simple negligence, and great or gross negligence ;

and it is said, that one who acts gratuitously is liable only for

the latter. But this case does not call upon us to define the dif-

ference (if it be capable of definition), as the verdict has found

this to be a case of gross negligence.

When carriers undertake to convey persons by the powerful

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:40 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

but dangerous agency of steam, public policy and safety require

that they be held to the greatest possible care and diligence. And

whether the consideration for such transportation be pecuniary

or otherwise, the personal safety of the passengers should not be

left to the sport of chance or the negligence of careless agents.

Any negligence, in such cases, may well deserve the epithet of

* ' gross. ' '

In this view of the case, also, we think there was no error in

the first instruction.

2. The second instruction involves the question of the liability

of the master where the servant is in the course of his employ-

ment, but, in the matter complained of, has acted contrary to the

express command of his master.

The rule of "respondeat superior/' or that the master shall be

civilly liable for the tortious acts of his servant, is of universal

application, whether the act be one of omission or commission,

whether negligent, fraudulent, or deceitful. If it be done in the

course of his employment, the master is liable ; and it makes no

difference that the master did not authorize, or even know of the

servant's act or neglect, or even if he disapproved or forbade it,

he is equally liable, if the act be done in the course of his ser-

vant 's employment. See Story on Agency, § 452 ; Smith on Mas-

ter and Servant, 152.

There may be found, in some of the numerous cases reported

on this subject, dicta which, when severed from the context might

seem to countenance the doctrine that the master is not liable
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if the act of his servant was in disobedience of his orders. But

a more careful examination will show that they depended on the

question, whether the servant, at the time he did the act com-

plained of, was acting in the course of his employment, or in

other words, whether he was or was not at the time in the relation

of servant to the defendant.

The case of Sleatli v. Wilson, 9 Car. & Payne, 607, states the

law in such cases distinctly and correctly.

In that case a servant, having his master's carriage and horses

in his possession and control, was directed to take them to a cer-

tain place ; but instead of doing so he went in another direction

to deliver a parcel of his own, and, returning, drove against an

old woman and injured her. Here the master was held liable

for the act of the servant, though at the time he committed the

offence, he was acting in disregard of his master's orders; be-

cause the master had intrusted the carriage to his control and

care, and in driving it he was acting in the course of his em-

ployment. Mr. Justice Erskine remarks, in this case: "It is

quite clear that if a servant, without his master's knowledge,
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takes his master's carriage out of the coach-house, and with it

commits an injury, the master is not answerable, and on this

ground, that the master has not intrusted the servant with the

carriage ; but whenever the master has intrusted the servant with

the control of the carriage, it is no answer, that the servant acted

improperly in the management of it. If it were, it might be con-

tended that if a master directs his servant to drive slowly, and

the servant disobeys his orders, and drives fast, and through his

negligence occasions an injury, the master will not be liable. But

that is not the law ; the master, in such a case, will be liable, and

the ground is, that he has put it in the servant's power to mis-

manage the carriage, by intrusting him with it. ' '

Although, among the numerous cases on this subject, some may

be found (such as the case of Lamb v. Palk, 9 C. & P. 629) in

which the court have made some distinctions which are rather

subtile and astute, as to when the servant may be said to be act-

ing in the employ of his master ; yet we find no case which asserts

the doctrine that a master is not liable for the acts of a servant

in his employment, when the particular act causing the injury

was done in disregard of the general orders or special command

of the master. Such a qualification of the maxim of respondeat

siiperior, would, in a measure, nullify it. A large proportion of

the accidents on railroads are caused by the negligence of the

servants or agents of the company. Nothing but the most strin-

gent enforcement of discipline, and the most exact and perfect

obedience to every rule and order emanating from a superior,
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can insure safety to life and property. The intrusting such a

powerful and dangerous engine as a locomotive to one who will

not submit to control, and render implicit obedience to orders, is

itself an act of negligence, the '^ causa causans" of the mischief;

while the proximate cause, or the ipsa negligentia which produces

it, may truly be said, in most cases, to be the disobedience of or-

ders by the servant so intrusted. If such disobedience could be

set up by a railroad company as a defence, when charged with

negligence, the remedy of the injured party would in most cases

be illusive, discipline would be relaxed, and the danger to the

life and limb of the traveler greatly enhanced. Any relaxation

of the stringent policy and principles of the law affecting such

cases, would be highly detrimental to the public safety.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore affirmed.

137. BRIEN V. BENNETT,

8 Car. & Payne 724; 34 E. C. L. 984. 1839.

Before Lord Abinger, C. B. Case — The declaration stated that

the defendant was the proprietor of an omnibus for carrying pas-

sengers from Hammersmith and divers other places to London,
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and being such owner, the plaintiff at the request of the de-

fendant, "agreed to become and became a passenger by the said

omnibus to be safely and securely conveyed ' ' from Hammersmith

to London for reasonable fare and reward to the defendant, ' ' and

the defendant then received the plaintiff as such passenger as

aforesaid, and thereupon it became and was the duty of the

defendant to use due and proper care that the plaintiff should

be safely and securely carried and conveyed by the said omni-

bus," yet the defendant, not regarding his duty, did not use

proper care, &c., but on the contrary neglected it, so that by the

negligence of the defendant and his servant in that behalf, "the

plaintiff, whilst such passenger as aforesaid, ' ' fell from the said

omnibus upon the ground, and was greatly hurt, &c. Pleas, 1st,

not guilty; 2nd, denying that the defendant was the proprietor

of the omnibus; 3rd, "that the plaintiff did not become a pas-

senger by the said omnibus, nor did the defendant receive him,

the plaintiff, as such passenger in manner and form as in the said

declaration is alleged," (concluding to the country).

It appeared that the defendant's omnibus was passing on its

journey, when the plaintiff, who was a gentleman considerably

advanced in years, held up his finger to cause the driver of the

omnibus to stop and take him up, and that upon his doing so the
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driver pulled up, and the conductor opened the omnibus door;

and that just as the plaintiff was putting his foot on the step of

the omnibus^ the driver supposing that the plaintiff had got into

it, drove on, and the plaintiff fell on his face on the ground,

and was much hurt.

Platt, for the defendant. I submit that the plaintiff never

was a passenger.

Lord Abinger, C. B. I think that the stopping of the omni-

bus implies a consent to t.Jce the plaintiff as a passenger, and

that it is evidence to go to the jury.

Verdict for the plaintiff — Damages 51.

138. STANDISH V. NARRAGANSETT STEAMSHIP CO.,

Ill Mass. 512; 15 Am. R. 66. 1873.

Tort for assault and battery and false imprisonment. Stand-

ish bought a ticket for passage from Boston to Fall River by

rail, thence by defendant's steamer to New York, and thence by

rail to Philadelphia. He checked his baggage, and on entering

his berth showed his ticket to an employee of the boat who said

it was all right. Plaintiff had no recollection of what became of
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the ticket. Next morning as he was attempting to leave the boat

at New York his ticket was demanded of him, and he, not pro-

ducing it, was turned back. He explained what had happened

the night before and showed his baggage checks, and his railroad

ticket to Philadelphia, but was informed that he must produce

the boat ticket, or pay $4 fare, or be carried back to Fall River

that night. Being forcibly prevented from leaving the boat,

after about two hours he paid the $i and left the boat. Judg-

ment for plaintiff for $50. Plaintiff alleged exceptions to the

rulings and the refusals to rule.

Chapman, C. J. The jury having found a verdict for the

plaintiff for $50, he excepts to all the rulings of the judge who

tried the cause, and to his refusals to rule.

1. He contends that it should not have been left to the jury to

find whether the plaintiff knew he was to give up the boat ticket

before leaving the boat, because there was no evidence whatever

tending to prove such knowledge. But from the manner in which

passengers purchase tickets, and the use necessary to be made of

them, any person of ordinary intelligence would infer that they

are to be given up on the boat to some officer, and as they had not

been called for earlier, he would naturally suppose that they
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would be called for at the time of leaving the boat. Whether the

plaintiff knew it was a question for the jury, under the circum-

stances of the case.

2. He contends that the defendants had no right forcibly to

detain the plaintiff at all for the purpose of investigating on the

spot the circumstances of the case. As passenger carriers the

defendants had a right to make reasonable rules and regulations.

It would be obviously reasonable to require passengers to pur-

chase tickets at the office before the boat started, instead of tak-

ing money on board, and to give up these tickets at the end of the

voyage while passengers were leaving the boat. If a passenger

should attempt to leave without producing a ticket, and should

allege that he had lost it, they would need to investigate the mat-

ter, and to ascertain the reason for his conduct, and to make

reasonable provision for their own security. The ruling re-

quested that they had no right to detain him, even if he was

fraudulently trying to get his passage without a ticket and with-

out paying the fare, was properly refused. The ruling was proper

that if the plaintiff lost his ticket it would be his own loss, and not
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one which the defendants were to bear; and it was sufficiently

favorable to the plaintiff to rule "that they had no right to detain

him till he did pay his fare or give up a ticket, or to compel him

to pay his fare or give up a ticket ; but, if he knew that he was

to give up his ticket before leaving the boat, the defendant had

a right, if he did not give it up or pay his fare, to detain him

for a reasonable time to investigate on the spot the circumstances

of his case ; and if the jury found that the defendants detained

him for the purpose of compelling him to pay his fare or to give

up his ticket, or detained him for the purpose of investigating

his case for an unreasonable time, or in an unreasonable way,

he was entitled to recover." Under this ruling the jury found

for the plaintiff. As he had sufficient money to pay his fare, as

it was his duty to do, he himself was the unnecessary cause of

his own detention for two hours, and the damages found by the

jury seem to be ample. Upon the ruling and verdict, the other

points insisted upon in the plaintiff's brief became immaterial.

Exceptions overruled.

139. O'BRIEN V. BOSTON AND WORCESTER RAILROAD

CO.,

15 Gray (Mass.) 20; 77 Am. D. 347. 1860.

Tort for wrongful ejection of a passenger. Plaintiff bought

a round trip ticket from Cordaville to Brighton. He went to
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Brighton and thence beyond to Boston. The same day he

boarded defendant's train to return from Boston to Cordaville,

offering the conductor his return ticket from Brighton to Corda-

ville. On plaintiff's refusal to pay fare either to Brighton or

Cordaville the conductor rang the bell and stopped the cars where

there was no station. O'Brien offered to pay before and after

the cars stopped, but the conductor refused it and ejected him.

Plaintiff again climbed on the ears and offered his fare, but the

conductor again ejected him. The jury found the first ejection

justifiable, but the second not, and gave $150 damages.

By Court, Bigelow, J. The correctness of the instructions

given to the jury in this case can be readily ascertained by con-

sidering the nature of the contract entered into between the

plaintiff' and the defendants, and the respective rights and duties

of the parties under it. On entering the cars of the defendants

at Boston, the plaintiff had a right to be carried thence to his

place of destination in that train on paying the usual rate of

fare. This fare he was bound to pay, according to the regulations

of the company, or on a reasonable demand being made therefor ;
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if he failed to do so, then his rights under the contract ceased;

he had forfeited them by his own act; and having himself first

broken the contract, he could not insist on its fulfillment by the

defendants. This is the rule of common law. It is also ex-

pressly enacted in statutes of 1849, chapter 91, section 2, that no

person who shall not upon demand first pay the established toll

or fare shall be entitled to be transported over a railroad. The

defendants therefore were not bound to transport him farther,

but were justified in ejecting him from the cars by the use

of all lawful and proper means : Angell on Carriers, sees. 525,

609 ; Redfield on Railways, 26, 261 ; Stephen v. Smith, 29 Vt. 160.

Nor could he regain his right to ask of the defendants to per-

form their contract by his offer to pay fare after his ejection.

They were not bound to accept a performance after a breach.

The right to demand the complete execution of the contract by

the defendants was defeated by the refusal of the plaintiff to

do that which was either a condition precedent or a concurrent

consideration on his part, and the non-performance of which ab-

solved the defendants of all obligation to fulfill the contract.

After being rightfully expelled from the train, he could not again

enter the same cars and require the defendants to perform the

same contract which he had previously broken. The right to re-

fuse to transport the plaintiff farther, and to eject him from the

train, would be an idle and useless exercise of legal authority,

if the party, who had hitherto refused to perform the contract
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by paying liis fare when duly demanded, could immediately re-

enter the ears and claim the fulfillment of the original contract

by the defendants. Besides, the defendants are not bound to re-

ceive passengers at any part of their route, but only at the regu-

lar stations or appointed places on the line of the road established

by them at reasonable distances for the proper accommodation of

the public : Angell on Carriers, sec. 527 a ; Murch v. Concord R.

K Corp., 29 N. H. 39, 61 Am. Dec. 631. The plaintiff had there-

fore no right to enter the cars at the place where the train was

stopped for the purpose of ejecting him. A person who had com-

mitted no breach of contract could not claim any such right;

a fortiori the plaintiff could not. It follows that, on the facts

stated in the exceptions, the plaintiff proved no just claim for

damages against the defendants, and the instructions given to

the jury, under which the verdict was rendered, were clearly

erroneous.

The court also erred in rejecting the evidence of the regulations

established by the defendants concerning passengers who refused

to pay their fare. The right to establish all needful and proper
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regulations is vested in the defendants by law: R. S., c. 39, sec.

83 ; Commonwealth v. Power, 7 Met. 602, 41 Am. Dec. 465. And

they should have been permitted to prove them as part of their

justification.

Exceptions sustained.

140. ZAGELMEYER V. CINCINNATI, SAGINAW &

MACKINAW RAILROAD CO.,

102 Mich. 214; 60 N. W. E. 436; 47 Am. St. R. 514. 1894.

Montgomery, J. This action is brought to recover damages

for being forcibly ejected from defendant's car, while riding

as a passenger.

The defendant had adopted a regulation requiring conductors

to make an additional collection of ten cents on all fares paid

by passengers taking defendant's trains from regular ticket sta-

tions. A notice had been posted in defendant 's cars, which read :

"Passengers will save ten cents on each fare by purchasing tick-

ets before entering the cars."

Plaintiff, without buying a ticket, boarded a car on defen-

dant's train at North Saginaw, bound for Salzburg, as he testi-

fies, or West Bay City, according to the testimony of the conduc-

tor. When the conductor asked him for his fare, plaintiff tendered

him a fifty-cent piece, and said he would pay him the legal and
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lawful rate, but would not pay an extra ten cents because he

had not purchased a ticket. The conductor thereupon forcibly

expelled him from the train. Plaintiff recovered judgment of

five hundred dollars, and defendant brings error.

1. Defendant contends that the requirement of passengers

that they pay an additional sum of ten cents for failure to pur-

chase tickets where there are stations is a reasonable regulation

within the power of the company to make. Numerous cases have

been cited by defendant's counsel in which it has been held that

such a regulation, requiring the payment of a small sum in addi-

tion to the usual fare in case of failure to purchase a ticket, is a

reasonable regulation, which the company has the right to make :

Swan V. Manchester etc. R. R. Co., 132 Mass. 116, 42 Am. Rep.

432; Du Laurans v. First Division etc. Ry. Co., 15 Minn. 49,

2 Am. Rep. 102 ; Reese v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 131 Pa. St.

422, 19 Atl. R. 72, 17 Am. St. R. 818. Indeed, there can be lit-

tle doubt as to the power of the railroad company to make such

a discrimination between its passengers when acting under the

common law, nor do we see any valid objection to a railroad com-
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pany's charging an increased sum for passage where fares are

collected on the train, provided that the sum collected does not

exceed the statutory rate. But it is held, and we think prop-

erly, that the company cannot impose, as a penalty for not pur-

chasing a ticket, such a sum that the fare collected on the train,

including such additional amount, shall exceed the maximum al-

lowed by law : Railroad Co. v. Skillman, 39 Ohio St. 444 ; Chase

v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 26 N. Y. 523.

2. But it is contended that inasmuch as the plaintiff might

have paid his fare and avoided being expelled from the car, he is

entitled to recover no substantial damages. We are cited to vari

ous Michigan cases as sustaining this doctrine. But all the eases

cited are cases in which the plaintiff had no ticket which, as be-

tween himself and the conductor, entitled him to ride upon the

car in question, and in which there was no tender of the legal

fare made. "We think the case of Hufford v. Grand Rapids etc.

R. R. Co., 53 Mich. 121, 64 Mich. 631, 31 N. W. R. 544, 8 Am. St.

R. 859, fully recognizes the right of the plaintiff to recover sub-

stantial damages for being evicted from the car when he either

produces a ticket or stands ready to pay the legal fare : See, also,

19 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 910, and cases cited.

The judgment will be affirmed, with costs.
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141. O'ROURKE V. CITIZENS STREET RAILWAY CO.,

103 Tenn. 124; 52 S. W. R. 872; 76 Am. St. R. 639. 1899.

Caldwell, J. Hugh O'Rourke brought this action against

the Citizens' Street Railway Company to recover damages for

an alleged wrongful and unlawful expulsion from one of its

cars. The jury returned a verdict against him, and upon that

verdict a judgment of dismissal was entered by direction of the

court.

Plaving appealed in error, O'Rourke seeks a reversal, remand,

and new trial for several reasons assigned.

Shortly after 2 o'clock in the afternoon of March 7, 1897, the

plaintiff, with his wife and three small children, embarked upon

a Beale and Lane avenue care of the defendant in the city of

Memphis, and, after paying proper fares, requested and received

from the conductor in charge the requisite number of tickets of

transfer to a north-bound Main street car of the same company.

At the proper place for the contemplated transfer the plaintiff,

his wife and children, disembarked from the first car mentioned,

and promptly took passage upon the other one. The conductor of
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the latter car, after examining the transfer tickets tendered by

the plaintiff', said to him: *'You were a long time waiting for

this car." Plaintiff' replied: "We ain't w^aited two minutes.

We just got off that Beale and Lane avenue car, going south.'*'

Continuing the dialogue, the conductor said: "Well, you will

have to get off or pay your fare"; and the plaintiff remarked:

"I won't do either; I won't get off or pay my fare. I have paid

my fare once, and that is, I think, sufficient to ride on." The

conductor then caused the car to be stopped, took the plaintiff

by the arm, and ejected him and his family from the car.

(Omitting a question of evidence.)

The expulsion, whether violent or otherwise, resulted prima-

rily from a mistake of the first conductor in punching the trans-

fer tickets so as to indicate their issuance at 1 :40 P. M., when,

as a matter of fact, they were issued nearly an hour later. The

second conductor, judging the tickets by the punch marks, as-

sumed, over the statement of the plaintiff to the contrary, that he

had violated the rule of the company requiring all transfer pas-

sengers to take the first connecting car, and upon that assumption

treated the tickets as expired, and, under another rule of the

company, expelled the plaintiff when he refused to pay addi-

tional fare.

In his charge to the jury the trial judge said : "A person may
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lose his right to continue his journey as a passenger upon a car

under the following circumstances: 1. When he acts in such a

way as to endanger the peace and comfort of the other passen-

gers, he has no right to continue his journey upon the car; 2.

When he presents to the conductor, as an evidence of his right

to ride, a ticket or transfer check which shows upon its face that

he has no such right, then he cannot continue his journey upon

such ticket ; 3. When the conductor, who declined to accept the

ticket or transfer, gave such explanation of the defect in the

ticket or transfer as would have satisfied any ordinarily reason-

able person that the conductor was justified in refusing to take

it, then he cannot continue his ride."

Though entirely sound in law, the first of these three proposi-

tions is wholly inapplicable in the present case, there being no

evidence tending, in the slightest degree, to show that the plain-

tiff was guilty of conduct calculated to ' ' endanger the peace and

comfort of other passengers." Legal abstractions in a charge are

not always hurtful, and, unless it appears that they may have

been so, the giving of them, while never to be approved, is not
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reversible error. In this instance it is not improbable that the

jury was misled into the belief that the court thought there was

evidence on this particular point, and expected its consideration

in the making up of the verdict ; hence the irrelevant instruction

may have been in some degree prejudicial to the plaintiif , and its

inclusion in the charge is therefore noted as one ground of

reversal.

The second proposition is one about which the authorities are

in irreconcilable conflict. Many of them, like the charge of the

learned trial judge, treat the face of the ticket as the sole cri-

terion of the holder's right of passage, justify his ejection in case

of defective ticket and refusal to pay fare, and allow him, as

his only remedy therefor, an action of damages for the negligent

mistake of the agent, or for breach of contract and not for ex-

pulsion (notably Pouilin v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 52 Fed. Rep.

197 ; Frederick v. Marquette etc. R. R. Co., 37 Mich. 342, 26 Am.

R. 531 ; Huiford v. Grand Rapids etc. Ry. Co., 53 Mich. 118, 18

N. W. R. 580; McKay v. Ohio River R. R. Co., 34 W. Va. 65, 11

S. E. R. 737, 26 Am. St. R. 913 ; Yorton v. Milwaukee etc. Ry. Co.,

54 Wis. 234, 11 N. W. R. 482, 41 Am. R. 23 ; Western Md. R. R.

Co. V. Stocksdale, 83 Md. 245 ; Bradshaw v. South Boston R. R.

Co., 135 Mass: 407, 46 Am. R. 481 ; 4 Elliott on Railroads, see.

1594), while others, on the contrary, deny the ticket such con-

clusive force and dignity, and rule that the passenger has the

right to rely upon the acts and statements of the ticket agent or

conductor, and that, if he be expelled on account of a defective
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ticket when he has acted in good faith and is without fault, the

carrier is liable in damages for such expulsion: New York etc.

R. R. Co. V. Winter, 143 U. S. 60, 12 S. Ct. R. 356 ; Laird v. Pitts-

burg Traction Co., 166 Pa. St. 4, 31 Atl. R. 51 ; Ellsworth v. Chi-

cago etc. Ry. Co., 95 la. 98, 63 N. W. R. 584; Northern Pacific

Ry. Co. V. Pauson, 70 Fed. Rep. 585 ; Hot Springs Ry. Co. v. De-

loney, 65 Ark. 177, 45 S. W. R. 351, 67 Am. St. R. 913 ; Head v.

Georgia Pacific Ry. Co., 79 Ga. 358, 7 S. E. R. 217, 11 Am. St. R.

434 ; Georgia R. R. Co. v. Olds, 77 Ga. 673 ; Burnham v. Grand

Trunk Ry. Co., 63 Me. 298, 18 Am. R. 220 ; Pennsylvania Co. v.

Bray, 125 Ind. 229, 25 N. E. R. 439 ; Hufford v. Grand Rapids

etc. Ry. Co., 64 Mich. 631, 31 N. W. R. 544, 8 Am. St. R. 859 ;

same case decided otherwise on former appeal and reported in 53

Mich 118 ; Murdock v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 137 Mass. 293, 50

Am. R. 307, and other cases.

We concur in the latter view, and hold that a person who makes

a valid contract is entitled to passage according to its terms,

though the face of the ticket furnished him may not in any true

sense express the contract. It is the contract and not the ticket
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that gives the right to transportation. The ticket is but an evi-

dence of the contract, made out and furnished by the carrier;

and if it fail to disclose the true contract, the fault is with the

carrier, and it is responsible for the natural consequences of the

variance.

The passenger is not required in law, nor allowed in fact, to

print or write or stamp the ticket. The carrier alone has that

right and the passenger is authorized to believe and presume that

it will be properly exercised, and that the ticket, when delivered,

is a faithful expression of the contract as made.

The ticket, whether for transfer, as in the present case, or for

original passage, may well be called the carrier's written direction

by one agent to another agent concerning the particular transpor-

tation in hand ; and if the direction be contrary to the contract,

and expulsion follow as a consequence, the carrier must be an-

swerable for all proximate damages ensuing therefrom, just as

any other principal is liable for the injurious result of misdirec-

tion to his agent.

In our opinion, the legal result, in such a ease, cannot be in-

fluenced by the fact that the carrier has conducted the transac-

tion through two agents instead of one, for the combined acts

of the two agents constitute but one continuous act of the car-

rier. Each agent is the alter ego of the carrier. The issuance of

the void ticket is the fault of the first agent, the expulsion is the

fault of the second agent, and both faults are those of the prin-

cipal, which stands before the court as if it had made the con-
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tract, issued the ticket and expelled the passenger through one

and the same agent.

Beyond question, carriers have the legal right to require pas-

sengers to procure and present tickets, but that does not imply

that passengers who have done their part in the matter, may be

rightfully expelled from the car because the tickets they offer

chance to be defective, or void. Before the rule of expulsion for

want of proper tickets can be made absolute and universal in its

application, the carriers must discharge the reciprocal duty of

absolute and universal accuracy in the issuance of the tickets.

The latter would be impossible, the former harsh and unreason-

able. To require a passenger, who has made a valid contract for

transportation and paid the requisite fare, as did the plaintiff,

to retire from the car and suspend his journey because of an

original defect in the ticket furnished him by the company's

agent is to visit the wrong of the offender upon the offended ; it is

to make the rightful passenger suffer for the fault of the carrier,

and that, too, in the latter 's interest. This court will not yield

its assent to a result so unjust and oppressive.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:40 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

The plaintiff had a right to believe the transfer ticket all that

it should be. With it he diligently sought and promptly entered

the first transfer car, and, upon being challenged by the con-

ductor of that car as too late to use the ticket, he made a fair

and reasonable statement, showing that he had just left the first

car and that the first conductor must have wrongly indicated the

hour of issuance on the face of the ticket. On that statement the

plaintiff should have been allowed to pursue his journey to its

end. He owed the company no other duty, and his expulsion

under such circumstances was a tortious breach of the contract,

for which he became entitled to recover all approximately result-

ing damages, including those for humiliation and mortification, if

such were in fact sustained.

It may be true, as suggested in some of the authorities (Fred-

erick V. Marquette etc. R. R. Co., 37 Mich. 342, 26 Am. R. 531 ;

Pouilin V. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 197 ; 4 Elliott on

Railroads, sec. 1594), that the carrier can dispatch its business

more conveniently and expeditiously, and can avoid losses

through fraud and imposition more readily, by treating the

ticket as conclusive evidence of the passenger's right to be car-

ried, than by taking and adopting his ex parte statement of the

real contract, when claimed to be different from the ticket ; yet

such ends, desirable as they may be and are, afford no legal sanc-

tion for the expulsion of a passenger who is without fault and

whose ticket fails alone through the mistake or negligence of the

carrier's agent, nor does their desirability render the expulsion
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of such person any less a tortious breach of the contract. Every

expulsion of a rightful passenger is wrongful.

It is no answer to the legal right of the bona fide passenger to

say that the carrier's general interest is better subserved by his

expulsion than by his carriage, by the violation of his contract

than by its observance. His right is not to be affected by the mis-

takes of ticket agents, or the attempted frauds of imposters;

these are to be met, if met at all, otherwise than through a rule

that excludes innocent as well as fraudulent passengers. It is not

allowable to punish the innocent with the guilty, to prevent the

escape of the guilty.

A ticket agent, on selling ticket to proposed passenger, re-

ferred him to conductor for privilege of stopover at intermediate

station; conductor authorized stopover, but instead of issuing

stopover check only punched passenger's regular ticket, telling

him that would be sufficient ; second conductor, following rule of

company, refused to recognize the punched ticket, and expelled

passenger when he refused to pay fare ; a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff' for ten thousand dollars was alhrmed upon the ground
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that the expulsion was unlawful, the court saying : ' ' The reason

of such rule is to be found in the principle that where a party

does all that he is required to do under the terms of contract into

which he has entered, and is only prevented from reaping the

benefit of such contract by the fault or wrongful act of the other

party to it, the law gives him a remedy against the other party

for such breach of contract" : New York etc. R. R. Co. v. Winter,

143 U. S. 60, 12 S. Ct. R. 356.

A street car conductor issued transfer ticket, punched at two

time marks, 7 :30 A. M. and 9 A. M., the conductor of car to which

transfer was made refused to accept ticket on ground that it was

two hours old, and ejected passenger on his refusal to pay fare,

although informed that the ticket was issued at 9 o'clock, just

before passenger got on car. Held, that the company was

liable in damages for an unlawful ejection, the company, and not

the passenger, being responsible for the defective or doubtful

character of the ticket : Laird v. Pittsburgh Traction Co., 166

Pa. St. 4, 31 Atl. R. 51.

By mistake a ticket agent sold a ticket dated back three days;

the passenger presented it on the day purchased, but was ex-

pelled by the conductor because the ticket was antedated and

holder refused to pay train fare ; company held liable for wrong-

ful ejection, the court saying the validity of the ticket depended

upon the actual time of sale, and not upon its date : Ellsworth v.

Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 95 la. 98, 63 N. W. R. 584.

The holder handed return coupon to proper agent to be
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stamped, at same time calling for sleeping car ticket ; the agent

returned coupon folded with sleeping car ticket, and holder put

them in his pocket without examination. Wlien presented on

train it was discovered that agent had not in fact stamped cou-

pon, and for that reason conductor refused to accept it, and ex-

pelled holder upon his refusal to pay fare. Held, that the holder,

having done his part, was a legal passenger, and that the rail-

way company was liable in damages for his expulsion : Northern

Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pauson, 70 Fed. Rep. 585.

An agent sold a canceled ticket and delivered it as a good one ;

the conductor refused it, and the passenger paid the fare a sec-

ond time to prevent ejection. He sued for damages, and the case

was twice before the supreme court of Michigan. On the first

appeal the court said that "as between the conductor and the

passenger, the ticket must be the conclusive evidence of the ex-

tent of the passenger's right to travel" (Hufford v. Grand Rap-

ids etc. Ry. Co., 53 Mich. 118, 18 N. W. R. 580) , and on the sec-

ond appeal the court, among other language, used the following :

"When the plaintiff told the conductor on the train that he had
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paid his fare, and stated the amount he had paid to the agent

who gave him the ticket he presented, and told him it was good, it

was the duty of the conductor to accept the statement of the

plaintiff until he found out it was not true, no matter what the

ticket contained in words, figures, or other marks": Hufford v.

Grand Rapids etc. Ry. Co., 64 Mich. 631, 31 N. W. R. 544, 8 Am.

St. R. 859.

In concluding this part of this opinion, it should be remarked

that our own cases of Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Fleming, 14 Lea,

146 ; Memphis etc. R. R. Co. v. Benson, 85 Tenn. 627, 4 Am. St.

Rep. 776, and Railroad v. Turner, 100 Tenn. 224, are not in fact,

and are not claimed to be, in point on the principal issue in the

present case. The most that was decided in the first and second

of them, in reference to a railway ticket, was that persons desir-

ing to travel upon railway trains must procure and present tick-

ets, when required by a rule of the company; and the last one

dealt with a different branch of the ticket question, that of notice.

The meaning of the third proposition in that part of the charge

heretofore quoted is somewhat obscure; yet, its effect seems to

be that a passenger "cannot continue his ride" on a transfer

ticket when the conductor points out such defect in it as justifies

the conductor, under the rules of the company, "in refusing to

take it." The instruction thus interpreted is erroneous, in that

it impliedly repeats the proposition that the ticket is the sole cri-

terion of the holder's right to passage, and also in that it attaches

unwarranted importance to the explanation of the conductor.
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No explanation the conductor might make could affect the plain-

tiff's legal right as a passenger. That right depended upon the

contract and not upon the face of the ticket, and it was incum^

bent on the conductor to heed the plaintiff's explanation and ob^

serve the contract, rather than upon the plaintiff to accept the

conductor's explanation as fatal and abandon his contract. The

disclosure of the fault of one agent by another agent could not

absolve their principal from the obligation of the contract, and

render the plaintiff a trespasser. Such a result cannot be justi-

fied in law, whatever the rule of the company may be.

On the face of the transfer check were printed the following

words :

"Transfer. — Passenger in accepting this transfer agrees to

read and be governed by the conditions on the back hereof, sub-

ject to the rules of the company.

"G. F. Jones, V. P. & G. M."

The court instructed the jury that this requirement and all

of the conditions on the back were reasonable, and that plaintiff

was bound to comply with them.
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In this instruction the court erred in at least two respects.

Among the conditions printed on the back of the transfer check

was one in this language : ' ' Part of the conditions upon which

this transfer is given and accepted are that the passenger exam-

ines date, time, and direction, and sees that the same are correct,

and complies with all its conditions."

This condition is unreasonable, because no passenger can be

bound to verify the act of the conductor in issuing a transfer

check; and also because no inexperienced passenger, however in-

telligent, could, in the time at his command on so brief a trip,

"examine date, time, and direction" indicated by the punch

marks, and, without an explanation, see "that the same are cor-

rect." There is no little complication about these three items

on the face of a transfer check, and especially about the matter

of indicating the "time" of issuance. The plaintiff made no ex-

amination on receiving his check from the first conductor, and

could scarcely understand the meaning of the punch marks when

explained by the conductor who expelled him. The complexity of

the checks, and the unreasonableness of the rule requiring a pas-/

senger to verify its correctness when issued, could hardly be bet-

ter illustrated than by a statement from this record that the

learned trial judge himself, with one of the very checks here in-

volved before him, was not able to understand its meaning with-

out a minute explanation.

At the trial the court; for its own information on the subject,
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propounded certain interrogatories to one of the officers of tlie

defendant about the meaning of one of these checks. Those ques-

tions and the answers thereto are as follows :

"The Court. — I wanted to ask you how would anybody know

what these figures over there on the right end stand for ? What

is there to indicate the hours and minutes outside of just the

figures themselves ?

<'A. — Well, I don't know how I could explain that, judge.

"The Court. — What are those figures all over the right-hand

end of the ticket ?

''A. — The black figures are the hours and the little figures in-

dicate 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 minutes.

"The Court. — I don't catch it exactly.

"Witness. — Well, here the figure is 1 o'clock, and if the '4'

is punched it would be 1 :40, and if the ' 2 ' is punched it would

be 1 :20.

"The Court.— Oh, yes, I didn't catch it; I didn't understand

the thing. It would be 1 :20 if the 2 is punched, and if the 3 is

punched 1:30; and if the 4 is punched 1:40, and if the 5 is
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punched 1 :50 ?

"A. — Yes, sir; same transfer that is used all over the coun-

try."

It cannot be fair or just or reasonable to require passengers,

in the hurry of rapid street car travel, to decipher at their peril

a check whose meaning so intelligent a judge cannot ascertain by

careful and deliberate inspection.

Another condition on the back of the check was expressed

thus : "In accepting this transfer, passenger agrees that in case

of controversy with conductor about this ticket and its refusal,

to pay the regular fare charged, and apply at the office of the

company for refund of same within three days."

This condition is unreasonable, in that it makes the conductor,

for the time, the sole judge of the sufficiency of the ticket, and re-

quires the passenger to pay additional fare though his ticket may

be refused without sufficient cause; and, further, in that it re-

quires the wronged passenger, who so pays, to apply for refund

at the office of the company, which must be remote from the

houses and business places of most passengers, and then limits the

amount to be received by such person to that wrongfully exacted.

It puts all of the burden of the ' ' controversy ' ' upon the wronged

passenger, and none upon the wrongdoing company, and thereby

makes the just suffer for the unjust.

Reverse and remand.
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142. FORSEE V. ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN RAIL-

ROAD CO.,

63 Miss. 66; 56 Am. R. 801. 1885.

Action for ejection from train. Defendant charged more

when fare was paid on train, and failed to afford plaintiff op-

portunity to purchase a ticket. Judgment for plaintiff.

Arnold, J. (Omitting minor points.) It is competent for a

railroad corporation to adopt reasonable rules for the conduct

of its business, and to determine and fix, within the limits speci-

fied in its charter and existing laws, the fare to be paid by

passengers transported on its trains. It may in the exercise of

this right make discrimination as to the amount of fare to be

charged for the same distance, by charging a higher rate when

the fare is paid on the train than when a ticket is purchased at

its office. Such a regulation has been very generally considered

reasonable and beneficial both to the public and the corporation,

if carried out in good faith. It imposes no hardship or injustice

upon passengers, who may, if they desire to do so, pay their

fare and procure tickets at the lower rate before entering the
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cars, and it tends to protect the corporation from the frauds,

mistakes and inconvenience incident to collecting fare and mak-

ing change on trains while in motion, and from imposition by

those who may attempt to ride from one station to another with-

out payment, and to enable conductors to attend to the various

details of their duties on the train and at stations. State v.

Goold, 53 Me. 279; Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Rogers, 28 Ind. 1,

92 Am. D. 276 ; Swan v. Manchester etc. R. Co., 132 Mass. 116,

42 Am. R. 432.

But such a regulation is invalid and cannot be sustained,

unless the corporation affords reasonable opportunity and facili-

ties to passengers to procure tickets at the lower rate, and there-

by avoid the disadvantage of such discrimination. When this

is done, a,nd a passenger fails to obtain a ticket, it is his own

fault, and he may be ejected from the train if he refuses to

pay the higher rate charged on the train.

When such a regulation is established, and a passenger en-

deavors to buy a ticket before he enters the cars and is unable

to do so on account of the fault of the corporation or its agents

or servants, and he offers to pay the ticket rate on the train,

and refuses to pay the car rate, it is unlawful for the corpora-

tion or its agents or servants to eject him from the train. He is

entitled to travel at the lower rate, and the corporation is a
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trespasser and liable for the consequences if he is ejected from

the train by its agents or servants. The passenger may, under

such circumstances, either pay the excess demanded under pro-

test, and afterward recover it by suit, or refuse to pay it, and

hold the corporation responsible in damages if he is ejected

from the train. 1 Redf. Railw. 104; Evans v. M. & C. R. Co., 56

Ala. 246, 28 Am. R. 771 ; St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Dalby, 19 111.

358 ; St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. South, 43 111. 176, 92 Am. D. 103 ;

Smith V. Pittsburg etc. R. Co., 23 Ohio St. 10 ; Porter v. N. Y.

Cent. R. Co., 34 Barb. 353; Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Rogers,

28 Ind. 1, 92 Am. D. 276; Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Rogers, 38

Ind. 116, 10 Am. R. 103; State v. Goold, 53 Me. 279; Swan v.

Manchester etc. R. Co., 132 Mass. 116, 42 Am. R. 432 ; Du Lau-

rans v. St. Paul etc. R. Co., 15 Minn. 49, 2 Am. R. 102.

In such case exemplary damages would not be recoverable,

unless the expulsion or attempted expulsion was characterized

by malice, recklessness, rudeness, or willful wrong on the part

of the agents or servants of the corporation. Chicago etc. R. Co.

v. Scurr, 59 Miss. 456, 42 Am. R. 373; Du Laurans v. St. Paul
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etc. R. Co., 15 Minn. 49, 2 Am. R. 102; Pullman etc. v. Reed,

75 111. 125, 20 Am. R. 232 ; Hamilton v. Third Avenue R. Co.,

53 N. Y. 25 ; Townsend v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 56 N. Y. 295, 15

Am. R. 419 ; Paine v. C. R. I. & P. R. Co., 45 Iowa, 569 ; Mc-

Kinley v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 44 Iowa, 314, 24 Am. R. 748.

The cause was tried in the court below on theories and prin-

ciples of law different from those here expressed, and the judg-

ment is reversed and a new trial awarded.

143. KENT V. BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD CO.,

45 Ohio St. 284; 12 N. E. E. 798; 4 Am. St. R. 539. 1887.

Kent bought a thousand-mile "commercial travelers' mileage

ticket," paying for it the usual price. He did not sign the

ticket at the time, nor even know the conditions printed on it.

He used the ticket several times without signature, but at length

one of the conductors refused to honor it unless he would sign

the conditions. He refused, as he was unwilling to agree to one

condition releasing the company from the fraud or negligence of

its agents. As the company's instructions to its agents, and its

uniform custom, required such signature, plaintiff was ejected

from the train. Verdict for plaintiff in court of common pleas

was reversed in the circuit for refusal of judge to instruct as re-

quested, and the case came up on this question.
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Owen, C. J. The instructions requested and refused i^ored

the proof which tended to show that Kent received the ticket

from the company's agent without actual knowledge of the

conditions and directions written therein. They also presup-

posed that, by receiving the ticket, Kent acquiesced in all its

terms and conditions, in spite of the fact (which the evidence

tended to prove) that he may have been wholly ignorant of

them.

It is well settled that the purchaser of a railroad ticket does

not, by its mere acceptance, acquiesce in and bind himself to

all the terms and conditions printed thereon, in the absence

of actual knowledge of them : Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co. v. Camp-

bell, 36 Ohio St. 647, 38 Am. Rep. 617; Davidson v. Graham,

2 Ohio St. 135 ; Jones v. Voorhees, 10 Ohio, 145 ; Rawson v. Penn-

sylvania R. R. Co., 48 N. Y. 212, 8 Am. Rep. 543; 2 Wharton

on Evidence, sec. 1243 ; Brown v. Eastern R. R. Co., 11 Cush.

97 ; Malone v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 12 Gray, 388, 74 Am. Dec.

598; Camden and Amboy R'y Co. v. Baldauf, 16 Pa. St. 67, 55

Am. D. 481 ; Wade on Notices, sees. 543, 552, 554, 555 ; Lawson
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on Carriers, sees. 106, 107; Blossom v. Dodd, 43 N. Y. 264; 3 Am.

Rep. 701 ; Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306, 72 Am. Dec. 469.

There is nothing in the circumstance that the ticket in the

case at bar was sold at a rate reduced from the regular fare

to take it out of the rule. The rate was the usual and estab-

lished one allowed to a numerous class of patrons comprising

commercial travelers whose principals were shippers over the

company's road.

The contract between Kent and the railroad company was

made when he bought his ticket, received and paid for it;

Rawson v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., supra. Neither party

could, after that, change its terms or impose new conditions

upon its enforcement without the consent of the other. Ac-

cording to the company's instructions to agents, and by

the uniform custom regulating the sale of such tickets, they

were required to be signed before their delivery to the pur-

chasers. The company saw fit, in the case at bar, to dispense

with this requirement. It received the plaintiff's money, de-

livered him the ticket, in his ignorance of any request that he

sign it, honored it for several trips without first requiring him

to sign its conditions. It thereby waived this requirement, and

its conductor was not justified, while it still retained plain-

tiff's money, in ejecting him from its cars by reason of his fail-

ure to sign the ticket, which had already gone into full effect

between the parties, and his failure to pay the usual fare in

money for a passage which was already paid for.
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The conclusion we have reached relieves us of a consideration

of the question arising upon the claim of counsel that the sixth

condition of this ticket was against public policy, and would

have been void if signed.

The trial court was right in refusing the instructions re-

quested.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and that of

the court of common pleas affirmed.

144. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO. V. PARRY,

55 N. J. L. 551; 27 Atl. R. 914; 39 Am. St. B. 654. 1893.

Action for wrongful ejection from a train. Parry was trav-

eling on an excursion ticket, and to save time left his train,

walked to the station at a junction point and caught another

train that would reach his station earlier than the regular train.

The conductor refused to receive the excursion ticket on that

train, and on Parry's refusal to pay fare ejected him. Error for

refusal of court below to nonsuit.

The Chancellor. The motion to nonsuit presented to the

court below this question, whether the contract between Mr.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:40 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

Parry and the railroad company permitted ]\Ir. Parry to quit the

branch road train before it reached its destination, and, pro-

ceeding in advance of it, continue his journey in a train with

which it did not connect, and was made available to him only

l)y accidental delay.

It is established by the course of judicial decision that when

a person who purchases a railway ticket to a certain place takes

his seat in a particular train that goes to his destination he

cannot, without permission of the railway company, while the

train is reasonably pursuing the duty of the carrier, leave it and

take another train, and complete his journey under the same

contract. The reason is that his contract is entire, and neither

he nor the company can be required to perform it in fragments :

State V. Overton, 24 N. J. L. 435, 61 Am. D. 671 ; Petrie v. Penn-

sylvania R. R. Co., 42 N. J. L. 449 ; Cheney v. Boston etc. R. R.

Co., 11 Met. (Mass.) 121, 45 Am. D. 190; Dietrich v. Pennsyl-

vania R. R. Co., 71 Pa. St. 432, 10 Am. R. 711 ; Oil Creek etc.

Ry. Co. V. Clark, 72 Pa. St. 231 ; Van Kirk v. Pennsylvania R. R.

Co., 76 Pa. St. 73, 18 Am. R. 404; Hamilton v. New York Cent.

R. R. Co., 51 N. Y. 100; Wyman v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 34

Minn. 210; McClure v. Philadelphia etc. R. R. Co., 34 Md. 352,
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6 Am. R. 345 ; Stone v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 47 Iowa 82, 29 Am.

R. 458 ; Clmrchill v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 67 111. 390 ; Cleve-

land etc. R. R. Co. V. Bartram, 11 Ohio St. 457; Hatten v. Rail-

road Co., 39 Ohio St. 375; Wilsey v. Louisville etc. R. R. Co.,

83 Ky. 511.

It is not necessary that the contract of carriage should be

fully set out in the passenger's ticket. The ticket is a mere

token that the fare has been paid, and that the passenger has

the right to be carried to the destination it indicates, accord-

ing to the reasonable regulations of the railway company. Such

regulations, at least so far as they are known to the passenger,

enter into the contract of passage, and it is the duty of the

passenger to conform to them.

The proofs of the plaintiff below very clearly exhibited that

Mr. Parry was familiar with the regulations under which the

defendant company was accustomed to transport passengers

between Riverton and Mount Holly upon such tickets as the

one he purchased. He admits that he knew that the local ac-

commodation train was apt to be belated, and that the train
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upon the branch road did not connect with it, and hence that

the latter train would not continue to the Broad Street station

in Burlington until the former had passed, and that it was

possible occasionally to catch it by quitting the branch road

train while it was M^aiting upon the Y, and walking a half

mile to the Broad Street depot. Indeed, it was his accurate

knowledge of the regulations of the company, and the delay

they occasioned, that prompted him to disregard them when

he saw an opportunity to expedite his transit.

He states that he could have purchased an excursion ticket

from Riverton to Burlington and back, and another from Bur-

lington to Mount Holly and return, for the same price that he

paid for the single excursion ticket from Riverton to Mount

Holly and return, and in that way have secured the undoubted

right to return by the local accommodation if he could have

caught it. 'But he did not purchase the two excursion tickets

and make his contract in that way. He chose rather to buy

the single ticket, which expressly provided that he should be

transported between the terminal points of his journey "via

Burlington branch," and subjected him to the regulations that

he should be carried to the Broad Street station, and there

change to the cars of a connecting train.

Under authority of the rule referred to, even in absence of

the express notice upon his ticket that he should not ''stop

off en route*' after he had once started in a train, it may be

questionable whether it would not have been an abandonment
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of his contract if he had left the train, while it was duly per-

forming its duty, at any other point than that which the reg-

ulations designated for that purpose. The notice upon the

ticket simply served to call attention to that rule. But in

deciding this case it is not necessary to determine that ques-

tion. The additional fact that, with the express notice which

the ticket gave before him, he quit the branch train with the

deliberate intention of not again taking either it or its con-

necting train, appears, and in light of such fact his noncon-

formity to the regulations which entered into his contract, and

consequent infraction of that contract and abandonment of

his rights thereunder, become too conspicuous to admit of doubt.

There was nothing in the evidence to indicate that the regula-

tions of the defendant company were not reasonable, and it is

admitted that the train abandoned was pursuing its way as those

regulations required.

Under these conditions the conductor was justified in de-

manding a new fare, and, upon the refusal of Mr. Parry to pay

it, to remove him from the train in the manner that was adopted :
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State V. Overton, 24 N. J. L. 435, 61 Am. D. 671.

It is our conclusion that the plaintiff below should have been

nonsuited, and hence that the judgment now reviewed must be

reversed.

145. FREDERICK V. MARQUETTE, HOUGHTON AND

ONTONAGON RAILROAD CO.,

37 Mich. 342; 26 Am. R. 531. 1877.

Judgment for defendant below.

Marston, J. This is an action on the case brought to recover

damages for being unlawfully ejected and put off a train of

cars by the conductor of the train. The evidence on the part of

the plaintiff tended to show that on the evening of January

29th, 1876, he went to the regular ticket office of the defendant

at Ishpeming and asked for a ticket to Marquette, presenting to

the agent in charge of the office one dollar from which to make

payment therefor; that the agent received the money, handed

plaintiff a ticket and some change, retaining sixty-five cents for

the ticket, the regular fare to Marquette; that the plaintiff

did not attempt to read what was on his ticket, nor did he

count the change received back until next morning or notice it

until then; that he went on board the train bound for Mar-

quette, and after the train left the station the conductor took
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up the ticket, giving him no cheek to indicate his destination,

but at the time telling him his ticket was only for Morgan; that

when the train reached jMorgan the conductor told the plaintiff

he must get off there or pay more fare; that if he wanted to go

to Marquette he must pay thirty-five cents more. Plaintiff' in-

sisted he had paid his fare and purchased his ticket to Mar-

quette and refused to pay the additional fare, whereupon he

was ejected from the train, etc. On the part of the defendant

evidence was given tending to show that the ticket purchased

and presented to the conductor was in fact a ticket for JMorgan

and not for Marquette. Under the pleadings and charge of the

court other evidence in the case and questions sought to be raised

need not be referred to, and as the real gist of the action was for

the expulsion from the cars by the conductor, the above state-

ment is deemed sufficient to a proper understanding of the case.

An erroneous impression seems to prevail with many that

where the conductor of a passenger train ejects therefrom a

passenger who has paid his fare to a point beyond, but has lost

or mislaid his ticket, or whose ticket does not entitle him to pro-
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ceed farther, or upon that train, that the company is liable in

an action at law for all damages which the party may in any

way have sustained in consequence of the delay, mortification,

injury to his health or otherwise, and that the passenger is

under no obligation to prevent or lessen the damages by pay-

ment of the necessary additional fare to entitle him to complete

his journey without interruption. Although such damages were

claimed in this case, under our present view it will be unneces-

sary to discuss this question any farther at present.

What, then, is the duty of the conductor in a case like the pres-

ent? and what are the passenger's rights? In considering these

questions we cannot shut our eyes to the manner and method

which railroad companies and common carriers generally have

adopted in order to successfully carry out their business. The

view to be taken of these questions must be a practical one, even

although it may work, perhaps, injustice in some special and

particular cases, resulting, however, in great part, if not wholly,

from other causes. In Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 521, 72 Am. D. 62,

Mr. Justice Manning, in speaking of the rules and regulations

of common carriers, said, "All rules and regulations must be

reasonable, and to be so, they should have for their object the

accommodation of the passengers. Under this head we include

every thing calculated to render the transportation most com-

fortable and least annoying to passengers generally; not to one,

or two, or any given number carried at a particular time, but to

a large majority of the passengers ordinarily carried. Such rules
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and rej^ulations should also be of a permanent nature^ and not

be made for a particular occasion or emergency."

It is within the common knowledge or experience of all trav-

elers that the uniform and perhaps the universal practice is for

railroad companies to issue tickets to passengers with the places

designated thereon from whence and to which the passenger is

to be carried; that these tickets are presented to the conductor

or person in charge of the train, and that he accepts unhesitat-

ingly of such tickets as evidence of the contract entered into

between the passenger and his principal. It is equally well

known that the conductor has but seldom if ever any other

means of ascertaining, within time to be of any avail, the terms

of the contract, unless he relies upon the statement of the passen-

ger, contradicted as it would be by the ticket produced, and that

even in a very large majority of cases, owing to the amount

of business done, the agent in charge of the office, and who sold

the ticket, could give but very little if any information upon

the subject. That this system of issuing tickets, in a very large

majority of cases, works well, causing but very little, if any,
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annoyance to passengers generally, must be admitted. There

of course will be cases, where a passenger who has lost his

ticket, or where through mistake the wrong ticket has been

delivered to him, will be obliged to pay his fare a second time

in order to pursue his journey without delay, and if unable to

do this, as will sometimes be the case, very great delay and injury

may result therefrom. Such delay and injury would not be the

natural result of the loss of a ticket or breach of the contract,

but would be, at least in part, in consequence of the pecuniary

circumstances of the party. Such cases are expectional, and

however unfortunate the party may be who is so situated,

yet we must remember that no human rule has ever yet been

devised that would not at times injuriously affect those it was

designed to accommodate. This method of purchasing tickets

is also of decided advantage to the public in other respects; it

enables them to purchase tickets at times and places deemed

suitable, and to avoid thereby the crowds and delays they would

otherwise be subject to. Were no tickets issued and each passen-

ger compelled to pay his fare upon the cars, inconvenience and

delay would result therefrom, or the officers in charge of the train

to collect fares would be increased in numbers to an unreasonable

extent, while at fairs and places of public amusement where

tickets are issued and sold entitling the purchaser to admission

and a seat, we can see and appreciate the confusion which would

exist if no tickets were sold, or if the party presenting the ticket

were not upon such occasions to be bound by its terms.
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How, then, is the conductor to ascertain the contract entered

into between the passenger and the railroad company where a

ticket is purchased and presented to him ? Practically there are

but two ways — one, the evidence afforded by the ticket; the

other, the statement of the passenger contradicted by the ticket.

Which should govern? In judicial investigations we appreciate

the necessity of an obligation of some kind and the benefit of

a cross-examination. At common law parties interested were not

competent witnesses, and even under our statute the witness is

not permitted, in certain cases, to testify as to facts which, if

true, were equally within the knowledge of the opposite party,

and he cannot be procifred. Yet here would be an investigation

as to the terms of a contract, where no such safeguards could

be thrown around it, and where the conductor, at his peril, would

have to accept of the mere statement of the interested party. I

seriously doubt the practical workings of such a method, except

for the purpose of encouraging and developing fraud and false-

hood, and I doubt if any system could be devised that would

so much tend to the disturbance and annoyance of the traveling
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public generally. There is but one rule which can safely be

tolerated with any decent regard to the rights of railroad com-

panies and passengers generally. As between the conductor and

passenger, and the right of the latter to travel, the ticket pro-

duced must be conclusive evidence, and he must produce it when

called upon, as the evidence of his right to the seat he

claims. Where a passenger has purchased a ticket and the con-

ductor does not carry him according to its terms, or, if the

company, through the mistake of its agent, has given him the

wrong ticket, so that he has been compelled to relinquish his

seat, or pay his fare a second time in order to retain it, he would

have a remedy against the company for a breach of the con-

tract, but he would have to adopt a declaration differing es-

sentially from the one resorted to in this case.

We have not thus far referred to any authorities to sustain

the views herein taken. If any are needed, the following, we

think, will be found amply sufficient, and we do not consider it

necessary to analyze or review them. Townsend v. N. Y. C. &. H.

R. E. r'. Co., 56 N. Y. 298, 15 Am. Rep. 419; Hibbard v.

N. Y. & E. R. R., 15 id. 470; Bennett v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R., 5

Hun, 600; Downs v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R., 36 Conn. 287,

4 Am. Rep. 77 ; C, B. & Q. R. R. v. Griffin, 68 111. 499 ; Pullman

P. C. Co. V. Reed, 75 111. 125, 20 Am. R. 232; Shelton v. Lake

Shore, etc. Ry. Co., 29 Ohio St. 214.

I am of opinion that the judgment should be affirmed with

costs.
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146. HUFFORD V. GRAND RAPIDS AND INDIANA

RAILROAD CO.,

64 Mich. 631; 31 N. W. R. 544; 8 Am. St. B. 859. 1887.

Assault and battery for threatening a wrongful ejection of

plaintiff from the train. The ticket agent at Manton sold him a

punched ticket originally good for a ride from Sturgis to Trav-

erse City. Plaintiff noticed the peculiarity in the ticket and re-

turned to the ticket office to ask if the ticket was good. The agent

assured him that it was good from Manton to Traverse City. As

a matter of fact the punch mark told the conductor that it had

been punched for a ride to Walton Junction beyond INIantou,

and was good only from Walton Junction to Traverse City. The

conductor so informed plaintiff, who told the former of his con-

versation with the agent when he bought the ticket, adding that

he had paid for his ticket and should not pay his fare again.

The conductor then laid his hands on plaintiff's shoulder, rang

the bell and said that unless he paid his fare, which was twenty-

five cents, he would be put off the train. The fare was then

paid under protest. Verdict for defendant, and plaintiff brings
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error.

Sherwood, J. (After stating the facts.) There seems to be

no question but that the plaintiff purchased his ticket of an

agent of the company, who had the right to sell the same and

receive the plaintiff's money therefor; that the ticket covered

the distance between the two stations, and was purchased by the

plaintiff in perfect good faith ; that the ticket was genuine, and

was issued by the company, and one which its agent had the right

to sell to passengers. The plaintiff had a right to rely upon the

statements of the agent that it was good, and entitled him to a

ride between the two stations. It was a contract for a ride be-

tween the two stations that the defendant's agent had a right

to make, and did make, with the plaintiff.

The ticket given by the agent to the plaintiff was the evi-

dence agreed upon by the parties, by which the defendant should

thereafter recognize the rights of plaintiff in his contract; and

neither the company nor any of its agents could thereafter be

permitted to say the ticket was not such evidence, and conclusive

upon the subject. Passengers are not interested in the internal

affairs of the companies whose coaches they ride in, nor are

they required to know the rules and regulations made by the

directors of the company for the control of the action of its

agents and the management of its affairs.
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When the plaintiff told the conductor on the train that he had

paid his fare, and stated the amount he paid to the agent who

gave him the ticket he presented, and told him it was good, it was

the duty of the conductor to accept the statement of the plaintiff

until he found out it was not true, no matter what the ticket con-

tained in words, figures, or other marks. All sorts of people

travel upon the cars ; and the regulations and management of the

company's business and trains which would not protect the edu-

cated and uneducated, the wise and the ignorant, alike, would be

unreasonable indeed. On the undisputed facts in this case, I

think the plaintiff was entitled to go to Walton junction upon

the ticket he presented to the conductor ; Maroney v. Old Colony

& N. R'y Co., 106 Mass. 153, 8 Am. Rep. 305; Murdock v. Bos-

ton & A. R. R. Co., 137 Mass. 293, 50 Am. Rep. 307. See this

case in 53 Mich. 118. . . .

The judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted.

Compare with Frederick v. Railroad, 37 Mich. 342, 26 Am. R.

531.

147. AUERBACH V. NEW YORK CENTRAL AND E[UD-
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SON RIVER RAILROAD CO.,

89 N. Y. 281; 42 Am. B. 290. 1882.

Action for damages for wrongful ejection from defendant's

train on which plaintiff was a passenger. Judgment for de-

fendant.

Earl, J. This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover

damages for being ejected from one of the defendant's cars while

he was riding therein as a passenger. He was nonsuited at the

trial and the judgment entered upon the nonsuit was affirmed at

the General Term. The material facts of the case are as follows :

The plaintiff, being in St. Louis on the 21st day of September,

1877, purchased of the Ohio and Mississippi Railway Company a

ticket for a passage from St. Louis over the several railroads men-

tioned in coupons annexed to the ticket to the city of New York,

It was specified on the ticket that it was ''good for one contin-

uous passage to point named on coupon attached ' ' ; that in selling

the ticket for passage over other roads the company making the

sale acted only as agent for such other roads, and assumed no

responsibility beyond its own line; that the holder of the ticket

agreed with the respective companies over whose roads he was

to be carried to use the same on or before the 26th day of Sep-

567

§ 147 OF CAEKIEES OF PASSENGEES.

tember then instant, and that if he failed to comply with such

agreement either of the companies might refuse to accept the

ticket or any coupons thereof, and demand the full regular fare

which he agreed to pay. He left St. Louis on the day he bought

the ticket and rode to Cincinnati, and there stopped a day. He

then rode to Cleveland and stayed there a few hours, and then

rode on to Buffalo, reaching there on the 24th, and stopped there

a day. Before reaching Buffalo he had used all the coupons ex-

cept the one entitling him to a passage over the defendant 's road

from Buffalo to New York. The material part of the language

upon that coupon is as follows:

"Issued by Ohio and Mississippi railway on account of New

York Central and Hudson River railroad, one first-class passage,

Buffalo to New York."

Being desirous of stopping at Rochester, the plaintiff pur-

chased a ticket over the defendant's road from Buffalo to Roches-

ter, and upon that ticket rode to Rochester on the 25th, reaching

there in the afternoon. He remained there about a day, and in

the afternoon of the 26th of September, he entered one of the
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cars upon the defendant's road to complete his passage to the

city of New York. He presented his ticket, with the one coupon

attached to the conductor, and it was accepted by him, and was

recognized as a proper ticket and punched several times, until

the plaintiff reached Hudson about three or four o'clock, A. M.,

September 27, when the conductor in charge of the train de-

clined to recognize the ticket on the ground that the time had

run out, and demanded three dollars fare to the city of New

York, which the plaintiff declined to pay. The conductor with

some force then ejected him from the car.

The trial judge nonsuited the plaintiff on the ground that the

ticket entitled him to a continuous passage from Buffalo to New

York, and not from any intermediate point to New York. The

General Term affirmed the nonsuit upon the ground, that al-

though the plaintiff commenced his passage upon the 26th of

September, he could not continue it after that date on that ticket.

We are of opinion that the plaintiff was improperly nonsuited.

The contract at St. Louis, evidenced by the ticket and coupons

there sold, was not a contract by any one company or by all the

companies named in the coupons jointly for a continuous passage

from St. Louis to New York. A separate contract was made for

a continuous passage over each of the roads mentioned in the

several coupons. Each company through the agent selling the

ticket made a contract for passage over its road, and each com-

pany assumed responsibility for the passenger only over its

road. No company was liable for any accident or default upon
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any road but its own. This was so by the very terms of the

agreement printed upon the ticket. Hence the defendant is not

in a position to claim that the plaintiff was bound to a continuous

passage from St. Louis to New York, and it cannot complain of

the stoppages at Cincinnati and Cleveland. Hutch, on Carriers,

§ 579; Brooke v. Grand Trunk Eailway Co., 15 Mich. 332.

But the plaintiff was bound to a continuous passage over the

defendant's road, that is, the plaintiff could not enter one train

of the defendant's cars and then leave it, and subsequently take

another train and complete his journey. He was not, however,

bound to commence his passage at Buffalo. He could commence

it at Rochester or Albany, or any other point between Buffalo

and New York, and then make it continuous. The language of

the corftract and the purpose which may be supposed to have in-

fluenced the making of it do not require a construction which

would make it imperative upon a passenger to enter a train

at Buffalo. No possible harm or inconvenience could come to

the defendant if the passenger should forego his right to ride

from Buffalo and ride only from Rochester or Albany. The
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purpose was only to secure a continuous passage after the passen-

ger had once entered upon a train. On the 26tli of September

the plaintiff, having the right to enter a train at Buffalo, it can-

not be perceived why he could not, with the same ticket, right-

fully enter a train upon the same line at any point nearer to

the place of destination.

When the plaintiff entered the train at Rochester on the after-

noon of the 26th of September and presented his ticket and it was

accepted and punched, it was then used within the meaning of

the contract. It could then have been taken up. So far as the

l^laintift* was concerned it had then performed its office. It was

thereafter left with him not for his convenience, but under regu-

lations of the defendant for its convenience, that it might

know that his passage had been paid for. The contract did not

specify that the passage should be completed on or before the

26th, but that the ticket should be used on or before that day,

and that it was so used it seems to us is too clear for dispute.

The language printed upon the ticket must be regarded as the

language of the defendant, and if it is of doubtful import the

doubt should not be solved to the detriment of the passenger. If

it had been intended by the defendant that the passage should be

continuous from St. Louis to New York, or that it should actu-

ally commence at Buffalo and be continuous to the city of New

York, or that the passage should be completed on or before the

26th of September, such intention should have been plainly ex-
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pressed and not left in such doubt as might and naturally would

mislead the passenger.

We have carefully examined the authorities to which the

learned counsel for the defendant has called our attention, and

it is sufficient to say that none of them are in conflict with the

views above expressed.

The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted,

costs to abide the event.

148. BOSTON & LOWELL RAILROAD CO. V. PROCTOR,

1 Allen (Mass.) 267; 79 Am. D. 729. 1861.

Action for fare for carrying defendant from Lowell to Bos-

ton. The ticket was purchased of the Vermont Central, con-

sisted of four coupons and had been used as far as Lowell by

March 17th. He staid there until March 21st. Judgment for

defendant and plaintiffs appealed.

By Court, Chapman, J. The plaintiffs, having carried the

defendant from Lowell to Boston, March 21, 1860, are entitled

to recover their usual fare, being seventy-five cents, unless he

has paid or tendered the amount. He offered to the conductor
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a ticket dated March 16, 1860, and having the words, "Good

only two days after date," stamped in red ink upon its face. He

contends that the plaintiff's were bound to accept this ticket;

and that, contrary to its terms, he could at his option, and

against their will, extend the contract from two days to five days.

But the courts of law must enforce contracts as the parties

make them, and can neither set aside any of their terms nor add

new ones. In the absence of fraud, which is not suggested here,

the court can see no reason why the defendant should make his

ticket available beyond its terms. The plaintiffs are not bound

to issue tickets; and if they do issue them, they alone must fix

their terms. They were not bound to make an arrangement by

which the defendant, being in Vermont, could purchase a ticket

through to Boston. But it is for the accommodation of the pub-

lic, as well as of railroad companies, that arrangements should

exist among connecting lines of roads, and that there should

be tickets, by means of which passengers can pass over the whole

route. Such arrangements, however, would be impossible, if

every passenger were at liberty to disregard them. Should

abuses grow out of the system, legislation can correct them.

Judgment for the plaintiffs.
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149. CPIICAGO & NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY CO., AP-

PELLANTS, V. WILLIAMS,

55 III. 185; 8 Am. R. 611. 1870.

Action for damages for wrongful exclusion of plaintiff from

defendant's railway car. Judgment of $200 for plaintiff, and

defendants appealed.

Scott, J. There is but one question of any considerable im-

portance presented by the record in this case.

It is simply whether a railroad company, which, by our statute

and the common law, is a common carrier of passengers, in a case

where the company, by their rules and regulations, have desig-

nated a certain car in their passenger train for the exclusive use

of ladies, and gentlemen accompanied by ladies, can exclude

from the privileges of such car a colored woman, holding a first-

class ticket, for no other reason except her color.

The evidence in the case establishes these facts : That, as was

the custom on appellants' road, they had set apart in their pas-

senger trains a car for the exclusive use of ladies, and gentlemen

accompanied by ladies, and that such a car, called the "ladies'
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car, ' ' was attached to the train in question. The appellee resided

at Rockford, and being desirous of going from that station to

Belvidere, on the road of appellants, for that purpose purchased

of the agent of the appellants a ticket, which entitled the holder

to a seat in a first-class car on their road. On the arrival of the

train at the Rockford station, the appellee offered and endeav-

ored to enter the ladies' car, but was refused permission so to

do, and was directed to go forward to the car set apart for and

occupied mostly by men. On the appellee persisting on entering

the ladies' car, force enough was used by the brakeman to pre-

vent her. At the time she attempted to obtain a seat

in that car, on appellant's train, there were vacant and un-

occupied seats in it, for one of the female witnesses states that

she, with two other ladies, a few moments afterward, entered

the same car at that station and found two vacant seats, and

occupied the same. No objection whatever was made, nor is it

insisted any other existed, to appellee taking a seat in the ladies'

car, except her color. The appellee was clad in plain and decent

apparel, and it is not suggested, in the evidence or otherwise,

that she was not a woman of good character and proper be-

havior.

It does not appear that the company had ever set apart a car

for the exclusive use, or provided any separate seats for the use
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of colored persons who might desire to pass over their line of

road. The evidence discloses that colored vv^omen sometimes rode

in the ladies' car, and sometimes in the other car, and there was,

in fact, no rule or regulation of the company in regard to colored

passengers.

The case turns somewhat on what are reasonable rules, and the

power of railroad companies to establish and enforce them.

It is the undoubted right of railroad companies to make all

reasonable rules and regulations for the safety and comfort of

passengers traveling on their line of road. It is not only their

right, but it is their duty to make such rules and regulations.

It is alike the interest of the companies and the public that such

rules should be established and enforced, and ample authority

is conferred by law on the agents and servants of the companies

to enforce all reasonable regulations made for the safety and

convenience of passengers.

It was held in the case of the 111. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Whitte-

more, 43 111. 423, 92 Am. D. 138, that, for a non-compliance with a

reasonable rule of the company, a party might be expelled from
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a train at a point other than a regular station.

If a person on a train becomes disorderly, profane or dangerous

and offensive in his conduct, it is the duty of the conductor

to expel such guilty party, or at least to assign him to a car where

he will not endanger or annoy the other passengers. Whatever

rules tend to the comfort, order and safety of the passengers, the

company are fully authorized to make, and are amply empow-

ered to enforce compliance therewith. But such rules and regu-

lations must always be reasonable and uniform in respect to per-

sons.

A railroad company cannot capriciously discriminate between

passengers on account of their nativity, color, race, social posi-

tion or their political or religious beliefs. Whatever discrimi-

nations are made, must be on some principle, or for some reason,

that the law recognizes as just and equitable, and founded in

good public policy. What are reasonable rules is a question of

law, and is for the court to determine, under all the circum-

stances in each particular case.

In the present instance, the rule that set apart a car for the ex-

clusive use of ladies, and gentlemen accompanied by ladies, is a

reasonable one, and the power of the comDany to establish it has

never been doubted.

If the appellee is to be denied the privilege of the "ladies*

ear," for which she was willing to pay, and "had paid, full com-

pensation to the company, a privilege which is accorded alike

to all women, whether they are rich or poor, it must be on some
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principle or under some rule of the company that the law

would recognize as reasonable and just. If she was denied that

privilege by the mere caprice of the brakeman and conductor,

and under no reasonable rule of the company, or, what is still

worse, as the evidence would indicate, through mere wantonness

on the part of the brakeman, then it was unreasonable, and there-

fore unlawful. It is not pretended that there was any rule that

excluded her, or that the managing officers of the company had

ever given any directions to exclude colored persons from that

car. If, however, there was such a rule, it could not be justified

on the ground of mere prejudice. Such a rule must have for its

foundation a better and a sounder reason, and one more in

consonance with the enlightened judgment of reasonable men.

An unreasonable rule, that affects the convenience and com-

fort of passengers, is unlawful, simply because it is unreasonable.

The State v. Overton, 4 Zab. 435, 61 Am. D. 671.

In the case of the Westchester and Philadelphia R. R. Co. v.

Miles, 55 Pa. St. 209, 93 Am. D. 744, it was admitted that no

one could be excluded from a carriage by a public carrier on
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account of color, religious belief, political relations or prejudice,

but it was held not to be an unreasonable regulation to seat

passengers so as to preserve order and decorum, and prevent

contacts and collisions arising from well-known repugnances,

and, therefore, a rule that required a colored woman to occupy

a separate seat in a car furnished by the company, equally as

comfortable and safe as that furnished for other passengers,

was not an unreasonable rule.

Under some circumstances, this might not be an unreasonable

rule.

At all events, public carriers, until they do furnish separate

seats equal in comfort and safety to those furnished for other

travelers, must be held to have no right to discriminate between

passengers on account of color, race or nativity, alone.

We do not understand that the appellee was bound to go for-

ward to the car set apart for and occupied mostly by men, when

she was directed by the brakeman. It is a sufficient answ^er to

say, that that car was not provided by any rule of the company

for the use of women, and that another one was. This fact was

known to the appellee at the time. She may have undertaken

the journey alone in view of that very fact, as women often do.

The above views dispose of all the objections taken to the in-

structions given by the court on behalf of the appellee, and the

refusal of the court to give those asked on the part of the appel-

lants, except the one which tells the jury that they may give

damages above the actual damages sustained, for the delay,
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vexation and indignity to which the appellee was exposed, if

she was wrongfully excluded from the car. If the party in such

case is confined to the actual pecuniary damages sustained, it

would, most often, be no compensation at all, above nominal

damages, and no salutary effect would be produced on the wrong-

doer by such a verdict. But we apprehend that, if the act is

wrongfully and wantonly committed, the party may recover,

in addition to the actual damages, something for the indignity,

vexation and disgrace to which the party has been subjected.

It is insisted that the damages are excessive, in view of the

slight injury sustained.

There is evidence from which the jury could find that the

brakeman treated the appellee very rudely, and placed his hand

on her and pushed her away from the car. The act was com-

mitted in a public place, and whatever disgrace was inflicted on

her was in the presence of strangers and friends. The act was,

in itself, wrongful, and without the shadow of a reasonable ex-

cuse, and the damages are not too high. The jury saw the

witnesses, and heard their testimony, and with their finding we
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are fully satisfied.

Perceiving no error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.

150. ZACHERY V. MOBILE AND OHIO RAILROAD CO.,

74 Miss. 520; 21 So. B. 246; 60 Am. St. R. 529. 1896.

Action against a common carrier for refusal to receive plain-

tiff as a passenger because he was blind. Defendants demurred,

and the court below sustained the demurrer,

Stockdale, J. (After stating the facts.) The demurrer, ad-

mitting the truth of the allegations of the complaint, one of

which is to the effect that the appellant had been riding on ap-

pellee's road for several years, pursuing his occupation, and had

given no cause of complaint, and none had ever been made until

January 25, 1896, and that the sole reason for rejecting him as

a passenger was his blindness, it follows that the naked question,

detached from any attending circumstances, is whether a per-

son, otherwise qualified, may be rejected as a passenger for the

sole reason that he is blind, and this court is asked to announce

that to be the law. There seems to be a scarcity of decisions on

the precise point.

In Rorer on Railroads, volume 2, page 957, it is laid down as

the law that, "as common carriers of persons, railroad com-
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panics are ordinarily bound to carry, according to their reason-

able rules and regulations, and in accordance with their regular

time cards, all persons who apply to be carried, and are ready to

pay, and do pay, the usual fare when required, except unsuitable

persons, hereinafter mentioned." These exceptions are those

who desire to injure the company, notoriously bad or justly sus-

picious persons, gross or immoral persons, drunken persons, and

those who refuse to obey the rules.

It is laid down in Angell on Carriers, section 524, to be the

common law that "it is the duty of public or common carriers

of persons to receive all persons who apply for a passage" (these

words italicized). In section 525 it is said: "It is, in fact, beyond

all doubt that the first and most general obligation on the part

of public carriers of passengers, whether by land or water, is

to carry persons who apply for a passage."

These are the general rules, subject always to the exceptions

enumerated; but we have not found any decision holding that,

as a matter of law, a person can be rejected because he is blind.

It is urged by counsel for appellee that a rule of a railroad
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company authorizing the refusal, by its agents, of an infirm

passenger, unless provided with an assistant, is reasonable and

demanded by the convenience of the traveling public. A propo-

sition we do not controvert, but in this case there is nothing in

the record to show that appellee had made or promulgated

such a rule. On the contrary, it is alleged in the complaint and

admitted by the demurrer that appellant was not infirm but ro-

bust, able to take care of himself, and to comply with the rules

applying to passengers generally ; that he had been traveling on

appellee's road for several years, and given no cause of com-

plaint to appellee's servants, and none was ever made. All this

being admitted by the demurrer, the doctrines laid down in

Sevier v. Vicksburg etc. E. R. Co., 61 Miss. 10, 48 Am. Rep. 74,

relied on by appellee, do not apply to this case. There is nothing

to show that appellant was informed that the absence of an at-

tendant was the cause of his rejection, and nothing to show that

he needed one. Appellee's counsel contends that infirm passen-

gers require more and extra care, and for that reason railroad

companies have the right to reject them. But appellee admits,

by its demurrer, that appellant was not such a passenger, and

had never required extra care.

We do not desire to intimate any opinion as to what regula-

tions and rules railroad companies may make as to passengers,

but we decline to hold that, ae^ a proposition of law, stripped of

all attending circumstances, public carriers of passengers can
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reject a person otherwise qualified, upon the sole ground that he

is blind.

The judgment of the court below is, therefore, reversed, the

demurrer overruled and the cause remanded.

151. MEMPHIS & CHARLESTON RAILROAD CO. V.

BENSON,

85 Tenn. 627; 4 Am. St. R. 776. 1887.

LuRTON, J. This was a suit for damages for an alleged un-

lawful ejection of the defendant in error from the train of the

plaintiff in error. There was a judgment for five hundred dol-

lars in favor of the defendant in error rendered by the circuit

judge, who tried the case without a jury. The railway company

have appealed, and a number of reasons are assigned for re-

versal.

The defendant in error went upon the passenger train at

Memphis, Tennessee, and went into the car set apart for ladies,

and gentlemen traveling with ladies. This car at the time was

overcrowded, and he was unable to obtain a seat, and this con-
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dition of things he saw before the train left Memphis, yet he

made no demand at Memphis, the terminal station, for a seat;

but, preferring to take his chances to get a seat, he remained

on the car standing until after the train had started upon its

trip. After the train had gotten well out of Memphis, the usual

demand was made upon him for his ticket. This he declined

to surrender, taking the position that he would not surrender

his ticket until he had been furnished with a seat. The con-

ductor called his attention to the fact that there was not a va-

cant seat in the car in which he was, and offered to get him a

seat in the next forward car, and further saying that it

would be but a short time before seats would be vacated by

passengers for local stations, and that he would then give him

a seat in the ladies' car. This he declined, and demanded a seat

in the ladies' car before surrendering his ticket.

The demand of the conductor for his ticket was renewed in

a short time, with the statement that he must either get off the

train or surrender his ticket. This demand was again refused,

and he further declared that he would not leave the train. Upon

the train stopping at the next regular station, he, still refusing to

leave the train, was ejected.

He neither surrendered his ticket to the conductor nor showed

that he had such a ticket, nor did he state the point to which
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he was destined. lie bases his refusal to go into the forward

car upon the ground that it was a smoking-car, and that the

foul air of such a car was likely to make him ill.

There can be no doubt that the contract of a carrier of pas-

sengers by railway is one not only to furnish the passenger withi

transportation, but with the comfort of a seat. The contract is

no more performed by furnishing him with a seat without trans-

portation than it is when he is offered transportation without a

seat. It is equally well settled that the passenger need not sur-

render his ticket until he is furnished with a seat, for the ticket

is the evidence of the contract which entitles him to one. But it

cannot be that one may ride free because not furnished with a

seat. If the passenger chooses to accept transportation without

a seat, he must, on demand, pay his fare. If unwilling to ride

without transportation is furnished him in a seat, he must get off

at first opportunity, and by so doing may bring his action for

breach of contract, and recover as damages such sum as will

compensate him for such breach, including such damages as are

the natural and immediate results of such breach. Rorer on
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Railroads, 968, 969 ; Davis v. Kansas City etc. R. R. Co., 53 Mo.

317, 14 Am. R. 457; St. Louis etc. R'y Co. v. Leigh, 45 Ark. 368,

55 Am. Rep. 558.

It results that for the indignity and vexation consequent

upon the ejection in this case there can be no recovery. This

result is made the more certain by the facts of this case, it ap-

pearing that at the time this passenger entered the car at the

terminal station he saw that this car assigned to ladies, and

gentlemen with ladies, was overcrowded, and he knew that he

must either ride standing or take a seat in the car called the

smoking-car. He gave the railway company no opportunity to

furnish additional seats while at this terminal station. We

have at this term, in the case of Chesapeake etc. R. R. Co. v.

Wells, 85 Tenn. 613, 4 S. W. R. 5, held that a railway company

may make reasonable regulations concerning the car in which

a passenger might be required to ride, provided that equal ac-

commodations were furnished to all holding first-class tickets,

and that a regulation assigning a particular car to persons of

color, that car being in all respects equal in comfort to any other

in the train, was reasonable. This rule has been sustained in

the courts of many states : West Chester R. R. Co. v. Miles, 55

Pa. St. 209, 93 Am. Dec. 744; Chicago and Northwestern R'y

Co. V. Williams, 55 111. 185, 8 Am. Rep. 641.

So we think a regulation setting apart a car for ladies, or

gentlemen accompanied by ladies, a reasonable regulation. A

passenger may not dictate where he will sit or in which ear he
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will ride. If he is furnished accommodations equal in all re-

spects to those furnished other passengers on the same train, he

cannot complain, and this was the substance of our decision in

the Ida Wells case. The doctrine is equally applicable here.

This passenger, when he took passage at Memphis, did it with

knowledge that the ladies' car was crowded, and that he would

either have to ride standing in that car, or go into the car de-

signed exclusively for gentlemen, and in which smoking was

permitted. The requirement that he should go temporarily into

the smoking-car under these circumstances was not unreasonable.

He ought not to have started when he did unless willing to sub-

mit to what he realized was an inevitable necessity, without giv-

ing the carrier notice of his demand.

But upon another ground this judgment cannot be sustained,

even for damages for breach of comtract. The defendant in

error in his deposition states that he had a ticket purchased at

Austin, Texas, which entitled him to passage to Atlanta, Georgia,

and that one of the coupons upon this ticket entitled him to

passage over the road of plaintiff in error from Memphis to
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Chattanooga. The ticket he does not produce, nor does he

account for his failure to produce it by proof of its loss, or that

he had subsequently used it. Objection was taken to this evi-

dence, and the objection overruled, upon promise of counsel, at a

subsequent stage of the trial, to account for its non-production

so as to let in secondary evidence of the fact of the contract

therein contained. This was not done. It is elementary law that

the contents of a written or printed contract cannot be proven

without the failure to produce the paper itself is accounted

for. This objection is fatal to the whole case of defendant in

error ; for there is no legal evidence that he had a ticket. This

being so, he was rightfully ejected.

The conductor who ejected this passenger, while using no

unnecessary force, did use unnecessarily abusive language, such

as was calculated to unnecessarily insult and degrade the person

ejected. In exercising a legal right of ejection railway com-

panies must not do so in an abusive way. They are the servants

of the public, and while their right to enforce reasonable regu-

lations will be upheld, yet the regulations must not only be

reasonable in themselves, but the manner and method of enforcing

such regulations must be reasonable, and free from unnecessary

force, as well as from unnecessary indignity. The unreasonable

demands of the defendant in error afford some excuse for the

temper shown by the conductor.

In view, however, of the absence of any proof of a legal char-

acter that the ejected passenger had any ticket, and his refusal
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to pay fare, and that, therefore, the relation of passenger and

carrier did not exist, we are constrained to reverse the judgment

of the circuit judge, and anter judgment here for phiintiff in

error, the carrier in such case not being held responsible for the

ejection.

152. INGALLS V. BILLS,

9 3Iet. (Mass.) 1; 43 Am. D. 346. 1845.

Assumpsit on an implied promise of defendants as common

carriers to carry plaintiff safely from Boston to Cambridge.

He was riding on the top of the coach when an axle broke and

the coach settled on one side, but did not upset. Plaintiff was

frightened and leaped to the ground, receiving the injuries

complained of. There was a flaw in the iron of the axle, entirely

surrounded by sound iron, and no external examination would

have revealed it. There was evidence that all possible care had

been taken to use the best materials and workmanship and to

keep the coach in good repair. The judge refused to charge that

this was enough, but did charge as stated in the opinion, and

further that if, because defendants failed to fulfill their obli-
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gations plaintiff as a prudent precaution leaped from the coach,

his recovery would not be defeated by the fact that it might now

appear that he might safely have remained in his seat.

By Court, Hubbard, J. The question presented in this case is

one of much importance to a community like ours, so many of

whose citizens are engaged in business which requires their trans-

portation from place to place in vehicles furnished by others;

and though speed seems to be the most desirable element in

modern travel, yet the law points more specifically to the se-

curity of the traveler.

Under the charge of the learned judge who tried this case, we

are called upon to decide whether the proprietors of stage-

coaches are answerable for all injuries to passengers arising

from accidents happening to their coaches, although proceeding

from causes which the greatest care in the examination and in-

spection of the coach could not guard against, or prevent ; or, in

other words, whether a coach must be alike free from secret

defects, which the owner can not detect, after the most critical

examination, as from those which might, on such an examina-

tion, be discovered. The learned judge ruled, that the defend-

ants, as proprietors of a coach, were bound by law, and by an

implied promise on their part, to provide a coach, not only ap-
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parently but really roadworthy, and that they were liable for any

injury that might arise to a passenger from a defect in the orig-

inal construction of the coach, although the imperfection was

not visible, and could not be discovered upon inspection and

examination.

The law respecting common carriers has ever been rigidly en-

forced, and probably there has been as little relaxation of the

doctrine, as maintained by the ancient authorities, respecting

this species of contract, as in any one branch of the common law.

This arises from the great confidence necessarily reposed in per-

sons engaged in this employment. Goods are intrusted to their

sole charge and oversight, and for which they receive a suitable

compensation; and they have been, and still are, held responsi-

ble for the safe delivery of the goods, with but two exceptions,

viz., the act of God, and the king's enemies; so that the owners

of goods may be protected against collusive robberies, against

thefts and embezzlements, and negligent transportation. But

in regard to the carriage of passengers, the same principles of

law have not been applied; and for the obvious reason, that a
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great distinction exists between persons and goods, the passen-

gers being capable of taking care of themselves, and of exer-

cising that vigilance and foresight, in the maintenance of their

rights, which the owners of goods can not do, who have intrusted

them to others.

It is contended by the counsel for the plaintiff, that the pro-

prietor of a stage-coach is held responsible for the safe carriage

of passengers, so far that he is a warrantor that his coach is road-

worthy, that is, is absolutely sufficient for the performance of

the journey undertaken; and that if an accident happens, the

proof of the greatest care, caution, and diligence, in the selec-

tion of the coach, and in the preservation of it during its use,

will not be a defense to the owner; and it is insisted that this

position is supported by various authorities. The cases, among

many others cited, which are more especially relied upon, are

those of Israel v. Clark, 4 Esp. 259 ; Crofts v. Waterhouse, 3

Bing. 319 ; Bremner v. Williams, 1 Car. & P. 414 ; and Sharp v.

Grey, 9 Bing. 457, If these cases do uphold the doctrine for

which they are cited, they are certainly so much in conflict with

other decided cases, that they can not be viewed in the light of

established authorities. But we think, upon an examination of

them, and comparing them with other cases, they will not be

found so clearly to sustain the position of the plaintiff, as has

been argued. It must be borne in mind, that the carrying of

passengers for hire, in coaches, is comparatively a modern prac-

tice ; and that though suits occur against owners of coaches, for
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the loss of goods, as early as the time of Lord Holt, yet the first

case of a suit to recover damages by a passenger, which I have

noticed, is that of White v. Boulton, Peak. Cas. 113, which was

tried before Lord Kenyon in 1791, and published in 1795. That

was an action against the proprietors of the Chester mail coach

for the negligence of the driver, by reason of which the coach

was overturned, and the plaintiff's arm broken, and in which he

recovered damages for the injury; and Lord Kenyon, in de-

livering his opinion, said, "when these [mail] coaches carried

passengers, the proprietors of them were bound to carry them

safely and properly." The correctness of the opinion can not

be doubted, in its application to a case of negligence. The

meaning of the word "safely," as used in declarations for this

species of injury, is given hereafter.

The next case which occurred was that of Aston v. Heaven, 2

Esp. 533, in 1797, which was against the defendants, as pro-

prietors of the Salisbury stage-coach, for negligence in the driv-

ing of their coach, in consequence of which it was overset and

the plaintiff injured. This action was tried before Eyre, C. J.
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It was contended by the counsel for the plaintiff, that coach-

owners were liable in all cases, except where the injury hap-

pens from the act of God or of the king's enemies; but the

learned judge held that cases of loss of goods by carriers were

totally unlike the case before him. In those cases, the parties

are protected by the custom; but as against carriers of persons

the action stands alone on the ground of negligence.

The next case was that of Israel v. Clark, 4 Esp. 259, in

1803, where the plaintiff sought to recover damages for an in-

jury arising from the overturning of the defendant's coach, in

consequence of the axle-tree having broken; and one count al-

leged the injury to have arisen from the overloading of the

coach. It was contended that if the owners carried more pas-

sengers than they were allowed by act of parliament, that should

be deemed such an overloading. To this Lord Ellenborough,

who tried the case, assented, and said: "If they carried more

than the statute allowed, they were liable to its penalties; but

they might not be entitled to carry so many ; it depended on the

strength of the carriage. They were bound by law to provide

sufficient carriages for the safe conveyance of the public who

had occasion to travel by them. At all events, he would expect

a clear landworthiness in the carriage itself to be established."

This is one of the cases upon which the present plaintiff spe-

cially relies. It was a nisi prius case, and it does not appear

upon which count the jury found their verdict. But the point

pending in the present case was neither discussed nor started,
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viz., whether the accident arose from the negligence of the

owner in not providing a coach of sufficient strength, or from

a secret defect not discoverable upon the most careful examina-

tion. No opinon was expressed whether the action rests upon

negligence or upon an implied warranty. But it was stated

that the defendants were bound by law to provide sufficient car-

riages for the passage, and, at all events, that there should be a

clear landworthiness in the carriage itself.

The general position is not denied with regard to the duty of

an owner to provide safe carriages. The duty, however, does

not in itself import a warranty. The judge himself may have

used stronger expressions, in the terms "landworthiness in the

carriage," than he intended by the thought of seaworthiness in

a ship, and the duty of ship-owners in that respect. If the sub-

ject had been discussed, and the distinctions now presented had

been raised, and then the opinion had followed, as expressed in

the report, it would be entitled to much more consideration than

the mere strength of the words now impart to it.

The next case was that of Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp. 79, in
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1809. There the axle-tree of the coach snapped asunder at a

place where there was a slight descent from the kennel crossing

the road, and the plaintiff was thrown from the top of the

coach. Sir James Mansfield, in instructing the jury, said : "As

the driver had been cleared of negligence, the question for the

jury was as to the sufficiency of the coach. If the axle-tree was

sound, so far as human eye could discover, the defendant was

not liable. There was a difference between a contract to carry

goods and a contract to carry passengers. For the goods, the

carrier was answerable at all events, but he did not warrant the

safety of the passengers. His undertaking as to them went no

further than this, that, as far as human care and foresight could

go, he would provide for their safe conveyance. Therefore, if

the breaking down of the coach was purely accidental, the plain-

tiff' had no remedy for the misfortune he had encountered."

The case of Bremner v. Williams, 1 Car. & P. 414, in 1824, is

relied on by the plaintiff. There, Best, C. J., said he consid-

ered that "every coach proprietor warrants to the public that

his stage-coach is equal to the journey it undertakes, and that it

is his duty to examine it previous to the commencement of every

journey." And so, in Crofts v. Waterhouse, 3 Bing. 321, in

1825, Best, C. J., said: "The coachman must have competent

skill, and use that skill with diligence ; he must be well acquainted

wdth the road he undertakes to drive ; he must be provided with

steady horses, a coach and harness of sufficient strength, and

properly made; and also with lights by night. If there be the
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least failure in any one of these things, the duty of the coach

proprietors is not fulfilled, and they are answerable for any in-

jury or damage that happens." But though this language is

strong, and would apparently import a warranty, on the part of

the stage proprietor, as to the sufficiency of his coach, yet Park,

J., in the same case said, "a carrier of passengers is only liable

for negligence. ' ' This shows that the court did not mean to lay

down the law, that a stage proprietor is in fact a warrantor of

the sufficiency of his coach and its equipments, but that he is

bound to use the utmost diligence and care in making suitable

provision for those whom he carries; and we think such a con-

struction is warranted by the language of the same learned

judge (Best) in the case of Harris v. Costar, 1 Car, & P. 636, in

1825, where the averment in the declaration was, that the de-

fendant undertook to carry the plaintiff safely. The judge held

that it did not mean that the coach proprietor undertook to

convey safely absolutely, but that it was to be construed like

all other instruments, taking the whole together, and meant that

the defendants were to use due care.
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But the case mainly relied upon by the plaintiff is that of

Sharp V. Grey, 9 Bing. 457, where the axle-tree of a coach was

broken and the plaintiff injured. There the axle was an iron

bar inclosed in a frame of wood of four pieces, secured by

clamps of iron. The coach was examined, and no defect was

obvious to the sight. But after the accident, a defect was found

in a portion of the iron bar, which could not be discovered

without taking off the wood work; and it was proved that it

was not ^^sual to examine the iron under the wood work, as it

vrould rather tend to insecurity than safety. It does not ap-

pear by the statement, that the defect could not have been seen,

on taking off the wood work; but it would rather seem that it

might have been discovered. However that may be, the lan-

guage of different judges, in giving their opinions, is relied

upon as maintaining the doctrines contended for by the plain-

tiff. Gaselee, J., held that "the burden lay on the defendant

to show there had been no defect in the construction of the

coach." Bosanquet, J., said: "The chief justice" (who tried

the case) "held that the defendant was bound to provide a safe

vehicle, and the accident happened from a defect in the axle-

tree. If so, when the coach started it was not roadworthy, and

the defendant is liable for the consequences, upon the same

principle as a ship-owner who furnishes a vessel which is not

seaworthy." And Alderson, J., said he was of the same opin-

ion, and that "a coach proprietor is liable for all defects in his

vehicle, which can be seen at the time of construction, as well
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as for such as may exist afterwards, and be discovered on inves-

tigation. The injury in the present case appears to have been

occasioned by an original defect of construction; and if the de-

fendant were not responsible, a coach proprietor might buy ill-

constructed or unsafe vehicles, and his passengers be without

remedy. ' '

This case goes far to support the plaintiff in the doctrine con-

tended for by his counsel, as it would seem to place the case

upon the ground that the coach proprietor must, at all events,

provide a coach absolutely and at all times sufficient for the jour-

ney, and that he is a warrantor to the passenger to provide such

a coach. But we incline to believe the learned judges gave too

much weight to the comparison of Bosanquet, J., viz., that a

coach must be roadworthy on the same principle that a ship

must be seaworthy. We think the comparison is not correct,

and that the analogy applies only where goods are carried, and

not where passengers are transported. And no case has been

cited, where a passenger has sued a ship-owner for an injury aris-

ing to him personally in not conducting him in a seaworthy ship.
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If more was intended by the learned court, than that a coach

proprietor is bound to use the greatest care and diligence in pro-

viding suitable and sufficient coaches, and keeping them in a safe

and suitable condition for use, we can not agree with them

in opinion. To give their language the meaning contended for

in the argument of the case at bar is, in fact, to place coach pro-

prietors in the same predicament with common carriers, and to

make them responsible, in all events, for the safe conduct of pas-

sengers, so far as the vehicle is concerned. But that the case of

Sharp V. Gray is susceptible of being placed on the ground which

we think tenable, namely, that negligence and not warranty lies

at the foundation of actions of this description, may be inferred

from the language of Mr. Justice Park, who, in giving his opin-

ion, says: "This was entirely a question of fact. It is clear

that there was a defect in the axle-tree ; and it was for the jury to

say whether the accident was occasioned by what, in law, is called

negligence in the defendant, or not." And Tindal, C. J., who

tried the cause before the jury, left it for them to consider

whether there had been that vigilance which was required by the

defendant's engagement to carry the plaintiff safely; thus ap-

parently putting the case on the ground of negligence and not

of warranty. See also Bretherton v. Wood, 3 Brod. & B. 54,

6 Moore, 141 ; Ansell v. Waterhouse, 6 Mau. & Sel. 385, 2 Chit. 1.

The same question has arisen in this country, and the decis-

ions exhibit a uniformity of opinion that coach proprietors are

not liable as common carriers, but are made responsible by rea-
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son of negligence. In the case of Camden and Amboy Railroad

Co. V. Burke, 13 Wend. 626, 28 Am. Dec. 488, the court say

that the proprietors of public conveyances are liable at all events

for the baggage of passengers ; but as to injuries to their persons,

they are only liable for the want of such care and diligence as is

characteristic of cautious persons. And in considering the sub-

ject again in the case of Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Id. 236, 32 Am.

Dee. 455, they say, that "stage-coach proprietors, and other

carriers by laud and vs^ater, incur a very different responsibility

in relation to the passenger and his baggage. For an injury to

the passenger, they are answerable only where there has been a

want of proper care, diligence, or skill; but in relation to bag-

gage, they are regarded as insurers, and must answer for any

loss not occasioned by inevitable accident or the public enemies. ' '

In a case which occurred in respect to the transportation of

slaves, Boyce v. Anderson, 2 Pet. 155, Chief Justice Marshall,

in giving the opinion of the court, says: "The law applicable

to common carriers is one of great rigor. Though to the ex-

tent to which it has been carried, and in cases to which it has
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been applied, we admit its necessity and policy, we do not think

it ought to be carried further, or applied to new cases. "We

think it has not been applied to living men, and that it ought

not to be applied to them." So in the case of Stokes v. Salton-

stall, 13 Id. 181, the question arose and was thoroughly dis-

cussed; and the same opinions are maintained as in the cases

above cited from Wendell. And the whole subject is examined

by Judge Story, in his treatise on bailments, sees. 592-600, with

his usual learning ; and his result is the same.

If there is a discrepancy between the English authorities

which have been cited, we think the opinions expressed by Chief

Justice Eyre and Chief Justice Mansfield are most consonant

with sound reason, as applicable to a branch of the law compar-

atively new, and, though given at 7iisi prius, are fully sustained

by the discussions which the same subject has undergone in the

courts of our own country. We have said, as being most con-

sonant with sound reason, or good common sense, as applied to

so practical a subject; because, if such a warranty were imposed

by force of law upon the proprietors of coaches and other vehicles

for the conveyance of passengers, they would in fact become

the warrantors of the work of others, over whom they have

no actual control, and — from the number of artisans employed

in the construction of the materials of a single coach — ^whom

they could not follow. Unless, therefore, by the application

of a similar rule, every workman shall be held as the warrantor,

in all events, of the strength, sufficiency, and adaptation of his
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own manufactures to the uses designed — which, in a community

like ours, could not be practically enforced — the warranty would

really rest on the persons purchasing the article for use, and

not upon the makers.

If it should be said, that the same observations might be ap-

plied to ship-owners, the answer might be given, that they have

never been held as the warrantors of the safety of the passen-

gers whom they conveyed ; and as to the transportation of goods,

owners of general ships have always been held as common car-

riers, for the same reasons that carriers on land are bound for

the safe delivery of goods intrusted to them. But as it respects

the seaworthiness of a ship, the technical rules of law respecting

it have been so repeatedly examined, and the facts upon which

they rest so often investigated, that the questions which arise are

those of fact and not of law, and in a vast proportion of in-

stances depend upon the degree of diligence and care which are

used in the preservation of vessels, and practically resolve them-

selves into questions of negligence ; so that the evils are very few

that arise from the maintenance of the doctrine that a ship must
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be seaworthy in order to be the subject of insurance.

The result to which we have arrived, from the examination of

the case before us, is this : That carriers of passengers for hire

are bound to use the utmost care and diligence in the providing

of safe, sufficient, and suitable coaches, harnesses, horses, and

coachmen, in order to prevent those injuries which human care

and foresight can guard against; and that if an accident hap-

pens from a defect in the coach, w^hieh might have been discov-

ered and remedied upon the most careful and thorough examina-

tion of the coach, such accident must be ascribed to negligence,

for which the owner is liable in case of injury to a passenger,

happening by reason of such accident. On the other hand,

where the accident arises from a hidden and internal defect,

which a careful and thorough examination would not disclose,

and which could not be guarded against by the exercise of a

sound judgment and the most vigilant oversight, then the pro-

prietor is not liable for the injury, but the misfortune must be

borne by the sufferer, as one of that class of injuries for which

the law can afford no redress in the form of a pecuniary recom-

pense. And we are of opinion that the instructions, which the

defendants' counsel requested might be given to the jury in the

present case, were correct in point of law, and that the learned

judge erred in extending the liability of the defendants further

than was proposed in the instructions requested.

The point arising on the residue of the instructions was not

pressed in the argument ; and we see no reason to doubt its cor-
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reotness, provided the peril to which the plaintiff was exposed

arose from a defect or accident for which the defendants were

otherwise liable : Jones v. Boyce, 1 Stark, 493.

New trial granted.

153. MEIER V. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO.,

64 Pa. St. 225; 3 Am.. R. 581. 1870.

Action for injuries received in an accident caused by the break-

ing of an axle on the sleeping car on which plaintiff was a pas-

senger. New axles had been provided the year before by a re-

liable firm ; they were of good quality and had been inspected

twenty-two miles east of the place of the accident. Verdict for

defendants and plaintiff appealed.

Agnew, J. It is agreed on all hands, says Judge Redfield, in

his work on Railways,, edition of 1867, p. 174, that carriers of

passengers are liable only for negligence either proximate or

remote, and that they are not insurers of the safety of their pas-

sengers, as they are as carriers of goods and baggage of passen-

gers. The numerous cases cited from which this result is drawn

justify this statement. Alden v. N. Y. Central Railroad Co., 26
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N. Y. 102, 82 Am. D. 401, holding that a carrier is bound abso-

lutely to provide a safe vehicle, irrespective of any question of

negligence, is not in accord with the American cases generally,

or the modern English decisions. It is reviewed in Readliead v.

Midland Railroad Co., 2 Law Rep., Q. B. 412, and therein said

not to be founded in good reason. See the cases collected in

Shearman & Redfield on Negl. (1869) 299, § 267.

The language of Judge Gibson, taken from New Jersey R. R,

Co. V. Kennard, 21 Pa. St. 204, that a carrier of either goods

or passengers is bound to provide a carriage or vehicle perfect

in all its parts, in default of which he becomes responsible for any

loss or injury that may be suffered, has no relation to the ques-

tion now before us. The case he was considering was that of

a car made without guards at the windows to prevent the arms

of passengers being thrust out, to their injury, which he con-

sidered a defect in the construction of the car, making the car-

rier liable for negligence. The car was not perfect in its parts

as he thought. The car was imperfect in construction, and there-

fore not adapted to the end to be attained, to wit, security.

It may not be amiss to say that this opinion of the chief jus-

tice as to window guards, was not sustained by the court in
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banc, and has since been overruled in Pittsburg & Connellsviile

Railroad Co. v. McClurg, 56 Pa. St. 294. The doctrine we

are now asked to sustain is, that though the car is perfect in

all its parts, if imperfect from some latent and undiscoverable

defect, which the utmost skill and care could neither perceive

nor provide against, the railway company must still be held

responsible for injury to passengers, on the ground of an abso-

lute liability for every defect. The plaintiff in error in effect

contends that the defendants were warrantors against every acci-

dent, but even in the case referred to, Judge Gibson denied this

rule. He said of the carrier, he is bound to guard him (the

passenger) from every danger which extreme vigilance can pre-

vent. This expresses the true measure of responsibility. He

answered a point in these words: "That the company is re-

sponsible only for defects discoverable by a careful man after

a careful examination and exercise of sound judgment. ' ' Thus :

"This is true, but were there such an examination and exer-

cise of judgment? The defective construction of the car must

have been obvious to the dullest perception," etc. The same
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rule was laid down in Laing v. Colder, 8 Pa. St. 482, 49 Am. D.

533. Judge Bell says, it is long since settled that the common-

law responsibilities of carriers of goods for hire do not as a whole

extend to carriers of passengers. The latter are not insurers

against all accidents. But though (he says) in legal contem-

plation they do not warrant the absolute safety of their passen-

gers, they are bound to the exercise of the utmost degree of

diligence and care. The slightest neglect against which human

prudence and foresight may giTard, and by which hurt or loss

is occasioned, will render them liable in damages. The same

doctrine will be found in substance in R. R. Co. v. Aspell, 23

Pa. St. 149, 62 Am. D. 323, and Sullivan v. The Philadelphia

& Reading Co., 30 Pa. St. 234, and in other cases. In all the

Pennsylvania cases, it will be found that negligence is the ground

of liability on the part of a carrier of passengers. Absolute

liability reqiiires absolute perfection in machinery in all re-

spects, which is impossible.

The utmost which human knowledge, human skill and human

foresight and care can provide is all that in reason can be re-

quired. To ask more is to prohibit the running of railways,

"unless they possess a capital and surplus which will enable them

to add a new element to their business, that of insurance. Nor

can we carry the requirements beyond the use of known ma-

chinery and modes of using it. Railroads must keep pace with

science and art and modern improvement, in their application

to the carriage of passengers, but are not responsible for the un-
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known as well as the new. The rule laid down by the learned

judge, in the language quoted in the second assignment of error,

is a correct summary of the law. The rule of responsibility

differs from the rule of evidence. Prima facie, where a passen-

ger, being carried on a train, is injured without fault of his own,

there is a legal presumption of negligence, casting upon the

carrier the onus of disproving it. Laing v. Colder, 8 Pa. St. 482,

49 Am. D. 533; Sullivan v. Philadelphia & Reading Railroad

Co., 30 Pa. St. 234; Shearman & Redfield on Negl., § 280; Red-

field on Railways, § 1760, and notes. This is the rule when the

injury is caused by a defect in the road, cars, or machinery,

or by a want of diligence or care in those employed, or by any

other thing which the company can and ought to control as a

part of its duty, to carry the passengers safely; but this rule

of evidence is not conclusive. The carrier may rebut the pre-

sumption and relieve himself from responsibility by showing

that the injury arose from an accident which the utmost skill,

foresight and diligence could not prevent.

"We think none of the errors assigned are sustained, and

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:41 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

the judgment is therefore affirmed.

154. COMMONWEALTH V. BOSTON & MAINE RAIL-

ROAD CO.,

129 Mass. 500; 37 Am. R. 382. 1880.

Conviction under a statute of causing the death of a passen-

ger.

SouLE, J. It is contended on the part of the government, that

where the person killed was a passenger, the statute does not re-

quire, in order to the maintenance of an indictment, that he

should have been using due care. But whether this is so or not

need not be decided, because, in the opinion of a majority of

the court, when Hill was killed he was not a passenger within

the meaning of the statute.

It is undoubtedly true that one who has bought a ticket, or

otherwise become entitled to transportation on a particular train

of cars of a railroad corporation, is ordinarily a passenger of

the corporation from the time when he reasonably and properly

starts from the ticket office or waiting room in the station to take

his seat in a car of the train, till he has reached the station to

which he is entitled to be carried, and has had an opportunity,

by safe and convenient means, to leave the train and roadway

of the corporation at that station. Warren v. Fitchburg Rail-
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road, 8 Allen, 227, 85 Am. D. 700. The duty of the corporation

toward him is to furnish a well-constructed and safe road, suit-

able engine and cars, competent and careful enginemen, con-

ductors and other necessary laborers, in order that all injuries

which human foresight can guard against may be prevented.

But this duty rests on the corporation only so long as the pas-

senger sees fit to be carried by it ; and if he chooses to abandon

his journey at any point before reaching the place to which he

is entitled to be carried, the corporation ceases to be under any

obligation to provide him with the means of traveling further.

And while it is true, that if he leaves the train while it is at

rest at a station, he is entitled to an opportunity so to do in

safety, it is equally true that the corporation is not under any

obligation to make it safe for him to leave the train while it is in

motion, and that if he does so, he assumes all risk of injury.

Gavett V. Manchester & Lawrence Railroad, 16 Gray, 501, 77

Am. D. 422. It would not be contended by any one that an

indictment under the statute could be maintained against a rail-

road corporation for causing the death of one who without look-
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ing to see if the track was clear, jumped from a train which

was running at ordinary speed between stations, and was imme-

diately afterward killed by the engine of a train going in the

opposite direction on another track. The indictment would

fail because the facts showed that the corporation owed no duty

to the deceased. He would have ceased to be a passenger, by

voluntarily leaving the train at a place and time when and

where the corporation could not anticipate that he would leave

it, and when and where the corporation was under no obliga-

tion to see that he had an opportunity to leave its roadway in

safety after leaving the train. He would have become an in-

truder on the track of the corporation, acting without any regard

to the dangerous character of the situation, and not entitled to

protection against the consequences of his own negligence. The

principle involved in the supposed case is involved in and governs

the case at bar.

So long as the train was in motion, Hill could not leave it and

still retain his right to protection till he had left the roadway of

the corporation. By leaving the train while in motion, he ceased

to be a passenger, and to have the rights of a passenger, as com-

pletely, though the train was moving slowly, and was near by

the station, as if he had left it while moving at full speed be-

tween stations. Hickey v. Boston & Lowell Railroad, 14 Allen,

429. The fact that the car in which Hill was had passed the

platform of the station to which he was entitled to be carried

did not give him the right to leave the train at the risk of the
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company. If he sustained any injury by being carried beyond

the station, his remedy would be by an action, counting on that

injury-.

Hill, having ceased to be a passenger, was on the track of the

defendant's road under circumstances which preclude the idea

that he was in the exercise of due care. The evidence on this

point is all in one direction, and it is to the effect, that if he had

looked, he could not have failed to see that the approaching train

on the other track was so near that he could not cross the track

before it would strike him.

It follows that the defendant was right in asking the ruling

that there was no sufficient evidence to support either count of

the indictment. There was no evidence to support the counts

in which Hill is alleged to have been a passenger, because by

his voluntary act he had ceased to be a passenger, or to be en-

titled to protection as a passenger. There was no evidence to

support the counts in which he is alleged not to have been a

passenger, because there was no evidence that he was in the

exercise of due care.
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Exceptions sustained.

155. CHRISTIE V. GRIGGS,

2 Campbell 79. 1809.

This was an action of assumpsit against the defendant as

owner of the Blackwall Stage, on which the plaintiff, a pilot,

was traveling to London, when it broke down, and he was greatly

bruised. The first count imputed the accident to the negligence

of the driver; the second, to the insufficiency of the carriage.

The plaintiff having proved that the axle-tree snapped asun-

der at a place where there is a slight descent, from the kennel

crossing the road ; that he was, in consequence, precipitated from

the top of the coach; and that the bruises he received confined

him several weeks to his bed — there rested his case.

Best, Serjeant, contended strenuously that the plaintiff was

bound to proceed farther, and give evidence, either of the driver

being unskilful, or of the coach being insufficient.

Sir James Mansfield, C. J. I think the plaintiff has made

a prima facie case by proving his going on the coach, the acci-

dent, and the damage he has suffiered. It now lies on the other

side to shew, that the coach was as good a coach as could be

made, and that the driver was as skilful a driver as could any

where be found. What other evidence can the plaintiff give?
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The passengers were probably all sailors like himself; and how

do they know whether the coach was well built, or whether the

coachman drove skilfully? In many other cases of this sort,

it must be equally impossible for the plaintiff to give the evi-

dence required. But when the breaking down or overturning

of a coach is proved, negligence on the part of the owner is

implied. He has always the means to rebut this presumption, if

it be unfounded; and it is now incumbent on the defendant to

make out, that the damage in this case arose from what the law

considers a mere accident.

The defendant then called several witnesses, who swore that

the axle-tree had been examined a few days before it broke,

without any flaw bing discovered in it; and that when the acci-

dent happened, the coachman, a very skilful driver, was driving

in the usual track, and at a moderate pace.

Sir James Mansfield said, as the driver had been cleared

of every thing like negligence, the question for the jury would

be — as to the sufficiency of the coach. If the axle-tree was sound

as far as human eye could discover, the defendant was not
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liable. There was a difference between a contract to carry

goods, and a contract to carry passengers. For the goods the

carrier was answerable at all events. But he did not warrant

the safety of the passengers. His undertaking, as to them, went

no farther than this, that as far as human care and foresight

could go, he would provide for their safe conveyance. Therefore,

if the breaking down of the coach was purely accidental, the

plaintiff had no remedy for the misfortune he had encountered.

The jury found a verdict for the defendant.

156. JAMMISON V. CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILWAY

CO.,

92 Va. 327; 23 S. E. B. 758; 53 Am. St. B. 813. 1895.

Action by an infant by her next friend for damages for in-

juries received from falling from a train. The train slowed to

eight miles per hour as it approached her station, but did not

stop. Plaintiff went out of the car seeking the conductor, and as

she reached the platform she was thrown from the train by

reason of a jerking motion due to an acceleration of speed as

the train rounded a curve. Verdict for $3,000, subject to de-

fendant 's demurrer to the evidence. Demurrer sustained. Upon

an order dismissing the suit of plaintiff a writ of error was se-

cured.
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Keith, P. (After stating the facts.) Without doubt, the

defendant in error was guilty of negligence in failing to stop

the train at Ewell 's station. For whatever loss or inconvenience

plaintiff may have sustained by reason of this neglect upon the

part of the defendant in error, she had an ample remedy, and

would have been entitled to full compensation in damages. The

injury, however, for which she sues is not the loss or inconven-

ience consequent upon that act, but for the damage she suf-

fered by falling from the train, and the injuries she then sus-

tained. The failure of the defendant in error to stop its train at

E well's station was not the proximate cause of the injury for

which the suit was brought, but, on the contrary, her injury

was directly attributable to causes wholly independent of that

act of negligence. Had she retained her seat she would have

been safe, and, leaving the train at the next station, could have

maintained an action for whatever loss or injury had been in-

flicted upon her. Instead of so doing, upon the advice of a

fellow-passenger, she, after encumbering herself with bundles

under each arm, passed out upon the platform, knowing, as she
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must or ought to have known, that the speed of the train was

being accelerated; that the platform was in a position of dan-

ger, and there, "by a jerk," incident to the increase of speed

from the slow rate at which the train had been moving when

it passed the station, she was thrown from the platform, and in-

jured.

Not only did her negligent conduct so far contribute to the

accident as to preclude a recovery on her part, even though the

evidence disclosed negligence upon the part of the company, but

I am at a loss to discover in the record of this case any evidence

whatever of negligence upon the part of the company, save and

except its failure to halt its train at Ewell 's station; but that

act, as we have seen, was the remote and not the proximate cause

of the injury, and cannot be taken into consideration as consti-

tuting an element of decision in this case.

Railroad corporations owe a high degree of duty to their pas-

sengers. They must do all for their safety that human skill

and foresight may suggest, and are responsible for any, even the

slightest, neglect ; but that the passenger may hold the company

to this high degree of responsibility, it is incumbent upon him to

occupy the position upon the train assigned to passengers, and if

he voluntarily assumes a position of peril, and injury results

from it, he cannot recover.

In this case the plaintiff in error voluntarily placed herself in

a position of peril, without justification or excuse, when, encum-
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bered with bundles v.diich incapacitated her for self-protection,

she walked out upon the platform of a moving train.

The principles relied upon in this opinion have been so fully

and so frequently enforced by the decisions of this court that

they may be considered as established law : See Farish v. Reigle,

11 Graft. 697, 62 Am. Dec. 666 ; Richmond etc. R. R. Co. v. Mor-

ris, 31 Graft. 200; Richmond etc. R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 31

Graft. 812, 31 Am. Rep. 750; Dun v. Seaboard etc. R. R. Co.,

78 Ya. 645, 49 Am. Rep. 388. . . .

Judgment affirmed.

157. DODGE V. BOSTON AND BANGOR STEAMSHIP

CO.,

148 Mass. 207; 19 N. E. R. 373; 12 Am. St. R. 541. 1889.

Tort to recover damages for personal injuries received while

landing from defendant's steamer. Plaintiff was a passenger

from Boston to Camden, and at Rockland left the steamer by a

small plank provided for the use of employees only. He wished

to secure breakfast at a restaurant on the wharf. Meals were

served to those who paid for them on the boat.
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Knowlton, J. This case presents an important question as

to the rights and duties of passengers and common carriers in

reference to egress from and ingress to the vehicle of trans-

portation at intermediate points upon a journey. Wlien one

has made a contract for passage upon a vehicle of a common

carrier, and has presented himself at the proper place to be

transported, his right to care and protection begins, and ordi-

narily it continues until he has arrived at his destination, and

reached the point where the carrier is accustomed to receive

and discharge passengers. So long as he stands strictly in

this relation of a passenger, the carrier is held to the highest

degree of care for his safety. While he is upon the premises

of the carrier, before he has reached the place designed for use

by passengers waiting to be carried, or put himself in readiness

for the performance of the contract, the carrier owes him the

duty of ordinary care, as he is a person rightfully there by in-

vitation. It has sometimes been said that a passenger at the

end of his journey retains the same relation to the carrier until

he has left the carrier's premises. But there are other cases

which indicate that the contract of carriage is performed when

the passenger at the end of his journey has reached a safe and
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proper place, where persons seeking to become passengers are

regularly received, and passengers are regularly discharged,

and that the degree of care to Vhich he is then entitled is less

than during the continuance of his contract, as a carrier of

goods is held to a liability less strict after they have reached

their destination and been put in a freight-house than while

they are in transit.

There is sometimes occasion to leave the boat, or car, or car-

riage, and return to it again before the contract is fully per-

formed ; and it is necessary to determine what are the rights and

duties of the parties at such a time. Wlienever performance

of the contract in a usual and proper way necessarily involves

leaving a vehicle and returning to it, a passenger is entitled to

protection as such, as well while so leaving and returning as at

any other time j and this has been held in cases where, in accord-

ance with arrangements of the railroad companies, passengers

by railway left their train to obtain refreshments: Peniston

V. Chicago etc. R. R., 34 La. Ann. 777, 44 Am. R. 444; Jefferson-

ville etc. R. R. v. Riley, 39 Ind. 568. So where a railroad com-
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pany undertakes to carry a passenger a long distance upon its

line, and sells him a ticket upon which he may stop at interme-

diate stations, in getting on and off the train at any station

where he chooses to stop, he has the rights of a passenger. Of

course, during the interval between his departure from the sta-

tion and his return to it to resume his journey, he is not a pas-

senger.

To determine the rights of the parties in every case, the ques-

tion to be answered is. What shall they be deemed to have con-

templated by their contract? The passenger, without losing

his rights while he is in those places to which the carrier's care

should extend, may do whatever is naturally and ordinarily

incidental to his passage. If there are telegraph offices at sta-

tions along a railroad, and the carrier furnishes in its cars

blanks upon which to write telegraphic messages, and stops its

trains at stations long enough to enable passengers conveniently

to send such messages, a purchaser of a ticket over a railroad

has a right to suppose that his contract permits him to leave

his car at a station for the purpose of sending a telegraphic

message; and he has the rights of a passenger while alighting

from the train for that purpose, and while getting upon it to

resume his journey. So of one who leaves a train to obtain

refreshment, where it is reasonable and proper for him so to do,

and is consistent with the safe continuance of his jour-

ney in a usual way. Where one engages transportation for

himself by a conveyance which stops from time to time along
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his route, it may well be implied, in the absence of anything to

the contrary, that he has permission to alight for his own con-

venience at any regular stopping-place for passengers, so long as

he properly regards all the carrier's rules and regulations, and

provided that his doing so does not interfere with the carrier

in the performance of his duties.

In the case of Keokuk Northern Line Packet Co. v. True, 88

111. 608, a plaintiff before reaching his destination was going

ashore for his own convenience at a place where the boat

stopped for two hours, and was injured on the gangway plank.

It was held that he was to be treated as a passenger, and that

the defendant was bound to use the utmost care for his safety.

See also Clussman v. Long Island R. R., 9 Hun, 618, affirmed

in 73 N. Y. 606; Hrebrik v. Carr, 29 Fed. Rep. 298; Dice v.

Willamette Transportation and Locks Co., 8 Or. 60, 34 Am. R.

575. In the first of these cases, the defendant was held liable

for a defect in a platform of its station to a passenger who

had left the train to send a telegraphic message ; but the court

did not decide whether the plaintiff had the rights of a pas-
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senger at the time of his injury, or merely those of a person

there by invitation. In the second, a passenger who had taken

his place on board a steamship started to go on shore to buy

some tobacco, and fell from an unsafe plank, and was drowned.

He was held to have had the rights of a passenger, and his

administrator was permitted to recover.

No decision has been cited that conflicts with our views. In

State V. Grand Trunk R'y, 58 Me. 176, 4 Am. R. 258, the

circumstances under which the passenger left the train and re-

mained away from it were such that, applying the principles

we have enunciated, he was not a passenger at the time he was

killed. The court, in that case, was not called upon to consider

at what point a passenger leaving a car under different cir-

cumstances would cease to be such, and at what point he would

resume his former relation.

Upon the undisputed facts of the case at bar, we are of opin-

ion that the plaintiff, as a passenger, could properly go on

shore to get his breakfast at Rockland, and that he had a pas-

senger's right to protection during his egress from the steamer.

The first seven of the defendant's requests for instructions were

rightly refused.

The defendant's tenth request was for an instruction that if

the plaintiff was justified in leaving the steamer as he did, the

"defendant did not owe him so high a degree of care after he

had left the steamer and was out upon the slip as it owed him

while he remained upon or within the steamer," This request
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referred to the degree of care which the law requires of carriers

of passengers, as distinguished from the ordinary care required

of men in their common relations to each other. Because a

passenger's life and safety are necessarily intrusted, in a great

degree, to the care of the carrier who transports him, the law

deems it reasonable that the carrier should be bound to exer-

cise the utmost care and diligence in providing against those

injuries which human care and foresight can guard against.

This rule is held not only in our own state and in England,

but all over the United States. It applies not only to carriers

who use steam railroads, but to those who use horse railroads,

stage-coaches, steamboats, and sailing-vessels. It applies at all

times when, and in all places where, the parties are in the rela-

tion to each other of passenger and carrier; and it includes at-

tention to all matters which pertain to the business of carrying

the passenger.

In Readhead v. Midland R'y, L- R- 2 Q. B. 412, it is said

that a "carrier of passengers for hire was bound to use the

utmost care, skill and diligence in everything that concerned
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the safety of passengers." In R. R. Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. St. 147,

62 Am. D. 323, carriers of passengers are said to be responsible for

"any species of negligence, however slight, which they or their

agents may be guilty of." In "Warren v. Fitchburg R. R., 8

Allen (Mass.) 227, 85 Am. D. 700, the principle was applied to

providing for a passenger a safe and convenient way and man-

ner of access to the train. In Simmons v. New Bedford etc.

Steamboat Co., 97 Mass. 361, 93 Am. D. 99, it was applied to

the duty of a carrier to protect passengers from the misconduct

or negligence of other passengers.

Gaynor v. Old Colony etc. R'y, 100 Mass. 208, 97 Am. D.

96, was a case where it appeared that the defendant did not

provide proper safeguards against injury for a passenger leav-

ing the place where he alighted from the cars. Mr. Justice Colt

said in the opinion: "The plaintiff was a passenger, and while

that relation existed, the defendants were bound to exercise

towards him the utmost care and diligence in providing against

those injuries which can be avoided by human foresight. He

was entitled to this protection, so long as he conformed to

the reasonable regulations of the company, not only while in

the cars, but while upon the premises of the defendants; and

this requires of the defendants due regard for the safety of pas-

sengers, as well in the location, construction, and arrangement

of their station buildings, platforms, and means of egress as in

their previous transportation." See also language of Chief
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Justice Shaw, in McElroy v. Nashua etc. R. R., 4 Cush. (Mass.)

400, 50 Am. D. 794.

Difficulty in the application of this rule has sometimes come

from an improper interpretation of the expressions, "utmost

care and diligence," "most exact care," and the like. These

do not mean the utmost care and diligence which men are

capable of exercising. They mean the utmost care consistent

with the nature of the carrier's undertaking, and with a due

regard for all the other matters which ought to be considered

in conducting the business. Among these, are the speed which

is desirable, the prices which passengers can afford to pay, the

necessary cost of different devices and provisions for safety,

and the relative risk of injury from different possible causes

of it. With this interpretation of the rule, the application of it

is easy. As applied to every detail, the rule is the same. The

degree of care to be used is the highest; that is, in reference to

each particular, it is the highest which can be exercised in that

particular with a reasonable regard to the nature of the under-

taking and the requirements of the business in all other par-
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ticulars: Warren v. Fitchburg R. R., 8 Allen (Mass.) 227, 85

Am. D. 700; Le Barron v. East Boston Ferry Co., 11 Allen

(Mass.) 312, 315, 87 Am. D. 717; Taylor v. Grand Trunk R'y, 48

N. H. 304, 316, 2 Am. R. 229 ; Tuller v. Talbot, 23 111. 298, 76 Am.

D. 695.

It may be assumed that the plaintiff would have ceased for

the time to be a passenger, if he had left the steamer and gone

away for his breakfast. But he was injured before he had

completed his exit. Inasmuch as he had a passenger's right

of egress, this request for an instruction was rightly refused.

For, while he was a passenger, the degree of care to be exer-

cised towards him did not depend upon whether he was on

the steamer, or on the plank, or the slip. It was the same in

either place. But in determining what is the utmost care and

diligence within the meaning of this rule, it is always neces-

sary to consider what is reasonable under the circumstances.

The decision in Moreland v. Boston etc. R. R., 141 Mass. 31, 6

N. E. R. 225, was made to rest upon the inaccuracy of the in-

structions as to the degree of care required of passengers, and it

is not an authority for the defendant in the present case.

In its eighth request the defendant asked for an instruction

as to the rights of a passenger acting in disobedience of an

order or regulation of a carrier. The evidence was undisputed,

that the defendant had provided a safe and convenient place

for passengers to land from the saloon deck, and that the

place where the plaintiff was injured was not intended for use
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by passengers. The judge said in his charge: "The phiintiff

does not now claim that the defendant did not furnish proper

means of egress from the saloon deck, nor do I understand

that the plaintiff now claims that the defendant intended the

gangway, which was in fact used by the plaintiff, for use by

passengers leaving the boat." We must therefore assume that

the court and the parties treated these matters as undisputed

facts of the case, and, upon these facts, a warning to the plain-

tiff not to leave the steamer from the gangway by which he

went was a reasonable order or regulation. A passenger is bound

to obey all reasonable rules and orders of a carrier in refer-

ence to the business. The carrier may assume that he will

obey. And the carrier owes him no duty to provide for his

safety when acting in disobedience. His neglect of his duty

in disobeying, in the absence of a good reason for it, will pre-

vent his recovery for an injury growing out of it.

This request, as applied to the admitted facts of the case,

and to a fact which the jury might have found from the evi-

dence, contained a correct statement of the law: Ellis v. Nar-
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ragansett Steamship Co., Ill Mass, 146 ; Pennsylvania R. R. v.

Zebe, 33 Pa. St. 318 ; McDonald v. Chicago etc. R. R., 26 Iowa

124, 142, 96 Am. D. 114; Gleason v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 32

Wis. 85, 14 Am. R. 716. We are of opinion that the jury should

have been instructed in accordance with it. It was not a re-

quest for an instruction merely as to the effect of a part of the

evidence upon a particular subject. It was rather a request

for a statement of the law applicable to one phase of the case,

which involved a consideration of all the evidence relative to

that phase of it. And if by the word "notified," in the ninth

request, was meant the giving of a notification intelligibly, so as

to make it understood by the plaintiff, the same considerations

apply also to that request. No instructions were given upon

this subject, and because of this error the entry must be, ex-

ceptions sustained.

158. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO. V. ASPELL,

23 Pa. St. 147; 62 Am. D. 323. 1854.

Action for injuries to a passenger. On judgment for plaintiff

defendant sued out a writ of error.

By Court, Black, C. J. The plaintiff below was a passenger

in the defendants' cars from Philadelphia to Morgan's Corner.

The train should have stopped at the latter place, but some de-
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feet in the bell-rope prevented the conductor from making the

proper signal to the engineer, who therefore went past, though

at a speed somewhat slackened on account of the switches which

were there to be crossed. The plaintiff seeing himself about

to be carried on, jumped from the platform of the car and

was seriously hurt in the foot. He brought this action, and

the jury, with the approbation of the court, gave him one

thousand five hundred dollars in damages.

Persons to whom the management of a railroad is intrusted

are bound to exercise the strictest vigilance. They must carry

the passengers to their respective places of destination and set

them down safely, if human care and foresight can do it. They

are responsible for every injury caused by defects in the road, the

cars, or the engines, or by any species of negligence, however

slight, which they or their agents may be guilty of. But they

are answerable only for the direct and immediate consequences

of errors committed by themselves. They are not insurers against

the perils to which a passenger may expose himself by his own

rashness or folly. One who inflicts a wound upon his own
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body must abide the suffering and the loss, whether he does

it in or out of a railroad car. It has been a rule of law from

time immemorial, and is not likely to be changed in all time to

come, that there can be no recovery for an injury caused by

the mutual default of both parties. When it can be shown that

it would not have happened except for the culpable negligence of

the party injured concurring with that of the other party, no

action can be maintained.

A railroad company is not liable to a passenger for an acci-

dent which the passenger might have prevented by ordinary

attention to his own safety, even though the agents in charge

of the train are also remiss in their duty.

From these principles, it follows very clearly that if a passen-

ger is negligently carried beyond the station where he intended

to stop, and where he had a right to be let off, he can recover

compensation for the inconvenience, the loss of time, and the

labor of traveling back; because these are the direct conse-

quences of the wrong done to him. But if he is foolhardy

enough to jump off without waiting for the train to stop, he

does it at his own risk, because this is gross imprudence, for

which he can blame nobody but himself. If there be any man

who does not know that such leaps are extremely dangerous,

especially when taken in the dark, his friends should see that

he does not travel by railroad.

It is true that a person is not chargeable with neglect of his

own safety when he exposes himself to one danger by trying to
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avoid another. In such a case the author of the original peril

is answerable for all that follows. On this principle we decided

last year, at Pittsburgh, that the owners of a steamboat, "^hich

was endangered by a pile of iron wrongfully left on the wharf,

and to get clear of it was backed out into the stream, where she

was struck by a coal-boat and sunk, had a good cause of action

against the city corporation, whose duty it was to have removed

the iron : Pittsburg City v. Grier, 22 Pa. St. 55, 60 Am. D. 65.

If, therefore, a person should leap from the car under the in-

fluence of a well-grounded fear that a fatal collision is about to

take place, his claim against the company for the injury he may

suffer will be as good as if the same mischief had been done by

the apprehended collision itself. When the negligence of the

agents puts a passenger in such a situation that the danger of

remaining on the cars is apparently as great as would be en-

countered in jumping off, the right to compensation is not lost

by doing the latter*; and this rule holds good even where the event

has shown that he might have remained inside with more safety.

Such w^as the decision in Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181, so
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much relied on by the defendant in error. A passenger in a

stage-coach, seeing the driver drunk, the horses mismanaged,

and the coach about to upset, jumped out, and was thereby much

hurt. The court held the proprietors of the line responsible,

because the misconduct of their servant had reduced the passen-

ger to the alternative of a dangerous leap or remaining at great

peril. But did the plaintiff in the present case suffer the injury

he complains of by attempting to avoid another with which he

was threatened? Certainly not. He was in no possible danger

of an3i;hing worse than being carried on to a place where he did

not choose to go. That might have been inconvenient; but to

save himself from a mere inconvenience by an act which put his

life in jeopardy was inexcusable rashness.

Thus far I have considered the case without reference to cer-

tain facts disclosed in the evidence, which tend to diminish the

culpability of the defendants' agents, while they aggravate (if

anything can aggravate) the folly of the plaintiff. "When he was

about to jump, the conductor and the brakeman entreated him

not to do it, warned him of the danger, and assured him that

the train should be stopped and backed to the station. If he

had heeded them, he would have been safely let down at the

place he desired to stop at in less than a minute and a half.

Instead of this, he took a leap which promised him nothing

but death ; for it was made in the darkness of midnight, against

a wood-pile close to the track, and from a car going probably at

the full rate of ten miles an hour.
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Though these facts were uncontradicted, and though the

court expressed the opinion that no injury would have hap-

pened to the plaintiff but for his own imprudence, the jury

were nevertheless instructed that the defendants were bound

to compensate him in damages. The learned judge held that

the cases of mutual neglect did not apply, because this action

was on a contract. Now, a party who violates a contract is not

liable any more than one who commits a tort for damages which

do not necessarily or immediately result from his own act or

omission. In neither case is he answerable for the evil conse-

quences which may be superadded by the default, negligence,

or indiscretion of the injured party.

There is no form of action known to the law (and the wit of

man can not invent one) in which the plaintiff will be allowed

to recover for an act not done or caused by the defendant, but

by himself.

When the train approached Morgan's Corners some one (prob-

ably the conductor) announced it. Much stress was laid on

this fact. The court said, in substance, that to make such an
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announcement before the train actually stopped was a want of

diligence, whereby the plaintiff was thrown into a position of

danger; and though he was warned not to jump, yet having

done so, he could make the company pay him for the hurt he

received.

We think this totally wrong. It is not carelessness in a con-

ductor to notify passengers of their approach to the station

at which they mean to get off, so that they may prepare to leave

with as little delay as possible when the train stops. And we

can not see why such a notice should put any man of common

discretion in peril. It is scarcely possible that the plaintiff could

have understood the mere announcement of Morgan's Corner

as an order that he should leap without waiting for a halt. If

he did make that absurd mistake, it was amply corrected by the

earnest warnings which he afterwards received.

The remark of the court that life and limb should not be

weighed against time is most true ; and the plaintiff should have

thought of it when he set his own life on the hazard of such a

leap for the sake of getting to the ground a few seconds earlier.

Locomotives are not the only things that may go off too fast;

and railroad accidents are not always produced by the miscon-

duct of agents. A large proportion of them is caused by the

recklessness of passengers. This is a great evil, which we would

not willingly encourage by allowing a premium on it to be

extorted from companies. However bad the behavior of those
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companies may sometimes be, it would not be corrected by mak-

ing them pay for faults not their own.

The court should have instructed the jury that the evidence,

taken altogether (or even excluding that for the defense), left

the plaintiff without the shade of a case.

Judgment reversed, and venire facias de novo awarded.

159. FILER V. NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD CO.,

49 N. Y. 47; 10 Am. E. 327. 1872.

Action for damages for injuries permanently disabling de-

fendant. The train slowed up at her station, but did not stop.

A brakeman said to her, "You had better get oft'; they are not

going to halt any more." She tried to get off, but her skirts

caught and she was dragged some distance, receiving painful

and permanent injuries. A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed

by the Supreme Court, and appeal was then taken to the Court

of Appeals.

Allen, J. It was submitted to the jury, if they found that the

plaintiff was directed by the brakeman to leave the cars or get

off when the cars were in motion, to determine whether under
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the circumstances there was any such negligence on her part as

would preclude her from recovering; the judge having in sub-

stance instructed the jury that if a person seeks to recover for

injuries resulting from the negligence of another, he must him-

self be free from any negligence contributing to the injury.

The question was put to the jury whether the plaintiff acted as

prudent persons generally would have acted under the circum-

stances, and the charge was that, if she did, that would not bar

a recovery.

There is no complaint of the manner in which the question as

to the alleged contributory negligence of the plaintiff was sub-

mitted to the jury, if there Avas any question for submission.

The claim of the defendant is, that the complaint should have

been dismissed, or a verdict ordered against the plaintiff, upon

the ground that she was culpably careless and negligent, and

by her carelessness and negligence contributed to the injury,

and that, there being no dispute as to the facts, the question

was one of law for the court and not of fact for the jury.

Ordinarily the question of negligence is one of mixed law

and fact, and it is the duty of the court to submit the same to
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the jury, with proper instructions as to the law. What is propei

care is sometimes a question of law, when there is no controversy

about the facts ; but where there is evidence tending: to prove

negligence on the part of the defendant, and a question arises

whether the plaintiff has by his own fault contributed to the in-

jury, it is ordinarily a question for the jury. If the evidence is

of that character that a verdict for the plaintiff would be clearly

against evidence, the question is one of law and should be decided

by the court.

The fact is undisputed that the plaintiff received the injury

while attempting to get off the cars while they were in motion,

making very slow progress, and the jury have found that she

was directed by the brakeman on the cars to get off, and was told

by him that they would not stop or move more slowly to enable

her to do so. That it was culpable negligence on the part of the

defendant to induce or permit the plaintiff to leave the train

while in motion, and a gross disregard of the duty it owed her,

not to stop the train entirely and give her ample time to pass

off with her luggage, is not disputed. Notwithstanding this, if
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the plaintiff did not exercise ordinary care, and might with ordi-

nary care and prudence have avoided the injury, she is precluded

from recovering.

The degree of negligence of which the parties are respectively

guilty, or whether the fault of the defendant was a breach of

contract or the mere omission of some duty resting upon it as a

carrier of passengers, is not material.

The plaintiff's negligence may have been slight and that of

the defendant what is ordinarily termed gross ; but if the plain-

tiff's fault directly and proximately contributed to the injury,

she cannot recover.

Indeed, it is now said that there is no difference between

negligence and gross negligence, the latter being nothing more

than the former, with a vituperative epithet. Grill v. Iron Screw

Collier Co., L. R., 1 C. P. 600 ; Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113.

That there was more hazard in leaving a car while in motion,

although moving ever so slowly, than when it is at rest, is self-

evident. But whether it is imprudent and careless to make the

attempt depends upon circnmstances ; and where a party, by the

wrongful act of another, has been placed in circumstances calling

for an election between leaving the cars or submitting to an in-

convenience and a further wrong, it is a proper question for the

jury whether it was a prudent and ordinarily careful act, or

whether it was a rash and reckless exposure of the person to

peril and hazard.

The plaintiff had purchased a ticket and taken passage for
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Fort Plain, at which place this train was advertised to stop, and,

on approaching the station, the name of the place was called

as a notice to the passengers intending to leave the train at that

place to be prepared to get off, Avhich was equivalent to notice

that proper time and facilities would be afforded them for their

passage from the cars, and the speed of the cars was reduced

very greatly, so that the baggage was removed and taken from

the baggage car by the porter ; one man, supposed to be a little

lame, had gotten off safely.

The plaintiff was told that the cars would not make any other

stop, and that she must get off there, and in attempting to do so

she was injured.

She was put to her choice, without any fault of hers, whether

to obey the advice and suggestion of the defendant 's servant,

and follow the example of the man who had preceded her, or to

remain on the cars and be carried beyond the place of her des-

tination, and away from her friends, and it was a proper question

for the jury whether this M^as or was not, under the circum-

stances, an act of ordinary care and prudence.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:41 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

It is true, there was no absolute necessity for this act ; but she

was called upon to decide upon the instant, and under peculiar

circumstances, and ought not to be held to the most rigid account

for the exercise of the highest degree of caution as against

one confessedly wrong. If, in leaving the cars, she did not exer-

cise the care and caution which she might, and ought to have

done, and vras careless and negligent in her movements, or in the

care of her dress, and by reason of such want of care caused or

contributed to the injury, she ought not to recover ; but no ques-

tion was made at the trial upon this branch of the case, except

upon the eft'ect of her leaving the cars when in motion.

Had the cars been going at a rapid rate, the plaintiff must

have known that she would be injured by leaping from them,

and the attempt to leave the cars, under such circumstances,

even at the instance of the railway servants, would have been a

wanton and reckless act, and no recovery could have been had

against the defendant. In Lucas v. New Bedford and Taunton

R. R. Co., 6 Gray, 64, 66 Am. D. 406, the plaintiff had accom-

panied a friend to the cars and remained with her until the

train had started, and then of her own volition attempted to

leave and received an injury, and it was held that her own act

was the cause of the injury, and that the defendant was in no

respect in fault.

In Hickey v. Boston and Lowell R. R. Co., 14 Allen, 429, the

plaintiff's intestate took a position upon the platform of a car

as it was coming into a station, w^here he was exposed to danger,

605

§ 159 OF CARKIEKS OF PASSENGEES.

voluntarily and without reasonable cause of necessity or pro-

priety, and it was properly held that the express or implied

assent and permission of the conductor of the train did not

change the relation of the parties and relieve the deceased from

the consequences of his own want of care. Railroad Co. v.

Aspell, 23 Penn. 147, 62 Am. D. 323, differed essentially in all its

circumstances from the case at bar. The plaintiff there leaped

in the dark from a train of cars while under a high rate of speed,

against the remonstrances of the persons in charge of the train,

and under an assurance that the train would be stopped to per-

mit him to alight. It was properly held a wanton and reckless

act, precluding a right to recover against the railroad company.

In the same ease the principle was recognized that if a passenger

was ordinarily careful and attentive to his own safety, and was

injured by the negligence of the company, he might recover.

The Penn. R. R. Co. v. Kilgore, 32 Penn. 292, 72 Am. D. 787, is

more analogous to the case in hand. A female passenger, accom-

panied by three young children, on arriving at an intermediate

station proceeded to alight with them. Two of the children had
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left the car, and while the plaintiff was still upon the train the

cars started, when she sprang upon the platform on which one

of the children had fallen prostrate and was injured. She was

allowed to recover. It was held that the question of concurrent

negligence was to be determined by the particular circumstances

of the case. There, as in this case, the defendant had involved

the plaintiff in the attempt to get off the cars; and her efforts,

made with proper care under all the circumstances, cannot be

imputed to her for negligence.

It is not denied that the attempt to leave the cars while they

are in motion is wrong. But as said by Judge Woodward, in the

case last cited, "it is one thing to define a principle of law, and a

very different matter to apply it well. The rights and duties

of parties grow out of the circumstances in which they are

placed."

Mclntyre v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 37 N. Y. 287, is, in principle,

analogous to this, and a recovery was had for injuries received

by a passenger in passing in the evening, and under circum-

stances increasing the hazard of the undertaking from one car

to another while the train was in motion, the attempt having

been made by direction of the defendant's servants, and to obtain

a seat which could not be had in the car in which the passenger

was. A passenger voluntarily and without necessity making

such an attempt and receiving an injury, would be held to be at

fault and without remedy; but the peculiar circumstances of

the case took it out of the general rule. In Foy v. London,
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Brighton and South Coast R. R. Co., 18 C. B., N. S., 225, a

recovery was had for an injury received in alighting from the

cars, caused by the insufficient means for alighting furnished

by the company, although the hazard of the attempt was as

patent to the plaintiff as to the servants of the company. The

jury there found that the defendant was guilty of negligence in

not having provided conveniences for getting down from the

carriage, and negatived the claim that the passenger contributed

to the accident.

The court in banc sustained the recovery and refused leave to

appeal, saying : "We do not think this a fit case to appeal." In

that ease, the lady was desired by a porter in the employ of the

company to alight ; and that circumstance was held by the court

to distinguish it from a subsequent case. Siner v. G. W. R. Co.,-

L. R., 3 Esch. 150 ; affirmed in Exchequer Chambers, 17 W. R.

417.

The case was similar in all its circumstances to Foy's Case,

except there was no direction or request by the company's ser

vants to the lady to get down from the carriage. The court held,
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against the dissent of Keij^y, C. B., in the court of exchequer,

and Justice Keating, in the exchecjuer chambers, that there was

no evidence of negligence to go to the jury. Chief Baron Kelly

was of the opinion that the stopping of the train, without any

notice to the passengers to get out, was an invitation to them to

do SO; that the descent, although dangerous, was not so clearly

dangerous that the plaintiff might not properly encounter the

risk; and that the company, having wrongfully put the passen-

gers to the necessity of choosing between two alternatives, the

inconvenience of being carried on and the danger of getting

out, they were liable for the consequences of the choice, pro-

vided it was not exercised wantonly or unreasonably. The reas-

oning of the chief baron applies with force to this case, and is

in harmony with Mclntyre v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., supra. The

danger here was not certain, and the defendant cannot complain

that the plaintiff did, under the circumstances, encounter some

degree of peril, the jury having found that it was not imprudent

for her so to do, and was encountered at the instance of the

brakeman on the cars.

If the injury was caused by the awln\^ard and careless manner

in which the plaintiff got down from the cars, a different question

would be presented. The motion for a nonsuit was properly

denied.

Upon the question of damages, the jury were instructed to

give the plaintiff, if the questions of fact were found in her

favor, such an amount of damages as they thought she was
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entitled to for the pain and suffering consequent upon her in-

jury, and for any disqualification for labor in the exercise of

her natural powers. A distinct exception was taken to that

part of the charge which included, as an item of damages proper

to be allowed, the plaintiff's disqualification to labor. The at-

tention of the court being distinctly called to the precise point

presented, an opportunity was given to qualify the charge and

limit its application, if any thing less was intended than the

language would clearly import.

It was not qualified or explained, and must be held as an in-

struction, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover consequential

damages resulting from her inability to labor. That was put

forth as a distinct item of damages proper to be allowed, and was

not referred to as evidence of the extent of the injury and con-

sequent pain and suffering.

There was no claim that the plaintiff was, at the time of the

injury, carrying on any business, trade or labor, upon or for

her sole and separate account. Her services and earnings be-

longed to her husband; and for loss of such services, caused by
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the accident, he may have an action; and another record before

us shows that he has recovered for them, as he lawfully might

do. Reeves' Dom. Rel. (Parker's ed.) 138, and cases cited,

marg. p. 63. The Laws of 1860, chap. 90, permit a married

woman to carry on any trade or business, and perform any labor

or services on her sole and separate account, and give to her

her earnings from her trade, business, labor or service ; and she

is authorized to sue for any injury to her person or character,

the same as if she were sole. This is for the direct injury, and

for direct and immediate damages, unless she is, on her own

account and for her own benefit, engaged in some business in

Vv'hich she sustains a loss.

The amendatory act of 1862, chap. 172, does not enlarge the

rights of the wife, or detract from the rights of the husband,

or take from him the right to recover for the loss of service of

his wife, caused by the wrongful act of another.

Consequential damages are in all cases limited to the amount

actually sustained; and unless the wife is actually engaged in

some business or service in which she would, but for the injury,

have earned something for her separate benefit, and which she

has lost by reason of the injury, she has sustained no conse-

quential damages; she has lost nothing pecuniarily by reason

of her inability to labor. The recovery was large, and was

probably affected by the instruction that the inability of the
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plaintiff to labor constituted one of the items of damage to be

taken ipto account by the jury.

For this error in the charge, the judgment should be reversed

and a new trial granted.

All concur, Church, C. J., not sitting.

160. SPRINGER V. FORD,

189 III. 430; 59 N. E. B. 953; 82 Am. St. E. 464. 1901.

Hand, J. This is an action brought by the plaintiff to re-

cover damages for an injury to his person. The trial resulted

in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, which judgment

has been affirmed by the appellate court for the first district.

The plaintiff was in the employ of the Kinsella Glass Com-

pany, a tenant of the defendant, occupying the sixth floor of an

eight-story building, of which the defendant is the owner, lo-

cated on Canal street, in the city of Chicago. The building was

equipped with a passenger and a freight elevator, both of which

were operated and controlled by the defendant. The falling of

the freight elevator while plaintiff, in the discharge of his duty,

was a passenger thereon caused the injury complained of.
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At the close of the plaintiff's testimony, and again at the

close of all the testimony, the defendant moved the court to

instruct the jury to find the defendant not guilty, which the

court declined to do, and the action of the court in that behalf

has been assigned as error.

The law is well settled that persons operating elevators in

buildings for the purpose of carrying persons from one story

to another are common carriers of passengers : Hartford Deposit

Co. V. Sollitt, 172 111. 222, 64 Am. St. Rep. 85, 50 N. E. 178 ;

Goodsell V. Taylor, 41 Minn. 207, 16 Am. St. Rep. 700, 42 N.

W. 873 ; Mitchell v. Marker, 62 Fed. 139 ; Treadwell v. Whit-

tier, 80 Cal. 575, 13 Am. St. Rep. 175, 22 Pac. 166 ; Hodges v.

Percival, 132 111. 53, 23 N. E. 423; Kentucky Hotel Co. v.

Camp, 97 Ky. 424, 30 S. W. 1010 ; Lee v. Knapp, 55 Mo. App.

390; Tousey v. Roberts, 114 N. Y. 312, 11 Am. St. Rep. 655,

21 N. E. 399; Southern Bldg. Assn. v. Lawson, 97 Tenn. 367,

37 S. W. 86. In Hartford Deposit Co. v. Sollitt, 172 111.

225, 50 N. E. 179, 64 Am. St. Rep. 37, we say: ''Persons ope-

rating elevators are carriers of passengers, and the same rules

applicable to other carriers of passengers are applicable to those

operating elevators for raising and lowering persons from one
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floor to another in buildings." In Treadwell v. Wliittier, 80

Oal. 575, 13 Am. St. Rep. 175, 22 Pac. 166, it was said: "The

defendants used their elevator in lifting persons vertically to

the height of forty feet. That they were carriers of passen-

gers, and should be treated as such, we have no doubt. The

same responsibilities as to care and diligence rested on them

as on the carriers of passengers by stage-coach or railway. ' ' In

Goodsell V. Taylor, 41 Minn. 207, 16 Am. St. Rep. 700, 42 N.

W. 873, the court say: "The relation between the owner and

manager of an elevator for passengers and those carried in it

is similar to that between an ordinary common carrier of pas-

sengers and those carried by him."

The operators of such elevators, upon the grounds of public

policy, are required to exercise the highest degree of care and,

diligence. The lives and safety of a large number of human be-

ings are intrusted to their care, and the law requires them to

use extraordinary .diligence in and about the operation of such

elevators to prevent injury to passengers being carried therein.

In Hartford Deposit Co. v. Sollitt, 172 111. 225, 64 Am. St.
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Rep. 37, 50 N. E. 179, it is said: "It is a duty of such carriers

of passengers to use extraordinary care in and about the opera-

tion of such elevators, so as to prevent injury to persons there-

in." And in Treadwell v. Whittier, 80 Cal. 575, 13 Am. St.

Rep. 175, 22 Pac. 166, the court say: "Persons who are lifted

by elevators are subjected to great risks to life and limb. They

are hoisted vertically, and are unable, in the case of the break-

ing of the machinery, to help themselves. The person running

such elevator must be held to undertake to raise such persons

safely, as far as human care and foresight will go. The law

holds him to the utmost care and diligence of very cautious

persons, and responsible for the slightest neglect. Such respon-

sibility attaches to all persons engaged in employments where

human beings submit their bodies to their control, by which

their lives or limbs are put at hazard or where such employment

is attended with danger to life or limb. The utmost care and

diligence must be used by persons engaged in such employments

to avoid injury to those they carry. The care and diligence re-

quired is proportioned to the danger to the persons carried. In

proportion to the degree of danger to others must be the care

and diligence to be exercised. Where the danger is great the

utmost care and diligence must be employed. In such cases the

law requires extraordinary care and diligence." And in Good-

sell V. Taylor, 41 Minn. 207, 16 Am. St. Rep. 702, 42 N. W.

874, it is said: "The same reason exists for requiring on the

part of the owner [of an elevator] the utmost care and fore-
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sight and for making him responsible for the slightest degree of

negligence. ' '

When a passenger is injured by reason of the giving way of

some portion of the machinery or appliances by which the ele-

vator is operated, the presumption of negligence from such

breaking, unexplained, arises. In New York etc. R. R. Co. v.

Blumenthal, 160 111. 40, 43 N. E. 809, we say on page 48 (160

111., 43 N. E. 811) : "The happening of an accident to a pas-

senger during the course of his transportation raises a presump-

tion that the carrier has been negligent. The burden of re-

butting this presumption rests upon the carrier. Undoubtedly,

the law requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant haf

been negligent. But where the plaintiff is a passenger, a prima

facie case of negligence is made out by showing the happening

of the accident. If the injury to a passenger is caused by ap-

paratus wholly under the control of the carrier and furnished

and applied by it, a presumption of negligence on its part is

raised." And in Hartford Deposit Co. v. Sollitt, 172 111. 225,

64 Am. St. Rep. 37, 50 N. E. 179, it is said: "The fact of the
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falling of the elevator is evidence tending to show want of care

in its management by the operator or its servants, or that the

same was out of repair or faultily constructed." In the case of

Ellis V. Waldron, 19 R. I. 369, 33 Atl. 869, in an action by the

servant of a tenant of a building against the owner for injuries

caused by the falling of an elevator, the declaration alleged that

the defendant had granted to the plaintiff's employer, as part

of his leasehold interest in the premises, the use of the elevator

for moving his goods ; that at the time of the accident the plain-

tiff was upon the elevator, engaged in the employment of moving

his master 's goods ; that the machinery in the elevator was de-

fective and unsafe, of which he had no knowledge, but which

fact was known to the defendant, or should have been known if

he had exercised a proper amount of diligence. The court held

that the declaration alleged sufficient facts to show that it was

the duty of the defendant to keep and maintain the elevator in

a safe and suitable condition for the plaintiff's use, as the em-

ployee of the tenant; and, further, that the elevator not being

under the control of plaintiff, it was not his duty to examine it

and ascertain whether it was suitable and safe, and hence he

was not required to allege specifically the nature of the defect

which caused the accident.

The contention on behalf of defendant, that the principles

above announced have no application to a person owning and

operating a freight elevator, is not tenable when a passenger

is lawfully and rightfully upon such elevator. Such passenger,
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by reason of the construction of that class of elevators, is sub-

jected to great risks and many hazards. The liability, how-

ever, of the owner or manager thereof as a common carrier is

measured by the same rules, and he is held to the same degree

of diligence, as that of persons owning and operating passenger

elevators. In the case of Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Arnol, 144

111. 261, 33 N. E. 204, where a passenger upon a freight train

was held entitled to recover for a personal injury received by

reason of the negligent management of the train, it was said

(144 111. 271) : "From the composition of such a train and the

appliances necessarily used in its efficient operation, there can-

not, in the nature of things, be the same immunity from peril in

traveling by freight train as there is by passenger trains, but

the same degree of care can be exercised in the operation of

each," And in New York etc. R. R. Co. v. Blumenthal, 160

111. 40, 43 N. E. 809, it was held a drover riding on a railway

freight train in charge of cattle he was shipping might recover

for an injury received by the negligent management of the train.

On page 48 (160 111.) the court say: "A carrier will be held to
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the same strict accountability for the negligence of its servants

resulting in injury to a passenger who is lawfully and properly

on a freight train, as governs its liability for such negligence

when the transportation is upon a train devoted to passenger

service exclusively. ' '

In the case of Hartford Deposit Co. v. Sollitt, 172 111. 222, 64

Am. St. Rep. 35, 50 N. E. 178, we held that the owner of a pas-

senger elevator was subject to all the rules and liabilities of

any other carrier of passengers, and there is no reason, in prin-

ciple, why the analogy held to exist between passenger and

freight trains, as common carriers, does not exist between pas-

senger and freight elevators, in cases where the owners of freight

elevators permit the carriage of passengers thereon for hire. The

proprietors of an elevator run for the use of the tenants of an

office building is a carrier of passengers for hire. The proprie-

tor 's compensation is the rental paid him by the tenant : 10 Am.

& Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 946.

The question as to whether the plaintiff was lawfully on the

elevator at the time of the injury, in the performance of a duty

incident to his employment, was a question of fact for the jury:

Stewart v. Harvard College, 12 Allen, 58. That the elevator fell,

that the plaintiff was rightfully a passenger thereon, and that

he was seriously injured by its fall, was clearly shown by the

plaintiff's testimony. The trial court did not, therefore, err in

declining to take the case from the jury.

The provision in the lease of the defendant to the Kinsella
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Glass Company, to the effect that the defendant should ' ' not be

liable for any damages occasioned by a failure to keep said prem-

ises and elevator in repair, ' ' was not binding upon plaintiff. He

was not a party thereto. A carrier of persons cannot limit his

liability to a passenger except by express contract with the pas-

senger.

The court did not err in permitting the plaintiff to prove that

it was his custom, as well as the custom of the employees of

other tenants in the buildings, to accompany freight being ele-

vated' or lowered by them on said elevator while such elevator

was being operated by the agent of defendant. Such evidence

was properly admitted as tending to show that plaintiff was

rightfully upon said elevator at the time of the accident.

The jury were properly instructed. All the refused instruc-

tions were covered by instructions given, or are in conflict with

the views herein expressed.

We find no error in this record. The judgment of the ap-

pellate court will therefore be affirmed.

Compare Burgess v. Stowe, — Mich. — ; 96 N. W. R. 29. 1903.
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161. SEARS V. EASTERN RAILROAD CO.,

14 Allen (Mass.) 433; 92 Am. D. 780. 1867.

Action containing one count in contract and one in tort. Judg-

ment for defendants and plaintiff appeals.

By Court, Chapman, J. If this action can be maintained, it

must be for the breach of the contract which the defendants

made with the plaintiff. He had purchased a package of tick-

ets entitling him to a passage in their cars for each ticket from

Boston to Lynn. This constituted a contract between the par-

ties : Cheney v. Boston and Fall River R. R., 11 Met. 121, 45

Am. Dec. 190 ; Boston and Lowell R. R. v. Proctor, 1 Allen, 267,

79 Am. Dec. 729 ; Najac v. Boston and Lowell R. R., 7 Allen, 329,

83 Am. D. 686. The principal question in this case is, What

are the terms of the contract ? The ticket does not express all

of them. A public advertisement of the times when their trains

run enters into the contract, and forms a part of it : Denton v.

Great Northern R'y, 5 El. & B. 860. It is an offer which, when

once publicly made, becomes binding if accepted before it is re-

tracted : Boston and Maine R. R. v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 227. Adver-

tisements offering rewards are illustrations of this method of mak-

ing contracts. But it would be unreasonable to hold that adver-
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tisements as to the time of running trains, when once made, are

irrevocable. Railroad corporations find it necessary to vary the

time of running their trains, and they have a right, under rea-

sonable limitations, to make this variation, even as against those

who have purchased tickets. This reserved right enters into

the contract, and forms a part of it. The defendants had such

a right in this case.

But if the time is varied, and the train fails to go at the

appointed time, for the mere convenience of the company or a

portion of their expected passengers, a person who presents

himself at the advertised hour and demands a passage is not

bound by the change unless he has had reasonable notice of it.

The defendants acted upon this view of their duty, and gave cer-

tain notices. Their trains had been advertised to go from Bos-

ton to Lynn at 9 :30 p. m., and the plaintiff presented himself,

with his ticket, at the station to take the train ; but was there in-

formed that it was postponed to 11 :15. The postponement had

been made for the accommodation of passengers who desired to

remain in Boston to attend places of amusement. Certain no-
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tices of the change had been given ; but none of them had reached

the plaintiff. They were printed handbills posted up in the cars

and stations on the day of the change, and also a day or two

before. Though he rode in one of the morning cars from Lynn

to Boston, he did not see the notice, and no legal presumption

of notice to him arises from the fact of its being posted up :

Brown v. Eastern R. R., 11 Cush. 101; Malone v. Boston and

Worcester R. R., 12 Gray, 388, 74 Am. Dec. 598. The defendants

published daily advertisements of their regular trains in the

Boston Daily Advertiser, Post, and Courier, and the plaintiff

had obtained his information as to the time of running from one

of these papers. If they had published a notice of the change

in these papers, we think he would have been bound by it. For

as they had a right to make changes, he would be bound to take

reasonable pains to inform himself whether or not a change was

made. So if in their advertisement they had reserved the right

to make occasional changes in the time of running a particular

train, he would have been bound by the reservation. It would

have bound all passengers who obtained their knowledge of the

time-tables from either of these sources. But it would be con-

trary to the elementary law of contracts to hold that persons

M'ho relied upon the advertisements in either of those papers

should be bound by a reservation of the offer, which was, without

their knowledge, posted up in the cars and stations. If the de-

fendants wished to free themselves from their obligations to the

whole public to run a train as advertised, they should publish
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notice of the change as extensively as they published notice of the

regular trains. And as to the plaintiff, he was not bound by a

notice published in the cars and stations which he did not see.

If it had been published in the newspapers above mentioned,

where his information had in fact been obtained, and he had neg-

lected to look for it, the fault would have been his own.

The evidence as to the former usage of the defendants to make

occasional changes was immaterial, because the advertisement

was an express stipulation which superseded all customs that

were inconsistent with it. An express contract cannot be con-

trolled or varied by usage: Ware v. Hayward Rubber Co., 3

Allen, 84.

The court are of opinion that the defendants, by failing to

give such notice of the change made by them in the time of

running their train on the evening referred to as the plaintiff

was entitled to receive, violated their contract with him, and are

liable in this action.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

162. GOLDBERG V. AHNAPEE & WESTERN RAILWAY
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CO.,

105 Wis. 1; 76 Am. St. R. 899. 1899.

Action for the value of trunks sent to the station in the even-

ing for checking the following morning. The defendant's agent

had no knowledge of their ownership, or the purpose for which

they were left there. They burned in the freight house during

the night. Judgment for defendants.

Dodge, J. 1. The liability of a carrier for ordinary baggage

while in its possession for carriage as such is very different from

the liability while the same articles are in storage with it. In

the first case it is an insurer ; in the latter, liable only as a bailee

for ordinary care. The exact point at which the possession for

carriage begins and ends is not easy to define, but it is not such

as to exclude some reasonable time at station before and after

actual transportation. After transportation the higher liability

continues only for such time as is reasonably necessary to present

duplicate checks and to remove the baggage: Hoeger v. Chi-

cago etc. R. R. Co., 63 Wis. 100, 53 Am. Rep. 271. No reason is

apparent why the same rule should not apply to the delivery for

transportation, so that the owner has the right to deliver at the

station such time before starting of train as may be reasonably
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necessary for obtaining ticket, checking the baggage, etc., and

that he cannot impose this extreme liability by earlier delivery

without the consent of the carrier : Green v. Milwaukee etc. R.

R'. Co., 38 Iowa, 100 ; Goodbar v. Wabash Ry. Co., 53 Mo. App.

434. This defendant had, by a rule knowna to plaintiff, prescribed

thirty minutes before train time as such reasonable time. It

certainly cannot be said, as matter of law, that such limit is

unreasonable, nor that twelve hours is reasonable, or was ren-

dered reasonably necessary by the circumstances. The submis-

sion of that question to the jury was not an error of which

plaintiff can complain. As to whether defendant assented to

such delivery, and accepted plaintiff's trunks for carriage as

baggage, with knowledge of their contents, was a disputed ques-

tion of fact, and a finding in the negative has abundant support

in the evidence.

2. The overruling of the objection to the testimony of de-

fendant's agent, Reitzel, that there was no advantage to the

company in having the trunks delivered the night before, was

without prejudice; for it appeared by plaintiff's own testimony
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that the agent was prohibited from checking baggage until half

and hour before train time, and that the convenience of the

company obviously could not be enhanced by delivery of bag-

gage earlier than that time.

3. Parol proof of the substance of the rules, printed on a card

and tacked up in the depot, prohibiting checking until within

half an hour of train time, could not have prejudiced plaintiff,

for he testified that he had knowledge of such a rule. Further,

any objection to parol testimony as to the contents of such card

was ob^nated by proof that it had been destroyed in the burning

of the station.

We find no reversible error in the record.

By the Court. Judgment affirmed.

163. RAILROAD CO. V. FRALOFF,

100 V. 8. 24. 1879.

Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error to a judgment rendered against the

New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, in

an action by Olga de Maluta Fraloff to recover the value of

certain articles of wearing-apparel alleged to have been taken

from her trunk while she was a passenger upon the ears of the
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company, and while the trunk was in its charge for transporta-

tion as part of her baggage.

There was evidence before the jury tending to establish the

following facts:

The defendant in error, a subject of the Czar of Russia, pos-

sessing large wealth, and enjoying high social position among

her own people, after traveling in Europe, Asia, and Africa,

spending some time in London and Paris, visited America in

the year 1869, for the double purpose of benefiting her health

and seeing this country. She brought with her to the United

States six trunks of ordinary travel-worn appearance, contain-

ing a large quantity of wearing-apparel, including many ele-

gant, costly dresses, and also rare and valuable laces, which she

had been accustomed to wear upon different dresses when on

visits, or frequenting theaters, or attending dinners, balls, and

receptions. A portion of the laces was made by her ancestors

upon their estates in Russia. After remaining some weeks in

the city of New York, she started upon a journey westward,

going first to Albany, and taking with her, among other
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things, two of the trunks brought to this country. Her ulti-

mate purpose was to visit a warmer climate, and, upon reaching

Chicago, to determine whether to visit California, New Orleans,

Havana, and probably Rio Janeiro. After passing a day. or so

at Albany, she took passage on the cars of the New York Cen-

tral and Hudson River Railroad Company for Niagara Falls,

delivering to the authorized agents of the company for trans-

portation as her baggage the two trunks above described, which

contained the larger portion of the dress-laces brought with

her from Europe. Upon arriving at Niagara Falls she ascer-

tained that one of the trunks, during transportation from Al-

bany to the Falls, had been materially injured, its locks broken,

its contents disturbed, and more than two hundred yards of

dress-lace abstracted from the trunk in which it had been care-

fully placed before she left the city of New York. The company

declined to pay the sum demanded as the value of the missing

laces; and, having denied all liability therefor, this action was

instituted to recover the damages which the defendant in error

claimed to have sustained by reason of the loss of her property.

Upon the firal trial of the case in 1873, the jury, being

unable to agree, was discharged. A second trial took place in

the year 1875. Upon the conclusion of the evidence in chief

at the last trial, the company moved a dismissal of the action^

and, at the same time, submitted numerous instructions which

it asked to be then given to the jury, among which was one

peremptorily directing a verdict in its favor. That motion
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was overruled, and the court declined to instruct the jury as

requested. Subsequently, upon the conclusion of the evidence

upon both sides, the motion for a peremptory instruction in

behalf of the company was renewed, and again overruled. The

court thereupon gave its charge,' to which the company filed

numerous exceptions, and also submitted written requests, forty-

two in number, for instructions to the jury. The court refused

to instruct the jury as asked, or otherwise than as shown in its

own charge. To the action of the court in the several respects

indicated the company excepted in due form. The jury returned

a verdict against the company for the sum of $10,000, although

the evidence, in some of its aspects, placed the value of the miss-

ing laces very far in excess of that amount.

It would extend this opinion to an improper length, and could

serve no useful purpose, were we to enter upon a discussion of

the various exceptions, unusual in their number, to the action

of the court in the admission and exclusion of evidence, as well

as in refusing to charge the jury as requested by the company.

Certain controlling propositions are presented for our consid-
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eration, and upon their determination the substantial rights of

parties seem to depend. If, in respect of these propositions,

no error was committed, the judgment should be affirmed without

any reference to points of a minor and merely technical nature,

which do not involve the merits of the case, or the just rights

of the parties.

In behalf of the company it is earnestly claimed that the

court erred in not giving a peremptory instruction for a ver-

dict in its behalf. This position, however, is wholly untenable.

Had there been no serious controversy about the facts and had

the law upon the undisputed evidence precluded any recovery

whatever against the company, such an instruction would have

been proper. 1 Wall. 369 ; 11 How. 372 ; 19 id. 269 ; 22 Wall. 121.

The court could not have given such an instruction in this case

without usurping the functions of the jury. This will, however,

more clearly appear from what is said in the course of this

opinion.

The main contention of the company, upon the trial below,

was that good faith required the defendant in error, when

delivering her trunks for transportation, to inform its agents

of the peculiar character and extraordinary value of the laces

in question; and that her failure in that respect, whether in-

tentional or not, was, in itself, a fraud upon the carrier, which

should prevent any recovery in this action.

The circuit court refused, and, in our opinion, rightly, to

so instruct the jury. We are not referred to any legislative
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enactment restricting or limiting the responsibility of passen-

ger carriers by land for articles carried as baggage. Nor is

it pretended that the plaintiff in error had, at the date of

these transactions, established or promulgated any regulation

as to the quantity or the value of baggage which passengers

upon its cars might carry, without extra compensation, under

the general contract to carry the person. Further, it is not

claimed that any inquiry was made of the defendant in error,

either when the trunks were taken into the custody of the

carrier, or at any time prior to the alleged loss, as to the value

of their contents. It is undoubtedly competent for carriers of

passengers, by specific regulations, distinctly brought to the

knowledge of the passenger, which are reasonable in their char-

acter and not inconsistent with any statute or their duties to

the public, to protect themselves against liability, as insurers,

for baggage exceeding a fixed amount in value, except upon

additional compensation, proportioned to the risk. And in order

that such regulations may be practically effective, and the car-

rier advised of the full extent of its responsibility, and conse-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:41 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

quently, of the degree of caution necessary upon its part, it

may rightfully require, as a condition precedent to any contract

for the transportation of baggage, information from the passen-

ger as to its value ; and if the value thus disclosed exceeds that

which the passenger may reasonably demand to be transported

as baggage without extra compensation, the carrier, at its option,

can make such additional charge as the risk fairly justifies.

It is also undoubtedly true that the carrier may be discharged

from liability for the full value of the passenger 's baggage, if the

latter, by false statements, or by any device or artifice, puts off

inquiry as to such value, whereby is imposed upon the carrier

responsibility beyond what it was bound to assume in considera-

tion of the ordinary fare charged for the transportation of the

person. But in the absence of legislation limiting the responsi-

bility of carriers for the baggage of passengers; in the absence

of reasonable regulations upon the subject by the carrier, of

which the passenger has knowledge ; in the absence of inquiry of

the passenger as to the value of the articles carried, under the

name of baggage, for his personal use and convenience when

traveling; and in the absence of conduct upon the part of the

passenger misleading the carrier as to the value of his baggage,

— the court cannot, as matter of law, declare, as it was in effect

requested in this case to do, that the mere failure of the passen-

ger, unasked, to disclose the value of his baggage is a fraud upon

the carrier, which defeats all right of recovery. The instructions

asked by the company virtually assumed that the general law
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governing, the rights, duties, and responsibilities of passenger

carriers described a definite, fixed limit of value, beyond

which the carrier was not liable for baggage, except under a

special contract or upon previous notice as to value. We are

not, however, referred to any adjudged case, or to any elemen-

tary treatise which sustains that proposition, without qualifica-

tion. In the very nature of things, no such rule could be

established by the courts in virtue of any inherent power they

possess. The quantity or kind or value of the baggage which

a passenger may carry under the contract for the transporta-

tion of his person depends upon a variety of circumstances

which do not exist in every case. - "That which one trav-

eler," says Erie, C. J., in Philpot v. Northwestern Railway Co.,

(19 C. B. N. s. 321), "would consider indispensable, would be

deemed superfluous and unnecessary by another. But the gen-

eral habits and wants of mankind will be taken in the mind

of the carrier when he receives a passenger for conveyance."

Some of the cases seem to announce the broad doctrine that,

by general law, in the absence of legislation, or special regula-
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tions by the carrier, of the character indicated, a passenger

may take, without extra compensation, such articles adapted to

personal use as his necessities, comfort, convenience, or even

gratification may suggest ; and that whatever may be the quan-

tity or value of such articles, the carrier is responsible for all

damage or loss to them, from whatever source, unless from the

act of God or the public enemy. But that, in our judgment,

is not an accurate statement of the law. "Whether articles of

wearing-apparel, in any particular case, constitute baggage, as

that term is understood in the law, for which the carrier is

responsible as insurer, depends upon the inquiry whether they

are such in quantity and value as passengers under like cir-

cumstances ordinarily or usually carry for personal use when

traveling. "The implied undertaking," says Mr. Angell, "of

the proprietors of stage-coaches, railroads, and steamboats to

carry in safety the baggage of passengers is not unlimited, and

cannot be extended beyond ordinary baggage, or such baggage

as a traveler usually carries with him for his personal conven-

ience." Angell, Carriers, sect. 115. In Hannibal Eailroad v.

Swift, 12 Wall. 272, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice

Field, said that the contract to carry the person "only implies

an undertaking to transport such a limited quantity of articles

as are ordinarily taken by travelers for their personal use

and convenience, such quantity depending, of course, upon the

station of the party, the object and length of his journey,

and many other considerations." To the same efi'ect is a deci-
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sion of the Queen's Bench in Macrow v. Great "Western Railway

Co., Law Rep. 6 Q. B. 121, where Chief Justice Cockburn

announced the true rule to be ''that whatever the passenger

takes with him for his personal use or convenience, according

to the habits or wants of the particular class to which he be-

longs, either with reference to the immediate necessities or to

the ultimate purpose of the journey, must be considered as

personal luggage." 2 Parsons, Contr., 199. To the extent,

therefore, that the articles carried by the passenger for his per-

sonal use exceed in quantity and value such as are ordinarily

or usually carried by passengers of like station and pursuing

like journeys, they are not baggage for which the carrier, by

general law, is responsible as insurer. In cases of abuse by the

passenger of the privilege which the law gives him, the car-

rier secures such exemption from responsibility, not, however,

because the passenger, uninquired of, failed to disclose the

character and value of the articles carried, but because the

articles themselves, in excess of the amount usually or ordi-

narily carried, under like circumstances, would not constitute
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baggage within the true meaning of the law. The laces in

question confessedly constituted a part of the wearing-apparel

of the defendant in error. They were adapted to and exclu-

sively designed for personal use, according to her convenience,

comfort, or tastes, during the extended journey upon which she

had entered. They were not merchandise, nor is there any

evidence that they were intended for sale or for purposes of

business. Whether they were such articles in quantity and

value as passengers of like station and under like circumstances

ordinarily or usually carry for their personal use, and to sub-

serve their convenience, gratification, or comfort while trav-

eling, was not a pure question of law for the sole or final

determination of the court, but a question of fact for the juiy,

under proper guidance from the court as to the law governing

such cases. It was for the jury to say to what extent, if any,

the baggage of defendant in error exceeded in quantity and

value that which was usually carried without extra compensa-

tion, and to disallow any claim for such excess.

Upon examining the carefully guarded instructions given to

the jury, we are unable to see that the court below omitted

any thing essential to a clear comprehension of the issues, or

announced any principle or doctrine not in harmony with

settled law. After submitting to the jury the disputed ques-

tion as to whether the laces were, in fact, in the trunk of the

defendant in error, when delivered to the company at Albany

for transportation to Niagara Falls, the court charged the jury,
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in substance, that every traveler was entitled to provide for

the exigencies of his journey in the way of baggage, was not

limited to articles which were absolutely essential, but could

carry such as were usually carried by persons traveling, for

their comfort, convenience, and gratification upon such jour-

neys; that the liability of carriers could not be maintained to

the extent of making them responsible for such unusual articles

as the exceptional fancies, habits, or idiosyncrasies of some

particular individual may prompt him to carry ; J;hat their re-

sponsibility as insurers was limited to such articles as it was

customary or reasonable for travelers of the same class, in gen-

eral, to take for such journeys as the one which was the sub-

ject of inquiry, and did not extend to those which the caprice

of a particular traveler might lead that traveler to take; that

if the company delivered to the defendant in error, aside from

the laces in question, baggage which had been carried, and

which was sufficient for her as reasonable baggage, within the

rules laid down, she was not entitled to recover; that if she

carried the laces in question for the purpose of having them
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safely kept and stored by railroad companies and hotel-keepers,

and not for the purpose of using them, as occasion might

require, for her gratification, comfort, or convenience, the com-

pany was not liable ; that if any portion of the missing articles

were reasonable and proper for her to carry, and all was not,

they should allow her the value of that portion.

Looking at the whole scope and bearing of the charge, and

interpreting what was said, as it must necessarily have been un-

derstood both by the court and jury, we do not perceive that

any error was committed to the prejudice of the company, or

of which it can complain. No error of law appearing upon the

record, this court cannot reverse the judgment because, upon

examination of the evidence, we may be of the opinion that the

jury should have returned a verdict for a less amount. If the

jury acted upon a gross mistake of facts, or were governed by

some improper influence or bias, the remedy therefor rested

with the court below, under its general power to set aside the

verdict. But that court finding that the verdict was abun-

dantly sustained by the evidence, and that there was no ground

to suppose that the jury had not performed their duty impar-

tially and justly, refused to disturb the verdict, and overruled

a motion for new trial. Whether its action, in that particular,

was erroneous or not, our power is restricted by the Constitu-

tion to the determination of the questions of law arising upon

the record. Our authority does not extend to a re-examination

of facts which have been tried by the jury under instructions
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correctly defining the legal rights of parties. Parsons v. Bed-

ford, 3 Pet. 446; 21 How. 167; Insurance Company v. Folsom,

18 Wall. 249.

(Omitting a reference to a statute.) Judgment affirmed.

164. KINSLEY V. LAKE SHORE & MICHIGAN SOUTH-

ERN RAILROAD CO.,

125 Mass. 54; 28 Am. R. 200. 1878.

Action for loss of a hand-bag and contents. Plaintiff, a pas-

senger on defendant's railroad, had purchased a ticket to ride

in the sleeping car "China" attached to the train. At Toledo

he left the car for dinner, and being informed by an employee

in the car that his baggage would be safe he left it in the car.

On his return he found the China had been taken out of the

train and his baggage had been removed to another car, except

the hand-bag, which was missing. Defendant sought to escape

liability by showing that the China was owned and con-

trolled by, and was in the care of, the employees of the sleeping

car company, and was not under the management of the rail-

road company. The judge ruled this no defense, and ordered
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judgment for plaintiff. To this defendants excepted.

Gray, C. J. Although a railroad corporation is not respon-

sible as a common carrier for an article of personal baggage kept

by a passenger exclusively within his own control, it is liable for

the loss of such an article by the negligence of the corporation

or its agents or servants, and without fault of the passenger.

Clark V. Burns, 118 Mass. 275, 19 Am. Rep. 456; Bergheim

V. Great Eastern Railway, 3. C. P. D. 221.

In the present case, we need not consider whether the evidence

introduced at the trial would justify the inference that the de-

fendant had assumed the custody and control of the plaintiff's

bag as a common carrier ; for it was clearly sufficient to warrant

the judge, by whom the case was tried without a jury, in finding

that the bag was lost, without any fault of the plaintiff, by neg-

ligence on the part of the defendant in removing or undertaking

to remove the plaintiff's baggage to another car in his absence

and without notice to him.

The plaintiff's contract of transportation was with the de-

fendant alone. The fact that the car was not owned by the

defendant, but was used on its road under a contract with other
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parties, who furnished conductors and servants to take charge

of such ears, there being no evidence that the plaintiff knew of

that contract, or had any notice that the car was not owned

^ by the defendant and under its exclusive control, could not

affect the measure of the defendant's liability to the plaintiff.

Exceptions overruled.

165. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILROAD

CO. V. BOYCE,

73 III. 510; 24 Am. R. 268. 1874.

Action for value of baggage. Boyce was traveling with a

trunk and box checked by defendants as baggage. On account

of ill health he stopped over in Iowa five days, but his baggage

went on to Chicago. As it was not claimed, it was stored in

the company's warehouse, where it burned in the great Chicago

fire, without fault on the part of the railroad. Judgment for

plaintiff.

Scott, J. (After stating the facts.) Under instructions from

the court, the jury found a special verdict, in which they enu-

merate the several articles which they find were contained in
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the trunk, and then find their respective values. The list con-

tains several articles, the value of which was included in the

verdict, and which could not, with any degree of accuracy, be

said to constitute any part of a gentleman's traveling baggage

— such as "one sacque and muff," "two silver napkin-rings,"

and perhaps some other articles, the whole amounting, in the

aggregate, to something over $40. To this extent, the finding

of the jury, in any view of the law that can be taken, is erro-

neous.

But this is not the principal question in the case. Another

objection taken is as to the law given to the jury, and it goes to

the foundation of the action. The baggage having arrived at its

destination, and no one appearing to claim it, the company

caused it to be placed in its warehouse, or baggage-room. The

question arises as to the responsibility of the company after

its arrival, and before it was called for by the owner.

The law is well settled that the responsibility as carrier ceases

when the carrier becomes a mere warehouseman, and from

thenceforward he is bound to exercise the same care, and no

more, that ordinarily prudent men do in keeping their own

goods of similar kind and value. AVhile the relation of common
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carrier exists, the company is held responsible for baggage or

freight as an insurer, and the reason given in the books is to

prevent fraud, and the better to subserve the public interests.

But when does the liability of passenger carrier cease, and

such carrier become mere warehouseman as to the luggage of

passengers ?

The rule is as stated by text-writers, that the responsibility

continues until the owner has had reasonable time and oppor-

tunity to come and take away his baggage. If it be not called for

within such reasonable time, the company may store it in a se-

cure warehouse, and from thence its liability as a carrier ceases,

and that of warehouseman is assumed. This doctrine is so well

supported by authority that it admits of no controversy. 2 Redf .

on Railways, § 171, sub-§ 3 ; Roth v. Buffalo and State Line R. R.

Co., 34 N. Y. 548, 90 Am. D. 736; Louisville, Cincinnati and

Lexington Railroad Company v. Mahan, 8 Bush, 184; Ouimit

V. Henshaw et al., 35 Vt. 605, 84 Am. D. 646.

The difficulty is not in the rule as stated, but in the determi-

nation of what is a reasonable time and opportunity for a pas-
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senger to claim and take away his luggage. The impossibility

of stating any absolute rule on this subject has given rise to

the apparent conflict in many of the adjudged cases. It has

been said, and we think with great force, that what constitutes

such reasonable time and opportunity is a mixed question of

law and fact, depending very much upon the peculiar facts of

each individual case; but when the facts are undisputed it is

purely a question o^ law, and the court should decide it. Louis-

ville, Cincinnati and Lexington Railroad Co. v. Mahan; Roth

V. Buffalo and State Line Railroad, supra.

In the case we are considering, the court, at the instance of

appellee, instructed the jury ''that a reasonable time allowed

the plaintiff to claim his baggage means such time as is reason-

able considering the state of his health, and his ability to pro-

ceed to his destination, or to make demand, and the other cir-

cumstances in the case proven."

This charge does not state the law correctly, as applicable to

the facts of this case. Commonly the passenger and his luggage

are carried on the same train, and it is delivered to him on the

platform on his arrival. But if, for any reason, not the fault

of the company, the passenger does not choose to claim it, the

carrier may rightfully store it in a secure warehouse. This is

not for the benefit of the carrier, but for the convenience of the

traveler. It was never intended that passenger carriers should

become warehousemen of the traveler's personal luggage. The

common custom is to deliver it immediately upon its arrival at
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its destination, on the platform. It would be extending the

liability of such carriers bej^ond anything required by public

exigency, or the necessities of public interests, to hold them re-

sponsible as common carriers after the lapse of reasonable time,

or after the traveler has had a reasonable opportunity to claim

and take away his personal baggage, and unless the carrier itself

is at fault, it seems to us the passenger ought not to be permitted

to extend the strict and rigid liability incident to common car-

riers, for any purposes of his own convenience, nor by reason of

any inevitable accident to himself. The carrier never contracted

to carry him as a passenger with a view to such extended liability

for his baggage.

It is sought to justify the giving of the instruction upon the

facts testified to by appellee, that his journey was delayed on

account of sickness. The company, it is contended, consented

to the delay by giving him a "lay-over ticket." It was under

no legal liability to give him such a ticket, and it was done for

the humane purpose of accommodating the passenger. He was

physically unable to prosecute his journey. This was certainly
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no fault of the company, and if the carrier was willing to oblige

him in his extremity, its responsibility ought not, for that rea-

son, to be enlarged. Had his sickness continued for any con-

siderable period, it seems unreasonable that the company, during

all the time it should be compelled, in consequence thereof, to

keep his luggage in its warehouse, should be held to the strict

and rigid liability of a common carrier. We think the objection

to this evidence offered by appellee ought to have been sus-

tained; its production could only mislead the jury; it did not

tend to show it was through any neglect or default of the com-

pany that it was compelled to place appellee's luggage in its

warehouse; and if it proves anything, it is that the company

gave him the "lay-over ticket" on the implied condition the

passenger would consent that the carrier might place his bag-

gage, on its arrival, in its warehouse, using ordinary care for

its preservation. This fact would relieve the company from

all responsibility as a common carrier. Had the passenger been

at Chicago, and for his personal convenience had his baggage

placed in the company's warehouse, this fact would relieve the

carrier from all responsibility except for gross carelessness as

a gratuitous bailee. Minor v. Chicago and Northwestern Rv.

Co., 19 Wis. 40, 88 Am. D. 670.

The case of Roth v. The Buffalo and State Line Railroad Co.,

supra, cited by counsel for appellee, as supporting his view of

the law, is not in conflict with the views here expressed, so far

as the decision itself is concerned. The judge who delivered the
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opinion of the court stated some hypotheticnl cases which might

arise in the future, to which the principles of that decision

should not apply. It was simply a passing remark, not the de-

liberate opinion of the court, and for that reason we are not

inclined to give it the weight of an authoritative decision.

We are satisfied the verdict in this case is contrary to the law

and the evidence, and the judgment will accordingly be reversed.
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CHAPTER XY.

OF OTHER CARRIERS.

166. FOSTER V. ^lETTS,

55 Miss. 77: 30 Am. E. 5uL 1377.

Action on a promissoiy note given by defendants, contractors

for carrj-ing United States mail, to recompense plaintiff for his

money stolen from the mail by an employee of defendants.

Defendants demurred below. Demurrer sustained.

Campbell, J. The post-office department is a branch of the

government, instituted for public convenience. The government

of the United States has undertaken the business of conducting

the transmission and distribution and delivery of all mail-mat-

ter. The government is the carrier of the mails. It carries

them by the aid of agents it contracts with for this service.

Contractors for carrying the mail are the agents of the govern-

ment in the business undertaken by them. The sender of mail-

matter has no contract with the carrier of the mail-bags, and

does not commit his mail-matter to him, but to the government,

which has undertaken to receive, carry, and deliver it. The

contractor for carrying the mail is neither a common carrier nor
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a private carrier. He does not carry for individuals, nor re-

ceive any compensation from them. He has no knowledge of the

mail-matter he carries, and no control over it, except to obey

the instructions of the post-office department. Letters and pack-

ets are inclosed in government mail-bags, secured by locks pro-

vided by the government, and at all times subject to the super-

vision and control of the officers and agents of the government

in the post-office department, who may open the mail-bags and

inspect the mail-matter they contain at will. Contractors for

carrjnng the mail are instruments of government whereby it

performs the function of transmitting mail-matter from place

to place in the execution of this part of its business.

Postmasters are necessary agents for the performance of the

business of the post-office department, and those who carry the

mail from place to place are equally necessary, and engaged in

the business of the government.
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A rider or driver employed by the contractor for carrying the

mails is an assistant about the business of the governipent. Al-

though employed and paid, and liable to be discharged at pleas-

ure by the contractor, the rider or driver is not engaged in the

private service of the contractor, but is employed in the public

service. U. S. v. Belew, 2 Brocken (U. S.), 280.

A carrier of the mail is required by law to be of a certain age,

to take a prescribed oath, is exempted from militia and jury ser-

vice, and is liable to certain penalties for violations of duty, as

well as subject to be discharged from service by any postmaster

in a certain contingency. He is a subordinate agent of the gov-

ernment, whose emplojTQent is contemplated and provided for

by the government in contracting to have the mail carried. Id.

Contractors for carrying the mail are responsible for their own

misfeasances, but not for those of their assistants. The assist-

ants must answer for themselves. The only security for the

safe transmission of packages by mail is the safeguards thrown

around it by the regulations of the government, which announce

that all valuables sent by mail shall be at the risk of the owner.
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All that the government promises in case of loss of money or

other valuables from the mail is to endeavor to recover it and

to punish the offender.

The duty of contractors to carry the mail is to carry it from

place to place, subject to the regulations of the post-office of-

ficials. Their obligation is to the government. They and their

assistants are agents of the government, and subject to the rule

of law applicable in such cases. Story on Agency, §§ 313, 319

n, 321 ; Shearm. & Redf . on Neg., § 177.

It is well settled that postmasters are not liable for losses

occasioned by the sub-agents, clerks and servants employed under

them, unless they are guilty of negligence in not selecting persons

of suitable skill, or in not exercising a reasonable superintend-

ence and vigilance over their conduct. Story on Agency, § 319

a; Storj^ on Bail., § 463; Wilson v, Beverly, 1 Am. Lead. Cas.

785 ; Schroyer v. Lynch, 8 "Watts, 453 ; Wiggins v. Hathaway,

6 Barb. 632 ; Keenan v. Southworth, 110 :\Iass. 474, 14 Am. R.

613 ; Whart. on Neg., § 292 ; Shearm. & Redf. on Neg., § 180.

As remarked before, carrying the mail is just as necessary,

and as much part of the business of the government as the ser-

vice rendered at the offices by postmasters; and those employed

about carrying the mail are as much the agents of the govern-

ment as are postmasters and their clerks and assistants. The

true test of the character of a person is, not who appoints or pays

or may dismiss him, but whether or not he is about a public
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employment or a private service. 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 621; Story

on Agency, § 319 et seq.

In Conwell v. Voorhees, 13 Ohio 523, 42 Am. D. 206, and

Hutcliins V. Brackett, 2 Foster (22 N. H.) 252, 53 Am. D. 248,

it was decided that contractors for carrying the mail are not

responsible to the owner of a letter containing money trans-

mitted by mail and lost by the carelessness of the agent of the

contractors carrying the mail. The rules applicable to agents

of the public were applied. And although the doctrine of these

cases is criticised in Shearm. & Redf. on Neg., § 180, and has

been disputed in Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Gratt. 230, we adopt it

as the better view.

In this case the money was stolen by the mail-carrier. As to

that, he certainly was not the agent of the contractors for whom

he was riding, and if they were liable for his acts within the

scope of his employment, they were not liable for his willful

wrongs and crimes. McCoy v. McKowen, 26 Miss. 487, 59 Am.

D. 264; New Orleans etc. R. R. Co. v. Harrison, 48 Miss. 112,

12 Am. R. 356 ; Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479, 9 Am. D.
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168; Wiggins v. Hathaway, 6 Barb. 632; Story on Agency,

§ 309.

As the defendants in error were not liable for the money "ex-

tracted" from the mail by the carrier, they did not make them-

selves liable by giving their promissory note for it. It is without

consideration. The compromise of doubtful rights is a sufficient

consideration for a promise to pay money, but compromise im-

plies mutual concession. Here there was none on the part of

the payee of the note. His forbearance to sue for what he could

not recover at law or in equity was not a sufficient consideration

for the note. Newell v. Fisher, 11 Sm. & M. 431 ; Sullivan v.

Collins, 18 Iowa, 228 ; Palfrey v. Railroad Co., 4 Allen, 55 ; Allen

V. Prater, 35 Ala. 169; Edwards v. Baugh, 11 M. & W. 641;

Longridge v. Dorville, 5 B. & Aid. 117; 1 Pars, on Cont. 440;

Smith on Cont. 157; 1 Add. on Cont. 28, § 14; 1 Hill on Cont.

266, § 20.

Judgment affirmed.
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167. TELEGRAPH CO. V. GRISWOLD,

37 Ohio St. 301; 41 Am. R. 500. 1881.

Action for damages for negligence of a telegraph company in

transmitting the following telegram:

Woodstock, Ontario, December 23, 1871.

Messrs. Griswold & Dunham.

"Will you give one fifty for twenty-five hundred at London?

Answer at once, as I have only till night.

S. W. COWPLAND.

This was an inquiry whether the sender would pay $1.50 in

gold for 2,500 bushels of flaxseed at London, Ontario. As de-

livered the dispatch read "five" instead of "fifty." The dis-

patch was sent under the following agreement :

"MONTREAL TELEGRAPH COMPANY, FORM NO. 2.

"(Terms and conditions on which this and all other messages

are received by this company.)

"In order to guard against, and correct as much as possible

some of the errors arising from atmospheric and other causes

appertaining to telegraphy, every important message should
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be repeated, by being sent back from the station at which the

message is received to the station from which it is originally sent.

Half the usual price will be charged for repeating the message,

and while this company in good faith will endeavor to send

messages correctly and promptly, it will not be responsible for

errors or delays, in the transmission or delivery, nor the non-

delivery of the repeated messages, beyond two hundred times

the sum paid for sending the messages, unless special agreement

for insurance be made in writing, and the amount of risk speci-

fied on this agreement and paid at the time of sending the

message, nor will the company be responsible for any error or

delay in the transmission or delivery, or for the non-delivery

of any unrepeated message, beyond the amount paid for sending

the same, unless in like manner specially insured, and amount

of risk stated therein, and paid for at the time. No liability is

assumed for errors in cipher or obscure messages, nor is any

liability assumed by this company for any error or neglect by

any other company over whose lines this message may be sent to

reach its destination, and this company is hereby made the agent

of the sender of this message to forward it over the lines ex-

tending beyond tho»^ of this company. No agent or employee
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is allowed to vary these terms, or make any other verbal agree-

ment, nor any promise at the time of performance, and no one

but a superintendent is authorized to make a special agreement

for insurance. These terms apply through the whole course of

this message on all lines by which it may be transmitted.

" (Signed) James Dakers,

Secretary.

" (Signed) Hugh Allen, President."

Judgment for plaintiff.

BoYNTON, C. J. As we have reached the conclusion that the

court below did not err denying the motion for new trial founded

on the alleged insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict,

and as a review of the evidence would serve no useful purpose,

it only remains to consider whether the court erred in the in-

structions given to the jury. The first question arises on the ex-

ception to that portion of the charge by which the jury were told

that the special agreement under which the message was sent

did not relieve the company from liability for the damages re-

sulting from the inaccurate transmission of the message, if the
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mistake or error occurred through the negligence of the company

or its agents. There seems to be a want of harmony in the de-

cided cases on the point of the correctness of this instruction,

and this no doubt arises, in some measure at least, from the

different views taken of the nature of the employment in which

telegraph companies are engaged, and to some extent from dif-

ferent views taken of their rights and liabilities by courts who

fully agree upon the nature of such employment, but differ as

to the extent of the duties and obligations that spring therefrom.

In Parks v. Alta California Tel. Co., 13 Cal. 422, 78 Am. D.

589, the obligations of telegraph companies were held to be the

same as those of common carriers, and consequently that they

were in effect insurers of the safe transmission of a message,

unless the transmission was interfered with by the act of God

or the public enemies. An early case in England held the same

doctrine. McAndrew v. Electric Tel. Co., 33 Eng. L. & Eq. 180.

But the weight of authority both English and American is

clearly the other way. Ellis v. American Tel. Co., 13 Allen, 226 ;

Leonard v. New York etc. Tel. Co., 41 N. Y. 544, 1 Am. R. 446 ;

Breese v. United States Tel. Co., 48 N. Y. 132, 8 Am. R. 526;

New York etc. Tel. Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Pa. St. 298, 78 Am. D.

338 ; Bartlett v. "Western Union Tel. Co., 62 Me. 209, 16 Am. R.

437 ; Birney v. New York etc. Tel. Co., 18 Md. 341, 86 Am. D.

607 ; Grinnell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 Mass. 299, 18 Am.

R. 485.
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But that telegraph companies exercise a quasi public employ-

ment with duties and obligations analogous to those of a common

carrier, is a proposition clearly settled. The statute confers

upon them power of eminent domain, which no one will contend

could be conferred upon them, consistently with the Constitu-

tion, if they were engaged in a mere private employment or oc-

cupation by which the public interests were not affected.

They are required to receive dispatches from individuals or

corporations, including other telegraph companies, and to trans-

mit and deliver the same faithfully and impartially in the order

received, except in a few specified cases, where from public con-

siderations certain preferences may be made. S. &. S. 155.

These provisions, as well as the nature of the employment itself,

are entirely inconsistent with the theory that the business of

conducting a line of telegraph is a mere private employment

as distinguished from one carried on for the benefit of the public

at large. Granting this, it is, however, contended that because

the company" is not an insurer of the safe transmission of a

message, and is authorized to make or adopt such regulations
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and by-laws for the management of the business as it may deem

proper (1 S. & S. 298, § 46), it cannot be made liable to the

plaintiff below beyond the amount paid for sending the message,

in the face of the stipulation against liability for any error in

an unrepeated message, notwithstanding such error resulted

from the negligence of the company's agents by whom the mes-

sage was sent over its wires. To this proposition we do not

agree. It has long been the settled law of this State, that a

common carrier cannot either by special agreement with, or by

notice brought home to the shipper, relieve himself from liability

for the consequences of his negligence. Davidson v. Graham,

2 Ohio St. 131 ; Railroad Company v. Curran, 19 id. 1.

In Graham v. Davis, 4 Ohio St. 377, 62 Am. D. 285, a case in-

volving the liability of a common carrier who claimed exemption

therefrom by reason of a special contract with the shipper — it

was said that "one of the strongest motives for the faithful

performance of a public duty is found in the pecuniary respon-

sibility which the carrier incurs for its failure. It induces him

to furnish safe and suitable equipments, and to employ careful

and competent agents. A contract therefore with one to relieve

him from any part of this responsibility reaches beyond the

person with whom he contracts, and affects all who place their

persons or property in his custody. It is immoral because it

diminishes the motive for the performance of a high moral duty;

and it is against public policy, because it takes from the public

a part of the security they would otherwise have."
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These considerations — there referred to common carriers — ap-

ply with equal force to those who furnish the means of tele-

graphic communication to the public. Their employment is not

only public in its nature, but it has become a necessity alike to

the social and commercial world.

Hence, it is as true of them, as of common carriers, that any

stipulation or re^ilation that authorizes or enables them to se-

cure exemption from liability for negligence, in the transmission

or delivery of the message, reaches far beyond the person with

whom they are dealing, and for whom the immediate service is

being performed, and affects the entire public. The cases which

hold that a common carrier may stipulate for immunity from

liability for mere negligence, all agree that they are liable for

"gross negligence." But just what this term means is not easily

ascertained. There is authority for holding it to be equivalent

to fraud or intentional wrong. Jones on Bailm. 8 — 46 et seq. But

a majority of the cases' would seem to hold it to be a failure to

exercise ordinary care. In Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113, it

was said by Baron Rolfe, that he "could see no difference be-
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tween gross negligence and negligence; that it was the same

thing with a vituperative epithet." In Hinton v. Dibbin, 2

Ad. & El. (N. S.) 646, Lord Denman remarked, that "when we

find gross negligence made the criterion to determine the liability

of a common carrier who has given the usual notice, it might

perhaps have been reasonably expected that something like a

definite meaning should have been given to the expression. It

is believed, however, that in none of the numerous cases upon

this subject is any such attempt made, and it may well be

doubted whether between gross negligence and negligence merely

any intelligible distinction exists." See also Beal v. South De-

von Ry. Co., 3 H. & C. 337; Austin v. Manchester Ey. Co., 11

Eng. L. & Eq. 513; and comments of Parke, B., in Wyld v.

Pickford, 8 M. & W. 443. In Duff v. Budd, 3 Brod. & Bing.

177, it was held by Dallas, C. J., that "gross negligence is

where the defendant or his servants have not taken the same care

of the property as a prudent man would take of his own. And

by Best, J., in Batson v. Donovan, 4 B. & Aid. 21, that "they

must take as much care of it as a prudent man does of his own

property. ' '

In Grill v. General Iron Screw Collier Company, L. R., 1 C. P.

600, gross negligence was held to be a relative term and meant

"the absence of the care that was requisite under the circum-

stances." It was the absence of such care as it was the duty

of the defendant to use in the circumstances of the case.

In Beal v. South Devon Ry. Co., supra, it was held in the case
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of a carrier that ' ' gross negligence includes the want of that rea-

sonable care, skill and expedition which may properly be ex-

pected of him." Crompton, J., remarking, that "for all prac-

tical purposes, the rule may be stated to be that failure to exer-

cise reasonable care, skill and diligence, is gross negligence." To

the same effect is Briggs v. Taylor, 28 Vt. 181, and Shearm. &

Redf. on Neg., § 16 ; all substantially agreeing with Willes, J.,

in Lord v. Midland Railway Co., L. R., 2 C. P. 344, that "any

negligence is gross in one who undertakes a duty and fails to

perform it. ' ' See also, Griffith v. Zipperwick, 28 Ohio St. 388 ;

and Pennsylvania Co. v. Miller, 35 id. 549, 35 Am. Rep. 620.

These authorities show a strong tendency in the adjudica-

tions to break down the impracticable distinction between what

is termed gross negligence, and ordinary negligence, which some

of the cases hold to exist. The rule, however, in this State is well

settled, that one exercising a public employment is liable for

failing to bring to the service he undertakes that degree of skill

and care, which a careful and prudent man would under the

circumstances employ ; and that any stipulation or regulation by
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which he undertakes to relieve himself from the duty to exercise

such skill and carotin the performance of the service, is contrary

to public policy, and consequently illegal and void. In our

opinion telegraph companies fall within the operation of this

rule; and that in failing to exercise such care and skill in the

transmission and delivery of messages, they become liable for the

resulting consequences, notwithstanding their stipulation to the

contrary. The right to make rules and regulations to govern

the management of their business is expressly conferred by

statute. But such rules must be reasonable, and if they fail to

accord with the demands of a sound public policy they are void.

Railroad Co. v, Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 ; Express Co. v. Caldwell,

21 id. 267.

We are also of the opinion that the failure to transmit and

deliver the message in the form or language in which it was re-

ceived, is prima facie negligence, for which the company is liable ;

and that to exonerate itself from the liability thus presumptively

arising, it must show that the mistake was not attributable to

its fault or negligence. This rule not only rests upon sound

reason, but is well sustained by well considered cases. Bartlett

V. Western Union Tel. Co., 62 Me. 209, 16 Am. R. 437; Ritten-

house V. Independent Line of Telegraph, 44 N. Y. 263, 4 Am.

Rep. 673; Tyler etc. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 60 111. 421, 14 Am.

Rep. 38; Baldwin v. U. S. Tel. Co., 45 N. Y. 744, 6 Am. Rep.

165; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Carrew, 15 Mich. 525; De La Grange v.

S. W, Tel. Co., 25 La. Ann. 383; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Meek, 49

635

§§ 167, 168 OF TELEGEAPH COMPANIES.

Ind. 53 ; Turner v. Hawkeye Tel. Co., 41 Iowa, 458, 20 Am. Rep.

605.

If the error or mistake is attributable to atmospheric causes

or disturbances, or to any cause for which the company is not at

fault, it is entirely within its power to show it. To require the

sender of the message to establish the particular act of negli-

gence, or ferret out the particular locality where the negligent

act occurred, after showing the mistake itself, would be to re-

quire in many cases an impossibility, not infrequently resulting

in enabling the company to evade a just liability. We are fur-

ther of the opinion that the court did not err in holding, and

so instructing the jury, that the message received by the com-

pany for transmission was not obscure within the meaning of

the stipulation in the agreement under which the message was

sent. It appeared upon its face that it related to a business

transaction, a transaction involving the purchase and sale of

property. The company was therefore apprised of the fact that

a pecuniary loss might result from an incorrect transmission

of the message. Where this appears, there is no such obscurity
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as relieves the company from liability for negligently failing

to transmit and deliver the message in the language in which it

was received. Western Union Tel Co. v. Wenger, 55 Penn. St.

262 ; Rittenhouse v. Independent Line of Tel., 44 N. Y. 265, 4

Am. Rep. 673 ; Manville v. W. U. Tel. Co., 37 Iowa, 220, 18 Am.

Rep. 8.

Judgment affirmed.

Okey, J., dissented.

168. TRUE V. INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPH CO.,

60 Me. 9; 11 Am. E. 156. 1872.

Action for damages for the non-delivery of a telegram. Facts

stated by lower court for supreme court to determine whether

True was entitled to more than cost of the message, and if so

to determine the rule of damages and remand the case for assess-

ment thereof.

Kent, J. On the 12th of January, 1870, the plaintiffs re-

ceived a telegram from a firm in Baltimore, offering to sell them

a cargo of corn at ninety cents per bushel. Whereupon one of

the plaintiffs went to the office of the defendants and asked for

one of the "night-message blanks," and wrote thereon the fol-

lowing telegram, addressed to the said firm, and paid forty-eight

cents, the uwm. demanded: "To Radcliff & Patterson, Balti-
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more ; — Ship cargo named at ninety ; if you can secure freight at

ten, wire us result. Geo. W. True & Co."

It is admitted that the telegram was never delivered to Rad-

cliff & Patterson. It is also admitted that the message was sent

the same night to Boston, which is the western terminus of de-

fendant's line, and was thence forwarded by the Franklin Tele-

graph Company, with which the defendants have a business con-

nection, making them responsible for the whole distance ; the

lines of the Franklin company extending through Baltimore

to Washington. No reason is assigned for the non-delivery of

the message.

1. The defendants admit their liability for the mistake or de-

lay in the transmission, and for the non-delivery of the telegram.

This is an important fact, and relieves the case of any difficulty

in determining this primary and fundamental point of actual

liability.

2. The defendants claim that this liability is limited to the

repayment of the forty-eight cents. The plaintiffs claim dam-

ages for losses sustained by them, beyond this small sum, by
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reason of the non-delivery of the message.

3. This claim of exemption, on the part of the telegraph com-

pany, is based upon a special condition contained in the paper,

on which the message, signed by the plaintiff, was written.

That paper, called a "night-message blank," contained, above

the written message, several printed specifications of the terms

and conditions on which these night messages would be received

and forwarded. The last one was in these words :

"And it is agreed between the senders of the following mes-

sage and this company, that the company shall not be liable for

mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery, or for non-

delivery of any message, beyond the amount received by said

company for sending the same. ' '

Then follows, next above the written message, the words,

"Send the following message, subject to the above terms, which

are agreed to."

There can be no doubt that the abo^€I conditions, with the

assent signified by the signature of the plaintiffs, covers this

and all other cases of mistake and non-delivery. The question

is whether the contract can legally be thus limited, and the de-

fendants be thereby exonerated for all liability, to the extent

claimed.

There has been much discussion in various cases, as to the

nature of this comparatively new contract for the transmission

of messages, by means of electricity; and the liabilities, limita-

tions and qualifications of this undertaking. It has been likened
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to the case of a common carrier, and it is contended by many,

that all the strictness of the common law, applicable to carriers,

is to be applied to telegraph companies. On the other hand, it

is contended, that they are but simple bailees for hire, to do a

certain specified thing — "locatio operis facieiidi." It is clear

that telegraph corporations or companies exercise a public em-

ployment, or as said by C. J. Bigelow, 13 Allen, 226 (Ellis v. A.

Telegraph Co.), a quasi public employment; certainly as much

so as express companies or stage-coaches or railroads. They

often invoke the exercise of the right of eminent domain. They

everywhere announce a readiness to transmit messages for all

applicants, at fixed rates. The nature of their undertaking is

analogous to that of carriers. One assumes to transmit a letter,

the other a larger, sealed package, to a given destination. Both

are bound by certain rules of law, and held to a faithful and

exact i:)erformance of a specified duty. So far as public policy is

concerned, there seems to be but little reason for not holding

both to the same rules. It might be interesting to follow out

these analogies, and to enter upon the discussions of various
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questions, touching the extent of the common law and statute

liabilities of these companies, and the extent of the right and

power of these companies to limit their liabilities by notice or

conditions, apparently assented to by the other party.

But the case before us does not require this extended examina-

tion. It presents to us the single question, whether this condition

is one which the company could rightfully impose upon its un-

dertaking.

We are satisfied that telegraph companies, like all other cor-

porations and individuals, may prescribe, adopt and enforce

reasonable rules and regulations for the convenient and prompt

and satisfactory performance of their duties and obligations,

not inconsistent with that performance. We think they may go

further and establish stipulations and regulations, to some ex-

tent restraining and limiting their common-law liabilities, made

known to and directly or indirectly assented to by those em-

ploying them.

We are equally well satisfied that there is a limit to this power

of avoidance of legal liabilities. It does not rest with such com-

panies to fix these conditions absolutely, by which they may

avoid duties and responsibilities, by their mere will, or by their

views of self-interest, or desire to shield the company or its offi-

cers from the direct consequences of neglect or carelessness.

The public and those who employ these agencies to perform im-

portant services have rights, which cannot be ignored or avoided

by stipulations made by interested parties. When a company
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assumes the position of offering its services generally, to all who

may apply, under its character of a public corporation, it does

not stand exactly in the same position as private individuals

contracting in a single matter, on terms and conditions mutually

agreed upon for that particular case.

The discussions in the text-books and in the decided cases

have led to the conclusion, that while, in the first instance, the

company may make its rules for the regulation of its business,

and for the limitation of its liability, those rules must be reason-

able, in view of all the circumstances, and of the nature of the

business, its risks and responsibilities, the necessity of securing

to the public, who may have occasion to use this means of trans-

portation, a reasonable protection against neglect or fraud or

want of due care and effort, to perform punctually and correctly

the act undertaken.

The company is not the ultimate judge of the reasonableness

of an adopted rule. And in this single proposition lies the gist

of the whole matter. The court must determine in every case

when the question is directly raised, whether the particular re-
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striction or qualification is a reasonable exercise of the powers

residing in the company.

Several questions as to reasonableness have arisen under dif-

ferent conditions made by telegraph companies, and have been

considered by the courts. One of them has arisen under a con-

dition, which is found in the general blank of the defendant com-

pany, by which it is stipulated that the company will not be

responsible for more than the sum received for mistakes or de-

lays, or for non-delivery of any message, unless requested to

repeat it on payment therefor, nor for more than fifty times the

sum received for any repeated message, unless paid for insuring

it.

It seems to be held, that however it may be in cases where the

error causing the injury was occasioned by not repeating, or

would have been manifestly prevented or avoided by repeating,

yet this condition could not cover and excuse negligence or delay

in delivering a message received, or any other nonfeasance or

misfeasance not imputable to or excused by not repeating. West-

em Union Telegraph Company v. Graham, 1 Colorado, 230, 9

Am. Rep. 136 ; Birney v. N. York & Washington Telegraph Com-

pany, 18 Md. 341, 81 Am. D. 607.

In the case at bar no such question arises. No such condition

is found in the "night message blanks" of the company. These

messages are of a special class, and are made subject to their own

rules, as printed on the blanks. The charge for transmission of

these night messages is considerably less than on those in the
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general business of the company, and, perhaps for this reason

chiefly, the whole provision relating to repeating is omitted, and

the sweeping and comprehensive provision by which in effect

all liability beyond the price paid is avoided is substituted. It

is clear that a mere change of rates or prices cannot avoid legal

liability. The duty and responsibility of the company cannot

properly be measured by the price for the duty undertaken.

The single question on this part of the case is whether the

stipulation, recited in full at the commencement of this opinion,

is a reasonable one, or one which the company could lawfully

impose as a condition of the contract.

After a careful reading, it seems difficult to give any other

construction to this clause than a general and unlimited ex-

emption from all and any liability beyond the sum paid. It is

not limited to those cases where reasonable care and attention

might not prevent mistakes or delays. It makes no reference to

the subtle and mysterious agency employed in the transmission

of messages, or to the peculiar liability to error in the work of

the operator. As before stated, this provision, in relation to
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night messages, does not require the repeating of telegrams sent,

before a liability should attach. It simply and nakedly exon-

erates the company from all liability (except for the fee paid)

for any and all mistakes in the transmission of the message — ■

and for all delays in transmitting — and all delays in delivery, or

even non-delivery, of the telegrams. These items seem to include

all the cases of neglect, want of care or attention, of which the

company can be guilty, in reference to the performance of their

duties and obligations under the contract. Even gross negligence

and the want of the lowest degree of care are protected from

complaint, although affirmatively proved by the other party.

The operator may, from sleepiness or haste to close for the night,

prefer to pay back the trifle paid, and leave the message unsent.

Or a message may have been carelessly, or even wantonly, thrown

into the waste basket, and never sent, or if sent it may have been

treated in the same manner at the office of reception, and never

delivered to a carrier, or if so delivered, it may have been thrown

aside or destroyed by the carrier to save himself labor or trouble.

And the sender, under this rule, must be debarred from all

remedy beyond a repayment of the few cents paid. This is not

the establishment of a rule or rules for the management of the

business which are reasonable and proper for the orderly con-

ducting of its business, or to protect the company against unfair

or unreasonable claims. In this case no attempt is made to ex-

cuse the non-delivery; but a liability is admitted.

We think this stipulation is not reasonable, for it does not
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come within any established principle, applicable to employments

of this nature, whether called public or private. It goes alto-

gether too far in attempting to cover all possible delinquencies.

"A party cannot in such a way protect himself against the con-

sequences of his own fraud or gross negligence, or the fraud or

gross negligence of his servants and agents." Ellis v. The

American Tel. Co., 13 Allen, 234. In the case of Birney v. New

York & Wash. Tel. Co., 18 Md. 341, 81 Am. D. 607, the court

says that courts and legislatures have been liberal in allowing

companies to provide against such risks as arise out of atmos-

pheric influences and kindred causes. At this point they have

properly stopped. To permit them to contract against their

own negligence would be to arm them with a most dangerous

power; one, indeed, that would leave the public almost reme-

diless. It must be borne in mind that the public have but little

choice in the selection of the company which is to perform the

desired service. They do not select the agents or employees, nor

can they remove them. They are bound to take the company as

they find it, and to commit to its agents their messages, however
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valuable they may be. Such being the case, public policy, as

well as commercial necessity, require that companies engaged in

telegraphing should be held to a high degree of responsibility.

We restate our propositions and conclusions on this part of

the case in order to prevent any misapprehension of the extent

and limitations of the rules laid down.

1. This company, and all others of a like nature, offering and

undertaking to perform acts or services for all applicants, at

fixed rates, exercise, at least, a quasi public employment.

2. Such company may adopt and enforce reasonable rules and

regulations for the convenient and prompt and satisfactory per-

formance of the act or duty undertaken.

3. This right in the company is not absolute and unlimited;

but such rules are subject to the test of reasonableness in view

of the rightful claims of public policy and private rights, and

the enforcement of the obligation of good faith and honest ef-

fort to perform.

4. The test must be applied by the court, whenever the ques-

tion arises on the validity of any such regulation, according to

the rule before stated.

5. A rule, or stipulation, like the one in question which covers

all possible delinquencies, mistakes, delays, or neglects in trans-

mitting or in delivering or not delivering a message, from what-

ever cause arising, is not, for the reasons before stated, a reason-

able regulation within the legal rule.

6. Such a rule is not saved from these objections, by the con-
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dition of a liability to repay, if required by the sender, of the

trifle paid to them. It is a mere evasion of the legal liability

and is never the measure of damages for non-performance of

a contract of this kind.

It is an insufficient and, therefore, an unreasonable stipulation,

and cannot save the otherwise clearly objectionable condition of

which it is a part.

Another question is presented relating to the rule of damages.

It is agreed, according to the report of the case, that if the

plaintiffs are entitled to recover a greater sum (than forty-eight

cents) as special damages upon the facts aforesaid, this court

is to determine the rule upon which damages shall be assessed.

The measure of damages in cases of this kind has been much

discussed in the text-books and decisions in this country and in

England. It would seem to be impracticable to attempt to lay

down any single and simple rule, which can be made to apply,

without qualification, to every case. There are, however, certain

general principles which may be considered as applicable, gen-

erally to these cases, and to be now quite well established.
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Before considering these principles, with these qualifications

and limitations, it may be well to examine the character and

exact extent of the message in the case before us. We may then

be better able to apply the rules established or admitted, to this

particular case. For it is the rule for this case, that we are called

upon to define.

We assume that the plaintiffs can prove that the firm in Balti-

more, to whom the telegram was addressed, had offered and

agreed to sell a cargo of corn at ninety cents per bushel to the

plaintiffs; that the telegram contained notice of acceptance of

the proposition; that the condition nailed, "if you can secure

freight at ten" (cents), could have been complied with, if the

message had been delivered when it should have been; that, if

it had been thus delivered, the bargain would have been closed,

and the plaintiffs would at that moment have obtained the cargo

at ninety cents per bushel, with freight at ten cents.

The pecuniary value, then, of this telegraphic message was

in this, that it contained a part of a contract, and that the final

and binding and effectual act, by which the bargain would be-

come operative and complete. It seems clear that such a message

has a distinctive and clear pecuniary value, and demands of the

party who, for a reward, undertakes to convey it, knowing its

contents, the same care and diligence; and that he is subject,

at least, to like rules and liabilities, as if he (not being a com-

mon carrier), had undertaken to transport an article of mer-

chandise.
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On its face it gives clear intimation that it is of a business

character, relating to a distinct and specific contract, and that,

according to the well-known custom of merchants, it must have

been understood by the operator or agent as an acceptance of an

offer to sell a cargo at the price named, if freight at ten cents

could be procured.

In this respect it dift'ers from a class of cases to be found in

the reports, where the message was so brief or enigmatical, or so

obscure, that it gave the operator no notice that it was of any

value pecuniarily.

It differs also from another class in this, that it is not a gen-

eral order to buy, if thought best, or if market had an upward

tendency, or if there was a probable chance of profit, or any like

condition. This telegram is a distinct acceptance of an offer, at

a fixed price, of a cargo. Its binding efficacy was not dependent

upon any contingency, or rise or fall in the market. If it had

been duly delivered, the plaintiffs would have been, at that mo-

ment, the purchasers and owners at Baltimore of a cargo of

corn at ninety cents, with freight at ten cents. It was not de-
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livered, and the plaintiffs were not at that time and place such

owners, as between the plaintiffs and defendants, the plaintiffs

were entitled to be, at such price. They would have been such,

but for the neglect of the defendants. What is the measure

of damages? Clearly not the price paid for the transmission

only. Paying that back would be rather in the nature of a re-

cission of the contract, than damages for its non-performance.

And we have before determined, that the special condition was

not binding so as to exonerate from all other damages occasioned

by neglect or want of common care and attention in the per-

formance of the contract and duty assumed.

A more difficult question arises in fixing an exact rule in de-

termining the amount of damages in this case.

The general rule is familiar, and is among the rudimental

axioms of the law.

In this State, the general doctrine was laid down at an early

day in Miller v. Mariner's Church, 7 Greenl. 51, 20 Am. D. 341,

in an opinion of the court drawn by Mr. Justice Weston in his

usually clear, discriminating, and accurate style, and precision

in use of language. "In general, the delinquent party is holden

to make good the loss occasioned by his delinquency. But his

liability is limited to direct damages, which, according to the

nature of the subject, may be contemplated or presumed to re-

sult from his failure. Remote or speculative damages, although

susceptible of proof, and deducible from the non-performance,

are not allowed. And if the party injured has it in his power
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to take measures by which his loss is less aggravated,

this will be expected of him. If the party entitled to the benefit

of a contract can protect himself from loss, arising from a

breach, at a trifling expense, or with reasonable exertion, he is

bound to do so. ' '

The above extract, as it seems to us, contains the substance

of the whole law applicable to this subject, and the germ from

which long chapters and long opinions have been expanded. It

is constantly cited as an early and authoritative statement of

the legal rule on this subject.

The principles and rules laid down in this case have been re-

affirmed in our court in many cases. In Berry v. Dwinel, 44

Maine, 255, it is held that ''remote and consequential damages,

possible gains, and contingent profits are not allowed." The

rule was applied in this case to possible or actual loss to plaintiff

in the future, which the defendant set up as a defense to re-

covery of damages, for non-delivery of logs at a stipulated price

and time.

Perkins v. P. S. & P. R. R., 47 Maine 592, 74 Am. D. 162 ;
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Ripley v. Mosely, 57 Id. 76, and cases there cited. In that case it

was held, that when the loss is not speculative nor dependent

upon contingencies, but is one of the natural and direct results

of the act, it may be recovered. But loss of probable profits is

too uncertain and problematical to be a basis for estimation of

damages.

In an English case, Hamlin v. G. N. Railway, 1 H. & N. 408,

it is laid down as a general principle, that no damages can be

given on contracts, which cannot be stated specifically.

Redfield, in his chapter on Telegraph Companies, § 1896, thus

states it as applicable to such companies : ' ' The company must

make good the loss resulting from any default on their part."

But what loss? Can a party recover for every loss, or injury

which he can show, by facts subsequently occurring, did in

truth result to him from the failure of duty on the part of the

other party ?

The clear preponderance and weight of the decisions are, that

the qualification, which was thought formerly to be sufficient

to meet all cases, is not satisfactory. That qualification was,

that the injury must be the ordinary, natural, or even neces-

sary result of the breach. But loss of profits may be clearly

shown to have been occasioned by the failure, and from no other

cause. So injury and loss may be directly traced to the same

cause, when the party is prevented from availing himself, by

this breach of one contract, of some other collateral, and inde-

pendent contract entered into with other parties. Or where a
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party has been prevented from doing some act, or making some

investment in his own business, not necessarily connected with

the agreement in question.

These damages are disallowed, not because they cannot be

traced directly as the immediate and undoubted effect of the

breach, but because they are in their nature uncertain and con-

tingent, and, perhaps more decidedly, because they are not such

as would naturally flow from such a breach, and could not

fairly be considered as having been within the contemplation of

the parties at the time of entering into the contract. This rule

necessarily excludes all remote, speculative, and uncertain re-

sults, as well as possible profits, advantages, and other like con-

sequences which might have arisen, or which it can be shown

would have arisen from the performance of the contract. This

seems to be the doctrine in other States and in England. Squire

V. Western Union Telegraph Co., 98 Mass. 232, 93 Am. D. 162 ;

Griffin v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 490, 69 Am. D. 718 ; Leonard v. New

York Telegraph Co., 41 Id. 544, 1 Am. Rep. 446; Freeman v.

Clute, 3 Barb. 426; Blanchard v. Ely, 21 Wend. 342, 34 Am.
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D. 250; The Sch. Lively, 1 Gall. 315; Graham v. Western Union

Telegraph Co. (Colorado), before cited; Hadley v. Baxendale,

26 Eng. Law & Eq. 398, a leading case on resulting damages.

Other English and American cases might be cited, bearing more .

or less directly on the subject. They can be found collected in

Sedgwick on Damages, and other text-books.

But the negation of certain elements still leaves the true rule

undetermined. This, we think is to be found in the application

of the principle, which, excluding all uncertain, pj-oblematical

and contingent profits, holds the party liable for the immediate

and necessary result of the breach, and which may fairly be pre-

sumed to have been in contemplation of the parties at the time,

and are capable of being definitely ascertained by reference to

established market rates.

Now, in the ease before us, the plaintiffs should have had, at

the time when the dispatch should have been delivered, a cargo at

ninety cents and freight at ten cents. The natural consequence

of this neglect, one which might well be anticipated or be in

contemplation of the parties, was that the bargain would be

lost, and that the cargo might be sold to other parties, or the

seller would decline to accept a repetition of the offer, after-

ward, at same price. Plaintiffs wanted the cargo and had a right

to have it at the price named. What was the damage ?

Here comes in the second proposition in Miller v. Mariner's

Church, viz., that the party should not at once abandon all at-

tempts to procure the corn, and rest upon a claim for indefinite
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and possible profits which he might have made by a rise in the

market, if he had obtained the article at the time, but must use

reasonable diligence, after notice of the failure, to procure the

same quantity, and the lowest freights, at the then market rates.

The sum, therefore, which would be a compensation for the

direct loss and injury sustained by the non-delivery of this mes-

sage, is the difference (if at a higher rate) between the ninety

cents named and the sum which the plaintiffs were or would

have been compelled to pay at the same place, in order, by due

and reasonable diligence, after notice of the failure of the tele-

gram, to purchase the like quantity and quality of the same

species of merchandise, and the same rule applies to any increase

of freight from the sum named, if it be shown that the corn

could have been shipped by the sellers, at that rate, if the tele-

gram had been duly received.

The case of Squire v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 98 Mass.

232, 93 Am. D. 162, adopts this view, in a case very nearly resem-

bling this in its facts.

Rittenhouse v. Independent Line of Telegraph, 1 Daly (N. Y.),
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474, where the operator made a mistake in the article ordered,

it was held that the company must make good the difference

between the price of the article actually ordered, at the time

when ordered, and the price of the same article, if purchased as

soon as the mistake was discovered.

United States Telegraph Co. v. Wenger, 55 Penn. St. 262, 93

Am. D. 751. An order to buy stocks; no reason given why not

delivered; a case of negligence; stocks ordered not bought on

the day; they would have been, if telegram had been received,

but were purchased three days afterward at an advance. That

difference, the court say, is undoubtedly the damages the plain-

tiff has sustained and is entitled to recover. ' ' The dispatch was

such as to disclose the nature of the business to which it re-

lated, and that loss might be very likely to occur if there was a

want of promptitude in transmitting it. ' ' Leonard v. New York

Telegraph Co., 41 N. Y. 544, before cited, a case of mistake;

Griffin v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 490, 69 Am. D. 718 ; DeRutte v. N.

Y. Al. & B. R. Tel. Co., 1 Daly, 547 ; Parks v. Alta California

Telegraph Co., 13 Cal. 422, 73 Am. D. 589.

In our own State, in the case of Berry v. Dwinel, before cited,

the rule, in an analogous case, is thus stated: "When a party

contracts to deliver goods at a particular time and place, and

no payment has been made, the true measure of damages is the

difference between the contract price and that of like goods at

time and place where they should have lieen delivered."

And so it has been held that a common carrier, who unrea-
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sonably delays to transport or deliver goods intrusted to liim,

will be held to pay the difference between the market value at

time and place when and where they ought to have been de-

livered, and the market value at that place on day of actual de-

livery. And this although no special contract as to time, and

no special intended use, and no deterioration in the quality of the

article. Cutting v. G. T. R. R., 13 Allen, 381. The same de-

cision has been made by this court in Ball v. Railroad — not re-

ported. See Weston v. G. T. R. Co., 54 Me. 376, 92 Am. D. 5.

Appleton, C. J., delivered a dissenting opinion.

169. AYER V. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO.,

79 Me. 193; 10 Atl. R. 495; 1 Am. St. B. 353. 1887.

By Court, Emery, J. On report. The defendant telegraph

company was engaged in the business of transmitting messages

by telegraph between Bangor and Philadelphia, and other points.

The plaintiff, a lumber dealer in Bangor, delivered to the de-

fendant company in Bangor, to be transmitted to his corre-

spondent in Philadelphia, the following message: "Will sell

800M laths, delivered at your wharf, two ten net cash. July
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shipment. Answer quick." The regular tariff rate was pre-

paid by the plaintiff for such transmission. The message de-

livered by the defendant company to the Philadelphia corre-

spondent was as follows: "Will sell 800M laths delivered at

your wharf two net cash. July shipment. Answer quick." It

will be seen that the important word "ten," in the statement of

price, was omitted.

The Philadelphia party immediately returned by telegraph

the following answer: "Accept your telegraphic offer on laths.

Cannot increase price spruce." Letters afterward passed be-

tween the parties, which disclosed the error in the transmission

of the plaintiff's message. About two weeks after the discovery

of the error, the plaintiff shipped the laths, as per the message

received by his correspondent, to-wit, at two dollars per M. He

testified that his correspondent insisted he was entitled to the

laths at. that price, and they were shipped accordingly.

The defendant telegraph company offered no evidence what-

ever, and did not undertake to account for or explain the mis-

take in the transmission of the message. The presumption

therefore is, that the mistake resulted from the fault of the

telegraph company. We cannot consider the possibility that

it may have resulted from causes beyond the control of the
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company. In the absence or evidence on that point, we must

assume that for such an error the company was in fault: Bart-

lett V. Tel. Co., 62 Me. 221, 16 Am. R. 437.

The fault and consequent liability of the defendant company

being thus established, the only remaining question is the ex-

tent of that liability in this case. The plaintiff claims it ex-

tends to the difference between the market price of the laths

and the price at which they were shipped. The defendant

claims its liability is limited to the amount paid for the trans-

mission of the message. It claims this limitation on two

grounds : —

1. The company relies upon a stipulation made by it with the

plaintiff, as follows: "All messages taken by this company are

subject to the following terms: to guard against mistakes or

delays, the sender of a message should order it repeated; that

is, telegraphed back to the originating office for comparison.

For this, one-half the regular rate is charged in addition. It

is agreed between the sender of the following message and

this company that the said company shall not be liable for mis-
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takes or delays in the transmission, or delivery, or for non-

delivery of any unrepeated message, whether happening by

negligence of its servants or otherwise, beyond the amount

received for sending the same." This is the usual stipulation

printed on telegraph blanks, and was known to the plaintiff,

and was printed at the top of the paper upon which he wrote

and signed his message. He did not ask to have the message re-

peated.

Is such a stipulation in the contract of transmission valid

as a matter of contract assented to by the parties, or is it void

as against public policy? We think it is void.

Telegraph companies are quasi public servants. They re-

ceive from the public valuable franchises. They owe the pub-

lic care and diligence. Their business intimately concerns the

public. Many and various interests are practically dependent

upon it. Nearly all interests may be affected by it. Their

negligence in it may often work irreparable mischief to indi-

viduals and communities. It is essential for the public good

that their duty of using care and diligence be rigidly enforced.

They should no more be allowed to effectually stipulate for ex-

emption from this duty than should a carrier of passengers,

or any other party engaged in a public business.

This rule does not make telegraph companies insurers. It

does not make them answer for errors not resulting from their

negligence. It only requires the performance of their plain

duty. It is no hardship upon them. They engage in the busi-
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ness voluntarily. They have the entire control of their servants

and instruments. They invite the public to intrust messages

to them for transmission. They may insist on their compen-

sation in advance. Why, then, should they refuse to perform

the common duty of care and diligence ? Why should they make

conditions for such performance? Having taken the message

and the pay, why should they not do all things (including

the repeating) necessary for correct transmission? Why should

they insist on special compensation for using any particular

mode or instrumentality as a guard against their own negli-

gence? It seems clear to us that, having undertaken the busi-

ness, they ought without qualification to do it carefully, or be

responsible for their want of care.

It is true, there are nuinerous cases in other states holding

otherwise, but we think the doctrine above stated is the true

one, and in harmony with the previous decisions of this court:

True V. Tel. Co., 60 Me. 9, 11 Am. R. 156 ; Bartlett v. Tel. Co.,

62 Me. 221, 16 Am. R. 437.

2. The defendant company also claims that the plaintiff was
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not, in fact, damaged to a greater extent than the price paid

by him for the transmission. It contends that the plaintiff was

not bound by the erroneous message delivered by the company

to the Philadelphia party, and hence need not have shipped

the laths at the lesser price. This raises the question whether

the message written by the sender and intrusted to the tele-

graph company for transmission, or the message written out

and delivered by the company to the receiver at the other end

of the line, as and for the message intended to be sent, is the

better evidence of the rights of the receiver against the sender.

The question is important, and not easy of solution. It

would be hard that the negligence of the telegraph company,

or an error in transmission resulting from uncontrollable causes,

should impose upon the innocent sender of a message a

liability he never authorized nor contemplated. It would be

equally hard that the innocent receiver, acting in good faith

upon the message as received by him, should, through such error,

lose all claim upon the sender. If one, owning merchandise,

write a message offering to sell at a certain price, it would

seem unjust that the telegraph company could bind him to

sell at a less price, by making that error in the transmission.

On the other hand, the receiver of the offer may, in good faith,

upon the strength of the telegram as received by him, have

sold all the merchandise to arrive, perhaps at the same rate. It

would seem unjust that he should have no claim for the mer-

chandise. If an agent receive instructions by telegraph from
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his principal, and in good faith act upon them as expressed in

the message delivered him by the company, it would seem he

ought to be held justified, though there were an error in the

transmission.

It is evident that in case of an error in the transmission of

a telegram, either the sender or receiver must often suffer loss.

As between the two, upon whom should the loss finally fall?

We think the safer and more equitable rule, and the rule the

public can most easily adapt itself to, is, that as between

sender and receiver, the party who selects the telegraph as the

means of communication shall bear the loss caused by the

errors of the telegraph. The first proposer can select one of

many modes of communication, both for the proposal and the

answer. The receiver has no such choice, except as to his

answer. If he cannot safely act upon the message he receives

through the agency selected by the proposer, business must be

seriously hampered and delayed. The use of the telegraph

has become so general, and so many transactions are based on

the words of the telegram received, any other rule would now
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be impracticable.

Of course the rule above stated presupposes the innocence

of the receiver, and that there is nothing to cause him to sus-

pect an error. If there be anything in the message, or in the

attendant circumstances, or in the prior dealings of the parties,

or in anything else indicating a probable error in the trans-

mission, good faith on the part of the receiver may require

him to investigate before acting. Neither does the rule include

forged messages, for in such case the supposed sender did not

make any use of the telegraph.

The authorities are few and somewhat conflicting, but there

are several in harmony with our conclusion upon this point.

In Durkee v. Vermont C. R. R. Co., 29 Vt. 137, it was held that

where the sender himself elected to communicate by telegraph,

the message received by the other party is the original evidence

of any contract. In Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431, the mes-

sage received from the telegraph company was admitted as

the original and best evidence of a contract binding on the

sender. In Morgan v. People, 59 111. 58, it was said that the

telegram received was the original, and it was held that the

sheriff receiving such a telegram from the judgment creditor

was bound to follow it as it read. There are dicta to the same

effect in Wilson v. M. & N. R'y Co., 31 Minn. 481, 18 N. W. R.

291, and Howley v. Whipple, 48 N. H. 488.

Telegraph Company v. Shotter, 71 Ga. 760, is almost a paral-

lel case. The sender wrote his message: "Can deliver hundred
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turpentine at sixty-four. ' ' As received from the telegraph com-

pany it read: ''Can deliver hundred turpentine at sixty," the

word ''four" being omitted. The receiver immediately tele-

graphed an acceptance. The sender shipped the turpentine, and

drew for the price at sixty-four. The receiver refused to pay

more than sixty. The sender accepted the sixty, and sued the

telegraph company for the difference between sixty and the

market. It was urged, as here, that the sender was not bound

to accept the sixty, as that was not his offer. The court held,

however, that there was a completed contract at sixty, that the

sender must fulfill it, and could recover his consequent loss of

the telegraph company.

It follows that the plaintiff in this case is entitled to recover

fne difference between the two dollars and the market, as to

laths. The evidence shows that the difference was ten cents

per M.

Judgment for plaintiff for eighty dollars, with interest from

the date of the writ.

170. WEBBE V. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO.,
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169 III. 610; 21 N. E. E. 4; 61 Am. St. B. 207. 1897.

Magruder, J. Upon the blank form, containing the tele-

graphic message delivered by Haas to the appellee's operator at

Montgomery, Alabama, there were printed in small type certain

conditions, among which was the following : ' ' The company will

not hold itself liable ... in any case where the claim is

not presented in writing within sixty days after the message is

filed with the company for transmission. ' '

Upon the back of the blank form, upon which the dispatch

as delivered to appellant in Chicago was written, certain stipu-

lations and conditions were printed, the last of which was as fol-

lows: "The company will not be liable for damages or statutory

penalties in any case where the claim is not presented in writing

within sixty days after the message is filed with the company for

transmission. ' '

It is contended by appellee that the claim here sued upon was

not presented in writing within the sixty days named in the

printed conditions. It is not altogether clear, under the evidence

in this case, that the claim was not presented in writing within

sixty days as required by the condition. On February 7, 1893,

one of the attorneys of the appellant wrote a letter to an officer

of the appellee company. Although this letter stated that the

claim for damages was made against appellee on behalf of I.
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H. & J. C. Haas, yet the letter explained fully the nature of

the alteration which was made in the dispatch, and the nature of

the claim based upon the loss incurred by reason of that altera-

tion. But whether the claim was presented in writing within

the sixty days or not, it seems to be conceded that the action of

the court in instructing the jury to find for the defendant was

based upon the conclusion that the claim was not presented in

writing within the time named.

The question in the case is, whether the court erred in taking

the case away from the jury. The further question involved is,

whether the failure to present the claim in writing within the

sixty days, if there was such failure, constitutes a defense against

the present action. It is not denied that the company was guilty

of negligence in delivering the dispatch as altered, instead of de-

livering it as originally sent. At any rate, no contest is made

upon the question as to whether there was such negligence or

not. Counsel for appellee confine themselves in their brief to

the proposition that, for want of a claim in writing within sixty

days after the dispatch in question was sent, appellant's right of
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recovery is barred.

It is to be noted that this suit is not brought by Haas, the

sender of the dispatch, but by Webbe, the receiver of the dis-

patch as changed. The dispatch, as sent, is signed by the sender,

but the dispatch, as received, is not signed by the receiver. The

question then arises, whether any difference exists between the

right of recovery by the sender of the dispatch and the right of

recovery by the receiver of the dispatch, so far as these printed

conditions upon the blank forms are concerned. We have held

that the relation of contract exists between the sender of the

dispatch and the telegraph company, but that no relation of con-

tract exists between the receiver of the dispatch and the tele-

graph company; and that the proper remedy of the receiver of

the dispatch for damages on account of its alteration is an action

in tort : Western Union Tel. Co. v. Du Bois, 128 111. 248, 21 N.

E. R. 4, 15 Am. St. E. 109. Ordinarily, where a shipper of

goods, or the sender of a telegraphic dispatch, is held to be

bound by stipulations or conditions printed upon the blank

form of a receipt, pr bill of lading, or dispatch, it is upon the

ground that the person so bound signs the document containing/

the conditions, and makes a contract with the company, which is

to carry his goods or transmit his message. It would seem to

be clear, however, that such conditions and stipulations would

not have the same binding effect where, as here, no contract rela-

tion exists.

In a ease where a suit in assumpsit for damages was brought
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by the sender of a dispatch against the telegraph company, we

held that the telegraph company is a servant of the public, and

bound to act whenever called upon, its charges being paid or

tendered; that such companies are, in this respect, like common

carriers, and, though not regarded, like common carriers, as in-

surers of the safe delivery of every message intrusted to them,

yet their duty is to transmit correctly the message as delivered ;

that they are bound to the use of due and reasonable care, and

liable for the consequences of carelessness or negligence, in the

conduct of their business; that where a party desiring to send

a telegraphic dispatch is required by the company to write his

message upon a paper, containing a condition exonerating the

company from liability for an incorrect transmission of the mes-

sage unless it shall be repeated and at an additional cost therefor

to the sender, such a restriction, even if regarded as a contract,

is unjust, without consideration, and void ; that it is against pub-

lic policy to permit telegraph companies to secure exemption

from the consequences of their own gross negligence by contract ;

that, notwithstanding any special condition which may be con-
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tained in a contract between a company and the sender of a

message respecting the liability of the former in case of an in-

accurate transmission of the message, the company will still be

liable for mistakes happening by its own fault; that it will de-

pend on circumstances whether a paper, furnished by the com-

pany on which the message is written and signed by the sender

is a contract or not ; that it is a question for the jury to deter-

mine, as a question of fact, upon evidence aliunde, and from all

the circumstances attending the signing of the paper, whether

or not the sender of the dispatch has knowledge of its terms and

assents to its restrictions : Tyler v. Western Union Tel. Co., 60

111. 421, 14 Am. Rep. 38. The Tyler case distinctly held that

assent by the sender of the dispatch to the printed terms and

conditions upon the blank form must be shown, in order to make

such terms and conditions binding as a contract upon the sender.

The doctrine of the Tyler case has been subsequently indorsed

and approved by this court : Western Union Tel. Co. v. Tyler,

74 111. 168, 24 Am. Rep. 279 ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Du Bois,

128 111. 248, 21 N. E. R. 4, 15 Am. St. R. 109.

If assent to such terms and conditions is necessary to bind

the sender of the dispatch, surely assent to such terms and con-

ditions, as printed upon a dispatch delivered, will be necessary to

bind the receiver thereof. The receiver of the dispatch will cer-

tainly not be bound by a provision thereon, requiring a claim to

be presented within sixty days, in the absence of proof that he

assented to such a provision: Western Union Tel. Co. v. Fair-
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banks, 15 111. App. 600; Western Union Tel. Co. v. De Golyer,

27 111. App. 489 ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lyean, 60 111. App.

124.

It is said, however, that the requirement that the claim should

be presented within sixty days is a reasonable requirement, and

that a party suing for damages will be bound to show that he

has complied with such requirement, if he had notice or knowl-

edge of the same, or if there were any circumstances of such a

character as to affect him with such notice or knowledge. Upon

an examination of the authorities, it will be found that, in most

cases where the provision in regard to the limit of sixty days

has been held to be reasonable, and notice or knowledge of the

same has been held to be binding upon the plaintiff in the suit,

the controversy has been between the sender of the dispatch,

and the telegraph company. Such doctrine, however, has no

application as between the receiver of the dispatch, whose suit

is in tort against the company for negligence in the perform-

ance of a public duty, and the telegraph company. From the

rule that assent is necessary to make such a condition as the
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sixty day limit binding, it necessarily follows that mere notice

or knowledge of such condition will not affect the receiver of

the dispatch. It is against public policy that a telegraph com-

pany may adopt rules, regulating its relations with its patrons,

which, if they are reasonable, shall be binding upon such patrons

without their assent, if they only have knowledge. Counsel for

appellee refer to the case of Oppenheimer v. United States Exp.

Co., 69 111. 62, 18 Am. Rep. 596, as supporting the doctrine con-

tended for by them ; but ' ' there is in that case ( Oppenheimer v.

United States Exp. Co., 69 111. 62, 18 Am. Rep. 596) no departure

from the uniform decisions of this court, that a carrier cannot

be released from the duties and liabilities annexed to its em-

ployment, unless the shipper assents to the attempted restric-

tions": Boscowitz V. Adams Exp. Co., 93 111. 523, 34 Am. Rep.

191.

Some of the cases seem to hold that the printed conditions

upon blank forms of telegraphic dispatches, including the one

in reference to the limit of sixty days, are mere regulations, and

not contracts between the sender of the message and the tele-

graph company. The force of the distinction thus sought to be

made lies in the fact that, if the conditions or stipulations are

considered as mere regulations, the assent of the sender to them

is not necessary, but that he will be bound if they are brought

home to his knowledge ; whereas, if they are held to be parts of

a contract, the assent of the sender must be shown in order to

bind him : Croswell on Law of Electricity, sec. 493. But what-

654

WEBBE V. W. U. TELEGRAPH CO. § 170

ever may be the correct view of these conditions as being regula-

tions or contracts where the controversy is between the sender

of the dispatch and the telegraphic company, we are of the

opinion that such distinction has no application where the con-

troversy is between the company and the receiver of the dispatch :

Croswell on Law of Electricity, sec. 540. There is no proof of

contract between the telegraph company and the person to whom

the message is addressed, and, therefore, he could not be held

bound by these conditions or stipulations : Croswell on Law of

Electricity, sec. 504, and cases cited in note 2.

Counsel for appellee rely mainly upon the case of Manier v.

Western Union Tel. Co., 94 Tenn. 442, 29 S. W. 732, as author-

ity for the position that such conditions and stipulations, includ-

ing the limit of sixty days, are binding upon the receiver, as well

as the sender, of the dispatch. But we are not inclined to assent

to the doctrine of the Tennessee case. The author of the opinion

in that case refers to cases holding that the addressee of the mes-

sage is not bound by the stipulation as to the sixty clay limit,

because he did not make the contract ; and also to cases holding
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to the contrary, and says that it is not necessary to determine,

in the case there under consideration, where the weight of au-

thority lies. The conclusion announced in that case rests mainly

upon two considerations, namely : 1. That where the receiver of

the message is a patron of the company, he will be presumed to

have knowledge of the form of the contract embodied in the

blanks used ; 2. That the receiver 's right to recover rests entirely

upon the contract of sending, and upon the principle that,

where two parties contract for the benefit of a third, such third

party may maintain an action for the breach of the agreement

in his own right. We are unable to see that these considerations

can have any influence, where the action brought by the receiver

of the dispatch is an action in tort for damages for the careless

and negligent performance of a public duty.

The opposite view from that contended for by counsel for

appellee is supported by respectable authority, and is in harmony

with the decisions heretofore rendered by this eo^yt, and is a

natural corollary from such decisions. Gray on Communication

by Telegraph, at section 75, says : ' ' The printed matter upon the

blank form, upon which a message is delivered at the place of

destination, acquaints the receiver usually with the fact that the

telegraph company will not be liable for a loss in any case in

which claim for that loss is not presented in writing within

sixty days after sending the message. As the receiver's right of

action is purely one in tort, it is difficult to see how the tele-

graph company can arbitrarily compel a claim for loss to be
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made within any particular time. The general rule is, that an

action of tort can be brought without other notice at any period

within the time allotted to it by the statute of limitations."

Upon this subject the supreme court of Nebraska says: "The

clause printed on the telegraph blank to the effect that the tele-

graph company would not be liable for damages in any case,

unless the claim was presented in writing in sixty days, was and

is unreasonable and wholly without consideration if viewed as

a contract between the telegraph company and the sender of the

message, and an attempt on the part of the telegraph company

to enact for itself a statute of limitations. . . . The attempt,

so often indulged in by insurance and telegraph companies to

prescribe for themselves a law, is not one that appeals to the

judgment, or commends itself to the conscience of this court":

Pacific Tel. Co. v. Underwood, 37 Neb. 315, 55 N. W. R. 1057, 40

Am. St. R. 490.

Croswell, in his work on the Law Relating to Electricity, sec-

tion 557, says : "In actions of tort by the addressee of the mes-

sage, it is difficult to see how any limit of time, in which claims

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:41 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

must be made against a telegraph company ^f or damages occa-

sioned by error or negligence in sending the message, can aft'ect

the plaintiff. In such cases, the plaintiff has no privity with the

sender of the message, but sues solely for the breach of duty by

the telegraph company, i. e., the failure of the telegraph com-

pany to perform its public duty of transmitting dispatches

promptly and with due care, and has nothing to do with the

special contract between the sender and the telegraph company,

and, therefore, whatever stipulations the sender may make with,

the telegraph company should not bind the addressee. ' '

The learned author of the article on Telegraphs and Tele-

phones, in volume 25 of the American and English Encyclo-

pedia of Law, pages 807, 808, says: "Other authorities hold

that the receiver's action is not on the contract, but for the tort,

i. e., for the breach of the company's public duty. Under th!s

view of the rule, the stipulations in the original contract can have

no binding effect upon the receiver's action. As a matter of fact,

the telegraph companies endeavor to incorporate the stipulations

into the message as delivered, but as the receiver does not at-

tach his signature thereto, they are of no effect, unless it can

be shown that they were brought to his notice and assented to

by him": Pacific Tel. Co. v. Underwood, 37 Neb. 315, 55 N. W.

R. 1057, 40 Am. St. R. 490; W. U. Tel. Co. v. McKibben, 114

Ind. 511 ; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Longwell, 5 N. Mex. 308 ; Herron v.

Western Union Tel. Co., 90 Iowa, 129; Johnston v. Western

Union Tel. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 362 ; De la Grange v. Southwestern
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Tel. Co., 25 La. Ann. 383 ; Harris v. Western Union Tel. Co., 9

Phila. 88.

It is well settled that, even if the stipulation in question would

be binding upon the receiver of the dispatch in case of an as-

sent thereto, it is a question for the jury to determine whether

there was such assent or not ; and, even if mere notice or knowl-

edge of the stipulation would bind the receiver of the dispatch,

the question whether such receiver had notice or knowledge is

a question of fact to be determined by the jury from all the facts

and circumstances in the case : Tyler v. Western Union Tel. Co.,

60 111. 421, 14 Am. Rep. 38 ; Boscowitz v. Adams Exp. Co., 93 111.

523, 34 Am. Eep. 191 ; Croswell on Law of Electricity, sec. 546.

In the case at bar, the appellant swore that he had never read

the printed matter on the blank received by him, and never

knew what it was ; that he had never heard of the sixty-day con-

dition until a few days before testifying; and that he did not

know what the terms of the conditions upon the blank form

were, and had not only never read them but had never heard

them talked about. The evidence, it is true, showed that, for a
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number of years, the appellant had been conducting his busi-

ness correspondence by telegraph, and that most of it had been

conducted over the lines of the appellee, and that he had re-

ceived and sent most of the telegrams upon the blanks of the

appellee. This proof did not authorize the court below to take

the case from the jury, and direct them to find for the defend-

ant. Even if the circumstance that appellant had used the

blank forms of the appellee for a number of years had a tend-

ency to show his notice or knowledge of the conditions printed

thereon, yet it was for the jury to say what effect should be given

to such circumstances, considered in connection with all the

other testimony in the case. Where certain consignees were fre-

quent shippers by a certain line, and were in the habit of re-

ceiving bills of lading with certain conditions therein, a pre-

sumption was held to arise that such consignees were familiar

with the contents of the bills of lading. The presumption of such

familiarity, however, would only arise out of the fact of tEe

use of the blanks where there was no evidence to the contrary.

The presumption that thus arises is not conclusive: Merchants'

Dispatch etc. Co. v. Moore, 88 111. 136, 30 Am. Rep. 541. Here,

whatever presumption may have arisen against the appellant, in

favor of his familiarity with the terms of the conditions printed

upon the blank used by him, was rebutted by his sworn state-

ment, that he had never read the terms of those conditions, and

did not know what they were. Certainly, it was the duty of the
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court to leave it to the jury to say whether or not he assented

to the condition in regard to the limit of sixty days.

For the error in taking the case away from the jury and in-

structing them to find for the defendant, the judgments of the

appellate court and of the circuit court of Cook county are re-

versed, and the cause is remanded to the latter court for further

proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.

171. GRINNELL V. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO.,

113 Mass. 299; 18 Am. R. 485. 1873.

Counts in contract and in tort joined for breach of a contract,

and negligence in transmitting a telegraph message to an insur-

ance company for renewal of insurance, and calling for an

answer. The operator omitted the word ' ' answer, ' ' and plaintiff

thereupon effected new insurance at a cost of $35. In addition

he was obliged to pay the first company $35, which sum he al-

leged as his damages. The message was written on a printed

blank requiring repetition of the message and payment of an

additional sum if the telegraph company were to insure correct

transmission. The court below ruled that the action could not
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be maintained for more than twenty-five cents, the charge for

sending the message.

Gray, C. J. The liability of a telegraph company is quite

unlike that of a common carrier. A common carrier has the

exclusive possession and control of the goods to be carried, with

peculiar opportunities for embezzlement or collusion with

thieves; the identity of the goods received with those delivered

cannot be mistaken ; their value is capable of easy estimate, and

may be ascertained by inquiry of the consignor, and the car-

rier's compensation fi:^ed accordingly; and his liability in dam-

ages is measured by the value of the goods. A telegraph com-

pany is intrusted with nothing but an order or message, which

is not to be carried in the form in which it is received, but is

to be transmitted or repeated by electricity, and is peculiarly

liable to mistake ; which cannot be the subject of embezzlement ;

which is of no intrinsic value; the importance of which cannot

be estimated except by the sender, nor ordinarily disclosed by

him without danger of defeating his own purposes; which may

be wholly valueless, if not forwarded immediately ; for the trans-

mission of which there must be a simple rate of compensation;

and the measure of damages for a failure to transmit or d€-
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liver which, has no relation to any value which can be put on

the message itself.

The duty of a telegraph company, as defined in our statutes, is

that it ''shall receive dispatches from and for other telegraph

lines, companies and associations, and from and for any person;

and on payment of the usual charges for transmitting dispatches,

according to the regulations of the company, shall transmit th6

same faithfully and impartially." Gen. Stats., c. 64, § 10.

The liability of a telegraph company may be limited by reason-

able stipulations expressed in its contracts with the senders of

messages ; and, according to the weight of authority, a regulation

that the liability of the company for any mistake or delay in the

transmission or delivery of a message, or for not delivering the

same, shall not extend beyond the sum received for sending it,

unless the sender orders the message to be repeated by sending

it back to the office which first received it, and pays half the

regular rate additional, is a reasonable precaution to be taken

by the company, and binding upon all who assent to it, so as to

exempt the company from liability beyond the amount stipulated,
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for any cause except willful misconduct or gross negligence on

the part of the company. Ellis v. American Telegraph Co., 13

Allen, 226 ; Redpath v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 112 Mass.

71, 17 Am. Rep. 69; Camp v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,

1 Mete. (Ky.) 164, 71 Am. D. 461; Western Union Telegraph

Co. V. Carew, 15 Mich. 525 ; United States Telegraph Co. v. Gil-

dersleve, 29 Md. 232, 96 Am. D. 519 ; Breese v. United States

Telegraph Co., 48 N. Y. 132, 8 Am. Rep. 526.

Such a regulation does not undertake wholly to exempt the

company from liability for loss, but merely requires the other

party to the contract, if he considers the transmission and de-

livery of the message to be of such importance to him that he

proposes to hold the company responsible in damages, for a non-

fulfillment of the contract on its part, beyond the amount paid

for the message, to increase that payment by one-half. Even a

common carrier has a right to inquire as to the quality and value

of goods or packages intrusted to him for carriage, and is not

liable for goods of unusual value if false answers are made to

his inquiries. Phillips v. Earle, 8 Pick. 182 ; Dunlap v. Interna-

tional Steamboat Co., 98 Mass. 371, 377, 378.

In the leading case in this Commonwealth of Ellis v. Ameri-

can Telegraph Co., the action was brought for an error in trans-

mitting a message, by substituting the words "seventy-five" for

"twenty-five;" and there was no evidence of carelessness or

negligence, except this error, which was made by some agent of

the company in transmission. The defendants requested the
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judge who presided at the trial to instruct the jury that on these

facts they were not liable. But the judge ruled that, notwith-

standing the terms and conditions set forth in the printed head-

ing of the message (which were substantially like those in the

case at bar), the defendants were bound, in transmitting the

message, to make use of ordinary care, attention and skill, and

were liable for damages arising from inattention or carelessness

in such transmission, and not produced by any unexpected or un-

foreseen accident; and that the difference between the m'essage

received and that actually delivered was prima facie evidence of

the want of ordinary care, attention and skill on the part of

the defendants. 13 Allen, 226-228.

Upon exceptions to that ruling, the court held that, in the

business of transmitting messages by telegraph, as in the ordi-

nary employments and occupations of life, men were bound to

the use of due and reasonable care, and were liable for the con-

sequences of their negligence in the conduct of their business to

those sustaining loss or damage thereby; but that this rule did

"not operate so as to prevent parties from prescribing rea-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:41 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

sonable rules and regulations for the management of the busi-

ness, or establishing special stipulations for the performance of

service, which, if made known to those with whom they deal,

and directly or by implication assented to by them, will operate

to abridge their general liability at common law, and to protect

them from being held responsible for unusual or peculiar hazards

which are incident to particular kinds of business." It was

further said : "Of course, a party cannot in such way protect

himself against the consequences of his own fraud or gross

negligence, or the fraud or gross negligence of his servants or

agents." "But he may to a certain extent, in the mode above

indicated, limit the extent of his liability, or graduate the amount

of his compensation, according to the risk which he assumes, as

well as by the nature of the service which he renders." 13 Allen,

234. It was held that the regulation in question was reason-

able and valid; that "the defendants were entitled to insist

on a compliance with that part of their regulations which re-

quired that the message should be repeated, and that the extent

of the risk should be made known to them, if they were to be

held to insure the safe and correct transmission of the mes-

sage, or, in case of failure, to be responsible for all the dam-

ages consequent on delays or errors." And the court declared

that it was mainly for these reasons that the instructions to the

jury could not be supported. 13 Allen, 235-237.

Although that action was by the receiver of the message, he

was treated throughout the case as claiming through the con-
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tract, of which he had notice, made with the company by the

sender of the message. No allusion was made, in the judgment

of this court, to the nature of the error in the message, or to its

effect as evidence of negligence on the part of the company. Nor

was it suggested that there was any insufficiency in the proof

of negligence; and there was nothing before this court upon

which such a point could have been decided; for the question

whether the substitution of "seventy" for "twenty" was or was

not of itself proof of negligence, depended upon the plainness

of the writing of the original message, which could only be ascer-

tained by inspection, and which was a pure question of fact to

be determined by the jury or the court below.

As the instructions at the trial of that case did not allow

the plaintiff to recover without proof of negligence to the satis-

faction of the jury, the judgment of this court, sustaining the

exceptions to those instructions, is a direct adjudication that

the regulations in question exempted the company from liability

for ordinary negligence where the message had not been repeated

and the additional charge paid.
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We have been led to make the fuller statement of that case,

because its scope and effect appear to us to have been misappre-

hended in Sweatland v. Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co., 27

la. 433, 1 Am. Rep. 285, which is the only decision, cited at

the bar, inconsistent with the law upon the subject as declared

by this court.

In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Buchanan, 35 Ind. 429,

1 Am. Rep. 744, the action was not for damages, but for a

penalty imposed by statute, which could not of course be re-

stricted by the contract of the parties ; and it was assumed that

in the case of a message not repeated in accordance with the rule,

the company would not be liable for damages beyond the amount

stipulated, except in case of gross negligence. In True v. In-

ternational Telegraph Co., 60 Me. 9, 11 Am. Rep. 156, the

regulation which was held invalid purported wholly to exempt

the company, in ease of messages sent by night, from any li-

ability beyond the amount received; and the opinion of the

majority of the court appears to be founded on a false analogy

between telegraph companies and common carriers, and is op-

posed by a very able dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Apple-

ton. In Squire v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 98 Mass. 232, 93

Am. D. 157; and in Leonard v. New York, Albany & Buffalo

Telegraph Co., 41 N. Y. 544, 1 Am. Rep. 446, there was no

regulation limiting the liability of the corporation against which

the action was brought. In New York & Washington Telegraph

Co. V. D:-yburg, 35 Pa. St. 298, 78 Am. D. 338, the action was
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by the receiver of a message, who had no notice of the regula-

tion ; and was in substance not founded upon contract, but upon

a misrepresentation by the company employed to send the mes-

sage, by which the receiver was misled and injured. See Ellis

V. American Telegraph Co., 13 Allen, 226, 238 ; May v. Western

Union Telegraph Co., 112 Mass. 90, 95.

In the case at bar, the form of the dispatch, delivered by the

defendant's agent to the plaintiff, and filled up and signed by

the latter, constituted the contract between the parties. The

plaintiff, having thus expressly agreed that, if he did not order

the message to be repeated, the liability of the defendant for

mistakes or delays in its transmission or delivery should be lim-

ited to the sum paid, and not having ordered it to be repeated

and paid the increased rate required in case of repetition, could

not charge the defendant for liability, beyond the amount orig-

inally paid for the transmission of the message, for a mistake

in the transmission, at least without proving willful default or

gross negligence on the part of the company.

There was no offer at the trial to show any wanton disregard
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of duty or gross negligence on the part of the company or its

agents. The offer to prove that "there was negligence on the

part of the operator," in not sending the whole message re-

ceived, must be understood to mean want of ordinary care. No

question therefore arises whether the company could be charged

by reason of gross negligence, as held in United States Telegraph

Co. V. Gildersleve, 29 Md. 232, 96 Am. D. 519, and suggested in

Ellis V. American Telegraph Co., 13 Allen, 226, 234.

The offer of the plaintiff to prove that the repeating of the

message as received by the operator of the telegraph at Boston,

to the operator at New Bedford, by whom it was sent, would not

have disclosed the omission in the message, was rightly rejected

as immaterial. The report does not show how such evidence

could possibly have proved that fact. But the conclusive answer

to it is that the plaintiff, having omitted to fulfill the condition,

on which alone, by the terms of the express contract between the

parties, he could recover for any mistake in transmission more

than the amount of his original payment, cannot be permitted to

prove that his own failure to fulfill his contract did not affect

the result. The ohiter dicta of Chief Justice Bigelow in Ellis

V. American Telegraph Co., 13 Allen, 226, 238— that it would

be a question of fact for the jury whether the mistake in the

dispatch would have been prevented or corrected by the repeti-

tion of the message; and that of course the company would be

liable for any negligence causing damage, which would not have

been prevented by a compliance with the rules — are somewhat

662

W. U. TELEGRAPH CO. v. VAN CLEAVE. §§ 171, 172

wanting in precision, owing doubtless to the fact that, as he

observed, no such question was before the court. They might

perhaps apply where the neglect sued for was in a matter not

within the terms of the regulations as, for instance, where no

attempt at all was made to send the message. Birney v. New

York & Washington Tel. Co., 18 Md. 341, 81 Am. D. 607. But

that they were not intended to countenance the admission of such

evidence as was offered in the present case, upon any point cov-

ered by the contract of the parties, is manifest from his state-

ment, only a few lines above, that it might be a sufficient answer

to the claim against the company, ' ' that according to the reason-

able regulations by which they were governed in the perform-

ance of their undertaking toward the plaintiff, and of which he

had notice, they have committed no breach of duty for which

they can be held liable to him."

The remaining questions may be briefly disposed of. The evi-

dence of usage and understanding was clearly incompetent to

vary the terms or effect of the written contract between the

parties. The plaintiff 's omission to read that contract cannot re-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:41 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

lieve him from being bound by his signature. Redpath v. West-

ern Union Telegraph Co., 112 Mass. 71, 73, 17 Am. Rep. 69;

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Carew, 15 Mich. 525; Wolf

V. Western Union Telegraph Co., 62 Pa. St. 83, 1 Am. R. 387 ;

Breese v. United States Telegraph Co., 48 N. Y. 133, 8 Am.

Rep. 526. The subsequent acts and declarations of the defend-

ant's agents, not connected with the transmission of the message,

were not competent evidence to charge the defendants. Mac

Andrew v. Electric Telegraph Co., 17 C. B. 3; United States

Telegraph Co. v. Gildersleve, 29 Md. 232, 96 Am. D. 519 ; Sweat-

land V. Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co., 27 Iowa, 433, 1

Am. Rep. 285 ; Robinson v. Fitchburg & Worcester Railroad Co.,

7 Gray, 92.

The result is that according to the ruling at the trial and

the terms of the report there must be judgment for the plaintiff

for 25 cents.

172. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. V. VAN

CLEAVE,

107 Ky. 464; 54 S. W. B. 827; 92 Am. St. E. 366. 1900.

Hazelrigg, C. J. The appellee recovered judgment of appel-

lant for the sum of one thousand dollars for mental angl^ish

caused by his inability to attend his brother 's funeral, and which

nonattendance, he avers, was owing to the negligent failure of
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the appellant to deliver to him in a reasonable time a telegiara

announcing the death of that relative. The message was sent

from the appellant's office at Lake City, Missouri, at about 9

o'clock on the evening of January 1, 1894, and reached Le-

banon, Kentucky, the place of its destination, at 11 :44 o'clock on

the same evening. It was not delivered to the appellee until

next morning at about 8 o'clock, and too late for the first train

out that morning. It may be assumed, for the purposes of the

case, that the failure of appellee to get the train was the sole

cause of his not attending the funeral.

The appellant resists recovery on the grounds: 1. That men-

tal anguish, accompanied by no physical injury, gives no cause

of action; 2. That the message was a "night" message, and,

according to the terms indorsed on the blank on which it was

written, was to be delivered "not earlier than the morning of

the next ensuing business day"; and 3. That its office at Leb-

anon during the night was in charge of an operator, who was

also the agent and night operator for the railroad company,

and the rules of his employment forbid his leaving the office
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at night for any purpose; that a delivery boy was kept only

from 6 o'clock A. M. until 6 o'clock P. M., because the business

did not justify night delivery.

Other minor defenses were presented, but, as we shall see,

they need not be considered.

The ground first suggested has furnished the occasion for

much controversy, and much conflict of authority. It is prob-

ably in accordance with the views of a majority of the state

courts that mental anguish and injured feelings alone, and un-

accompanied with physical injury, do not furnish ground for

recovery. But in this state the rule has been announced other-

wise: Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1890), 90 Ky. 265,

13 S. W. R. 880.

And so likewise a recovery in this class of cases can be had

under the decisions of the states of Texas, Alabama, Indiana,

Iowa, North Carolina, and Tennessee. It may be admitted that

there are difficulties in the way of an exact measurement of

such damages, but it does not seem to us that this is a sufficient

reason why a negligent public carrier should escape with merely

nominal damages. The same difficulty of accurately measuring

such damages arises in cases of slander, breach of marriage

contract, and in cases where mental suffering is accompanied

with physical pain.

If, as argued, the law does not deal generally with the feel-

ings and emotions, it may be answered that here the parties

themselves have contracted with respect to those very things,
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or, at least, have contracted with respect to those things which

naturally affect the feelings and emotions.

For the purpose of having him attend, a message is sent to

a son, informing him of his mother's death, and the date of

her funeral and burial. It must be supposed that a failure to

deliver such a message will cause mental suffering; and this

suffering is, therefore, a consequence or result within the con-

templation of the parties. This is true whether the carrier is

sued on its contract or because of its failure to perform a pub-

lie duty as a common carrier of intelligence.

It is an old doctrine that, "when the parties have made a

contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the

other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of con-

tract should be^such as may fully and reasonably be considered

either as arising naturally — i. e., according to the usual course

of things — from such breach of contract itself, or such as may

be reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation of

both parties at the time they made the contract as the probable

result of the breach of it": Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341.
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The rule is certainly not less comprehensive if applied as a

test for the ascertainment of the liability of a common carrier

who may violate its public duty. The subject matter of the

undertaking by the carriers is not of a pecuniary nature, and

the breach of the undertaking cannot be measured by an at-

tempted ascertainment of what money is lost by reason of the

breach. As the question, however, must be regarded as a set-

tled one in this state, we need not elaborate this branch of the

case further. The doctrine is fully supported in the recent

WTll-considered cases of Mentzer v. "Western Union Tel. Co.

(1895), 93 Iowa 752, 62 N. W. R. 1, 57 Am. St. R. 294, and

Cashion v. Tel. Co. (1898), 123 N. C. 270, 31 S. E. R. 493, where

all the cases are collated.

We are of the opinion, however, that the second and third

points suggested are conclusive against appellee's right of re-

covery. While the nature of his action is in tort, and not on

a contract — as he had none with the company — he cannot recover

if the company has complied with the terms of its contract

and undertaking with the sender of the message, provided, in-

deed, those terms are such as may reasonably be imposed and

agreed upon. That night mesages are a business necessity, and

contracts of the kind made here for delivery of such messages

on the next morning after sending them may be made, cannot

be doubted in the face of the authorities and on principle : Hib-

bard v. Tel. Co., 33 Wis. 558, 14 Am. R. 775 ; Fowler v. West-
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era Union Tel. Co., 80 Me. 381, 15 Atl. R. 29, 6 Am. St. R. 211,

and cases cited.

The contract enables the Sender to get cheaper rates, and yet

have his message delivered in time to be acted upon the next

morning; and it enables the company to send the message dur-

ing the odd hours of the night, when business is not press-

ing, and when it may furnish the service at a cheaper rate. The

court below, therefore, erred in striking this plea from the com-

pany's answer.

We think it likewise competent for such companies to estab-

lish reasonable hours within which their business may be trans-

acted, and they may fix those hours with reference to the quan-

tity of business done. They may not be required to employ

both a day and a night messenger, if it be apparent that the

business of the office will not justify such employment. This

we understand to be the rule everywhere : Western Union Tel.

Co. V. Harding, 103 Ind. 505, 3 N. E. R. 172; Western Union

Tel. Co. V. Wingate, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 394, 25 S. W. R. 439 ; West-

ern Union Tel. Co. v. McCoy, Tex. Civ. App., Apr. 3, 1895, 31
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S. W. R. 210. Under the proof on the points last named, the

law is for the defendant, and a peremptory instruction should

have been given.

Wherefore the judgment is reversed for proceedings not in-

consistent with this opinion.

173. LEAVELL V. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO.,

116 N. C. 211; 21 8. E. B. 391; 47 Am. St. B. 798. 1895.

Appeal from penalty imposed on defendants by railroad com-

missioners for violation of schedule tariff rates for telegraph

messages.

Clark, J. In Atlantic Express Co. v. Wilmington etc. R. R.

Co., Ill N. C. 463, 16 S. E. R. 393, 32 Am. St. R. 805, this court

affirmed the constitutionality of the act (Acts 1891, c. 320)

establishing the Railroad and Telegraph Commission. In Mayo

V. Western Union Tel. Co., 112 N. C. 343, 16 S. E. R. 1006, it

sustained the power of such commission, under section 26 of

said act, to establish rates for telegraph' companies. In Railroad

Commission v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 N. C. 213, 18 S. E.

R. 389, the court held that telegraphic messages transmitted

by a company from and to points in this state, although traver-

sing another state in the route, do not constitute interstate com-
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merce and are subject to the tariff regulation of the commission.

In this it followed the unanimous opinion of the supreme court

of the United States, delivered by Fuller, C. J., in Lehigh Valley

R. R. Co. V. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192, 12 Sup. Ct. R. 806. To

the same purport, Campbell v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 86 la. 587,

53 N. W. R. 351.

In the present case the commission find as a fact that "the

defendant has a continuous line by which messages may be

transmitted from Wilson to Edenton and other adjacent points

in North Carolina, but this line traverses a part of the state of

Virginia, passing through the city of Norfolk ' ' ; and it properly

holds upon the evidence "that the telegraph office at Edenton

is under the control of the defendant, and the operator, though

employed by the railroad company, is the agent and operator of

the defendant." It necessarily follows from this state of facts

that as the defendant could have sent the message the w^hole dis-

tance over its own line it cannot be heard to say that it did not

do M^hat it ought to have done, and thus collect fifty cents for

the message instead of twenty-five, as allowed by the commission
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tariff. The defense set up that in fact it only carried the mes-

sage to Norfolk and then paid another company to forward it to

Edenton, cannot be regarded when it might itself have completed

the delivery of the message. The defendant seeks to excuse itself

on the plea that it has only one wire to Edenton, and that this is

fully occupied at that office by the work it does for the railroad

company. But it is the duty of the telegraph company to have

sufficient facilities to transact all the business offered to it for all

points at which it has offices. If the press of business offered is

so great that one wire or one operator at a point is not sufficient,

it is the duty of the company to add another wire or an addi-

tional employee. It is not a mere private business, but a public

duty which the defendants by their franchise are authorized to

discharge. It is further to be noted that in giving to the rail-

road company the preference in the use of their line to Eden-

ton, while at other points, as Moyock, Centreville, and Hertford

on the same line, the public is admitted to the use of the wire,

the defendant is making a forbidden and illegal discrimination in

favor of one customer and against the public at large, as was inti-

mated in Railroad Commission v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113

N. C. 213, 18 S. E. R. 389. The findings of fact in evidence

are fuller, and present a somewhat different and stronger case

against the defendant than in Albea's case. By section 11 of the

defendant's contract with the railroad company the defendant

remains owner of the telegraph line to Edenton, North Carolina,

and its belongings, which are to remain "part of its general
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telegraph system" and "to be controlled and regulated by the

telegraph company." Section 3 of the contract gives the rail-

road messages precedence over commercial business, but stipu-

lates that when railroad business shall require the exclusive use of

one wire the telegraph company shall, on sixty days' notice, fur-

nish material for a second wire, which second wire shall be used

for railroad business exclusively and such commercial business

as can be done without interfering with railroad business. Sec-

tion 6 provides that where the railroad company shall open offices,

the operators ''acting as agents of the telegraph company" shall

receive such commercial and public telegrams as may be of-

fered, collecting rates prescribed by the telegraph company, and

render monthly statements and pay over the receipts to the tele-

graph company. Section 7 provides that whenever the volume of

l3usiness at any point justifies it, the telegraph company shall

put in an additional operator. It will be thus seen that the

line to Edenton is an integral part of the defendant's general

telegraph system. It is only by virtue of its franchise as a

telegraph company that it can operate its line to Edenton at
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all. It cannot discriminate at that point in favor of or against

any customer. It cannot subtract itself from obedience to the

rates prescribed by the authority of the state, acting through

the commission, by a contract giving one customer, the railroad,

preference in business, and pleading that such business occu-

pies the only wire it has. The discrimination is itself illegal.

Besides, if it were not, the small cost of an additional wire,

which it is common knowledge does not exceed ten dollars per

mile, furnishes no ground to exempt the defendant from furnish-

ing the additional facility to do the business for all. The charge

of a double rate between Edenton and other points in North

Carolina is a far heavier imposition upon the public than the

cost of the additional wire to defendant, and is just the kind of

burden and discrimination which the commission was estab-

lished to prevent. In Railroad Commission v. Western Union

Tel. Co., 113 N. C. 213, ho commercial message was tendered,

and the point now decided was not presented by the record.

The ruling of the commission is in all respects affirmed.

174. ITARKNESS V. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO.,

73 la. 190; 34 N. W. R. 811; 5 Am. St. B. 672. 1887.

Action for loss due to delay in delivering a telegram. Judg-

ment for plaintiff.
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Seevers, J. The material facts are that the plaintiff is a

resident of the state of Iowa, and had a suit pending in the

state of Nebraska, which it was expected would be reached for

trial on the thirtieth day of October, 1884. W. C. Sloan, one

of the plaintiff's attorneys, was a resident of the state of Ne-

braska, and A. M. Walters was also her attorney, who, however,

was a resident of the state of Iowa. Both said attorneys were

expected to take part in the trial of the suit. The plaintiff

intended to start from her home in Iowa with her witnesses and

attorney on the morning of the 29th of October, so that she

could be present when the case was called for trial on the fol-

lowing day. During the night of the 27th of October a message

was delivered to the defendant in these words : —

"Fairmount, Neb., October 5, 1884.

"To A. M. Walters, Villisca, Iowa: Do not come till No-

vember 5th. Court adjourned till then.

''W. C. Sloan.''

Such message was a half-rate or night message, and Sloan

paid the defendant forty cents for transmitting the same. The
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message was received at Villisca, October 28th, about one o 'clock,

A. M., at which place Walters resided, but was not delivered to

him until October 31st. Plaintiff started to Nebraska on October

29th, with her witnesses and attorneys, and thereby incurred

expenses, Avhich she paid, and this action is brought to recover

the same of the defendant, -who had no knowledge for what pur-

pose the message was sent, other than is disclosed on its face.

Nor had the defendant any knowledge that Sloan was acting

for the plaintiff, or that she had a suit pending in Nebraska.

The contract was made wath Sloan, and is attached to the mes-

sage, the material portion of which is as follows : —

''(Form No. 45.)

**The Western Union Telegraph Company.

''Night Message.

"The business of telegraphing is subject to errors and delays

arising from causes which cannot at all times be guarded against,

including sometimes negligence of servants and agents whom

it is necessary to employ. Errors and delays may be prevented

by repetition, for which, during the day, half-price extra is

charged in addition to the full tariff rates. The Western Union

Telegraph Company will receive messages, to be sent without

repetition, during the night, for delivery not earlier than the

morning of the next ensuing business day, at reduced rates, but

669

§ 174 OF TELEGKAPH COMPANIES.

in no case for less than twenty-five cents toll for a single mes-

sage, and upon the express condition that the sender will agree

that he will not claim damage for errors or delays, or for non-

delivery of such messages happening from any cause, beyond a

sum equal to ten times the amount paid for transmission; and

that no claim for damages shall be valid unless presented in

writing within thirty days after sending the message."

1. It is objected that the court erred in rendering judgment

for the plaintiff, because the message was neither sent by nor

to her^ and no contract was made with her. The court was

justified in finding that both Sloan and Walters were the agents

a;id attorneys of the plaintiff, and that the telegram was sent

by one of them, and received by the other, for the use and

benefit of the plaintiff. Therefore she may well be said to be

an undisclosed principal, and in such case we understand the

rule to be that such principal, as the "ultimate party in interest,

is entitled, against third persons, to all advantages and benefits

of such acts and contracts of his agents, ' ' and the principal may

sue in his own name on the contract : Story on Agency, sec. 418 ;
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National Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 116 Mass. 398 ; Gage v. Stimson,

26 Minn. 64, 1 N. W. R. 806. The fact that the defendant had

no knowledge that the plaintiff w^as in fact principal, and that

the telegram was sent for her use and benefit, is immaterial, ex-

cept that it may be true that the defendant may set up as a

defense any matters that would constitute a defense if the suit

was brought in the name of the agent, which occurred prior to

the disclosure of the principal.

2. It is insisted that the court erred in finding that the de-

fendant was negligent in failing to deliver the telegram earlier

than it did. It will be observed that the telegram was received

by the agent of the defendant at Villisca, Iowa, on the morning

of the 28th of October^ and that it was not delivered until the

thirty-first day of that month. The court was justified in finding

that defendant was negligent, because no excuse whatever for the

failure to deliver the telegram on the twenty-eighth day of Octo-

ber is given. The delay was such as to cast on the defendant the

burden of explaining the cause of the delay.

3. It is insisted that the contract limits the liability of the

defendant, and that the recovery cannot exceed such limit. It

has been held that it is competent for a telegraph company to

restrict its liability, as was done in this case, but that it cannot

contract against its own negligence in failing to transmit and

deliver the message : Sweatland v. Illinois etc. Tel. Co., 27 Iowa

433, 1 Am. R. 285 ; Manville v. Western Union Tel. Co., 37 Iowa

214, 18 Am. R, 8. But it is urged that the contract was made
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with Sloan, and that he can only recover the amount stipulated

in the contract, for the reason that the money expended by him

was the amount paid for the message, and that this is the extent

of the plaintiff's recovery, for the reason that she is an undis-

closed principal, and not known in the transaction. We do not

concur in this proposition, but think that, as the telegram was

sent and received for the benefit and use of the plaintiff, she

may recover such damages as she has sustained, subject only to

any payments in liquidation of damages made by the defendant

to Sloan prior to the time defendant had knowledge that the

telegram was sent for the use of the plaintiff, and that she was

the principal in the transaction.

4. It is further insisted that the plaintiff recovered $24.52

more than in any event she was entitled to. We deem it sufficient

to say that we cannot concur in this proposition.

Affirmed.

175. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. V. MITCHELL,

91 Tex. 454; 66 Am. St. B. 906. 1898.

Case, certified by court of civil appeals to determine, among
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other things, whether the trial court ruled correctly in charging

in effect that if the telegraph company could not find the ad-

dressee the message should have been delivered to his wife. The

telegram read: "Water is getting low. Come out," and was

sent to inform plaintiff of danger to his cattle from lack of

water. It was alleged that if the message had been delivered

within a reasonable time he could have gone to his ranch and

made arrangements that would have saved him from heavy losses.

The defendant's agent was informed of the danger to the cattle.

Plaintiff left home at 10 :50 A. M. the day the message was sent,

but his wife remained at home in the town all day. On failing

to find plaintiff the receiving operator telegraphed the sending

operator of the fact and was instructed to deliver the message to

a firm of merchants in the town where plaintiff lived.

Brown, A. J. (After stating the facts, and ruling on ques-

tions of pleading and evidence.) There was error in giving the

special charge mentioned in the third question. The general

rule is expressed by Croswell in his work on the law of Elec-

tricity, section 412, thus : ' ' The leading principle as to delivery

of a telegram is, that the message is to be delivered to the person

to whom it is addressed, and the place of address is subordinate

to the person; and, therefore, if the person cannot be found at
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the street and number or other place to which the telegram is

addressed, but can be found by reasonable efforts of the tele-

graph company in some other place, it may be negligence for the

company to leave the telegram at the place of address without

making further efforts to find the absent person and make per-

sonal delivery": Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cooper, 71 Tex.

507 ; 9 S. W. R. 598, 10 Am. St. R. 772 ; Western Union Tel. Co.

v. Houghton, 82 Tex. 561, 17 S. W. R. 846, 27 Am. St. R. 918 ;

Tel. Co. V. Newhouse, 6 Ind. App. 422, 33 N. E. R. 800 ; Pope v.

Telegraph Co., 9 Mo. App. 283.

If a message be addressed to the care of another, it may be

delivered to such person; or if the addressee has taken rooms

at a hotel, where it is the custom to deliver mail and such mes-

sages, it will be presumed that the clerk is the agent of the guest

to receive messages of this character, and a delivery to such

clerk will be sufficient.

The wife, as such, is not in law the general agent of her hus-

band, and we know of no principle of law that would justify

the conclusion that it was the duty of the defendant to deliver
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the message in this case to Mrs. Mitchell, nor that such a de-

livery to her would have satisfied the obligation of the tele-

graph company to Mitchell.

The duty which the telegraph company owes to the addressee

is personal, and cannot be discharged by making inquiry for

the person to whose care the message may be sent, nor by ap-

plying to the place of business or residence of the addressee, but

inquiry must be made for the person addressed, if the circum-

stances are such as to show that he may probably be found away

from such place of business or residence. The place to which

a message is sent is but a guide for the messenger, and does not

determine the measure of his diligence. Whether the messen-

ger who is charged with the delivery of a telegram and fails to

present it at the residence or place of business of the addressee

has used ordinary diligence such as the law requires is a question

of fact for the jury; and it was error for the court in effect to

charge the jury as a matter of law that it was a duty of the

telegraph company to deliver the message to the plaintiff's wife.

Attorneys for appellee cite the case of Given v. Western Union

Tel. Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 119, as supporting the charge of the

court above referred to; and upon a careful investigation we

have found Western Union Tel. Co. v. Woods, 56 Kan, 737. 44

Pac. R. 989,'which we think is more nearly in point. The former

case was based upon substantially the following facts : A mes-

sage was sent to the plaintiff, and the telegraph company in-

quired at his place of business, ascertaining that he had left the
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city, and having exhausted all means of delivering the message

to him personally, delivered it to his wife and notified the

sender of the fact of such delivery. The court held that the

telegraph company had used due care and had discharged its

duty to the plaintiff, but did not hold that it was the duty of the

company to make the delivery to the wife.

In the case of the Western Union Tel. Co. v. Woods, 56 Kan.

737, 44 Pac. R. 989, a message was sent to the plaintiff in the case

at the town of his residence. He was a merchant, and his store

was a short distance from the telegraph office, where his wife

was in charge of the business, and he had a clerk employed also.

His residence was also near by. The party addressed was out of

the town, and the telegraph company failed to apply at his place

of business or residence for information or for the purpose of

delivering his message. The court held as follows : ' ' Being un-

able to make a personal delivery at that place, it was the duty

of the company to deliver it to his wife or to his clerk at the

store or to members of his family at his residence. If delivery

had been made at either of these places, the agents of Woods
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would have had time and opportunity to have sent a message to

him at Grant Summit, and thus have averted the loss which fol-

lowed." It will be observed that the court here speaks of the

persons to whom the delivery should have been made as the

agents of the party addressed, and in so far as they were agents

and authorized to receive the message this is a correct expres-

sion of the law, but that portion which announces that it was

the duty of the telegraph company to deliver to members of the

family is purely dictum and without any support whatever.

176. CENTRAL UNION TELEPHONE CO. V. FALLEY,

118 hid. 194; 20 N. E. E. 145; 10 Am. St. B. 114. 18S8.

Mandamus, to compel appellant to furnish her a telephone at

her place of business with telephonic connections and facilities.

The Indiana statutes required every telephone company with

wires wholly or partly in the state and doing a general telephone

business to furnish telephone service and connections without

discrimination to all applicants at a charge not in excess of $3.00

per month. Defendant alleged that it had gone out of the gen-

eral rental business, offering a public toll service instead.

Olds, J. ... In determining this case, it is important to consider

the nature of the telephone, how operated, tlie utility of it, and
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the rights of the parties in the absence of the statutes enacted

by the legislature. The telephone differs from the telegraph

very materially, in this, that the transmission of news,- the send-

ing and receiving of messages by telegraph, can only be done

by those having a knowledge of the business, and having a

knowledge of the art and science of telegraphy. To others who

are not telegraphists, the telegraph would be useless. It is,

therefore, only beneficial to the general public when operated

by persons or companies keeping in their employ telegraphists

to send, receive, and transmit messages, and messengers to de-

liver them to persons to whom addressed. A telegraphic instru-

ment in the house or place of business of a patron of the com-

pany, connected with the wires of the company, with facilities

for transmitting and receiving messages by telegraph, would be

of no use to a patron unless he was learned in the art of

telegraphy. But the telephone is entirely different ; a telephone,

with proper connections and facilities for use, can be used by

any person; it requires no experience to operate it. Webster

defines it as "an instrument for conveying sound to a great dis-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:41 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

tance."

In the case of the Central Union Telephone Co. v. Bradbury,

106 Ind. 1, 5 N. E. R. 721, the word "telephone," as used in the

act of April 13, 1885, was held to mean ' * an organized apparatus

or combination of instruments usually in use in transmitting

as well as in receiving telephonic messages. ' ' By the use of the tel-

ephone, persons are enabled to converse with each other while

in their respective business houses or residences a great distance

apart. Although of recent date, it has become of important use

in the transaction of business, and there is no other invention or

device to supply its place. While it may not supply and take

the place of the telegraph in many instances and for many pur-

poses, yet in others it far surpassess it, and is and can be put

to many uses for which the telegraph is unfitted, and by persons

wholly unable to operate and use the telegraph. It has been

held universally by the courts, considering its use and purpose,

to be an instrument of commerce and a common carrier of news,

the same as the telegraph, and by reason of being a common car-

rier, it is subject to proper obligations, and to conduct its busi-

ness in a manner conducive to the public benefit, and to be

controlled by law. To conduct the business of the telephone by

public telephone stations and by sending messengers to notify

persons with whom a patron of the company desires to converse

in other parts of the city, to compel the person desiring to con-

verse with others to remain at the public telephone station until

the persons with whom they desire to converse can be notified
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and so arrange their business as to leave and go to another tele-

phone station and hold the conversation, renders the use of the

telephone almost worthless. It is by reason of the fact that

business men can have them in their offices and residences, and,

without leaving their homes or their places of business, call up

another at a great distance with whom they have important

business, and converse without the loss of valuable time on the

part of either, that the telephone is particularly valuable as an

instrument of commerce. It being an instrument of commerce,

and persons or corporations engaged in the general telephone

business being connnon carriers of news, what are the rights of

the public, independent of the statute, as regards discrimina-

tion?

Any person or corporation engaged in telephone business, op-

erating telephone lines, furnishing telephonic connections, facili-

ties, and service to business houses, persons, and companies,

and discriminating against any person or company, can be

compelled by mandate, on the petition of such person or com-

pany discriminated against, to furnish to the petitioner a like
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service as furnished to others. This has been held in the case of

State V. Nebraska Telephone Co., 17 Neb. 126, 52 Am. R. 404;

Vincent v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 49 111. 33; People v. Man-

hattan Gas Light Co., 45 Barb. 136. And the principle held in

these cases is in accordance with the well-settled rules governing

common carriers.

It is not controverted in the argument by counsel for the

appellant that the legislature had the right to regulate the price

to be charged and collected for the use of telephones and tele-

phonic connections, facilities, and service; and even if it were

controverted, it is well settled by authorities that the legislature

has the right to do so, relative to the business conducted within

the state : Hockett v. State, 105 Ind. 250, 5 N. E. R. 178, 55 Am.

R. 201 ; Central Union Telephone Co. v. Bradbury, supra, and

authorities cited in those cases; Johnson v. State, 113 Ind. 143,

15 N. E. R. 215 ; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 ; Ouachita Packet

Co. V. Aiken, 121 U. S. 444, 7 S. Ct. R. 907 ; Patterson v. Ken-

tuclrr, 97 Id. 501.

The telephone company being liable for discriminating be-

tween persons and companies, and the person or company dis-

criminated against having a remedy without the enactment of

section 2 of the act of April 8, 1885, there was no occasion for the

statute on that account alone. Then what was the purpose and

object of the two statutes set out?

It should be presumed the legislature had some purpose and'

object. If section 2 of the act of April 8th was only to prevent
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discrimination, and section 1 of the act of April 13th only to fix

the price for the rental of telephones when the telegraph com-

pany was operating under a rental system, then all that the

companies operating telephone lines would have to do would be

to cease to operate their business under a rental system, and

charge so much for each conversation, or, as they have done in

this case, establish public telephone stations, and then charge for

each separate use of the telephone, and they might thereby derive

a greater income for the use of the telephone, and render to the

public much inferior service, and yet avoid lialiility under the

statute. We do not think such was the object or purpose of the

statute, or that such construction can be placed upon it.

It was the evident intention of the legislature that where a

telephone company was doing a general telephone business in

this state, any person within the local limits of its business in

a town or city should have the right to demand and receive a

telephone and telephonic connections, facilities, and service, the

best in use by such company, and should only be liable to be

charged and to pay three dollars per month therefor. With
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this construction only are the statutes of any benefit to the citi-

zens of the state. The legislature fixed what, in the judgment

of that body, was the maximum price that should be charged

for the service, and placed it in the power of each individual

and gave him the right to demand and receive such service

within the limits of the company's business, in any town or city

where such company is doing a general telephone business.

It is insisted, as it appears by the answer that the lines of

the appellant extended through the states of Ohio, Indiana,

and Illinois, that appellant was engaged in interstate com-

merce: that it was a common carrier of news between the

states, and that therefore such statutes are an interference

with interstate commerce. We cannot agree with that theory.

These statutes simply provide that telephone companies shall

provide persons within this state with certain service, and for

such service shall receive a certain compensation. They only

seek to control the service within this state. If section 2 of

the act of April 13th, providing for the price to be paid for con-

nections between two cities or villages, should be construed to

apply to two cities or villages one of which was without this state,

then there would be some question as to the validity of that sec-

tion, or the power of the legislature to control the price to be

paid for a message or the use of the telephone for communica-

ting with a person beyond the limits of the state; but that ques-

tion is not involved in this case, as one section of a statute may be

valid and another not. Telegraph companies stand upon a dif-
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ferent footing, in some respects, from that of telephone com-

panies; they have been granted some rights and privileges by

acts of Congress which cannot be abridged or interfered with.

In the case of Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S.

347, 7 S. Ct. R. 1126, referred to by counsel for appellant, it was

held that the act was void in so far as it sought to govern the

delivery of messages outside of the state : State v. Newton, 59

Ind. 173.

It is also contended by counsel for appellant that as the

statute provides a remedy other than that by mandate for a vio-

lation of the statute, the w^rit of mandate is not a proper remedy.

The right to have the telephone and telephonic connections

and facilities is a right given by the statutes. It is a legal right,

which may be enforced by mandate. No remedy is adequate

which does not give the person that to which he is entitled by

law ; the penalty of one hundred dollars is cumulative, and does

not abridge or take away the right to a writ of mandate. The

statute itself provides that the act shall not be so construed as to

''abridge the right of such aggrieved party to appeal to a court
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of equity to prevent such violations or discriminations, by in-

junction or otherwise." The statutes should be so construed

as that the penalty shall not take away any of the other remedies

the aggrieved person may have, one of which remedies is by

writ of mandate. This court held, in the case of Central Union

Tel. Co. V. Bradbury, supra, that Bradbury was entitled to his

remedy by writ of mandate compelling the company to furnish

him with a telephone and telephonic service. The right to a

writ of mandate requiring telephone companies to furnish tele-

phonic service to persons entitled thereto has been held in State

V. Telephone Co., 36 Ohio St. 296, 38 Am. E. 583 ; also by the

supreme court of Pennsylvania, in Bell Telephone Co. v. Com-

monwealth, Sup. Ct. Penn., Apr. 19, 1886, 59 Am. R. 172. In

this case the complaint states a good cause of action under the

statutes.

The second paragraph of the answer alleges the conducting

of the defendant's business in the several states, and that it is

engaged in interstate commerce, and that to furnish relatrix with

an instrument and connection with its lines would put her in

connection with its offices outside of the state, and furnish her

facilities for transmitting messages from Lafayette to various

places in Ohio and Illinois, where the appellant has its wires

and offices. This paragraph does not controvert the facts alleged

in the complaint, that appellant, at the time of the acts and

things complained of, etc., was owning and operating a system

of telephone lines and wires, and engaged in doing a general
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teleplioiiG business in the city of Lafayette, and that the place

of business of the relatrix is within the limits of the appellant's

telephone business in said city; and it must also be remembered

that tlie demand, as alleged in the complaint, was only that she

be furnished with a telephone and telephonic connections and

facilities necessary to place her, at her said store, in telephonic

communication with patrons of appellant in said city. The

statutes contemplate two kinds of service, and different compen-

sations for each; one, connections and facilities for conversing

with patrons of the company within any city or town where an

exchange is maintained; the other, for conversing between two

towns or cities.

The other paragraphs show the appellant to have been engaged

in a general telephone business in said city, operating the same

under a toll system at the time of the demand and tender by

relatrix, and do not controvert the allegations in complaint that

the plaintiff's place of business is within the local limits of ap-

pellant's business in said city. Neither of the paragraphs of

answer is sufficient.
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Under the construction we have given the statutes, there was

no error committed by the court below in overruling the de-

murrer to the complaint, sustaining the demurrers to the answers,

or in granting the writ of mandate.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
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PAET V

OF ACTIONS AGAINST CARKIERS

CHAPTER XVI.

THE ACTION AND THE DAMAGES.

177. FINN V. WESTERN RAILROAD CORPORATION,

112 Mass. 524; 17 Am. B. 128. 1873.

Action on contract for shipment of shingles. No consignee was

named in the bill of lading, but evidence was introduced to show

that one bunch in six or eight of the shingles was plainly marked

"J. S. Clark, Southampton, Mass." Shipment was by Erie

Canal to Greenbush, thence by defendants' railroad to destina-

tion. Defendants' agents at Greenbush wrote plaintiff that

there was no consignee named in the bill of lading, and plaintiff

mailed a letter giving direction. This the agent testified he did

not receive. The shingles were burned in defendants' warehouse.

Plaintiff had meantime drawn on Clark for the price and the

draft had been paid. The jury found that defendants' agent did

see the full address of the consignee on the bunches of shingles.

Verdict for plaintiff. Exceptions by defendant.

Wells, J. The only question argued by the defendant, upon
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these exceptions, is whether the action for loss of the property

can be maintained by and in behalf of Finn. It is contended

that if there was a delivery, with proper directions for the trans-

portation, so as to charge the defendant with responsibility as

carrier, then the title to the property had passed to Clark, the

consignee; and the right of action for injury to it was in him

alone. On the other hand, if proper directions for its transpor-

tation had not been given, then the defendant is not liable at

all as carrier, according to the former decision in 102 Mass. 283.

It is not contended that the defendant is liable as warehouseman.

In either aspect of the case, upon this view of the law, no re-

covery could be had by Finn.
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The jury having found that the defendant became responsible

as carrier, the case is now presented only in that aspect. We

think also that the facts, as disclosed by the present bill of ex-

ceptions, show that the title to the property had passed to Clark

before the loss occurred; leaving in Finn at most only a right of

stoppage in transitu.

The liabilities of a common carrier of goods are various ; and,

when not controlled by express contract, they spring from his

legal obligations, according to the relations he may sustain to

the parties, either as employers, or as owners of the property.

Prima facie, his contract of service is with the party from

whom, directly or indirectly, he receives the goods for carriage ;

that is, with the consignor. His obligation to carry safely, and

deliver to the consignees, subjects him to liabilities for any fail-

ure therein, vv'hich may be enforced by the consignees, or by the

real owners of the property, by appropriate actions in their own

names, independently of the original contract by which the ser-

vice was undertaken. Such remedies are not exclusive of the

right of the party sending the goods, to have his action upon the
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contract implied from the delivery and receipt of them for car-

riage. This, in effect, we understand to be the result of the

elaborate discussion of the principles applicable to the case in

Blanchard v. Page, 8 Gray, 281. That decision may not be pre-

cisely in point, as an adjudication, to govern the case now before

us ; for the reason that there was a written receipt or bill of lad-

ing for carriage by water, and the plaintiffs were acting in the

transaction as agents for the owners of the goods; yet the gen-

eral principles evolved do apply, and are satisfactory to us for

the determination of the present case.

When carrying goods from seller to purchaser, if there is noth-

ing in the relations of the several parties except what arises from

the fact that the seller commits the goods to the carrier as the

ordinary and convenient mode of transmission and delivery,

in execution of the order or agreement of sale, the employment is

by the seller, the contract of service is with him, and actions

based upon that contract may, if they must not necessarily be,

in the name of the consignor. If, however, the purchaser desig-

nates the carrier, making him his agent to receive and transmit

the goods; or if the sale is complete before delivery to the car-

rier, and the seller is made the agent of the purchaser in re-

spect to the forwarding of them, a different implication would

arise, and the contract of service might be held to be with the

purchaser. This distinction, we think, must determine whether

the right of action upon the contract of service, implied from

the delivery and receipt of goods for carriage, is in the consignor
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or in the consignee. In the case of Blanchard v. Page the action

was maintained in the name of the consignors, who were merely

the agents of the owners in forwarding the goods. But that was

explicitly on the ground of the express contract with them, em-

bodied in the receipt or bill of lading.

As already suggested, the consignee, by virtue of his right of

possession, or the purchaser, by virtue of his right of property,

may have an action against the carrier for the loss, injury or

detention of the goods, though not party to the original contract.

Such action is in tort for the injury resulting from a breach of

duty imposed by law upon the carrier ; or, in the language of the

early cases, upon ' ' the custom of the realm. ' '

There are many cases, both in England and in the United

States, in which the doctrine appears to be maintained that, ex-

cept when there is a special contract, a remedy for injury result-

ing from breach of duty by a carrier, can be had only in the

name and behalf of some one having an interest in the property

at the time of the breach, which is injuriously affected thereby.

The rule might well be conceded, if the exception were not too
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restricted. It will hold good in actions of tort, because they are

founded upon injury to some interest or right of the plaintiff.

And the cases which support this view are mostly, if not alto-

gether, actions of tort. This is true of the leading early case

from which the doctrine is mainly derived: Dawes v. Peck, 8

T. R. 330; also of Griffith v. Ingledew, 6 S. & R. (Pa.) 429, 9 Am.

D. 444 ; Green v. Clark, 5 Denio, 497, 13 Barb. 57, and 2 Ker-

nan, 343; and does not appear from the report to be otherwise

in Krulder v. Ellison, 47 N. Y. 36, 7 Am. R. 402. In discussing

the grounds of decision it seems to have been assumed by various

judges, as we think erroneously, that the right of recovery neces-

sarily involved the question with whom the original contract of

service was made. And the effort to make the inference of law

as to that contract conform to what was deemed the proper de-

cision as to the right to recover for the injury, has led to some

statements of legal inference which appear to us to be somewhat

overstrained. Thus in Dawes v. Peck, it is said by Lawkence,

J., that, in the payment of freight by the consignor, he is to be

regarded as the agent of the consignee; that the carrier gen-

erally knows nothing of the consignor, but looks to the person

to whom the goods are directed. In Freeman v. Birch, 1 Nev.

& Man. 420, it is said by Parke, J., "In ordinary cases the

vendor employs the carrier as the agent of the vendee." In

Green v. Clark, 13 Barb. 57, it is said by Allen, J., that when

the consignee is the legal owner, or the property vests in him by

the delivery to the carrier, "it is an inference of law, and not
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a presumption of fact, that the contract for the safe carriage

is between the carrier and consignee, and consequently the latter

has the legal right of action." But in the same case in the

Court of Appeals, 2 Kernan, 343, it was regarded as immaterial

by whom the contract was made, and whether the plaintiff was

consignor or consignee, for the purposes of an action of case for

negligence by which his property was injured.

In Griffith v, Ingledew, the dissenting opinion of Gibson, J.,

assuming that the contract of carriage formed the basis of the

action, combats with great force of reasoning the proposition

that a contract with the consignee is the legal result of the re-

ceipt of goods by a carrier, when no privity with, or authority

from, the consignee is shown, and none professed by the con-

signor at the time, unless the direction of the goods to the ad-

dress of the consignee can be taken to be such profession.

The whole force and effect of the reasoning in Blanchard v.

Page is in the same direction. The ordinary bill of lading or

receipt, given to the consignor by the carrier, simply expresses

what is the real significance of the transaction independent of
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the writing. There is no reason for giving a different interpreta-

tion to, or drawing a different inference from, the acts of parties,

because of a writing which is nothing but a voucher taken to pre-

serve the evidence of those acts.

"Whatever remedy is sought in contract must necessarily be

sought in the name of the party with whom the contract is en-

tered into, whether it be special, that is, express or implied. The

question then is simply this : In the absence of an express agree-

ment, with whom is the carrier's contract of employment and

service in respect of goods delivered to him by the seller to con-

vey to the purchaser, when there is no privity or relation of

agency between the carrier and the purchaser save that which

springs from possession of the goods, and the seller has no au-

thority to make a contract for the purchaser except what is to

be implied from the agreement of purchase or the order for

the goods?

The law imposes upon the carrier the duty to transport the

goods, allows him a reasonable compensation, and gives him a lien

upon the goods for security of its payment. It also implies a

promise on the one part to carry and deliver the goods safely,

and on the other, to pay the reasonable compensation. These

two promises form the contract. Each is the counterpart and

the consideration of the other. If the contract of carriage is

with the consignee, the reciprocal promise to pay the freight

must be his also. Against this inference are the considerations

that the seller is acting in his own behalf in making the delivery,
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and the goods remain his property until the contract with the

carrier takes effect. The title of the purchaser does not exist

until that contract is made. It follows as a result. The carrier

is not agent for either party, but an intermediate, independent

principal. If made an agent of the consignee, his receipt of

the goods cuts off the right of stoppage in transitu on the one

hand, and satisfies the statute of frauds on the other. He has a

right to look for his compensation to the party who employs

him, unless satisfied from his lien. The fact that, as between

seller and purchaser, the purchaser must ordinarily pay the

expenses of transportation as a part of the cost of the goods,

does not affect the relations of contract between the carrier and

either party. We discover nothing in the nature of the trans-

action, and we doubt if there is any thing in the practice or un-

derstanding of the community, which will justify the inference

that one to whom goods are sent by carrier, without direction

or authority from him, other than an agreement of purchase or

consignment, is the party who employed the carrier and is bound

to pay him; unless he assumes such liability by receiving the
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goods subject to the charge.

The contract is made when the goods are received by the car-

rier. If it is then the contract of the consignee, it will not cease

to be so, and become the contract of the consignor, by reason of

subsequent events. Suppose, then, the seller exercises his right

of stoppage in transitu. Is the purchaser still liable to the car-

rier for the unpaid freight ? Suppose the contract of sale to be

without writing and within the statute of frauds. The contract

of the carrier is not within the statute, and the authority to the

seller to make such contract in behalf of the purchaser need not

be in writing. Is the carrier to look to the purchaser or to the

seller for the freight ? Or does it depend upon the contingency

whether the contract of sale is affirmed or avoided ? And if af-

firmed, and the carrier should deliver the goods without insist^

ing on his lien, of whom must he collect it? The authorities

hold, when the agreement of sale is within the statute of frauds,

that the contract of the carrier is with the consignor. Coombsr

V. Bristol & Exeter Railway Co., 3 H. & N. 510; Coats v. Chap-

lin, 3 Q. B. 483.

We do not think the carrier's contract and right to recover hits

freight can be made to depend upon what may prove to be the

legal effect of the negotiations between consignor and consignee

upon the title to the property which is the subject of transporta-

tion. His contract must arise from the circumstances of his eni'

ployment. He has a right to look for his compensation to the

party who required him to perform the service by causikig the
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goods to be delivered to him for transportation. And that party,

unless he is the mere agent of some other, may enforce the con-

tract, and sue for its breach by the carrier.

One who forwards goods, in execution of an order or agree-

ment, for sale is not a mere agent of the purchaser in so doing.

He is acting in his own interest and behalf, and his dealings

with the carrier are in his own right and upon his own respon-

sibility, unless he has some special authority or direction from

the purchaser, upon which he acts.

The plaintiff in this case is, therefore, entitled to maintain

his action upon the contract ; and we think there is no sufficient

reason shown to prevent his recovering the full value of the

property destroyed. If Clark was the owner at the time, and his

interest has been in no way satisfied or discharged, the plaintiff

will hold the proceeds recovered in trust for his indemnity. Clark

might have prosecuted an action of tort in his own name; and

recovered the -value of his property lost; in which event the dam-

ages in Finn's suit would have been nominal, or reduced to

whatever amount of actual loss he suffered. But it is not pre-
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tended that Clark has ever brought any suit or made any claim

upon the defendant, although knowing of the pendency of this

suit, and having testified as a witness in the same ; and all claim

by him is long since barred. It is to be presumed that he

acquiesces in the recovery by Finn. If there were any doubt

upon this point, we might order a new trial upon the question

of damages only. As there is none, the judgment must be upon

the verdict.

Exceptions overruled.

178. SAVANNAH, FLORIDA AND WESTERN RAILWAY

CO. V. PRITCHARD, MATTHEWS AND CO.,

77 Ga. 412; 1 8. E. R. 261; 4 Am. St. R. 92. 1887.

Action for damages due to delay by defendant railway in

carrying. Judgment for plaintiffs.

Hall, J. The plaintiffs, who were engaged in gathering crude

turpentine and manufacturing it into spirit and rosin, brought

suit against the Savannah, Florida and Western Railway Com-

pany for failing to deliver to them the worm of a turpentine-

still which they had shipped by their road from Savannah to

Lumber City, on the East Tennessee, Virginia, and Georgia

Railroad. It seems from the evidence that the worm was carried
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to Cochran, on the latter railroad, where it was delivered in

the depot, and from there it was carried to the distillery of

another party, some eight miles into the country. After va-

rious efforts to trace the missing worm, and considerable ex-

pense incurred to find it, it was at length reclaimed by its

owners from the party to whom it had been delivered, six weeks

having elapsed between the time it should have been received at

Lumber City and when it was actually received and put to use

by the plaintiffs. During all that time their machinery, and

hands employed in running it, were idle, and the tree-boxes,

from which the crude gum was gathered, had run over, and

much of it was wasted for the want of barrels in which to deposit

it; and such loss would not have occurred had the worm come

to hand at the proper time, and the plaintiffs been enabled to

use their still. The principal loss was in the crude turpentine,

estimated at eighty-six barrels, the value of which was four dol-

lars a barrel. Plaintiffs had a verdict for $564.70, which was

the amount of the entire damages proved, less $16. Defendant

made a motion for new trial, which was overruled, and the de-
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fendant excepted.

(After stating the defendants' exceptions to the verdict and

the charges of the court below.)

There are two questions, and only two, made by this record : —

1. The first is as to the liability of the defendant for the delay

in delivering the still-worm, which occurred on the, connecting

road at the point to which it was consigned, and to which the

defendant had contracted to carry and deliver it. Of its legal

liability for this default, we think, under the decisions of this

court, there can be no doubt : See Central R. R. v. Dwight Mfg.

Co., 75 Ga. 609 ; Falvey v. Georgia R. R., 76 Id. 597. _

2. The material question in the case, however, is, whether

the court gave the jury the correct rule as to the measure of

damages, especially in the charge as to the item of loss of the

crude turpentine. That loss, as we think, was the natural and

legal result of the defendant's negligence. The claim on that

account did not rest upon expected profits, but the loss of the

material from the manufacture of which it was expected profits

would be derived. These questions were fairly submitted to

the jury, and there was evidence under the repeated ruling of

this court and other courts which justified their finding in this

respect : Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341 ; 1 Sutherland on Dam-

ages, 71, 77, 93, on the last of which pages it is said that the

party injured is entitled to recover all his damages, including

gains prevented as well as losses sustained, and this rule is sub-

ject to but two conditions: that the damages must be such as
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may fairly be supposed to have entered into the contemplation

of the parties when they made the contract, that is, must be such

as might naturally be expected to follow its violation; and they

must be certain both in their nature and in respect to the cause

from which they proceed : Georgia R. R. v. Hayden, 71 Ga. 518,

51 Am. R. 274 ; Code, sees. 2944, 3072-3074, cited and commented

on in that case; Willingham v. Hooven, Owens, Rentschler, &

Co., 74 Ga. 233, 58 Am. R. 435 ; Stewart v. Lanier House Co.,

75 Id. 582.

There is very little doubt that the plaintiffs were entitled to

recover the necessary expenses incurred in finding the still-

worm, and taking posession of the same. The result of that

search mitigated the damages that would have formed a proper

claim against the defendant. It should not complain of acts

which inured to its benefit. We cannot conclude from anything

that appears in this record that the finding in favor of the plain-

tiff is excessive, or in this respect contrary to the amount of

actual damages proved to have been sustained by the plaintiffs.

It was the province of the court to interpret and construe the
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contract of affreightment made between the plaintiffs and de-

fendant, and we agree with the judge in his interpretation of

this contract; in fact, we think the charges excepted to emi-

nently correct and clearly and happily expressed.

Judgment affirmed.

179. COOPER V. YOUNG,

22 Ga. 269; 68 Am. D. 502. 1857.

Case. Judgment for plaintiff.

By Court, McDonald, J. This suit is instituted against the

defendant, as a common carrier, for the non-delivery of stone-

coal which he had undertaken to carry for the plaintiff from

Chattanooga in Tennessee to Etowah in Cass county, Georgia.

The plaintiff is engaged extensively in the manufacture of iron,

and relies for his supply of coal to carry on his operations on

that which is carried by railroad from Chattanooga to the neigh-

borhood of his works. The coal belonged to plaintiff; the de-

fendant was to transport it. It is alleged that by reason of the

failure of defendant to carry the coal according to contract the

plaintiff was obliged to suspend his work, and that by reason

of that suspension he failed to make a certain amount of per

diem profit, and this loss of profit he insists is the measure of

his damages. He offered proof of these profits, which was ob-
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jected to by the defendant's counsel, and the decision of the

court sustaining the objection is the only error complained of

in the record. The soundness of the decision in law depends

on the rule by which damages are to be assessed against com-

mon carriers for non-delivery of articles committed to them at

the time and place stipulated for their delivery. The general

rule is, that if a common carrier fail to deliver goods according

to contract he is liable for the value of the goods at the time

and place at which he engaged to deliver them. The rule is an

easy and simple one. It is just to the owner, and does no in-

justice to the carrier: Sedgwick on Damages, 355; Angell on

Carriers, 460; Edwards on Bailm. 570. In such cases the carrier

deducts from the value at the place of destination the freight

for transporting them, and pays the balance. The owner gets his

profit, and the carrier gets his freight ; but if there be no trade

in the article transported at the place of destination, and nothing

of the kind can be purchased there, and the owner wishes it for

consumption in carrying on his business, and cannot proceed

without it, what is the rule ? We know of no rule making the
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carrier liable for the loss of profits in the sale of articles to be

manufactured of materials delivered to him for transportation,

if he should fail to deliver them.

When he undertakes as a common carrier, he undertakes in

view of the liability which the law annexes to the character of

common carriers for a breach of their contracts ; and the owner,

when he commits his goods to him, does it likewise with a view

to the redress which the law entitles him to against the carrier,

if he make default. But because there is no trade in the arti-

cle delivered to be carried at the place of destination, it is no

reason that the carrier should not be liable for the breach of his

contract. The plaintiff is injured, and seriously injured, by his

default. In the case before us, the plaintiff is engaged at hea\j

expense in the manufacture of iron, and coal is essential to the

carrying on of his business. His works are constructed for the

use of coal, and a failure in a regular supply subjects him to

serious losses. If there be no market at the place at which the

coal was to be delivered to the plaintiff from which he might

supply himself, he must resort to some other mode of transpor-

tation, however expensive, or stop his w^orks. In the case of

O'Connor v. Forster, 10 Watts, 418, cited in Sedgwick on Dam-

ages, 357, the defendant was sued for damages for refusing to

transport wheat from Pittsburg to Philadelphia according to

contract. The transportation was prevented by the approaching

freezing of the canal. The defendant contended that the meas-

ure of damages was the price agreed on for the freight and

687

§ 179 ACTIONS AGAINST CAEEIEES OF GOODS.

that for which the carriage by others might have been obtained;

and the court held that this would be the rule if the plaintiff

could have obtained another conveyance. There being a market

for wheat at Pittsburgh as well as Philadelphia, the court held

the rule of damages to be the difference between the value of

wheat at Pittsburgh, with the freight added, and its value at

Philadelphia.

In estimating the damages in cases when the article to be

transported cannot be purchased at the place of destination, and

the carrier who has contracted to carry it has the exclusive right

of transportation by the cheapest mode, the difference between

the price agreed upon or usual by that mode and the terms on

which others would carry it by other modes of transportation

ought to be considered; and in this case, and all like it, it might

not be improper to admit, additionally, evidence of losses by

the expense of hands, etc., during a necessary suspension of

business occasioned by the default of the carrier for a period

during which the plaintiff, by ordinary diligence, could not sup-

ply himself by other means with the article agreed to be carried.
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It is proper for me to remark that the rule as to the measure

of damages in this case was not very fully discussed by us, as it

was not necessary for the decision of the question presented in

the record to go beyond the particular measure of damages in-

sisted on by the plaintiff.

We know of no rule which subjects a common carrier to a

higher measure of damages for a breach of his contract than

the amount of profits which the ow^ner might have made, over

the freight and cost, by a sale at the time and place at which the

article or goods to be transported were to be delivered, provided

there be a market for the article there. In case there be no mar-

ket for the commodity or goods, and the owner requires them

for his own use, I do not see why the rule should not be modi-

fied to suit the justice of the case; but it cannot, in our judg-

ment, be so modified as to hold that the carrier shall be liable

for the profits which the owner might have realized by the sale

of articles into w^hich he might manufacture them. Such a rule

would make the carrier an insurer against all casualties in the

process of manufacturing.

Several cases have been relied on to establish the proposition

contended for, but none of them, in our judgment, sustains

it. The case of Masterton v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 7 Hill, 61, 42

Am. Dec. 38; Sedgwick on Damages, 74, was not the case of a

carrier, but it was the ordinary case of an agreement to pur-

chase, at stipulated prices, marble, to be delivered as agreed

upon in the contract. The seller of the marble had to purchase

688

GKEEN V. B. AND L. K. R. CO. §§ 179, 130

it. The agreement had all the essential parts of a contract. One

party had no right to disaffirm and annul it without the consent

of the other.

If the plaintiff in that action had been a defendant, and the

suit had been for a failure to deliver the marble agreeably to his

contract of sale, he could not have discharged himself from lia-

bility by alleging that he could not himself purchase the marble

at any price, but he would have been held to the contract, and

the damages to which he would have been subjected would have

been the difference between the price at which he had contracted

to sell it and the price that the plaintiff had or would have

had to pay for it, however enormous, if it was a price, and no

greater, at which the same quality of marble could be obtained

by the use of due prudence and diligence. If one of the ele-

ments of a contract be mutuality of obligation, the other party

was certainly liable for a breach, from whatever cause, except

the fault of the plaintiff, and he could not excuse himself by his

abandoning or suspending the work on which he intended to

use the marble.
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But the action in this case was not instituted for a breach of

the sale of coal at a stipulated price to be delivered at that place.

Had it been, the measure of damages would have been the dif-

ference between the market price at that place and the stipulated

price, without reference to its value elsewhere.

The rule which I have suggested as the proper, one for the

measures of damages against a carrier who has the exclusive right

of transportation by the cheapest mode, at the suit of a person

engaged extensively in manufacturing, and who, from the breach

of the contract for carrying the article necessary to him in his

business by the carrier, has been compelled to suspend his opera-

tions, seems to meet the justice of the case more nearly than any

that occurs to my mind.

Judgment affirmed.

180. GREEN V. BOSTON AND LOWELL RAILROAD CO.,

128 Mass. 221; 35 Am. B. 370. 1880.

Action against a carrier for the value of ar oil painting of

plaintiff' 's father. Judgment for plaintiff.

Morton, J. (Omitting other matters.) The contract between

the parties contains the following provision: "No responsibil-

ity will be admitted, under any circumstances, to a greater

amount upon any single article of freight than $200, unless
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upon notice of such amount and a special agreement therefor.

Specie, drafts, bank-bills and other articles of great intrinsic

or representative value, will only be taken upon a representa-

tion of their value, and by a special agreement assented to by

the superintendent." The defendant asked the judge to rule,

that as the plaintiff had not given notice of the value of the

lost case, and had made no special agreement as to its transpor-

tation, assented to by the superintendent, he could not recover.

The plaintiff admitted that the first clause of this provision

applied to this case, and claimed and recovered only a verdict

for $200. The other clause does not specify portraits as articles

which will be taken only upon a representation of their value

and a special agreement. It specifies "specie, drafts, and bank-

bills." In determining the meaning of the words "other articles

of great intrinsic or representative value," the rule noscitiir a

sociis applies; the general words following the particular enu-

meration must be held to include only articles of the like kind.

A portrait is not an article of great intrinsic or representative

value, like specie or drafts or bank-bills, and therefore the Su-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:41 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

perior Court rightly refused to rule as requested in the first

and second prayers of the defendant.

The defendant asked the court to rule that "the plaintiff can

recover only a fair market value of the article lost." The gen-

eral rule of damages in trover, and in contract for not deliver-

ing goods, undoubtedly is the fair market value of the goods.

But this rule does not apply when the article sued for is not

marketable property. To instruct a jury that the measure of

damages for the conversion or loss of a family portrait is its

market value would be merely delusive. It cannot with any pro-

priety be said to have any market value. The just rule of dam-

ages is the actual value to him who owns it, taking into account

its cost, the practicability and expense of replacing it, and such

other considerations as in the particular case affects its value

to the owner. Stickney v. Allen, 10 Gray, 352. The court prop-

erly refused to give the instruction requested, and we are to

presume gave proper instructions instead thereof. This being

the rule of damages, the testimony of the plaintiff that he had

no other portrait of his father would bear upon the question of

its actual value to him and was competent.

(Omitting other matters.)

Exceptions overruled.
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181. LOUISVILLE, NEW ALBANY AND CHICAGO RAIL-

WAY CO. V. GOODYKOONTZ,

119 Ind. Ill; 21 N. E. B. 472; 12 Am. St. R^ 371. 1889.

Action by guardian to recover damages for negligence causing

death of ward.

Mitchell, J. Goodykoontz, as guardian, complains of the

appellant railroad company, and charges that the death of his

ward, George Lowery, a minor under the age of twenty-one

years, was instantaneously caused by the negligence and wrong-

ful conduct of the company. The only averment upon the sub-

ject of damages is, that the ward left surviving him "a mother

and sister and next of kin competent to share in the distribu-

tion of the personal estate of said deceased, to whom damages

inure," and that by reason of the injury and death the ward's

estate has been damaged in the sum of ten thousand dollars.

There was a special verdict, and a judgment for two thou-

sand five hundred dollars.

It is conceded that the action was brought under section 266,

Revised Statutes of 1881, which reads as follows: "A father
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(or in case of his death, or desertion of his family, or imprison-

ment, the mother) may maintain an action for the injury or

death of a child, and a guardian for the injury or death of his

ward. But when the action is brought by the guardian for an

injury to his ward, the damages shall inure to the benefit of his

ward, ' '

It was a settled rule of the common law that that no one could

maintain a civil action for damages on account of the death of

a human being. All claims for injuries to the person were ex-

tinguished by the death of the person injured. Actio personalis

moritur cum persona. If a child was wrongfully injured, the

father, or person lawfully entitled to the child's ser\aces, might

recover for the loss of services during the period of disability

up to the time of death, if death resulted. Incidental damages

for nursing, surgical and medical attendance, including appro-

priate funeral expenses in case of death, were also recoverable

by a parent.

The statute above set out has added to the common-law remedy

of a parent the right to recover all the probable pecuniary loss

resulting from the death of a child. The right of action is

primarily in the father, but contingently in the mother; and

whether there be a guardian or not, the father, or under cer-

tain contingencies the mother, may maintain an action under
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the above section. In estimating the damages, the value of the

child's services from the date of the injury until he would have

attained his majority, including the cost of nursing, medical and

surgical attendance, occasioned by the injury, together with

necessary funeral expenses if death resulted, are to be consid-

ered : Pennsylvania Co. v. Lilly, 73 Ind. 252 ; Mayhew v. Burns,

103 Ind. 328, 2 N. E. R. 793; Rains v. St. Louis etc. R'y Co., 71

Mo. 164, 36 Am. R. 459 ; McGovern v. New York etc. R. R. Co.,

67 N. Y. 417 ; 2 Thompson on Negligence, 1292 ; 2 Wait's Actions

and Defenses, 477; Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, 3d

ed., sec. 608.

The foregoing are the elements which enter into and pre-

sumably comprise the sum of the pecuniary loss sustained by

a parent in case of the injury or death of his child; and whether

the child was under guardianship or not, the right of action to

recover this pecuniary loss is in the parent to whom the child

owed service, and from whom he was entitled to receive sup-

port. While either the father or mother is alive, unless they

have relinquished their right, respectively, to the services of
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the child, by emancipation or otherwise, and have abdicated

their duty to furnish him support, no one else is entitled to

maintain an action for the loss of his services during minority,

because the injury is to the person entitled to the child's

services and not to the minor's estate: Walters v. Chicago etc.

R. R. Co., 36 Iowa, 458 ; Cooley on Torts, 314 et seq.

If a minor under guardianship sustains an injury to his per-

son from the wrongful conduct of another, his guardian may

maintain an action and recover for the benefit of the ward, pre-

cisely as the latter might have recovered through the interven-

tion of a prochein ami, in case he had not been under guardian-

ship. This is so, whether the ward's father or mother be living

or not. The pain and suffering endured and the permanent in-

jury resulting from the wounding or maiming of a minor are

personal to himself, and damages for such pain and injuries are

always recoverable for his benefit. We know of no principle

or precedent which sustains a recovery of damages for the death

of a human being, no matter how caused, simply for the purpose

of enhancing the value of the decedent's estate. The action is

given to afford compensation for those who have sustained pecu-

niary loss by the death, and not for the benefit of the decadent's

estate. Doubtless, a guardian who has been required to make

expenditures for care and medical attendance, or for funeral

expenses, out of his ward's personal property, may maintain an

action against a wrong-doer to reimburse the estate; but surely

he cannot recover general damages for the death of the ward
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for the benefit of his estate, no matter who inherit as his heirs.

Damages cannot be recovered for the death of a human being,

except by or for the benefit of those who are supposed to have

sustained a sensible and appreciable pecuniary loss therefrom.

Pecuniary loss, not to the estate of the deceased person, but to

those who had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit,

as of right, or of duty, or from a recognized sense of obligation,

from the continuance of life, is the foundation of the action:

Franklin v. South Eastern R'y Co., 3 Hurl. & N. 211; Dalton v.

South Eastern E'y Co., 4 Com. B., N. S., 296; Pennsylvania R.

R. Co. v. Adams, 55 Pa. St. 499 ; Mayhew v. Burns, supra; North

Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Kirk, 90 Pa. St. 15. It is the injury

to the survivors entitled to sue, and not the value of the life lost,

that forms the basis of damages : Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Zebe,

33 Id. 318.

Under section 266, only persons having a reasonable expecta-

tion of pecuniary benefit, as of right, duty, or obligation, in

some sense, from the continuance of the life, are entitled to

maintain the action, unless possibly under exceptional circum-
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stances clearly showing appreciable pecuniary loss. Section

284, which gives a right of action to the personal representa-

tives for the exclusive benefit of the widow and children, or

next of kin, is entirely disconnected from section 266, and exerts

no sort of influence upon the construction of or rights conferred

under the latter section: IMayhew v. Burns, supra. The two

are not to be confused or confounded with each other, but each

is to be construed independently of the other.

Where the death of a minor has been wrongfully caused, the

parent may maintain an action to recover the probable pecu-

niary loss sustained. The guardian, if there be one, may, no

action having been brought by the parent, maintain an action

to reimburse the personal estate of the ward for any actual

loss: Section 266. If the death of any one is caused in like

manner, an action may be maintained by his personal repre-

sentatives, provided the person whose death has been caused

left a wife or children, or next of kin, who had any appreciable

pecuniary interest in the continuance of his life: Section 284;

~ Mayhew v. Burns, supra, and cases cited.

It appears, from the complaint in the present ease, that the

ward whose death gave rise to the action was a minor, and that

his mother was alive at the time the suit was commenced. Pre-

sumably she was, and is yet, unless barred by lapse of time, en-

titled to maintain an action to recover for the loss of her son's

services. Death was instantaneous, and it does not appear that

the guardian paid anything out of the ward's personal estate
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for funeral expenses. Hence the complaint shows no right of

action in the guardian.

The judgment is therefore reversed, with costs.

182. CARSTEN V. NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.,

44 Minn. 454; 47 N. W. R. 49; 20 Am. St. B. 589. 1890.

Damages for wrongful ejection from a train. Plaintiff pur-

chased of a ticket broker the return portion of a limited round-

trip ticket. An agent styled a "ticket-exchanger," acting as

assistant to the conductor, notified plaintiff that his ticket was

not good because purchased at a scalper 's office, and took up and

retained the ticket. The regular conductor later affirmed this

and told plaintiff' he must leave the train unless he paid his fare.

As the train approached a station he returned with two brake-

men to eject plaintiff, put his hand on plaintiff's shoulder and

without violence or abuse led him to the door. A stranger, how-

ever, paid his fare to Brainerd, where plaintiff voluntarily left

the train,

Vanderburgh, J. ... 1. The evidence is sufficient to show that

the ticket was genuine and was good for one passage from Minne-
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apolis to Detroit as a return ticket, and that it was wrongfully

taken away from plaintiff', and appropriated by the agent of the

defendant. The ticket was transferable in the absence of any

restrictions in the original contract of sale, and was valid in

plaintiff's hands. The conductor was fully advised of the facts

in the case, which he could verify by reference to his assistant

on the same train. His conduct in requiring the plaintiff to

leave the train was therefore wrongful: Burnham v. Grand

Trunk R'y Co., 63 Me. 298, 18 Am. Rep. 220.

2. It is an action sounding in tort, and we think the plaintiff

entitled to claim damages for the wrong and injury done him,

in addition to the price of the ticket, though no particular loss

or special injury to his person was shown. The evidence tended

to prove that the agents of the defendant laid hands on hira,

and were proceeding to eject him by force, if necessary, from

the car, which was full of passengers. The fact that he escaped

personal violence by non-resistance does not deprive him of his

right of action ; and the jury were entitled to consider, in con-

nection with the physical acts of the conductor in wrongfully

attempting to eject him, the annoyance, vexation, and mortifica

tion suffered by him, and the indignity put upon him : Chicago

etc. R. R. Co. V. Flagg, 43 111. 364; 92 Am. Dec. 133; 3 Suther-
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land on Damages, 712, 715 ; 2 Beach on Railway Law, sec. 891.

But the jury must be governed by the evidence, and the dam-

ages assessed must be appropriate to the nature of the case,

which will be modified by the circumstances, such as the presence

or absence of personal malice, actual violence, and threatening

or insulting language: Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Parks, 18 111.

460, 68 Am. Dec. 562, 573. The instruction given by the court

to the jury, that if the conductor took up the ticket, and failed

to give any excuse for his refusal to return the same to plaintiff,

and no excuse existed, they might presume that he acted malevo-

lently, and with a tyrannical and oppressive motive, and might

award him ' ' any amount of damages that is proper, not exceed-

ing the sum of one thousand dollars," was, we think, in view of

the evidence in the case, erroneous, and likely to mislead the

jury as to the extent of their discretion on the question of dam-

ages.

3. The plaintiff was permitted, against the objection of the

defendant, to prove that, by reason of his delay at Brainerd,

he lost a job of thrashing at Detroit, for which he expected $2.25
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per day. He testified that he was detained there for a week for

want of money to go any farther, and this alleged loss the jury

were allovred to consider. This was error. Such damages are

too remote. They cannot be considered the proximate result of

the alleged wrongful act of the conductor. There must have

been several other independent causes to which the same result

might have been referred : BroAvn v. Cummings, 7 Allen, 507.

Order reversed.

183. SPADE V. LYNN AND BOSTON RAILROAD CO.,

168 Mass. 285; 47 N. E. R. 88; 60 Am. St. B. 393. 1897.

Tort for injuries to a passenger due to fright caused by the

ejection from the car of a drunken passenger. No other injury

was suffered. Judgment for plaintiff.

Allen, J. This ease presents a question which has not here-

tofore been determined in this commonwealth, and in respect

to which the decisions elsewhere have not been uniform. It

is this: whether, in an action to recover damages for an injury

sustained through the negligence of another, there can be a re-

covery for a bodily injury caused by mere fright and mental

disturbance. The jury were instructed that a person cannot re-

cover for mere fright, fear, or mental distress occasioned by

the negligence of another, which does not result in bodily injury ;
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but that when the fright or fear or nervous shock produces a

bodily injury, there may be a recovery for that bodily injury,

and for all the pain, mental or otherwise, which may arise out

of that bodily injury.

In Canning v. Williamstown, 1 Cush. 451, it was held, in an

action against a town to recover damages for an injury sustained

by the plaintiff in consequence of a defective bridge, that he

could not recover if he sustained no injury to his person, but

merely incurred risk and peril which caused fright and mental

suffering. In Warren v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 163 Mass. 484,

40 N. E. R. 895, the evidence tended to show that the defendant's

train struck the carriage of the plaintiff, thereby throwing him

out upon the ground, and it was held to be a physical injury to

the person to be thrown out of a wagon, or to be compelled to

jump out, even although the harm consists mainly of nervous

shock. It was not, therefore, a case of mere fright, and resulting

nervous shock.

The case calls for a consideration of the real ground upon

which the liability or nonliability of a defendant guilty of neg-
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ligence in a case like the present demands. The exemption from

liability for mere fright, terror, alarm, or anxiety does not rest

on the assumption that these do not constitute an actual in-

jury. They do in fact deprive one of enjoyment and of com-

fort, cause real suffering, and to a greater or less extent dis-

qualify one for the time being from doing the duties of life. If

these results flow from a wrongful or negligent act, a recovery

therefor cannot be denied on the ground that the injury is fanci-

ful and not real. Nor can it be maintained that these results

may not be the direct and immediate consequence of the negli-

gence. Danger excites alarm. Few people are wholly insensible

to the emotions caused by imminent danger, though some are

less affected than others.

It must also be admitted that a timid or sensitive person may

suffer not only in mind, but also in body, from such a cause. Great

emotion may, and sometimes does, produce physical effects.

The action of the heart, the circulation of the blood, the tem-

perature of the body, as well as the nerves and the appetite,

may all be affected. A physical injury may be directly traceable

to fright, and so may be caused by it. We cannot say, therefore,

that such consequences may not flow proximately from uninten-

tional negligence, and, if compensation in damages may be re-

covered for a physical injury so caused, it is hard on principle

to say why there should not also be a recovery for the mere men-

tal suffering when not accompanied by any perceptible physical

effects.
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It would seem, therefore, that the real reason for refusing

damages sustained from mere fright must be something differ-

ent ; and it probably rests on the ground that in practice it is im-

possible satisfactorily to administer any other rule. The law

must be administered in the courts according to general rules.

Courts will aim to make these rules as just as possible, bearing

in mind that they are to be of general application. But as the

law is a practical science, having to do with the affairs of life,

any rule is unwise if, in its general application, it will not as a

usual result serve the purposes of justice. A new rule cannot

be made for each case, and there must, therefore, be a certain

generality in rules of law, which in particular cases may fail

to meet what would be desirable if the single case were alone to

be considered.

Rules of law respecting the recovery of damages are framed

with reference to the just rights of both parties; not merely

what it might be right for an injured person to receive, to afford

just compensation for his injury, but also what it is just to com-

pel the other party to pay. One cannot always look to others
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to make compensation for injuries received. Many accidents

occur, the consequences of which the sufferer must bear alone.

And in determining the rules of law by which the right to re-

cover compensation for unintended injury from others is to be

governed, regard must chiefly be paid to such conditions as are

usually found to exist. Not only the transportation of passen-

gers and the running of trains, but the general conduct of busi-

ness and of the ordinary affairs of life, must be done on the

assumption that persons who are liable to be affected thereby

are not peculiarly sensitive, and are of ordinary physical and

mental strength. If, for example, a traveler is sick or infirm,

delicate in health, specially nervous or emotional, liable to be

upset by slight causes, and therefore requiring precautions which

are not usual or practicable for travelers in general, notice should

be given, so that, if reasonably practicable, arrangements may

be made accordingly, and extra care be observed. But, as a gen-

eral rule, a carrier of passengers is not bound to anticipate or

to guard against an injurious result which would only happen

to a person of peculiar sensitiveness. This limitation of liability

for injury of another description is intimated in Allsop v, Allsop,

5 Hurl. & N. 534, 538, 539. One may be held bound to antici-

pate and guard against the probable consequences to ordinary

people, but to carry the rule of damages further imposes an un-

due measure of responsibility upon those who are guilty only

of unintentional negligence. The general rule limiting damages

in such a case to the natural and probable consequences of the
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acts done is of wide application, and has often been expressed

and applied: Lombard v. Lennox, 155 Mass. 70, 28 N. E, R.

1125, 31 Am. St. R. 528; White v. Dresser, 135 Mass. 150, 46

Am. R. 454 ; Fillebrown v. Hoar, 124 Mass. 580 ; Derry v. Flitner,

118 Mass. 131; Milwaukee etc. Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469,

475; Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227, 36 Am. R. 308; Ellis v.

Cleveland, 55 Vt. 358 ; Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 111. 11, 28 Am.

R. 607; Hampton v. Jones, 58 Iowa 317, 12 N. W. R. 276; Ren-

ner v. Canfield, 36 Minn. 90, 30 N. W. R. 435, 1 Am. St. R. 654 ;

Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577, 591, 595, 598 ; The Notting

Hill, L. R. 9 P. D. 105 ; Hobbs v. London etc. Ry., L. R. 10 Q. B.

Ill, 122.

The law of negligence in its special application to cases of

accidents has received great development in recent years. The

number of actions brought is very great. This should lead courts

well to consider the grounds on which claims for compensation

properly rest, and the necessary limitations of the right to re-

cover. We remain satisfied with the rule that there can be no

recovery for fright, terror, alarm, anxiety, or distress of mind,
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if these are unaccompanied by some physical injury; and, if this

rule is to stand, we think it should also be held that there can

be no recovery for such physical injuries as may be caused solely

by such mental disturbance, where there is no injury to the per-

son from without. The logical vindication of this rule is, that it

is unreasonable to hold persons who are merely negligent bound

to anticipate and guard against fright and the consequences

of fright; and that this would open a wide door for unjust

claims, which could not successfully be met. These views are

supported by the following decisions: Victorian Ry. Commrs.

V. Coultas, L. R. 13 App. Cas. 222; Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.

Co., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. R. 354, 56 Am. St. R. 604; Ewing v.

Pittsburg etc. Ry. Co., 147 Pa. St. 40, 23 Atl. R. 340, 30 Am. St.

R. 709 ; Haile v. Texas etc. Ry. Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 557.

In the following cases, a different view was taken: Bell v.

Great Northern Ry. Co., 26 L. R. Ir. 428 ; Purcell v. St. Paul

City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. R. 1034; Fitzpatrick v.

Great Western Ry. Co., 12 U. C. Q. B. 645. See, also, Beven on

Negligence, 77, et seq.

It is hardly necessary to add that this decision does not reach

those classes of actions where an intention to cause mental dis-

tress or to hurt the feelings is shown, or is reasonably to be in-

ferred, as, for example, in cases of seduction, slander, malicious

prosecution, or arrest, and some others. Nor do we include cases

of acts done with gross carelessness or recklessness, showing

utter indifference to such consequences, when they must have
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been in the actor's mind: Lombard v. Lennox, 155 Mass. 70,

28 N. E. R. 1125, 31 Am. St. R. 528; Fillebrown v. Hoar, 124

Mass. 580 ; Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, 96 Am. D. 759.

In the present case, no such considerations entered into the

rulings or were presented by the facts. The entry therefore

must be, exceptions sustained.

184. FERGUSON V. ANGLO-AMERICAN TELEGRAPH

CO.,

178 Pa. St. 377; 35 Atl. R. 979; 56 Am. St. B. 770. 1896.

Action to recover damages for delay in delivering a cipher

telegraph message.

McCoLLUM, J. This was an action for damages caused by

the failure of the defendant to deliver promptly a telegraph

message written in cipher. The evidence was to the following

effect : Plaintiffs, on March 15, 1890, sent two cable messages in

cipher, addressed to "Oetorara," "Liverpool," the first of which

ordered the purchase of fiftj^ tons of soda ash, and the second

ordered one hundred tons of the same, subject to shipment on

the steamer Kingsdale. The first message was duly delivered to
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plaintiffs' agents, the second was not delivered until six days

afterward. The steamer Kingsdale had sailed in the mean time.

The delayed message reads as follows: "Bewail boarish, bewail

bluster, provided steamer Kingsdale," and was interpreted to

mean "purchase for our account 50 tons jarrow 55-56 per cent

soda ash, 50 tons jarrow 48 per cent soda ash, provided shipment

can be made per steamship Kingsdale." The plaintiffs had con-

tracted for a resale of the entire one hundred and fifty tons, and,

when the one hundred tons failed to arrive, they were compelled

to pay a higher price to fill their contract, and thereby lost eight

hundred and ninety-two dollars and seventy-two cents. The

plaintiffs claimed that this was the measure of damages, but the

court confined it to the sum paid for transmission of the mes-

sage. Was this ruling erroneous? Is seems that the question

now presented has not been decided by this court. It has been

frequently considered in many of the courts of our sister states

and in England, and the great preponderance of authority is in

accord with the ruling of the court below. The rule on this

subject is stated in 25 American and English Encyclopedia of

Law, 842, 843, as follows: "The rule already set out as to the

measure of damages confines the plaintiff's recovery, in actions
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against the company for negligence, to snch as may fairly be sup-

posed to have been in contemplation of the parties at the time of

making the contract. This being true, it follows as a logical and

necessary sequence that where the message as delivered for trans-

mission is unintelligible, except to the sender or the addressee,

and the company had no information otherwise as to its character

and purport, nor of its importance and urgency, the party in-

jured can recover of the company nothing more than nominal

damages or at most the price paid for transmission. And this is

the rule which has been adopted by the English and American

Courts almost without exception. ' ' Many decisions of the courts

of this country and England are cited as sustaining the rule

above stated. The numerous decisions of the courts of many

states Avill be found to be opposed to the decisions of the courts

of only three states, those of Virginia, Georgia, and Alabama.

Florida has recently reversed an earlier ease, and thus joined the

majority of the states on this question. The reasons advanced

in support of the decisions which support the ruling of the court

below have been various, the one most commonly applied being
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the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341. It is earnestly con-

tended by the appellants that the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9

Ex. 341, has no application to the case in hand, that the word

"contemplate" is there used as contradistinguishing what is

proximate and direct from what is remote and speculative, as in

Pennypacker v. Jones, 106 Pa. St. 237, and Adams Express Co.

V. Egbert, 36 Pa. St. 360, 78 Am. Dec. 382. They also call our

attention to the fact that the view of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex.

341, contended for by the defendant, has been unsuccessfully

urged upon this court at least twice before, namely, in United

States Tel. Co. v. Wenger, 55 Pa. St. 262, 93 Am. Dec. 751, and

Telegraph Co. v. Landis, 21 Week. Not. Cas. 38, and that there-

fore this question is not an open one.

We do not concede that the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex.

341, has no application to this case, nor that the decision of this

court in United States Tel. Co. v. Wenger, 55 Pa. St. 262, 93 Am.

Dec. 751, or in Telegraph Co. v. Landis, 21 Week. Not. Cas. 38,

is opposed to the ruling of the court below. The message in

United States Tel. Co. v. Wenger, 55 Pa. St. 262, 93 Am. Dec.

751, disclosed to the agent of the company the nature of the busi-

ness to which it related, and there was uncontradicted evi-

dence that the sender ' ' notified the operator that he would look

to the company for damages if they failed in transmitting the

message." In Telegraph Co. v. Landis, 21 Week. Not. Cas. 38,

there was enough on the face of the message ''to indicate to the

operator that it referred to sheep, to be shipped to Philadelphia
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and their price." It was a case, not of delay, but of error in

transmission, and Paxson, J., speaking for this court said: "It

seems reasonable that where damages are claimed for mere delay

in delivery, the face of the telegram ought to contain something

to put the company on its guard. A delay of a day, or even a

few hours, might cause a heavy loss." This suggestion is ap-

plicable to the case now before us and in harmony with the view

taken in Abeles v. Western Union Tel. Co., 37 Mo. App. 554, in

which the court said: "Aside from the reasons which support

the rule of damages in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, there

is here a question of public policy to which we could not shut our

eyes if we were in doubt upon the question. Upon any other rule,

where a cipher dispatch is delivered to a telegraph company for

transmission, and not translated to them, and there is a delay

in delivering it or a total failure to deliver it, the door is open

to unlimited fraud upon the company. The evidence of its mean-

irg is entirely in the breast of the sender and person to whom

it Is sent. They may construct any meaning they choose, and,

upon the meaning thus constructed, they may, by evidence which
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the company will be powerless to rebut, construct any fabric of

facts on which to build an action for damages which they may

see fit." That the measure of damages contended for by the

appellants might produce such results is obvious. Under it a

telegraph company may receive for transmission a cipher mes-

sage which on its face is absolutely unintelligible to them, and

was intended by the sender to be so, and for the slightest delay

in transmitting it they may be charged with damages which can-

not reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of

both parties when they received it. Surely such a message fur-

nishes no tangible ground for an inference that it relates to an

important business transaction, or that the slightest delay in the

delivery of it might subject the company to liability for such

damages as are claimed in this case. In Candee v. Western

Union Tel. Co., 34 Wis. 471, 17 Am. Rep. 452, Dixon, C. J., said :

"It cannot be said or assumed that any amount of damages or

pecuniary loss or injury will naturally ensue or be suffered ac-

cording to the usual course of things, from the failure to trans-

mit a message, the meaning and import of which are wholly

unkno^vn to the operator. The operator who receives, and who

represents the company, and may for this purpose be said to be

the other party to the contract, cannot be supposed to look upon

such a message as one pertaining to transactions of pecuniary

value and importance, and in respect of which pecuniary loss

or damages will naturally arise in case of his failure or omission

to send it. It may be a mere item of news, or some other com-
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munication of trifling or unimportant character. Ignorant of

its real nature and importance, it cannot be said to have been in

his contemplation at the time of making the contract that any-

particular damage or injury would be the probable result of a

breach of the contract on his part." To subject the company to

the same liability for mistake or delay in the transmission of

such a message that it might be subject to for a like mistake or

delay in the transmission of an intelligible message would open

the door to the perpetration of fraud, and disregard the well-

settled rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341. We find nothing

in Adams Exp. Co. v. Egbert, 36 Pa. St. 360, 78 Am. Dee. 382,

or in Pennypacker v. Jones, 106 Pa. St. 237, which can be con-

sidered as a repudiation or qualification of that rule, or in the

way of its application to the case at bar. For the reasons above

stated, we concur in the ruling of the court below.

Judgment affirmed.

185. MENTZER V. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO.,

93 la. 752; 62 N. W. B. 1; 57 Am. St. R. 294. 1895.

Action for damages caused by delay in delivering a telegram.
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Judgment for plaintiff.

Deemer, J. There was testimony tending to show, and the

jury may well have found that on the eleventh day of April,

1892, one H. Dorn delivered to defendant, at Creston, Ohio,

to be transmitted to plaintiff, at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, the follow-

ing telegraphic message :

"Creston, Ohio, 11, 1892.

To J. D. Mentzer, Cedar Rapids, Iowa :

Mother dead. Funeral Wednesday. Answer if coming or not.

H. Dorn."

That Dorn paid the regular charges for transmitting the same,

and, at the time of the delivery of the message, informed de-

fendant's employee in charge of the office at Creston that it was

plaintiff's mother who was dead. That the message reached de-

fendant's office at Cedar Rapids at 9:16 A. M., April 11, 1892,

but through the negligence and carelessness of defendant's em-

ployees, was not delivered until 9 P. M., April 13th. The plain-

tiff inquired at defendant's office at Cedar Rapids at about 7

o'clock in the evening of April 11th, and was informed there was

nothing there for him. It is shown beyond dispute that plain-

tiff's mother died at Creston, Ohio, on April 11, 1892, and was
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buried on the 13th, and that, by reason of the failure of de-

fendant to deliver the message informing plaintiff of her death,

he was prevented from attending her funeral. There was also

testimony tending to show that plaintiff lost some time from his

work, in trying to discover whether a message had been sent him

or not. The court gave the jury the following instructions with

reference to the measure of damages, in the event they found

plaintiff entitled to recover: "7. If you find for plaintiff, then

you will allow him for the amounts he paid for messages sent

by him, if any ; for loss of time caused by the failure to deliver

said message, and rendered useless thereby, if any ; and, in addi-

tion thereto, such an amount as you may find from the evidence

to be just and reasonable to compensate plaintiff for the dam-

ages sustained by reason of mental anguish suffered by him by

reason of failure to deliver said message, if any. But you should

not allow plaintiff anything for loss of time or expense in going

to Creston, Ohio, nor should you allow plaintiff for the money

paid by Dorn for the message in question."

It is first insisted by appellant's counsel that the plaintiff can-
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not recover because he made no contract with the defendant, and

is not in privity with it; that the action is founded on contract,

and therefore he cannot maintain the suit. Such, no doubt, is

the rule in England. But the courts of this country almost uni-

versally hold to the contrary. In the recent case of Herron y.

Telegraph Co., 90 Iowa, 129, we had occasion to consider this

question; and the holding there, which is in accord with the cur-

rent of judicial opinion in this country, was that the person to

whom the message was addressed might maintain an action for

the damages sustained by him.

2. It is conceded by appellant's counsel that plaintiff siiffered

damages under the first two heads covered by the instruction, to

the amount of one dollar, and no complaint is made of the

charge, so far as it relates to these two items. The objection to

the instruction is, that it allows the jury to assess damages for

"mental anguish," and it is contended that such damages are not

allowable in actions of this kind. Counsel also insisted that, if

such damages are recoverable in any case, they should not be al-

lowed here, for the reason that the testimony negatives any

such suffering on the part of plaintiff as would entitle him to

recover. Disposing of this last proposition first, we have to say

that there is sufficient testimony in the record to justify the

conclusion that the plaintiff did suffer as claimed. The evidence

discloses such conduct on the part of plaintiff in inquiring for a

message at the office of the defendant company, and in the efforts

put forth by him to ascertain if a death message had come, as to
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evince mental anxiety. Plaintiff says he was desirous of attend-

ing his mother's funeral, and that he felt "hard" because of

the delay in the delivery of the message. He immediately tele-

graphed to ascertain if he could be present at the funeral, and

took up his journey to Ohio, to be in attendance upon the burial.

When he called at defendant 's office, after the receipt of thfe mes-

sage, he was excited and anxious. He complained of the delay,

and wanted to know why the message was not delivered at his

house. We think these declarations, and this course of conduct,

clearly indicate that plaintiff did suffer as charged. We have,

then, the question as to whether damages for mental suffering

can be recovered in actions of this kind, independent of any

physical injury, where the company is advised of the character of

the message, and negligently fails to deliver it. This question

has been variously decided by the different courts of the coun-

try, but, up to this time, is an open one in this state. The fol-

lowing cases answer the proposition in the affirmative : So Relle

V. Western Union Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 308, 40 Am. Rep. 805;

Stuart V. Western Union Tel. Co., 66 Tex. 580, 18 S. W. R. 351,
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59 Am. R. 623 ; Gulf etc. Ry. Co. v. Wilson, 69 Tex. 739, 7 S. W.

R. 653 ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Broesche, 72 Tex. 654, 10 S.

W. R. 734, 13 Am. St. R. 843 ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Simp-

son, 73 Tex. 423, 11 S. W. R. 385; Western Union Tel. Co. v.

Adams, 75 Tex. 531, 12 S. W. R. 857, 16 Am. St. R. 920 ; Wo-

mack V. Western Union Tel. Co., Tex. Civ. App., May 10, 1893,

22 S. W. R. 417 ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Carter, 2 Tex. Civ.

App. 624, 21 S. W. R. 688 ; Wadsworth v. Western Union Tel.

Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S. W. R. 574, 6 Am. St. R. 864; Northport

etc. R. R. Co. V. Griffin, 92 Tenn. 694, 22 S. W. R. 737; Reese

V. Western Union Tel. Co., 123 Ind. 294, 24 N. E. R. 163 ; West-

ern Union Tel. Co. v. Stratemeier, 6 Ind. App. 125, 32 N. E.

R. 871 ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Newhouse, 6 Ind. App. 422,

33 N. E. R. 800 ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Henderson, 89 Ala.

510, 7 Sou. R. 419, 18 Am. St. R. 148; Thompson v. Western

Union Tel. Co., 106 N. C. 549, 11 S. E. R. 269 ; Young v. West-

ern Union Tel. Co., 107 N. C. 370, 11 S. E. R. 1044, 22 Am. St.

R. 883 ; Thompson v Western Union Tel. Co., 107 N. C. 449, 12

S. E. R. 427 ; Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 90 Ky. 265,

13 S. W. R. 880; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Stephens, 2 Tex.

Civ. App. 129, 21 S. W. R. 148; Logan v. Western Union Tel.

Co., 84 111. 468; and perhaps others. While perhaps equally as

large a number answer it in the negative. See the following:

Western Union Tel. Co. v. Wood, 57 Fed. Rep. 471 ; Russell v.

Western Union Tel. Co., 3 Dak. 315, 19 N. W. R. 408 ; West v.

Western Union Tel. Co., 39 Kan. 93, 17 Pac. R. 807, 7 Am. St.
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R. 530; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748, 9

Son. R. 823, 24 Am. St. R. 300; Chapman v. Western Union

Tel. Co., 88 Ga. 763, 15 S. E. R. 901, 30 Am. St. R. 183 ; Connell

V. Western Union Tel. Co., 116 Mo. 34, 22 S. W. R. 345, 38 Am.

St. R. 575 ; International etc. Tel. Co. v. Saunders, 32 Fla. 434,

14 Sou. R. 148 ; Summerfield v. Western Union Tel. Co., 87 Wis.

1, 57 N. W. R. 973, 41 Am. St. R. 17 ; Francis v. Western Union

Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 59 N. W. R. 1078, 49 Am. St. R. 507.

Perhaps other cases announcing the same rule may he found.

Of the text-writers. Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, page

692, section 605 ; Thompson on Electricity, section 379, 3 Suther-

land on Damages, sections 975-980, inclusive; 2 Sedgwick on

Damages, section 894, and others, hold that such damages may be

recovered, while Wood's Mayne on Damages, page 74, Cooley on

Torts, 271, and others, seem to deny it. The general rule which

has come down to us from England, no doubt, is that mental

anguish and suffering resulting from mere negligence, unac-

companied with injuries to the person, cannot be made the basis

of an action for damages: See Ljmch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas.
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577 ; Hobbs v. London, etc. Ry. Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 122. And

doubtless this is the rule of law to-day in all ordinary actions,

either ex contractu or ex delicto. But it must be remembered that

there are exceptions to the rule, and that the telegraph, as a means

of conveying intelligence, is comparatively a new invention. The

general rule above referred to was adopted long before the elec-

tric current was harnessed and made subservient to the will of

man. One of the crowning glories of the common law has been

its elasticity, and its adaptability to new conditions and new

states of fact. It has grown with civilization, and kept pace with

the march of events, so that it is as virile to-day, in our advanced

state of civilization, as it was when the race was emerging from

the dark ages of the past. Should it ever fail to be adjustable to

the new conditions which age and experience bring, then its use-

fulness is over, and a new social compact must be entered into.

Let us look at this query, then, upon principle, and see if such

damages are recoverable. And* first we must determine the na-

ture, objects, and purposes of telegraph companies; their legal

status and duties to the public, and to those with whom they do

business, then the nature of the action, and, finally, the elements

of damage which may be recovered, either by reason of their

breach of contract or because of their failure to perform their

(duties — and see if there is any reason known to and recognized

by the law, why such damage should not be allowed. Far be it

from our purpose to make law. We cannot legislate, but will

45
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discover, if we can, whether there are any precedents for recov-

ery lying in the ashes of the past.

What, then, is the nature, purpose, and object of the telegraph,

and what is its legal status? It is a system of appliances con-

ducting the electric current or fluid, used for the purpose of

transmitting intelligence, thought, or news from one place to an-

other. Somewhat akin is it to a common carrier, in this: that

they are both carriers, and must serve all alike; but the carrier

transports persons or goods, while the telegraph conveys intelli-

gence. The very object of the invention is to quickly convey in-

formation from one to another, upon which that other may act.

It is a public use, and for that reason eminent domain may be ex-

ercised in its behalf, and is engaged in a business affecting pub-

lic interests to such an extent that the state may regulate the

charges of companies engaged in the business. It is not an in-

surer of the accuracy or of the delivery of messages intrusted to

it, but it is so far a common carrier as to be bound to serve all

people alike, and to exercise due care in the discharge of its pub-

lic duties. Nor can it provide by contract for exemption from
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liability from the consequences of its own negligence. Enough

has been stated to show that it owes a duty to all whom it at-

tempts to serve, independent of the contractual one entered into

when it receives its messages. Telegraph companies are held,

then, to the exercise of due care, and for negligence, either in

sending or delivering messages, are liable to any person injured

thereby for all the damages he may sustain. We have stated

these rules in order to show that one who is injured by their neg-

lect of duty may maintain an action, either ex contractu or ex

delicto, for the injuries sustained. The rule, no doubt, is as an-

nounced by Judge Cooley in his work on Torts, at page 104 et

seq: "In many cases an action, as for tort, or an action for a

breach of contract, may be brought by the same party on the

same state of facts. This, at first, may seem in contradiction

to the definition of a tort as a wrong unconnected with contract,

but the principles which sustain such actions will enable us to

solve the seeming difficulty. . . . There are also, in certain

relations, duties imposed by law, a failure to perform which is

regarded as a tort, though the relations themselves may be

formed by contract covering the same ground. . , . Thus,

for breach of the general duty imposed by law because of the

relation, one form of action may be brought, and for the breach

of contract another form of action may be brought" : See, also,

Rich V. New York etc. R. R. Co., 87 N. Y. 382 ; Nevin v. Pullman

etc. Car Co., 106 111. 222, 46 Am. R. 688 ; Baltimore etc. Ry. Co.

V. Kemp, 61 Md. 619, 48 Am. R. 134; Cooley on Torts, 3. In
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this state all forms of action are abolished. The pleader simply

makes a plain statement of the facts, avoiding legal conclusions,

and may recover as damages, on the facts stated, whatever the

law will allow, either for breach of the contract or for the tort

pleaded. We desire to make this plain, for if, in the further

progress of the opinion, it should appear that damages for

mental suffering are allowed in eases of this kind, either for

breach of contract or for tort, then plaintiff may recover. With

this thought in mind, the reader may also be able to explain and

reconcile some of the cases before cited.

Having determined the nature and objects, the status, and re-

lation of the defendant company, we turn to the verdict of the

jury in this case, and find that not only did the defendant break

its contract, but that it was guilty of negligence as well, and that

under all known rules of law, plaintiff is entitled to some dam-

ages. Defendant insists they are simply nominal, and plaintiff

contends he has suffered acute and actual damages, for which he

should be compensated. The general rule of damages for breach

of contract comes down to us from the opinion of Hadley v.
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Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, and is as follows: "When two parties

have made a contract which one of them has broken, the dam-

ages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such

breach of contract should be such as may fully and reasonably

be considered either as arising naturally — i. e., according to the

usual course of things — from such breach of contract itself, or

such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the con-

templation of both parties at the time they made the contract,

as the probable result of the breach of it." In actions for tort

the rule is much broader. The universal and cardinal principle

in such cases is, that the person injured shall receive compensa-

tion commensurate with his loss or injury, and no more. This

includes damages not only for such injurious consequences as

proceed immediately from the cause which is the basis of the

action, but consequential damages as well. These damages are

not limited or affected, so far as they are compensatory, by what

was in fact contemplated by the party in fault. He who is re-

sponsible for a negligent act must answer "for all the injurious

results which flow therefrom, by ordinary, natural sequence,

without the interposition of any other negligent act or overpow-

ering force." Whether the injurious consequences may have

been "reasonably expected" to follow from the commission of

the act is not at all determinate of the liability of the person who

committed the act to respond to the person suffering therefrom.

As said in Stevens v. Dudley, 56 Vt. 158, "it is the unexpected,

rather than the expected, that happens in the great majority of
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cases of negligence." Under all the authorities, it was the duty

of the defendant to transmit and deliver messages intrusted to

it without unreasonable delay; and, in failing to do so, it becomes

liable for all damages resulting therefrom : Cooley on Torts, 646,

647 ; Gray on Communication by Telegraph, sees. 81, 82, et seq;

Wharton on Negligence, sec. 767. That a person is entitled to

at least nominal damages for an infraction of the duty imposed

upon a telegraph company is conceded. And it must also be

conceded that every person desires to attend upon the obse-

quies of his near relations. And when, able and anxious to at-

tend, he is, through the negligence of a telegraph company, not

notified of their death in time to attend the funeral, he naturally

and almost inevitably suffers mental pain and anguish. No man

is so depraved but that he yet remembers his mother, and, when

able, will pay her the last respect that is her due. In the case

at bar, it is established that defendant knew the nature of the

intelligence it was to transmit, and also knew that, if it was not

delivered within a reasonable time, plaintiff was likely to be

greatly pained on accoiuit not only of not knowing of the death
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of his mother until she was placed under the ground, but also

because of his inability to attend the funeral on account of the

delay. That the defendant should reasonably have contemplated

such results, under the rule laid down in Iladley v, Baxendale,

9 Ex. 341, is clear.

But it is insisted that damages for mental suffering, although

contemplated by the parties, cannot be recovered for mere breach

of contract. That such is the general rule announced by the

courts, and that it is the rule with reference to all ordinary con-

tracts must be conceded. But it must be remembered that this

rule grew up at a time when there was no thought of the trans-

mission of intelligence by electricity. Breaches of contract, such

as the one in question, were unknown to the common law. The

business of telegraphy has grown up within comparatively re-

cent years. But must we say that the law furnishes no remedy

because no case of the kind was known to the common law? If

so, such law is no longer applicable to our present conditions.

Regard must be had, too, to the subject matter of the contract.

The message does not relate to property. In such cases, for

breach of contract, the law affords adequate compensation. But

it does relate to the feelings, the sensibilities, aye, sometimes,

even to the life, of the individual. It does not affect his pocket-

book seriously, but it does relate to his feelings, his emotions,

his sensibilities — those finer qualities which go to make the man

Shall we say that in one case the law affords compensation,

and in the other it does not? Instead of goods which are con-

708

MENTZEE V. W. U. TELEGEAPH CO. § 185

veyed by the defendant, it is intelligence — thought. If defend-

ant were a common carrier of goods, it would be liable for all

damages sustained by reason of its breach of contract to de-

liver them within a reasonable time. But it is said no damages

can be recovered for failure to deliver intelligence, beyond the

amount actually paid for the message, or nominal damages, al-

though the addressee may endure the greatest of mental pangs,

notwithstanding the fact that such suffering was in the con-

templation of the parties at the time the contract was made. Of

course, every breach of contract is likely to cause some pain, but

most of these contracts relate to property and pecuniary matters,

and in such case the law furnishes what has always been held to

be an adequate remedy for the pecuniary loss sustained. Mental

suffering has never been considered as within the contemplation

of the parties at the time the contract is entered into, and recov-

ery cannot be had therefor. But few contracts have direct re-

lation to the feelings and sensibilities of the parties entering into

them, and the pain growing out of the ordinary breach of

contracts relating to property is entirely different from that
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suffered from a death message: Sutherland on Damages, sec.

980. We find a well-recognized exception to the general rule that

damages cannot be had for mental anguish in cases of breach of

contract, in the action for breach of promise of marriage, and

the reason for this exception is quite applicable here. In such

cases, the defendant, in making his contract, is dealing with the

feelings and emotions. The contract relates almost wholly to

the affections, and one is not allowed to so trifle with another's

feelings. He knows at the time he makes the contract that if

he breaks it the other will suft'er great mental pain, and the

courts, without exception, have allowed recovery in such a case :

See HoUoway v. Griffith, 32 Iowa, 409, 7 Am. Rep. 208;

Royal v. Smith, 40 Iowa, 615. The distinction we have

pointed out is well stated in 1 Sutherland on Damages, section

92. Other exceptions have sometimes been made, which we need

not further refer to. As said in the case of Wadsworth v. W. U.

Tel. Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S. W. R. 574, 6 Am. St. Rep. 864 : ''These

illustrations serve the purpose of showing that in the ordinary

contract only pecuniary benefits are contemplated by the con-

tracting parties, and that, therefore, the damages resulting from

such breach of contract must be measured by pecuniary stand-

ards, and that, where other than the pecuniary benefits are

contracted for, other than pecuniary standards should be ap-

plied in the ascertainment of damages flowing from the breach."

"The case before us, so far as it is an action for breach of con-

tract, is subject to the same general rule ; and the defendant is
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answerable in damages for the breach, according to the nature

of the contract, and the character and extent of the injury suf-

fered by reason of its nonperformance. The message was sent

for a particular purpose, of which the defendant had knowledge.

That purpose was not of a pecuniary nature. There was no

offer or instruction to buy or sell anything — no proposition or

promise with respect to any business transaction. The message

was of far greater importance to the receiver than any of these.

It was information which defendant undertook to convey for

a stipulated sum, and which, if promptly conveyed, would have

enabled plaintiff to have been with him at the last moments, and

would have saved her the injury of which she complains

The messages were in proper language, and lawful in purpose.

She was entitled to the information they contained, and to what-

ever benefits that information would have conferred upon her,

even though such benefits be mainly or altogether to the feelings

and affections. The defendant contracted that she should have

those benefits, and that she should be spared whatever pain and

anguish such information, properly conveyed, would prevent."
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Reverting now to the damages which may be allowed if the

action is treated as ex delicto, and to the broader rule of dam-

ages in cases of tort, we find that, in very many of these actions,

damages are recoverable for mental anguish, some of which we

will refer to hereafter. It is conceded by appellant's counsel

that such damages may in certain cases be recovered, but they

insist that they are never recoverable unless accompanied by

some physical injury. It seems to us that, when it is conceded

that mental suffering may be compensated for in actions of tort,

the right of plaintiff to recover in this case is established. Let us

look to some of the cases authorizing recovery in such cases, and

see if there are no analogies. Damages for injuries to the feel-

ings are given, though there are no physical injuries, where a

person is wrongfully ejected from a train: Shepard v. Chicago

etc. Ry. Co., 77 Iowa, 54, 41 N. W. R. 564 ; in actions for slander

and libel : Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N. Y. 54, 72 Am. D. 420 ; for

malicious prosecution : Fisher v. Hamilton, 49 Ind. 341 ; for false

imprisonment : Stewart v. Maddos, 63 Ind. 51 ; for criminal con-

versation and seduction, and for assault. So damages for in-

jured feelings were allowed where a conductor kissed a female

passenger against her will : Craker v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 36

Wis. 657, 17 Am. R. 504. So, likewise, it has been held that the

removal of the body of a child from the lot in which it was

rightfully buried to a charter plot gives the parent a right to

i-ecover for injury to his feelings : Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass.

281, 96 Am. D. 759, And a widow may recover for such suffer-
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ing and nervous shock, against the person who unlawfully

mutilates the dead body of her husband, although no actual pe-

cuniary damages are alleged or proven : Larson v. Chase, 47

Minn. 307, 50 N. W. R. 238, 28 Am. St. R. 370. See, also, Suth-

erland on Damages, sec. 979, and authorities cited for kindred

cases. The wrongs complained of in these cases all directly af-

fected the feelings, and injury thereto proximately resulted.

But not more so than in the case at bar, where the injury to

the feelings is apparent, and suffering necessarily followed. This

rule of necessity applies where the feelings are directly affected

by the nature of the wrong complained of. It has no application

to such mental suffering as indirectly results from the commis-

sion of every tort.

Let us now look to our own cases for a moment, and see what

has been held. In the case of Stevenson v. Belknap, 6 Iowa, 103,

71 Am. D. 392, which was an action brought by a father for

the seduction of his daughter, this court approved an instruction

that damage may be given, not only for his loss of service and

actual expenses, but also on account of the wounded feelings of
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the plaintiff, and of his anxiety, as a parent of other children,

whose morals may be corrupted by the example. In the case of

McKinley v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 44 Iowa, 318, 24 Am. R. 748,

which was an action for an assault by one of defendant's em-

ployees upon the plaintiff, the lower court instructed the jury

that plaintiff might recover, as compensatory damages, not only

for bodily pain and suffering, but for the outrage and indignity

put upon him. This instruction was approved, and it was held

that mental suffering not arising from bodily pain, but from the

nature of the assault, might be recovered, the court using this

language : ' ' The question is fairly presented whether mental

anguish, arising from the nature and character of the assault,

constitutes an element of compensatory damages We,

on principle, are unable to see why mental pain arising from

or caused by the nature of the assault whereby the wound was

inflicted .... should not be an element of such damages." **A

careful examination of the authorities will disclose the fact that

the weight of adjudicated cases is in favor of the proposition

that mental anguish arising from the nature and character of the

assault is an element of compensatory damages The mind

is no less a part of the person than the body, and the sufferings

of the former are sometimes more acute and lasting than those

of the latter." It may also be said in this connection that the

court in this case declined to follow the case of Johnson v. Wells,

6 Nev. 224, 3 Am. R. 245, and kindred cases which are relied

upon by the appellant's counsel, remarking that "the decided
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weight of authority is opposed to the view taken in that ease, and

we are unwilling to follow it, and by so doing ignore the other

authorities cited." That the question was well considered and

deliberately decided is apparent from the fact that Mr, Justice

Day dissented from the conclusion of the majority. In the quite

recent case of Shepard v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 77 Iowa, 58, 41

N. W. R. 564, we went still farther, and squarely held that dam-

ages for mental suffering are recoverable, although there was no

physical pain or injury. In that case we said : "If these things

[wounded feelings] may be considered in connection with physi-

cal suffering, in estimating actual damages, we know no reason

which forbids their being considered in the absence of physical

suffering. It is said that the 'mental pain' contemplated by the

court in the case last cited (McKinley v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co.,

44 Iowa, 315, 24 Am. Rep. 748) includes something more than

mere wounded feelings or wounded pride, and that the latter can

be considered only where malice is alleged and proven, and where

there has been proof of actual bodily injury. We do not think

the claim is well founded. Humiliation, wounded pride, and the
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like may cause very acute mental anguish. The suffering caused

would undoubtedly be different in different persons, and no ex-

act rule for measuring it can be given. In ascertaining it, much

must necessarily be left to the discretion of the jury, as en-

lightened by the charge of the court. The charge given in this

case, as a whole, confined the jury to an allowance for compen-

satory damages." In the case of Curtis v. Sioux City etc. Ry.

Co., 87 Iowa, 622, 54 N. W. R. 339, this court squarely held that

damages might be recovered for mental pain and suffering, al-

though the damages for physical injury were merely nominal ;

and further held that such damages were compensatory, and not

punitive. In the case of Parkhurst v. Masteller, 57 Iowa, 480,

10 N. "VV. R. 864, which was an action for malicious prosecu-

tion, this court followed McKinley v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co.,

44 Iowa, 318, 24 Am. Rep, 748, and held that in such actions

actual damages would include compensation for bodily and men-

tal suffering, and clearly held that damages for mental suffering

might be recovered in such cases although entirely disconnected

from bodily suffering or disability. In a case of assault and bat-

tery (Lucas V, Flinn, 35 Iowa, 9), this court held that damages

for mental anguish might be allowed as compensation. In the

case of Paine v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 45 Iowa, 569, the rule

in McKinley v. Chicago etc, R. R. Co., 44 Iowa, 318, 24 Am. Rep.

748, was recognized ; but it was held there was no right of recov-

ery for injury to feelings, on account of the peculiar facts of that

case. And the case of Fitzgerald v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 50
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Iowa, 79, merely follows Paine v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 45

Iowa, 569, and holds that, under the facts, plaintiff was not

entitled to recover. The rule of McKinley v. Chicago etc. R. R.

Co., 44 Iowa, 318, 24 Am. Rep. 748, has never, to our knowledge,

been doubted by any later decision. In the case of Stone v. Chi-

cago etc. R. R. Co., 47 Iowa, 88, 29 Am. Rep. 458, it was held

that the action in that case, owing to its peculiar facts, was an

action for breach of contract; and that damages for mental

suffering were not recoverable, and in this case it is said : "In-

sult and abuse accompanying a breach of contract cannot affect

the amount of recovery in such actions. If the action is based

upon a wrong, the jury are permitted to consider injury to

feelings, and many other matters which have no place in actions

to recover damages for breach of contracts": Citing Walsh v.

Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 23, 24 Am. R. 376. It is enough

to say here that the action at bar is ex delicto, or that damages

may be recovered as if it were, under our system of code plead-

ing. The only other case having any bearing upon this question

is Hall V. Manson, 90 Iowa, 585, 58 N. W. R. 881, which was a
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case where plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal in-

juries sustained by reason of a defective street crossing. The

lower court instructed the jury that plaintiff might recover "for

the peril, if any, the jury may find she was subjected to,

from the evidence in the case." The court disapproved the in-

struction, not because damages for mental anguish could be

recovered, but because, "in our view of the instruction, its

wording would warrant the jury in allowing damages for mental

pain and suffering, which would include peril, and also for peril,

as a distinct, independent, and additional element of damage,

thereby allowing double compensation for the peril plaintiff

was in, which would be erroneous."

From these cases it is apparent that in actions of tort this

court has frequently announced the rule that damages for men-

tal suffering may be recovered, although there is no physical in-

jury. And, if this be so, why is not this a case where they

ought to be allowed? It cannot be possible that here is a legal

wrong for which the law affords no remedy. The wrong is

plain, the injury is apparent, and we think the law affords a

remedy, for compensatory damages, under the rules above given.

It must not be understood to follow that, in all actions ex delicto,

damages for mental suffering may be allowed. There must be

some direct and proximate connection between the wrong done

and the injury to the feelings, to justify a recovery for mental

anguish. But, when there is this connection so manifest as in

the case at bar, we think such damages ought to be allowed. It
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is very appropriately said, however, in one of the cases which has

been cited, that "great caution should be used in the trial of

cases like this, as it will be so easy and natural to confound the

corroding grief occasioned by the loss of a parent or other rela-

tive with the disappointment and regret occasioned by the fault

or neglect of the company, for it is only the latter for which re-

covery may be had; and the attention of juries might well be

directed to this fact." It is not necessary for us to determine

on which theory damages for mental anguish are recoverable. If

we find they are recoverable, either in an action for breach of

contract, or by reason of a breach of public duty, then the in-

struction given by the lower court was correct, and should be

sustained. It will be noticed that, in some of the cases holding

to a contrary doctrine from that here announced, recovery was

denied because of the form of the action ; that is to say, it was

held that the action in the particular case was for breach of con-

tract, and that damages for mental suffering were not recoverable

in such an action. Whether they would be recoverable in actions

ex delicto or not was not determined. Let us look for a moment
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at some of the objections urged to such a rule as we have an-

nounced.

1. It is said that such suffering is speculative and remote.

We have, as we think, answered this by showing that in actions

of this kind it is direct and proximate to the wrong complained

of.

2. It is urged that such damages are sentimental, are vague

and shadowy, and that there is no standard by which an injury

can be justly compensated or approximately measured. This

objection is answered if we find any case in which such damages

are allowed, for if they may be allowed in one kind of case they

may in all, so far as this objection is concerned. We have al-

ready seen numbers of cases, both from this and other states,

wherein it is held that damages for mental suffering, independ-

ent of physical injury, may be recovered. It is conceded by coun-

sel that damages can be recovered for mental suffering when ac-

companied by physical pain or bodily suffering. If this be true,

then let us ask how they can be any more accurately measured

when so accompanied than when not. Wlien it is once conceded

that mental anguish can be considered, and compensation made

therefor, then the objection last urged falls to the ground.

3. It is said there is no principle on which such damages can

be recovered. We have endeavored to show, to the best of our

ability, that there is abundant authority to justify a recovery in

such cases.

4. It is contended that the rule opens up a vast and fruitful

714

WEST V. W. U. TELEGEAPH CO. §§ 185, 186

field for speculative litigation. We have endeavored to so guard

and limit the rule that there may be no mistaking its operation

and effect. If recovery is for breach of the contract, then it can

only be had because of the subject matter — the fact that it is

intelligence that is transmitted, and the feelings only affected.

And, if the recovery is had because it is a tort, then a somewhat

similar limitation is made, which we have tried to make apparent.

If, as thus limited, the rule opens up a vast and fruitful field of

litigation, it is only because telegraph companies fail to do

their duty. We cannot think that a rule which will tend to

make telegraph companies more careful in the matter of deliver-

ing their messages will be fraught with such fearful results as

counsel imagine. The single, plain duty of a telegraph company

is to make transmission and delivery of messages intrusted to it

with promptitude and accuracy. When that is done its respon-

sibility is ended. When it is omitted, through negligence, the

company should answer for all injury resulting, whether to the

feelings or the purse, one or both, subject to the proviso that

the injury must be the natural and direct consequence of the
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negligent act. We cannot conceive of any danger in such a

rule. It seems to us to be in accord with the enlightened spirit

of modern jurisprudence and that in actual practice no evil can

result therefrom. Juries may be prone, in cases of this kind, to

place their estimates high; but the judge is ever present, with

a restraining power, ample to prevent unconscionable and unjust

verdicts. Without further extending this opinion, it is sufficient

to say that the instruction of the district court was correct, and

the judgment is aifirmed.

186. WEST V. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO.,

39 Kan. 93; 17 Pac. B. 807; 7 Am. St. B. 530. 1888.

HoRTON, C. J. This was an action brought by George West

against the Western Union Telegraph Company to recover ten

thousand dollars damages, occasioned, as claimed in the petition,

by the gross and malicious negligence of the company to trans-

mit and deliver the following telegraphic message : —

''North Topeka, Ej^nsas, September 14, 1885.

"To George West, Delphos, Kansas, care Post-office.

"Uncle Sam died last night; funeral Wednesday.

John G. West.**

Upon the trial, after the plaintiff had closed his evidence, the

telegraph company interposed, and filed a demurrer thereto,
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upon the ground that no cause of action was proved. The court

sustained the demurrer. The plaintiff excepted, and brings the

case here for review.

The testimony introduced tended to show that the foregoing

written message was handed by John West, the son of George

West, to the agent of the telegraph company, at its office at

North Topeka, on the afternoon of its date, with directions "to

forward it immediately"; that the message was ordered by John

West to be sent for the benefit of his father; that he paid the

agent forty cents for sending the message; that subsequently

his father repaid to him the money; that Delphos is about one

hundred miles west of North Topeka; that at the date of the

message, and subsequently, it was operating a telegraph line

for hire between the towns of North Topeka and Delphos, with

an office in each town; that George West has resided in Kin-

mundia, Illinois, since 1859; that in September, 1885, he was

visiting in Kansas, and at the date of the message, and for

several days thereafter, was with friends in the neighborhood

of Delphos; that Samuel C. West was his oldest brother, and
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after his death that he had no other brother living ; that Samuel

lived at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and at the time of his death

was seventy-eight years of age; that George West was seventy-

three years of age; that he was expecting to hear of the death

of his brother, on account of his ill health, and was anxious to

attend his funeral, if notified in time; that while in Kansas he

had so fixed his matters as to start at a moment's warning to

attend the funeral ; that on September 14, 1885, he inquired at

the post-office at Delphos for his mail, but did not receive the

telegram ; that he inquired frequently afterward, and sent others

to inquire for his mail, but never received the telegram; that

subsequently he learned by a letter from his son John of the

death of his brother Samuel, but the information came too late

for him to attend the funeral ; that if he had received the tele-

gram within a reasonable time after it had been sent, he could

have attended the same; that his son John informed the agent

at the office of the telegraph company in North Topeka that the

message had never been delivered; that George West also in-

quired at the office of the telegraph company at Delphos on the

morning of the 18th of September for the telegram; that the

agent said that none had been received for him; that he then

told the agent "he would investigate the matter," and he replied

"he had received none, and that none could have been received

without his knowing it"; that both George West and John West

were informed by the agent at North Topeka that the message

had been sent over the wire at its date to Delphos ; that the tele-
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gram was never delivered to the post-office at Delphos, or to

George West, by the agent of the telegraph company, or any one

else.

Upon what grounds the trial court sustained the demurrer

to the evidence is not clearly disclosed. In our opinion, the

demurrer should have been overruled, as there was ample evi-

dence introduced for the case to go to the jury. The message

was written and delivered at the office in North Topeka, and

paid for by John West, the son of the plaintiff, for the benefit

of the latter. Subsequently, George West returned to his son

the money paid by him to the telegraph company, and ratified

and approved his son's acts in the transaction, in all respects

as if the message originally had been written and sent under

his direction. In Burton v. Larkin, 36 Kan. 246, 13 Pac. R. 398,

59 Am. R. 541, it was held that a "person for whose benefit a

promise to another, upon a sufficient consideration, is made may

maintain an action on the contract in his own name against the

promisor." In Dresser v. Wood, 15 Kan. 344, it was held "that

where an action is commenced by an attorney at law, without
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the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, the plaintiff may af-

terward ratify the same, and thereafter be entitled to all its

benefits." The contract, therefore, made by the son with the

telegraph company, for the benefit of his father, which was

afterward approved and ratified by the father, was sufficient

as the basis of this action. The plaintiff, upon the evidence

introduced, was entitled to recover judgment against the de-

fendant for his actual damages, including the forty cents paid

for the transmission of the message : Western Union Tel. Co. v.

Howell, 38 Kan. 685, 17 Pac. R. 313 ; Western Union Tel. Co. v.

Crall, 38 Kan. 679, 17 Pac. R. 309 ; Logan v. Telegraph Co., 84

111. 468.

Further than this, if upon another trial it shall be established

that there was such gross negligence on the part of the agents of

the telegraph company as to indicate wantonness or a malicious

purpose in failing to transmit and deliver the message, then the

plaintiff would be entitled to exemplary damages. Such dam-

ages are given more to punish the wrong-doer than to recompense

the party injured: Scott and Jarnagin on Telegraphs, sees.

417, 418 ; Southern Kansas Ry. Co. v. Rice, 38 Kan. 398, 16 Pac.

R. 817, and cases cited therein. In Schippel v. Norton, 38 Kan.

567, 16 Pac. R. 804, we recently held where no actual damage

is suffered, no exemplary damages can be recovered; but as ac-

tual damages are shown in this case, that decision is not ap-

plicable.

It seems, however, to be claimed upon the part of the plaintiff

717

§ 186 ACTIONS AGAINST TELEGEAPH COMPANIES.

that he is entitled to recover for his mental anguish or suffering

occasioned by the delay in the announcement of the death of his

brother. Where mental suffering is an element of physical pain,

or is a necessary consequence of physical pain, or is the natural

and proximate result of the physical injury, then damages for

mental suffering may be recovered, where the injury has been

caused by the negligence of the defendant; but in an action of

this kind, we do not think that damages for mental anguish or

suffering can be allowed. ' ' Such damages can only enter into and

become a part of the recovery where the mental suffering is the

natural, legitimate, and proximate consequence of the physical

injury": City of Salina v, Trosper, 27 Kan. 544. The general

rule is, "that no damages can be recovered for a shock and injury

to the feelings and sensibilities, or for mental distress and an-

guish caused by a breach of the contract, except a marriage

contract": Russell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 3 Dak. 315, 19

N. W. R. 408. In So Relle v. Western Union Tel. Co., 55 Tex.

308, 40 Am. R. 805, it was decided that an action for mental

suffering alone can be maintained. The opinion in that case,
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however, was prepared by a member of the commission of appeals

of Texas. And subsequently, in the case of Gulf etc. Ry. Co. v.

Levy, 59 Tex. 563, 46 Am. R. 278, the supreme court of Texas

overruled that decision: See, also, Wood's Mayne on Damages,

1st Am. ed., 74.

We also add that the trial court should have permitted the

plaintiff to show the arrangements made with his son John to

forward to him at Delphos all telegrams and mail matter that

came addressed to him at Topeka.

The judgment of the district court will be reversed, and the

cause remanded for further proceedings, in accordance with the

views herein expressed.
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INDEX.

[references are to sections.]

ACCEPTANCE—

delivery not complete until, 19.

of guest, 40, 51, 56, 57, 58.

by common carrier, 81, 82,

evidence of acceptance, 82.

bill of lading issued without goods, 84.

of a passenger, 129-131, 135, 137 139.

see also Delivery.

ACCOMMODATIONS—

carrier must furnish, 80.

suflB.cient accommodations, 67, 68, 85.

preferences, 73, 74, 79, 80, 85.

unusual demand, 67, 68, 85.

of passenger carrier, 149, 151-153.

of telegraph and telephone companies, 172, 173.

ACTIONS—

by bailor or bailee against third persons, 13, 14, 37, 41.

against pledgee for wrongful sale, 21.
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of trover against hirer for conversion, 12 33 34.

by hirer against third persons, 14, 47.

by bailor and bailee in locatio operis bailments, 37, 41, 4T.

against carrier for refusal to carry, 62, 63.

against connecting carriers, 83, 124, 127.

against common carriers of goods —

the parties, 76, 122, 177.

contract action, 79.

consignor agent of consignee, 177.

tort action, 177.

the form of action, 79, 177, 185.

modern procedure, 185.

the evidence —

see Burden op Proof.

the damages for injury to or loss of goods, 178, 180, 185.

proximate cause, 178-180.

measure of damages, 178, 179.

for default in carrying, 67, 85, 168, 178, 179.

against carriers of passengers —

the parties, 133. 181.
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[references are to sections,]

ACTIONS— Continued.

the pleadings, 134.

the evidence, 131, 153.

the damages, 159, 181.

for wrongful ejection, 142, 182.

for mental suffering or fright, 183, 185.

exemplary damages, 142, 182.

against carriers of intelligence —

against telegraph and telephone companiee —

the parties, 169, 174, 185, 186.

contract action against sender or his principal, 185.

tort action on common law duty, 170, 185.

the evidence, 167, 169, 174.

the damages, 168, 169, 174, 185.

duty to disclose importance of message, 167, 168, 184,

for mental suffering, 172, 185, 186.

ACT OF GOD—

defined, 62, 88, 89.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:41 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

distinguished from inevitable accident, 62,

as excuse in case of delay, 89.

ACT OF SHIPPER—

as excuse for loss of goods by carrier, 87, 92, 93, 100.

ADVEESE CLAIMS—

see Interpleader.

redelivery by bailee, 3.

cannot be set up by borrower, 3.

AGENT—

of bank in accepting deposit, 19.

of carrier has authority to contract to furnish cars, 67.

in contracts as to liability of common carrier, 66, 107.

in shipping goods over connecting lines, 77, 114, 125.

liability of passenger carrier for acts of, 129, 135, 136, 141.

must be competent, careful and courteous, 154.

of Postoffice Department —

employees are, 166.

of telegraph and telephone companies, 167, 170, 172, 173, 185.

telegraph company whose agent, 169, 174, 185, 186.

AGISTERS AND LIVERYMEN—

have no lien, 40.

ANIMALS—

redelivery of, 2, 16.

carrier's liability for losses, 85, 94-96, 104.

railroads, common carriers of live stock, 85, 94-96, 106,

ASSIGNMENT—

by bailee, 2.

of bill of lading, 49, 84.

of pledge by pledgee, 22, 23, 26, 30.

of corporate stock, 28.
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[references are to sections.]

BAGGAGE—

of guest at inn, 51, 56.

measure of innkeeper's liability, 50, 54, 58, 59, 60.

exceptions, 61.

burden of proof, 58, 61.

goods must be infra hospitium, 40.

effect of owner's custody, 52, 53, 61.

of passenger —

carrier an insurer of, 100, 152, 162.

what is baggage, 93, 119, 165.

value of, 93, 119, 163.

compensation for carrying, 93, 119.

custody of passenger, 53, 54, 93, 164.

passenger supposed to accompany, 165.

delivery of, 165.

BAGGAGE CHECKS AS CONTRACTS LIMITING OAREIER'8 LIA-

BILITY—

see Tickets.
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BAILMENT—

defined, 1, 2.

contractual relation, 2, 13.

delivery and acceptance necessary, 19.

subject matter any personal chattel, 25.

possession transferred, but not title, 2, 3.

bailment distinguished from sale, 4.

redelivery, 2, 3, 4, 14.

classified, 1, 2, 8.

general principles applicable to all bailments —

care, 1, 5, 6, 7.

see Care.

three degrees, 1, 6, 7, 8, 19, 103, 135.

consideration, 1, 6, 10.

expenses, 11.

defect in bailed chattel, 11.

right to use, 1, 12, 34.

property of bailee, 1, 2, 13, 14, 41.

liability to third persons, 23.

termination of the relation —

bailment contract executed, 15.

rescission of bailment contract, 12, 15, 83.

redelivery, 1, 11, 17, 19.

what, 2, 4, 16.

see also the various classes of bailments.

BANK—

see Deposits, Safety-Deposit Companies,

BILL OF LADING, WAREHOUSE RECEIPT—

nature of warehouse receipt, 24, 49.

as evidence of acceptance by carrier, 82.
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722 INDEX.

[references are to sections.]

BILL OF LADING, WAREHOUSE RECEIPT— Continued.

a receipt and a contract, 69, 83.

issued without goods, 84.

as a contract, 69, 83, 114,

aasignability and negotiability, 49, 84.

nature of bill of lading, 49, 84, 114, 121.

duplicate bills, 49. ■*■

liability of carrier for delivery on unindorsed bill, 49, 121,

as contract limiting liability of common carrier —

must be assented to by shipper, 66, 79, 114.

cannot be varied by parol, 69, 107.

must be delivered with the goods, 101.

as evidence of right to receive goods, 49, 121.

as directions for shipment, 77.

BOARDING AND LODGING HOUSES—

not inns, 50-54.

BORROWING—

see Gratuitous Loans.
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BURDEN OF PROOF—

in showing negligence of bailee, 5, 9, 43.

on innkeeper, 58, 59, 61.

on carrier in case of losses due to excepted perils, 68, 89, 92, 97.

in case of losses due to causes exempted in contract, 79, 83, 9T,

100.

for failure to perform duty, 85.

on passenger carrier in case of accident, 131, 153, 155, 160.

in action ex delicto against carriers of goods, 89, 114.

on telegraph companies, 167, 169, 174.

CARE—

see Negligence.

required in various classes of bailments, 1, 5-7.

three degrees, 1, 6-8, 19, 103, 135.

burden of proof in showing, 5, 9, 43.

is question of fact for jury, 5, 6, 14.

required of mandatory and depositary, 1, 5, 7, 15, 19, 20.

same care as of one's own, 1, 5, 6, 19, 20.

special skill, 6, 7, 135.

facts equally within knowledge of both parties, 1, 20.

liability for misfeasance and non-feasance, 10.

required of borrower, 1, 8, 15.

required in mutual benefit bailments, 1, 19. ,

of pledgee, 1, 7.

of bailee for hire, 1, 47.

of warehouseman, 9, 43.

required in extraordinary bailments, 67, 235, 347, 392.

diligence of carrier when overtaken by Act of God, 89.

in case of delay, 99.

burden of proof in showing, 79, 83, 89, 97.
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[references are to sections.]

CAKE — Continued.

of passenger carrier, 151-154.

the measure of diUgence, 100, 131, 135, 152, 153, 155-159.

as to gratuitous passengers, 103, 129, 133-136.

sleeping car companies, 53, 54.

owners of passenger elevators, 160.

of telegraph and telephone companies, 167, 170, 172, 173, 185.

CARRIEES—

see Private Carriers, Common Carriers, Connecting Carriers, Car-

riers BY Water, Carriers of Passengers, Carriers of Intelli-

gence, Elevators, Steamboats, Sleeping Cars, Telegraph and

Telephone Companies, Postoffice Department.

CAEEIERS BY WATEE—

where make delivery, 108, 110-114.

CAEEIEES OF INTELLIGENCE—

see Postoffice Department, Telegraph and Telephone Companies.

CAEEIEES OF PASSENGEES—

are quasi-bailees, 65.
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definition, 65.

illustrations, 54, 65, 129.

passengers defined, 129, 130, 133.

relation established by —

offer to become passenger, 131, 154, 157.

special callings, 132.

employees not passengers, 129, 133-135.

payment of fare not necessary, 103, 129, 134, 136.

trespassers, 130, 151.

acceptance by carrier, 129, 130, 131, 135.

what amounts to, 130, 131, 137, 139.

rights and duties of carriers of passengers —

by operation of law —

right to compensation —

fare, 138, 139.

tickets, 138, 140-142.

sale of, 140, 142.

nature of, 102, 138, 144.

as contract with passenger, 102, 125, 141,

143, 144.

as between passenger and conductor, 141,

145, 146.

conditions printed on, 102, 134, 143, 144.

stop-overs, coupon and limited tickets, 102,

144, 147, 148, 151.

right to make regulations, 131, 138, 139, 142, 144, 145, 148,

162.

must be reasonable, 141, 142, 146, 149-151, 157.

ejection of passenger for breach, 139, 140, 149, 150.

duty to accept all, 129, 149, 150.
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[references are to sections.]

CAKRIEES OF PASSENGEES— Continued.

duty to furnish accommodations —

must be equal, 149.

must be adequate and safe, 151-155.

roadbed and bridges, 154, 158.

agents and servants, 154.

stational facilities, 131, 157, 158.

liability for injuries to passenger —

measure of diligence, 100, 103, 129, 131, 135, 136, 152,

153, 155-158.

as to gratuitous passengers, 103, 129, 135, 136.

contributory negligence of passenger, 131, 157, 158.

what amounts to, 131, 154, 158, 159.

must be proximate cause, 156.

of owners of passenger elevators, 160.

liability of sleeping car companies, 53, 54.

liability for delay, 161.

liability for baggage, 100, 119, 152, 162.
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what is baggage, 93, 119, 163, 165.

value of, 54, 93, 119, 163.

custody of passenger, 53, 54, 93, 164.

passenger supposed to accompany, 165.

delivery of, 165.

under special contract —

as to baggage, 102.

as to passenger, 134.

gratuitous passengers, 103, 133, 134.

termination of the relation —

contract executed, 125, 154, 157, 158, 159.

passenger may leave conveyance, 144, 147, 154, 157.

ejection of passenger, 139-142, 151.

actions against, 181-183.

see Actions.

CASH ON DELIVERY—

shipments C. O. D. by express, 117.

CAUSE—

see Proximate Cause.

CHATTEL MOETGAGE—

see Pledge.

COLLATEEAL SECURITY—

see Pledge.

COMMODATUM—

classified, 1, 2, 6.

see also Gratuitous Loans.

COMMON CARRIERS OF GOODS—

definitions and classification, 1, 62-65, 68, 95,

public employment, 62, 63, 65, 73, 79, 80, 85, 95.

for hire, 62, 103.
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[references are to sections.]

COMMON CAERIEES OF GOODS— Continued.

kinds of goods carried, 62, 65, 85, 95, 96.

action for refusal, 62, 63.

illustrations, 55, 64-66, 80.

who not common carriers, 53, 66.

right to compensation, 62, 67-69, 100.

amount of compensation, 202.

statutory control, 70, 71.

demurrage, 72.

discrimination —

what is unlawful, 73, 74.

on what goods, 75.

who liable, 76.

carrier's lien, 42, 46, 67, 72, 79.

connecting carriers, 46, 76, 77.

storing goods held on lien, 72.

goods shipped by one not the owner, 78.

duty to carry for all, 68, 69, 79, 80, 100.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 14:41 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t3514334j
Public Domain in the United States / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-us

when liability begins, 68, 81.

delivery and acceptance, 67, 81, 82.

evidence of acceptance —

bill of lading, 82, 83.

issued without goods, 84.

as a contract, 69, 83.

assignability and negotiability, 49, 84.

nature of bill of lading, 49, 84.

duplicate bills, 49.

aecommodations —

suitable accommodations, 73, 80, 85, 94.

must be sufficient, 67, 68, 85.

preferences, 73, 74, 79, 80, 85.

unusual demand, 67, 68, 85.

need not accommodate express companies, 86.

liability for loss —

common law rule, 1, 62, 64, 66, 68, 79, 87, 93, 100.

exceptions, 62, 64, 66, 68, 79, 87-89.

Act of God, 1, 64, 88, 89.

distinguished from inevitable accident, 62.

proximate cause, 89.

see Proximate Cause.

diligence of carrier, 89.

public enemy, 1.

public authority, 90-92.

act of shipper, 87, 93.

concealing value, 92, 93, 100.

inherent nature of the goods, 94, 106.

live animals, 85, 94-96, 104, 106.

726 INDEX.

[references are to sections.]

COMMON CAEEIERS OF GOODS— Continued.

burden of proof in case of loss from excepted perils, 89, 92,

97.

liability for deviation and delay, 35, 67, 97-99, 101.

effect of delay on losses caused thereby, 67, 98, 99.

reasonable time, 97, 98.

delay not sole cause for loss, 89, 178.

contract affecting carrier's Kability, 62, 64, 65, 79, 100, 103.

enlarging liability, 66, 85.

restricting liability, 79, 103.

historical account, 100, 103.

must be express, 79, 92, 97, 105.

by public notice, 64, 79, 100.

reveal value of goods, 62, 93, 100, 105.

rules and regulations, 114.

limiting liability for loss, 62, 66, 79, 92.

English rule, 100, 103.

American rule, 79, 100, 103, 114.
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by special contract —

the earlier cases, 62, 68, 103.

United States rule, 79, 103, 114.

form of special contracts —

bill of lading, 66, 114.

assent of shipper necessary, 66, 79, 114.

not varied by parol, 69, 107.

must be delivered when goods are accepted,

101.

parol contract, 82, 101.

tickets, baggage checks, etc., 102.

extent of the limitation —

reasonable and just, 66, 103.

as to the nature of the liability, 66, 79, 103,

106.

special rules in certain States, 103, 104.

as to the amount of the liability, 105, 106.

common law duty remains, 79, 97, 103, 114.

consideration for the contract, 105, 114.

parties to the contract, 114.

agent of the carrier, 107.

burden of proving loss due to exempted cause, 79,

83, 97.

termination of the relation —

by deUvery, 68, 108, 115.

reasonable time, 98, 110, 111.

proper place, 98, 108-110.

by carriers by water, 108, 110, 111.

by railroads, 112-114.

by express companies, 109, 115, 116.
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[references are to sections.]

COMMON CAERIEKS OF GOODS— Continued,

shipment C. O. D., 117.

the right person, 118, 120.

effect of fraud, 118, 119.

presentation of bill of lading, 49, 121.

consignee presumptively proper party, 46, 121, 122.

interpleader if dispute as to proper party, 120.

to a connecting carrier, 68, 77.

duty to carry beyond carrier's route, 68, 107, 115,

124.

partnership arrangements, 123, 124.

receiving goods directed beyond carrier's line,

68, 124.

American rule, 124, 125.

special contract as to carriage, 107, 124, 125.

carriers agents of consignor, 77, 114.

what amounts to delivery to connecting carrier, 81,

126.
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presumption as to carrier liable, 68, 83, 97, 127.

benefit of contract exemptions to connecting carriers,

114.

to a warehouseman, 72, 110, 112, 113.

what constitutes —

Massachusetts rule, 113.

New Hampshire rule, 112.

Michigan rule, 114.

delivery by carriers by water, 108, 110, 111.

manner of delivery, 110.

to an elevator, 80.

by excuses for non-delivery, 98, 120, 121.

see Act of God, Public Enemy, Public Authobity, Act of

Shipper, Animals.

stoppage in transitu, 46, 78, 128.

inability to find consignee, 108-111, 117.

actions against, 177-180.

see also Actions.

COMPENSATION—

in deposits and mandates, 6, 7, 18, 19.

in gratuitous loans, 10.

in mutual benefit bailments, 18, 36.

of innkeeper, 40.

of carrier of goods, 62, 67, 68, 93, 100, 103, 105.

amount, 69.

statutory control, 70, 71.

demurrage, 72.

discrimination, 73, 74, ,

on what goods, 75.

who liable, 76.
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[references are to sections.]

COMPENSATION— Continued.

carrier's lien, 46, 67, 72.

extends to connecting carriers, 46, 77.

of carrier of passengers, 138, 139.

see Fare, Tickets.

for baggage, 93, 119.

of telegraph and telephone companies, 172, 173.

right to regulate by statute, 70, 176.

CONNECTING CAREIEES—

lien for freight, 46, 76, 77.

delivery to, 77.

duty to carry beyond carrier's route, 68, 107, 115.

partnership arrangements, 123, 124.

receiving goods directed beyond carrier's line, 68, 124, 125.

American rule, 114, 124, 125.

special contract as to through carriage, 107, 124, 125.

carriers agents of consignor, 77, 114.

what amounts to delivery to, 81, 126.
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presumption as to carrier liable, 68, 83, 97, 127.

benefit to of contract exemptions, 114.

carrying passenger on coupon ticket, 144, 147.

liability of for baggage, 100, 119, 162.

CONSIDERATION—

in bailment contracts, 1, 10, 18.

CONSIGNEE—

prima facie liable for freight, 76, 122, 177.

rights subject to carrier's Hen, 46, 78.

presumptively proper party to receive goods from carrier, 116, 121, 122.

carrier's inability to find, 108-111, 117.

action by against carriers of goods, 76, 79, 122, 177.

CONSIGNOR—

liable for freight vrhen, 76.

right subject to carrier's lien, 46, 78.

carrier liable to for delivery without indorsed bill of lading, 49, 121.

connecting carriers agents of, 77.

stoppage of goods in transitu by, 46, 78, 128.

action by against carriers of goods, 76, 79, 122, 177.

CONTRACTS—

consideration, 1, 10, 18.

as to redelivery, 3, 17, 113.

as affecting rights and duties of gratuitous bailees, 1, 7, 19, 20.

in pledge, 21, 25, 32.

as to sale of pledge, 31, 32.

may fix relations of parties in locatio operis bailments, 44, 62.

compensation under, 36.

warehouse receipts as, 24, 49.

limiting liability of innkeeper, 61.

fixing compensation of carrier, 62, 69, 74.
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[refkrences are to sections.]

CONTEACTS— Continued.

affecting liability of carrier of goods —

Bee Common Carriers op Goods, Connecting Carriers.

bills of lading as, 66, 69.

limiting liability of passenger carrier —

see Carriers of Passengers.

limiting liability of telegraph companies —

see Telegraph and Telephone Companies.

CONTEIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE—

of guest, 59-61.

of shipper of goods, 87, 93.

of passenger, 54, 131, 156, 158.

what is, 131, 154, 158, 159.

must be proximate cause, 156.

CONVEESION—

by wrongful use by bailee, 1, 6, 7, 12, 34.

redelivery to wrong person, 3, 17, 118-120.

by wrongful use by pledgee, 1, 21.
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by pledgee's misapplication of property, 1, 23, 25, 29.

measure of damages, 25, 29.

terminates pledge, 25, 44.

by wrongful use by hirer, 33.

what amounts to, 12, 33, 34.

trover for, 33-35.

by warehouseman or elevator owner, 48, 72.

delivery to wrong connecting carrier amounts to, 77.

damages against carrier for, 35, 77, 179.

see Trover.

COEPOEATIONS—

in bailments, 19.

CUSTOM AND USAGE—

as to expenses in locatio rei, 11.

important in case of warehouseman, 48.

as to carrying express companies, 86.

effect on agent's power to contract for carrier, 84, 107, 114, 135.

as to delivery to connecting carriers, 68, 81, 115, 126.

as to delivery of baggage, 119, 162.

DAMAGES—

recovered by bailee against third person, 14.

against sleeping car companies, 54.

for conversion of property by pledgee, 25, 29, 31.

for wrongful ejection of passenger, 139, 140, 142, 151, 182.

against carrier for keeping incompetent agent or servant, 154.

for injury to or loss of goods, 178, 180.

measure of damages, 179.

for default in carrying, 67, 85, 168, 177-179.

against passenger carriers —

the measure, 159, 181.
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DAMAGES— Continued.

for wrongful ejection, 140-142, 182.

exemplary damages when, 142, 182.

for mental suffering or fright, 183, 185.

against telegraph and telephone companies —

for negligence in transmitting and delivering, 168, 169, 184.

causing mental suffering, 172, 185, 186.

DEATH—

action for injury causing, 181.

DEFECT—

in bailed chattel, 11.

in passenger vehicle, 151-153.

in roadbeds and bridges, 153, 154.

in stational facilities, 131.

DELAY—

liability of carrier for losses due to, 67, 68, 85, 89, 97-99, 111.

liability for of passenger carriers, 161.

of telegraph and telephone companies, 174.
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damages against carriers of goods for, 67, 85, 178, 179.

DELIVERY—

not complete until acceptance, 19.

essential in pledge, 23, 24.

to common carrier, 67, 81, 82.

of bill of lading, 101.

by common carrier —

see Common Carriers of Goods.

of baggage, 165.

of telegraph message, 175, 176.

DEMAND—

by bailor to terminate bailment, 14, 17, 33, 41, 47, 120.

DEMURRAGE—

when allowed to carriers, 72.

DEPOSITUM—

see Gratuitous Services.

DEPOSITS—

see Gratuitous Services.

special bank, 19.

with safe-deposit companies, 7.

DEPOT—

see Stational Facilities.

DEVIATION—

makes carrier absolutely liable, 35, 98.

DILIGENCE—

see Care, Negligence.

DISCRIMINATION—

in receiving guests, 50, 51, 53, 56.

in freight rates, 73, 74.

in providing accommodations, 79.
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DISCEIMINATION— Continued,

the Express Cases, 86.

in accommodating passengers, 149, 151.

by telegraph and telephone companies, 167, 173, 176, 185.

DROVER'S PASS—

see Fare, Carriers of Passengers.

EJECTION OF PASSENGER—

for refusal to pay higher fare on train, 140-142.

for presenting defective ticket, 139, 141,

for breach of regulations, 138, 139, 142, 149, 151.

damages for, 140-142, 182.

ELEVATORS-

whether grain is bailed in, 4.

as warehouses, 43, 70.

delivery to by carrier, 80.

owners of passenger elevators —

are carriers of passengers, 160.

EVIDENCE—
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see Burden of Proof.

parol to vary bill of lading, 69, 82, 83, 107.

in actions against carriers of goods, 79, 89, 114.

against carriers of passengers, 131, 153.

against carriers of intelligence, 167, 169, 174.

EXPENSES—

in bailments in general, 11.

as to pledge, 16, 27.

in locatio rei bailments, 11,

EXPRESS COMPANIES—

are common carriers, 66, 116.

railroad not common carrier of, 73, 86.

delivery by, personal, 109, 115, 116,

shipment C. O. D., 117.

EXTRAORDINARY BAILMENTS—

see Innkeepers, Common Carriers.

FARE—

payment not necessary to constitute one passenger, 103, 129, 134, 136.

passenger carrier's right to, 138, 139.

tickets as evidence of payment, 144, 146.

payment of covers cost of carrying baggage, 93, 100, 119, 162.

FINDER OF LOST GOODS—

as bailee, 13, 19.

FIRE—

see Act of God, Innkeepers.

FRAUD—

see Negligence, Contracts.

gross negligence an evidence of, 1, 19.

as to revealing to carrier value of goods, 92, 93, 100, 106, 163.

will not excuse delivery to wrong person, 118-120.
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FEAUD— Continued.

as to becoming a passenger, 130.

against telegraph and telephone companies —

see Value.

FEEIGHT—

carrier's right to, 67, 68.

discrimination, 73, 74.

on what goods, 74.

who liable, 76.

GEATUITOUS LOANS—

defined, 1.

nature of the relation —

no recompense, 10, 18.

property of bailee, 3, 14.

rights and duties of the parties —

care, 1, 8, 15.

right to use, 15.

termination of the relation, 3.
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redelivery, 1, 3, 17.

GEATUITOUS SEEVICES—

defined, 1, 6.

deposits and mandates compared, 6.

the nature of deposits and mandates —

no compensation, 1, 6, 7, 10, 18.

special banli deposits, 7, 19.

rights and duties of the parties —

diligence, 1, 5, 6, 7, 19, 20.

same care as of one's own, 1, 5, 6, 19, 20.

special skill, 6, 7, 8, 135.

facts equally within knowledge of both parties, 1, 20.

misfeasance and non-feasance, 10.

right to use, 6, 7, 19.

termination of the relation, 19.

GUEST—

defined, 40, 56.

who not a guest, 40, 50-52, 56.

how long a guest, 40, 50, 56.

right to resort to inn, 40, 50, 51, 53, 56.

excuses for refusal to receive, 51, 56.

right to bring goods to inn, 50, 51, 53.

liability of innkeeper to, 50, 51.

negligence of guest, 61.

termination of relation, 40.

HIEE—

see Locatio Bailments.

HOTELf—

see Innkeeper.
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[references ake to sections.]

INJUKIES—

see Liability, Negligence, Common Carriers of Goods, Carriers op

Passengers.

INJUNCTION—

against common carriers, 73.

INNKEEPER—

history of inns, 50.

definition, 50-53.

extent of accommodations, 50, 52, 54.

who are not innkeepers, 50, 53, 54.

sleeping-car companies, 53, 54.

steamboat companies, 55.

boarding, lodging and restaurant keepers, 50-54.

holding out to the public, 50, 52.

his guest, 40, 56.

acceptance by innkeeper, 57, 58.

entertainment furnished, 50, 52, 53, 56.

not compelled to receive all, 40, 51, 56.
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duration of relation, 40, 50, 56.

duty to receive, 40, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57.

liability of innkeeper — ■

for goods brought to the inn, 40, 50, 51, 56.

rules of liability for loss of goods, 50, 51, 54, 58-60.

exceptions, 50, 52, 59, 61.

burden of proof, 58, 59, 61.

for what property, 40, 52-55, 57, 59.

owner's custody, 52, 53, 61.

limitation of liability, 61.

compensation and lien, 38, 40, 54.

termination of relation, 40.

INSURANCE-

SCO Property of bailor and bailee.

INTERPLEADER—

in adverse claims, 3.

by common carrier in delivery of goods, 120.

LEGISLATION—

see Statutes.

LENDING—

see Gratuitous Loans.

LIABILITY—

see Care, Damages, Negligence.

for wrongful use of bailed chattel, 1, 6, 7, 12, 84.

for misfeasance and nonfeasance, 10.

of innkeeper to guest —

for guest's goods, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 58-60.

exceptions, 50, 52, 61.

burden of proof, 58, 59, 61.

for what property, 40, 52-55, 57.
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LIABILITY— Continued.

of common carrier of goods —

see Common Carriers of Goods.

of carrier of passengers —

see Carriers of Passengees,

of Postoffice Department and employees, 166.

of telegraph and telephone companies —

see Telegraph and Telephone Companies.

LIEN—

defined, 37.

distinguished from chattel mortgage and pledge, 23-25,

compensation of bailee for hire secured by, 37, 46.

who can give, 38, 39.

basis, 37, 40-42.

not extended to agisters and liverymen, 40.

kinds of, 42.

how regarded by courts, 26, 42.

their extent, 42, 43, 46.
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enforcement of, 44, 45, 77. ' •

waiver of, 37.

termination, 44.

of warehouseman, 42, 43.

of pledgee, 26.

of innkeeper, 38, 40, 54.

of carrier, 46, 67, 72.

as to connecting carriers, 46, 77.

storing goods held, 72.

goods shipped by one not the owner, 46, 78.

goods stopped in transitu, 78.

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY—

see Contracts, Statutes.

LIVERYMAN—

see Agisters.

LIVE-STOCK—

see Animals.

LOAN—

see Gratuitous Loans, Mutuum.

LOG AT 10 OPEBIS—

classified, 1.

defined, 1, 62.

nature of relation, 1.

rights and duties of the parties —

compensation, 18, 36.

secured by lien, 37.

who can give lien, 38, 39.

basis of lien, 37, 40-42.

not extended to agisters and liverymen, 40.

kinds of lien, 42.
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LOCATIO OPEBIS— Continued.

how regarded hj the courts, 26, 42.

their extent, 42, 43, 46.

enforcement of lien, 44, 45.

waver of lien, 37.

termination of lien, 44.

property rights of parties, 14, 41.

ordinary care required, 1, 47.

special locatio custodiae bailments —

warehousemen, elevator owners, cold storage companies, 43.

usage and custom important, 48.

warehouse receipts, 24, 48, 49.

confusion of goods, 4, 48.

care required, 9, 43.

safe-deposit companies, 7.

LOCATIO EEI—

classified, 1.

defined, 1.
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rights and duties of the parties-

bailor warrants title, 11.

expenses borne by whom, 11.

right to use, 11, 33, 34.

misuse may amount to conversion, 12, 33, 34.

trover for conversion, 12, 33-35.

special property of hirer, 14, 47.

termination of the relation, 17, 33.

MANDAMUS—

against common carrier, 71-73, 80.

against telephone companies, 176.

MANDATUM—

classified, 1.

see also Gratuitous Services.

MISFEASANCE AND NONFEASANCE—

liability of bailee for, 10.

MUTUAL BENEFIT BAILMENTS—

see Locatio, Pledge.

nature of relation in general —

recompense essential, 6, 7, 18.

termination of the relation, 33.

MUTUUM—

distinguished from bailment, 4.

NEGLIGENCE—

see Care.

three degrees, 1, 6-8, 19, 103, 135, 159, 167.

burden of proof in showing, 9, 43, 58, 59, 61, 79.

of carrier when overtaken by Act of God, 89.

cannot contract against, 66, 79, 103, 106, 167.

special rules in certain States, 103, 104.
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NEGLIGENCE— Continued.

burden of proof in showing, 79, 97.

see BtJRDEN OF Proof.

of passenger carrier —

in providing safe means of conveyance, 135, 151, 153.

latent defects, 152.

as to roadbed and bridges, 153, 154.

as to stational facilities, 131, 157, 158.

liable for slightest negligence, 100, 103, 131, 134-136, 152, 153,

155-158.

contributory negligence of passenger, 150, 158.

affected by contract, 100, 103, 133, 134.

of telegraph and telephone companies —

contracts against, 166-171. ,

companies liable for agents' negligence, 167, 170, 185.

actions for, 169, 170, 174, 185.

the damages, 168, 169, 174, 184-186.

NEGOTIABLE INSTEUMENTS—
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see Bills op Lading, Stocks and Bonds.

how cared for by pledgee, 7.

not sold to satisfy pledge, 32.

NOTICES—

see Common Carriers op Goods, Telegraph and Telephone Com-

panies.

OWNEE—

in general, bailor is, 3.

bailee may not dispute title, 3.

custody of goods by guest, 52, 53, 61.

delivery to by carrier, 120.

custody of goods by passenger, 53, 54, 164.

may sue carrier, 76, 122, 177.

PAETIES—

see Actions.

PAETNEESHIP—

among connecting carriers, 123, 124.

PASS—

see Fare.

PASSENGEES—

see Carriers of Passengers, Elevators, Steamboats, Sleeping Cas,

Companies.

PEESONAL PEOPEETY—

subject of pledge, 22, 25.

PIGNUS—

see Pledge.

PLEADINGS—

see Actions.

PLEDGE—

classified, 1.
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PLEDGE— Continued,

defined, 1, 21, 22.

nature of the relation —

distinguished from chattel mortgage and lien, 23-25.

subject matter, 22, 25.

incorporeal property, 22, 24, 25.

corporate stock, 25, 28.

delivery essential, 23, 24.

the obligation, 26.

rights and duties of the parties —

custody of pledgee, 22-24.

profits and expenses go with pledge, 16, 27, 28.

right to use, 1, 21.

assignment by pledgee, 23, 80.

corporate stock, 28.

power of pledgee to compel transfer on books of corpora-

tion, 25.

care, 1, 7.
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proceeds of collateral how applied, 22, 26, 27.

conversion by misapplication, 25, 29.

measure of damages, 25, 29.

termination of the relation —

various ways, 21, 22, 31.

by full performance, 30.

by default of pledgor, 31.

remedies of pledgee, 21, 22, 23, 31.

suit on debt, 31.

sale at common law, 21, 22, 25, 31, 32.

of stocks, bonds, notes, 25, 32.

sale in equity, 21-23, 31.

sale under special contract, 31, 32.

equitable principles govern, 26, 30, 32, 44.

equity of redemption, 21, 25.

by consent of pledgee, 44.

by wrong of pledgee, 29, 30, 44.

redelivery by pledgee, 1, 16, 21, 23, 25-27.

POSSESSION—

passes in bailment, 2, 3.

in chattel mortgage, pledge and lien, 23-25, 40.

right of pledgee against all the world, 22.

essential to Ufe of pledge, 16, 21, 23-27.

POSTOFFICE DEPAKTMENT—

postmasters, mail contractors, etc., not common carriers, 116.

PKIVATE CAEEIEES—

defined, 1, 62, 63, 103.

PEOPEETY—

of bailor and bailee, 2, 3, 4, 13, 14, 16, 41, 122.

of borrower, 1, 3, 8, 14, 15.

47
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PROPERTY— Continued,

of pledgee, 1, 16, 23-25.

of pledgor, 22, 25, 26, 30.

of hirer and letter, 11, 14, 47.

of parties in locatio operis bailments, 41, 47, 79.

PROXIMATE CAUSE—

conversion of property as, 29.

Act of God as, 89.

delay as, 89.

of injuries to passenger, 141.

contributory negligence of passenger, 156.

of injuries to goods, 178, 179.

of injury to passengers, 159, 182.

of failure of telegraph company in transmission of message, 168, 169,

172, 174, 184-186.

PUBLIC AUTHORITY—

as excuse for carrier's failure to deliver, 90, 91, 92.

PUBLIC CARRIERS—
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see Common Carriers.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT—

of carriers of goods, 62, 63, 65, 73, 79, 80, 85, 95, 100, 103, 112, 113.

of innkeepers, 50, 52.

of carriers of passengers, 103, 129, 136, 149-151.

of telegraph and telephone companies, 167, 170, 172, 173, 176, 185.

PUBLIC ENEMY—

defined, 1.

see Common Carrier.

PUBLIC POLICY—

forbids discrimination in freight rates, 73, 74.

makes the innkeeper an insurer of guest's goods, 50, 54, 58-60.

makes common carriers insurers of goods carried, 62, 66, 68, 79-100,

103, 104, 112.

as to contracts by common carriers limiting their liability, 62, 103-

105, 114.

must be reasonable and just, 103.

as to carriers of passengers, 103, 129, 134, 136.

affecting conditions printed on tickets, 144.

demands utmost care as to passengers, 103, 136.

sleeping car companies, 53, 54.

owners of passenger elevators, 160.

in the case of gratuitous carriers, 103, 133, 134,

QUASI-BAILEES—

see Carriers of Passengers, Postoffice Department, Telboraph

AND Telephone Companies.

RAILROADS—

see Common Carriers.

not common carriers of express companies, 86.
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BAILE0AD8— Continued.

delivery by, where, 112-114.

as warehousemen, 72, 80, 108, 111-114.

BEDELIVEEY—

in general, 1, 2, 3, 16, 17, 113.

what, 2, 4, 16, 25.

where, 17, 113.

to whom, 3, 17.

by gratuitous bailee, 1, 15, 19.

by borrower, 1, 13, 15.

by pledgee, 16, 21, 23, 25-27.

by hirer, 33.

EEDEMPTION OF PLEDGE—

see Pledge.

EEGULATIONS—

see EuLES and Eegulations.

EESTAUEANTS—

see Boarding and Lodging Houses.
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BIGHTS AND DUTIES—

see the various classes of bailments.

EOADBED AND BEIDGES—

must be safe, 154, 158.

EULES AND EEGULATIONS—

public notice of by carrier of goods, 79, 100, 114.

as to sale of tickets, 138, 140-142, 145.

by passenger carrier, 131, 138-140, 142, 144, 148, 149.

must be reasonable, 138, 141, 146, 149, 150, 151, 157, 162.

ejection of passengers for breach, 139, 140-142, 151.

by telegraph and telephone companies, 167, 168, 170, 172.

SAFE-DEPOSIT COMPANIES—

are bailees, 7.

SALE—

distinguished from bailment, 4.

of pledge upou default of pledgor, 21-23, 25, 26, 31, 32, 44.

under lien, 77.

SKILL—

see Care.

SLEEPING CAE COMPANIES—

are not innkeepers, 53, 54.

nor common carriers of passengers, 53, 54, 65, 129.

nature of their undertaking, 54.

STATIONAL FACILITIES—

railroad must maintain, 131, 157, 158.

STATUTES—

extending lien, 77.

affecting liability of innkeeper, 61.

controlling compensation of carrier, 70, 71, 73.

as to negotiability of bills of lading, 49, 84.
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STATUTES— Continued.

regulating charges by telephone companies, 176.

giving action for injury causing death, 133, 181.

STEAMBOAT COMPANIES—

not innkeepers, 55.

STOCKS, BONDS, ETC.—

redelivery of, 25.

may be pledged, 25.

corporate stock, 25.

how pledged, 25, 28.

damages for conversion of, 25.

how sold to satisfy pledge, 32.

STOPPAGE IN TBANSITU—

goods subject to carrier's lien, 46, 78.

as excuse for non-delivery by carrier, 128.

TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANIES—

are quasi-bailees, 167-169, 185.

definition, 185.
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exercise a public calling, 167-170.

are not common carriers, 167, 168, 171, 185.

rights and duties —

right to compensation, 169, 172.

must not discriminate, 173.

right to make rules and regulations, 167, 168, 172, 173.

notice of rules, 170.

what regulations reasonable, 168, 170, 172.

duty to serve all impartially, 167, 173, 185.

duty to provide adequate facilities, 172, 173.

liability for mistakes in transmitting message, 167, 170, 171, 185.

contracts limiting liability, 167-171, 174, 185.

liability for delay or failure to deliver, 167, 174.

termination of the relation —

delivery of message, 175.

actions against —

the parties, 170, 174.

contract by sender or his principal, 169, 170, 174, 185.

tort on common law duty, 170.

the evidence, 167, 169, 174.

the damages, 168, 169, 174, 184-186.

TELEPHONE—

see Telegraph and Telephone Companies.

Uke telegraph, 176.

not common carriers, 176.

duty to serve all impartially, 176.

statutes regulating charges, 176.

TERMINATION OF RELATION—

see the various classes of bailments.
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TICKETS—

as contracts limiting carrier's liability, 102, 134, 143.

required of those desiring to become passengers, 138, 139.

as evidence of right to ride, and may contain contract, 146.

sale of, 140-142.

nature of, 102, 138, 144.

as contract with passenger, 102, 125, 141, 143, 144.

as between passenger and conductor, 141, 145, 146.

conditions printed on, 134, 143, 144.

stop-overs, coupon and limited tickets, 102, 144, 147, 148, 151.

TIME-TABLES—

carriers should conform to, 161.

TITLE—

see Property, i

does not pass in bailment, 2, 3, 4.

of bailor, bailee may not dispute, 3.

of pledgee, 1, 23-25.

of assignee of pledgee, 28.
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letter warrants, 11.

of bailee for hired services, 41, 47.

TRANSIENTS—

kept at inn, 52.

defined, 50, 52, 53, 56.

how become guests, 57, 58.

TEOVER—

see Conversion.

for failure to restore chattel, 19.

against pledgee, 21.

for wrongful sale of property, 44, 77.

USAGE— '

see Custom.

USE—

right to by bailee, 6, 7, 12, 15, 19, 34.

by pledgee, 1, 21.

by hirer, 33.

VALUE—

duty of shipper to reveal, 92, 93, 100.

public notice to reveal, 62, 93, 100, 105.

fixed by contract, 105, 106.

duty of passenger to reveal as to baggage, 54, 93, 100, 163.

duty to disclose importance of telegraph message, 167, 168, 184.

VEHICLES—

of passenger carrier must be safe, 151-153.

defects in, raise presumption of negligence, 153.

WAREHOUSEMAN—

are custodians for hire, 43.

usage and custom of importance, 48.

742 INDEX.
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WAREHOUSEMAN— Continued.

nature of warehouse receipts, 24, 49.

confusion of goods, 48.

care required, 9, 43.

warehouseman's lien, 42, 43.

storing goods held on lien, 72.

railroad companies as, 72, 80, 112, 113.

connecting carriers are not, 81, 126.

delivery to by a carrier, 108, 111-114.

WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS—

3ee Bills or Lading, Waebhouskman.

WARRANTY—
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see TlTLB,

